Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-51a-ISIS Saudi Arabia

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-51a- Saudi Arabia

The Myth of Saudi Power

Analysts from the Gulf Arab states are generally upbeat about Saudi Arabia’s possible military dominance in the Gulf neighborhood and the Middle East region.

But the Saudis were hardly close to achieving their stated objectives either in Yemen or in Syria.

Saudi Arabia made a splash when it announced the formation of a 34-country "Islamic" alliance against terrorism in December -- and followed it up with a massive military exercise that ended last week.

Riyadh's "Islamic Military Alliance" is missing Muslim powerhouses Indonesia and Iran, and questions remain about the makeup and motives of the coalition.

At the center of Saudi Arabia’s current bid for regional dominance lies King Salman’s muscular approach to foreign policy.

Mohammed Nuruzzaman April 11, 2016Analysts from the Gulf Arab states are generally upbeat about Saudi Arabia’s possible military dominance in the Gulf neighborhood and the Middle East region. A Saudi commentator has recently argued in an online feature published by the National Interest that Riyadh, in collaboration with Sunni Arab and Muslim allies, stands poised to fill the strategic void created by America’s move to disengage from the Middle East. The kingdom, by means of the “Salman doctrine,” would militarily defeat the ISIS terrorists and Shia extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, subverting Shia Iran’s regional ambitions to challenge 1,400 years of Sunni dominance. The commentator seems animated with sectarian firepower, driven more by rhetoric and less by realities on the ground.The buzz about Saudi Arabia’s ascendant military role started with King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s ascension to the throne in January 2015. The new king’s approach to foreign policy was marked by a big shift—a shift from the traditional policy of restraint to a more assertive role in regional affairs, what the press has branded a “muscular foreign policy.” Just two months after being crowned as the new king, he launched an air offensive on Yemen in late March 2015 to punish the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who forced the Saudi-supported government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee Yemen, and deny Iran a foothold in the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula. He also doubled down support for the pro-Saudi Islamic Army rebels, a loose alliance of forty-three Islamist groups committed to establishing sharia law in Syria, to topple the Bashar al-Assad government, Iran’s only Arab ally.But the Saudis were hardly close to achieving their stated objectives either in Yemen or in Syria. And there are indications that Riyadh is losing the bid for regional dominance, putting its credibility as a counterweight to Iran at risk. President Hadi is still heading the Yemeni government-in-exile, mostly operating from Riyadh. Disappointingly, though, the Saudis are now secretly negotiating with the Houthis to bring the abortive invasion to an end. They appear ready to emerge from Yemen as the losers, leaving their Houthi opponents to cheer victories and probably control Yemeni politics in the future.In Syria, the Assad government was nowhere close to falling, despite consecutive defeats at the hands of diverse rebel groups in the first half of 2015. But recently, Russia’s direct military intervention, starting in September of last year, gave the Assad government a new lease on life, mostly by eliminating or downsizing the rebel groups backed by Saudi,

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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Turkey, Qatar or the United States. President Bashar al-Assad’s survival now looks more guaranteed than at any previous point in the five-year civil war.

The “Muscular Foreign Policy” ApproachAt the center of Saudi Arabia’s current bid for regional dominance lies King Salman’s muscular approach to foreign policy. This policy banks more on military might than on the use of diplomatic tools, cash or even religious influence, which Riyadh has traditionally employed to protect and promote Saudi interests. This assertive policy started with the late King Abdullah’s counterrevolutionary actions against the prodemocracy movements in the Arab world better known as the Arab Spring. King Abdullah, defying U.S. concerns and in a show of strength against Iran, sent troops to Bahrain in March 2011 to trample the Shia-led movements for democratic rights. In September 2013, he also decided to arm and fund the Islamic Army in Syria to simultaneously beat Al Qaeda and ISIS forces and turn the tide of the Syrian civil war to eventually dislodge the Assad government. King Salman has followed King Abdullah’s policy more vigorously, adding to it a high degree of military assertiveness. The bombing of Yemen remains a signpost in his approach.Challenging Shia Iran, however, remains the central part of King Salman’s policy. There is no denying that the Arab prodemocracy movements have directly or indirectly expanded Iran’s regional sphere of influence, even if only by default. They paved the way for Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese militia Hezbollah to become militarily involved in Syria to defend their ally, the Assad government. Across the border in Iraq, Shia Iran and various Iraqi Shia political groups and militias solidified their ties after the United States brought down the Saddam Hussein regime in May 2003. The rise of Islamic State (ISIS) in late June 2014 further cemented those ties, putting them on the same strategic page to confront ISIS, which views the Shia as heretics, as do the Saudi Wahhabi clerics. A scared Saudi Arabia, after Syria and Iraq had largely slipped into Iranian hands, saw the Houthis as simply another Iranian proxy to spread Iran’s influence in the Arabian Peninsula, thus enlarging the so-called “Shia Crescent” from Beirut to Sanaa via Damascus and Baghdad.What was equally scary to the Saudis was the United States’ gradual policy shift towards Iran, seemingly at the expense of Washington’s Arab allies. To their dismay, the Obama administration negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran in July 2015, whereby Iran agreed to scale back, not destroy, its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The Saudis perceived the deal as a destabilizing development, as did the Israelis, with the potential to upset the regional political and military balance. Viewed realistically, the deal strengthens Tehran’s regional economic and military positions, offering it opportunities to reengage in global trade and commerce and reintegrate itself into the global economy. That’s an outcome Israel and the Gulf Arab states unsuccessfully tried to stop.The Saudis were already complaining that the United States did not come to the defense of the now fallen Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak or intervene in Syria to unseat the Assad government, expectations that did not match America’s interests in the region. President Obama recently dubbed the Gulf Arab allies “free riders” who want “to drag the United States into grinding sectarian conflicts that sometimes had little to do with American interests.” For the United States, facing a rising China in East Asia and cultivating good relations with other important world regions were more important than getting involved in sectarian feuds in the Middle East, driven by Iran and Saudi Arabia.Saudi Strategies to Achieve DominanceThe Saudi response to these unfavorable developments took two dimensions: reducing dependence on the United States, and forming alliances to face Iran and its proxies resolutely. Both dimensions ultimately proved ineffective or defective.





First, Riyadh approached China, Russia and India to enhance its economic and diplomatic clout. But the first two states were already more

aligned with Iran, and the third enjoys no significant leverage in Middle Eastern affairs. It was hard to find an alternative ally. Instead, close trade, military and diplomatic relations prompted the Saudis to avoid completely jumping out of the U.S. orbit.Second, Riyadh decided to flex its military muscles and contain Iranian influence by forming new Arab and Muslim military alliances—the Arab coalition to eliminate the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the thirty-four-nation Islamic military alliance to defeat terrorism and extremism.Both appear to be more “paper alliances” than realistic military blocs, however. The anti-Houthi coalition suffered a massive blow after the Pakistani parliament voted in April 2015 to stay out of the conflict in Yemen. GCC member Oman refused to be a party to the conflict, while Egypt, mindful of its military debacle in the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s, was dragging its feet on the issue of sending troops to aid the Saudi ground offensive in Yemen. Sudan agreed to contribute troops after securing a much needed financial lifeline of $2.2 billion from Qatar and Saudi Arabia; Egypt won oil concessions and $8 billion investment commitment from Riyadh for its participation. The Saudis won Arab support for the war on the Houthis, but at a big cost.Equally unimpressive is the alliance of thirty-four Sunni Muslim countries Saudi Arabia announced in December 2015. This alliance not only shuts out the Shia-majority states but also excludes the Muslim Central Asian republics and Afghanistan. Oman is not a member of the alliance; neither is Algeria, the largest North African Muslim country with a modern army. There are also real, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties in making this alliance an effective military bloc, such as the limited military capabilities of many of its members; problems of commitment; wide geographic distances (from Morocco in North Africa to Malaysia in Southeast Asia); domestic, political and religious fissures; and so on. There is no common strategic thread other than the Sunni brand of Islam that ties them together. Limitations to Saudi DominanceSaudi Arabia has its own fundamental weaknesses, mostly in its economic and military systems, to overcome before it can assert its regional dominance. The Saudi economy is awfully dependent on oil exports—approximately 80 percent of national revenues and 90 percent of export earnings come from the oil sector. The economy remains less diversified with a narrow industrial base, despite a massive modernization program initiated by the late King Faisal in the early 1960s. High dependence on oil has often made it vulnerable to wide fluctuations in global oil markets, such as the drop from $116 per barrel of oil in June 2014 to today’s price below $40.Recent downticks in oil prices forced the Saudis to declare a deficit budget in 2015, estimated at 20 percent of GDP, a condition likely to persist a few more years. On top of that, the war on Yemen and support for the rebels in Syria have taken a toll on the Saudi economy. Riyadh is incurring a cost of $6 billion every month, or $200 million daily, for war operations in Yemen, a price that the ailing Saudi economy can hardly afford for long. A parallel example is the United States’ high military spending in Iraq, with a total cost of $2 trillion and military expenditures claiming 4.75 percent of GDP in 2011. The United States eventually opted for withdrawal, giving the Iraq dossier to Iran. One might wonder whether a similar fate awaits the Saudis in Yemen.Another area of serious concern is Riyadh’s recent military expansion, which looks fraught with defects, if not impending dangers. The kingdom keeps importing foreign military hardware, from sophisticated multirole fighter jets to guided missiles. It became





the world’s largest arms importer in 2014, with a total of $6.4 billion spending on defense. Between 2011 and 2015 arms imports by Riyadh rose

by 275 percent compared to the previous five years. This is part of a general trend in arms purchases by Middle Eastern states, whose imports increased by 61 percent over the same period as a whole. The question is whether a state like Saudi Arabia can assert its military dominance on the regional scale based on imported arms, while its nemesis Iran has achieved remarkable self-sufficiency in armaments. Great and rising powers are also major arms exporters, though they import arms on a limited scale. Saudi Arabia produces no major arms or weapon systems, having instead built up an arms dependency relationship with the West, China and Russia. This makes it susceptible to pressures from exporters, particularly during times of regional military crises. One example is the European Parliament’s recent decision to call for an arms embargo against Riyadh in response to humanitarian disasters in Yemen created by Saudi bombings.Overall, it looks like that Saudi Arabia is engaging in brinkmanship that it lacks the power to back up. Its bid to emerge as the region’s preeminent military power and control regional affairs may come up short.Mohammed Nuruzzaman is associate professor of international relations at Gulf University for Science and Technology in West Mishref, Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia made a splash when it announced the formation of a 34-country "Islamic" alliance against terrorism in December -- and followed it up with a massive military exercise that ended last week.Riyadh's "Islamic Military Alliance" is missing Muslim powerhouses Indonesia and Iran, and questions remain about the makeup and motives of the coalition.

The mainly Sunni Muslim coalition -- which includes regional power and NATO-member Turkey, the region's most populous state in Egypt, and nuclear-armed Pakistan -- appears formidable. But Riyadh's "Islamic Military Alliance" is missing Muslim powerhouses Indonesia and Iran, and questions remain about the makeup and motives of the coalition.

High-Profile OmissionsThe exclusion of Shi'ite-dominated Iran and Iraq, and their ally Syria, has fueled suspicions that Riyadh is not motivated by the desire to combat terrorism."The Saudis are motivated by their internal security and grip on power as well as a sectarian and geopolitical rivalry with Iran," says Hayder al-Khoei, an associate fellow at Chatham House, London.Tensions have escalated between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent months – particularly in January, when Iranian protesters ransacked the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and set fires inside after Saudi authorities executed an outspoken Shi'ite cleric. Riyadh and Tehran also back opposite sides in ongoing wars in Syria and Yemen. Khoei says it is unclear how the coalition would tackle Islamic State (IS) extremists in Iraq and Syria without the agreement of those governments.Afghanistan and Indonesia have both been invited to join the alliance but have not yet accepted. Ten other countries have been invited to join the alliance but have been dragging their feet.





Unlikely Torch-Bearer?The notion that Saudi Arabia -- a country that has been widely accused of exporting Islamic radicalism around the world -- could lead a fight against extremism strikes some analysts as deeply ironic.

"In order to really fight terrorism, the Saudis must declare war against themselves and end the support it has been giving to radical groups across the world," says Khoei of Chatham House. Micah Zenko, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations, says that a Saudi-led coalition fighting terrorism is like a "[drug] cartel leading a counternarcotics campaign." Riyadh has come under mounting international pressure over its air campaign against Iran-supported Huthi rebels in Yemen, which is widely seen as a sectarian-driven proxy war with Tehran.

Saudi Arabia has also been criticized for its failure to go after clerics in the kingdom that spread radical Wahhabism.

On top of that, some critics allege that Riyadh supports the IS extremist group.And while some of the biggest Muslim countries are outside the "Islamic" alliance, some of its members do not have Muslim majorities. For example, around 80 percent of the West African state of Gabon's population is Christian. In Benin, the biggest religion is Roman Catholicism, while the majority of people in Togo hold indigenous beliefs. All these countries, however, do have sizable Muslim minorities.Caught UnawaresWhen Riyadh announced the military alliance on December 15, several of the countries listed as joining or invited seemed surprised. Indonesia's Foreign Ministry said it had been invited to join a "center to coordinate against extremism and terrorism," not a military alliance. Lebanon's Foreign Ministry denied having knowledge of Saudi Arabia's creation of an Islamic antiterrorism coalition. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry was quoted in the daily newspaper Dawn as saying he had been surprised to read of Islamabad's inclusion. Pakistan, which has strong historical ties with Riyadh, later expressed support -- if not much visible enthusiasm -- for the coalition. Pakistan's role will be limited to providing training to troops from the participating countries, sharing intelligence on terrorist groups, and helping member states create counter-radicalization initiatives.





Regards Cees***

Saudi Arabia — A Kingdom In Retreat04/15/2016 Alon Ben-MeirSenior Fellow, Center for Global Affairs, NYU

ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGESThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was once at the front and center of the Arab world and a significant player on the global stage due to its oil riches, has been steadily losing its regional influence and prominent role. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been confronted with multiple challenges simultaneously, including its domestic, social, political, economic and religious trials, its conflict with Iran, its bilateral relations with the US, the rise of extremism, and the intra-Arab crisis. Saudi Arabia failed to catch up with the rapidly changing developments that engulfed the region, and now it finds itself squeezed from all angles, with little prospect of relief unless the kingdom undertakes sweeping changes.The challenge for Saudi Arabia is that given its culture, socio-political make up, and the dominant role of religion, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the Saudis to change direction without experiencing great turmoil that could destabilize the country for many years to come. That said, the Saudis have little choice but to begin serious domestic and foreign policy reforms consistent with the changing regional geopolitical environment, and do so gradually to preserve the integrity and stability of the kingdom.The growing domestic challenges:Since the 2003 Iraq war and especially in the wake of the Arab Spring, the country is going through an identity crisis. There is growing unrest among many youth who no longer tolerate living in servitude and oppression—they want more freedom and civil rights, and refuse to settle for handouts to keep them quiet.

With the eruption of the Arab Spring, the government spent $130 billion to silence the opposition. These top-to-bottom handouts failed to satisfy the nearly 60 percent of the population under the age of twenty-one. They are unwilling to live in a country where criticism of the government is considered a threat to national security, live fire is used against protesters, secret police are everywhere, freedom of speech is completely stifled, and women are confined to the home.

Any political opposition is quelled by force, and punishments for crimes such as





blasphemy, sorcery, and apostasy, are gruesome and carried out publicly. In 2015 alone, 157 people were beheaded, and more than 82 have been executed

thus far in 2016, which is twice as many as have been beheaded by ISIS in the same time period.

Moreover, political activists serve long-term sentences and administrative detention is rampant. The opportunities for upward mobility and personal growth are limited, leaving little for which to aspire. This has led many young men to join various terrorist organizations in the search for a new identity.Although there are women activists struggling for reform, violence against women is symptomatic in Saudi culture and is accepted as a means of controlling their behavior. The state-sanctioned execution of women convicted of adultery (whom are often in reality the victims of rape), and killing of women by male relatives (honor killing) for sexual offences, perceived or otherwise, is acceptable.Religious oppression: Given that Saudi Arabia is the custodian of Sunni Islam and is the seat of the holiest Muslim shrines in Mecca (the birthplace of Mohammed) and Medina, the Saudis have carved for themselves a special role in the Sunni Muslim world.

The annual Hajj to Mecca further enshrines the Saudis’ religious role and enhances their strict form of Sunni Islam (Wahhabism), which they have been exporting to every Muslim state by building thousands of schools (madrassas) at an exorbitant cost.The country is run by sharia law, music is not allowed, religious police are given extended authority to use extreme violence, and the religious Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice enforces Islamic law. All Saudis are expected to attend mosque every Friday, and Wahhabism is taught from an early age.

Saudi Arabia uses religion to control the population and teaches to hate those who do not share their Islamic values. The clergy exercises extraordinary power and are free to issue edicts (Fatwas) at their pleasure.The religious system is often run contrary to the social, political, and economic aspirations of the young, and is leading to a growing resentment which is becoming increasingly troublesome for the government.The looming economic crisis: With estimated oil reserves of 270 billion barrels, the fall of oil prices has had an unprecedented effect on the Saudi economy. The oil crisis has inflicted major economic disruption, forced the government to cut subsidies and curtail many development projects, and reduced its international stature and ability to exert influence over other Arab states.Although the Saudis have nearly $660 billion in cash reserves, the government has withdrawn roughly $70 billion to make up for shortages in the fiscal 2015 national budget. If the price of oil decreases further in the next few years, the Saudi economy could go bankrupt.

There is massive inequality between the various classes. Nearly one fifth of the population lives in poverty, especially in the predominantly Shiite south where, ironically, much of the oil reservoirs are located. In these areas, sewage runs in the streets, and only crumbs are spent to alleviate the plight of the poor.

While the poor are getting poorer, thousands of princes and princesses live lavishly (mostly in Europe), spending hundreds of millions of dollars and occupying opulent villas, which further drains economic resources.Being that Saudi Arabia has and continues to be almost completely dependent for revenue on oil exports, which has more than covered its national budget, it had no compelling reason to develop diversified industries.





Moreover, the Saudis became increasingly dependent on millions of foreign laborers, who are subjected to abusive, slave-like conditions, to do the ‘dirty

work’ that Saudi citizens are unwilling to undertake.The hostile rivalry with Iran:

The relationship between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran has always been characterized by tension and mistrust. The quiet enmity came to the fore in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war and the growing influence of Tehran over the Shiite Iraqi government.This was further aggravated with the eruption of the civil war in Syria, where Iran supported the Assad regime with money, military equipment, training, and subsequently foot soldiers, while the Saudis provided similar aid to the rebels opposed to Assad, short of dispatching ground troops.The enmity between the two countries took another turn for the worse when it was suspected that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, which Riyadh viewed as a direct threat to its national security. Despite the Iran deal, the Saudis remain deeply skeptical about Tehran’s ultimate intentions.The Iraq war also ignited the dormant millennium-old religious conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, and Syria and Iraq became the battleground between the two sects, where the bloodshed continues unabated, claiming the lives of thousands each year.The execution of the Saudi Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al Nimr—an icon who called for addressing human rights violations in Saudi Arabia, was charged with incitement and treason, and sentenced to death along with 46 others—further deepened the animosity between the two countries. This caused unrest among Shiites in the country, sparked protests in Tehran, and was condemned by the international community.To be sure, although Tehran recently called for reconciliation with the Saudis, the latter rejected the Iranian gesture as the Saudis view the conflict with Iran as irreconcilable, mainly due to religious and geopolitical reasons, as both seek to exercise regional hegemony.Due to the size of the population, its natural resources, and industrial advancement, the Saudis believe that Iran will inevitably become the regional powerhouse, with the ability and resources to intimidate the entire Gulf region (especially once it acquires nuclear weapons), which the Saudis consider their own domain.The unsettling relations with the US:Although Saudi Arabia and the United States have enjoyed decades of close bilateral relations, the relationship has soured over the changing geostrategic interests of the US and its ‘pivot’ to the East, and the manner in which it has tackled the Syrian civil war and the Iran deal.

While the US continues to support Saudi Arabia militarily and remains the de facto guarantor of its national security, the Saudis remain unconvinced of the US’ commitment to that end.Indeed, from the vantage point of regional security, the Obama administration chose to draw a balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In a recent interview with the Atlantic, President Obama said that they “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood.” Moreover, Obama believes that bringing Iran out of its isolation will lead to greater regional stability, from which the Saudis will also benefit.

Another point of contention between the two countries is Obama’s failure to make good on his vow to punish Assad if he crossed the “red line” of using chemical weapons against civilians, which created serious doubts in the minds of the Saudis that the US won’t come to their aid, even if their security is threatened.Despite repeated efforts by the US to assure the Saudis of America’s unwavering





commitment to their national security, the strained relationship is likely to persist. The Saudis still believe that the nuclear deal will only delay rather

than end Iran’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, which may lead to regional nuclear proliferation.The dangerous intra-Arab crisis: Due to its riches and ability to provide financial support to several Arab countries including Jordan and Egypt, the Saudis have been able to exert significant influence throughout the region and essentially assume the leadership role of the Arab world, which was traditionally held by Egypt.With the rise of Egyptian President Sisi to power, however, the pendulum swung back and Egypt reassumed its leadership role, even though the country remains in need of Saudi financial aid. The recent visit of the Saudi monarch attests to the Kingdom’s need of Egypt’s support in confronting Iran, the turmoil in Iraq and Syria, and in its fight against the Houthis in Yemen.

The prognosis for the future does not bode well for Saudi Arabia as the Sunni-Shiite conflict is simply unwinnable, and regardless of how the civil war in Syria comes to an end, Iran will continue to exercise considerable influence in the country. The same can be said about Iraq, which has, in any case, a Shiite majority.In conclusion, Saudi Arabia must face these challenges head on and avoid what might become an albatross that would choke off its potential to be a significant player in and outside the region.In dealing with human rights, the current state of affairs is bound to come back and haunt the Saudi government as it would be impossible to silence such a huge segment of the population, even with the use of brutal force. Young men should be given greater opportunities for growth, and women deserve basic civil rights and freedom from servitude; the Kingdom can accomplish this while still maintaining Islamic tradition along the lines of what other Gulf states have successfully done.The Saudi government must wake up to this ominous development because it is now only a matter of time when the young will rise and be prepared to die, like many of their brethren in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, for a cause they believe in.In relation to the practice of religion, the survival of the kingdom may well depend on its ability to ease religious pressure and decisively limit the internal religious police’s prerogatives to use force at their whims without any accountability.It is about time to modify the criminal justice system and end the public display of beheadings, which does nothing but further alienate the public—instead of spreading fear and awe, it breeds hatred and resentment of the government, which only increases defiance.The government must heed the public outcry without necessarily compromising the religious principles that guide the county. Being a devout Muslim is one thing, but using religion arbitrarily and as a tool to subjugate the people will no longer be tolerated.In addition, the government must end draconian legislation in the name of religion. In fact, the more religious laws and edicts are imposed, the greater the youth’s rejection will be.Economically, the country must now focus on industrial development on a large scale and gradually reduce its dependence on revenue generated from the energy sector. This will provide over time millions of jobs and create a self-sustaining middle class.In addition, the government should also invest in sustainable development projects that would allow communities to choose their own projects, develop a sense of empowerment while supporting themselves without handouts, and regain their self-respect.Regarding the Saudi-Iranian conflict, both sides ought to begin a process of





reconciliation and restore diplomatic relations, which could also potentially help facilitate a mutually-accepted solution to Syria’s civil war.

With the best of intentions, the bilateral relations between the two countries will continue to experience ups and downs, and hence accepting the inescapable reality of where each stands religiously and geopolitically could ease tensions and lead to improved relations, recognizing that neither of them can win the religious war or dominate the entire region.In respect to the US, the Saudis have little choice but to trust the US to stand by it, not only because of the US’ commitment to shield the kingdom from outside threats, but also because the US continues to have major strategic interests in the region.The Saudis, however, must also understand that in being a global power, the US must balance its overall strategic interests with its bilateral relations with countries who are hostile to one another; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran deal offer good cases in point.And finally, in connection with intra-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia can still play a leading role, but it must adjust to unfolding events throughout the region while maintaining its leadership role in the Gulf.Moreover, the Saudis, who have genuine concerns over the security of the entire Arabian Peninsula, should work toward ending the violence between the Houthis and the internationally-recognized government of Yemen.Saudi Arabia is facing a pivotal crossroad; the kingdom must take a hard look at its internal and external affairs and chart a new course to stave off the otherwise inevitable violent eruption by the country’s youth who are no longer willing to live with the status quo.The above challenges cannot be overcome unless Saudi Arabia faces reality, as none will be mitigated by wishful thinking or by the use of excessive force and brutal acts in the name of a higher authority, which has long since been universally rejected with revulsion.Saudi Arabia has the human and natural resources to reclaim its leadership role in the Gulf, and together with other regional powers must embark on a process of reconciliation, which is the only recipe for stability and peace.




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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-51a-ISIS Saudi Arabia