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Comparative analysis of Airbus and Boeing’s Supply Chain upon collaborative risk management Group A11 Bharat Subramony PGP/16/012 Deepak Kumar PGP/16/016 Priyank Bavishi PGP/16/037 Shashank Shekhar PGP/16/045

Airbus and Boeing

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Supply Chain Management

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Page 1: Airbus and Boeing

Comparative analysis of Airbus and Boeing’s

Supply Chainupon

collaborative risk management

Group A11Bharat Subramony PGP/16/012

Deepak Kumar PGP/16/016Priyank Bavishi PGP/16/037

Shashank Shekhar PGP/16/045

Page 2: Airbus and Boeing

1. Traditional v/s Lean Production Supply Chain2. Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration3. Airbus 380 program4. Boeing 787 Dreamliner program5. Global Outsourcing in Boeing – Japan and

China6. Global Outsourcing in Airbus – Japan and China7. Why is Risk so devastating?8. How to achieve collaborative risk

management

Agenda

Page 3: Airbus and Boeing

1. Traditional v/s Lean Production Supply

Chain

Page 4: Airbus and Boeing

Widely practiced by Western Auto majors like Saab and GM

Majority of components produced in-house Fear of loss of intellectual property, important components in-

house Push-based rather than pull-based production

Higher inventory handling Production flexibility lost, thus leading to partial oursourcing

Traditional Mass Production SRM

Suppliers Manufacturer

Darwinian Price CompetitionLow Price – sometimes below costHigher quality and delivery promisesShort-term contracts without extension

Arm’s length, short-term, transactionalLack of trust, no open communicationLow involvement in product designZero-sum game of profit sharing

Page 5: Airbus and Boeing

Tiered supplier network structure, with long-term relationship

Tier-1 : Equipped with technological capabilities, design whole systems

Tier-2 : Suppliers to Tier-1, handle component, partial tech capabilities

Tier-3 : Suppliers to Tier-2, do-as-directed, no tech capabilities Early involvement in product development cycle

Every tier focuses on their individual core competencies

Lean Production SRM

Suppliers Manufacturer

Fairness of pricing, negotiationsLong-term relationship promiseMultiple suppliers for same componentOpen communication, and frequent

Customer specific tech investmentHigh risk complemented by closer linksOpen-ended contracts, based on trustLow Demand Improved S.C. Efficiency

Page 6: Airbus and Boeing

2. Supply Chain Integration and

Collaboration

Page 7: Airbus and Boeing

To tackle severely dynamic nature of competitive marketplace

E-Business speeds up the rate of decision-making Strategic alliance and partnerships with suppliers Way to enhanced supply chain coordination

Lack of information visibility and the failure of coordination across the supplier network are the main reasons contributing to the bullwhip effect

Objectives of supply chain integration1. Minimizing the bullwhip effect2. Maximizing the efficiency of conducting activities along the supply chain3. Minimizing inventories along the supply chain4. Minimizing cycle times along the supply chain5. Achieving an acceptable level of quality along the supply chain6. Achieving better product design

S.C. Integration and Collaboration

Page 8: Airbus and Boeing

3. Airbus 380 Program

Page 9: Airbus and Boeing

555-seat double deck A380 most ambitious civil aircraft program Airbus’s ambition in terminating Boeing’s long-term dominance in the

long-haul jumbo jet Designed for a hub-and-spoke airline route system Airbus expected the passenger traffic to increase at staggering rate But most Airlines are restricted by limited runway space available A380 has 35% more capacity than the largest currently operated

plane A380 operated in three models

1. 555-seat A380-800 in a three-class configuration2. Up to 853 passengers in a single-class economy configuration3. A380-800F, a 590-ton MTOW aircraft with a range of 10,410km (5620nm)

that will be able to carry a 150-ton payload (Logistics Purpose Only)

Airbus 380 Program

Page 10: Airbus and Boeing

Airbus A380 v/s Boeing 747

Page 11: Airbus and Boeing

A380 Supply Chain

Prime Contractors from France, Germany, U.K. and Spain Component suppliers are from Australia, Austria, Belgium,

Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States

The largest Suppliers by value1. Rolls-Royce2. SAFRAN3. United Technologies4. General Electric5. Good-Rich

Final Assembly takes place in Toulouse, France and then flown to Hamburg for delivery

Page 12: Airbus and Boeing

A380 Customers

As in August 2006, 16 customers had committed firm offers for 159 A380s, with an additional 75 optional orders

1. Singapore Airlines (the launch customer with an order for 10 aircraft2. Lufthansa (15)3. Emirates (41)4. Air France (10)5. Qantas (12)6. Malaysian Airlines (6)7. Virgin Atlantic (6)8. International Lease Finance (10)9. Kingfisher Airlines (5)10. Qatar Airways (2)11. Federal Express (10),12. Korean Air (5)13. Thai Airways (6), 14. Etihad Airways (4),15. China Southern Airlines (5) and United Parcels Service

Page 13: Airbus and Boeing

Challenges facing Airbus A380

Technological Issues The wake of A380 creates much more turbulence in air, requiring

other flights trailing it, to stay twice the normal distance away from it

Greater aircraft separation would take up two landing slots and largely reduce the frequency of aircraft landings

Severe impact on landing slots during peak periods Production Delay

Excessive complexities in the wiring of various customised components

Electronic systems are highly integrated, even a small change would cascade down through the whole system

Singapore Airlines reported to have demanded compensation 26% drop in Airbus’s parent EADS Stock price

Page 14: Airbus and Boeing

Airbus has embraced partnerships since its inception among

the core national “champions” in the respective European countries

Brought together under the Airbus umbrella in the early 1970s The core technologies related to complex or key airframe

components have typically been in-house within the core respective companies

This model has remained essentially unchanged despite outsourcing several components of-late

Eg: Airbus has its own international joint design team located in Wichita (U.S) and Filton (U.K.), working together to design a large A380 wing component, while Airbus’ Korean suppliers are manufacturing the wing panel according to the engineering design specifications handed down by Airbus.

Airbus A380 in brief

Page 15: Airbus and Boeing

4. Boeing

787 Dreamliner Project

Page 16: Airbus and Boeing

787 Dreamliner

787 was Boeing’s response to the greater demand for a cheaper aircraft to operate and maintain

Targeted at rapid, direct, point-to-point connections with capacity of only 250 passengers (middle of the market)

787 would thus be a high speed, fuel efficient competition for the newly popular A330 from Airbus

Offered in three variants1. 787-8 Dreamliner will carry 217 passengers in a three-class

configuration with a range of up to 8,500 nautical miles (15,700 kilometers)

2. 787-3 Dreamliner will carry 289 passengers in a two-class configuration with a range up to 3,500 nautical miles (6,500 kilometers)

3. 787-9 Dreamliner will carry 257 passengers in three classes, with a range of 8,300 nautical miles (15,400 kilometers)

Page 17: Airbus and Boeing

787 Supply Chain & Customers

Majority of the systems and assemblies are designed, developed and tested by principal industrial partners in the USA, Japan and Europe

Boeing responsible for only about one-third of the overall production of the entire aircraft

The final assembly process complete in three days

Launch customer All-Nippon Airways with 50 units 32 customers, including Monarch, have logged 420 orders and

commitments Of these, 377 are firm orders valued at $59 billion at current

list prices The most successful commercial airplane launch in history

Page 18: Airbus and Boeing

Risk sharing in Boeing 787

Partnering suppliers to carry all of the non-recurring costs But in return gives back to the suppliers the intellectual

property (IP) rights on the components and systems they provide

This marks a reversal of earlier practices Suppliers taking more responsibility in design and

development

But Boeing slowly moving to what is “Systems Integration” Model All major components and systems, to be given to risk-sharing partners

Page 19: Airbus and Boeing

Risk sharing in Boeing 787

Boeing delegates entire system production to tier-1 suppliers/partnersJapan’s Fuji Heavy

IndustriesCenter wing box and installation of the wells

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Wing box

Kawasaki Heavy Industries

Mid forward section of the fuselage, fixed section of the wings and the landing gear

Global Aeronautica Mid section and rear section of the fuselage including the tail-plane

French Latecoere Passenger doors Goodrich Nacelles and thrust reverser BOEING ~ 33% - 35% of total components• Reduced final assembly down to three

days• Boeing adopted a higher-level of

integration at the supplier level• Reduced the number of parts and

components, subassemblies/sections in final assembly stage

Page 20: Airbus and Boeing

Example of Close-linking of

Partner Major supplier partners would be given additional

responsibilities to help them synergise their tech capabilities for efficiency

Hamilton Sundstrand1. Environmental control system2. Electrical system3. Cabin pressurization4. Auxiliary power unit5. Ram air turbine and the other systems

The wide scope of the contracts allows it to subcontract the design work within each work package and across its divisions

This means that the first-tier suppliers are moving upward in the value chain and assuming more the role of the system integrator

Page 21: Airbus and Boeing

787 Supply Chain in few words…

Build to Design

Modify and Build

Design, Develop,

Build

First-tier suppliers can offer more integrated and interconnected solution

Decreasing the number of the components comprising the airplane

First-tier partnering suppliers are also given full control of their own lower-tier supplier networks

First time ever when a first-tier supplier is given control of the selection of second and third-tier suppliers in a Boeing commercial aircraft program

Page 22: Airbus and Boeing

5. Global Outsourcing in Boeing – Japan and

China

Page 23: Airbus and Boeing

Global Outsourcing - Boeing

Foreign content of the Boeing program In 1960s was only 2 percent for 727 In 1990s was 30 percent for 777 In 2006, it might jump to as high as 70 percent for 787

Boeing 787

Japan

China

Rest of World

Page 24: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – Japan

Boeing depends greatly on Japanese airframe and composite tech

Long-standing, mutually-beneficial relationships with the Japanese aerospace and aviation industries

Boeing and Japanese aerospace collaboration started in the 1970s

Japanese aerospace manufacturers are partners supplying about 20 percent of the 777 airframe, including fuselage panels and doors, the wing center section, the wing-to-body fairing and the wing inspar ribs

Government of Japan, Japan Developmental Bank and Export-Import Bank provided loans to Boeing

Page 25: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – Japan for 787

Japanese partners take up a significant percentage of the work, about 35%, in designing and manufacturing airframe structures

Formal contract for research and development on composites for 787 Dreamliner project

Japanese govt will be subsidizing the 787 program up to $3 billion

Entire manufacturing process for the final assembly of the wing will be created by 1. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries2. Fuji Heavy Industries and3. Kawasaki Heavy Industry

FIRST TIME EVER WING MFG & ASSEMBLY TO JAPAN Japanese aerospace manufacturers are thus playing a

significant role

Page 26: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – Japan for 787

Airframe 727 767 777 787 Wing US US US Japan

Center Wing Box US Japan Japan Japan

Front Fuselage US Japan Japan Japan/US

After Fuselage US Japan Japan Italy

Empennage US US Foreign Italy/US Nose US US US US

Page 27: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – China for 787

Beginning of the Boeing-China relationship in 1972 Boeing has provided 565, or about 61 percent of the 924

commercial jetliners operating in China while only 251 or 27 % of them have been provided by Airbus

Recent supplier contracts signed in Beijing are worth $600 million including work in the 737, 777 and 787 programs

Active supplier contracts between Boeing & China’s aerospace suppliers are valued at $1.6 billion in total

Chengdu Aircraft Industries the single source for the rudder Shenyang Aircraft Industries the vertical fin leading edge Hafei Aircraft Industries upper & lower wing-to-body fairing

panels

Page 28: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – China for 737

Page 29: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – China for 787

Page 30: Airbus and Boeing

Boeing – Investments in China

Since 1993, transferring its technical expertise and operational experience to China’s aviation industry Regulatory authority

Aimed at improving flight safety, reliability and efficiency Production quality control initiatives to help improve product

quality A resident team in China, offering direct technical

assistance/support to the Chinese factories Continued to expand its training facilities in order to address

the needs of the growing Chinese aviation professions.

Page 31: Airbus and Boeing

6. Global Outsourcing in Airbus – Japan and

China

Page 32: Airbus and Boeing

Airbus – Japan and China

In 2001, Airbus set up a Japanese subsidiary Mitsubishi, Fuji and Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Co., were

contracted as suppliers of airframe assemblies Despite its efforts, Airbus is encountering tremendous

difficulties 1. No Japanese airline has placed any order for the Airbus A3802. Aerospace manufacturers have so far declined Airbus’ contract

offers 3. Claim their production capacity is fully committed to the 787

program Staggering economic growth and Olympics in 2008, boost for

Airbus Airbus A380 could be seen as a great choice for airlines to

operate on routes connecting mega-hub cities China’s commitment to more orders came at

Intensified cooperation signing contracts worth $300 mn Double its procurement of local content from local suppliers to

$120 mn

Page 33: Airbus and Boeing

Airbus – Japan and China

Airbus announced that Tianjin will be the site for Airbus’ first final assembly plant outside Europe

The plant is exclusively dedicated to the manufacturing the A320 aircraft and is expected to roll out assembled airplanes by 2008

Page 34: Airbus and Boeing

7. Why is Risk so

devastating?

Page 35: Airbus and Boeing

Risk-Management

No one link in the supply chain has all the information necessary to identify and monitor risk comprehensively

They cannot see many risks that are emerging and changing

Following risks need to be carefully evaluated, and taken into perspective1. Financial2. Geopolitical3. Regulatory4. Operational

Page 36: Airbus and Boeing

Risk-Management

Inventory Turnover for supplier tiers

Page 37: Airbus and Boeing

8. How to achieve collaborative risk

management

Page 38: Airbus and Boeing

Collaborative Risk Management

1. Treat all suppliers as critical members of program team Must encourage innovation across industry Must be prepared to accept and share risk Any prime contractor is only as good as its supply chain and each

member in that chain is as important as the last

2. Bring the best minds to supply chain risk identification Too many contractors do not know all the links in their supply

chain How can they know where the risks lie ? Map the entire supply chain, assess risk by supplier, & then start

managing A collaborative partnership with suppliers involving personnel

from all suppliers and cross-functional

Page 39: Airbus and Boeing

Collaborative Risk Management

3. Seek out early warning signs Systematically filter and communicate supply chain information Better visibility into the fabricator’s levels of resource allocation,

numbers of internal corrective actions, and aging might provide an early warning and allowed an earlier, less costly intervention.

4. Create a culture of proactive risk reporting Primes paying, subcontractors delivering according to price,

quality, and schedule estimates in old transactional model Each side tried to minimize its liability for execution failures, and

subcontractors took sole responsibility for their own suppliers Shift away from fine-print supplier agreements to solid,

transparent policies with accountability and sufficient support for training

Page 40: Airbus and Boeing

Thank You