Air Power - Prof. Joel Hayward's Books and Articles · AIR POWER THE AGILE AIR FORCE Contents Foreword Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy 5 Introduction Group Captain Neville Parton

Air PowerThe Agile Air Force

Edited by Neville Parton

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AIR POWER THE AGILE AIR FORCE

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Contents

Foreword Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy 5

Introduction Group Captain Neville Parton 7

DevelopingAgileAirmenAir Vice-Marshal Peter Dye 11

TheTheoryOfAgility Group Captain John Jupp 17

Agility–AHistoricalPerspective Mr Seb Cox 37

TheLuftwaffe’sAgility:AnassessmentofRelevantConceptsandPracticesDr Joel Hayward 45

PerspectiveoftheChiefofStaffoftheUnitedStatesAirForce

General T. Michael Moseley 55

AgilityinaSmallAirForceBrigader Morten H Lunde 67

AgilityintheLogisticsArenaAir Commodore Simon Bollom 75

ParadoxesandProblemsofAirpowerDr Phillip S. Meilinger 81

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The Agile Air Force

Foreword by cAS

Agilityhasbecomesomethingofabuzz-wordinthedefencecommunity,andlikemanysuchtermsneedstobetreatedwithadegreeofcautioninorderforthephrasenottobecome‘allthingstoallmen’.Thatwaspartoftherationalebehindmydecisiontofocusthe2006CASAirPowerConferenceonthesubjectofagility–totaketheopportunitytoexplorewhatthetermreallymeansintermsofdevelopingatrulyagileAirForceforthe21stCentury.Ofcourse,beingagileisnothingnewforAirForces.FromtheverystarttheRoyalAirForcedemonstratedAirPower’sabilitytodelivereffectsrapidlytopartsofthebattlespacethatwerebeyondthereachofeithertheRoyalNavyortheArmy.AirForceshavealsobeenveryquicktoharnesstechnology,andadapt theirwaysofoperating to suit changes in the securityenvironment; thishasbeenparticularly apparent in recent years, where capabilities designed for high intensity warfighting operationshavebeenadaptedtosuitthedemandsofthecounter-insurgencycampaignsbeingfought in Iraq andAfghanistan.This did not come about without considerable effort, and awillingnesstolearnandexperiment,bothofwhicharekeyelementsintheagilityequation.

TheexploitationoftechnologyhasbeenattheheartofAirPowerdevelopmentoverthepast 100 years but the greatest difficulty, paradoxically, has not been in the development of newtechnologies,butconceptualisinghowtheyshouldbeusedtomaximumeffect.Therefore,whilsttechnologyoffersrealopportunitiesforwideningtheutilityofsystemsacrossarangeofscenariosand,increasingly,providesscopeforgreaterincrementalcapabilityenhancement,itistheagilityofourpeople–inthewaytheythinkandbehave–thatsetstheframeworkforhowweoperateourequipmentandexploitnewtechnology.IseethisasthemainpurposeofourAirPowerConferences.Toprovide-inconjunctionwithotheraspectsofourAirPowerandAirWarfareeducationandtraining–theenvironmentinwhichwecanthinkanddiscussAirPowerissues,inordertodevelopnewideasandconceptsforthefuture.

The papers contained in this publication, which cover the main areas discussed at theConference, do not define absolutely what is meant by either ‘agility’ or an ‘agile air force’. They do,however,containsomethought-provokingideasthatIwouldcommendtoanyonewithaninterestindevelopingtheagilityoftheRoyalAirForce,whichis,ofcourse,oneofthekeytenetsoftheRoyalAirForceStrategy.

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cAS Air PoWer coNFereNce 2006 – iNTroDUcTioN

group captain Neville Parton

The2006CASAirPowerConference, asoutlined in theForewordbyCAS,providedanopportunityforsharedthinkinganddebateonwhattheterm‘agileairforce’actuallymeansfortheRoyalAirForceatthebeginningofthe21stCentury.Indeed,inthisregarditfollowedinalonglineofCASAirPowerConferences,which, fromtheverystart,haveenjoyedacommonpurpose–namely to assist indeveloping a spiritof intellectual rigour anddebatewithin theRAF.Byprovidingaplatformwherepractitioners,theoreticiansandhistorianscouldpresentanddiscussabroadrangeofairpowerrelatedtopicswithadegreeofrelevanthistoricalcontext,thatintenthasbeenachieved.Howeverasattendanceatsucheventsisalwayslimited,thispublicationis intended to allow those who were unable to benefit first hand from the presentations given bythespeakers,andthereby,hopefully,toencouragethethinkinganddebatetocontinue.Forsuchadocument,themainpurposeoftheintroductionistooutlinethecontentsofthepapers,thusallowingreaders torapidly identify thoseareasofgreatest interest tothem.However italsoallowstheopportunitytoexplainwhyparticulartopicswerechosen,inordertoaddtothecoherenceofthepieceasawhole.

Oneof themain reasons for choosing the subject areaof agility for the conferencewasthat,ifthereisasingleproblemthatisatpresentasgenerictomilitaryorganisationsasitistobusiness, it is thebuzzwordbandwagon.Themovetosoundbitepoliticshasresulted inmuchmoreemphasisbeingplaceduponterminology,andinanumberofquartersunlessyouusetherighttermsyouarelikelynottobetakenseriously.Termssuchas‘thecomprehensiveapproach’,ortheentirelexiconofeffects-basedelements–EBO,EBA,EBP–arefrequentlyusedwithoutanycommonconceptualframework–andofcourse,inanumberofcases,whatworkswellasastrategic level concept becomes much more difficult when it has to be turned into operational oreventacticallevelrealities.Agilitycouldwithoutdoubtbeseenasoneofthoseterms,andhence the aim of the conference was to provide a number of different perspectives on thesubjectofagility,lookingbothwithintheRAFandwithout,inordertoensureagreatercommonunderstandingofwhatbeingapartofanagileairforcemeansforthosewhoservewithinthem.That was the aim, and you will find that the papers which follow explore a variety of the different dimensions inherent in the term ‘agility’ with considerable insight, thereby fulfilling the original remitandallowingyoutoexplorethepresenter’sideasindetail.Itisworthnotingthatwiththeexceptionofthekeynoteaddress,almostallofthepaperswerepresentedinpairs,andhenceareconsideredinthesamemannerinthisreview.

Anappositeplacetostartis,ofcourse,withanappreciationofthefactthatinordertohavean agile organisation you need to have agile people, and the first two papers, on Developing Agile Airmen, andThe Theory of Agility, byAir-ViceMarshalPeterDyeandGroupCaptain John Jupprespectively,providesomeusefulperspectivesonthisparticulararea.Theformerbroughtouttheimportanceofteachingpeoplehowtothinkratherthanwhat to think, and the difficulty in achievingtherightbalancebetweeneducationandtraining.Thelatterexploredvariousaspectsofagility,rangingfromtheneedforemotionalintelligencetothecapacitytodealwithambiguity,andthenprovidedanumberofcasestudiestodemonstratehowtheabilitytoimproviseandinnovate–bothhallmarksofagility–areactuallybeingworkedoutwithintheService.

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However agility is very definitely not a new phenomenon within the RAF, as the paper by SebCox, theHeadof theAirHistoricalBranch, cogently illustrates.His historical analysisoftheperiodfromtheformationoftheRFCandRNASthroughtotheendoftheSecondWorldWarisrepletewithexamples,bothgoodandbad,andstronglymakesthecasethatitisnotjustenoughtohaveagileindividuals–theorganisationhastobeequallyresponsiveorproblemswillarise.DrJoelHaywardexaminesanalternateperspective,lookingattheagilitythattheLuftwaffedisplayed in terms of supporting the German Army throughout the first 4 years of World War 2.ItisclearthatmuchoftheoperationaladvantagethattheGermanArmyenjoyedthroughoutthis period resulted from the way that the Luftwaffe could rapidly adapt to meet its needs,andcertainlytherearelessonsherethatshouldnotbeforgotten.TogetherbothSebandJoel’sorganisationsarehelpingtheRAFtoreshapeitselfintermsofthrough-lifeeducationofallourpeople,particularlywithregardtounderstandingourpast,aswellasourpresent,andhowtoderive from both of these lessons for the future – essential if we are to produce warfighters who arewellmotivated,highlytrainedandaboveallagile–akeystrategicpriority.

Aninterestingaspectofagilityisthatthereisnosuchthingasanaturallyagileairforce,and

certainly size is not a key indicator as is amply demonstrated by the next pair of papers. In the first theChiefofStaffoftheUSAF,GeneralMoseley,exploreswhatagilitymeansfromtheperspectiveoftheworld’slargestairforce.MostoftheareasthatheconsidershavetremendousresonanceintermsofaspectsthattheRAFisalsoengagedinexamining,althoughthenagain,giventhelonghistoryofmutualco-operationandclosesupport,perhapsthis isnotreallysosurprising.ButtheemphasisondevelopingpeopleandleaningsystemsarequiteclearlyseenasfundamentaltodevelopingtheUSAFfortomorrow.Attheotherendofthespectrum,BrigaderLundefromtheRoyalNorwegianAirForce(RNoAF)providesauniqueunderstandingofjusthowtheRNoAFcompletelyreinventeditselfinthespaceof6years,anddespiteastrengthofonly1600personnelinlightblueuniform,isabletoprovidedeployableairtransport,supporthelicopter,airdefence,strike/attack,ground-basedairdefence,andcommandandcontrolelementsworld-wide.HealsopointstoapossiblemodelforEuropeinthefuture,intheshapeoftheEPAFExpeditionaryAirWing (EEAW), which provides significant agility by leveraging across national boundaries.

However agility, as already pointed out, requires more than just a good‘front of house’,andAirCommodoreBollom’spaperconsidersthepartthatthe‘lean’approachhastoplayintermsof increasingagilitywithinthe logisticsarea.Thispresentsastrongdefence for leaning,andappositelypointsoutthatsimplyhaving‘fat’inalogisticssystemdoesnotequalresilience–whatisimportantishavingthecapacitytodealwiththeunexpected.Theapplicationofthesame approach to the procurement of modifications also makes for interesting reading, and in particularthepartthatthisapproachcanplayinmakingtheintroductionofnewcapabilitiesbothquickerandmoreaffordable. It isheartening toknowthatDLOandDPA IPTsaremanagingtoproduce innovative support arrangements thatproducegreater levelsof availability at thefrontlineatlowercost–andyetstillmanagetoprovideagilityintermsofmeetingoperationaldemand.

The final paper comes from the one of the best-known contemporary writers on air power, intheshapeofUSAFColonel(retired)PhilMeilinger,whohasmemorablybeendescribedasthe‘Clausewitzof theAir’.Thisprovides,amongstotherelements,a timelyreminderofwhatairpowerbringstothejointbattle,andespeciallythefactthatthisisnota‘freegood’–gainingair superioritycosts–and inourcase,as for theUSAF, that includesconvincingdoubters in

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peacetimeoftheneedtospendtoensurecapabilitywhenitcomestowar.Italsoclearlypointstotheneedformentalagilityonallourpartsifwearetocopewiththechangesinwarfarethatareoccurring,andtobeabletounderstand,andmoreimportantlyexplain,someoftheparadoxesthatairpowerpresents.Thisofcourseaccordswithanotherofourstrategicpriorities,thatofimprovingourabilitytoclearlyarticulatethecontributionthatairpoweringeneral,andtheRAFinparticular,makestoUKdefence.

Taken as awhole, these papers provide a uniqueopportunity to explore the conceptof

agilityintermsofitsapplicationacrossthespectrumofairpower,andallofthemprovidefoodforthought.AsCAShasnotedinhisforeword,whilsttheydonotrepresenteitheracompleteoruniqueviewofagilityinthisregard,theydorepresentausefulresourceforanyonewithaninterestinairpower.Andthisisoneoftheareasthatwedoneedtoconcentrateon,asevidencedinanumberofthepapers–enhancingourabilitytoexplainwhatairpoweris,anddoes,toabroadrangeofaudiences–andperhapsmostcrucially,inlanguagethattheyunderstand.Beingabletodothiseffectivelywillcertainlyrequireaconsiderabledegreeofmentalagility,andthecontentsofthispublicationareintendedtoaidindevelopingthatparticularaspect–enjoy!

GroupCaptainNevillePartonDirectorofDefenceStudies(RoyalAirForce)DefenceAcademy,Shrivenham,2007

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organisation

individualcultureFig 1

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DeVeloPiNg Agile AirMeN

Air Vice-Marshal Peter Dye

IntroductionThere is a temptation at conferences, focussed as they must be on a specific, topical theme,

todramatizeone’sarguments–ifnottocreateasenseofurgency.So,beforeIgoanyfurther,IshouldmakeitclearthatIdonotbelieveweareatacross-roads,somehowcaughtbetweenthenon-agilepastandtheagilefuture.Infact,theRoyalAirForcehasalwaysbeenagileinthewaythat itemployspeopleandinthewaythat individualsrespondtochangeandtheuniquedemandsofoperations.However,weliveinanincreasinglydynamicenvironmentwheretheonlycertainthingaboutthefutureisthattherewillbelesscertainty.Increasedagilitythereforewillbethefoundationforcontinuedoperationalsuccess.But,howdoweachievethis-atboththecorporateandindividuallevel?Myintentiontodayistosetthescene,toindicatewhereweareandhowwemightmeetthechallengeinthefuture.

Definitions (and some Questions)So, what defines the agile airman? Implicitly, you might expect me to include the characteristics

ofagilityinpeople–alertness,liveliness,suppleness,etc.Youwillnotbesurprised,therefore,tofind I define agility as the sum of the personal qualities that deliver: adaptability, robustness, flexibility and responsiveness. We can all visualise these characteristics, but, are these natural (innate)orcantheybecreatedanddeveloped?Iftheycanbecreatedanddeveloped(whichafterallismytopic),isthisbestachievedthrough‘hard’competenciesorisitmoreaboutmindset,aboutapproachandaboutattitude?Inshort,arewetalkingabouteducationratherthantraining?But is it sufficient just to have agile individuals, in other words what needs to be in place to allow anagileairmantoactinanagilefashion–dowehavetheenablingstructuresandculture?Infactcanpeoplebeimplicitlyagilebutpreventedbystructuresfromexercisingthisagility–orperhapsweshouldseektomakestructuresagile,inordertoallowthemtocarrythelessagileamongstus?

Tohelpconceptualisetheseissues,Iofferthefollowingmodel(Fig 1)thatsuggeststhereare3elementsinDevelopingtheAgileAirman:

I will return to this model in due course, but for the present it is sufficient to say that these arenotdiscreteelementsandthatagilityarisesfromtheircomplexinteraction.

So where have we come from?Thisisnotintendedtobeadetailedhistoricalanalysis-afterall,youwillgetaprofessional

viewlaterthisafternoon.However,itcanbearguedthattheRAFwasatitsmostagileinthelate1920s–whenwewereofaroughlysimilarsize(35,000uniformedpersonnel).Trenchardrecognised that he had to invest for the future and provide solid foundations on which theServicecouldlaterbuild.Budgetarypressures,thejealousiesoftheotherServicesandthelackof

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anovertmilitarythreattoUK,forcedTrenchardtobefrugalbutdidnotstophimbeingversatileand opportunistic - placing key people in key posts - and putting substantial resources intotrainingandeducation.Developingandsustainingastrongethos/espritwascentraltohisthinking.ThelessonsIdrawfromthisarethatyouneedtoinvestforthefuture(inorganisation,cultureandtheindividual),avoidshort-termism,anddecideonyourvitalground.

TheRAFinWW2wasverylarge(over1millionstrong)–whichwasinitselfatestamenttothesuccessofTrenchard’sstrategy.TheRAF,andairpoweringeneral,wascrucialtoAlliedsuccessonland,atseaandintheair-ineverytheatreofoperations.However,withexpansioncameaverylargestaffandarguablyaprice-tagthatwasunaffordable.Infact,theRAFwassolargein1944thattheArmystartedtorunoutofmanpower.ThefurtherlessonsthatIdrawarethatsizeprovidesanagilityallofitsown,resiliencecanbeassuredthroughredundancy,anddiversityprovidesanaturalagility;butitcomesataprice.

But, less anyone think that the late 1920s orWW2 were without problems, I have twoquotations for you to ponder. The first is from the Director of Academic Studies at Cranwell in 1920:

“The officer of the R.A.F.,” I used to say, “has got to be a quite different product from an Army or a Naval officer. The time has passed when an officer could afford to narrow his interests down to his sport and his immediate job. You’ve got to cultivate a liberality of mind, a breadth of outlook, a tolerance and an all-pervading enthusiasm for every side of life at least as big as that of the head of a great business firm. The sole use of this subject, which we call English for want of a better name, is to develop your individuality if you have one, or to bring one to birth if you haven’t.”1

AttheendoftheyearhereceivedthefollowingcommunicationfromtheAirCouncil.

“Sir,

1. I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you that certain aspects of the instruction lately given to the Cadets of the R.A.F. College, Cranwell, were brought to their notice by the Air Officer Commanding.

2. The Council viewed with considerable apprehension the type and method of instruction disclosed and in consequence instructed the A.O.C. to call for your explanation, which they have now received.

3. This explanation has been carefully considered by the Air Council, who are forced to the conclusion that you have adopted methods of instruction which cannot be justified even by the widest interpretation of the duties entrusted to you, and which are not compatible with the ordinary obligations binding on a member of the teaching profession. Some of these methods were moreover, in their opinion, peculiarly unsuitable to an Officers’ Training Establishment such as Cranwell.

4. I am to say therefore that the Council regret that they have no option but to call upon you to resign your appointment, such resignation to take effect as terminating your connection with the College before the commencement of the next term.

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I am sir,Your obedient servant,

W. F. Nicholson.”

Ineffecthewassackedforteachingthecadetshowtothinkratherthanwhattothink.Thesecond quotation is from a retired senior officer writing in 1941:

“I have often wondered why some senior officers in the services show all the symptoms of mental paralysis after the age forty-five or so. It is not because the level of intelligence of candidates for commissions is markedly below the average of educated members of the community. On the contrary, the severe competition for entrance to some branches of the service secures some of the best brains in the country; but as the years roll on the critical faculty seems to become atrophied, and it is interesting now to be able to be able to discuss the phenomenon without being called for one’s “reasons in writing” by one’s immediate superior.

If a junior officer puts forward a suggestion the implication is that a senior officer might have thought of it, and didn’t think of it.

The attitude therefore tends to be that the proposal has been thoroughly considered by wiser and more experienced heads and rejected for good and sufficient reasons.After being squashed a sufficient number of times according to his tenacity, the junior officer ceases to put forward unwelcome suggestions, and by the time he in turn achieves seniority he has usually absorbed the attitude of his erstwhile superiors.”2

The officer who wrote these words was Lord Dowding.

Where are we now?BeforeItrytoanswerthisquestion,itmightbeworthwonderingwhetherwecanidentify

aperiodwhenwewereatour leastagile? Was itperhapsduringtheColdWar?Orduringthe subsequent transition? Anobjective assessment is probablybeyondus, since it is largelyevent-drivenandowesmoretohindsightthananinnate,measurablequality.WhatIthinkwecansay(returningtomymodel)isthat-toachieveagility-organisation,cultureandtheindividualmust be aligned. Since the 1990s, there have been some very significant shifts in RAF posture, equipment, basing, manpower, structures and training, andwe are only part way through thechangeprocess:

Organisation.In1990theRAFwasstillorganisedfortheColdWar,and,although,theServicehas contracted significantly since then, the shape (that is: basing; Branch and Trade structures; personnelprocesses;trainingregimes;Headquarters;etc)haveremainedessentiallythesame.Forexample,onlyinthelastyearhastheExpeditionaryAirWingconcepthasgainedmomentum.

Culture.TheColdWarcreateditsownculture.Fixedbases, largenumbersofnon-deployablepersonnel,monolithicHeadquarters,rigidpatternsoftrainingandemployment–allproducedatransactionalmentality–epitomisedbythehostilitytowardseducationandtheprevalentviewthatifitcouldnotbemeasuredithadnovalue.1.Mais,AllTheDaysofMyLife,pages83-117,Hutchinson,London,19372.Dowding,TwelveLegionsofAngels,pages55-60,Eyre&Spottiswoode,London,1941

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Individual.RAFpersonnelofthe1990sweretheproductoftheColdWar.Theassociatedmindsetsandattitudeswereheavily ingrainedandhavestillnotentirelydisappeared– in facttheymayneveruntilmygenerationretires.WhileoneofourgreatestconcernsposttheColdWarwasthe perceived erosion of values (frequently identified with contractorisation and civilianisation), wesingularlyfailedtodevelopacommonunderstandingofwhatconstitutedRAFethos(thevitallightbluethread).

Ofcourse,weshouldnotforgetthat,overthesameperiod,theRAFparticipatedinaseriesofsuccessfulcampaigns.But,wedidsorelyingonexistingpatternsofbehaviourandwiththeequipmenttomatch.Agileindividualswereabletoprovideoperationalagilitybutthiswasinspiteoftheorganisationandtheprevalentculture,notbecauseof.

How do we develop agility?WeneedlooknofurtherthantheChiefoftheAirStaff ’sStrategicPriorities.Thekeyelements

(detailedinRAFStrategy2006)forthenext5-10yearsrequirethatwe:

- Maintainandfurtherdevelopanagile,adaptableandcapableexpeditionaryService

- Ensureourstructures,organisationandprocessesdeliverrapidandaccuratedecisionmakingattherightlevel

- Developasustainablemanningandpersonnelstrategythatsupportsourexpeditionarycapabilityandtakesaccountoftheprevailingsocialenvironment

Agility iseitherstatedor implied inallof theabove.Sodowe justrecruitnaturallyagilepeople?Itmaybeunreasonabletoexpectpeopletobeagile–inourterms–whenwerecruitthembutshouldwenotseekoutthecharacteristicsinindividualsthatwillenableagility?But,doweknowwhatthesecharacteristicsare?Innovationandimaginationwouldfeaturehighlyonmylistbutaretheysoimportantthatwewouldcompromiseon,say,pilotskillsoranengineeringdegreebecauseanindividualisregardedaspotentiallyagile?

Intermsofpersonalitytypes(Myers–Briggs)doweencourageselfassured,outgoingtypes,ordoweseekabalancewiththemoreintrospectivelyinclined?Ofcourse,thispresumesthatthereissuchathingasanagilepersonality.Frankly,weneedtodosomemorethinkingaboutthequalitiesandcharacteristicsweseek.Canwemakepeoplemoreagile?Ihavetosaythatyouwill need to look very hard to find the words innovation and imagination in any of our training syllabuses.TheDefenceSystemsApproachtoTrainingdoesnotseemtoencouragethem,yetthesequalitiesmustunderpinatrulyagileorganisation.Istherenotadangerthatmuchofourtraining actually stultifies innovation and imagination, so reducing natural agility?

Anyway,cantrainingmakeindividualsmoreagile?Or,isitmorelikelytobeeducationthatmakes people more agile? Training is the acquisition of competence to achieve specific tasks. Education lies higher up the taxonomy and is more to do with the development of mentalprocessesandattitudes.Wemightchoosetoassociate‘mentalagility’withan‘agilementality’orperhaps,moreaccurately,apotentiallyagilementality.

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ProgressTherearesignsthatwearemovingintherightdirection;forinstancechangestoRecruit

TrainingandIOTarenowlargelyinplace,withtheconceptualbuildingblocksforagility(‘howtothinknotwhattothink’),principlesofmissioncommandandanenhancededucationelementbeing integral to these courses. At the same time the Review of Officer and Airmen Development (ROAD)recognisesthatweneedtobuildcoherentlyontheseinitialfoundationsinaprogressive,inclusive manner. The early findings confirm that there needs to be a greater emphasis on increasingthethough-lifetrainingandeducationof individuals.Furthermoretheneedforleanthinkinghasaneffectacrosstheentirespectrumofagility.Notonlydoesitinvolvechangestoorganisationandprocessbutitdemandsstrongleadershipandanenablingculturethatisnotafraidofchallenge.Itsimpactonindividuals,ontheirsenseofempowerment,onwhereownershiplies and on enhanced self-confidence is significant. Lean is as much about cultural change as it is aboutprocessaccelerationandeliminatingwaste.

Althoughsubstantialprogresshasbeenmade,therearesomeoutstandingissues.Changesintrainingdeliveryarrangements–notablytheMilitaryFlyingTrainingSystemandDefenceTrainingRationalisationprogrammes–maypotentiallyweakenService ethos.On theotherhand, thecreationof theCOS(Trg)appointment,withendtoendresponsibilities forallRAF individualtraining,isawelcomedevelopmentthatwillgoalongwaytobringcoherencetoanincreasinglydiversetrainingenvironment.

However, are we really confident that we have done all we can to permit/oblige people to be more agile?The application of‘Lean’, in coverage, coherence and sustained impact, is notyet where we want it to be. Our Cold War operational posture, with a larger but less flexible force,hasgone,butmuchofthepersonnelstructureremains.Quitesimply,wehavetoomanytrades and branches. We have relatively inflexible personnel policies. We also do not have a truly responsivemanpowerplanningprocesses.TherecentMCSGstudyhaslookedatalltheseissuesandproposedawayahead.Therewillbeatrainingandeducationbillassociatedwithagility–itisunlikelybeafreegood–butequally,wecannotaffordnottoreleasetheinnatepotential(andagility)inallourpeople.Wemustalsocreateacultureinwhichpeoplefeelencouraged,andaresupported,inbeingagile.

ThisisverymuchattheheartofMissionCommand,butdowehavetherightstructures?ArewestillstuckintheColdWar–inorganisationalterms?Infact,canorganisationsbeagileoraretheymerelyadaptable?Arethereorganisationalcharacteristicsthatencourageagility?Doweneed flatter structures but, if we do, are they compatible with our military hierarchy? Can agility trulyexistwithinatraditionalcommandchain?Whilecentralised,highleveldecision-makingmaysuppressanindividual’sinnateagility,isthereversetrue?Forexample,bydecentralisingmanpowercontrolwecertainlymadestationsmoreagilebutultimatelywemayhavecompromisedagilityattheorganisationallevel.

Keeping People AgileAgility requires energy. It has fitness implications – for the brain as well as the body. But like

physical fitness, it is susceptible to disuse and subsequent atrophy. Loss of agility in individuals is recoverablebutitrequiresitsownexerciseprogramme,timeandopportunity.Lookingtothefuture, it seems inevitable that therewill be furthercontractionwithever greaterbudgetary

incoherent

Fragile

Paranoid

Frenetic

ill-disciplined

Unstructured

Fig 2 – The Future State

rule-bound

cumbersome

Unimaginative

Unresponsive

Dogmatic

Inflexible

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pressuresandcontinuingoperationaldemands.Agilityisboththekeytomeetingthesechallengesandthebasisforourcontinuedrelevance,justasagilitywasessentialtooursurvivalinthelate1920s.

Coherence and AssuranceHowcanwe tell ifweare succeeding?Howdowemeasure theagilityof individuals (or

organisations)?ThePeopleCampaignPlanhasanimportantroleinthisrespect.Thereisclearlyagreatdealofeffortunderwaytoimproveagilitybutitisvitalthatwemaintaincoherenceacrossand through the personnel agendas; balancing competing priorities and assessing the peopleimplicationsinallthatwedo.But,bearinginmindwhatIhavealreadysaid,perhapsthereshouldbeanEducationStrategywovenintothePeopleCampaignPlan?

ConclusionsHoweveragilewehavebeeninthepast,weneedtodevelopgreateragilityifwearetocope

withthefuture.Muchhasbeendonetosetinplacethehardinfrastructureforanagileairforcebutlessfortheenablingcultureandpeoplepolicies.CAS’sStrategicPrioritiesprovidethehooksfordeliveringagileairmentogetherwiththenecessarypermissivestructuresandprocesses.Ifweareagreedastothenatureofindividualagility,andwewishtodevelopagileairmen,weneedtoacknowledgethatimplicitagilityexistsatanindividuallevelinallourpeople,andseekevidenceofagilityduringtherecruitmentandtrainingprocesses.Wemustnurtureouragiletalent;beingcarefulnottotrainoutagilityinfavourofconformity,andrewardagilitythroughtheassessmentprocessandincorporateitaspartofcareerdevelopment.Wealsoneedtoenhanceindividualagility through education (mental agility produces an agile mentality!) and of course providetheopportunitiestoexercisetheseagiletalents–althoughinourcurrentoperationalclimatesuch occasions are not difficult to find. It is also up to us to create adaptable organisations that permit,encourageandobligepeopletobeagileratherthanprecludethemfrombeingso,andfinally, we need to find some way to assess our overall agility, if we want to know whether we aresucceeding

IamconsciousthatmuchofwhatIdonehasbeentoposequestions.Thatishowitshouldbe at these events. However, I offer this final model (Fig 2)ofwhatIbelievewearetryingtoachieve.Ontherightisthenon-agileAirForce(ontheleftiswherewealsodon’twanttobe).Thechallengeishowtomoveourorganisation,cultureandindividualstotheleftbutnotsofartotheleftthatweloseagilityinaconfusedmassofinitiativesandchangeprogrammes.

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The Agile AirMANThe TheorY oF AgiliTY

group captain John Jupp

TheChiefoftheAirStaffhassaidthat“Agilityisattheheartofourcapability”;that“weneedtokeeppacewithchangeintellectually”andthat“wemustmakesurethatwearejustasagileandadaptableasourequipment”1.Hewentontosaythat“IraqandAfghanistanhavebothemphasisedthecomplex,ambiguousnatureofthemodernbattlespace”.TheFASOC2seekstoshowthatAirPower’sdistinctiveattributes,oneofwhichisagility,arethemesforitsfuturedevelopment.Sowhatisitthatismeantbyagilitywhenitisappliedtopeople?Weseemtounderstanditwhenit isappliedtomachinesandintuitivelywethinkthatagilepeople inthissensearenotthosegymnastsamongstus. It is some intellectualormental ability.TheFASOCdescribes it as theabilitytouseandadaptstructures,processesandequipmentininnovativewaystoachievethedesiredeffects3.Butwhatdoesitmeanwhenitisattachedtotheepithet‘Airman’.

The Airman’s Perspective

TheAirman’sPerspectivehasbeentoutedsincetheinceptionoftheRAFandhasitsgenesisin the fact that the airman literally had a view of the whole battlefield as he flew above it.

Hitherto only gallant men with rope and axe had struggled to attain summits to whose height we rose daily, unmindful of the privilege. From this exalted eminence we surveyed the earth… The war below us was a spectacle. We aided it and abetted it, admiring the tenacity of men who fought… to take the next trench thirty yards away. But such objectives could not thrill us, who, when we raised our eyes, could see objective after objective receding fifty, sixty, seventy miles beyond4.

Because the air is ubiquitous, extends over everything, and the sphere of influence of the airmanismuchgreaterthanthatofthesoldierorsailor,theairman’sviewofthebattlespacehasalways tended to the operational rather than the tactical. Today’s airman has a tactical influence within about150miles radiusofhisorher aircraftbut iswell aware thathemaybe taskedintoanotherareawith totallydifferentdynamicsandpossibly intoadifferentrolewithin thesame sortie.He isoperating in4dimensions5.The airmanneeds theoperational viewof thebattlespace to cope with this change. Those that support the flying effort need the same broad view.InOperationTELICforexample,theRAFwasdeployedto9differentairbasesin7differentcountriesandoperatedover thesouthern2/3rdsof Iraqwhile ithad tobe intimatelyawareof what was happening in the North of the country. Supporting organisations needed to beaware of all of this activity spread over a huge geographical area as well as the other JointForcecomponentsandtheirrequirements.Afterall,theaircomponentwasoften(thoughnotexclusively) a supporting component and so needed to understand the entirety of the JointForce’sbusiness.

1AnInterviewwithChiefoftheAirStaffRoyalAirForceinTheJournaloftheJPACC,Edition32006.2FutureAirandSpaceOperationalConcept.3FASOC,TheBeacon.4SagittariusRising,CaptainCecilLewis,PeterDavisLondon1936.5FASOC,SupportingEssay1,TheAirman’sPerspective.

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Somuchforthe‘Airman’(usedheretomeanallthosewhodealwithAirPowerfromanairmarshal to an SAC), but what of agility? An MOD paper, ‘The Agile Commander’ defines agility as adaptability7,responsiveness8, flexibility9androbustness10.

Flexible Responsive

The words responsive and flexible are defined by reference to change, whether that be changingcircumstancesorwholesalechange.Thissortofchangeisendemiconoperations,“noplan survives first contact with the enemy” let alone the change that any military action brings aboutphysicallyandmentallyonthoseinvolved.Allleadersneedtobeabletochange,toadapttodifferentcircumstanceswithoutnecessarilyhavingtheadviceordirectionoftheirsuperiorsexceptforcommandintent.(IntheRAF,leadershipisnecessaryatanyandeveryrankascanbeseenfromthestoriesfromSACsandNCOsbelow).Butleaderscannotbeagilewithoutknowingthecommonpurpose;knowingtheintentallowsspeedofaction.Militaryactionisdesignedtobringaboutmassivechangeontheenemywithinashortperiodoftime,yettheenemywillneedtobedealtwithassoonasmilitaryactionisover.Leadingformeradversariesthroughthechangeintheaftermathofoperations–peaceenforcement,peacekeepingornationbuilding,willneedsome considerable skill in this area calling on all the robustness, flexibility, responsiveness and adaptabilitythatourleadersofallranksarecapableof.

Mentally Agile

InnovationinadaptingprocessestomeetthedemandsofamodernexpeditionaryAirForcewillbevital. Butthoseourprocesseshaveevolvedtoensurethatpifallsencounteredbyourpredecessorsdonotcatchusout;ourchangesmustensurethatthosepifallsarestillavoided,if,ofcourse,theyarestillrelevant.Therefore,knowledgeoftheprocessanditspurposearealsovital.Putanotherway,westopbecominga‘cando’air forceatourperil, thoughweneedtoacknowledge that we cannot do it all, all the time. The need for flexibility and responsiveness on operationsisaxiomatic,buttheseattributesarelinkedtotheleadershipofchangenomatterwhatthecircumstances.Change,largeandsmall,isnowapermanentpartofourlivesastheRAFdeterminedlymeetsthechallengeofremainingrelevantinaworldthatitselfisrapidlychangingpolitically, economically, socially and technically. RAF leaders need a flexible and responsive approach,bothseeingtheneedsoftheirownorganisationandrecognising,andevenanticipating,theneedsofthehigherorganisationforwhichtheywork11. Whetheronoperationsornot,within the uncertainty of change there are opportunities that can be grasped by those agileenoughtoseethem.Theempowermentofpersonnelwithinthe‘leaning’processisapowerfulexampleofthis.

6 D CBM/J9 Capping Paper: Agile Command Capability: Future Command in the Joint Battlespace and its Implications for CapabilityDevelopment.

7Adaptable–Abletoadjustorbealteredfornewconditions.Acclimatize,adjust,attune,becomehardened,getusedto,reconcile,alter,amend,change,transform.

8Responsive–respondingreadilyandwithenthusiasm.Alert,alive,aware,interested,open,perceptive,receptive,sensitive.9Flexible–abletochangeorbechanged,toadapttodifferentcircumstances.Accommodating,adaptable,cooperative,open-minded,responsive,

willing.10Robust – Able to withstand difficult conditions, strong and healthy, determined and forceful. Athletic, brawny, fit, hale and hearty, powerful,

strong,tough,vigorous.11TheAttributesforRAFLeaders–FlexibleandResponsive–expandsonthisandcanbeaccessedfromtheRAFLeadershipCentrewebsite

http://www.cranwell.raf.r.mil.uk/live/RAF_Leadership_Centre/Index.htm

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Innovationisoftenalliedwith‘thinking-out-of-the-box’,butwhatdoesitmeantothinkoutof the box, and what is the ‘box’ in the first place? The box is those beliefs and values that are builtupthroughlifeandexperience.Theboxisthosethingsthathaveofteninthepastensuredsuccessandthatwethereforetaketoournextappointmentasgivensthatwedonothavetore-examine.Unfortunatelyforus,thisisnotalwaysthecaseandwhathasworkedconsistentlywellinthepastwillnotalwaysdosointhefuture.However,tobeabletoquestionthesortsof beliefs involved here requires serious reflection or the confrontation of those beliefs by an externalsource.Becauseofthis,itisnecessarytoconsiderseriouslyalltheideasthatarebroughtto the table no matter how extraordinary they may seem at first. It demands that we are Willing to Take risksandtoknowourselvesandothers–tobeemotionally intelligent.Thereistension in between the promptsof intellect andour experience. Experience enables patternrecognition,whichspeedsupresponsebutcanbetheenemyofinnovation.Adevelopedintellectallowsfortheadaptationofexperiencetochangecontext.Harnessingintellectandexperienceoffers a route to intuitive decision making that combines and balances risk, benefit and speed.

Mentally and Physically Robust

Adaptability can be taken as another word for flexibility but some of its connotations take the concepts further. While its definition is being able to adjust or be altered for new conditions12thesynonymsforadaptableinclude‘becomehardened’,‘reconcile’and‘transform’.Thereareideasofrobustnessandempathyherethatmustbeexamined.Anadaptableleadermustbeabletochangethenatureof thebusiness inhand.Hemust, at thesame time,beable toreconciledifferentdemandsandopportunities.Perhapsthismaybereconcilingtheintentofthecommanderwiththesituation‘on theground’or thecomplexitiesofapeacekeepingmission.Thiswill requireemotional intelligence. Clearly, whenever judgement is being used, the leader must actethically.

Robustnessisanecessityforallmilitaryleadersastheymustbeabletowithstandthephysicalrigoursofoperationswithout losing theirmental capacity.Thephysical rigoursofoperationsare not the only physical demands on a leader. Any leader in any sphere can find the demands ontheir timewearing, theymayhave tobeconstantlyavailable togivedirection, toreassuretheirteamormembersoftheirwiderorganisationandfeelingsofconstantresponsibilitycanbe draining.The pressures of leadership can be very stressful and are often faced alone. Inoperations these problems can be increased tenfold. A leader who is not fit, or physically robust, willnotlongsurvivehisorhertenureingoodhealth.Thementalsideofrobustnessdemandsthe determination to carry things through, the forcefulness to get results.A leader must bevigorous and powerful in pursuing the aims and yet flexible and adaptable enough to know when tochangedirection.EmotionalIntelligencetounderstandthepeoplewithwhomheisdealingwillbeessentialwhetherthosepeoplearewithinhisorherteamorexternalagencies.Political

12OxfordDictionaryandThesaurus200113SeetheAttributesforRAFLeaders–EmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness

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astutenesswillalsobeessential13.Able to Handle Ambiguity

Onoperations,theremaynotbemuchtimefordecisionstobemade;awayfromoperationsconsiderabletimemaybeavailable.Eitherwaytheagileairmanwillneedsounddecisionmakingskillsandtheabilitytoactswiftlywhentheoccasiondemands.Certainlytoknowwhenadecisionneeds to bemade.Also, in peaceorwar,military affairs are complex andoften shrouded inambiguity. The ability to handle ambiguity is clearly linked to flexibility and responsiveness, mental agilityandthewillingnesstotakerisks.Itisalsovitalinbeingpoliticallyastute.Theoperationalfrictionthatcausesthefogofwarisreasonablywellunderstood;itcreatesambiguity.Thepaceandcomplexityofmodernwarfarecanalsocreateambiguityofitsown.Considerthebattlespaceof the Gulf War in 2003; warfighting, peacekeeping and peace support operations were being carriedoutinonebattlespace.TheUSMChasdescribedthisasthe3-blockwar.Thiscancreateimmenseambiguityforaleaderwhohastoworkwithinthemoralframeworkexpectedofhisforces ineachof thosetypesofoperation,andtheycanbeverydifferentwithverydifferentimperatives.Certainlydecisionswillrarelybeclear-cutinsuchasituation.Equally,politics,whetherinternational or national, within a large organisation or in the office, are seldom straightforward. Aleadermuststeerapaththroughthe‘shadesofgrey’thatismorallyacceptableandwillgainthe support of his or her team. A leader can process out ambiguity, find his or her way through itorexploit it14. Exploiting ambiguity requires strong leadership andworksbest in situationswhere there is leadership without authority. Joint, and particularly, multinational operations fit this model perfectly. In peacetime, the model fits in many situations where differing start points, opinionsandhistoriesmeanthatgroupsworkingtogethermaynothaveidenticalendsinmind.Yettherecanbecommonalitiesthatshouldbeexploitedbyourleaders.Therehasbeensomeresearchinthisarea15 that shows that defining and agreeing the means of advance rather than thegoalsorendstobeachievedhasmoreeffectonproductivity;itisessentialthatthisistakenin the inter-organisational field rather than the intra-organisational one. While this may seem contrary to the tenets of mission command where a commander is to define what he wants to beachievedbutnothow,itmustberememberedthathemustalsoexplainwhysomethingistobeachievedandthis‘why’ismoreimportantthanthe‘what’.Itistheintentthatiskeyandtheactionsofsubordinatesmustalwaysbein-linewiththat.

Inthepoliticalworld,theNorthernIrelandPeaceProcessprovidesaninsightintoexploitingambiguity. Defining clearly what ‘decommissioning’ meant would have held apart the parties to theagreementinintractablepositionsthatwouldnothaveallowedanyadvance.Byleavingtheendstatesomewhatvague,bothsideswereabletomovetowardsagoalbymeansthatwereagreedtobeagoodthingbybothsides.Eventually,theyarrivedatapositionwheretheywerebothcontentandpeacecouldbeareality.

Mission Command

Clearly,ifagilityistobeleveragedtheremustberoomformanoeuvrebyallRAFleaders.ThephilosophyofMissionCommandallows this freedom.MissionCommandwasdevisedasanArmytactictoovercometheimpossibilityofacommanderbeingabletocommunicatewith

13SeetheAttributesforRAFLeaders–EmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness14SeetheAttributesforRAFLeaders–AbletoHandleAmbiguity.15Inter-organisationalPerformance,LJBourgeois

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hisorhersubordinatesatalltimesandbecausefriction,orthefogofwar,didnotallowhimorhertoseeallthatwasgoingon.IntheAircomponent,andasweexpandourNEC16,thelimitsto the commander being able to communicatewith his subordinates and his visibility of thebattlespacearelargelybeingremoved.However,whatcannotbechangedisthetimeelement.IfsubordinatesarenottomakedecisionsthenthereisalimitastohowfasttheycanbemadebythecommanderashemustmoveroundhisorherOODA17 loop and this takes a finite time. If NECissubjecttosuchstrategiccompressionthendecisionspeedswillslowdowncontrarytotheintentofNECtomakethepaceofoperationsbeyondthecapacityofanenemytorespond.Ifsubordinatesaretomakedecisions,thentheyneedthefreedomtoexploitthesituation,tousetheiragility.ThisisthephilosophyofMissionCommand.Theartofthecommanderistoknowwhichdecisionsheneedstomake.HeneedstobePolitically Astute.NEC,however,allowsahugestepforwardintheclearandunambiguoustransmissionofthecommander’sintenttoalllevelsoftheorganisationsothatdecisionscanbemadewithinitsguidanceandframework.Equally,withthecommander’sintentinmind,subordinatescanweighuptheconsequencesofdecisionsandactionsandmusthavethegoodfollowership18toknowwhentheymustseekthecommander’sview.Theymustalsobeabletouseconstructivedissentattheappropriatetimeandfeedbacktotheircommandersandknowwhentomovetoconstructiveconsent.Ifdelegationinthiswayworksasitshould,thenspeedisenhancedandthepureformofmanoeuvrewarfareenvisionedbythearchitectsofNECcanbecomeareality.

AiroperationsarecontrolledthroughaCAOC19whichhasamassive3-dayrollingplanningprocess that apportions, assigns and schedules allmovements in the air environment into anATO20.Manyhavestigmatisedthisasbeingtheantithesisofagility,barelyallowing‘centralisedcontrol anddecentralisedexecution’ towork.Yet theplanning cycle shouldnotbe confusedwiththeoperational imperative;norshouldanyonebe inanydoubtthat it is theoperationalimperativethatdrivesCAOCprocessesandnottheprocessesthemselves.Yettoensurethattheprocessdoesnotbecomethemasterrequiresadeepknowledgeofthesystemandhowtoexploitandimproveit.TheBritishArmyhasa3-dayplanningcyclebutwouldnotstigmatiseitselfas inflexible. Equally well the processes of all the functions supporting air operations are there to facilitatethatsupport.Butprocessisnottheissue,itismorethecaseofensuringajointmindsetthat is geared from theoutset toproduceoneplan andwhich recognises theneed tobringappropriate influence to bear early enough in the process to identify and derive the intended effect.Theattachedannexesoffersomepersonalexamplesofhowagilitymightmanifestitselfatvaryingranks,withgreaterorlesserresponsibilitiesandindifferentsituations.Therearemanystoriesfromallspecialisationsbutonlyafewcouldbeincludedhere.Theyarenotintendedasatemplateforfuturebehaviourbutasaninsightintoagilityinpracticeanditisacknowledgedthatanyparticularstorywillnotinspireeveryone.

CONCLUSION

Weneedtopreservethe‘cando’ethosoftheRAFthatdrivesourperformance.Weneedtotrainasbestwecan,anticipatingasmanyofthevariablesaspossibleandfullyunderstandingthe

16NetworkedEnabledCapability.17ObserveOrientate,Decide,Act.18Forexplanationoffollowership,constructivedissentandconstructiveconsent,seeFollowership:TheAnvilofLeadership,ProfessorKeithGrint

inAirForceLeadership:BeyondCommand?RAFLeadershipCentre2005.19CombinedAirOperationsCentre.

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processesthatwehaveinplace.Butweneedtobemastersoftheprocessesandtobeabletoadaptthemtochangingcircumstances.Somestoriesofourpeople’sexperiencesonoperationsandelsewhere follow; theyamplydemonstrate theneed to improvisewithin the frameworksand encourage as much innovation as we can in ourselves and others; to be flexible, adaptable, responsiveandrobust.

Thereismuchinlanguageandhowvariouspeopleinterpretit.However,theAttributesforRAFLeaders21coverallthisgroundandtheyhavebeenhighlightedwheretheyapplyinthetheoryabove.CombinedwiththeneedtoembodytheRAFCoreValuesandactethically,thephilosophyofMissionCommandandFollowership,knowledgeofandefforttobehaveinaccordancewiththeAttributesforRAFLeadersshouldenhanceagilityintheService.

CAOC COMMAND22 IN OP IRAQI FREEDOM

AmodernUSCAOCisclearlynotyetfully‘NEC’,butsomepartsofitarequitecloseandperhapsgiveusanindicationofthechallengesaheadasNECmatures.Inparticular,thevolumesof information available (literally at the‘click of a mouse’) are immense, especially when airoperationson thescaleofOp IRAQIFREEDOMare takingplace.Thedelegationofdecisionmakingwasthusthekeytomaintaininganysenseoftempo–essentiallyMission commandworkingwithinthevariouslevelsoftheCAOC(aswellofcourseasinthecockpitsofaircraft).Oneofthekeyfunctionsofcommandinthisenvironmentiseffectiveriskmanagement–willtheresultsbeworththerisk,eithertoourownforcesorintermsofundesiredeffects(collateraldamage,casualtiesetc)?Whiletherewereclearguidelinesforcertaindecisions–forinstancetheCFACChimselfretainedtheapprovalforCSARpackagesintoallbutlowriskareas–wealsodelegatedwhereverpossible.

Ambiguityabounds insuchanenvironment,andthetimeavailabletotrytogainthebestpossibleinformationtoreachadecisionwillbedifferentinalmosteverycase.The‘informationmanagement’ challenges, both across the CAOC and in one’s own working area, can beconsiderable!However,eveninthemosttimecriticalmoments,itisprobablyworthtakingafewsecondstopersonallycheckoneor2facts!IrealisedfairlyearlyonthatIhadsentsomemissionsinto high threat areas to attack ‘high value’ targets and they had failed to find anything. On further investigationIfoundthattheintelligenceonmanyofthe‘timesensitive’targets(SSMs,SAMsetc)wasbasedonimagery,andthatitsometimestookupto12–14hourstointerprettheimagery,giventhevolumebeingproduced.Clearly,withmost Iraqimobilesystemsbeingmovedeveryfewhours,therewaslittlepointintaskinganaircraftintoahighthreatenvironment(suchastheBaghdadarea)toattackoneifitwasalmostcertainthatithadmovedinthemeanwhile!Butofcoursethedecisionwasnotalwaysasstraightforward;whatifthetargetwaspotentialWMD,andtheISRwasonlyafewhoursold,howmuchrisktotaketotrytoattackit…..?especiallyifELINThasjustreportedpossibleactiveSAMradarcloseby?………andyourSEADaircrafthavejustdepartedtheareafortheirAAR?…….and…..etc!Interestinglyenough,othershadnotmadethisconnectionandwerecontinuingtosearchfortargetslongaftertheyhadalmostcertainlymoved.ItisprobablyjustaswellthattheBaghdad‘SuperMEZ’turnedoutnottobequitethe

20AirTaskingOrder.21Warfighter, courageous, Emotionally Intelligent, Flexible and Responsive, Willing to take Risks, Mentally Agile/Physically Robust, Able to Handle

Ambiguity,PoliticallyandGloballyAstute,TechnologicallyCompetent.Abletoleadtomorrow’srecruit.Anexplanationoftheseattributescanbefoundathttp://www.raf.mod.uk/leadershipcentre/

22FromaninterviewwithAVMNickolsonhistimeasoneoftheCAOCDirectorsduringOpIraqiFreedom.

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threatthatwethoughtitwasatthetime!Although sleepwas inquite short supply,physical robustnesswasprobablynot themost

essentialrequirementofthejob;theenvironmentwasprettycomfortable,withairconditioning,good food anddrink and adecentbed.But themental robustness requiredwasperhaps fargreaterthanIhadeverimagined.Thepressureofconstantlyhavingtomakedecisionsonwhichother(sometimesmany)peoples’liveswereatstakewasmentallydrainingtoadegreethatIhadneverbeforeexperienced.Unlikemanybeforeme,Iwasfortunatethatthislevelofstressreallyonlylastedforacoupleofweeks.

And considerable robustness was also required in dealings with others at times. In the first fewdaystheB52aircraftwereoperatingaloneinNIraq(becauseoftheTurkishdecisionnottoallowusbasing)withouteitherairdefenceor,moreimportantly,SEADsupport.B52commanderstelephoned theCAOCtoexpress their considerableconcerns that the levelof risk to theircrewsduring theseoperationswasnot beingproperly considered.Apart from their surpriseat dealing with a British officer over the issue, it was difficult explaining to them that we were verywellawareoftherisksandhadconsideredthemextremelycarefully,butthatthepotentialstrategic significance of not sending them (they were the only support we could provide to the Kurdsatthatstage)meantthattheriskwasworthwhile–incampaignterms,evenifhigherthantheindividualsintheircockpitsfeltwasnecessary!

Theagilityofourstructuresandprocessesisofcoursehighlydependentontheagilityofourpeople.Despite someveryablepersonnel,maturedoctrine, andstrong joint andAirC2processes,theCAOCwasprobablynotasagileasitcouldhavebeeninmanyways.Thiswasmainlyintheachievementofasmoothtransitionofworkbetweenthevariousdivisions(Strat/Plans,Ops,ISR,Mobility);asaresult,our‘feedbackloops’werenotalwayscomplete(particularlyinareassuchasBDA)andoverallagilitysuffered.Thecauses?Probablyamixtureofsomepeoplewhodidnotunderstandtheprocesseswellenough(training)andsomewho,althoughtheywerewell trained, did not have the agility of mind needed in a fast-moving high intensity fight. That we succeededwasmainlybecausewehadplentyofassetsandtheCombatOpsdivisionprovedtobe the most flexible and agile I have ever seen (in large part due to some outstanding embedded RAFpersonnel);thisundoubtedlymaskedalackofagilityelsewhereandthe‘seams’betweentheCAOC’sdivisions.Thelesson?IthinkthatyourpeoplemustbebothproperlytrainedinAirC2andhavetheagilityofmindtocopewithambiguityandtheunexpected;eitheroneontheirownis just not sufficient!

A DOB COMMANDER23

BasedonmyexperiencesasaStnCdrpreparingforcesforexpeditionaryoperations,andthen subsequently as aDOBCommander, the key‘enablers’ to an agile airman are:mindset;preparation; flexibility and adaptability; and empowerment.

Therightmindset is to recognise thatexpeditionaryoperationsarenot anaberration inday-to-dayroutine:theyarewhatwedoandtheagile,expeditionaryairmankeenlywantstobeinvolved.Hedoesnotrecognisetheterm‘out-ofarea’,becausehisorherprimaryoperatingareaisawayfromhomebase.Similarly,hedoesnotaccepttheterm‘MainOperatingBase’,becausethenaturalstateofoperationsisnotathomebasebutondeployment.AttheDOB,theright23FromAirCdreHillier,DOBCommanderatAlUdiedonOpTELIC.

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mindset involves therelentlesspursuitofoutcomes:dowhatever isnecessary toget the jobdone,temperedwiththeknowledgeandprofessionalismofknowingwhatboundariescanandcannotbepushed;makeitworkandreferproblemsupwardsoroutoftheatreonlyasa lastresort.ThismindsetcanonlybeenabledbyproperMission commanddownwards,articulatingthewhat,notthehow,anddrivingresponsibilityascloseaspossibletothepointofdelivery.

Agility demands preparation, which means seeking out opportunities to build the skillsrequired for rapid deployment and confidence in abilities. Expeditionary training exercises in the UKare,again,notadisruptiontoroutineoperations–theyareonmaineffort.IwouldperhapshavebeenmorecautiousinvolunteeringmyStationtoestablishanewDOBatveryshortnoticehaditnotbeenforthelevelofgeneralpreparationforexpeditionaryoperationswhichwehadcarriedoutover theprecedingyear.Thisranged fromDOBCommandTeamtraining, toself-generatedSectorLevelTraining,tomonthlyStation‘readinesstodeploy’checks.TogetherwiththecoreofmyDOBCommandTeam,Idepartedat3daysnoticeonwhatwasexpectedtobea3dayon-siterecce,andreturned3monthslaterafterthewar.MyDOBgrewfrom13to450personnel in 48 hours: only through preparation and training can you have the confidence that youarereadyforsuchchallenges.

Physical and mental fitness are important parts of preparation. For the former, we need to change the overall fitness level of our Service: I still saw too many examples of unfit personnel unabletotaketheirfullshareofthetask,placinganadditionalburdenonothers.Forthelatter,theagileairman’smindsetrecognisesthatthenatureofthechangedsecurityenvironmentmeansthatcurrentoperationsareamatterofchoicefortheUK,andwherethereischoicethereisalwaysopinion.Ithereforeencouragedmypersonnelnottobeoverlyfocusedonwidespreadpublicopinionandsupport.Thiswasnotanargumenttooperatewithoutasenseofhighermoralpurpose,butsimplyapragmaticpositionwherecontributioncouldbemeasuredmorebythedegreeofprofessionalismbroughttotheassignedmission,notbyitspopularityorotherwise.

Flexibility and agility must be the touchstone for expeditionary operations and the agileairman.Donotexpectpredictability:thecharacteroftheoperatingenvironmentensuresthatchangeisinevitableandtheagileairmanrecognisesthatinuncertaintythereisopportunity.Theagileairmandoesnotseektooperateonlywithintradeorspecialisation:heorsheisageneralistaswellasaspecialist,readyandwillingtoturnahandtowhateverneedstobedone.AtmyDOB,somepersonnelaskedshortlyaftertheirarrivalwhythetentsrequiredintheirtechnicalaccommodationareahadnotbeenerected,andwhowouldbedoingthework.Afterarealitycheck, they cracked-on and developed a first-rate complex which became a regular ‘show’ to VIPvisitors:thepotential inourpeopleistheretobeexploited.Similarly,everyone(includingaircrew) can fill a sandbag and everyone needs to be able to look after him/herself when living inanexpeditionaryenvironment:aperiodicerraticwatersupplyisanopportunityforforwardplanning! The first instinct of some personnel, albeit a minority, on arrival at my DOB was to determine their shift pattern,weekly day off and phone allowance. Re-focusingwas requiredtoemphasisethatlookingafterpersonnelwouldbealeadershipresponsibility,notaseriesofentitlements.

TheagileairmanrecognisestheimportanceofthejointandCoalitionoperatingenvironment,compromisingand falling-inwithothers’wayofdoingbusiness inorder toget the jobdone,whilststillbeingabletoliveuptotheessenceofhisorherownService’svalues.Workingwith

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Allies,someactivitieshavevaluesimplybecausetheyhelpbuildandsustaintheCoalition: formanyofthe6000USAFpersonnelatmyDOB,IsuspectoneoftheirstrongestmemoriesoftheUK presence at Al Udeid was the capabilities of 12 first-rate RAF chefs!

Theagileairmanoperatingwithanexpeditionary spirit is requirednotonlyat theDOB,butatallpointsinthereachbackprocess:everyoneisdoingdeployedoperations,regardlessoftheirphysicallocationandneedstoadapttheprocessestoachievetherequiredresults.AircrewpistolammunitionwasremovedfromanATaircraften-routetotheDOBbecauseithadnotbeenproperlydemanded:InitialOperatingCapabilitywasdelayedasaresult.Doubtlesstherearearguments from both sides on this specific issue, but the point is that decisions need to be taken withafullunderstandingoftheoperationalimperative,notjustwithanarrowfocusonprocess.

Finally,agilitygetsfrustratedwithoutproperempowerment.Riskownership liesbestwiththe person best placed to manage it. Judging aircraft explosive safety distance requirementsfrom3000milesaway in theUK,withoutanyrecognitionof the impactoncoalitionpartnerarrangements, frustrates proper ownership of decisions. Some personnel are just not up tothe job:theprocessofremovingthemneedstobeswiftandwithaproperbalancebetweensensitivitytotheindividualandtheneedtogetthejobdone.WhenaDOBcommandersayshedoesnotneedmorepersonnelorequipment,trusthisorherjudgement;holdhimorherresponsibleifitsubsequentlygoeswrong.

A DOB COMMANDER24

Thedoctrine,SOPsandmanualsaregreatwhenthingsaregoingasexpected.Youneedagilitywhenyoumoveoffthebeatenpath.TheoperationalsecurityissuesthatsurroundedmyDOBpreventedmefromdoingaproperrecce;henceIwasoff-pistefromsquareone.Ididmanageavisittoanexerciseatthebase,whichamountedtoaclandestinerecceofsorts,butmanypeoplevital toareccecouldnotgo.Severely limitedonnumbers, I tooktheperson I thoughtmostvital–myRAFRegimentForceProtectionspecialist.ItmeantthatIhadtolookatotherwaysofgaininginformation,likespendingconsiderablymoretimethanusualtalkingtokeyEmbassystaff.At this stage, thereweremany issues that required tact andperseverance; forexample,STCA5repeatedlyputamediahandlingteamonmyparty,despitemytakingitoffseveraltimes,explainingthatmyhostswouldnotallowthemediawithin30milesofthebase.Themessageis,inthespiritofMission command, trust the DOB Cdr's judgement. He can always be fired if hegotitwrong.

Onorder,Ideployedwiththeset-upteamandcommencedworktomeetthetimelines.Iwastaskedtobereadyforopsatmaximumrate,within14days.Thiswastoinclude2aircrafttypesandthenecessaryforceprotection.Thiswasachieved.Unfortunately,ourhostsdidnotwanttheHarrierstoarriveuntilitwasabsolutelycertainthathostilitieswereinevitable.Hence,wecouldnotgetdiplomaticclearanceforthemtoarriveandIhad22daysfromdeclarationofopenforbusinesswithnoaircraft.Thisrequiredinnovativeleadershiptopreventpeoplefromgoingofftheboil.WithnoHarriersuntilfurthernotice,IproposedanearlyentryfortheCanberraPR9duringavisitbytheCombinedForcesAirComponentCommander.Itwasaclassiceveryone'sawinnersolution: the Coalition could use imagery from the aircraft for genuine operational benefit; our

24FromaninterviewwithAirCdreKirkpatrick,DOBCommanderonOpTELIC.

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hostscoulduseitfortheirpurposesandmypeoplewouldhavesomethingtodotomaintaintheir interest.Ourhostswereconcernedabouttheobviousdifference insilhouettebetweenHarriersandtheiraircraft,mindfulthatthepresenceofthenewaircraftwouldnotbelostonthelocals. I asked if the Harriers could arrive at night. Our hosts were surprised that we flew at night andwentawaytothinkaboutit.Theycamebackwiththeoffertogettheminthefollowingnight–therebyprovidinganagilitychallengeforus,whichwemet.

Forme,mycentreofgravitywastoensurethatnosmalltacticalincidentonbaseresultedinunintendedstrategicconsequences,withthepossibilityofmissionfailure. Iwasdeterminedtomaintainthegoodwillofourhosts.Thisinvolvedspendingmanymorehoursthanfelthealthyin smoke filled rooms, drinking endless cups of sweet tea. It was important to me that the Host BaseCommanderheldusinhigherregardthantheUSAFdetachment.

I did not foresee that I would find myself standing in the middle of an airfield on a mobile phone, speaking to a commercial Belgian Boeing 737 captain. Mentioning no identifiable locations, loads,ortypes,IassistedhiminunderstandingtheTerminalApproachChart(TAP)whichhadbeen faxed tohim; thiswasalmost illegiblebefore itwas sent it as ithadbeenphotocopiedsomanytimes,but itwastheonlyoneavailable.Hewantedreassurancethat itwasgenuine,"because it didn't look right". He wanted me to read the figures out to him so that he could ink themin.IntheendIreassuredhimthatIwasalsoapilotandIwasstandinginthemiddleoftheairfield, with flatness for a goodly number of miles around, and that he would have to hunt for an obstacle with vertical extent to be able to hit it. He filed a copy of the TAP for his company's recordsandturnedupabout8hourslaterwithourDOBGuardForce.

Oneparticularlyagilemomentforoneofmyteaminvolvedthelocalcontractcateringstaff.AhighproportionofthelocalsatourlocationwerePalestinian.ThiswasboundtoleadtotheoddtensiongiventheAmerican/Britishpresence,especiallyifhostilitieshadcommenced.Iwasconcernedattheriskofourfoodbeingsabotaged.Relationshipswiththelocalsgottensewhenthe first action got underway. The US response was to send down some HUMVEEs containing verylargeguardsinsunglassesheavilyarmed,completewithknives.IaskedmySqnLdrRAFRegtofficer to go down there and sort things out. He checked in his personal weapon and went to his tenttochangeintosportskit.HeinvitedtheAmericanstoclearoff,thenwenttothekitchenstodrinkteawiththecaterers,whilstwatchingSkyNewsshowingBaghdadbeingbombed.Amazingly,hegotthecatererstocalmdownandgobacktowork.

One piece of Branch bashfulness affected me considerably and demanded agility. Havingdeployed 2 hand-picked Air Traffic Controllers, each current on Harrier operations, one a qualified Tactical Air Traffic Controller, it came as a surprise that they were ordered by their BranchsponsoratHQSTCthattheywere,undernocircumstances,tocontrolaircraft.IhadnotrealisedthattheOpsSpt(ATC)BranchwastheonlyoneinourServicetohaveitsutilitylinkedtopostcode.Ipointedoutthatthepilotswerenotfamiliarwiththelocality(orWesternIraq),thatweallhadtodriveonthewrongsideoftheroadandthatadegreeofadaptabilitycouldreasonablybeexpected.ItookthesituationasfarasIcouldwithStrikeCommand(viatheUKAir Component HQ) but Strike ATC would not budge. Unless the controllers were qualified at my particular airfield by RAF ATC examiners (who also did not know the airfield) they could not controlandwehadnowayofqualifyingthem.IapproachedtheUSAFDetachmentcommanderandaskediftheyhadacoursetoqualifytheircontrollersontheirdeployedset-up.Theydid.He

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agreedthatmycontrollerscouldenrolonthecoursetobefamiliarisedwiththeequipmentandprocedures,butthatIshouldbeinnodoubtthattheyriskedfailureifnotuptothemark.Iwasunsurprised when both passed with flying colours and became lynch pins in the combined ATC successes.

I insisted that we had our RAF Regt SO1 in the USAF ground defence cell.Agility wascertainlyneeded inthisarea.Wehad localtroopspatrollingoutsidethewireonourbehalf. Iwasconcernedaboutthepotentialforablue-on-blue.ItnearlyhappenedwhenUSguardssawmovementatnightwhichtheywereunsureofandwhichmadethemwanttoengage.MyRAFRegtSO1heardthebeginningsofthe'goat'fromhispositionintheopsroom.ExcitedAmericanvoicesfromaUSArmyPatriotBatterywereradioingtheUSAF-controlledgrounddefencecell,reportingsuspiciousactivityjustoutsidethewire.Theywantedpermissiontoengage.TheRAFRegt SO1 took charge of the network, got an assurance that no one was being fired upon and broadcast that therewasno reason toengage.Hehadcorrectlydeduced that theobservedmovementswere localtroopsactingonourbehalf.His interventionpreventedacatastrophicblueonblue.

ToallprospectiveDOBCommanderswho, likeme,harbouredthenotionthattheyweregoing to lead the flying ops from the front in the cockpit - a message: that is not your job. YourprimaryjobistoestablishandmaintainanetworkofharmoniousrelationshipsbetweenyourDetachmentandyourhost,coalitionpartners,theEmbassy,yourAirComponentHQ,andbetweenallsub-elementsofyourDOB.Bysodoing,youwillcreatethenecessaryconditionstoletthesquadronsgetonanddothebusinessofcreatingprecisecampaigneffectsusingairpower.

THE COMMANDER COMBAT OPS WITHIN THE CAOC25

AstheSO1 inchargeofCombatOps, it isvital tohavetherightteamaroundyou.Theyneedtobecompetentbutalsotoworkasateamandtheiragilityisvitaltotheagilityoftheorganisation.Alsoitisvitalforagilitythatwehadthefullsupportofoursuperiors,atleast2up.ForTELICwehadawork-upculminatinginafullBLUEFLAGatShawAFB,SouthCarolinatocreateacohesiveteambutevensoafewpeoplehadtobereplacedbecausetheywerenotuptothe‘cando’spiritthatwasnecessarytomakeitwork.IlikenedtheCAOCtoanorchestrawiththe various sections fulfilling various roles and the Chief of Combat Ops being the conductor; each individualmaybeasuperbplayerbuttheconductorhastomakethemworkasateamtogetthemtomakeagoodsound.Onefalsenoteruinseverything;notnecessarilyfromtheorchestraofcourse,itcouldevenbeamobilephoneintheaudience.WhenthebombdroppedinthemarketplaceonTELICitmadeabadnote.

InTELIC,oneexampleofagility,andthelackofit,wasknownas‘thebridgetoofar’.TherewasabridgeinthewesterndesertthatneededtakingdownandwetaskedsomeF16sagainstit.WhentheygotthereitwasobscuredbycloudsotheyusedJDAMinGPSmode.WhenwegottheBDAthebridgewasstill intactsoweairbornere-taskedsomemoreassetswhoalsousedJDAMinGPSmode.AfterthatBDAwehadtodoitagain.InallwesentF16s,F15sandF14sagainst thatbridgeandnonehit it.The fourth timewesentGR4s.Theygot therewith

25FromaninterviewwithWgCdrHyslop.

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bridgenotobscuredandsawthatthecoordinatestheyhadbeengivenwereslightlywrongsousedEnhancedPavewayinthelasermodeandtookthebridgeout.Agreatpieceof‘agility’thatenhancedtheBritishreputationintheCAOCforweeks!ButtherewasalackofagilityintheCAOCastheBDAshowedalltheUSAFJDAMimpactstobeinthesameplaceawayfromthebridge, this shouldhavebeenpickedup, the coordinates corrected and thebridge takenoutsoonerwithoutwastingsomucheffort.

In IncirlikduringNorthernWatch IwastheDCFACCandwehadTornados in thereccerole with us. All the coalition aircraft were fired on most days mostly by AAA. The Iraqis seemed to have a cycle where new gun crews came along and genuinely tried to fire at our aircraft. However,theysoonlearnedwhatourresponsewaslikeandtoaimprogressivelyfurtherbehindtheaircraftandactwithalotlessfervour.Oneguncrew,however,discoveredthatiftheirgunwasnexttoavillagewewouldnotretaliatebecauseoftheROEconcerningcollateraldamage.Sotheyalwaysplacedtheirgunnexttoresidentialbuildingsandgenuinelytriedtoshootdownouraircraftallthetime;andtheyweregettinguncomfortablyclose.Werealisedthattheonlyattackwe could make with sufficient accuracy to meet the ROE but also with the likelihood of damage tothetargetwashighanglestrafe.Wediscoveredthattherewere3USpilotswhohadbeentrained in strafe – all fighter school graduates – and got them together to plan the attack. That day our rogue gun crew did fire on our aircraft and got an unexpected response from us – high anglestrafe.Weonlydiditoncebecauseofthegreaterriskassociatedwiththeattack,butweonlyneededtodoitoncetocreatethedeterrenteffectwerequired.

THE REGT SQN COMMANDER26

When51SqnRAFRegtarrivedbackatitshome,RAFLossiemouth,inDecember2002after4monthsonOPRESINATE(SOUTH)weexpectedtohaveayearawayfromoperations.No51SqnRAFRegtwasnewlyre-formedandmanpowerwas76all-rankspriortoincrementalfundingallowingthemanpowerceilingtoreach164all-ranks.Likeoursister‘Field’sqnsoftheRAFRegt,51SqnwasequippedasLandRover-bornespecialistinfantryforISTAR-basedtasksandwiththeability to react and hit any aggressors against our air assets in flight-strength. This all sounds very effective,buttherealitywasthatthe76-manSqnhaslimitedutilityasitwasusedtooperatingonlyatsection(8-man)strength.

OnChristmasEve2002IfoundmyselfbeingbriefedatRAFHoningtonontheSqn’s‘emergency’deploymenttoKuwaitandthenIraqinsupportoftheJointHelicopterForce.Inordertogiveme a full-Sqn’s-worth of manpower my two flights were augmented with two flights from 63 Sqn RAFRegt,otherwiseknownastheQueensColourSquadron(QCS),basedatRAFUxbridge.InadditionIwouldreceive15Auxiliaries(10%ofthetotal)totopuptheSqnstrength.TheSqnwastobereadytodeployinshortorder,infactthemainbodydeployedinearlyMarch2003.ThechallengewastounitethetwohalvesoftheSqnundermySqnHQ,(whilstbased600milesapartintheUK),andtraintoastandardtobeabletooperateinIraqinsupportoftheJHF.TheJHFwasnotanorganisationwithwhich51SqnRAFRegthadtrainedbeforeandsoIwasunfamiliarwiththeirSOPs.Equipmentissuessuchasvehicles,weapons,nightvisionaidsandcommunicationshad to be matched to the skills level of individuals. QCS had no vehicle fleet so our 40-odd Land Rovers and trailers had to be put on trains south for them. Range qualification shoots had to beundertakeninavarietyofweaponssystems–assumingthatwecouldbooktherangesatno-26FromWgCdrBeckley,OC51RAFRegtSqn,OpTELIC.

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notice.Nottheidealpreparationforwar!SittingontheborderthenightbeforethegroundwarstartedIcouldseethewholeSqn

convoylaidoutinthedesertlikepiecesspreadoverthesquaresofachessboard.Theammunitionhadbeen‘borrowed’, in themaincourtesyofourRAFRegtcontactsatAliAlSalem.Desertclothinghadbeenre-allocatedbetweentheSqntoensurethateveryonehadat leastonesetofdesertdpmclothing.OurNBCdetectorshadbeensharedoutamongstotherunitsbutwehadatleastthecorrectNBCclothing.GroundIntelligencehadbeengenericandlackeddetailonourobjective,thetownofSafwan.Weweretooccupyadesertedlandingground(wheretheIraqissurrenderedtoSchwarzkopf in1991)justnorthoftheIraq/Kuwaitborder.IhadmadefulluseofTACIMINTWGstaffatAliAlSalemwhohadbeenabletoprovidemewithimageryoftheexactroutethatweweretouseacrosstheborder.MyleadsectionsallhadA4bindersofthisimagerytohelpnavigatetheway.Indeed,throughoutthenexttwomonthswehadfrequentassistancefromTACIMINTWG,egforouroccupationofBasraairport,theimagesallowedusto see with our eyes what awaited us and allowed us to make up airfield crash maps ready for defenceoperations.COMBRITFORtoldmeontwooccasionsthathewasappalledthattheArmycouldnotgetimageryfromairassets.More‘agility’somewhereinthechainwasnecessarybutitpaidtobe‘air-aware’.

OuroperationsatSafwanwerebreadandbuttertotheRAFRegt.WorkingalongsidetheUSMarinesofthe272MarineWingSupportSquadronandourownTacticalSupplyWing,IwasabletocoordinatethedefenceofthelandinggroundandensuredtheprotectionoftheUSandRAFhelicoptersthatpassedthroughforFuelandAmmunition.Therewasnodoctrine,noTTPsandnocoalitionexercisestoprepareusforthisoperation;Ijustappliedcommonsense.Thechallenge was to overcome the efforts of the Saddam Fedayeen andBaath Party activists towhom the helicopters and fuel presented a high-profile target. The obstacles were presented bythelackof intelligencethatImentioned,(intheendwegatheredourownlocal intel),therapidroulementofBritishunitsassignedtooverseetheDivisionalRearArea,inwhichwewerelocated,thelackofacoordinatedCIMICeffortinourareawhichannoyedtheIraqis,andtherandomhumanitarianaideffortslargelysponsoredbytheKuwaitis.OurdefenceofSafwanwasproved by the 100% flying sortie success rate. Our co-ordination with Div Rear HQ, PWRR and theRMPgaveusthelinkagesweneededwithourneighbouringunits.WewontheheartsandmindsofthelocalfarmersandtownspeoplebyusingourmedicalandEODassetstocometotheir aid. We co-ordinated detailed food and water re-supply around the airfield and ensured the safedeliveryofwaterfromBritishForcestankersintoSafwantown.ThepresswewelcomedandescortedaroundSafwanandthefarmingcommunities.

Within short weeks of deployment the Sqn’s flights had knitted together to form a capable sqn. Not fully capable by the book by any means, but good enough for purpose. Officers and NCOsusedtheirinitiativeateveryphase:procuringrationsfromtheUSForces;sectioncdrstrainingtheirpersonnelintheeveningsandateveryvehiclehalt;designingourownVehicleCheckPoints to meet the threat; engineering personnel modifying vehicles to overcome the threatofcheese-wiresdesignedtobeheadoursentries;aSqnshopinIraqsellingsuppliesboughtinKuwait;asatellitedishtobringtheTVnewstothetents;generatorswhichappearedfromout-withtheServicessupplychain;thelayoutoftheSqnleaguerallowingthesectionstoliveoffoftheirLandRoversandtrailersintheopenair;hygienedrillsthatwereadheredtoandminimisedthecasualtiesfromdiarrhoeaandvomiting;asectioncdrsavingthelivesofthetwogunmenwhofired on his patrol and who were then cut down by the fire from his section.

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Intheenditallworked.Wekeptthehelicoptersprotectedfromthegroundthreat.Itwasmessy;therewerenegligentdischarges,overturnedvehiclescausinginjury,andavehiclegothitbyamineandthecrewhadtoberescued,(justlikethetrainingvideo).Itwasnotthewaywehadplannedtogotowar.YetnooneonmySqndiedorsufferedseriousinjury.Theleadershipqualities imbued in the officer and NCO cadre enabled the Sqn to take advantage of every opportunity in whatever situation. I like to think I was a flexible leader; I probably was not as flexible as I thought I was! The important message is for commanders at all levels to listen to andusethepersonwithexperiencetoundertakeatask;inthatwayyoumakethemostofyourassetsandencouragepeopletocontributetothemission.

A HARRIER MISSION COMMANDER27

In2003IwenttoIraqasanexecwith3Sqn.TheAirTaskingOrdersimplyprimedusfor‘NonTraditionalISR’withaback-upofon-callCAS.Therewerenogiventargetsorweaponsweweresimplyaskedtocarrythe‘bestavailable’.Thetripswouldlastanythingbetween4and6hrs.

On one mission, my third in theatre, we got airborne with instructions to go to an ISRmissioninourareaofresponsibility.WetankedsoastobefulloffuelforanycontingencyandalmostimmediatelytheAWACS28taskedustogotoAnNajaf,whichwasoutsideourareaofoperations![AcrossintheeasternpartofIraq]Wehadnomapsforitandhadnotconsideredthatpartoftheoperation.OnarrivalatAnNajafwecontactedaforwardaircontrollerwhowassomewhatupset.HewaspartofasmallteamofconventionalAmericanforcesandtheyhadjustfoundabigweaponscacheinthetown.TheyhadbeentryingtoloadsomeoftheRPGs29ontothebackoftheirHumveeswhenthelocalmilitiahadarrivedtostopthem.Themangaveusthe standard forward air controller talk-on and finished with the non-standard comment “If you seeanythinginthetownthatisn’tus,youcanbombit.”Wemanaged,afteracoupleofminutesnegotiation,topersuadehimtochangehismindandproposedthatwedoalittle‘airpresence’toseeifwecouldsplitupthebadguysandmakethemrunaway.Thenwedroppeddowntolowlevelandtactically‘airpresenced’thetown.ThisgavetheAmericansalittlebitofbreathingspacetogetontheirHumveesandlegit.

Bythisstagewewereoutoffuelandsowentbacktothetankerhopingthatweweregoingto be re-tasked back to scud-hunting. Just before we had completed the refuelling, we weretaskedtosupportsometroops[backintheoriginalareaofresponsibility].ItwasagainCASfortroopsincontact.Wegotourbombsawaytohelpoutthoseboysandreturnedtothetankerforathirdtime.OffthetankerweweretaskedrighttotheedgeofourareaofresponsibilitywhereweareoutofcontactwithourC2soworkingprettymuchonourown.Wewerealsoverytightforfuel.Wegotincontactwiththegroundforces,droppedanotherbombandsortedthingsoutbeforereturningbacktobase.BythattimemycockpithadbeenaprettywickedplaceandIwasinneedofabreak!

Therewasnopre-planningandonlyafewdecisionswerepre-emptedontheground.WesimplyhadtogetairbornewithamapofIraqandhopeforthebest.Everysortieinvolvedself-assessment from the cockpit of positive identification of the target; in-cockpit application of the

27FromSqnLdrHarveySmyth’spresentationtotheRAFLeadershipConference2005.28AirborneWarningandControlSystem.29RocketPropelledGrenades.

Risk/Benefit

TimeSituation

Awareness

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Law Of Armed Conflict (is this proportional, is this effect necessary?); in-cockpit evaluation of collateraldamageandcontinuousselfassessmentoftheRulesOfEngagement.Allthishappeningin the cockpit whilst integrating with ground manoeuvring Forces, deconflicting from organic fires suchasMLRS30andcontinuouslyavoidingthethreat.

Cockpit leadersarenowoperating inaworldwherereducingthekillchain,orsensortoshootertime,canhavestrategiceffect.Todothistheyaremakingmoreandmoredecisionsin-cockpit,sometimeswithadegreeofcalculatedriskbecauseoftheambiguityofthefogofwar;decisionsthatinpreviousyears,mayhavebeenmadeinaCAOCorsomeC2buildinglocatedawayfromthecontrolledchaosofthebattlespace.

THE COMMANDER WHOSE AGILITY WAS SEVERELY TESTED31

ThatwewerelikelytogotowarinIraqwasonalimiteddistributionforseveralmonthsbeforeoperationTELIC.ThismeantthatIhadtore-focusourpre-deploymentactivities,withoutmaking it obvious that Ops were imminent. In my MBA studies, case histories proved thatcommunication was a common theme in taking people to places they might not otherwisechoosetogo–leadingthem.IhadtoleadthemtoaplacethatIcouldenvisagebutwithouttellingthemanything,indeedcoveringthetruthwithmistruthsabout‘prudentpreparation’etc.This period of several months was certainly a time where my ability to be self-sufficient and robustasaleaderwereputtothetest.

ForOpTELICalltheMarhamsqncdrshadtodeploytoAliAlSalemwhichrenderedC2adhocatbest.Ihadtoadaptandmakedowithcommandarrangementswhichdidnotmeetwithmycreativesubconsciousandthisdidcausemetobeunsettled. ItwasrighttosuppressmyinnerthoughtsonC2asIconsideredthearrangementsthebestcourseofactionandnothreattooperationalcapability.HereIbelievetherearethreedimensionstoconsiderwithina‘triangle’ofvariablepressuresonthe‘agileairman’thatshapeandpressurisehisorheractions:

With pressure to act rapidly, there can be a propensity to act before sufficient Situational Awareness is available or without due consideration of the risk or benefit of ones actions. But as SituationalAwarenessbuildsovertimethemomenttomaketheoptimumimpactcanbelostorthepositiveimpactreduced.Everydayinhisorhercareer,the‘agileairman’balancesthetriangleofpressurestoactdecisively.

31FromOC9SqnonOpTELIC.

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DuringthecombatphaseofOpTELIC,myrolebecamemorefocusedonleadingbyexamplewith time allocated to supporting my ground personnel who were working in difficult conditions. UnderthreatofSSM32attacksandwithoutadequateNBCprotection.

WhentheNo2inmyformation,oneofmycrews,werekilled,IremainedondutysothatIcouldspeakwiththeoncominggroundcrewshift(whohadseenthecrewoff)inordertoallowthemtoexploretheirfeelingsandexorcisetheirgrief.IpartlysuppressedmyownemotionalfeelingswhichIbelievedtobeinthebestinterestsofleadingthroughtheepisode.Iwasopen-mined enough to realise that each individual affected by the event needed to react as they saw fit, butintermsofgettingonwiththejob,IwantedtoplaceatimepressureonthemtodothatandgetbacktodoingthesuperblyprofessionaljobIrequiredofthem.Ididnotappreciatehavingtoaskforthereportintotheincident2yearsaftertheevent–Ifeltthatitshouldhavebeenmadeavailabletomeimmediatelyitwascomplete.IfeltIwaspreventedbyprocessfromfullyvoicingmyconcernsoverthefragilityofourgreatestasset–ourpeople.

Mypersonalexperienceandsummationisthatthefeaturesofthe‘agileairman’aretangiblebut they canbe affectedby intangiblemeans. Inorder to retain themalleability andbalancebetweenanautomatonandaspiritedleaderwhofullyunderstands‘missioncommand’,thereisaneedtonurtureandprotect,bywayofappropriaterecognitionandreward(betheyintrinsicorextrinsic).Withoutappropriatelubricationthe‘agileairman’canbecomebrittle.

A FG OFF SUPPLIER33

InJanuary2001theRAF,undertheauspicesofISAFhadrestoredtheoperatingcapabilityofKabul international airport such that itwascapable,notonlyofproviding theonly lineofcommunication to support ISAF but, more crucially, providing a means by which aid could flow into Kabul. Equally, it was the means by which the ever-growing army of diplomats and officials could travel with reasonable speed and security. Not surprisingly the airport attracted theattentionofthoseopposedtotheinterimnationalgovernmentand,throughoutFebruaryandMarchof2001,attemptsweremadetoshelltheairportusingimprovisedmortarsandrocketlaunchers. On the night of 30 April, the dissidents achieved their first success, dropping 107mm rocketroundsontotheoperatingapronandrunway.

Whilst the post attack recovery process was underway, notification was received that two C130 aircraft were inbound, one requiring fuel as a matter of urgency, and one to offload RM Commandos.Thearrivalofthesetroopshadbeensubjecttoamyriadofdelaysandpressurewasmounting to complete their inload. Despite an expectation that the airfield may imminently come underfurtherattack,thedecisionwastakentolandbothaircraftundertotalblackoutforarapid,engines running, refuel and unload – an unusual procedure fraught with its own difficulties. Once the aircraft were on the ground, speed was to be of the essence and Flying Officer Watson, the APOD Movements Officer, was responsible for co-ordinating the rapid refuelling and unloading of both aircraft. She quickly assembled her movements team in full fighting order and led them out onto the apron. Under her leadership the first aircraft was refuelled and dispatched in under thirtyminuteswithoutincident;shethenpreparedforthesecondaircraftwhichwasfollowingon quickly behind. The Royal Marines on the second aircraft were aware that the airfield had

32Surfacetosurfacemissile.33FromLeadership:AnAnthology,RAFLeadershipCentre2005,VisionandDecisiveness,AirCdreAbbott.

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just been under attack. Disorientated by an unfamiliar, pitch black airfield and the deafening roar ofC130engines, theMarineswere in a vulnerableposition.As the aircraft taxied in and theramp dropped, Flying Officer Watson wasted no time in organising the Commandos and ensured theirrapiddisembarkationtoanearbyshelter.Despitetherisksinvolved,andurgencyrequired,to dispatch the aircraft for its onward journey, Flying Officer Watson had the forethought and judgementtoquicklyorganisethere-loadingoftwopalletsontotheC130soasnottowastetheoutboundsortie.

A WO FIREMAN34

My section was responsible for providing fire cover at Kabul [Op FINGAL 2002], but a lot of our time was spent on non fire duties – force protection and guarding issues and so on. The setup at Kabul had a military area and a non-military side but the fire section was located next tothenon-militaryactivity.Onthedayinquestionasituationhadbeenbrewingthroughoutthatdayasnoaircrafthadtakenoffforthepastfewdaysandacrowdofpeoplehadgatheredonthedispersalandwerebecomingveryagitated.LateoninthedaytheMinisterforTransportandhisaidehadbeenshowntoanaircraftthatwasreadytodepartandthecrowdbecameveryrowdyinresponse to this, firing into the air and shouting. They crowded round the aircraft, which already haditsenginesrunning,andthenafewofthemmanagedtobreakintoit,attackingandkillingtheMinisterforTransportandthrowinghisbodyinthebackofataxi.Onseeingthis,hisaideandanothermanbeganrunningawayacrossthedispersalpursuedbytherioters.AllthisactivitywastakingplaceoutsideourareaofresponsibilityandIhadreceivedordersinthebuildupofthesituationthatwewerenottogetinvolvedbut,astheeventsescalatedandthecrowdmovedclosertowardsus,Isawthatactionwasnecessary.

Iformedmymanpowerintoalineandalthoughwewereonlytwelvepeople,wewereofcoursearmed,andsoimmediatelylookedquitethreatening.Atthatstageinmymindwewerepurelyactingasadeterrentandguardforourareaofresponsibility,butfairlyquicklythetwomen who were fleeing from the crowd saw us and started running towards us. I had to make a decisionthenandthereastowhattodoand,inmyminditstoppedbeingadecisionbasedonareasofresponsibility,andbecameamoraldecisionwherepeople’sliveswereatstake.Ishoutedorders to move forward, by this stage there was only about fifty feet between the crowd and usbutwemanagedtosurroundthetwomenandgetthemtosafety.Ithinkthesightof,albeitasmallnumber,butagroupnevertheless,ofmilitarywelldisciplinedpersonneladvancinginawellorderedmannerwasenoughtoensurethesafetyofthetwomenindanger.Thesituationhadthepotentialtoescalatefurtherandbecomequitenastybutoncewemovedforwardinadecisiveway,shoutingordersandmakingastancewewereluckyandtheybackeddown.

A SGT ARMOURER35

Intermsofmanpower,[5131(BD)Sqn] isaroundthesizeofthegroundcrewelementofaTornadoSqn;that is,about105men.Ourtraditionalrolehasbeentiedcloselytothemainoperating bases, as we are responsible for keeping airfields clear and operable. For that purpose weareequippedwitharmouredSpartanvehicles.SincetheRAFRegimentlosttheirarmouredcapabilityafewyearsagowearenowtheonlyarmouredunitwithintheRoyalAirForce.Although

34Ibid,VisionandDecisiveness,WOAndyPittock.35FromAirForceLeadership:BeyondCommand?ExposedLeadership!RAFLeadershipCentre2005.

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Iamtrainedasanarmouredvehiclecommander,itisafarcryfromthatofatankcommander.

About2weeksbeforewewereduetoenter Iraq fromKuwaitwewereattachedtothe5thand7thRegimentalCombatTroopsoftheAmericanMarines.Unfortunatelytherewasverylittletimetotrainwiththeseunits,comingdown,intheendtojustacoupleofdays.Wecrossedthe borderwith theAmericanMarines atH+20minutes andmade straight for theGas andOil Separation Plants. … As we approached the first installation, which was fiercely alight and shroudedby a thick, acrid, black smoke,wewere surroundedby troopsengaged in sporadiccontactandtoourwestfourhelicoptergunshipswerebatteringanIraqiconvoy.[Thiswasa]completelyalienenvironment.

Shortlyafterthis initialactionwe[myself,myCplandSACandvehicle]weredetachedinsupportof16AirAssaultBrigadeasasmall(3man)BDteam.…[Now]completelyonourownintermsofRAFCommand…weworkeddirectlyforanSO3RoyalEngineerwho,althoughhedidhisbest forus,wasnot inapositiontogiveusthesortofcommandwewouldnormallygetfromaFlightCommanderorTroopCommander.Theimportantthingtopointouthereisthat during training build-up wherewe train toworkonDeployedOperating Bases,we arealwaysprotectedbysupportfromtheRAFRegiment,andaspartofJointForceEODweweretoldthatwewouldalwayshaveaccesstoForceProtection.However,whenwe joined16AirAssaultBrigadewerealisedthat,beingatthesharpedgeofArmyoperations,wehadsuddenlybecometheForceitself.…whenIwasworkingquite lateonenight.ALandRoverpulledupoutsideandtookmetoBrigadeHQwhereIwasfacedwithacircleofpeoplewaitingeagerlyfor the Bomb Disposal Officer to arrive. As the Commander of my team that meant me. There wasanArmouredCommanderfromtheRoyalHorseArtilleryArmouredScreen;aParatroopsCommanderwhowasreadytoprovideablockingforce;anAmericanspecialistdecontaminationunit;oneofourownjointNBCCommanders;anin-theatreweaponsintelligencepersonandmySO3.TheBrigadeCommanderwasapparentlyarriving10minuteslater.Now,IwasabitconfusedbytheexpectantlooksontheirfacesbutapparentlyitisArmytraditionthat[thissortof]taskisalwaysBombDisposalled.So,atthatmomenteveryoneintheroomwasexpectingmetoputtogetherthetask.TheArmyCommanderwantedtoknowwheretopushthearmouredscreen,theParatrooperreallywantedtheblockingforceinplaceandtheintelligencepeoplewantedtoknowhowIwasgoingtogettheinformationbacktothem.ThiswasquiteastirringmomentbecauseIhadnoideawhattodowithanarmouredscreen,orhowtocarryoutblocking.Afteraquick run down of what I needed to know I managed to find my way through a plan. It must have been sound because, despite the screen coming under fire, the task was carried out smoothly.

AN SAC MT DRIVER36

I really enjoyed acting as packet commander [a small convoy of four or five vehicles]; once I knewtheroutesIwasgivenmoreresponsibility,whichwasgood,becauseitwassomething,I’dneverdonebefore.Wewerealsoputinchargeofthelocallyemployedciviliansandtookthemoutintheirowntrucksonconvoysandhadtolookafterthem.ThelanguagebarrierattheArmycampsmeantyouhadtotakethemandfeedthemandmakesureyouhadthemallcomingbackandthatwasreallygood.BecausewehadArmyescortsaswell,weusedtotaketheconvoystothebordersandtoKuwait,wehadtounloadthemandloadthembackupagaintocomebackon

36FromLeadership:AnAnthology,ToBeaLeader,RAFLeadershipCentre2005.

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ourown,soitwasexcellentresponsibilitytodothatandI’mjustanSAC.

The most difficult incident I had to deal with was when we had civilians with us and we were goingintoBasra,ledbyanArmyCaptainwhosemapreadingskillswereabitsketchy;weendedupgoingintowardsahostilevillageandofcoursealltheciviliansstartedtopanicbecausetheydidn'thaveanyweapons. Weendedupdown inaravinegoing thewrongwayuptheroad.Thatwasquiteunnervingbutitwasourresponsibilityaspacketcommanderstomakesurethecivilianswerealrightintheircabsbecausetheywereallshoutingandpanicking.IneverthoughtI'dbeabletodothat,buthavingbeengiventhechanceandprovingtomyselfthatIcandoit,gaveme a lot more confidence and I think it's given a lot of other lower ranks more confidence in themselves.It’smademethinkthatanyonecanbeagoodleaderputintherightposition,intherightsituationandgivenachance.

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AgiliTY – A hiSToricAl PerSPecTiVe

Mr Seb Cox

I think thatonemajorproblem thatwe face in trying toconsider“agility” in ahistoricalcontextisthat,intermsofterminologyandjargonitisaveryrecentadditiontoourlexicon.In times past, and not so recent past either, you would be hard pressed to find any RAF officer exceptaPEdOreferringtoagilityasapositiverequirement.

Thishistoricalconsiderationwillthereforeattempttopickuponthemessuchasadaptability,robustness, flexibility, and responsiveness at the individual and organisational levels, together with organisationalculture.SohowdoestheRAFratehistorically?

Thestory,asonemightexpect,isfarfromconstantovertime.AttheverystartofourstoryIthinktherearelegitimatecriticismstobemade.TheveryearlydevelopmentofairpowerintheUKwasratheruneven.Therewere,Ithinkseveralreasonsforthis.Thisstemmedinpartfromtwo factors, first the military conservatism of the British Army and Royal Navy at the time – both weresomewhathideboundinstitutionswhichwerenotparticularlywelladaptedinstitutionallyor organisationally to adopting new, indeed potentially revolutionary, technologies. Secondly,aeronauticsatthetimewasveryclearlyanextremelydangerouspursuit,andwasthusayoungman’sgame.Acombinationwherebyknowledgeandenthusiasmareconcentratedatajuniorranklevelwithinapowerfullyhierarchicalandsomewhatconservativeorganisationisnotconducivetothoughtfulandrapidprogress.IthinktheearlyhistoryoftheRFCandRNAS,particularlypre-war, shows a number of relatively junior officers trying simultaneously to demonstrate the utility ofanewtechnologywithintheframeworkofexistingmilitaryroles,notablyreconnaissance,tosome rather sceptical seniors. At the same time these self-same junior officers were attempting toexploreandextendtheenvelopeofpotentialairpowerrolestodirectattacketc.andtodoso when neither the weapons, nor frankly the aircraft, were sufficiently capable. It is a difficult task simultaneouslytobothproselytiseandmaintainarapidpaceofdevelopmentwithoutexposingone’s flank to the sceptics all too ready to pour scorn on one’s efforts should they fall short in somerespectorother.

The aviation pioneers also ran across influences other than scepticism which were far from benign. Thus, we find the early structure of the Royal Flying Corps, as originally proposed by the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was to be a model ofjointery, intended to have a Naval Wing, a Military Wing and a unified Central Flying School1,butisrapidlyunderminedbyinter-servicerivalrywhichdestroysthisstructureandeventuallyseestheformationofaseparateRoyalNavalAirServicewhichgoesitsownway.Originally,theWarOffice had agreed that it held responsibility for the air defence of the UK, including London itself andimportantmilitarysitessuchasRNdockyards,WoolwichArsenal,munitionsfactoriesetc.Aslate as June 1914, just weeks before the outbreak of war, the War Office had no scheme for home defencebut insisted that it remained their responsibility and that any availableNaval aircraftshould operate under Army control. At the same time War Office plans called for the despatch of allavailablesquadronstoFranceontheoutbreakofwar,andwhenwarcameinAugusttheydulydecampedenmasseoverthehorizonleavingjustafewsecondlineaircraft,noneofwhichwerearmedwithanythingmorelethalthanthecrew’spersonalweapons.Whilstthiswasanimpressiveexampleofearlyexpeditionaryprowessit lefttheUKlargelydefencelessagainsttheGermanZeppelins,thoughfortunatelythelatterwerenofurtheradvancedintheirpreparationsforWar.

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Churchill, at the time First Lordof theAdmiralty, bravely, though perhaps unwisely, acceptedresponsibilityforhomeairdefenceon3September1914,thustakingoverataskwhichtheWarOffice had insisted was solely its own just two months earlier. Churchill knew very well that he hadpotentiallytakenonapoisonedchalice,statingthattheRNASwas“powerless”topreventthedeathofcivilians.Hesoughttopre-emptcriticismbyreferringto“theobviouslimitsofourresponsibility”2.HisprincipalmotiveforacceptingthetaskwasalmostcertainlyaconvictionthatNavalbasesandother importanttargetsneededsomeprotection,andsince itwasclearthattheArmywouldnotorcouldnotdosohehadallowedthelattertoevadetheconsequencesoftheirownpre-warobduracy.

Notallpoliticianswouldbewillingtoaccepttheriskofseverepubliccriticismbecausetheyconsideredthepolicyadoptedthecorrectone.

MuchoftheearlydisputesbetweentheRFCandRNASwereconcernedwithattemptstoobtainsuitableaircraftandequipment.Theearlystructureoftheaviationarmshadmadethisalmostinevitablebyfailingtoestablishaproperbureaucraticstructureforaircraftprocurementwhen there was only a very narrow industrial base to support attempts at rapid expansioninbothnaval andmilitary air arms. In strugglingwith the lackof a suitable industrial base intheUK,withenginesupply inparticularbeing largelydependent intheearlyyearsonFrenchmanufacturers, the two Service began to fight each other, and the early attempts at creating bodies to ameliorate or manage this largely failed (see below)3.As engine development wascrucialtoexploitingthefullpotentialitiesofairpowerthiswasamajorproblem.Italsocausedincreasinginter-servicetensions.

Thesetensionsoversupplyquicklyspilledoverintotheoperationalarena.TheRNASIthinkproveditselfrathermoreinnovativeandagilethantheRFC.Thelatterwasslowtothinkofairpowerintermsofanythingmuchmorethanreconnaissance,withoccasionalairattacks,usuallyonrailwaytargetsjustbehindthefront.TheRNAShowever,showedearlyinterestinstrategicairattack.TheyattackedtheZeppelinshedsatDusseldorfandCologneinOctober1914,destroyingaZeppelininitsshed.LaterontheyestablishedabombingWingatLuxieulwhich,drawingonlongnavaltradition,addressedamongstotherthingsthevexedproblemoflongdistancenavigation,aswellastargetingandbomb-aiming4.Thedeeperpenetrationofenemyterritoryimplicitinsuchoperations brought the two Services into open conflict, since whichever of the RNAS or RFC was given the responsibility that service would have first call on the large aircraft with more powerful engineswhichwerebeginningtocomeintoservice.Inaddition,SirDouglasHaigobjectedtotheLuxieulWingoperating fromFranceagainstGermany, i.e. conducting independentoperationsfromwithinhistheatreofoperations.TheAdmiralty’sDirectorofAirServicescomplained“Itisthe same story, the War Office want to stop our long distance bombing in order to get hold of ourenginesandmachines…”.5TheArmygotitswayandtheWingwaswithdrawn.Meanwhilethe JointWarAirCommittee, a bodywithbothRFCandRNAS representativesunderLordDerby,whichhadbeenestablishedtooverseesuchquestions,provedincapableofresolvingtheproblemsofallocationlargelybecausetheAdmiraltyprovedunwillingtocompromise.EventuallytheJWACbrokeupwhenDerbyandtheindependentmemberLordMontagu,resigned.

Inessence,althoughtheRNASwereundoubtedly the innovatorsat theoperational level,theirabsoluteintransigenceintheJWACdestroyedtheCommitteeandultimatelyworkedtotheirdisadvantage.Almostpreciselythesamethinghappenedwiththesuccessororganisation,knownastheCurzonAirBoard.ItwasallverywellbeingfortheRNAStobeagilethinkersinoperational terms, but their lack of adaptability in the Whitehall battlefield proved ultimately

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counter-productive. Admiral Sir David, later Lord, Beatty, complained that the existingestablishmentofnavalorganisation“killsprogress”6.SowiththeRNASwehaveanoperationallyinnovativeServicewhichislessagilethanitoughttohavebeenbecauseoforganisationalandculturalshortcomings,particularlywithregardtotheappointmentofnon-aviatorstopositionsof influence within its supporting bureaucracy resulting in what one historian has termed the “recalcitrance…ofoldseadogsinhighcommand”.7

The fossils at the Admiralty were ultimately outmanoeuvred by those officers, principally but notexclusivelyfromtheRFC,whosawthatthepotentialofairpowercouldonlybefullyexploitedbyafullyindependentservice.PrincipalamongstthemwasoneGeneralSirDavidHenderson,ofthegreatunsungheroesofBritishmilitaryaviation,andLordHughCecil,whohadservedatGHQinFranceandbelievedferventlythatairoperationsneededtobedirectedbypeoplewithanunderstandingoftheenvironmentinwhichtheyoperated.Mostpeoplehere,Ihopeandtrust,willhaveheardofFieldMarshalSmuts,andwillknowthatitwashisrecommendationsdrawnupasaresultofGermanairraidsontheUKin1917,whichleddirectlytotheformationoftheRAF.InfactmuchofthevisionarythinkingcontainedintheSmutsReportwasHenderson’s8.Muchof the bureaucratic influence, however, stemmed from a belief that the production problems of previousyearswouldbesolvedin1918,andthata“surplus”ofaircraftwouldbeavailableforoperationsaboveandbeyond thosedirectedat supporting themaritimeandmilitary serviceforces. If that was so it made sense to concentrate and exploit the knowledgeable humanresources in one organisation, namely an independent air service, rather than dispersing theknowledge around existing military organisation where it could not effectively influence and exploitthefutureavailablepotentialofairpower.Thisallsoundsverylinear,withLudditesononeside,andvisionarythinkersontheother.Infact,asalwaysinlifeitwasmorecomplex.ThusTrenchard,thoughherecognisedthecapacityoftheairarmforoperationsatstrategicdepth,wasopposedtothecreationoftheRAFbecausehebelieved,correctlyasithappens,thatthewarwouldbewonorlostontheWesternFront.AdmiralBeatty,ontheotherhand,supportedanindependentairservice,largelyaswehaveseenbecausehebelievednavalbureaucracywasstifling the airmen. Despite its operational agility the RNAS actually contributed little to the debate on unification of the air services. As one historian has written “naval air administration was dominated not by officers of the like of Trenchard, Branker or Henderson, but rather by non-aviators,generallyselectedfortheirsoundnessthanforanyindependenceofthought”9.Theremaybeawarningthere–ifyougoforsoundessyoumaysidelineyouragilethinkers.ThatthelikesofAdmiralMarkKerrwereagilethinkersiswithoutdoubt,thattheylackedreal influence in theAdmiraltyisequallyobvious.AhostileorganisationalcultureandlackofresponsivenessandadaptabilitywithintheAdmiraltyundermineditsowninnovativethinking.

We should not, however, imagine that thiswas limited to theAdmiralty.There are somefascinatingcross-currentsandwhirlpoolsintheearlythinkingoftheRAF.Trenchard,aswehaveseen, was opposed to the new service but ends up as its first CAS, though he falls out with his ministerandresigns.Heispersuadedbackintothefoldbyanewminister,andironicallyendsupcommandingtheIndependentbombingforcewhichwasformedastheresultoftheSmutsreporttoundertakestrategicoperationsagainstGermany.HeagreestothiscommandonlyonconditionthathereportsdirectlytotheMinister,LordWeir,andnottothenewCAS,SirFrederickSykes.HeandSykeshadbeenatloggerheadswitheachothersince1914.Interestingly,however,thisalso ensures that his conduct of operations is subject to no outside scrutiny or influence. The downsideofthis,thoughIdoubtittroubledTrenchardonejot,wasthatthedeepest,mostagile

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ifyouwill,thinkerintheRAFonthestrategicuseofairpowerwasoneMajorTiverton,laterthe Earl of Halsbury, and he was back in London where his influence on operations was minimal. Tivertonwasinmanywaystheforerunneroftoday’soperationsanalysts.Hesetouttoanalyseair operations as scientifically as possible, both in terms of the effects of individual raids, and in termsofpossibletargetingofvulnerablesectorsofanenemyeconomyetc10.Hewaswayaheadofhistime,buttherewaslittleprospectofTrenchardacceptinganyadvice,nevermindcontrolfromWhitehall.

Thisproblem,ofcourse,resurfacesinspadesintheSecondWorldWar,whenamyriadofeconomists,scientists,andMondaymorningquarterbacksbelievethattheyknowexactlyhowthe C-in-C Bomber Command should run his campaign. SirArthur Harris gets a bad press,but I have to say that when you see some of the suggestions that were pressed on him bysupposedly knowledgeable officers in the Directorate of Bomber Operations in the Air Ministry youunderstandwhyhegotsoirritated11.Byandlarge,andbecauseofitscapacitytoattackanumberofdifferentandwidelydispersedtargetssimultaneouslyorsequentially,itisonlywithairpowerthatyougetmajorandcontinuousdisputesoveritsapplicationinvolvingnotjustairmen,but also senior officers of the other services and politicians. They all want a slice of the air power cakebecausetheyrecognisetheimmensecombatpoweritwields,buttheyallwantitfortheirbitofthewarortheirpetscheme,usuallywithouttheslightestconsiderationfortheopportunitycostofwhattheypropose.Nowadays,itisalsoasubjectfordirectinterventiononthepartofthe combat lawyers. The latter may, of course, make your lives more difficult in one way, but they mayalsosaveyoufromaprisoncellintheHague.

Interestingly, many of Tiverton’s ideas on bombing were picked up by a US Air Services officer namedColonelGorrell,whoincorporatedthemmoreorlessverbatiminhisownpaperonairoperationswhichfound itswaybackupthechainofcommandtotheUnitedStatesandwasacceptedasthebasisforplanningfutureUSairpower.ItistoTivertonviaGorrellthatwecantracequitedirectlytheideasconcerningselectiveandprecisetargetingofvulnerableelementsofanenemyeconomywhichweredevelopedbetweenthewarsbytheUSAirCorpsTacticalSchoolatMaxwellAlabama12.ItwaspreciselytheseideaswhichtheUSstrategicbomberforcesattemptedtoputintopracticeoverGermanybetween1942and1945.Ironically,ofcourse,andpartlybecauseTrenchard,whodidnotbelieveinprecisetargeting,heldswayintheRAF,theRAFwasmuchmoreinclinedtotheviewthatmoregeneraltargetingandmoraleffectweremoreimportant.

Yet Trenchard himself was no stranger to agile thinking. He understood very well that his first priorityafterWW1wasnotaircraftatall,butinfrastructureandtraining.Hebelievedthatifhecouldgettherightpeopleandtrainthemproperlytheywouldprovidethecadreforanyfutureexpansion.His innovative thinkingextendednot simply tocreating thenecessary institutions,notablyCranwell,HaltonandtheStaffCollege,butalsotoattractingtherightpeopletothem.Atthattimesecondaryeducationbeyondfourteenhadtobepaidforinmanylocalauthorities.AtHaltonTrenchardprovidedfreeongoingeducationandskilledtradetrainingtoalargenumberofhighqualityboysfromsocialclasseswhohadnoaccesstosucheducation.Notonlydidthisprove extremely attractive, but it provided sufficient numbers of really high quality well trained technicalpersonneltosupporttheService.Furthermore,thetopthreeHaltoncadetseachyearwereoffered free scholarships toCranwell.AtCranwell,where feeswerepayable,Trenchardwanted the Treasury to finance full scholarships for fifteen per cent of the cadets, but the Treasury

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would allow only five of these “King’s Cadetships” per annum. In similar vein Trenchard pioneered theconceptoftheshortservicecommission13.NeitheroftheothertwoServiceshadanythingcomparableandtheirmoretraditionalrecruitingmethodsdidnotproducethesameconsistentlyhighqualityrecruits,particularlyinthejuniorranks.Suchschemeswerenotcheap,andtosomeextent he sacrificed the equipment budget to pay for it, but it most certainly paid off during the SecondWorldWar.ThiswastrulyinnovativethinkingonTrenchard’spart,buthehadthedrive,energy and adaptability to ensure that such schemes did not fall foul of financial or bureaucratic obstacles.Inthisrespecthistoryshowsusthatagilityisnotsimplyanoperationalorstrategicconcept,itappliestotrainingandrecruiting.Indeed,ifweaccepttheideathattheindividualisthekey,thentheseareasareabsolutelyfundamentaltotheabilitytobeagileinthefuture.Whilstyoucannottrainpeopletobeinnovativeyoucanverycertainlydiscourageagilethinking,andhistoricallysomemilitaryorganisationshavebeenprettygoodatdoingthat–blameculturesbeingonesupremelyeffectivemethod.

Trenchard could also be innovative in other ways. It was he who proposed to Churchillthat theRAFwould takeon the taskof defeating the Islamic insurgencywhich sprangup inwhatwasthenBritishSomaliland in1919.TheArmyhad famouslyproposedanexpeditionofseveralbattalionsatacost,eveninthosedays,ofseveralmillionpounds.Trenchardofferedtosend a squadron of DH9s to do the job much more cheaply. He fulfilled his promise, completing themissionagainstAbdullahbin-Hussain’s[knownastheMadMullah]insurrectionatacostofapproximately£100,000. Itwas thisoperationwhich caught the imaginationof theSecretaryofState,Churchill,who incidentallyhadhimselfproposedamission toSomalilandwith threeairshipsin1914duringtheMullah’spreviousinsurrection.WhetherTrenchardknewofChurchill’sproposal five years earlier we do not know, but the CAS surely knew that a proposal to use technology and innovation to solve an old problem, and at reduced cost, was bound to fire the mindofhisSecretaryofState.ItwasthesuccessinSomalilandwhichenabledTrenchardtobuildthe entire edifice of Air Control, particularly in Iraq, which then did so much to preserve the independenceoftheRAFinthefaceoftheconcertedhostilityoftheothertwoservicesinthatpost-warperiod.

IfAirControl andstrugglesover theService’s continuedexistencedominated the1920s,thethirtieswereatimeofwholesaleexpansionandpreparationforwar.HereagaintheRAF’srecordisonthewholecreditable,thoughattimesanover-concentrationonstrategicbombingthreatenedtounbalanceitscontribution.ItisthereforeinpartaparadoxforaServicesupposedlyobsessedwithstrategicbombingtodisplayitsmostinnovativeandstrikingexampleofagilityinthecreationoftheUKairdefencesystem,thoughitistruetosaythatitwasarealunderstandingof what a strategic bomber force might inflict on the UK which inspired its creation. As those of you who have heard me lecture ad nauseum on the subject know, I consider this a trulyremarkable achievement. To create the world’s first integrated air defence system based on radar andsophisticatedtelecommunicationswastrulyindicativeoftheverysoundfoundationswhichTrenchardhadlaidfortheServiceinthepreviousdecade.Radarandtheaircraftandaircrewswould not, of themselves, havewon theBattle of Britain, it required a properly thought outcommandandcontrolsystemtointegratethemintothewhole.Thatdrewonamyriadofskills,not least those of a warrant officer, probably a product of Halton, who designed the interior functioningof thevariousoperationsrooms,whichthoseofyouwhohavebeentosurvivingexampleatUxbridgewillappreciatewasanergonomictriumph.Thisintegrationofabrandnewtechnology, and one not directly related to flying, into an operationally effective system, all within five years of the first “proving” experiment is one of the RAF’s, and indeed the Nation’s, most

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remarkableachievements.Itistoooftenportrayedasthetriumphofone“agile”individual,LordDowding, in defiance of the “system”. Though Dowding’s interest and encouragement were vital, thissimplisticviewpointdoesadisservicetothemanyothersinvolved,andindeedthesystem’sagilityinaccommodatingit.

OntheotherhandtheearlywaryearsofBomberandCoastalCommandsandtacticalco-operationwiththeArmywerefarlesshappy.BomberCommand,andhereTrenchardcertainlymeritscriticism,wasequippedwithadoctrinebutlittleelse.Itsequipmentwasnotwellsuitedto the task, and itsunderstandingof somuch in termsof thebasic requirementsneeded tofulfil its intended role was wide of the mark. Leaving aside the aircraft, its navigation training and equipment was woeful, its bombs poor, and its bombing techniques, if we can call themsuch, simplistic in the extreme14. Once the technical shortcomings were addressed, then theoperationalmatterscouldbedealtwith in turnandthroughacombinationof thoughtfulbutforceful,nottosaybloody-minded,leadership,iteventuallybecameaforceofimmensepower.15Sopowerfulinfact,thatthetendencyImentionedearlierwherebyeverybodythinkstheyknowhowbesttowieldtheweaponcametothefore.BytheendofthewarBomberCommandhadcertainlydemonstratedacapabilityfortakingonawidevarietyoftargetsinawidevarietyofcontextsandintheprocessprobablyproveditselfmoreagilethanitsC-in-Cfoundcomfortable.This flexibility undoubtedly led to the occasional misuse of Bomber Command as a weapon, e.g. itsover-useinaclosesupportrolefortheBritishArmyinNorth-WestEurope,aroleforwhichitwasnotdesignedandtowhichitwasnotgenerallywell-suited.Butwhatthatalsodemonstratesis just how flexible and effective it had become by 1944. There is a regrettable tendency seriously tounderestimatethesophisticationoftheoperationalartinplacewithinBomberCommandbytheendoftheWar.TheCommand’scapacitytohitanddestroyawidevarietyoftargettypesusingavarietyoftechniquesandweaponsispoorlyunderstoodnotjustbythepublicandthemedia, who see only acres of devastated cities, but also, sadly, by too many of today’s RAF officers who have not studied the campaign in the depth required to appreciate its complexity. Forexample,ifyouwanttoseeanexemplaroftacticalagilitylookatthedeceptionmeasuresputintoeffecttospooftheGermannightdefencesduringtheDresdenraid16.

Intacticalairpowertheearlyyearswerejustasdepressing.Pre-wardecisions,notablytheGovernment’sreluctancetocountenanceanylargescalemilitarycommitmenttotheContinent,together with financial parsimony and a reluctance to embrace co-operative roles too openly lest itjeopardisetheService’sindependentstatus,ledtopoorsupportforArmyoperationsinNorway,France,Greeceetc.Thatsaid,however,Ithinkthesensibleandinnovativedoctrinaldevelopmentwhichtookplaceparticularlyunder‘Mary’ConinghamandTedderintheMiddleEast,notonlyredressedthatimbalance,butdidsoreasonablyquickly.InthisregardIthinktheRAFwasfarquickerinadaptingtotherealitiesofthewartheyfacedthantheirArmycounterparts.Ibelieveit is fair tosay that theRAFwasable tomeet theGermansonequal terms inNorthAfricafarearlierintheMiddleEastWarthantheBritishArmy.TheyalsoprovedthemselvesIbelievemoremobileandinnovativethantheirArmycolleaguesinthatcampaign.Iwillgiveyoujustoneexample, Coningham was prepared to send his fighter wings to forward airstrips in advance of theleadingBritishCommonwealthspearheadsandinbehindtheGermansasthelatterfellbackafterAlamein,atatimewhentheArmystillhadanexaggeratedrespectfortheWehrmachtandwaswaryofpressingpursuittooclosely17.ManyofthecommandandcontrollessonsrevealedinthatcampaignanddevelopedbyTedderandConinghamarestillapplicabletodayandarestillnotwellunderstood,inmyopinion,insomequarters.

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CoastalCommandreallywasthepoorrelation,andsuppliesofjustabouteverything,fromsuitableaircrafttofunctioningbombsanddepthcharges,tookanunconscionablylongtimetoreachthefrontline.Inter-servicerivalryandtheresultingstilteddoctrine,combinedwithpooraircraft18andequipmenttorendertheCommand’searlystrugglesinwarlargelyastudyofthetriumphofcharacteroveradversity.Nevertheless,tacticallyandtechnicallyCoastalalsoproveditselfaformidablefoebythemiddle-yearsoftheWar,anditmeritsanequalclaimwiththeRoyalNavyinthedefeatoftheU-boat.

The area in which the RAF continued to struggle almost to the end of theWar was inair transport.This has always rather puzzledme, given that the forgingof air transport linksacrosstheEmpirehadfeaturedsoprominentlyintheService’sinter-warstruggles.Theoccasionaltriumphs, such as the aerial evacuation of Kabul, were insufficient to overcome what I suspect waspartlyaprejudiceagainstwhatwasseenasaroleforcivilians,andthusviewedasprincipallythebusinessofImperialAirwaysandnottheRAF,andpartlyavisceralreluctancetoexploretoodeeply intoroleswhichwereprincipallyconceivedasauxiliarytotheolderServices19.ArthurHarris who commanded 45 Squadron, then flying Vickers Vernons, a primitive transport aircraft, in Iraq was a highly perceptive officer but himself was not without prejudice here. Although I would not criticise his attempts to extend the role of his transport aircraft by fitting bomb racks andsawingaholeinthenosetoallowforprimitivevisualbomb-aiming,hisdescriptionofhisreasoninginconvertinghissquadron’saircraftinthiswayisrevealing.Hewrote“ItimmediatelystruckmethatherewaspotentiallythemostpowerfulpartoftheAirForceinIraq,employedonvirtuallycivildutiesandmaking no serious contribution to our military strength in that part of a very disturbed World”20.Lackofresourcesplayedaparttoo,butthedeeper-seatedreasonswhytheoperationsof,forexample,theVernonsandVictoriasintheMiddleEastwerenotmorecloselystudiedaresurelyrevealedinHarris’scomments21.Hence,theRAFgavealmostnothoughttothepotentialofmilitaryairtransport,whichprovedanexpensivemistakeinthefirst part of the war, when the Luftwaffeprovedthemselvesfarmoreeffectiveintherole,atleastuntilReichsmarshalGoeringemasculatedtheGermanairtransportforceatStalingrad22.Harrisdisplayedadmirableagility inonesense, inextendingthecapacityofhisaircraft,butrigidityinanother,innotexpoundingandexpandingtheexistingroleheinherited.

Inthetimeavailabletherehasonlybeentheopportunityheretoscratchthesurfaceofthissubject inhistorical terms.Nevertheless, I hope it has given you some food for thought, notleastinsuggestingthatbureaucraticandinstitutionalfactorsplayalargepart,andalsothat,asTrenchardhimselfdemonstrated,agilethinkingextendswaybeyondtheoperationalsphere.

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1 On the early structure see SirWalter RaleighTheWar in theAirVol 1 (OUP, Oxford, 1922), pp.198-199; Malcolm CooperThe Birth ofIndependentAirPower(Allen&Unwin,London,1986)pp.7-8;CaptSWRoskill(ed)DocumentsRelatingtoTheNavalAirService(NavyRecordsSociety,London,1969)pp33-37

2Cooper,Op.Cit.,p.14.WSChurchill,TheWorldCrisis1911-1914,(ThorntonButterworth,London,1923)312-13.3Cooper,Op.Cit,pp.15-16.4NevilleJones,TheOriginsofStrategicBombing:AStudyoftheDevelopmentofBritishAirStrategicThoughtandPracticeupto1918(London,

Kimber,1973),passim.5Roskill(Ed),Op.Cit.,p.365,MinutebyRearAdmiralVaughn-Lee,5June1916.Cooper,Op.Cit.,p.1016Ibid.,andJohnSweetman,TheSmutsReportof1917:MerelyPoliticalWindowDressing?inJournalofStrategicStudies,June1981,p.161.7SeeespeciallySweetman,loc.cit.8Cooper,Op.Cit.,p.101.9OnTivertonseeTamiDavisBiddle,RhetoricandRealityinAirWarfare–theevolutionofBritishandAmericanIdeasaboutStrategicBombing,

(PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonandOxford,2002),pp.38-40.11Forexamplesofsomeofthesesuggestions,memorablytermed“panaceas”byHarris,seeDrNobleFrankland’scommentsquotedinSebastian

Cox’sIntroductiontoSirArthurHarris:DespatchonWarOperations(FrankCass,London,1995)p.xix.12OntheTiverton/GorrelllinkseeBiddle,Op.Cit.,pp.54-55.SeealsoSebastianCox“Anglo-USCo-operation”inAirPowerReview,Vol.7No.

4,pp.19-20.[TheArticlewasprintedunderanerroneouspartialtitle,whichshouldproperlyhavereadAnglo-USCo-operationintheFirstWorldWar]

13SeeEBHaslamCranwell,pp.23-25andJohnJamesThePaladins,(MacDonald&Co,London,1990)especiallyChapters6&8.14OnthetechnicalshortcomingsseeBiddleOp.Cit.,pp.122-123,andSirCharlesWebsterandNobleFranklandTheBombingOffensiveAgainst

Germany(HMSO,London,19614Vols.),Vol1,passim.15OnleadershipinBomberCommandseeHenryProbert,BomberHarris–hisLifeandTimes,(Greenhill,London,2001),especiallyChapter10.16OntheoperationalaspectsoftheDresdenraidseeSebastianCox,TheDresdenRaids:WhyandHow,inPaulAddisonandJeremyCrang(Eds),

Firestorm:thebombingofDresden,1945(Pimlico,London,2006).17VincentOrange,Coningham,(Methuen,London,1990),Chapter9.18OnewartimeC-in-CwroteofCoastalCommandbeing“accustomedtogettingthe‘leavings’”.SirPhilipJoubertdelaFerte,BridsandFishes

(Hutchinson,London,1960),p.130.19 For insights into Imperial Airways see D C T Bennett, Pathfinder (Frederick Mueller, London, 1958)20Probert,op.cit.,p.52.Emphasisadded.21ThelaterhistoryofairtransportiscoveredbytheAirHistoricalBranchhistoryofRAFTransportCommand–HumphreyWynn,Forgedin

War:aHistoryofRoyalAirForceTransportCommand1943-1967(HMSO,London,1996),butsadlyithasnothingtosayabouttheinter-warperiod.

22On thedestructionof theLuftwaffe air transport forceatStalingrad see theexcellentworkby JoelHayward, StoppedatStalingrad:TheLuftwaffeandHitler’sDefeatintheEast1942-1943,(UniversityPressofKansas,Kansas,1996),especiallyChapters8-10.

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The lUFTWAFFe’S AgiliTY: AN ASSeSSMeNT oF releVANT coNcePTS AND PrAcTiceS

Dr Joel hayward1

AstudyoftheRoyalAirForce’sworthyaspirationtoincreaseitsagilitywouldbeincompletewithoutat leastsomeanalysisoftheair forcethatseemstoembodyexactlythatquality:theLuftwaffeof1939to1945.

It is fashionable among modern warfighters to lavish praise on the Wehrmacht; the army, air forceandnavyoftheNazistate.LaudatoryanalysisoftheWehrmacht’soperationalartseemsaninherentcomponentofbooksandarticlesthatattempttoexplainthetheoryandpracticeof jointery, the manoeuvrist approach, and the expeditionary nature of today’s armed conflict. Commenting harshly upon the fixation that modern western warfighters seem to have with the Germans,DanielP.Bolgerlamentedthat“Maneuveristshaveabadcaseofwhatmaybecalled,toborrowfromasistersocialscience,‘Wehrmachtpenisenvy.’”Thesedevotees,Bolgerwrites,“lovethePanzers,theStukas,andtheSturmundDrangwiththeenthusiasmofanytwelve-year-oldboywhohasyettolearnaboutKursk,OmahaBeach,orOperationCobra,letaloneBergenBelsen.”2

Yetthefashionisnotwithoutfoundationormerit.TheWehrmachtworkedforanunbalancedandcruelregimeanditsfrequentlyweirdstrategies,butnonethelessexcelledatwar’soperationallevel.ItperformedsomarvellouslyatthatlevelthatittookthecombinedweightoftheSovietUnion,theUnitedStates,theBritishEmpireandotherstoenditsexistence.Modernwarriorswill indeed learn much from studying Wehrmacht warfighting.

ThisshortstudyofLuftwaffeattributesandhabitsisunrelatedtothefad.Evenifno-oneelsebotheredtostudytheWehrmachtIwouldfeelcompelledtohighlightitsinstructionalvalueformodernairforcesastheyfaceunforeseenchallengesintheambiguousstrategicenvironmentleftaftertheColdWar’sendandtheWaronTerror’sbeginning.

“TheAgileAir Force” is the overarching theme of this conference and its proceedings.“Agility” is a quality highly desired by those air officers and strategists who want to keep the RAF very efficient and effective as it serves Her Majesty’s Government in both the pursuit of security andtheconductofanethicalforeignpolicy.AccordingtoBritishmilitarydoctrine,“agility”hasfour attributes: robustness, responsiveness, flexibility and adaptability.3

While I agree with this doctrinal definition, I see agility as something more fluid and intangible thanitsfourdrydescriptorssuggest.

Agilityisanorganicquality;theabilityofalivingthingtomoveswiftly,seamlesslyandskilfullythroughvariouscomplicatedandsometimesdissimilarmotions. ItmightseemasthoughIamdescribingadecathlete;someonewhocompetesintenrunning,jumpingandthrowingeventsto

1DrJoelHaywardistheDeanoftheRoyalAirForceCollege,Cranwell.2DanielP.Bolger,“ManeuverWarfareReconsidered,”inRichardD.Hooker,Jr.,ManeuverWarfare:AnAnthology(Novato,CA:Presidio,1993),p.27.3JtHLOC,CappingPaper,para.2,asarticulatedinFutureAirandSpaceOperationalConcept,p.2.

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provehimselfthebestall-roundathlete.Itiscertainlytruethatthedecathleteisagileaccordingto the doctrinal description: he is responsive, robust, flexible and adaptable.

Yetanevenmoreaccuratelyanalogousactivitymightbethe“tumbling”ofagymnast.Throwinghimself through a long, tortuously difficult and variously paced set of somersaults, twists, rolls and othercontortionsthegymnast’sgreatestchallengeistousethemomentumandkineticenergygenerated to carry him through the routine whilst constantly and instantly repositioning hiscentreofgravitysothathedoesn’tunbalance,tripandsprawlheadlong.Thatistrueagility.

Usingthefourattributesofagilityascribedindoctrineasalooseframework,IwillanalysetheLuftwaffe’sagilityinordertodeterminethenatureandscopeofthatalmostorganicquality.IwilltrytoshedatleastalittlelightontheLuftwaffe’sunusualabilitytothrowitselfrapidlyinandoutofdistinctactivitiesinallphasesandatalllevelsofwar,tomaintainveryhightempo,andyetsomehowtokeepitsbalance.

Robustness

WhenHermannGöringassumedcommandofthebrand-newLuftwaffein1935heandhisseniorcommandersimmediatelycommenceddevelopingitintoaphysicallyresilientforcewithmenandmachinescapableofenduringlongperiodsofhighstressinavarietyofenvironments.Rather thanchoosing tocreate separate,essentiallymono-functionalcommandsas theRoyalAirForcedid in19364, theLuftwaffe formedhuge self-contained,multi-functionaloperationalcommands called Luftflotten (Air Fleets).

Each Luftflotte comprised all types of air combat units (reconnaissance, transport, fighter, ground-attack, dive-bomber, and bomber) as well as ground-based signals and flak units. The transfer of the latter from the Army to the Luftwaffe, in order to protect airfields and to aid in the air superiority battle, greatly strengthened the physical toughness of each Luftflotte5.Thismutuallysupportingintegrationofaircraftandanti-aircraftartillerywasyearsaheadofitstime.

A Luftflotte was immense, growing throughout WWII to become the air equivalent of an entireGermanarmygroup.ItwasnonethelesscapableofbeingdeployedinfulltoanyEuropeanandMediterraneantheatreofoperations,where itwouldpartneranarmygroup.Or itcouldbe deployed in subordinate, army-sized commands called Fliegerkorps (Air Corps). EachFliegerkorpswas itselfasmallerversionof itsparent;self-containedand fullymulti-functional,capableofundertaking—eithersequentiallyorsimultaneously,cooperativelyorindependently—virtually the entire rangeof airmissions fromair superiority to reconnaissance, close airsupport, interdiction and independent bombing. Fliegerkorpswere, in that sense, not entirelydissimilartotheExpeditionaryAirWingsthattheRAFiscurrentlycreating.

Each Luftflotte possessed one or more partnering Luftgau (Air District). These Luftgaue were administrative organisations designed to manage the fleet’s principal training, procurement, supply,repairandmaintenanceaffairs,aswellasthecreationandupkeepof fueldepots,main

4 With Fighter Command, Bomber Command, Coastal Command, Training Command and later Ferry (finally renamed as Transport) Command.5 The best treatment of the integration of flak artillery into the Luftwaffe is still Horst-Adalbert Koch, Flak: Die Geschichte der deutschen

Flakartillerie,1935-1945(BadNauheim:Podzun,1954).

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operating bases and deployed airfields. Without direct daily responsibility for those time-intensiveadministrativematterstheoperationalcommanderswereabletoconcentratefarmoreexclusivelyontheirkeytask:defeatingtheenemyinbattle6.

During wartime the Luftgaue served as the logistical lifeline between the Reich and thevarious highly mobile in-theatre Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps, which were sometimes fighting over one thousandmilesoutside theReich’spre-warborders.Upuntil inexorableSovietvictoriesbegan to crush the Wehrmacht in 1944 the system worked well. During periods of fluid combat andfastmanoeuvretheLuftgaueworkedundergreatpressure,butgenerallymanagedtokeepairunits repaired, maintained and operating from often hastily constructed airfields right behind the Army’sforwardlinesatwhatwas,byWWIIstandards,anextraordinarydailysortierate.

The ability of the Luftgaue hastily to create adequately functioning airfields on rough strips ofpastureorsteppe,forinstance,allowedvariouswidelyseparatedFliegerkorpstoloanwholewings toeachotherat relatively shortnoticewhenopportunitiesorcrisesemerged.Duringthree days in mid-May 1942, for instance, Luftflotte 4 frenetically transferred over 360 fighters, dive-bombersandbombers300milesnorthfromtheCrimeatotheKharkovregiontobluntanunexpectedmassiveSovietoffensive7.

Aircraft flew into airfields that had been hurriedly transformed from empty steppes and rough crop fields. Thanks to the exhausting work of highly mobile Luftgau “special staffs”,8andassociated air, army and Reich Labour Service battalions, they were each able to fly up to eight combatsortiesperdaythroughouttherestofMay.9Theyhadahugeimpact.

ArelievedGeneraloberst(Colonel-General)FranzHalder,ChiefoftheArmyGeneralStaff,notedinhisdiarythattheforceoftheSovietattackhadapparently“beenbrokenbytheeffortsofourLuftwaffe.”10

Responsiveness

AlthoughbothdoctrineandwartimenecessitytiedtheLuftwaffetoarmycooperationtoa greater degree than that experienced by the RAF and the USAAF, the Luftwaffe generallyproved both sensitive to minor fluctuations within and around the battle-space and able to react quickly when opportunities or crises emerged. Even during the pre-war years the Luftwaffeemphasised, and validated duringwar games, the importanceof keeping the optimal ratio ofspecialised short andmedium-range reconnaissance aircraft atmore than tenper centof allcombattypes11. During the first three and a half years of war, in particular, the Luftwaffe possessed proportionately farmorereconnaissanceaircraft thandid theRedAirForce, itsgreatest foe,andRAFtacticalcommands.WhenBarbarossastartedon22June1941reconnaissanceaircraftcomposed eighteen per cent of the Luftwaffe’s total fleet.12

6Karl-HeinzVölker,“DatenzurGliederungundOrganizationderLuftwaffe,”WehrwissenschaftlicheRundschau,4,April1967,pp.113-114;JoelHayward,StoppedatStalingrad:TheLuftwaffeandHitler’sDefeat in theEast,1942-1943 (Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressofKansas,1998.2001ed.),pp.xi-xii.

7Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv[hereafter:BA-MA]N671/9:Dr.WolframFrhr.vonRichthofen,Generalfeldmarschall.PersönlichesKriegstagebuch[hereafter:RichthofenTB]:Band9:1.1.-31.12.1942,entryfor12May1942.

8LuftgaustäbezurbesondererVerwendung.9JoelHayward,“TheGermanUseofAirpoweratKharkov,May1942”,AirPowerHistory,Vol.44,No.2(Summer1997),pp.18-29.10FranzHalder,Kriegstagebuch:TäglicheAufzeichnungendesChefsdesGeneralstabesdesHeeres,1939–1942(Stuttgart:Kohlhammer,1965),

Volume3,p.442.11Forabasicbreakdownof theLuftwaffe’scomposition, strengthandserviceabilityrates inall theatres throughout thewarseeWilliamson

Murray’sclassic,StrategyforDefeat:TheLuftwaffe,1933-1945(MaxwellAFB:AirUniversityPress,1983).ForathoroughassessmentoftheLuftwaffe’scomposition,strengthandserviceabilityratesinRussiasee‘StoppedatStalingrad’.

12 BA-MA RL 2 III/713: Vortrag über die Einsatzbereitschaft der fliegenden Verbände, Stand: 21.6.1941, GenSt. Gen.Qu. 6. Abt. (I) vom 24.6.1941.

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UnderLuftwaffecommandbutassignedtoarmyformationsandtheirtacticalcontrol13,short-rangereconnaissanceunitsroutinelyprovidedtheArmywithapleasingquantityandqualityofinformation in a highly timely fashion, thus enhancing the operational tempo and flexibility of bothservices.

AftertheBattleofKharkovinMay1942,forexample,GeneraloberstEwaldvonKleist,GOCof the First Panzer Army, profusely praised Fliegerkorps IV’s “tireless” reconnaissance fliers, who gavehim“aclearpictureoftheenemyatalltimes”andallowedhimtooperatewithnotabledexterity.14

Moreover, because medium-range reconnaissance units (mainly flying Do17s) remained under Luftwaffecommand,andwereboundlesstightlytoarmyunitsthantheirshort-rangebrethren,they were free to roam far behind the battlefield without too many army accusations that theywerenotdoing“theirjob”.Somecoveredtrulylongdistances.Tomaximisethereachandsurvivabilityofdangerouslong-rangeobservationandphotographicreconnaissancemissions,theLuftwaffeoperatednumeroussquadronsofpermanentlyconvertedbombers,includingJu88sandHe111s.Itevenoftensentregularbombersinroutinesquadronserviceoutonreconnaissancemissionswhenbriefpausesinoperationalactivitypermitted.15

Inordertoeaseandspeedthegathering, interpretationanddisseminationof informationtheLuftwaffedevelopedadecentralisednetworkofhighlymobilephotolabs,radiointerceptionunits, intelligence cells and telephone and wireless signals teams spread out across manyairfields in each Fliegerkorps operational area. Flexibility was the buzz-word. The system had to beimmediatelyresponsive.Delayswerenottolerated.AfterthewartheUSWarDepartmentobservedthat, inordertokeepthissystemhighlyeffective,theLuftwaffeexpandeditssignalsserviceproportionately throughout thewarmore than anyother armorelement.16At leastduring the first four years this resulted in impressive flexibility.

Intelligenceassessmentswentimmediatelyanddirectlytolocalcombatsquadronandwingcommanders(aswellastohigherauthorities,ofcourse)sothattheycouldrespondimmediatelyas tactical circumstances demanded and opportunities emerged without having to wait forintelligence, guidance and orders to filter down through the chain of command.

Thispatternappearstoreinforceacommonperceptionamongtoday’smanoeuvriststhatGermanarmy,airandnavalcommandershabituallyemployedthehighlydecentralised,tempo-enhancingcommandconceptknownasAuftragstaktik,or“missioncommand”.17According tothisconcept:

• The commander should trust his well-trained subordinates to respond to changingcircumstances responsibly, creatively andwith initiative in his absence because of thesubordinates’farmoreintimateandimmediatesituationalawareness.

13UnitedStatesAirForceHistoricalResearchAgency[USAFHRA]512.625-3:Br.AirIntelligence,A.I.3.E.,ArmyCooperationintheGAF:TheDutiesandResponsibilitiesofReconnaissanceUnits,29.7.43.

14BA-MARL10/473a:GeneralkommandodesIV.Fliegerkorps,Adj.IIa.,Gefechtsstand,1.Juni1942,gez.vonKleist.15Cf.BA-MARL8/86:FliegerführerSüd,Tageseinsatz-Meldungen,24February1942.16U.S.WarDepartmentTechnicalManualTM-E30-451:HandbookonGermanMilitaryForces,15March1945,p.X-II.17ExplanationsofAuftragstaktik(lit.“task-tactics”)arenowcommoninworksonmanoeuvrewarfare,butareliableplacetostartisstillRobert

Leonhard,TheArtofManeuver:Maneuver-WarfareTheoryandAirLandBattle(NewYork:Presidio,1991),pp.113-116.

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• Toensurethatthesubordinates’decisionsandactionsconformtooverallobjectives,thecommander should ensure that they always know what results he intends (usually defined astheconditionorpositionhewantedtheenemytobeinaftertheengagement).

• Ordersatalllevelsshouldbeshort,simple,easilyunderstoodandnon-prescriptive.

Weshouldnotexaggerate thedegree towhich theGermanmilitaryhabituallyemployedAuftragstaktik.Evenduringthesuccessfulcampaignsof1939to1942onlyaminorityofWehrmachtofficers understood, liked, or (as the quality of staff training decreased during wartime) were adequately taught to practice the concept effectively.Then, as overwhelming enemy strengthbegan to crush theWehrmacht after 1943, creative offensive actions petered out, thereafterreplacedbyreactivedefensiveoperations.

Yet,liketheGermanArmy,theLuftwaffediddecentraliseoperationalandtacticalcommandrelationships,andpermitthespontaneous,initiative-drivenseizureofopportunities,toagreaterdegreethanitsSoviet,AmericanandBritishcounterparts.Decision-makinggenerallyoccurredatthelowestpossiblelevelinthecommandchain,andeventheLuftwaffeOperationsStaffdirectedin May 1941 that it might often be necessary to by-pass various levels in order to maintaintempoandinitiative.18ColonelRobertPötter,abombercommanderinRussia,summarisedhisexperienceofeffectiveAuftragstaktikwithintheLuftwaffe:"Weweretoldwhatwehadtodo,butnothowtodoit."19

This command style enhanced both responsiveness and flexibility, at least in the years before war-wearinesssetin.In1945theU.S.WarDepartmentexpressedgrudgingpraisethat“Germantacticaldoctrinesstresstheresponsibilityandtheinitiativeofsubordinates.”20Amistakenbeliefthat the German forces “were inflexible and lacking in initiative has been completely destroyed in this war, in which aggressive and daring leadership has been responsible for many bolddecisions.”WhileitmentionedtheGermanArmyespecially,theWarDepartment’sassessmentequallyappliedtotheLuftwaffe,whichwasunsurprisinginlightofthefactthatthebattle-spaceintegrationoftheArmyandtheLuftwaffe,atalllevels(inminorengagements,largebattlesandvastcampaigns)exceededmostAlliedefforts.Forexample, armyregimentsanddivisionsandlocal Luftwaffe wing-sized commands often swapped reconnaissance information and otherintelligencedirectly.Withoutmuch(ifany)involvementfromtheirparentdivisional,corpsandFliegerkorps headquarters, they sometimes closely coordinated their almost-spontaneous,collaborativeexploitationofemergentopportunitiesorresponsetothreatsorcrises.

Thispracticehadthepotentialtocreateinnumerablesmallandunconnectedairefforts,withindividual units fighting their own battles without much coordination. Such a situation would obviouslyhavedissipatedtheenormouseffectthatairpowercangeneratewhenconcentrated.21Yetthisseldomhappened.FliegerkorpsandLuftdivisioncommandersmaynothaveinitiatedalloperations, but they and their staffs attentively monitored them as the information flow permitted and,whennecessary,coordinatedorreshapedthemtocreatethedesiredfocusandeffect.

18 BA-MA RH 27-18/4: Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe Führungsstab, Ia 1440/41 geheim, Taktisches Merkblatt für die Führung vonNahkampfverbänden,8.5.41.

19LonnieRatley,“ALessonofHistory:TheLuftwaffeandBarbarossa,”AirUniversityReview,Vol.34,No.3(March-April1983),p.57.20U.S.WarDepartmentTechnicalManualTM-E30-451:HandbookonGermanMilitaryForces,15March1945,p.IV-I.21ForaLuftwaffeGeneralmajor’sdiscussionofthispotentialweakness,see:USDepartmentoftheArmyMS#B791a:“TheCollaborationbetween

the Army and the Luftwaffe: Support of the Army by the Luftwaffe on the Battlefield.” Translation by Charles E. Weber of the PW Report of GeneralKarlHeinrichSchulz,12December1947.

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TheLuftwaffealwaystookprideinitsresponsiveness,especiallywhenjointoperationswereinvolved.Itdidnotwant—andseldomgot—accusationsthatitfailedtocooperateinatimelyfashionorwithappropriateactionsatthedesiredplace.GeneralfeldmarschallAlbertKesselringwas sodetermined thathispartneringarmy inRussiawouldget full and timely support thathe told his Luftflotte 2 staff and commanders that they were to consider the Army’s wishes as ordersissuedbyhim.22Kesselring’sdesiretoprovidefullandtimelycooperationwasnotunusual.Commonpracticebasedondoctrine—includingthekeystoneConduct of the Air Warpublishedin 193523 — ensured that, alongside the prosecution of some independent air missions, theLuftwaffeandtheArmyworkedtogetherratherwell.Incloseconsultationonadailybasis,ideallyfromco-locatedheadquarters,24 operational commanders and their staffs fromboth servicesironedoutminorconceptualdifferences,meticulouslycoordinatedtheintegrationoftheirforcesand identified joint Schwerpunkte (lit. “heavy points”).

Tocreatethesefocalpointstheycarefullychosethegeographicalpositionineachtheatreorsectorthattheyjointlyconsideredtobetheoptimalplacetounbalancetheenemyforce’scentreofgravitythroughsynchronisedattack.

VariationsofthispracticeexistedwithintheSovietandotherAlliedforces,ofcourse,andtheRAF’s Tactical Air Forces of the war’s final two years spring quickly to mind. Yet the Germans were unusually flexible in the way they scrutinised and amended their Schwerpunkte repeatedly each day during periods of high tempo or unusual fluidity. During the June 1942 Battle of Sevastopol, forinstance,FieldMarshalErichvonManstein,GOCEleventhArmy,andGeneraloberstWolframFreiherr von Richthofen, GOC FliegerkorpsVIII, oversaw their joint battle in total harmonyand usually from shared command posts.With intelligence gained mainly by Richthofen’s airreconnaissancesquadrons,theyconstantlyswitchedtheirSchwerpunktfromplacetoplaceasthe battle ebbed and flowed. Their Schwerpunkt on 3 June was the defensive line facing the 30th ArmyCorpssouthofSevastopol,on4JunethelinefacingtheRumaniansintheeast,andon5Junethatfacingthe54thArmyCorpsinthenorth.On6Juneitwasagainthelinefacingthe30thArmyCorps.25

Flexibility

AtthetacticalandoperationallevelstheLuftwafferoutinelydemonstratedacceptable,andsometimes excellent, flexibility when it encountered unexpected or heavy stresses that might have confounded or broken more rigid air forces. At the heart of its warfighting flexibility lay a spirit of “ad hocery,” a perception among Luftflotte and Fliegerkorps commanders that, when particular needs demanded, they could fragment, transform and reassemble their commandstructures as they saw fit without having to argue a case to do so with the Luftwaffe’s strategic-levelauthority,theOberkommandoderLuftwaffe(HighCommandoftheLuftwaffe).

Particularly during tough defensive battles it was not uncommon for a Fliegerkorps orLuftdivisioncommandertoselectaskilled,toughandtrustedlieutenant-colonelorcoloneland

22HorstBoog,DiedeutscheLuftwaffenführung,1935-1945:Führungsprobleme,Spitzengliederung,Generalstabsausbildung(Stuttgart,DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt,1982),p.196.

23LuftwaffeDienstvorschrift16:DieLuftkriegführung(Berlin,1935).Thebest,althoughnotcomplete,translationofthisimportantdocumentisprovidedinJamesS.CorumandRichardR.Muller,TheLuftwaffe’sWayofWar:GermanAirForceDoctrine1911-1945(Baltimore:NauticalandAviation,1998),pp.118-157.

24 BA-MA RH 27-18/4: Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe Führungsstab, Ia 1440/41 geheim, Taktisches Merkblatt für die Führung vonNahkampfverbänden,8.5.41.

25BA-MAN671/9:RichthofenTB:Band9,entriesfor3-7June1942.

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havehimcreateanewaircombatgroupwiththesoletaskofbluntinganenemyadvanceorregaining the initiative. Often named after that “heroic” officer to enhance its focus, cohesion and élan; the makeshift formation would get its own airfields, supporting infrastructure and logistics networks. It would fight furiously until its mission at the new Schwerpunkt ended, perhaps in a weekoramonth,whereuponitscomponentsquadronswouldreturntotheiroriginalwings,orbereassembledintoanotherad-hocformation.26

Sometimes these ad-hoc formations were vast and hardly of a minor tactical nature. For

example,whenitbecamecleartoRichthofenon25January1943thatelementsoftheretreatingGermanSeventeenthArmyfacedencirclementintheTamanPeninsula,heorderedGeneralleutnant(LieutenantGeneral)MartinFiebig,GOCFliegerkorpsVIII,tothrowtogetherahugetemporaryairlift command to protect and supply that army while it evacuated it, bit by bit, back to theCrimea.27Truetoform,Fiebigworkedfeverishlytocreatethisnewcommand.HeorderedLuftgauadministrators, pioneer battalions and signals teams to create and equip new airfields and expand existing ones. He began skilfully plucking reconnaissance, fighter, bomber and transport squadrons from various wings throughout FliegerkorpsVIII’s vast theatre — thinning those wings by onesquadroneach—andassemblingbrand-newwingsandgroupsfromthem.Withindayshecreatedafullcommand,LufttransporteinsatzKrim(AirTransportMissionCrimea),whichimmediatelybeganits main missions, protected by its own fighters. It proved highly effective, evacuating no fewer than 50,000Germantroopswithinamonthandcarryingadailyaverageof500tonsoffuel,ammunitionandrationsacrosstothosewhoremained.Onsomedaysthead-hoccommandevacuated5,000menandcarriedacross700tonsofsupplies.28

All the examples of Luftwaffe flexibility presented here relate to the joint battle-space involving both the Army and the Luftwaffe. That is understandable. Joint warfighting was the Luftwaffe’sbreadandbutter.Criticsmightargue,therefore,thattheLuftwaffewaseveronlyasflexible as the army it partnered, and was not independently flexible. That is a fair criticism, as far asitgoes.YetitignoresthefactthattheLuftwaffeunderstooditsroleverywell,andalthoughitsoperationalcommandersoccasionallyfumedaboutthelackofindependentmissions—army-friendlyRichthofen himself oncehissed that the Luftwaffewas“theArmy’swhore”29— theyappliedanincontestablelogic:toenhancetheirown flexibility they needed to enhance the Army’sflexibility. They applied this logic with commendable commitment, and raised the flexibility of the jointeffortasaresult.

Adaptability

In its preferred environment of joint air-land warfighting the Luftwaffe demonstrated significant flexibility, as shown above, and it continued to do so in that environment and others untilitpermanentlylosttheoneoverridingconditionthathadalwayspermittedit:airsuperiority.TheLuftwaffelostthisinItalyinAugust1943,intheWestandabovetheReichseveralmonthsbeforeD-Day,andintheEastseveralmonthsthereafter.

26Cf.ibid.,entryfor2January1943;USAFHRA168.7158-335:GruppeStahel,Gef.Qu.,den20.12.1942,BerichtüberdenZustandderTruppeam20.12.1942.

27USAFHRA168.7158-335:TagebuchGeneralleutnantFiebig,25.11.1942-2.2.1943,FiebigTB,entryfor25January1943.28BA-MAN671/10:RichthofenTB:Band10,entriesfor9and28Februaryand11,12and14March1943;BA-MARL8/59:LufttransporteVIII.

Fliegerkorps,JanuarundFebruar1943.29 USAFHRA 519.619-7 14 August 1945: HQ US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (Rear) Office of the Historian, AAF Sta 390, APO 413, US Army,

QuestionnaireonGAFDoctrineandPolicy:AnswersbyGen.Maj.vonRohden(PW)andCol.Kriesche(PW)toQuestionsSubmittedbyMajorEngelman.

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AgilityroutinelyenhancedLuftwaffeperformance,butitcouldnotdomuchinwhatbecameanon-winnablewarof attrition in theair.Noamountof agilitycouldprevent the lossof airsuperiorityornegatethedisastrousconsequencesofthatloss.DuringitsprodigiousstruggletoadjustandrespondtotheconstantlychangingandeverworseningCombinedBomberOffensive,theLuftwaffeintheWesttriedalmosteverythingandvirtuallyrecreateditselfbyadaptingoldmethodsandequipmentwhen itcould,andadoptingentirelynewoneswhen itcouldnot. ItvastlyexpandedandimproveditsintegratedairdefencenetworkofFreya(andlaterWürzburg)radar stations, ground control intercept stations, spotlights, flak batteries, radar-equipped night-fighters and super-fast day fighters. To coordinate the Reich’s air defence battle the Luftwaffe created a new air fleet, Luftflotte Reich — its first mono-causal, mono-functional air fleet — in February 1944. The Luftwaffe also ceaselessly experimented with, introduced and refined a range ofimprovedaircraft,newarmamentsandbolderandmoreimaginativetactics.30ButthistimetheLuftwaffe was fighting a foe that, because of its virtually unlimited resources, great resolve, high moraleandequallymarvellousadaptability,itcouldneitheroutnumbernoroutclass.

The fact that the United States produced four-fifths as many planes in 1944 alone as Germany had throughout the entire previous five years was bad enough31 (and Britain and the SovietUnionalsohadlargeproductionrates),buttheintractableoffensive-mindednessofWehrmachtand Luftwaffe air power thinking worsened the situation considerably. Even when the rapidmanufacture of fighters for defensive counter-air battles above the Reich became a desperate priorityduring1943and1944,Germanfactoriescontinuedtochurnoutthousandsofbombers(which took far more raw materials and factory floor space) for offensive joint battles around the Reich’sshrinkingperimeters,particularlyintheeast.32

These production figures should not disguise what lay at the crux of the attritional air war, which was not Germany’s ability to produce sufficient airframes, but something that agility could never address: theReich’s impossibilityof trainingpilots and aircrews to a competitive level insufficient quantities.

AtthebeginningofthewartheLuftwaffe’spilotshadspentslightlymoretime inbasicandoperationaltrainingthantheirRAFcounterparts.

Whenwarboggeddownin1943andacutefuelandaircombatattritionbegantobite,theLuftwaffe’strainingprogrammeattemptedtoadaptbycompressingandstreamliningcoursesandparingdowntuitioninallnon-essentialskills,butstillcouldnotmeettheLuftwaffe’soutputdemands.BythetimeofD-Dayitgaveitsnewpilotsbarelyhalfthebasictraininghoursandonlyone-thirdthehoursinoperationalaircraftthattheRAFgaveitsown.

TheUSAAF’spilotsreceivedevenmorethantheRAF’s.33 Luftwaffe fighter trainees, to highlight this disparity, received only 30 hours in operational training, RAF fighter trainees got around 80, andUSAAFtraineesgotaround160hours.34 By mid-1944, when the Allied campaign was inflicting appalling attrition on Luftflotte 3 and Luftflotte Reich, the Luftwaffe had no choice but to man their fighters and bombers with fewer and fewer skilled pilots. It was an impossible situation.

30LuftwaffeeffortstoadapttoitsgreatestchallengearestronglyanalysedinRichardR.Muller,“LosingAirSuperiority:ACaseStudyfromtheSecondWorldWar,”Air&SpacePowerJournal,Vol.17,No.4(Winter2003),pp.55-66.

31JohnH.Morrow,Jr.,“TheGermanAircraftIndustryintheFirstandSecondWorldWars:AComparison”,inHorstBoog,ed.,TheConductoftheAirWarintheSecondWorldWar(NewYork:Berg,1988),p.47.

32 National Archives and Records Administration, Microfilm T321/10/4746765: Luftwaffenführungsstab Ia/Flieg. Nr. 9592/44 g.Kdos. Chefs. (T), StudieüberdieFlugzeuglagederKampfverbände,5May1944.

33WilliamsonMurray,“AttritionandtheLuftwaffe,”AirUniversityReview,March-April1983,Vol.34,No.3,pp.66-77.34Murray,StrategyforDefeat,pp.312,314.

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TheLuftwaffe’slossofairsuperiorityalongmostfrontsby1944devastatedtheWehrmacht’sjoint warfighting, which was based around “reconnaissance pull,” one of the key ingredients in implementingAuftragstaktik andmaintaining tempo. In theGerman systemattacks tended tomove in directions identified by forward air and ground units, not by commanders in the rear who mighthavefelttemptedtopushtheirforcesforwardalongpre-selectedroutes.Reconnaissanceunits constantly watched the enemy and probed for undefended or lightly defended gaps intheenemylinethatpotentiallyledtotheenemyrear.Thewholeforcethen,uponordersfromforwardcommanders,followedthe“pull”ofthereconnaissanceunitsandsmashedthroughthegapstoachievepenetrationsandhopefullyabreakthrough.

YetinthemonthsfollowingtheNormandylandings,ferociousAlliedairpowerrobbedtheLuftwaffeofitsabilitytofunctionas“theArmy’seyes”.

Almost everything that the Luftwaffe put into the sky got shot down — except for thestunningandalmost invulnerableAradoAr234 jetbomber-reconnaissanceplane,very fewofwhichexisted.35BoththeGermanArmyandthedecreasingnumberofLuftwaffesupportforcesbecame tactically and operationally blind, thus denying them any flexibility and useful ability to employinitiative.

TheLuftwaffereconnaissanceunitsrespondedwithcharacteristicadaptability,experimentingwith new flight tactics and dispersal, camouflage and deception procedures, but nothing made much difference. Reconnaissance units could not fly, and ground-attack aircraft, also flying at great riskagainstoverwhelmingairstrength,thereforeaccomplishedverylittle.

TheLuftwaffeitselfreportedthatitsground-attackaircraft“nolongeraffordedanydecisivesupport tothe land forces,andtheheavy losses incurredroseultimately toa leveloutofallproportiontothesuccessesachieved.”36

Conclusions

This short assessment focused only on aspects of the notable agility that the Luftwafferevealed as it prosecuted warfare within the deficient conceptual framework that Nazi politicians andstrategists,includingairmen,createdfortheirarmedforces.

The paper demonstrated that the Luftwaffe commonly operated with what can only bedescribed,bythenormsoftheperiod,aseffectiveagility.DuringitsyearsofgainandevenintoitsyearsoflosstheLuftwaffeconstantlymonitoredthebattle-space,quicklyassimilatedandactedoninformation, and flexibly applied force. It coped well with high-tempo operations, adapted quickly to changing circumstances and flexed without breaking under enormous stresses. It is beyond the scopeofthispapertocatalogueandcritiquethereasonsfortheWehrmacht’seventualfailure,oreventoexplainitslackofemphasisonindependent“strategic”aircampaigningandmaritimeaviation. It is sufficient to note only that, among the Wehrmacht’s many weaknesses and failings, theLuftwaffe’sagilitycouldnotbecounted.Thatdoesnotmeanthatagility,despitebeingapotentforce multiplier, could rectify fatal strategic flaws. The Germans learned a hard lesson, one worth reflecting upon: that if a nation fights the wrong war against the wrong foe then its military agility willdonothingmorethandelaydefeat.

35AlfredPrice,TheLastYearoftheLuftwaffe:May1944toMay1945(London:Greenhill,2001),pp.63-65.36 USAFHRA 512.621 VII/14, 15: Generalstab 8. Abteilung, [Historical Office of the Luftwaffe General Staff] “Development of the German Ground

AttackArmandPrinciplesGoverningItsOperationsuptotheEndof1944,”1December1944.

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general T. Michael Moseley

chief of Staff of the United States Air ForceThank you for a warm invitation, and thank you for the opportunity to share some

thoughts.It’simportantforustohaveanopportunitytothinkaboutthefutureofcoalitionairandspacepower,andwhatitmeansforourcountriesandtheworldwhenwetalkabout“agility.”Ifyou’llallowmetoday,that’swhatIwanttotalkabout.Iwanttotakethenotionofagilityandthenotionsthatwe’vetalkedaboutintheareaofnationalairandspacepower,and I want to tell you what we are trying to do in terms of some American Air Force-specific programsandinitiatives.

Letmestartwithabriefreminder.It’snostrangemessagetothisgroupthat66yearsagotodaytheRoyalAirForcewasaweekandahalf intotheBattleofBritain.Today,66yearsago, the RAF flew 655 sorties – with 224 serviceable Spitfires and 308 serviceable Hurricanes. That day the RAF downed nine confirmed enemy fighters, bombers and seaplanes, and claimed another 13 unconfirmed kills, while losing just five Hurricanes and one Spitfire.

Similardaysfollowedinthesubsequentmonths.Idon’tneedtoremindthisaudienceofwhatitmeantfortheentirenationandarguablytheentireindustrializedworld--waitingandwatching.Theoutcomeatthattimewasnotcertain.UltimatelytheBattleofBritainwastosaveanation,arguablytosavetheworld,turningthecourseofhistorySowhatdoweknowfromthoseexperiencessowecanapplyittoday?Ifyou’llallowmeto,that’swhatIwanttotalkabout.

Iwanttotalkaboutthisworldthatwelive in,thattheotherspeakersbeforemehavecapturedveryeloquently…weareaworldatwar.Itisanincreasinglystrangeandchallengingworldthatweliveinwhenwedealwithreligiousextremism,transnationalcriminalactivity,transnational narcotic trafficking, human trafficking, very very violent activities…all threats towhatwethinkinthecivilizedworld,andhowaswelookatthisthesimultaneityoftheseeventsthatoccur.Pluswehavehumanitarianevents-anearthquake,amudslide,atsunami,orinthecaseofmycountrythreenearsimultaneoushurricanesontheGulfCoast-allwhileyou’re attempting to fight a war on terrorism…it makes for a full day as an Air Chief.

It alsomakes for a full day to thinkofourselves as amemberof the joint teamand acoalitionteamandhowwedealwiththeseproblemsofglobalproportion.SowhenIthinkaboutagility,Iputthatinthecontextoftoday’sworld.Whatdoesthismeantoday?Whatdoesthismeanforprogrammaticdecisionsandpersonneldecisions?Whatdoesthismeanfor infrastructure and military construction decisions, for recapitalization decisions acrossthatentirewaterfront?

AlsowhenIthinkaboutagilityIrecallthewordsofagreatAmericanfootballcoachfrommyalmamaterTexasA&M,a fellowby thenameofBearBryantwho laterdefected fromTexasA&MandwenttotheUniversityofAlabamaandtooktheUniversityofAlabamatomultiplenationalchampionships,quitetothechagrinofmyalmamater.Butheusedtosaythathewantedhisfootballteamtobe“agile,mobile,andhostile.”Ithinkthat’sprettymuchwhatwe’retalkingabouthere.IwantmyAirForcetobethesame.Iwantittobeinherentlyagile,

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Iwantittobeinherentlymobile,andcertainlyhostile.

Sohowdowedothat?Well,howdoweshapewherewearewhicharethelegaciesoftheColdWar,towhereIbelieveweneedtogowhicharemanifestationsofaninformationagewherethings,thoughts,ideas,theglobaleconomy,message,moneymovesthroughcyberspaceandthroughtheinternetatthespeedoflight.Howdowedealinaworldthatisfundamentallydifferentthanourfathers’andourgrandfathers’?

Whenyouthinkintermsofcyberspace,forinstance,trillionsandtrillionsofpoundsanddollarsandyenandeurosaretravelingthroughthatmediumaswespeak.Aswellasbillionsandbillions of bits of information that make up our health records, our finance records, archival dataofgovernments,allliveinthisuntouchable,hardtounderstandworldofcyberspace.

Whenyoutalkaboutthemediaandwhenyoutalkaboutaccesstoinformation,andouropponentsarelearningtoliveinthatworldandtheyarelearningtooperateinthatworldverycomfortably.Whatdoesthatmeanontopoftherequirementslefttodefendthecountries?And on top of that to maintain the notion that the mission of the Air Force is still to fly and to fight. So I want to share what we are trying to do to get at this new world and to shape and transformtheAmericanAirForceintosomethingthatisperhapsfundamentallydifferentthanitwaswhenItooktheoathtodefendthecountryin1967,1968.

Thisagility,Ibelieve,isdemonstratedinanumberofways.OnecontemporaryexampleisthestrikeonAbuMusabal-Zarqawi.Thisisaremarkablestoryintheevolutionofairpower.TheF-16s that launchedoutof that expeditionary base that day launchedon amissionofreconnaissance with precision bombs on board to go out and fly along lines of communication tolookforimprovisedexplosivedevicestoreducetheattritiononlandcomponentactivities.Whiletheywereout,SpecialOperationsForceswereabletonarrowthelistdowntolocatingal-Zarqawiandhispartyinasafehouse,whichwasthenpassedtotheCAOC,whichassessedcollateral damage and blast effect mitigation, passed that to the fighter, recce’d the fighter over the top of the house, while literally still on the tanker. Cleared the final drop, signaled laser-guidedweapons,andthenwasaskedtodropasecond500-pounderwhichwasaJDAM.

IthinkthisisatypicalillustrationofwhatagilitymeanstoanAirForce.Thiswasnotthefirst time this pilot had thought about this. Over countless NATO TACEVALS, over countless operationalreadinessinspections,overcountlesssortiesatRedFlag,overcountlesscompositeforcetrainingexercisesandexplorationofrulesofengagementandspecialinstructions.Wehad trained our Airman to be inherently flexible and adaptable or agile. So while tasked to go outandlookforIEDsandpeoplethataresettingupexplosivesonroads,themissionturnedintoastrategicallydislocatingevent for theopposition.While theoriginal taskwasnot todeliverordnance,attheendofthedaytwo500poundersweredeliveredwithstrategicimpactonal-Qaida.Noothercomponentcanmakethingshappenthat fast,not landcomponentsfor sure, nor naval components. So what do we pay for that? What are we doing as faras organizational constructs to benefit from this sort of thing, to benefit from this sort of thinking?

Thelaserweaponisalsoagoodstory.InmyAirForce’sactivitiesinSoutheastAsiaduringthe‘60sand‘70s,wewentafteracoupleofbridgesinNorthVietnam.Onewascalledthe

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Paul Doumer Bridge, the other one was called the Thanh Hoa Bridge. We flew mission after missionaftermissionagainst thePaulDoumerBridge,and in factwe lostover100F-105stryingtoattackthatbridge.Infact,overthecourseofthewarinSoutheastAsia,welosthalfofeveryF-105everbuiltoverNorthVietnam.Ofthe50percentthatwereshotdown,one-thirdofthepilotswerekilled;one-thirdofthepilotswerecaptured;andonlyaboutone-thirdwererecovered[pickedup]becauseofthedistancesupnortharoundHanoi.SoagainstthePaul Doumer Bridge we lost over a wing of fighters, not to mention the lost pilots. Folks at EglinattheAirArmamentlabbegantothink,“Whycan’twelaserguideaweapon?Ifwecanlaser guide a weapon then the accuracy of the weapon and the flexibility of the airplane would be certainly significantly enhanced.” So they did. They worked that. And as we have seen, in Mayof1972,the8thTacFighterWing,theWolfPack,droppedthePaulDoumerBridge,withtheirbigF-4sloadedwithapairofweaponseach.SowhathadcostusawingofF-105splusallthepilots,wewerethenabletodrop[thebridge] inasingleafternoonwithoneofthetechnologicaladvancesofthatwar.

So,fromtheexplorationoftechnologytoallthethingsthatwehavedonetogether,letmetalk you through some things that I think you will find consistent. Yesterday was very helpful to me;wetalkedaboutpersonnelandwetalkedaboutcuts,wetalkedaboutjointness,wetalkedaboutjointrepresentation,becauseI’lltellyouquitehonestly,everysingleoneofthoseissuesisabsolutelyconsistentwiththechallengesinWashingtonastheyarewiththechallengesinLondonorinNorwayorwhereverourforcesoperate.

OurDepartmentofDefenseandourAirForceisintheprocessoftransformingitselfinawaythatwehaven’tdoneinthepast.Thisisatruegenerationalopportunitytochangehowwefundamentallydobusiness,tomovefromagarrisonmindsetintoanexpeditionarymindsetatlevelsthatcutacrosstheentireAirForce.It’sanopportunitytobecomemuchmoreagileandmuch more flexible. It is an opportunity to become much more interdependent.

Letmeshareathoughtortwowithyouhere.FromtheSoutheastAsiaexperiencewelearnedorweoperatedundertheguiseof“wewilljuststayoutofeachother’sway.”TheNavyoperatedanaireffort;StrategicAirCommandoperatedanaireffort;ElectronicSecurityCommandoperatedanaireffort;7thAirForceoperatedanaireffort; and therewasn’tasingleCFACCorJFACC.SowedividedSoutheastAsia,NorthVietnam,upintoroutepacks.TheAirForcewouldoperateXnumberofroutepacks,theNavywouldoperateXnumberof route packs and we’d just stay out of each other’s way. But deconfliction like that is not an inherentlyoperationallysoundmodelinmyview.Outofthatwelearnedthatweneedtodothatinamuchmoreinteroperablemanner.OutofcountlessRedFlagexercisesatNellis,wethoughtthroughthemissionofbeingabletotrainandbeingabletoworkwithpartnersandbeingabletoshareideasinthehighdesertoutatNevadaandnothavetolearntheselessonsalloveragainincombat.

InAugustof1990,forOperationDesertShieldandDesertStorm,wecollectivelydeployedintotheArabianGulfarea.WeenteredintoawarwherewewereinteroperableinIraq.That’sa much better place to be than deconflicting. But after interoperabilitythere’sanotherworld.There’saconceptbeyondinteroperableandit’scalledinterdependent.That’sthepaththatI’mtryingtotake.Ibelievetherewon’tbeenoughmoney,Ibelievetherewon’tbeenoughpeople,Ibelievetherewon’tbeenoughtimeNOTtobeinterdependent.Ibelievewehavetolookat

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thingsinamuchmoredifferentmanner,andImeanthatinajointsensebutalsoinacoalitionsense.

WhenyouseewhatmySecretaryofDefensesaysandwhatIsayabouttransformation,what’snotsaidinthereisthattheAirForceisessentiallyleadingthiseffortoftransformation.Althoughourchallengeisreallynodifferentthananyotherfolks’,sometimesitseemslikeitisdifferentbecausesomeinthemediaandsomeacademicsassumethatinfantry–thenotionof“bootsontheground”–istheonlywaytosolvetheworld’sproblems.Ofcourseweknowthat’snottrue,thatjointnessandinterdependencearenotonlyheretostaybutmakeustheincredibly strong fighting force we are, but we are all too gentlemanly and ladylike to take them oninthatlight.ButwhenyougetintothenotionofinteroperabilityIthinkitbeginstoopendoors so that you don’t have to have personal fights. You can talk about things that an Air Forceprovidestothejointcommander,thelandcomponentprovides,amaritimecomponentcommanderprovidesandyoudon’thavetocrossoverintosomeofthesepettyarguments.

I would offer to you that our Air Forces have collectively been fighting solid for 15 years. WhenwesaythisinthediscussionsthatwehaveinWashingtonit’sabitofaneye-openerfor folks who haven’t thought about it. This is a significant notion, that our First Fighter Wing deployedtotheeasternprovinceofSaudiArabia inAugustof1990,andwe’vebeenintheArabianGulfincombateversince.Whenyouthinkaboutit,whenhostilitiesbeganinJanuary1991forDesertStormweonlybegan fighting. We spent the next 12 years in no-fly zones, in bothNorthandSouth.AndbesidetheNo-FlyZonebusinesswe’vedoneVigilantWarrior,Desert Strike, Desert Fox, Bosnia, Kosovo, and a variety of other humanitarian events:Mogadishu,Somalia,Madagascar,Pakistan,ourownGulfCoast,etcetera.Sofor15straightyearstheaircomponenthasbeenincombat.

AnotherinterestingnoteisAfghanistan,wherewehavebeenincombatfrom9/11tothepresentlongerthantheAmericanexperienceinWorldWarII.Sothelessonslearnedinthis--asfarasbeingagile,beingnimble,beingmobile--thelessonslearnedinthisasfarasbeingexpeditionary andhowtomove into theseareasof theworldoffersusperhaps themostmagnificent laboratory…and that’s very hard to argue with. So when folks say we have been inBaghdadforXnumberofmonthsmycommentiswe’vebeenintheArabianGulfincombatfor15years.We’vebeeninAfghanistanlongerthantheAmericanexperienceinWorldWarII.Andontopofthat,theAirForcehasalsodoneoperationsindefenseofthecountry.Wecallthat“OperationNobleEagle.”Since9/11we’vehadover100aircraftwrappedupinthisnotion of Homeland Defense, fighters either airborne or on ground alert, multiple tankers, multipleAWACS,fromnorthofFairbanksinAlaskatooverHonoluluinHawaiitoNewYorkandWashington.SowhilecombatoccursinAfghanistanandIraq,theAirForceisstilloperatingoverthetopofthecountryjustliketheRoyalAirForceandothershavedonehistorically.Soas we look at these lessons out of 15 years of fighting, out of contemporary activities, out of historic activities as we move from deconfliction to interoperability to interdependence, what doesthatmeantous?Wehavecloseto100initiativeswearepushingtomaketheAirForcemore nimble and more flexible. We have 67 or 70 or so that are primary initiatives and others thatI’mnotgoingtogothroughwithyou,butI’lloffersomethoughtsonthemifyouhavequestions. But I want to talk to you about some specifics regarding our priority initiatives first. Weareintheprocessoflosingabout40,000people.Wesay“40,000people,”butwhatwereallymeanare“40,000full-timeequivalents”whichreallyisabout57,000peoplewhenyou

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consider our Air National Guard and Reserves. I’ve caught reasonable flack over this.

My answer is,we canbe smaller becausewe canbemorenimble.We canbe smallerbecausethenewsystemsdon’trequireasmanycrewchiefs.Theydon’trequireasmanyback-shop maintainers. They don’t require as much airlift. These systems are much more flexible, inherently,becauseit’sdesignedintothem.Sotheolddepthofsupportpersonnelwedon’tneed.Aswelookattherecapitalizationofouraircraftinventory,thenewaircraftrequirelesspeople.Also,wehadachancetotalkalittlebityesterdayaboutthis,thatinmyDepartmentofDefensetherearefourcolorsofmoneythatIhavethepleasureandhonortohavetodealwitheveryday.Wehaveour personnel accounts whichwehave365,000orsoactiveduty;atotalofabout700,000intheAirForcewhenwecountGuard,Reserve,civiliansandactive.Thesecondcolorofmoneyisreconstruction and MilConwhichisourbases,theinfrastructureofourbases,hangars,etcetera,justlikeeveryoneelse.Thethirdkindofmoneyisouroperations and maintenance money. Since we’re at war, our flying hour money, our training money is constant.TheinfrastructureandMilConmoneyisconstant.We’retryingtogoafterthatwithanotherBaseRealignment andClosure activityorBRACwhichwithourCongressBRACis surely a four-letter word so I’ve told the Congress and testified to questions about base closures.SowhenyouholdthepeopleconstantandtheCongressmandatesthatweholdthebases constant and you hold the flying hours and the training and the preparation for combat constant,thentheonlyplaceyoucangoformoneyisthe investment account.That’sthefourthcolorofmoney.That’sthenewequipment.

Historicallywehaveheldthepeopleconstant,wehaveheldthebasesconstant,wehaveheld the flying hours constant, and we have raided the investment account. The result is today theAmericanAirForceoperatestheoldestinventoryithasoperatedinthehistoryoftheAirForce.Ourtankerswerebuiltinthe‘50s.Ourbomberswerebuiltinthe‘50sand‘60s.Ourfighters -- our main line fighters -- are 23 or 24 years old. Today, the average age of the Air Force inventoryis 23.8 years old.WhenIputtheuniforminon1967-1968,theaverageagewaseightyears.Ifwegeteverythingthatweareprogrammedfor[inourfutureyearsdefenseplan],theagewillgrowto30years.Sotherehastobeawaytobreakthecycle.Givenonlythosefourcolorsofmoney, you have to be able to figure out a way to break this cycle.

What I have proposed is we give up people. The systems will give us efficiencies, the systemswill letusoperatewith fewerpeople.Sincemydesire istobeabletorecapitalizethisAirForce,ourpersonnelaccountisonesourceofthemoney.I’lltalkofacoupleofothersources about efficiencies, but that sets the tone for all of the other activities as we look at transformationandwelookatthenewworld.

TheobjectivesandprioritiesthatI’vegivenandhaveworkedwithmystaffonare:To be able to fight this global war on terrorism better, to fight in a more interdependent

manner, to fight it in a more joint and coalition manner, to be able to highlight the use of special operations,landcomponent,maritimecomponent,andairandspacecomponentonanequalfooting.

Thesecondpriorityformeistotakecareofthepeople.ItsoundslikeI’mtalkingoutofbothsidesofmymouthwhenIsayI’llgetridof57,000butIwanttotakecareofthem,butit’strue.Everyoneofthe900orsolieutenantsthatwehavereducedourforcebyIhavesentlettersto.Wehaveworkedthis,wehaveofferedsomeofthemmovementintotheGuard,

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movementintotheReserve,movementintotheciviliansectoroftheAirForceormovementintoeitherNavy,Marine,CoastGuardorArmybeforeweshowedthemthedooronthewayout.Icallthisan“opportunityladder”tobeabletohighlighttheircontributionandbeabletocontinue to serve the country in as much of a dignified manner as we can.

57,000peopleisalotofpeopletolose.Sothisiscreatingabitofstruggleinmyworldandwearelookingatavarietyofwaystocontinuetofocusonthehumancapital.I’lltellyou,it’snodifferentthananyotherairforce:ourpeoplearethebiggesttreasure.Ourpeoplearesoimportanttous,buttheyarealsothemostexpensivecommodity.Inmycountryeveryoneofus,whether it’sthenewestAirmanortheoldestgeezer intheAirForceaverageabout$100,000ayearinpayandallowances.Soforevery10,000peopleitcostsusaboutonebilliondollarsasfarascapital investment.Soifthissystemcangetyoutosmallernumbersandifthenewworldcanallowyoutooperatesmaller,andifyouhavetoholdthoseotheraccountsconstantasyoureinvest,thentakingthenumbersofpeopledownistheonlywaytodothis.

We’ve focused on warfighting headquarters. We have focused on streamlining our headquartersstaffs.I’mgoingafterlargenumbersofpeopleonthestaffs.Interestinglyenough,peopleonthestafftendtobemoresenior.ThatcreatesawholedifferentbattlebecausemostofthepeopleonthestaffareseniorNCOsorlieutenantcolonelsorcolonels. I’llgiveyouacoupleofexamples.Wehaveineachofourmajorcommandstaffs100to150personnelofficers. Air Combat Command,

AirMobilityCommand,AirForceSpaceCommand,Air Education and Training Command, US Air Forces Europe, US Air Forces Pacific, all

havebetween100and150personnelists.Now,I’veworkedinpersonnel,soIcansaythis:I’mnotsurewhattheydo.WehaveanAirForcePersonnelCenterthatestablishespolicyandprograms folks’ assignments. We have senior officers and senior NCOs that worry about this. SoI’mnotsurewhatthose150peopledoineachofthosemajorcommandstaffs.Wealsohavevarioustribesofcivilengineers.IfyouareatOsan,Korea,andifyouwantedtoenhancethedormsfortheenlistedtroopsyouhavea51stFighterWingCivilEngineer;a7thAirForceCivil Engineer; a Pacific Air Force Civil Engineer; a Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer; and we have a field operating agency that is nothing but civil engineers. Again, I don’t know what theydo.Itseemstomethatwehavecheckerscheckingcheckerswhocheckcheckersalongtheway.

Wewerejusttalkingaboutthistheotherday,soIaskedsomequestionsbecauseIjustwantedtoknow.Infact,I’veaskedacoupleofquestionsofthestaffs,questionsthatIalreadyknowtheanswerto,justtoseehowlongittakestheanswertogetbacktomeandtoseewhocoordinatesonasheetthatprovidestheanswer.Amazing.Idon’tknowwhatallthosefolksdoeveryday,butIbelievewecanreducethosenumbersonthestaffs.Thesamewithcommunicators, the same with some of the others. I’ve also established a Directorate ofDevelopment and Assessment – an “A9” – because when you fight for 15 years there’s lots of things that you learn along theway that you need to get into the budget program andputresourcesagainst.We’venormalizedourAEFrotations.We’vebecomemuchmoreleaninexpeditionaryoperations, andwe’ve learnedsomuchaboutoperatingonexpeditionaryairfields that it’s taken us to a different place relative to defending the airfields, operating the airfields, setting up the airfields, and in each of those we focus on contingency response groups

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that are bodies of mixes of combat engineers, air traffic control, and security forces that go in and take an airfield, and then own the airfield until they turn it over to regular forces, et cetera.Wehavetwowingsofthose,EastCoastandWestCoast;andwehavetwogroupsofthose,oneatRamsteinandoneontheislandofGuam.We’veusedthosequiteextensivelyinIraqandAfghanistanandI’mveryproudofwhattheydoandI’mfocusingmoreandmoreonthatparticularaspectofgettingexpeditionary.

Intheworldofinteroperability,though,I’mnothappythatIcan’tdependonlandcomponentoperations to defend the airfields. We all know that our Army thinks it has other things to do other than defend the airfields. Therefore we’re having to look at ways to protect our forces, tobuyequipment and to setup activities todefendour air bases.Ouropponents’ 82mmmortarhasarangeofabout3.5miles.Their122rockethasarangeofabout13miles.Howdo we defend the airfields from 3.5 to 13.5 miles against mortars and rockets while holding as sanctuary the arrival and departure corridors on the airfields while we prevent activities that are threatening the operation of the airfield? Again, there’s not a plan, and so this is one of the itemsthattheRoyalAirForceandtheUSAirForceshare.Iamlookingtoyouforsomehelpandsomementoringonhowyoudothis.

We’re lookingatwaystoshrinkandreshapethis force.As Imentioned,57,000peopleis a big bite.But I alsohavediscovered that, fromSeptember11, 2001, to today,wehaveonlydeployedabouthalftheAirForce.Westillhave112,000peoplesitting inmissilesilosanddoingspaceactivities.That’sokay.Onanygivendaywehave53,54percentoftheAirForce that is tasked to a combatant commander -- be it EUCOM, PACOM, STRATCOM,NORTHCOM.That’sokay.ButI’vegothalfoftheAirForcethathasnotdeployedandwe’vebeen inAfghanistan longerthanWorldWarII.Something is fundamentallywrongwiththesystemthatwehavewiththisforcebecauseIcan’tgetathalfofthegenepoolintheAirForceto be able to fight. So that is another of my objectives -- to get at 100 percent of the Air Force. In1999wehad22orsopercentoftheAirForce inanexpeditionarydeploymentbucket.Todaywehave85percentandI’mstillnothappy.Iwanttoknowwhothoseother15percentare.Wherearethey?Whoarethey?Whyaretheynotdeployable?

Wealsohaveaninterestingtrick,andI’msureotherAirForcesarethesame.Ihaveonanygiven day 10,000 people that are medically disqualified. Five thousand are righteous: They’re pregnant, hips are broke, legs are broke…we’re going to fix them and get them back. But I’ve got5,000peoplewhoonanygivenday--whentherotationschedulecomesouttogobacktoBaghdadorgobacktoKandaharorBagram--theygetasthmaortheyhavelowerbackpainortheyhavesomeotherissue.ThatwasoneofthequestionsthatIknewtheanswertobeforeIasked.SoIasked,howdoesthishappen?Flightsurgeonscameinandsaid,“Sir,we’retheonesthatapproved those medical waivers.” I said, “Do you talk to commanders? Do you talk to first sergeants?Commandchiefmastersergeants?Doyoutalktolieutenantcolonels,sergeantmajors?”Theysaid,“No,wejustapprovethosewaivers.”“Okay,howabouttomorrowmorningwehavethecommandermakethatchoice.”Nowfrommyforceof5,000peoplethatnormallygetsickbeforedeployment,theycangetsickatal-Udeid,theycangetsickatBagramorKandahar,ortheycangetwell.It’suptothem.ThesearethingsthatareinternaltoanAirForcewhenwetalkaboutgettingourhandsonthepeopleandgettingourhandsontheabilitytodeploy.

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I tell you, I’m finding this interesting because in my Air Force there are sanctuaries out there of peopleandactivitiesthatviewthemselvesseparatefromadeployable,expeditionarybody.

We’relookingtocontinuetointegrateouractivewithourAirNationalGuardandourReserve.OurAirNationalGuardbelongstotheUnitedStatesfederalgovernmentbutitalsobelongs to each of the states. There are 54 adjutants general that own flying machines and people inside theAirNationalGuard. I sometimes thinkof themas“54 independentcity-states”becausetheyattimehavenoallegiancetoanyoneotherthanthemselves.ButtheyarecomingalongbecausetheyseethefuturethesamewayIdo.Thecountry’satrisk,theworld’satrisk,andalongthewaythiswillallbebetterifwe’reworkingthisbusinessofbeinginteroperable.

We’vealso lookedatstreamliningourbusinesspractices,andI’mnotabusinessmajor,finance, business, accounting, but I’ve asked, “Why does it take so long to get an airplane out ofourdepots?”Upuntilayearorsoagoittookover400daystogetaKC-135throughourdepot.Notbecausewehadbadpeople,andnotbecausetheydidanythingwrong,itwastheprocesswassoonerousandsoByzantinethatittook400-plusdaystogetoneofthetankersout of depot. In fact the operational impact of that was that one-third of our tanker fleet was tiedupeitherbeinggroundedgoing intothedepot, indepot,orcomingoutof thedepot.Nowbecausewe’vefocusedalittlebitonthebusinesspractices,we’vegotthatdowntolessthan200days.Sowe’veeffectivelydoubledtheeffectivenessofthedepots.Thepeopleupthere are much happier, I’m much happier, we have more flying machines that we can deploy with.Butthinkabout400-plusdaysofprocessittakesyouforoneofthekeyenablingpiecesofequipmentthatyouhave.Youcannotgetyourhandsonitforwelloverayear.Thatisnotbeingagile,thatisnotinanywaybeingnimble.

Wehavealsocombinedour trainingpractices andour separateWarfareCenters.WeusedtohaveaSpaceWarfareCenter,aMobilityWarfareCenter,andanAirWarfareCenter.Wehavenowmergedthoseintoone.OneAirWarfareCenter.WeusedtohaveaFighterWeaponsSchoolthatincludedintel,airbattlemanagement,space,itincludedcombatrescue,and we’ve merged mobility into the weapons school. Until recently we had two weaponsschools,MobilityandthentheUSAirForceWeaponsSchoolatNellis,nowwehaveone.

Isharethosewithyoubecausethetraining,theexperience,theunderstandingacrosseachofthoseexamplesissocriticalforusaswelookatsharedoperationsabroadlikeal-UdeidandBaladandAlBasra.Becausewedon’tdeployasseparateentities,wedon’toperateasseparateentities,weoperateasanaircomponent.We’vealsoworkedveryhardwith theJointAirandGroundOperationsGroupoutofNellistogetbetteratcloseairsupportandbetteraturbanCAS.We’velookedatexpandingtheworldoftheAggressorsoutatNellis.We’reblessedtohaveRoyalAirForceparticipationofpilot,intel,andweaponrypeopleoutthere. But this is not just about a flying machine aggressors. This is about space aggressors, informationoperationaggressors,threatexperts,allinoneplace.Aswellastheexploitationopportunitiesinoneplace.

We’ve got to streamline this so we can get much better and much quicker at seeingsomething, analyzing something, and returning it back to the field as the red team effort so we cantrainagainstit.

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We’veextendedourbasicmilitarytrainingby2.5weeks.IwantedtogofourweeksbutI couldn’t get themoney.Lastnightat thedinner I told some folkshow I gotmostof themoneytoextenditby2.5weeksthanksto“negotiations”withourSenateArmedServicesCommittee.ItoldtheChiefoftheAirStaffthatIwasalittleembarrassedthatIwasoutinfrontofthehotelonmyhandsandkneesbeggingformoney.Thecellphoneinmyear.Ifitworked,I’mokaywiththat.

Butourbasicmilitarytraining,wehavelookedatthisinacompletelydifferentlight.Thesekids get the rifles day one. Each recruit keeps that rifle throughout that whole experience. Each recruit will qualify with the rifle and qualify with the pistol. Each recruit will spend much more time talking about the laws of armed conflict, talking about how we do business in an expeditionary sense. We will spend much more time in the field attacking them, confusing them, having them set up cantonment areas, having them move from cantonment area tocantonmentarea.ApieceofthisthatI’mextremelyexcitedaboutiseverysingleoneoftheseyoungsterswillcomeoutofourbasicmilitary training in the futurewith theequivalentofemergency medical technician qualification.

TheUnitedStatesArmyonlysendstenpercentofitsrecruitstotrainthemonmedicalcare,combatcare.TheNavyisnotasconcernedaboutthisbecausetheyhavetheshipsandthey spend more time fighting fires on ships, et cetera, which is valid. But in our case, I want everysingleoneoftheseyoungwomenandmenwhocomethroughthistobeabletodoselfaid/buddycareandbeabletodoemergencymedicalcare.Again,the82mmmortarhasarange of 3.5 miles and the 122 rocket 13 miles. Our airfields in CENTCOM are being mortared androcketedeveryday,soIintendtohavethesepeoplemuchmorecapableandtakingcareofthemselvesandtakingcareoftheirfellowAirmenortheothersthatarethere.Sowe’removingoutonthatinaveryrapidway.

Theseexpeditionaryskills,Ibelieveifyouteachthemthis,ifwecanimprintonthemfromday one we will be in a much better position than we have been in the past. We’ve also modified ourtechschools.TheAirForce--ourAirForce--istheonlyservicethatsendseverykidthrough basic military training and then through a tech school and then out to the field. Our tech schools we have remodified again into more expeditionary stuff. We are focusing on the groundcombatpieceofthisforpararescue,specialtactics,combatcontrollers,terminalaircontrollers,etcetera,atoneplace.Again,focusonthepeoplethatmaketheagilityhappen.

Another piece of this is for senior NCOs and officers. At our Command and Staff College beginningnextmonthandatourSeniorNCOAcademyandourAirWarCollegeatMaxwell,everystudentwillhaveanopportunitytotakealanguage.Itoldthem,youwilltakealanguage,youwilltakethetest,youwillpass,andyouwillenjoyit.ThelanguagesareChinese,Arabic,FrenchandSpanish.SpanishbecauseofCentralandSouthAmerica.FrenchbecauseofAfrica.Chinese and Arabic, obvious. I know they will not come out being native speakers, but Iknowtheywillcomeoutofwithanappreciationforthenuancesofthelanguageandsometerminologythatwillbehelpful.Thatwillhelpusfocuseachofthemonaregionandkeepthem focusedon a region for the restof their careers.The languagemaybenoteworthy,becauseIknowinthisroomsomeofy’alldon’tthinkwe’reabletoactuallyspeakEnglish,soweshouldlookatperhapslearningEnglishinadifferentway,butI’vetotallyrunoutoftime,andwecan’tteachthemEnglishaswellasChinesesowe’lltrytofocusontheChinesepieceandtheArabicpiece.

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LetmeclosewithacoupleofotherthingsthatIthinkwillbeusefulfordiscussion.Ithinkanairforceisinherentlydifferentthananarmyoranavy.ButIthinkwehavenotdoneaverygoodjobofarticulatingwhatdoesthatmean.LetmeshareacoupleofobservationsandthenwhatI’mtryingtodoaboutthat.

An Air Force sends its officers out to fight. An Army, a Marine Corps or a Navy sends its enlisted corps out to fight. Because we send our officers out to fight and because our officers arecombatants,wehaveacompletelydifferentviewofthisbusinessthantheotherservices.It’s natural for us. We grow up with airfields where we operate together. We grow up in CAOCs, we grow up in no-fly zones, we grow up and do business in Bosnia and Kosovo and humanitarian relief things and because the officers go out and fight and meet other officers, wehaveacadreamongstourselvesthatwearecomfortablewith.Wetrusteachother,weoperate with each other, we’re officers. We are much more informal than an army or a navy forthosereasons.Sometimesinthatrelationshipwebelievethatothersviewusthesameway.Theydon’t.Theydonotviewusthesamewayasweviewourselves.Ithinkthatisablessingandacurse,andIthinkthere’ssomethingtherethatisusefulforusinouroutreachtotheotherservices.

Theotherpartofthisiswemakethislooksoeasy,peoplebelieveitiseasy.Itisnoteasytobuildanairbridge.ItisnoteasytobuildanATO.Itisnoteasytotrainlieutenantsandcaptainsto fly high performance aircraft to go out on a mission of looking at improvised explosive devicesandthendynamicallyretaskthemthroughtheCAOCtoanew,strategictarget,andhave that occur flawlessly. That is hours and hours and months and years of training, of thinking, ofNATOtactics,ofRedFlag.Wemakethislooksoeasypeoplethinkitiseasy.Ofcourseweknowit’snot.Wedonotdoourselvesafavorwhenwefailtoexplainhowcomplicatedthisbusinessisandwhatthismeanstousrelativetohavingcontrolofthetankersandlong-rangestrike and the ability to generate sorties of expeditionary airfields, et cetera.

Thethirdthingthat Ibelievehashurtus is thatwehave, I’ll saywe, theAmericanAirForce,havemadeitoneofourmantrasthatwearetheenablingforce.Whetheritisspace,geosynchronousorbit,lowearthorbit,whetheritisweather,earlywarning,communications,whether it isnavigationmodeorGPS timingwesayweare theenabling force.Ourairliftaircraftmovepeople.Wesetupthingsforourotherpeople.Weprovideimageryforotherpeople.Prettysoonfolksbelievethatyouronlyfunctioninlifeistheenablebecausewedon’tgooutandengageasaggressivelyasweshould.SowhenanAirChiefsaysIneedtobuildanew (fill in the blank) bomber, we’re immediately told “You’re not Joint” because the soldier saysthat’snotanenablerfunction.Sodoesthisthingmatterinthejointworld?Ofcourseitdoes.

Theargumentswehave tocontinue tostressare that theair andspacecomponent isas lethal as the land component as themaritime component…with asmany challengesonequipage,ontraining,onrules,etcetera.SoIthinkwehavenotdoneagoodjob.Ithinkwelike each other, I think we operate with each other, our officers go out and fight, they have relationships,wemakethislooksoeasypeoplethinkitiseasy,andwehavesoldourselvesastheenablingfunctionasopposedtoaprimarystrikefunction.I’msayingthataboutus,theU.S.AirForce.

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SoasIlookatrecapitalizationoftheAmericanAirForceIamlookingatlosingsomeoftheseoldaircraft; Iam lookingatanAirForce in the futurethatwillbeabout15percentfewer fighters because the new fighters will be much more capable; I’m looking at about 20percentfewertankersbecausethenewtankerwillbemuchmorecapableandgeneratemultiplesorties;butI’malsolookingat50percentmorelong-rangestrike;I’mlookingatabout30percentmoreSOF;about20percentmorecombatrescue.I’mlookingatabout45percentmoreISRassetsandabout73percentmoreUnmannedAerialVehicles.AndI’mlookingatabout10percentmoreairliftplatformstobeabletodobusinessinthisnewworld.

Letmeclosebysayingasweworkthroughthisbusinessofhowtobeagile,asweputour money where our mouth is, the objectives for me are to be able to fight there, to be able to take care of the people, to recapitalize. And as we look at this, in my world thelegalrequirements that Ihaveto“Organize,TrainandEquip,”we’re lookingatacompleterestructure of the organization, to flatten the staff and get rid of dead weight. We’re looking attrainingopportunities,howtorollinandintegratelessonslearnedandrollinhowtodothisbusinessintheexistingworldandperhapsthenewworld.Theequippiecegoesbacktotherecapitalization,gettingridoftheseoldairplanes.

I’ve asked the Congress to let me get rid of 953 airplanes over the next five years. And as I testified earlier this year about these airplanes, we can incrementally let these airplanes go withoutthreateningourabilitytogivetheCombatantCommanderstheairpowertheyaskforandneed.ButCongresshasrestrictedmefromretiringsomeoftheseaircraft,includingsomethataren’tcombat-capable.I’llhaveachancetoprovideareportcardeventually,andI’llpointoutthecongressionallimitationsonretiringupto15percentoftheAirForceinventory,including old B-52s, U-2s, C-5s, C-130Es, KC-135Es, et cetera. We need to retire theseobsoleteaircraft,andmodernizetheonesthatremain.

SoletmeclosebysayingI’mlookingforwardtothecommentsandquestionsbecauseIbelievewe’reallinthesameboat.Letmethankyouagainfortheopportunitytoshareafewthoughtswithyou,andletmethankyouagainfortheopportunitytoexpresssomefrustrationwithyoubecauseIthinktheAirForceneedstodobettertellingourstory.Therearesomanywaysthatwecanengage.Therearesomanywayswecanengagewiththeworld,therearesomanywayswecanaccessthisbetterthanwehaveinthepast.Again,Ithinkwe’recomfortableinthisbecauseweallknoweachother.We’recomfortableinthisbecauseweknowhowtomaketheimpossiblehappen.We’recomfortableinthisbecausewe’rejustgentlemanlybyournatureandwehavechosennottobetheaggressively“outinthepublic”services.

My task to my staff is to figure out a way to break that mold. To stop being a softer, gentler AirForceandtobesomethingmuchmoresaggressiveindetailingtheattributesofairandspace alongside the required attributesof land andmaritimewarfare to get better at thisworldweliveintoday.

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AgiliTY iN A MeDiUM/SMAll Air Force

Brigader Morten h lunde, royal Norwegian Air Force

Introduction

Thetitleofthispresentation;“Agility in a medium/small Air Force”requiresashortexplanation.Firstofalltheword‘agility’–whatdowemeanbythat?IlookedupinthegoodoldOxfordDictionaryandWebster’sNewCollegiateDictionarywhatthewordagile/agilityreallymeans.

Agile according to the Oxford Dictionary means to be quick-moving.WhilstWebster’sexpands themeaning further to;“marked by ready ability to move with quick easy grace” and/or“mentally quick and resourceful.”Andagilityisthe“quality or state of being agile.”Inadditionagilityforairmenmeans,atleastinmyhead,beingabletodeliversustainedoperationaleffectontimeandontargetandtooutmanoeuvretheenemy.SecondlywhodoIrepresent?Thetitleindicatesa medium/small air force. I most certainly would define the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RnoAF) asasmallairforce.Currentlyweare1590personnelintheRNoAF,andadditionally1800lightbluemaintainerswhobelongtotheNorwegianDefenceLogisticOrganisation(NDLO).

Norway’s strategic outlook is primarily shaped by the country’s position within a powerstructurewherethedominantactorsareNATO,theUnitedStates,EU,UNandRussia.Wearenolongerfacingthesamemassivethreatfromtheeast.

Wearefacingotherthreatsjustaschallenging.Firstly–withanationalfocusandperspective,there could be a potential for incidentsoriginating fromdiscussions anddisagreementsoverresources in the Barents Sea – oil, gas, fishery – a dispute possibly involving all these players. Weneedtobeprepared forsuchcontingencies justasmuchas for internationaloperations.Uncertainty is a major factor to consider for anybody that tries to stay agile and adaptable.Secondly - you can scour the pages of the newspapers in the 80s and 90s and not find one incidenceofthenameSaddamHussein,OsamabinLadenorSlobodanMilosevic.Theywerenotinthenews.Yetbythesummerof1990andonthroughthedecadeofthe'90s,thesearethepersonsandforcesthatguidedouractivitiesforafulldecadeandintothiscentury.

Thechangethatwehaveexperiencedwhentheseplayerscamealongrequiredrethinkingofour defence posture, and how we organised our approach to war fighting. Our ability to predict thefutureisnotthatgood,andourlackofabilitytopredictdemandsthatweatleasttrytobeagileandabletorespondtoavarietyofsituationsinthefuture.

TheNorwegianDefenseiscurrentlygoingthroughthemostcomprehensivemodernizationaftertheSecondWorldWarinordertobecomemoreagile,andtomakeagilityourtrademark.TheRNoAFstartedthisprocessin2000.Themainaimwastochangepeople,theorganizationandtheoverallmindsetapproachingthechallengestheparadigmchangeaftertheendof theColdWargaveus.InthecourseofthispaperIwillfocusonhowwechangedandarechangingintoamoreagileposture–andsomeoftheconsequencesoftheinternalprocessintheRNoAFandourfocusedareasforchange,thefocusoninternationalpartnershipandforcepooling,andmaintainingagilityinthefutureinasmallairforce.

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A new challenge – the end of the Cold War

TherealitycheckforRNoAFcamewhenwejoinedOperationAlliedForcein1998/99.The need to transform the RNoAF, especially the combat aircraft force, from a static anti-invasionposturetoanexpeditionaryagileairforcebecameevidenttouswhenplanningforandparticipatingintheKosovocampaign.Keyelementssuchasmobility,deployability,sustainability,adaptability andhenceour agility in the combat aircraft forcewerenowherenearwhatwasexpected.WeendeduplookingaftertheAdriaticSeawithourF-16s.

Thisshouldnothavehappened.Thechallengesshouldnothavebeenunknowntous.WehadalreadyparticipatedwithC-130sandBell412helicoptersinanumberofoperationsfromthemid1980s,includingparticipationinmajorairandlandoperationsinthePersianGulfandinBosnia.However,theselessonsobservedwerenotanalysedproperly.

Afterall,excepttheunitsconcerned,therestofoursystemwasinthe“deepestfeelingofapeacefulenvironment”everencounteredsincethemid-1930s.TheColdWarworkedverymuchinthesamewayasalullabyforthesystem.

ImyselfcommandedourC-130deploymentinsupportofIFOR/SFORfrom1995to1997,andmyexperiencewasthatIwasinacomplicatedwar/crisissituationwhilsttherestoftheairforcelumberedalongwiththeireverydaylifeandproblems.ThesamesituationprevailedwhenwedeployedourF-16stoNaples insupportofOperationAlliedForcea fewyears later.Themindsetwasverymuchstaticandstove-pipedineacharmoftheservices,andnobodyseemedto,orwasafraidof,thinkingoutsidethebox.Itseemedasifwehadlearnednothingfrompreviousoperations.Agility was definitely not a trademark for the organisation. Somethinghadtobedone,andfast.

Creating the vision of change/Changing the Air Force

First of all we had to realise that something was wrong. Our forces didn’t deliver whatour politicians and the rest of the world was expecting – we had become irrelevant.We had dug in too deep waiting for the Soviet invasion. The first step on our way to a more agile airforcewastochangeourfocusandapproachtoproblemsolvingandbuildingofairpower.Thisgaveusthestartingpointweneededinordertobuildamoreagileairforceorientedtowardsthe new challenges without having to fight our way through a long and devastating “war of fog andfriction”withintheairforceitself.

Our next challenge was to create a vision and build a force designed and dedicated forinternationaloperationsandnationalcrisismanagement.

This meant the need for a more adaptable, mobile and flexible air force – properly equipped withafastresponsetime,orhighdegreeofagilityifyouliketoputitthatway.

Theforcecontributionandcompilationshouldbeindividuallytailoredfromcasetocase.Thiswouldhavetobedonewithintheframeworkofmoretasksathand,feweremployees,higherdemands for efficient operations and a common mindset where decisions should be taken at therightlevelandattherighttimeinthemilitaryhierocracy.Ourvisionbecame“feweroffice chairs and more air power”.

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The following four cornerstonesbecameparamount inour approach to a newair force:theability toachievearapidresponse,with theminimum logistical footprint, tobenetwork-centricandadaptable,andtoachievemaximumoperationaleffectasasmallairforce.Basicallywefocusedonanumberofkeysuccessfactorstobuildasmall,modern,highlyagileandmoreadaptableairforcethatwouldbeapreferredpartnerairforceforfutureoperationsinallianceandcoalitionwarfare.Thismeantdevelopingavision,andassociatedstrategyandrelatedconcept,followedbythenecessaryhumancapitalwiththerightknowledgeandcompetence.Thecorrecttechnologyandweaponrywouldalsoberequired,aswouldthedevelopmentof internationalpartnershipandcooperation.Iwillnowlookateachoftheseelementsinturn.

Vision and strategy/focus areas

TheRNoAFhaschosenthemotto;“AimingHigher”.Thismirrorstheover-archinggoaltogetbetterbothasindividualsandasanorganisation

everyday.Inadditionwehavetheinhouseambitiondescribedas“Bestatwhatwearedoing”–realisingthatwecan’tdoeverythingbutwhatwedowewilldowell.

Actually we wanted“Just Do It!” – but this slogan was already taken.This encompassedthe vision of putting the war fighters in focus, reducing staffs, empowering at all levels of the organisation, and giving responsibility and resources to air wings and the Defence LogisticalOrganisationdirectly.

TherequirementforchecksandbalanceswastobeconductedthroughwrittencontractsbetweentheCASandthosewhoreceivedmoneyandresources.

OurnewCASin2000,MajorGeneralArcherusedverymuchofhistimeandenergyvisitingunitsandpersonnel inordertobringhomethemeaningand importanceoftheambitionsofthenewagileairforce.Hispersonalleadershipandinvolvementwasamajorsuccessfactoronourwayforward.AnotherkeycontributorwastheBalancedScorecardtoolforimplementinga new strategy and surveying our strategy development as we went along. However our first attempt at creating a strategy map identified 10 executive leaders with 104 main goals to focus on,soitbecameclearthatwedidnothaveacommonpictureofwhatwewantedtoachieve.Inordertokeepitsimpleitbecameobviousthattherewereonlythreequestionstobeanswered;whatwasourpresentposition?Wheredidwewanttobeinthefuture?Andwhatdidwehavetodotogetandstaythere?ThemaingoaloftheprocesswastoestablishactualownershipoftheStrategicMapandthescorecardwithinthe leadershipandmakepeopleunderstandwhatweweretryingtodo.Thewaytocreatethebestpossibleresultsreliedontrust,involvement,frankness,responsibility,andinparticularawillingnesstoseethebestsolutionsforthewholeorganisation.

FromthisapproachdevelopedanewbasisforanagilesmallAirForcewhichsawachangein focus from territorial defence and defensive counter air operations to expeditionary airoperations, and a mix between air to air and air to ground operations. Much greater flexibility and mobilityinorganizationandequipment,andallbasesupportlocatedinaseparateunitcapableofsupportinganyairelement(fromF-16totransportaircraftandhelicopters)ifnecessary.Unitswere to be flexibly structured and organized to match different tasks and operations, and aiming forqualitybeforequantity.Butitwasalsoimportanttoconsiderthedefenceofvaluesandjobsatisfaction–beingamilitaryairmanisnotastandbystatusbutachallengingoccupation.Andinordertoenableallofthisitwouldbenecessarytominimize“RedTape”.

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Concept

WemadeastrategicdecisiontofollowtheprinciplesinaM2N-concept(Mobile,ModularandNetworkCentric)asatooltoachievetheaimofbecomingacredibleandagileTaskForcefor the future.By these termswemeant:Mobility - the rapid generation anddeploymentofforce-andsupportmodulesintherighttimetotherightplace;Modularity-havingcost-effective,reduced-footprint, flexible and scalable broad units; Network Centric and Adaptable –modulesoperatinginanintegratedmanneracrossalllevels,jointandcombined,andinteroperablewithkeypartners

As a result of the concept we defined what we call the Smallest Operational Unit(SOU)andSmallest Deployable Unit(SDU).AnSOUisthesmallestunitthatgivesasubstantialcontributiontoanoperation.Thatmeanscapableofconductingmoreorlessindependenttasksandmissions.AnSDUwillbethesmallestunitcapableofbeingdeployedabroad.Suchaunitwillnotbeabletooperateindependently,butincooperationwithotheralliedandcoalitionforces.ThesizeofaSOU and SDU will vary dependent of weapon system and type of operation. For fighters a SDU willtypicallybefrom2-4aircraft.Itcanbeasingletransportaircraftorcouldbeonesingleradarunit NASAMS/GBAD. A fighter SOU on the other hand would be between 6-12 F-16s.

This modular design makes us light, mobile, flexible, adaptable and agile. If we can not contribute with much, we could at least contribute with something and on a short notice.Together with allies and partners we can be a significant force in any operation. I will come back totheEPAF-cooperationlaterinmypresentation,butinsumwethinkthatthisapproachhelpsustoberelevantincurrentandfutureoperations.AsLEGOpiecescanbeahousetodayandacartomorrow,theseSDUscanbeanintegratedpartofdifferentoperationalorganisationsandstructures. We don’t know what tomorrow brings, and our elements must be small and flexible enoughtoadaptintoanyfuturechallenge.

The Human capital

BuildingagilityandmakingitthetrademarkfortheRNoAFmeanstrusting,believing,focusingonandcommunicatingwith thehumancapital in theorganisation. Inorder tobreak thede-motivating chainof endless reorganisations and cutbacks in theorganisation, and its negativeeffect on the fighting spirit we decided to let people do what they came to the air force to do in the first place. Fly, shoot missiles, conduct command and control and to maintain aircraft and maybemostimportantlyallowforlocalinnovation.

And inadditionwegavethemresourcesand“freedomofmovement”todosowithinanoverarchingframework.

We decided to cut back on staff and HQ office workers and increase the resources going to thefrontendoftheairforce.

TodaywehaveanAirStaffconsistingof23people,anAirWarfareCentreof150peopleandaJointAirOperationsCentre(JAOC)consistingof40persons.

Allofthesecanandwillbeusedwhenconductingdeployedoperationsifneedbe.Thismovehadanimmediateeffectonmorale,innovationandoperationaleffectiveness.For

example. the total flying hours increased from 9500 hrs/year to 12000 hours/year on F-16 in twoyearsandwewentfromsingletomulti-rolecapableforceatthesametime.Similartrends

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wereapparentforallofourotheroperationalunits.Wealsosawanimmediateeffectondecisionmaking and the time from an idea was conceived to a solution/action was taken. Our staffsactuallybecamemoreeffectiveandagileaswell.

The OODA-loop in the Air Force was definitively improved!

Howeveritdidalsomeanthattheopstempoishigherthanbefore,whichisalwaysachallengeinasmallairforce.Wehaveveryfewpeopleinuniform–approximately1600operators.Fatigueis apparent in theorganisation, andwehavehad to adjustouroperational tempo somewhatbasedonourexperiences.Weneedtolookcarefullyattherotationcycles’ofourpersonnel.3monthsfortheleadershipand6-8weekscyclesseemstobethemaximumthesystemandpersonnelcanabsorbifweareparticipatinginoperationslasting6monthsormore.WehavealsoreorganisedtheDefenceLogisticalOrganisation.Thereorganisationincludedjobcutsandanapproachtowardsoutsourcedmaintenanceandlogisticalservices,withaseparationbetweenoperatorandmaintainer.But lookingbacknotallof thesechangeshaveenhancedouragility.Peacetimeoperationsathomedon’tenhance“esprit de corps”, we don’t train as we fight any more,andtherearetoofewfrontlinemaintainersintheinventory.

A high ops tempo we find especially hurts the maintenance side of the house, and as a consequencepeoplestarttolookforotherjobsoutsidetheairforce.Wearenowintheprocessofchangingthisbacktoamoreintegratedoperator/maintainerunits.1600intheoperationalorganisationand1800inNDLOaremarginalinordertobeanagileforce.WehopethatwecanincreasethenumbersinthenextNorwegianDefenceStudy.

Knowledge/competence

Air Forces are technology and experience driven organisations, operating advanced andcostlyequipment.OurmainproductisAirPower.

We are measured by the agility and effectiveness in this product, and the quality of theproductwillbedependantuponthequalityofthelimitednumberofpersonnelthatweafterallselect,andintheendofthedayhaveavailable.FortheNorwegianAirForcehighqualityinselection,educationandtrainingisparamountinordertobuildagility.Thisbeginsinourselectionprocessforaircrews.

Thisyearwewillselectapproximately25personsoutof450applicantsforinitialselectionflying, of which approximately 10-12 will become pilots and navigators. The surplus of the 25, who weconsiderstobethebestofthebestcomingfromtheciviliansideofthestreet,willbeofferedaopportunitieswithinourC2orGBADsystem.

Theagilityfactorisfurtherenhancedthroughthealliancebasictrainingthatwedotogetherwithsomeofourclosesalliesin(define)ENJJPT.

The idea is that people who learn to fly the same aircraft together (e.g. F-16) will eventually operatetogetherinalliedorcoalitionops.

We find that operators who know each other from basic training have their agility enhanced, andthissameapproachistakenforhelicopterandmulti-engineaircrewtraining.Lateronintheircareerswewillbuildonthisandseekknowledge,trainingandeducationfromthebestsourcesandinstitutionswithinthealliancewhereeveritisavailable.ItisparticularlyimportantforsmallairforcestobeabletoparticipateinexercisesandhighstandardtraininglikeRedFlagorMapleFlaginordertostayabreastwiththeagilityandknowledgeoflargerairforces–tousthismeansbenchmarking.Henceknowledgeandcompetencefrombasictraining,operationsandadvanced

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exercises/training/educationarethecornerstoneforasmallairforceoftodaytostayagileandrelevant.

Technology and weapons

Technologyandweaponrywillbeanotherimportantissueforasmallairforceinthefuture.Technologyanddevelopmentof capabilitiesmeans inmostcasesa lighter logistical footprint,needforfewermaintainersbutontheotherhandaneedformoreoperatorstotakeadvantageoftheincreasedmissionrate.WeintheRNoAFwillalwayschaseandchoosethecapabilitiesthatgivemostoperationalvalueformoney.Whetherthisiscommercialtechnologythatcanenhanceexistingornewsystems,ornewmilitarytechnologyandweaponsthatarewithinreachofourresources.Wehaveestablishedaconcepts,developmentandexperimentation(CD&E)activity,theNorwegianBattleLabExperiment(NOBLE),tohelpusmakeitpossibletostayinfrontwhenitcomestoutilisingcommercialtechnologyformilitarypurposes,orexpandingpossibilitiesformilitarytechnology.NOBLEhasdevelopedfromasingleserviceinitiativeintheAirForcetoaTri-Serviceinstitutionthatreallyenhancesouragilityinjointoperations.Anexampleofthisisthepossibilitieswehavedevelopedforstreaminglivevideoandinformationviacommercialavailablehard-andsoftwarefromF-16tonavalunits,FACandSFforces.ThistypeofCD&Eactivityismosthelpfulinoureffortstostayrelevantandadaptableforfutureoperations,andhelpsustostayvigilantwithregardstofuturetrendsanddevelopments.

AllinallthetransformationoftheNorwegianAirForcehasbeenasuccess.Weconsiderourselvesasadaptedforcurrentandfuturechallengeswithinthelimitations

thatanysmallairforcehaswithregardstocapabilitiesandresources.WehavecontributedmoreorlesscontinuouslywithairpowertotheUNinBosnia,IFOR,

SFOR, KFOR, Op Enduring Freedom, ISAF, BalticAccession and OpActive Endeavour since1993.

Andinourowneyestheoperationalagilityhasbecomebetterandbetter.Wehaveestablishedanewmindset,anewwayofdoingbusiness,acquirednewweaponsand

technologyfrom2000–2006,andsetthestandardforfuturedevelopment.

International partnership and cooperation

SofarinmypresentationIhavefocusedontheinternaltransformationthattookplaceinordertocreatethenecessaryagilityintheNorwegianAirForce.ButIhavealsoalludedtotheconnectionto,andpartnershipwith,othermediumandsmallEuropeanairforcesinthisequationofcreatingagility.TheRNoAFisasmallairforcewithlimitedresourcesandcapabilities;thesamegoesforourpartnerswithintheEuropeanF-16programme–theEuropeanParticipatingAirForces (EPAF)–consistingofDenmark, theNetherlands,BelgiumandPortugal–all smallormediumsizedairforces.

We could never as single stand-alone nations make any significant contribution in any internationaloperation.Wehaveallrealisedthisandin2002wedecidedtocombineoureffortsasmuchaspossible.

Thiswas done through the creationof the EPAF ExpeditionaryAirWing (EEAW)whichwas confirmed and formalised in a MoU between the nations in 2004. Agility in an international contextforusthereforestartswithinternationalcooperationandforcepoolingbetweensmallerairforces.

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What is the EEAW?

Smaller nations face a big burden as individual nations participating in internationaloperations.Thenumberofpersonnel,supportunitsetc.availablenationbynationis,andwillforthe foreseeable future, be limited and maybe declining in the next decade. None of us would fulfil thetrueambitionofagility.

Howeverifwetogethertakeamodularapproachwecancombineoureffortsandbecomeatrulyagileforce.TheEEAWcomprisingaself-sustainingdetachmentprovidingairpowerwithF-16MtotheJointForcesCommanderwascreatedforthispurpose.TheconcepthasworkedverywellinouroperationswithF-16sinOEFandISAF,andisthebasisforourparticipationwithfighter aircraft in the current NRF 7.

TherestrictionslayinnationallegislationandreservationstotheJointForcecommandersROEs. Furthermore we are currently limited in the abilty to fly in, and especially maintain, each othernation’saircraft.

The same goes for flying within the tactical elements i.e. 2 and 4 ships. However the main gain laysintheabilitytoutiliseeachother’stransportaircraft,refuellingaircraft,GBADsystemsandforceprotectionifneeded,andlogistical/maintenancesystemssuchashousingandmessing.Thecooperationisbasedoncommonalityandinteroperabilitybetweenhumansandequipmentthataredeployedforindependentoperations.

This helps building situational awareness and sharing of essential information, and henceimproved war fighting capabilities within a deployed detachment as well.

Aspointedoutearlierthisexcellentpartnershipandtrust ineachotherstartswithbasictraining and using common platforms and equipment, and the benefits from the partnership include burden sharing, greater operational efficiency, more experience from live operations than would otherwisebepossible,theopportunitytoexchangeinformationandsmartwaysofconductingbusiness,greateragilityatalowcost(4F-16sand85personsinKabulfor3monthshadapricetagof50millNKr(approx£4,5million)),apositiveeffectonnationalairpowerdevelopment,ahighdegreeofjobsatisfaction,plustheopportunitytocatchtheeyeofthepoliticians-hopefullymakingiteasierforthemtosayyestofuturemoneytodevelopmoreairpower.

Future development of EEAW

InthefuturewefromtheNorwegiansidewouldinacombinedeffortwithourpartnerslookat,andpotentiallyreconsider,someofthecurrentlimitationsintheEEAW.

Wearepursuingsolutionsforexchangeandcommonuseofcomponentsandsparepartsforourjets.SinceweareallfollowingtheF-16M-programmeitwouldtakeaminimumofefforttoauthoriseourmaintainerstoworkoneachothersaircraft.

ThiswouldbeatrueandagileapproachtoPerformanceBasedLogisticsandMaintenance(PBL&M).SimilarlywewouldliketoseeadevelopmentofEEAW-likeinitiativesforMPAsandGBAD.

ThecurrenteffortwithintheEuropeanAirGroup–EAG–seemstotakecareoftheneedswithinthetransportandtankerworld.OuraimistomakeEEAWthemostappropriateairpowertailoredtoanymultinationaloperationorcoalition,andmakeEEAWintoaNRFinanutshell.

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Maintaining agility in the future in a small air force

Agilityisthequalityand“ability to move with quick easy grace” and/orbeing“mentally quick and resourceful”.Wemustmakesurethatthetransformationeffortthatwehaveproducedoverthelastfewyearstoachievethisambitiondoesnotvanishagain.

We must continue to produce an agile force of soldiers, NCOs and officers. Without them the change and the fighting spirit is not possible. We must also keep a constant

eye on technology development; apply smart ways of utilising the technology and find partners withthesameorcomparabletechnologyasourowninordertosharetheburdensofoperatingandmaintainingcuttingedgemilitaryequipment.Furthermoreweneedtocontinuetobeableto educate, train and fight along our larger brothers in arms. Isolation and too strict disclosure policieswillhurtthesmallerplayersinthelongrun.

Conclusion

Agilitycomesfromwithin.We as individuals and organisations must allow the war fighter and the system to develop and

makewayforinnovation.Asseniorleadershipweshouldnotstandintheway,butinsteadhelpthiscreativityandinnovationfromideatosolutionoractiontothebestofourabilities.

TheprincipleoftheOODA-loopverymuchappliesforanyairforcethatwantstobeagileandtostayabreastwiththechallengesinapplyingfutureairpower.OurownprocessandtheprocesstogetherwithourEPAF-partnersoverthelast5-6yearshaveshownusthatitispossibleto have agility in today’s complex war fighting environment even with the limited resources availabletoasmallairforce.

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AgiliTY iN The logiSTicS AreNA

Air commodore Simon Bollom

Although logistics is not perhaps not the first area that springs to mind when the subject of agilityisraised,itiscertainlytruetosaythatifwewanttorealiseouraimofhavinganagileairforcethenagilesupportisanabsolutemust.AndwhileknowledgeofthevariousfundingcutsthathavebeenappliedtotheTornadoprogrammeisgenerallywellappreciatedthroughtheAirForce,together with the challenge that it has posed for all those involved in supporting the Tornado fleet, westillneedtoconsiderwhethersupporttransformation,notjustTornado’sbutacrosstheairenvironment,isreallygoingtostanduptotheagilitytest.

So just to set the scene, a ‘small’ financial challenge was set in 2003 and this was the catalyst for thetransformationofTornadosupport.Thesavingtargetsplacedwereanaggregationofvariouswedges,andtheircombinedeffectwasthattheTornadosupportteamneededtodeliverthesameoutputasbefore-butforjustunderhalfthecost.Ontopofthatofcourse,thereweretheEnd-to-EndStudyrecommendationsonmanpowerreductionswhichamountedtosomethingintheorderof a 25% cut in the manpower available in Tornado depth. So not only was there a financial challenge, but the requirement had to be delivered with significantly fewer people.

Howarewedeliveringthattransformation?Themaintoolthatisbeingusedisthatof‘Lean’,whichisatleastanapproachthatmostserviceaudiencesarenowfamiliarwith.ByapplyingtheLeanprocessitispossibletorationalisethesurfeitofrepaircapabilitythatexistsbetweentheMainOperatingBases,ThirdLineandbackinindustry.

Aspartofthis,theopportunity isalsobeingtakentotransformthewaylogisticsupport isdelivered,andtodothiswithintheframeworkofpartneringwithindustry.Inthismodel,industrywillbecontractedtodeliverthetotalityofdepthsupportthroughtothefrontline.Progresssofarhasbeengoodandatpresenttherequiredsavingstargetsbothincashandmanpowersavingsaregoingtobeachieved-althoughatthemomentdeliveryoftherightlevelofservicetothefrontline is not being achieved, albeit this is perhaps not unexpected as there are a number of difficult transitionalphasestopassthrough.

However, there is no doubt that the difficulties are being overcome, and delivery of a very much more effective and efficient logistics support chain is beginning to happen. There is no question that thisrationalisation,thecollapseofmultiplefacilitiesintosingleones,theremovalofmanpower,theremovalofinventory,hasdeliveredamuchreducedsupporttail-butthequestionthatneedstobeconsidered now is whether this new construct is perhaps too inflexible, and therefore lacking the agilitythatwillberequiredinthefuture.

Recentlyattentionhasbeenturnedtothefrontendofbusiness,lookingathowtheaircraftareactuallyoperated,howthetrainingtaskisachieved,howtheoperationaloutputisactuallydelivered,andparticularly lookingathowthedeployedfootprintcanbereduced–anaspectthatwillbereturnedtolater.Atthecentreofthishasofcoursebeenthe‘agileairman’,thedevelopmentofwhichiswellcoveredinAirMarshalDye’spaperelsewhereinthispublication.

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Butwhatarethecharacteristicsofagilesupport?Topofthelisthastoberobustness,whichinourtermsmeansresiliencetochange–theonesurethingaboutmountingamilitarycampaignisthatchangeisinevitable.Butdealingwithcomplexandinsomeinstancesobsoleteequipmentbringsfurtherchallenges-theTornadowasdesignedinthelate60sandearly70s,broughtintoserviceinthelate70s,andhastorunontill2025–whichmeansoperatingaplatformthatis40+years old. That means planning now to ensure that there is sufficient resilience in the support chain tobeabletomeetfuturerequirements,butalsoensuringresponsivenesstochangesindemandandoperationalconcept ismaintained.Oneof thedangershere isa tendency toclosely tailorthe transformation of support to fit exactly what is being done today. The problem is that there maywellbeotherscenariosthatthesupportchainhastobeabletocopewith,whichprovidesitsownchallengesintermsofprovisioningandfundingsupportforsomethingthatmayhappeninthe future. Support needs to be flexible, and it needs to be adaptable, and in the last part of this paperconsiderationwillbegiventothebusinessofmeetingnewthreats,howobsolescencecanbecombatted,andhowembodyingnewcapabilitesinthesortoftimescalesthataregoingtoberequiredinthefuturecanbeenabled.

However there issues associated with logistic support that need to be tackled first. Foremost ofwhichiswhatcanbedescribedasanurbanmythorcommonplacemisconception,whichisthatitispossibleto‘over-lean’asupportchain.Wellthefactis,thatleanisabouttheeliminationofwaste,nottheeliminationofresilience.Theproblemariseswhenthereisafailuretoensurethe correct approach to lean is made from the start, in terms of the fact that the very first step is toidentifyvalue,orinotherwordswhatthecustomer(front-line)requires,andinthiscasethatwillbeledbythenatureofoperations.Forthemilitary,partofthevaluestreamshouldbetheflexibility to adapt to new requirements or threats. So if the logistic support chain is constructed only to cope only with a single scenario, it will not be surprising that it is slightly inflexible in coping with other scenarios that might arise. This is the really difficult bit, and the bit that tends to get missedsometimeswhenengagedinthissortofleantransformation.Gettingtherequirementrightat the outset is absolutely vital, and that involves an acknowledgement that flexibility is part of the requirement.Howeveranothermisconceptionisthatsomehowa‘fat’andover-provisionedlogisticsupportsystemsismoreagilethataleanone.Sparecapacityisonlyusefulifyouplantouseit,andinthepast,lookingatpreviouslogisticsupportsystems–thesurfeitofengineeringcapability,theexcess inventory, none of which is truly available – did not provide us with the sort of flexibility and agilitythatisrequired.So,havingquantitydoesnotnecessarilymakeyouagile.

So, when is it waste or when is it resilience? Well stock levels are probably the first place people tendtofocusinonandcertainlyin2002thevalueoftheTornadoinventorywasjustabout1.4billion pounds, but in terms of what was really needed, the figure then came out was probably about athirdofthatsize.Indeedin2004aprovisionwastakenagainstsurplusstockofsome£700million,witharequirementtophysicallydisposeofthesurplus–whichraisesthequestionastowhetherassetsarereallyanasset,oractuallyahindrance?Thedangerhereagainisthatispossibletobedrawnintoremovingallsurplusstockinthebeliefthatactuallyallthatisrequiredistosupporttoday’sops.Thekeyhere,particularlywhendrawingdown,istobeabletoreducedowntoalevelthat provides a sufficient degree of contingency to support the essential range of operations – with the trick of course coming in the definition of what is ‘essential’. This is far more difficult when bringinganewplatformintoservice,suchasTyphoon,whereeveryspareisadirectcashcost.ForTornadothemajorityofcostisintermsofdepreciationandcapitalcharge-butnotcash.

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Anotherareaof concern–or interest–dependingon theperspective is thatofduplicatefacilities.AnexamplehereiswheretwoyearsagotheRAFhadtwoenginebays,oneatLossiemouthand one at Marham, both producing engines, with between them a total of 56 strip and buildpositions.Nowthatleaninghastakenplace,theServicehasasinglesupportfacilityatRAFMarham,withonly10stripandbuildpositions.Thequestionis,doesthatrepresentmoreorlessresiliencethan before? Is it more flexible or more agile than the situation that we had before? A traditional approachwouldbetoarguethatwithtwobaystherewasafargreaterdegreeofresilienceinherentinthesystem,whichinturnmeantgreateragility.Therealpointherethoughisthatundertheoldsystem, both of those engine bays were working flat out to deliver the same requirement that is nowbeingachievedwithone,sowhatrealresilience,capacity ,oragilityactuallyexisted inthechain?

Andthenontothemostpreciousasset,thatofourmanpowerresource.Turningtodeployedsupport,andconsideringOpTelic,thereare6TornadoGR4aircraftoutintheatrewhichrequirejustover100Tornado tradesmen to support. It took something like20 ISOcontainers to gettheequipmentoutintotheatretosupportthedetachment.Everyairmanin-theatrerequireslifesupport-feeding,accommodationandforceprotection-andthenbackinUKthereisagearingofabout4:1tomeettheharmonyguidelines,meaningabout4personnelintheUKtosupporteveryonedeployed.So,oneoftheissueshereisthatafocusonthefrontendisneededinorderto realise the benefits that provide the sort of flexibility and agility that the commander in theatre requires, and to minimise the overall logistic footprint. However there is a difficult balance to be struckherebetweenbuildingagilityandresilienceintoasupportchain,andtheassociatedcost.Resilienceisusuallyregardedasdiscretionaryexpenditurewhenfacedwithtightbudgets.Quiteoftenthereforeresilienceandprovisionagainstobsolescenceislookedatasa‘nicetohave’,andtheseopportunitycostsareoftenreinvestedelsewhere.Nowtalkingaboutfocusingonthefrontendinamanagementsummary,butwhatexactlyismeantbythisapproach?Well,traditionallywhendriving greater effectiveness and efficiency has been attempted through the support chain, this has startedbylookingatthebackendofit.Soareassuchaslookingatreducingrepairturnaroundtime,howtomakedowithfewerspares,howtoachievefasterdeliveries–allofthesehavebeenthefocusinthepast.Butwhathasbeenrealisednowisthatifthefocusisinsteadplacedonthefrontend;lookingcarefullyathowtheaircraftareactuallyoperated,bringingtogetherthemaintainersandtheoperatorsinafarcloserrelationship,itispossibletomakebestuseofalltheresourcesthatare there to meet the flying task. Key to this is using industry’s knowledge as a design authority, with appropriate incentives, to drive significant improvements in effectiveness and efficiency.

HavinglookedattheTornadovaluestream,howtheaircraft isoperated,whereriskcanbetaken,andwherethedemandvariablesareandhowtheycanbesmoothed–whatisleft?Onethingisclear,whichisthatwithanaircraftthatisalready30yearsofage,itissimplynotgoingtobepossible to make significant inroads into making the platform more reliable or more maintainable. Thatisafunctionofthedesignofthekit,whichtoalargeextent,justhastobelivedwith.Butwhatcanbedonetohugeadvantageistolookatthewayinwhichmaintenanceiscarriedoutandtheplatformisoperated.Thecurrentstatisticsshowthatonlyhalfthesortiesplannedfortrainingactuallygotairborneandachieve‘dutycarriedout’-onlyhalf!Thatishugelywasteful,andfocusingonthefrontendallowsustoconcentrateonwherewecanmakeimprovementsthathavethegreatestpotentialimpactthoughoutthesystem.

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Continuingwiththethemeofagilityat‘forward’,thefactisthatwhenanyplatformisstartedupandthenshutdownitgoesthroughastresscyclewhichgeneratesmanyminorunserviceabilities–somethingknowntoanyonewhohaseverownedacomputer.Well,aconsiderablenumberofoptionshavebeenexploredtototryandminimisethenumberofstartupandshutdowns,suchaslookingatenginerunningcrewchanges,hotpitrefuelling–evenuptorepackagingmaintenance,suchthat itcanbedone insmallbitesratherthanthe largechunksthattaketheaircraftawayfromthefrontline.Butbyfarthebiggestleverthathastobeexploitedismakingbetteruseofinformation. Take the codification of fault codes for example, where the phenomenon of an aircraft thathashadthesamefault20timesover,andwherethesameLRI(LineReplaceableItem–orablackboxforthenon-technical)hasbeenchanged10times,isunfortunatelynotatypical–butwhyisthisstillhappening?Whyisitthatsystemsarenotinplacetoprovidetheintelligentanalysisofthe data that is available, and make sure that the fault is fixed the first time round. The key interface is,ofcourse,thetraditionaloneofcommunicationbetweenthegroundcrewandaircrew.Thethirdelementatthefrontlinethathastobemadethemostofishavingindustryinvolvedandbringingtheirexpertisetobearearly.Doesthisproduceresults,wellyesitdoes,andthishashelpedtoreduceengine rejectionson theTornadoaircraft by something in theorderof50%.Nomagicappliedhere,quitesimplymakingsurethattherightinformationisproduced,thatwehavebothmaintaineranddesignauthority involvementatthefront-line,abletomakethedecisionswhichenablethoseenginestobekeptonthewingforaslongasitissafetodoso.

Moving rearwards to consider our depth element, the people element has already beendiscussedtosomeextent,andinoneoftheotherpapersmentionwasmadeoftheempowermentthat lean brings. Well, most of the ideas actually do come from the shop floor. The engine support conceptdescribedearlierinwhichtherequirementhasreducedto10enginesinrepairfrom50before,providingfarbettersupportdirectlytothefrontline–mostofthepracticalcontentofthe initiativesthat ledtothissituationcamefromthepeoplethatareactuallydoingthe job. Inmanyways,Leanatitsbestismostlyaboutrealisingthepotentialoftheworkforce.Intermsofthesystemsthathavebeensetuptocombinemaintenanceandupgrade,withoutdoubtthiswasa‘no-brainer’butupuntil2yearsagoitwasn’tdone:therewereseparatelinesforupgradeandmaintenance–whichsimplymeantlessaircraftavailabletothefrontline.Sowiththepulselineconceptandtheconsolidationofmaintenanceintoasingledepthfacility,ithasbeenpossibletobringtogetheralloftheelementsthathavecontributedtowardsmaintenanceandupgradeoftheaircraft,sothattheycanbeoptimisedbothtomeetthecurrenttaskand be flexible enough to be abletodeliverchangewhenrequired.

Nowletusmoveonandconsidertheproblemofremainingagileinaworldwherethethreatsare ever-changing. The obsolescence cycle of a fast jet aircraft is probably in the order of five years, andwithoutupgradeandupdatequitesimplythelevelofplatformcapabilitywillrapidlybecomeeroded.Examiningdefence’sperformanceinthisareainthepastisnotreassuring:thelastmajorupgradethattheTornadohad,theGR4upgrade,costoverabillionpoundsandtookwellover10yearstogetitintoservice.BycontrasttheJaguarupgradewascompleteatafractionofthecostanddeliveredin4-5yearsbecauseofthepullofanurgentoperationalrequirement.SowhyisitthenthatinconcertwithindustryitispossibletodesignandintegrateUOR’s(urgentoperationalrequirements)andgetthemembodiedontoanaircraftinamatterofmonths,whereasifthenormaldesign authority route is used, the full modification service takes something in the order of seven years?

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Perhapsmoreworryingly,theassociatedhighcostofintegratingnewcapabilitiesontoallairplatforms significantly affects our ability to secure funding for future upgrades. So why does this problemexist? Muchof it lies inthehighlycomplexsupportchainthat inevitablyresults frommulti-nationalprojects,withalltheimplicationsofwork-shareagreementswhichresultinmultipleagencies,multiple interfaces, duplicationof analysis, duplicationofdata collection, reportsbeingwritten,reportsbeingrejected,awholeprocessindustry.Howeverifaleanapproachistakentoallofthis,itispossibletoidentifywhichofthemreallydoaddvalue.Thiswasrecentlysuccessfullyprovenona smallproject–namely the integrationof theAMRAAMmissileonto theF3.Asaconventionalsmallpilotprojectitwasunaffordableat£40million,andwasgoingtotake3yearstocomplete.Butthiswasreducedtoa£25m,18monthprogramme,simplythroughtheapplicationoflean-byputtingthepeopleintojustonelocation,ensuringsingledatacollectionandsingledataanalysis,swathesofprocesscouldberemovedsafely–andtheprojectwasdeliveredontime.Thekeyhereishavingarealandshareddesiretoimproveperformance,andbeingabletoincentiviseallpartiessothatitisintheirintereststocutthroughredtape,bureaucracyandprocess.

Attheheartofthisiscontractingwithindustrytodeliverthetotalityoflogisticsupport,however

thisisonlygoingtoworkifitispossibletohaveagilecontracts.Itmeansthatbothourselvesandindustryneedtorecognisethattherewillbedemandinstability,andthattherequirementsmightcompletelychangeovernight–and tounderstandhowtherisksherecanbestbemanaged tominimiseadditionalcosts.Buttodothisthereisafurtherneedtoworkon‘openbook’principles,whichallowcosttransparencyinbothdirections, forwithoutthis itwillbe impossibletoworkcloselywithindustrytoworkouthowtomeetthedemandsofachangingrequirementinawaythat is both profitable to industry and cost-effective for the MOD. And that is a challenge whose magnitudeshouldnotbeunderestimated.Indeedalargeelementoftrustisrequiredheretomakethisworksuchthatitispossibletositdownasatrulyjointteam,andlookathowitisfeasibletodelivertherequirement,veerandhaulasneeded,butallwithinaclearcontractualframework.Thereiscertainlyaneedtoincentiviseindustrytodeliverimprovedeffectivenessandcostsavings,butalsoaneedtoincentiviseallareasofthesupportchain,tomakesurethattheServiceelementworks efficiently and effectively as well.

Inconclusion, thispaperhassetoutanassessmentofwhether‘TeamTornado’ isprovidingagilesupportforourfutureoftheplatforms.Oneofthekeythingsthatneedstoberecognisedthoughisthatresilienceisprobablythekeycomponentofprovidingagilesupport,butresilienceisnothaving‘fat’inthesystem–whichisactuallyahindrance–itishavingthecapacitytodealwiththeunexpected.Ifresilienceistobemaintainedwithinthelogisticsupportchain,thenithastoberecognisedthatthiswillrequireacertainamountofinvestmentinlatentcapability.Anditisimperativetoworkend-to-endtomakesurethatweengagetheoperatorsatthefrontend,andclosetheloopwithinindustry,rightthewaythroughthelogisticsupportchain.Everyoneneedstobeon the samepageandcommitted to the sameobjectivesof improvingeffectiveness andimproving efficiency. The threat is agile too, and although only in a pilot programme to date, we havemanagedtoshowthatwecancutthroughthebureaucracythatsurroundsourupgrades–butthereisahugeamountthatstillneedstobedonetochangeabureaucraticculture.Butaboveallitis about getting the balance right. Infinite agility will cost an infinite amount of cash, and ultimately itisgettingthebalanceofinvestmentrightthatwillbekeytobothmeetingtheuncertaintyofthefuture, and providing logistic support that is lean and efficient to meet the full range of tasks.

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PArADoxeS AND ProBleMS oF AirPoWer

Dr Phillip S. Meilinger

When thinking and writing about Airpower over the past two decades I have oftenbeen struck by the paradoxes inherent in our chosen weapon. A paradox is, of course, aseemingly contradictory statement that may nonetheless be true. I have identified several oftheseparadoxes,andtheremaybeothers.Thepointisthatidentifyingsuchodditieshasmorethananacademicinterest,andthesecontradictoryandcounter-intuitivestatementscanleadtoconfusion,misunderstandingandproblems.Mygoalinthisarticleistoilluminatetheparadoxesinthehopethatsheddinglightwillalsoremoveconfusion–andwecanbeginbyexaminingsomeveryearlyperspectives.

“It is not necessarily impossible for human beings to fly, but it so happens that Goddidnotgivethemtheknowledgeofhowtodoit. Itfollows,therefore,that anyone who claims that he can fly must have sought the aid of the devil. To attempt to fly is therefore sinful.” RogerBacon

“When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyesturnedskyward,forthereyouhavebeen,andthereyouwillalwayslongtoreturn.”LeonardodaVinci

From the very beginning of flight—actually from the beginning of dreams of flight—these contradictions have existed. Roger Bacon thought that flying was sinful. Da Vinci, on the other hand,thoughtitneartogodliness.

“Pilotsareararekindofhuman.Theyleavetheordinarysurfaceoftheworld,to purify their souls in the sky, and they come down to earth, only afterreceiving the communion of the infinite.” JoséMaríaVelascoIbarra

After the actual invention of the airplane, there were those—like Ibarra—who saw flight in almostmysticalterms.Theairplanewouldallowmantoleavethesqualidandbanalexistenceof earth and move into the sky where there was freedom, nobility and purification. And to takethisconceptfurther,hereisapoemwrittenduringWorldWarIbyNinoSalvaneschi,anItalianwriterwhowasacontemporaryandfriendofbothGiulioDouhetandGianniCaproni,theaircraftbuilder.Yes,thisistheformatinwhichhewroteit,andweseehereanattempttoillustratehowAirpower—theoffensiveuseofAirpower—wouldbringaboutanewageofvictory, and one, it is implied, that would not require the sacrifice of brave soldiers.

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Thesupremegallantryoftheheroesofsomanybattles,fromso many countries, and the sacrifice of those who

gavetheirlives,aresoontoberewardedwith

victory.Where

couldwestrikedecisively?Intheairandbytheair.Howcanweallconcur

withcertaintyforvictory?

With the bombardment fleets.Withasinglecommand.

Andanewairstrategy.

A slightly different view was expressed by Clement Ader, the noted French aviationenthusiast,whowrotein1908:

“Thegreatbombingplaneswillbeveritableterrors!Iamconvincedthattheirawesome power and the fear of seeing them appear will provoke salutaryreflections among the statesmen and diplomats who are the real dispensers of peace and war, and that in the final analysis these airplanes will serve the cause ofhumanity.

All of which leads us to our first and greatest paradox, namely that “Airwar is so horrible it will be humanizing”. From the very beginnings of flight there were those who saw both promiseandpitfallsinthenewairplane.OrvilleWrightoncesaidthatwhenheandhisbrotherbuilt the first flying machine they sincerely thought that it would make further wars practically impossible. The fictional writings of H.G. Wells and Jules Verne spoke often of this dual and paradoxicalnature.Theythoughtairwarfarewouldbesohorrible itwouldbehumanizing.Thetheorywentthatwarfromtheairwouldbesodestructivethatitmightdeterwarfromevenbreakingout.Butifwardidoccur,thentheinherentlystrategicandoffensivenatureofAirpower,whichwasthenviewedasvirtuallyunstoppable,wouldensurethatitwouldbeoverfairlyquickly.Thisinturnmeantthatoveralllossoflifewouldberelativelysmall.15milliondiedinWorldWarI,sothiswasnotatrivialconsideration.

JustpriortotheoutbreakofWorldWarIIthistheoryseemedtobeborneout.Hitler’sLuftwaffewasviewedwithanalarmborderingonpanicthatshookBritaintoitscoreduringtheinterwarperiod.In1934formerPrimeMinisterStanleyBaldwinmadehisglumpredictionthatthebomberwouldalwaysgetthrough—andthatwouldmeandisasterforEngland.Duringthe 1938Munich crisis, trencheswere being dug inHyde Park and in Paris in anticipationof Nazi bombing attacks. War was averted, temporarily. As Lord Alfred Tedder indicatedin his thoughts later on, “The real importance of Munich is that it was the first victory of airpower—no less significant for being temporarily bloodless.” The threatofAirpower,ofstrategic bombing, deterred war. The prophecy seemed fulfilled.

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“Tomeourbombingpolicyappearstobesuicidal.Notbecause itdoesnotdovastdamagetoourenemy—itdoes;butbecause,simultaneously,itdoesvastdamagetoourpeaceaim,unlessthataimismutualeconomicandsocialannihilation.”J.F.C.Fuller

Intruthofcourse,thatwasnotthecase.Wardidbreakout,withAirpowerplayingamajoranddecisiveroleineventualvictory.Attimesitwasindeedawful.TensofthousandsdiedinairstrikesonDresden,Hamburg,Tokyo,Hiroshima,andelsewhere.Thiswasthehorrorthatmanypeople,airmenandnon-airmenalike,hadpredictedbeforethewarandwhichmilitarythinkerslikeJFCFullerfoundsoobjectionableinpractice.Partly,theproblemwasthatAirpowertendedtolenditselftosuchgraphicdepictions.Asaconsequence,Airpowercarriedwithitfromthewarasomewhatunsavoryreputation.Clearly,airmenwerehoistedontheirownpetard.Theyhadwarnedpeopleaboutthehorrorsofairattack,andthepeopleandnewsmediabelievedthemandplayeduponthosefears,accentuatingeverygraphic imagethatdisplayedthedevastationcausedbyAirpower—whileseldomdisplayingthatcausedbyotherformsofwar.

Asanimportantaside,Iwouldnotethatthingshavechangeddramaticallysincethen.Inaremarkablereport,RefugeesInternationalarguesthatthemilitarycapabilityoftheUSnowallowsittointerveneincivilwarsortocounteraggressiveattacksbyotherstateswithextremelylowrisk.Itseesthisasanimportantandpositivedevelopment.Inotherwords,becauseAirpowernow allows the US to fight and yet cause little collateral damage or incur few civilian casualties, theUShasa“responsibility”tointervene,worldwide,inordertosavelives!

Butreturningtomymaintheme–whathadgonewronginWorldWarII?Whywaswarnotdeterred? In my view, effective deterrence requires five things—my five “C”s. All must occur in orderfordeterrencetotakeplace.

Capability Communication Credibility Concern Cooperation

First,thedeterringpowermusthavetheCapabilitytodamageanenemy.Second,itmustCommunicatethatcapabilityand intentiontotheenemy.Therehavebeeninstancesinhistorywhenthiscommunicationwasmuffed—onerecallsthelead-uptoIraq’sinvasionofKuwaitin1990whenSaddamseemedtogettheimpressionfromtheUSambassadorthattheUSwouldnotinterveneifhemovedagainsthisneighbortothesouth.Wefailedtocommunicateourpolicyeffectively.

Third,thetargetofdeterrencemustbelievethatthethreatisCredible.Itmustbelievethatitsopponenthasthepowertohurtit,andthatithasthepoliticalwilltodoso.

ThismustConcerntheenemy.Hemustworrythatsuchdamagewillbesoseverethatitwillmakehisowngoalsunattainableatareasonablepriceorevencosthimhislifeorposition.Hemustthereforemakearationalcalculationastorelativecosts.

And finally, the enemy must “Cooperate.” And by that I mean, after making the above calculus,hemustbewillingtobedeterred.

“NopoweronearthcanshaketheGermanReichnow.DivineProvidencehaswilled it that I carry through the fulfillment of the Germanic task.” AdolfHitler

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Thereinliestherub.OnecouldcertainlyarguethatAdolfHitlerwassimplyundeterrable.HeknewtheallieswereopposedtohisinvasionofPoland;heknew that, finally, they would act againsthim.Heknewthatitwouldhurt;butnoneofthatmattered.Hismindwasalreadymadeup.NothingthatBritainandFrancecouldhavesaidordonewouldhavedeterredhimfromattackingPolandandthusinitiatingWorldWarIIinEurope.Hesawitashisdestiny.

“Notasingleiteminourtrillion-dollararsenalcancomparewiththegeniusofthesuicidebomber—thebreakthroughweaponofourtime.Ourintelligencesystemscannotlocatehim,ourarsenalcannotdeterhim,and,alltoooften,oursoldierscannotstophimbeforeitistoolate.Amanofinvincibleconviction—callitdelusion,ifyouwill—armedwithexplosivesstolenorpurchasedforahandfulofsoiledbillscanhaveastrategicimpactthatstaggersgovernments.Abettedbytheglobalmedia,thesuicidebomberisthewonderoftheage.” RalphPeters

Todayofcoursewehaveadifferentandinsomewaysanevenworseproblem.IconfesstonotbeingafanofRalphPeters,butinthisinstanceIthinkhegotitright.Theterroristsuicidebombersseemundeterrable,withnoamountofmilitarymightabletoswaythemfromtheirself-appointedmissionofdeath. Ifdeterrencedoesnotworkagainstsuchpeople, itwouldseem we would have to move either up or down the scale of power to find a remedy—we must eitherdissuadetheterrorists—changetheirmindsastothevalueofdiversity,democracyandfreedom—orwemustdestroythem.I’mnotsurewhichofthoseismorepractical.

After World War II the US Air Force also had a problem with the deterrence issue,albeitofadifferentnature.DeterrenceoftheSovietUnionwasbasedonapolicyof“massiveretaliation,”andthatwasdependentonthenuclearmightofStrategicAirCommand(SAC).For itsmotto, SAC stated, paradoxically, that “peacewas its profession”—anechoof theRomanadage,andparadox,thatifyouwantpeaceyoushouldprepareforwar.Astimewenton,thisincongruousstanceledtomisunderstandingandevenridicule.Inthehighlyentertainingmovie, Dr Strangelove, the fictional Gen “Buck” Turgidson, the SAC commander, argues that nuclearwarwouldn’tbeallthatbad.

“I'mnotsayingwewouldn'tgetourhairmussed.ButIdosaynomorethantentotwentymillionkilled,tops.Uh,dependingonthebreaks.“

What’s20millioncasualties?Recallthatthefacetioussubtitleofthismoviewas“Or,howIlearnedtostopworryingandlovethebomb.”AlthoughImustconfess that Dr Strangelove remains one of my favorite films, this was indeed adevastatingsatireontheAirForceanditsstatedpolicy-paradoxthattheirabilitytodestroytheworldwasagoodandhumanething.So how can we sum up this first and most enduring paradox of Airpower? First, wemustconcedethat itdidNOTdetertheoutbreakofWorldWarII.Butthenagain,neitherdidthemoreconventionalformsofmilitaryforce—andofcourse,betweenthewarsitwasthearmyandnavyofourtwocountriesthatreceivedthemajorityofdefensefunds.TheRAFandtheAirCorpsreceived,onaverage,lessthan15percentofourrespectivedefensebudgetsduringthosetwo decades. But, Airpower did shorten the war—especially in the Pacific

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wherestrategicbombing,culminating inthetwoatomicstrikes,broughtthewartoanendpriortothenecessityofabloodyinvasion.

Andairwarwaslessdeadlythanitscounterparts,astheairtheoristshadpredicted.Perhaps60millionpeoplediedduringWorldWarII.Peacegroupsestimatethatperhaps3millionofthose60milliondiedduringairattack.Howdidtheother95percentdie?Theoldfashionedway—theywereshelled,shot,starvedandgassedtodeath.AtthesiegeofLeningradover1millionRussianciviliansperished,andAirpowerplayedalmostnorolethere.Duringthelandcampaign on Okinawa in 1945, 160,000 civilians were killed, caught in the crossfire between theopposingarmies—thatistwiceasmanyasdiedinTokyoorHiroshimaduetoairattacks.AndthenofcoursetherewastheHolocaust.Thefactis,despitethesatireofDr Strangelove,itisthisveryparadox,thatairwarissohorribleitwillbehumanizing,whichstillrestsattheheartofnucleardeterrencetheorytoday.

“Theendoftheworldwillcomewhensomeenormousboilershallexplodeandblowuptheglobe.Andthey[theAmericans]aregreatboilermakers.”JulesVerne

Infact,itispreciselybecausewearesowellpreparedtowagenuclearwarthatwehavebeenabletodeteritsoccurrenceandthusforestallthegloomypredictionofJulesVerne.

WhichinturnleadsustooursecondparadoxofAirpower:“Because we’re so good, we no longer have to fight”. In other words, the better we get at fighting, the less we have toworryaboutactuallydoingso.

After the first Gulf War in 1991 and ten years of air patrol operations over Iraq that followed, the Iraqiair forceknewbetter than tocontestcontrolof theair. Idon’tbelieveasingle Iraqiaircrafteven tookoff in the2003campaign. Instead,we foundsomeof theirbest fighters buried in the desert in an attempt to protect them from coalition Airpower. Dwellonthat forasecond. Ican’t thinkofanother instancewhenacountry’smilitaryhasbeen so petrified of another country’s military might. The Iraqis were not just afraid of flyingtheir aircraft, they were afraid of parking them! You may recall that in 1991 they parkedmanyoftheiraircraftnexttocivilianobjectslikemosquesandarcheologicalsites,knowingthatwewouldn’thitthemduethefearofcollateraldamage.In2003theyrealizedthateventhatwouldn’tsavethem—theiraircraftcouldbedestroyedwithoutcollateraldamage.Sotheyburiedthem.

“Ourproblemwas,wealwaysmadeitlooktooeasy.” GenCarlSpaatz,USAF

But sometimes we make it look too easy, as our very first USAF Chief of Staff noted. I say this because during the past 15 years, Airpower proved decisive in the first Persian Gulf War—attritingall48ofIraq’sfrontlinedivisionsbyover50percentbeforegroundoperationsofficially began. In other words, the Iraqi army was, by definition, “combat ineffective” beforeourgroundassaultevenstarted.After thewar, theUSAirForcedownsizedby40percentwhilereorganizingitselfforpeacetimeoperations.GeneralTonyMcPeakdisbandedSACandMilitaryAirliftCommand,rollingtheirassetsintothenewAirCombatCommand

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and Air Mobility Command. He instituted a new wing organizational structure and a newpromotion system—he even found time to inflict on us the blessedly short-lived Total Quality Management program and design a new AF uniform. The USAF then flew over 300,000 combat sortiesoverIraqinNorthernandSouthernWatchwhilesimultaneouslyrestructuringitselfagain,thistimeforwar,intoanAirExpeditionaryForce.Airpowerprovedtobethedecisivemilitary force inBosnia—leading to theDaytonpeaceaccords, and inKosovo—leading totheliberationofKosovo.ItwasdecisiveinAfghanistanwhereitteamedwithafewhundredspecialoperationstroopstomakeworld-beatersoutofthepreviouslyineffectiveanti-Talibanforces.Andof course in Iraq it paved theway for the 3-week campaign to takeBaghdad,despitethesandstorms.InnorthernIraqairpower,combinedwithspecialoperationsforcesand Kurds, overcame 12 Iraqi divisions. Now, the USAF is re-cocked and ready to fight again. If Transformation is defined as revolutionary technology combined with organizational change andradicallynewdoctrinestoemploythosenewtechnologiesandstructures,thantheUSAFepitomizes Transformation. And I might add, it has done these things—conduct combatoperationsnon-stopforthepast15years—withoutwhiningaboutopstempo,demandingthattheotherservicesdoitsmissionforit,orbeggingformoremoneytopayforwhatnormallyisconsidereditsmainjob.Thatisquitealegacy.

Thetruthis,wehavebeenincrediblysuccessfulinachievingandmaintainingairsuperiority—perhapsAirpower’smostimportantrole—overthepastsixdecades.Thisspeaksforitself:

US Army has not fought without air superiority since Kasserine Pass (Feb 1943)

US Army has not lost a soldier to an enemy aircraft since 1953 US Army has never shot a SAM at an enemy aircraft in anger—the bad guys

never got that close F-15 and F-16 are 175-0 in air-to-air combat, worldwide

Iwouldalsocommentthata friendofminewhenseeingthese factsaskedwhytheUSArmyevenhas any AAA in their inventory since they haven’t had to use it in over fifty years. Goodquestion.Iwouldnotehowever,that,somewhatparadoxically,itisnotairthreatsthattendtobotherourAirpower.Rather,thegreatestdangertoouraircrafthascomefromtheground.SinceWorldWarIItheUSAirForcehaslostover2,700aircraftincombat,butofthose,onlyslightlymorethan200werelostinair-to-aircombat—andnonesinceVietnam.In other words, since WWII 94 percent of all USAF combat losses have been due ground fire. Ofcourse,evenmoreparadoxically,youcanbetthatassoonaswestopworryingabouttheair-to-airthreatanadversarywillmoveintothatarenatochallengeus.

Theseratherstartlingstatisticsleadtoanotherparadox,asubsetofthe“we’resogoodwe don’t have to fight” one, which argues, if you aren’t beaten up and bloodied pretty badly in a fight, than you aren’t much of a man – which you might term the “Not fighting fair” paradox. Personally, I subscribe to the school that says “if you’re in a fair fight you didn’t plan itproperly.”Butthismisguidedemphasisonamacho e macho knife fight is disturbing besides beingfoolish.YouwillrecallthesillycriticismduringairoperationsoverSerbiain1999thatNATOcrewswereoftenremainingabove15,000feetwhendroppingtheirbombs,outofAAArange.DespitethefactthatsuchaltitudesmadethedeliveryofPGMsmorenotlessaccurate,some thought these tactics were somehow unsportsmanlike because it made it difficult for theSerbstohitusatthatheight.Ofcoursethisparadoxleadssometoquestionwhyweneed

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the,admittedly,veryexpensiveF-22ifourcurrentinventoryisalreadysogood—rememberthepreviousstatisticoftheF-15andF-16being175toZEROinair-to-aircombat.Afriendofmine,anF-15pilot,referredtothesituationas“Supermanhanginguphiscape.”Headmittedthat all of his time spent flying boring orbits over Iraq from 1991 on was a waste of MREs. But ofcourse,that’spreciselythepointandtheparadox.Whenyou’rethatgood,youdon’thaveto fight. The thrust of the critics’ argument seems to be that it is a bit unfair to be so good; thatweshouldgivethebadguysachance.

Whichbringsustoanotherparadox:“The very ability of Airpower to Fight and Win at the conventional level makes Asymmetrical war increasingly likely”.Putsimply,our dominance, especially in our air and space power, makes it increasingly likely that wewon’tbeabletousethatpower.Ouradversarieshavenowbeenconditionedtoavoidthosestrengths.Andso,justasnuclearweaponsdeterredwardowntotheconventionallevelafterWorldWarII,sotoohasourairsupremacydeterredwardowntotheunconventionallevel.Paradoxically,wehavetakenourselvesoutoftheballgamewithourexcellence.Ontheotherhand,ofcourse,wemustnotforgetthatconventionalwarmayindeedbecomeanattractiveoptionforfutureadversaries—assoonaswestoppreparingforit!

ThenextParadoxisabitofanintellectualchallenge:“Airpower’s most unique quality is the most difficult to quantify”.FromthebeginningithasbeenvirtuallyanarticleoffaithforairmentostatethatAirpowerisaninherentlyoffensiveweaponthatcanhavedirectandimmediateeffectsatthestrategiclevelofwarattheoutsetofhostilities.ThishasroutinelybeenseenasoneofAirpower’smostuniqueandimportantcharacteristics.AsaBillyMitchellor Hugh Trenchard would have put it, Airpower flies over the armies and fortifications below andstrikesdirectlyatanation’svitalcenters.Itwasthenpresumedthatthesestrategicattackswould have very significant strategic effects—but when it came time to quantifythoseeffects,thetrainstartedtorunofftherails.Effects-BasedOperations,orEBO,iswhatairmenhavealwaysclaimedtheywereconducting in theirstrategicoperations.Butputtingnumbers tothoseeffectshasbeenproblematic.ThiswasapparentinWorldWarIIandlingeredthroughVietnam and Desert Storm. In essence, analysts could survey the battlefield, count tank carcassesandattempttoconcludewhatdestroyedthem,butattemptingtodeterminewhateffectthatdestructionhadonthestrategicplansandcapabilitiesoftheenemywasafarhardernuttocrack.Takingittoahigherlevel,determiningwhatsuchdestructionhadonthemindofenemyleaderswasevenmoreproblematic.Inmyview,wearegettingbetteratthis—muchbetter.Ouranalyticaltoolsarenowabletoveryaccuratelymodelandmeasureairstrikesoncomplexsystems.Butnay-sayersremain.TheUSArmyespeciallyrejectstheentirenotionofEBO,preferringinsteadtheirClausewitzian-basedattritionmodel.

This in turn leads to anotherparadox: “our greatest perceived weakness is often our greatest Strength”. This one is very important. In my view, the inability toholdground—oftenconsideredAirpower’sgreatestweakness—isactuallyoneofitsgreateststrengths.Intoday’senvironmentwehavediscoveredthatoccupationofterritory—theallegedsinequanonofgroundforces—isoftentooprovocativeandtooriskytobeausefultoolofforeignpolicy.InVietnam,forexample,theUSarmyhighcommandsuggestedtoPresidentLyndonJohnsononseveraloccasionsthattheUSinvadeandoccupyNorthVietnamtostoptheproblematitssource.Johnsonrejectedthisadvicebecausehefearedsuchamove,thoughpotentially “decisive” in the army’s terminology, was also too dangerous. It might induce

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Chineseintervention,ashadoccurredinKoreathepreviousdecadewhenUNforcesmovedintoNorthKoreadespiteChinesewarningsnottodoso.Insteadandparadoxically,JohnsonchoseAirpower—althoughadmittedlyinadismallyinadequatefashion—preciselybecauseofitsallegedgreatestweakness—itsinabilitytoholdground.

Similarly,attheoutsetofAlliedForceinKosovoin1999,PresidentBillClintonandotherNATO leaders stated flatly that ground troops would not be used—partly due to opposition withinNATOandpartlybecauseofwarningsfromRussiathatsuchaninvasionwouldmeanWorldWarIII.Andso,again,Airpowerwaschosenbecauseofitsgreatestweakness.

“Theenmityofadefeatedpopulationinitshomeismoredangerousthanitshostilityonthebattlefront.”Machiavelli

“Ofwhatuseisdecisivebattleifwebleedtodeathasaresultofit?”WinstonChurchill

Today we see in Iraq the cost—politically, financially and in blood—of putting ground troopsinharm’sway.Isthereabettersolution?InBosnia,Kosovo,AfghanistanandnorthernIraqwesawthevalueinusingAirpower,alongwithspecialoperationsforcesandindigenousground troops like theKosovoLiberationArmy,NorthernAlliance, andKurds, toachieveour military objectives in an amazingly effective and efficient manner. Can anyone really argue withastraightfacethatitismerecoincidencethatourgreatestsuccessesofthepast15years,thosewhichnotonlyachievedourpoliticalobjectivesbutdidsowithanamazinglysmalllossoflife,werealsotheonesthatdidnotrequiretheextensiveuseofconventionalUSgroundforces? Airpower provides political decision makers with more flexible options, with greater agility.

In fact,whatwemaybe seeing is anewparadigmofwaremerging that seesAir and Space Power + SoF + indigenous ground Troops + ciA + information opsasthemost effective form of warfare. Indeed the present difficulties in Iraq actually make it seem morelikelythatthisparadigmwillbecomepopularinthefuture.Certainlysuchaparadigmwillnot work in all situations, but because of its amazing success, it should be considered as a first optioninfuturecrises.Thisinturnleadstoanotherparadox,perhapsanalternateformofthe‘fighting fair’ one I mentioned earlier: “Dying in war is So glamorous”.

“Hewas froma longgreatmilitary tradition.Somebody fromhis familyhadfoughtanddiedineverysingleAmericanwar.Iguessyoucouldsayhehadalottoliveupto.”Re.“LieutenantDan”fromForrestGump

I’m not trying to be flippant here, but when watching the movie Forrest GumpagainrecentlyIwasstruckbythescenewhereweseeLieutenantDan’sancestorsbeingkilledincombat,oneaftertheotherstartingwiththeAmericanRevolution.AndthenLieutenantDan,whileinthehospitalrecoveringfromhiswounds,grabsGumpandshoutsangrilythatbysavinghislifeGumphaddeniedhimhisdestiny—hisdestinytodiegloriouslyinbattlelikehisancestors.

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This of course is just a movie. But we cannot allow ourselves to be hoodwinked intothinkingthatsuchsillyideasarereallywhatwarfareisallabout.Itisnotgloriousornobletogetyourselfkilledincombat.IfitisAirpower’sdutytodenysuchpeopletheir“destiny”sobeit.AsGeorgeC.ScottplayingGeorgePattonstatedinthatwonderfulmovie:“NowIwantyoutorememberthatnobastardeverwonawarbydyingforhiscountry.Hewonitbymakingtheotherpoordumbbastarddieforhiscountry.”

However we now find another paradox which can affect our ability to do just that,

namelythat:“civilian and military leaders cannot resist micromanaging Airpower, precisely because it is so Flexible”. It is difficult for senior commanders not on the scenetointerveneintacticalgroundoperations.Groundforcesaresimplytoocumbersome,toounwieldy,andusuallytoooutoftouchwitheachotherandheadquarterstoallowsuchintervention. And so, strategy as defined by ground commanders was the art of bringing forces to the battlefield—the supreme commander would then often sit back and let his subordinates manage the tactical battle. Today the dispersed nature of the modern battlefield often sees commandersthousandsofmilesbehindthelines.WithAirpoweritisdifferent.

“Theycan’tevenbombanouthouseinNorthVietnamwithoutmyapproval.” LyndonB.Johnson

Airplanes can takeoff and head in one direction at 700 knots to conduct a particularstrikemission—but then receive orders to change course and go 300miles in a differentdirection and do something else. The specific targets they are to strike can be vetted in the PentagonortheWhiteHouse,inrealtime,usingairandspace-basedsensorplatforms.Thedata from those sensors can be beamed via satellite real time into a cockpit, or into theSituationRoomintheWhiteHouseorthePentagon.Thisallowsseniormilitaryandcivilianleaderstointerveneinairoperationsatthelowesttacticallevelimaginable.Iwonderifthatisagoodthing.But,asagoodfriendofmineoncecommentedinturninganoldaphorismonitshead:“FlexibilitymaybethekeytoAirpower,butmoreimportantly,Airpoweristhekeytoflexibility”, or in today’s parlance, agility.

Now while I may be sounding a bit cynical, I believe that the next paradox, which isthat “Unpreparedness is the American Way of War” actually applies to America’sentiredefenseestablishment. It isatruismofUSmilitarytraditionthatweenterourwarsunprepared:wesufferahumiliatingdefeatortwo,andthenwecinchupourbeltsandgettowork.Eventually,weprevail.Thispolicyofnon-preparationhasactuallystoodusinfairlygoodstead over the years—except of course for those unlucky enough to be present at those first fewbattles.TheparadoxisthattheUSwasseeminglysowellpreparedgoingintoVietnam.Thesizeofthemilitarywasenormous—inallbranches—byfarthelargestpeacetimemilitaryorganization in our history. The equipment was first-rate—it had to be given that the Soviets outnumberedusby3 to1.Our trainingwas similarly superb.Unfortunately, all that forcestructure,traininganddoctrineweregearedtowardsawarfardifferentthantheonethatexistedinVietnam.

WeseeasimilarsituationinIraqtoday.Allofourincrediblehightechweaponry,sensorsand intelligence-gathering apparatus are proving deficient in the mundane tasks of occupying territoryandlocating,identifyingandtrackingdownindividualterroristsandwhackingthembefore they strike us first. How do break out of this paradox and begin to better prepare

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USARussiaChinaIndiaJapanFranceUK NoKoreaROKTurkeyItalyEgyptGerm

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ourselvesforthewarweareactually in,nottheonewe wishtobein?

Ournextparadoxcouldeitherbeseenas“redundancy is also the American Way of War”or“Indecision is the Key to Flexibility”.Thecynicismcontinues.MypointhereisthatAmericanspridethemselvesontheirmanagerialacumen,andwetrumpetourYankeeingenuity, efficiency and productivity in the global business environment. And yet, when it comes to our military structure, we seem to be unable to make firm decisions. As a result, it is one of the oddities of US defense that over the past five decades, despite the changing world situationanddespiteourvariedadversariesandthewarswehavefought,theforcestructureand budget share between the services have remained remarkably stable. But it occurredtometherewasamethodinourmadness.Wecanaffordtobuyseeminglyredundantandsuperfluous weapons systems, so therefore we do. This puts an enormous burden on any potentialenemy.ItisnotenoughthatwehavethebestAirForceintheworld,wealsohavethebestnavy,andthebestarmy,andthebestmarinecorps,thebestspaceforces,andthebestspecialoperationsforces.Wehavesomanyarrowsinourquiveritbecomesalmostimpossiblefor an adversary to move against us—to find chinks in our armor. At least, paradoxically, when thatadversaryisaconventionalenemy.

Total Military Aircraft, all Types, Worldwide

Data from Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 16, 2006Here’s an exampleof this redundancy.This chart depicts the total numberofmilitary

aircraft,ofalltypes,bycountry.TheUShasalmosttriplethenumberofRussiaandChina,and nearly ten times the number of most other major countries. And that dominance isactuallyevengreaterthanitappears.TheairarmsofRussiaandChinaareagingandbudgetconstrained, thus theUSadvantage ismassivenot just inquantitybut inquality aswell. Inaddition,theUShasanenormousarrayofspecializedaircraft—over900airliftersand600tankersforexample—bothofthosenumbersarearound75percentoftheworld’stotal.Itisanamazinglydiverseforcebesidesbeingalargeandhigh-qualityone.

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OneofthesupposedweaknessesofAirpowerhasalwaysbeenlistedasitsgreatcostandcomplexity—it was difficult for most countries to build a first-rate air force. Well, as you can guess,thisparadoxicallynowmeansthatbecausewehavespentthetimeandmoneytobuildAirpower,wehavegainedatremendous,andprobablyinsurmountable,leadoveranypossiblecompetitors.

Air Arms of the World, All Types

Butgetthis.Whenlookingatthenumbersmoreclosely,somethingelsebecomesstrikingandindeedparadoxical.There’sanoldsaying:ifyouwanttoknowwhat’simportant,followthemoney.IntheUSmilitarythatpathleadstoAirpower.IfwejustlookatindividualairarmsweseethattheUSAirForceisthelargestintheworld,andasjustnoted,thequalityoftheforce is astounding. There are, for example, only 3 stealth aircraft flying today—and all three are in theUSAF.But lookwho is number2—theUSArmy.After themarginally effectiveairforcesofRussiaandChinacomestheUSNavy,andnottoofarbehindistheUSMarineCorps.AsanasidehereIwouldnotethathardlyanyothercountriesintheworldevenhaveamarinecorps,muchlessamarinecorpsairarmthatisthe8thlargestairarmintheworld!Sowhilsttheotherservicesmaytalkofseapowerandlandpowerandamphibiousoperations,paradoxically, they put their money in the air. In my view, all the services recognize thatAirpowerdominateswar.Indeed,theyloveitsomuchtheyinsistonhavingahugeairarmoftheirown.Theargumentsarenotoverthevalueofairandspacepower,theyareoverwhowillcontrolitandforwhatpurposewilltheyuseit.

LetmenowshiftgearsandtalkaboutsomeofthechallengesfacingtheUSAF—someofwhichmayresonate inyourownair force—andsomeofwhich includeparadoxes. Igroupthese challenges into 3 areas, the first I call “Organizational.”

We in the USAF have had some “acquisition difficulties.” Bluntly, about two years ago our second-ranking acquisition official was caught taking bribes. She went to jail. But here’s an

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ironicparadox:shewasacivilian,putinplaceasawatchdogtomonitorthemilitaryandensureitremainedhonest.Thecivilianwatchdog,nottheairmen,turnedouttobethecrook.Whenattemptingtouncoverwhatwentwrong,someUSsenatorsgottheimpressionthattheUSAFwas trying to hide something—to stonewall. As a result, the Senate held up confirmation hearings on a number of general officers for up to six months. At the same time, it seemed every other week—I’m exaggerating—one of our large procurement programs was beingcriticizedforbeingoverbudgetandbehindschedule.Basically,theUSAFwascaughtwithitsflaps down.

What was to be done? First, the new USAF Chief fired, demoted and retired a general officer found guilty of sexual harassment. Character counts. Integrity matters. Second, a new Special Assistant to the AF Secretary for Acquisition, Governance and Transparency wasappointed. After taking over this job, the new incumbent was asked about his somewhatunusualtitle.HerespondedthatthetitlewasdesignedtosendasignaltoCongressandthepublicthattheUSAFhadnothingtohideandthatitwascleaningupitsact.Wewouldgetahandleonmanagingourprograms,ongoverning.Andwewouldbeopen—ouractivitieswouldbetransparentforalltosee.Certainlythat’sausefulstart,butIwouldsuspectthatitwill take more than a new duty title for the USAF to regain the public confidence it lost two yearsago.

Thesecondissueconcernsculture.TheUSAFiscomposedofvarioustribesandthereisoften tension between them: pilots vs. navigators vs. non-rated; fighters vs. bombers; tankers vs. airlift; fixed-wing vs. rotary wing, etc. However, just take a look at figures contained in this nexttable.

Air Force General Officers (3 and 4 Star Level) Backgrounds

4-Star Level 3-Star Level Total AF-Wide

12 Total 39 Total 51 ~ 73,000

11 Pilots (92%) 31 Pilots (80%) 42 Pilots (82%)~12,000(16%)

9 Fighter Plts (75%)

21 Fighter Plts(54%)

30 Fighter Plts(59%)

~ 3,000(4%)

7 A/S Plts(58%)

8 A/S Plts(21%)

15 A/S Plts(29%)

~ 700(< 1%)

1 Non-Rated(8%)

8 Non-Rated(21%)

9 Non-Rated(17%)

~ 60,000(83%)

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Mypointisthiswehavearound51generalsatthe3and4starlevel.82percentofthemarepilots. In fact, around 59 percent of them are fighter pilots. In fact, 29 percent of them are air superioritypilots—58percentatthe4-starlevel.Paradoxically,intheUSAFtherearepresentlyaround 73,000 officers, of which only 17 percent are pilots, 4 percent are fighter pilots, and less than1percentareairsuperioritypilots;thereseemstobeabitofabiasatourseniorcommandlevels!Also,althoughspaceconsumesnearly30percentofourbudget,only5generalsofthose51 have had significant space experience. There has never been a tanker pilot to attain 4 star rank—despitethefactthattankersmakeup14percentoftheAF’scombatinventory;andonlythefirstC-130pilothasrecentlypinnedona4thstar.

Why is this a problem? Again, don’t misunderstand me: I am in no way impugning theintelligence, dedication, professionalism or capabilities of the current USAF leadership of fighter pilots. Rather, I worry about focus, and specifically myopia. I worry about group think. It is only naturalthatsomeonewhohasspentthebetterpartofhiscareerinacertainweaponsystemtendstorelatetothatexperienceandtoseeproblemsthroughaparticularprism—inthiscase,an air superiorityprism.And Iwouldnote thatour leadershipused tobe composed almostexclusivelyofbomberpilots—theytooviewedallissuesthroughabombsightprism.Idon’tseethatashealthy—eitherthenornow.ThatmeansourcurrentleadershipisassociatedwiththeF-22.Itisagreatairplane,itistransformational,butquestionsremainaboutitsnecessity—recallagain my 175-0 figure for the F-15 and F-16 in air-to-air combat. Who will the F-22 fight? Does it havetherangetoovercometheaccesschallenge,especiallyinanAsianscenario?Doesithaveacredibleair-to-groundcapability thatwill allow it takeoutdouble-digitSAMdefensessoastoallowthevastbulkofourstrikeaircraft—whicharenon-stealthy—topenetrateenemyairspace?

Inthetheoreticalorintellectualrealm,thegreatestchallengetheUSAirForcefacesistoshowitsrelevancetothewaronterror.Unfortunately,thereisacomplicationhere—thecurrentoperationsinIraq.SomeserviceshavebeenverysuccessfulinequatingtheGlobalWaronTerror(GWOT) with Iraq. They are not the same thing. They are significantly different problems with differentsolutions.TheGWOT isa long-termchallenge;ourcurrentoperations in Iraqareashorttermproblem—bythatImean,therewillbeapresidentialelectioninlessthantwoyears.I would be surprised if there has not been a significant reduction in our ground troop presence bythen.Moreover,giventhisexperience—whichhasbeen,tosaytheleast,anastysurprisetotheAmericanmilitaryanditspoliticalleaders—whataretheoddsthatwewillengageinsimilarsuchinvasions/occupationdutiesintheforeseeablefuture?Iwouldthinktheyareverysmallindeed.Andso,thechallengeofairmenistodevisesolutionstopresentoperationalproblemsinIraq,butmoreimportantly,tolookbeyondIraqandthinkthroughhowwecanassistinwinningthefargreaterandmorelong-termchallengeoftheGlobalWaronTerror.

“AsAirmen our perspective is strategic, and as anAir Force our effects areglobal.”Gen“Buzz”Moseley

TheparadoxhereisthatwhilstAirpowerisaninherentlystrategicweapon,“our Strategic thinkers are Tactical doers”.Asthecurrentchiefstateshere,ourtheateristheworld;ourterrainmapoftheoperationalareaisaglobe.Weroutinelyproducestrategic-leveleffects.Asa result, we have often prided ourselves on being the broadest and most strategic thinkers

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becausewehavehad tobe—becauseourweaponhas global range, somustour thinking. Inreality,however,thatseemsoftennottobethecase.Weoftentendtobethebesttacticiansandtechnicians,notstrategists.Partly,Ibelieve,thisisbecauseofourunusualhistory.FordecadestheUSAirForcewasdominatedbythebomberpilotsofSAC.Vietnamdestroyedthatparadigm—the bulk of the fighting was done by fighter pilots. In the war’s aftermath the fighter pilots took overtheUSAF.Butbecausetheyhadspentdecadesinasecondaryposition,honingtheirtacticalskills rather than formulating a strategic vision, the leading fighter generals tended to believe that theirmissionwastosupportthearmy—toconducttacticalsupportoperations,asthisquotefromaformerchiefofstaffadmits.

“Conventional capability in the form of tactical airpower became inextricablytied to air-land warfighting doctrine. The primary role of tactical airpower was supportfortheclosebattle—eitherdirectlyintheformofcloseairsupportorindirectlyintheformofinterdiction.”GenRonFogleman

This isnotarecipe forbroadthinking. Ina timewhentheAirForceconsistedofbothaSACandaTacticalAirCommand(TAC),perhapsthenotionthatTAC’srolefocusedonsupportofthearmymadesomesense.ButwhenSACandTACwererolledintoasinglecommand,AirCommand Combat (ACC), then such a notion could no longer work. But, could the fighter pilotswhoranTAC,andnowACC,maketherequiredadjustment?It’snotclear,andperhapsthisiswhytodaysofewofourseniorjointcommandersareairmen.Indeed,ofthe11four-starjointcommandersintheUSmilitarytoday,only2areairmen,andneitherofthemaretheatercommanders. In addition, there are 12, 3-star staff officers on the Joint Staff in Washington—only twoareairmen.Doourpoliticalleadersquestiontheabilityofairmentothinkstrategicallyandthuspassthemoverforseniorjointpositions?Ifthatisthecase,thenthatisapainful paradox.Iwouldnoteasanasideherethatourtwomosttacticallyorientedservices,thearmyandmarines,now fill six of those 11 strategic level joint command billets, 4 of which are theater commands—anotherinterestingthought.

It iscommonlynotedthattheUSistoday’ssolesuperpower,but itmustbecareful—andmanywouldarguewehaven’tbeencarefulenough—topullourpunches,tonotthrowourweightaround,toseekconsensus,todefertoourfriendsandallies.Asaresult,forthepast15yearstheUShasbeenreluctanttoactalone–whichbringsustotheparadoxthat“Military cooperation with allies becomes more necessary politically, just as it becomes increasingly more difficult militarily”.Instead,theUSseeksamantleofinternationalauthority.Insomecases,it’saspartofanestablishedalliance—NATOintheBalkans.Atothertimeswecobbletogetheranadhoccoalitiontoprovidepoliticaltop-coverandshowourinternationalistmentality.Atthesametime,however,ourabilitytooperateeffectivelywiththosemanycountriesandespeciallytheirmilitaries, has grown increasingly difficult. Recall the statement by Lord Robertson after Kosovo thatEuroperiskedbecoming“militarypygmies”nexttotheUS.Andwehaveworkedtogetheras an alliance for over five decades! The problems with new allies in ad hoc coalitions are far more difficult.

Theseinteroperabilityproblemswillgetworse.Warisanamazinglaboratory.Wetrynewweaponsand tactics,bynecessity,whichwemaynothaveeven thoughtofduringperiodsofpeace.Thesenewweaponsandtactics thenbecomethenewbaselineandourcapabilitiesgo

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upfromthere.Inshort,ourcombatoperationsinAfghanistanandIraq,nowintheir5thyear,havepushedAmericanmilitarycapabilitiesfurtherahead,andourdefensebudgetshavegrownsignificantly, while at the same time, the capabilities, force structures and defense budgets of our friendshavetendedtogodown.Themilitaryinteroperabilitygapgrows,paradoxically,justasthepoliticalnecessityforcloserelationsgoesintheoppositedirection.

NowIhavenotedanumberofparadoxesofAirpowerinthepreviouspages,andtherearenodoubtothers Ihavemissed.Butof these, there isonecharacteristic that seems tocomethroughinallofthem,andindeed,whichisinherentinthenatureofaparadox—aproblemofcommunication.Weas airmenhave toooften failed toexplainwhatAirpower is;what it cando to address theproblemsour leaders face;what it cannot do.As a result, becausewe areunabletoarticulateaclearmessage,we—andourchosenweapon—areoftenmisunderstoodandunappreciated.Webecomethesubjectofparadoxes.

The US Air Force understands this. One of General Moseley’s first acts as chief was to establish a Strategic Communications director at the two-star level to specifically address this issue of Message.The communication problem begins, I believe, with the basics.What is themissionoftheAirForce?ThisisthemissionasarticulatedlastyearbythenewUSAirForceSecretary:

ThemissionoftheUnitedStatesAirForceistodeliversovereignoptionsforthedefense of the United States of America and its global interests -- to fly and fight inAir,Space,andCyberspace.

Butbehindthisbriefstatementtheremustliesomethingelse.Onceairsuperiority,andpreferablyairsupremacyisachieved,itmustthenbeexploited.Numerousairandspacerolesareessentialtothesuccessfulaccomplishmentofa jointmilitaryoperation,butwhicharetoooftentakenforgranted.Deepstrike,interdiction,closeairsupport,airlift,ISR,communicationsrelay,weatherforecasting, geographic positioning, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, andothers are allrequiredcomponentsofmostmilitarycampaigns.Mostofthesecannotbeeffectivelyconductedwithoutairsuperiority,butevenifthatsuperiorityispresent,thesemissionsmustbeconducteddespite difficulties encountered with distance, terrain, or weather. If those “other” air missions cannot be conducted effectively and efficiently, the entire survival of the joint force is at risk.ThatiswhatAirpowerdoesforournation—itexploitstheairandspace.We must communicate this!Missionstatementsareimportanttoexplainandinstitutionalizetheseideasandgoals.Atthesametime,however,Iwouldarguethateachindividualairmanalsoneedsamission.Certainly,itisimportantforustoidentifywiththemissionoftheorganizationtowhichwebelong,butthatisnotgoodenough.Weneedapersonalmissionaswell.So,Ihaveprovidedonehere.

“ThemissionoftheairmanistoplananduseAirandSpacePowertoachieveobjectiveswiththeminimalcostinbloodandtreasure.”

By that Imean,wemust strive to save lives.Wemust take it asour goal toprevent thenecessityofourtroopsgettinginharm’sway.This,ofcourse,willnotalwaysbepossible.Closecombat will undoubtedly occur, and our troops will need to fight and perhaps die at enemy hands. Butsayingthatisfardifferentfromassumingthatclosecombatwillalwaysandnecessarilyoccurorthatitshouldbeourprimaryobjective.Itistheairman’smissiontodoallpossibletopreventthat

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eventuality.ThatmeansusingAirpowertoachieveObjectiveswhileputtingasFewofourSonsandDaughtersaspossiblewithinRangeofEnemyFires—toPrecludeCloseCombat.

I realize that this may be controversial to some, and others will argue that this MissionStatementisaparochialandillusoryabstraction.TheywillsayIamclaimingtheAirForcecanwinwars“alone”andthatairmenaredeludingthepublicintobelievingthatwarcanbepainless,orthatwe are trying to avoid our responsibility to fly close air support. No. It is not parochial to attempt tosavethelivesofoursoldiers.Suchagoal,admittedly,evolvesfromauniqueperspective—anair andspaceperspective—but thatdoesnotmean it is antithetical to jointness. Indeed, truejointness,asPresidentGeorgeBush(theelder)oncesaid,isusingtherighttoolforthejobathand. Exposing our most precious assets to risk should never be our first choice. The goal of anymilitaryplanner, fromanyservice,mustbeto limitcasualties, tobothsides,andtosufferthemonlyasabsolutelynecessarytoachievedesiredobjectives.Suchagoaldoesnotimplythatairmen can win wars alone. Rather, it is a claim—amply confirmed in the conflicts of the past two decades—thatinsomecircumstancesAirpowercanbethedominantanddecisiveforceinwar.Dominancedoesnotmeansingularity:theuseoflandandseaforceswillusuallybenecessary.However,Airpower,becauseofitsreach,speed,precisionandinherentstealthiness,istheidealweapon for achieving the goal of an effective and efficient use of force. That was demonstrated in DesertStorm,inBosnia,inKosovo,inAfghanistanandinIraqin2003,and,moreimportantly,itwasdemonstratedwitharemarkablylowcostinblood.

Andthatbringsmetomyverylastpoint,whichisnotsomuchaparadoxasatruism,whichisthat“leadership is everything”,andIcannotstressthisenough.

“Amilitaryunit,likeapieceofspaghetti,canonlybeledfromthefrontend.” GeorgePatton

Itallbeginsatthetop.Everyoneofourcommandersandsupervisorsmustseeitastheirduty to impart the vision ofAirpower and of their organization to everyone serving underthem.Theymustunderstandandexplaintoeachindividualtheirroleinachievingthemission.Itiscommonatchangeofcommandceremoniestoinstructthenewbossthattheessenceofcommandisresponsibility—whatevergoesrightwillbeattributedtotheirleadershipandtheywillberewarded.Whatevergoeswrongwillalsobeattributedtotheirleadershipandtheywillbechastised.Everycommanderandsupervisormustthereforeseeitastheirresponsibilitytoinculcatethegoalsandthemissionoftheorganizationtoallofitsmembers.Theymustlead.Theymusthaveavision.Thatiswhytheywereputincharge.

Intruth,Ithinkbothofourairforcesaretodayveryfortunate.Wehavebeenatwarnowalmostcontinuouslyfor15years.Ourcommandersarebattlehardened,asareourairmen,atalllevels.Ourforcesareprobablybettertrainedandequippedthanatanytimeintheirhistory.Yes,wehavechallengestoovercome,butinmyviewtheyarerelativelyeasyones—ourperformancerecord of continuous success is amazing.We simply have to communicate the facts to ourpublics,ourpoliticiansandourbrethrenintheotherservices.Wemustturntheparadoxesintotruisms.

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ISBN0-9552189-1-8

978-0-9552189-1-0

DesignedbyTheDesignStudio,RAFInnsworth,Gloucester.07/3207JulesLocke