AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE BULLETIN

AIR POWER AND THE MAIN BATTLE TANK

No aircraft ever took and held ground.US Marine Corps Manual.

The 5th-generation Air Force will be capable, agile and potent, both in its own right and, more importantly, as part of the future integrated joint force. A capable and effective joint force, based on the optimum combination of ADF capabilities, will be critical to providing Government with its best possible military options. This is not to suggest that all the Services will always contribute to every mission. Maritime, land and air power each have their own characteristics that influence how well-suited they are to particular scenarios. This means that despite the critical importance of air power to modern military operations, there will remain tasks that are better undertaken by forces operating in the land and maritime domains.

Air Force doctrine articulates the characteristics of air power, with an emphasis on its strengths. Speed and reach are two of these characteristics that serve Australia particularly well given the isolation and vastness of our country. Be it in response to threats to Australian sovereignty, or to project force into the region in support of military or humanitarian objectives, speed and reach are of enduring value to the ADF and the nation.

However, as a mature and self-critical organisation, Air Force also acknowledges in its doctrine, the limits of air power’s effectiveness. Impermanence is a stated characteristic of air power that acknowledges the effects delivered from the air tend to have limited persistence in the battlespace. Despite the force multiplying effects of air-to-air refuelling, an inhabited airborne platform has a finite endurance based on the limitations of its human crew. While uninhabited platforms and systems might be able to overcome human frailty, they still share the other limitations of inhabited platforms such as weapons depletion, technical servicing requirements and weather constraints. As some missions and tasks require an

ongoing presence on the battlefield, they do not lend themselves easily to a quick solution. Any or all of these limitations can prevent the application of air power at the appropriate time and for the necessary duration to achieve the desired military effect.

The lack of a clear-sighted, impartial and critical appreciation of both the strengths and weaknesses of air

power, as well as those of maritime and land power, can lead to potentially flawed views in regards to force design and the conduct of military operations. Perhaps there is no better example of the need for air power professionals to be objective in their thinking than in the case of the main battle tank1.

Some air power proponents are quick to dismiss the tank as an anachronism on the basis of its perceived inferiority to air power in delivering firepower effects, its vulnerability to modern weapons and its lack of mobility. However, these arguments focus on only one function of the tank, exaggerating the tank’s vulnerabilities while glossing over those of air power. This effectively promotes a

perception of an ADF capability ‘system’ that it lacks flexibility and resilience. Accordingly, a brief review of these arguments is warranted.

Whenever Australia is compelled or chooses to commit troops to ground operations, from peacekeeping to high-end conflict, the tank provides the option of an essential mix of direct firepower, armoured protection, mobility and C4. Air power is undeniably critical to the overall success of military operations but it will not always be able to provide the level of intimate support essential to the successful conduct of close combat. While air power can destroy targets, it cannot replicate the tank’s enduring presence on the battlefield nor provide soldiers with a physical shield. In terms of this shielding function, the tank can build on its basic armoured protection by adding

Issue 268, June 2016ISSN: 2205-0078 (Print) 2205-0086 (Online)

RAAF Hornet overflying armour on parade

advanced sensor and communications systems, electronic countermeasures and counter-rocket and counter-missile suites. Accordingly, claims of the tank’s vulnerability, particularly in operating outside of flat and open terrain, are frequently exaggerated—as are claims about the vehicle’s lack of mobility.

The size and weight of the modern main battle tank belie its tactical mobility. While the Australian Abrams M1 weighs around 63 tonnes, it exerts a ground pressure through its tracks of around half of that of an average passenger car and is capable of on-road speeds of 65 kph and cross-country speeds of around 50 kph. Furthermore, its powerful gas turbine engine provides a very high power-to-weight ratio that makes the tank equally capable of pushing through buildings or thick vegetation. Arguments that tanks are unsuited to, and unemployable in, our region are disproved by the widespread use of tanks by the United States Army and Marine Corps, as well as the Australian Army, in the Pacific Campaign of World War II. There, they proved critical in overcoming fortified and fanatical Japanese defenders. In terms of strategic mobility, both the RAAF C-17 and RAN Landing Helicopter Dock are capable of transporting the M1.

The preceding discussion is not meant to suggest that tanks do not suffer their own limitations—Army doctrine highlights, for example, the logistical challenges of sustaining tanks in the field. However, the discussion does support the need for the ADF to be a balanced joint force and undermines arguments that air power can replace the tank. Such claims are akin to arguing that a surface-to-air missile could replace a fighter aircraft—at best, the missile might replace some aircraft functions in some circumstances. Naval, land and air forces provide complementary effects for the joint force and, when operated together, provide flexible and robust military capabilities. For example, the F-35 will possess devastating firepower and unparalleled sensor capabilities but this will be cold comfort to an infantry platoon in close contact with the enemy if the aircraft has higher priority tasking, has depleted its weapons or cannot get airborne because of a thunderstorm. There is significant risk in putting all our ‘force protection eggs’ in one basket.

Joint operations combining air power and armour are not new; they date to the infancy of both military aircraft and tanks during World War I. The Australian General Sir John Monash was one of the most accomplished early proponents of joint warfare. He later commented that at the Battle of Hamel in July 1918, to ‘prevent the noise of the tank engines being overheard when they were moving forward to reach the starting line, RE8 observation

aircraft from No. 3 Squadron Australian Flying Corps (AFC) were directed to fly up and down the entire Army front when the armour was running’.2 Monash also tasked aircraft to strafe enemy troops and guns and to airdrop ammunition to the advancing Australian troops.

In conclusion, there is little doubt that air power is and will remain instrumental in ensuring Australia’s security. However, as effective as it is, air power has its limitations and air power professionals have an obligation to acknowledge and understand them. Doing so will allow the ADF to be a genuinely joint force that is able to exploit the strengths of its constituent parts while mitigating their weaknesses. Viewed through this prism, the main battle tank has a clear and important place in the ADF’s order of battle.

Key Points• The joint force concept enables the selection

of capabilities from the air, land and maritime domains, which complement each other to provide effects optimised for the mission.

• Air power’s strengths are well suited to the Australian environment, but its acknowledged weaknesses require that it be applied in concert with capabilities which overcome them.

• Air power’s impermanence over the contested land battlespace can be effectively overcome by the employment of the tank.

Notes1. This article focuses on the ‘main battle tank’ (‘tank’ for short) rather than

the broader category of ‘armour’, which comprises ‘tanks’, ‘infantry fighting vehicles’ and other armoured vehicles.

2. Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, first published 1920, reprinted Naval & Military Press, Sussex, UK, 2013.

Air Power Development CentreF3-GF, PO Box 7932, Department of Defence

CANBERRA BC ACT 2610Ph: 02 6128 7041 Fax: 02 6128 7053

Email: airpower@defence.gov.auWeb: www.airforce.gov.au/airpower

Disclaimer: The views in this Pathfinder are not necessarily those of the RAAF

An M1 Abrams tank being loaded onto a 36SQN C-17