Air Force

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Iranian air force is organized as follows:

Western Area Command, with 7 fighter squadrons 6 fighter/ground attack squadrons 5 transport squadrons 3 reconnaissance squadrons 2 training squadrons 1 support squadron 1 VIP squadron 1 ASW squadron

Southern Area Command, with 4 fighter/ground attack squadrons

Eastern Area Command, with 1 fighter/ground attack squadron 3 training squadrons

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The air force has some 30,000 personnel, including a 12,000-man Air defense force.

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database. Equipment is of U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)

AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 AIRCRAFT

Fighters/Ground Attack 65 65 64 64 F-4D/-E Phantom attack (one crashed Nov. 2007) 60+ 59 60+ 40 F-5E Tiger II fighter # Azarakhsh (Iranian derivative of F-5) # # # Saegheh (Iranian derivative of F-5) 25 25 25 25 F-14A Tomcat fighter 24 24 24 24 Shenyang F-7M Airguard attack/training

(Chinese J-7) 25 25 25 40 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter (Russia) 30 30 30 28 Su-24MK Fencer (Russia) 7 10 13 13 Su-25 Frogfoot attack (Russia) 24 24 24 4 Mirage F-1E (France)

Reconnaissance 6 6 6+ 6+ RF-4E Phantom tactical 1 N/A # 0 Il-76 Adnan AEW (Russia)(crashed Sept. 2009) 5 5 5 P-3 Orion maritime patrol

Transports 3 3 3 3 B707-3J9C tanker 1 B747 (Boeing 747) 4 4 4 4 B747F-131/-2J9F (Boeing 747) 1 1 1 1 B727-81 VIP transport (Boeing 727) 17 17 17 19 C-130E/-H Hercules 10 10 10 10 F27 Mk 400M Troopship/600 Friendship (Netherlands) 3 3 3 3 Turbo Commander 681B liaison 2 2 2 1 Jetstar II VIP transport 1 1 1 1 Falcon 20F VIP transport (France) 1+ 1 1 12 Il-76MD Candid (Russia) 12 # # 23 Xi'an Y7/Y7H/Y12 (China) 10 10 10 10 PC-6B (Switzerland) 40 40 45 An-140 (Russia)(Iran 140 Faraz) 11 An-72

Trainers 20 20 20 20 F-5B Tiger II 20 20 20 25 F-33A/C Bonanza 7 7 7 9 T-33A Shooting Star 15 # # # MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Russia) 15 15 15 23 EMB312 Tucano (Brazil) 40 40 40 45 PC7 Turbo Trainer (Switzerland) 22 22 22 25 MFI-17 Mushshak (Pakistan) 4 4 4 4 Socata TB200 Tobago XL (France) 8 8 8 8 Socata TB21 Trinidad TC (France) 15 15 15 15 JJ-7 Mongol A 12 Paratsu 15 PC-6

Helicopters 2 2 2 2 AB206A JetRanger utility (OH-58A Kiowa) 30 30 30 30 AB214B/C Super Transporter SAR 2 2 2 2 CH-47 # # # # Shabaviz 2-75 (Iran) # # # # Shabaviz 2061 (Iran) # # Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)

MISSILES Surface-to-Air 150 150 150+ 150+ MIM-23 HAWK (U.S.) 15 15 15 15 Tigercat (U.K.)(many non-operational) 45 45 45 45 HQ-2J (Red Flag 2) launchers (Chinese

SA-2) 30 30 30 30 Towed Rapier launchers (w/Blindfire radar) (U.K.) 10 10 10 10 SA-5 Gammon (Russian S-200 Angara) # N/A N/A N/A SA-6 Gainful (Russian 2K12 Kub) # # # SA-7 Grail (Russian 9K32 Strela 2/M) # N/A N/A N/A SA-10 Grumble (Russian S-300P) # N/A N/A N/A SA-11 Gadfly (Russian 9K37 Buk 1M) # 29 29 29 SA-15 Gauntlet (launchers)(Russian Tor M1) # 250 # # CPMIEC FM-80 launchers (Chinese) # N/A N/A N/A Bofors RBS 70 low-altitude SAM (Sweden) # N/A N/A N/A Hongqi-2/2B (CSA-1) launchers w/ 45+ missiles (Chinese) # Shahin (Iran)

Air-to-Air 2,400 N/A N/A N/A MIM-23 HAWK (modified for air-to-air role) # # # # AIM-7 Sparrow # # # # AIM-9 Sidewinder # # # # AIM-54 Phoenix # # # # AA-8 Aphid (Russian K-60) # # # # AA-10 Alamo (Russian R-27) # # # # AA-11 Archer (Russian R-73) # # # # PL-2 (China) # # # # PL-7 (China)

Air-to-Surface # # # # AS-10 Karen (Russian Kh-25) # # # # AS-11 Kilter (Russian Kh-58) # # # # AS-14 Kedge (Russian Kh-29) 3,000 # # # AGM-65A Maverick (U.S.) # # # CSS-N-4 Sardine (China)

ARTILLERY Anti-Aircraft # N/A N/A N/A 57-mm SZ-60 towed (Hungary) # N/A N/A N/A 40-mm M1 towed (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A 40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden) # # # 37-mm Oerlikon # # # # 23-mm ZSU-23 twin towed (Russia)

*Editor's Note: Much of Iran's Western-supplied aircraft inventory is in a state of disrepair, due to the inability to secure parts as well as undertake necessary upgrades. Iran's F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft suffer from wear, and the avionics are largely obsolete. Iran also lacks advanced air force capabilities such as beyond-visual range air-to-air combat and airborne sensors.

Deployment

The Iranian air force operates from less than a dozen tactical air bases (TAB), most of which are located close to major urban centers. Most of the operational airbases have hardened shelters for aircraft. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:

Western Area Command 11 Fighter Squadron (MiG-29) Tehran-Mehrabad 11 Transport Squadron (C-130) Tehran-Mehrabad Reconnaissance squadron (Il-76) Tehran-Mehrabad Transport squadron Tehran-Mehrabad (Boeing 707, Boeing 747) 11 Helicopter Transport Squadron Tehran-Mehrabad (CH-47) Support squadron Tehran-Mehrabad (Falcon 20, F27) VIP squadron Tehran-Mehrabad (Boeing 707, Falcon 50, AB212, Bell 412) Reconnaissance squadron Tehran-Mehrabad (RC-707, RC-130) 21 Fighter Squadron (F-5) Tabriz 23 Fighter Squadron (MiG-29) Tabriz 31 Recce Squadron (RF-4E) Hamadan 31 Fighter Squadron (F-4) Hamadan 41 Fighter Squadron (F-5) Dezful 43 Fighter Squadron (F-5) Dezful 72 Fighter Squadron (Su-24) Shiraz Training squadron (PC-6) Shiraz 71 Transport Squadron (C-130) Shiraz 72 Transport Squadron (C-130) Shiraz 73 Transport Squadron (Il-76) Shiraz 71 ASW Squadron (P-3) Shiraz 51 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7) Isfahan 52 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7) Isfahan 53 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7) Isfahan 81 Fighter Squadron (F-14) Isfahan 82 Fighter Squadron (F-14) Isfahan 85 Fighter Squadron (F-5) Isfahan Training squadron (PC-7) Isfahan

Southern Area Command 61 Fighter Squadron (F-4) Bushehr 62 Fighter Squadron (F-4) Bushehr 91 Fighter Squadron (F-4) Bandar Abbas 101 Fighter Squadron (F-4) Chah Bahar

Eastern Area Command Training Squadron Tehran-Ghale Morghi AP (F-33, EMB312, PC-7) Training Squadron (MFI-17) Tehran-Ghale Morghi AP 141 Fighter Squadron Mashhad (Mirage F-1, F-5) Training squadron (Beech F33) Kushke Nosrat

An air base at Omideyeh is in the process of being transferred to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps air force. In 2008, the 51st, 52nd and 53rd fighter squadrons stationed there moved to Isfahan.

Several air bases may operate SAR detachments using Bell 214 helicopters. The status of these detachments is unclear.

Eastern Area Command operates two forward air bases at Birjand and Zahedan with no active units.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps air force operates several airbases across the country. Shiraz is the main operating base. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:

Transport squadron (An-74, Il-76) Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base Transport squadron detachment Mashhad (An-74, Il-76) VIP squadron (Falcon 20) Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base Support squadron (Y-12) Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base Helicopter transport squadron Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base (Mi-17) Fighter squadron (Su-25) Shiraz Training squadron (EMB312A) Shiraz Support squadron (Y-12) Shiraz Support squadron detachment (Y-12) Bandar Abbas Support squadron detachment (Y-12) Bushehr Helicopter squadron (Mi-17, AB206) Shiraz Helicopter squadron detachment Ahwaz (Mi-17) Helicopter transport squadron Faraj (Mi-17) Attack helicopter squadron (AH-1) Faraj Helicopter training squadron Faraj (AB205, AB206, Schweizer 300) Training squadron (O-2, EMB312) Badr Training squadron (MFI-17) Nasr Attach Helicopter squadron (AH-1) Unknown, possibly near Isfahan Helicopter transport squadron Unknown, possibly near Isfahan (AB214, AB205) Training and Reconnaissance Unknown, possibly near Isfahan Helicopter squadron (AB206, Shahed 274, Shahed 278)

Issues

An F-4 Phantom fighter jet crashed into the Sea of Oman in November 2007.

A Sukhoi fighter crashed near Tehran in April 2008.

The Il-76 Adnan AEW aircraft crashed during a September 2009 air parade near Tehran.

Plans and Programs

Aircraft Acquisition and Modernization

The delivery of 14 Xian Y-7 transports is underway.

The Azarakhsh (Lightning), Iran's first domestic fighter and a derivative of the F-5 , was introduced in 1997. It reportedly entered mass production in 2000.

The Saegheh (Thunderbolt ) succeeded the Azarakhsh and attained operational capability in September 2006. The aircraft is a light fighter and ground attack plane with avionics and radar of Iranian design and some Russian components. It made its first flight in late 2007.

Iran is developing an advanced trainer/light attack jet known as the Tavarze. The aircraft was designed by the Aviation University Complex. It is a subsonic aircraft composed of radar-absorbing materials that weighs about 11,000 pounds. Iran has a requirement for around 25 Tavarzes. The aircraft reportedly entered serial production in 2007.

A contract for three Su-25UBT Frogfoot fighters was signed with Russia in 2005, and the aircraft were delivered in 2006. The UBT model of the fighter is its most advanced variant, with new electronic warfare and jamming systems.

Iran announced in early 2008 that it was in the "early stages" of the development and production of a fifth-generation stealth fighter.

Russia completed deliveries of 29 Tor M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet ) SAM systems in January 2007.

Iran has expressed some interest in the Russian-made Ka-32 helicopter.

Israeli intelligence has suggested that Iran received S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia in late 2008. Iran has since publicly rebuked Russia for failing to deliver the systems. Moscow maintains it will supply the systems, but has repeatedly postponed a delivery date. Iran announced in April 2010 that it would develop its own version of the S-300 missile defense system.

Iran is also reportedly working to establish an independent missile command.

Iran announced that the domestically produced Shahin (H) anti-aircraft missile entered production in June 2009.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.

Army

Armed Forces StructureEquipmentDeploymentPlans and Programs

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Iranian army is organized into:

5 corps headquarters 14 military districts 4 armored divisions, each with 2 armored brigades 1 mechanized brigade 1 self-propelled artillery battalion 1 reconnaissance brigade 4 infantry divisions, each with 3-4 infantry brigades 1 artillery brigade 2 mechanized infantry divisions, each with 1 armored brigade 2-3 mechanized infantry brigades 1 reconnaissance battalion 1 self-propelled artillery battalion 1 artillery battalion 1 special operations brigade 1 commando division 3 commando brigades 1 airborne division 6 artillery groups 12 SAM missile battalions 1 independent armored brigade 1 independent infantry brigade 5 army aviation groups, each with 2-3 light attack helicopter squadrons 1 utility helicopter squadronA typical armored division has from 10,000-15,000 personnel; an infantry division has about 16,000 troops.

Air defense forces are divided into three regions: northern, central and southern. All anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile systems are under the operational control of the army. Air force and Pasdaran units have retained some man-portable and towed surface-to-air missiles systems for base protection.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Active army manpower is approximately 350,000, including 220,000 conscripts.

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database).

AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES Tanks 100 # # 100 Zulfiqar MBT (Iran)(in production) 480 480 480 480 T-72M/S MBT (Russia) 75 75 75 75 T-62 medium (Russia) 540 540 540 540 T-54/T-55/T-59 medium (Russia) 100 100 100 100 Chieftain Mk 3/Mk 5 medium (U.K.) 168 168 168 168 M47M/M48A5 Patton medium (U.S.) 150 150 150 150 M60A1 MBT (U.S.) 80 80 80 80 FV010 Scorpion light (U.K.) # # # # Towsan light tank (90-mm main gun) (Iran)

Armored Vehicles 300 300 300 300 BTR-50/BTR-60 APC (incl. variants) (Russia) 210 210 210 210 BMP-1 mechanized infantry (Russia) 400 400 400 400 BMP-2 (Russia) 200 200 200 200 M113A1 APC (U.S.) 35 35 35 35 EE-9 Cascavel armored car (Brazil) 140 # 140 140 Boragh amphibious APC (Iran)

Artillery Guns 30 30 30 30 175-mm M107 self-propelled (U.S.) 10 10 10 10 170-mm M1978 self-propelled (Russia) 985 985 985 985 130-mm M46 towed (Russia)

Howitzers 20 20 20 20 203-mm M115 towed (U.S.) 30 30 30 30 203-mm M110 self-propelled (U.S.) 70 70 70 70 155-mm M114A1 towed 180 180 180 180 155-mm M109/A1 self-propelled (U.S.) 120 120 120 120 155-mm GHN-45 towed (Austria) 15 15 15 15 155-mm NORINCO Type WAC 21 (China) # # # # 155-mm Thunder-2 SP (Iran) 30 30 30 30 152-mm D-20 GH (Russia) # # # # 122-mm Thunder-1 SP (Iran) 100 100 100 100 122-mm Type 54-1 towed (China)

60 60 60 60 122-mm 2S1 Gvozdika SP (Russia) 540 540 540 540 122-mm D30 towed (Russia) 130 130 130 130 105-mm M101A1 towed (U.S.)

Air Defense Guns (1,700 of the following:) # N/A N/A N/A 100-mm KS-19 (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 85-mm KS-12 (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 85-mm M1939 towed (Russia) # # # # 57-mm ZSU-57-2 self-propelled (Russia) # # # # 57-mm S-60 towed (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden) # N/A N/A N/A 40-mm L/60 towed (Sweden) # # # # 37-mm M1939 towed (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 35-mm GDF-003 Skyguard twin towed (w/Skyguard radar) (Switzerland) # # # # 23-mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled (Russia) # # # # 23-mm ZU-23-2 twin towed (Russia) (incl. IRGC) # # # # 14.5-mm ZPU-2/4 (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 37-mm NORINCO Type 55 LAAG (China)

Mortars (5,000 of the following:) # # # # 120-mm Soltam M65 towed (Israel) # # # # 120-mm (Iran) # # # # 107-mm (4.2 in) M30 towed (U.S.) # 82-mm (Iran) # # # # 81-mm M29 towed (U.S.) # # # # 60-mm (Iran) # # # # 60-mm M19 (U.S.)

Multiple Rocket Launchers # N/A N/A N/A 333-mm Shahin 1 (Hawk 1) towed (Iran)(incl. IRGC) # N/A N/A N/A 333-mm Shahin 2 (Hawk 2) towed (Iran)(incl. IRGC) # # # 333-mm Fajr 5 # N/A N/A N/A 320-mm Oghab (Eagle) self-propelled (Iran) (incl. IRGC) 10 10 10 240-mm Fajr 3 9 9 9 9 240-mm M-1985 (China) 100 100 100 100 122-mm BM-21 (Russia) 7 7 7 122-mm BM-11 (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A 122-mm Hadid (30-round) self-propelled (Iran) 50 50 50 50 122-mm Hadid variant (40-round) self-propelled (Iran)(incl. IRGC) # N/A N/A N/A 122-mm Type 81 (China) 700+ N/A N/A N/A 122-mm Fajr 6 minelaying rocket (Iran) # # # # 107-mm Fajr 1 (12-round) self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese Type 63) (incl. IRGC) 700 700 700 700 107-mm Haseb SP (Iran) (Chinese Type 63)

MISSILES Anti-Tank # N/A N/A N/A BGM-71A TOW air-to-ground (U.S.) # # # # BGM-71A TOW (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A M47 Dragon launchers (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A MGM-32A ENTAC (France) # # # # AT-4 Spigot (Russian 9K111 Fagot) 75 # # # AT-3 Sagger (Russian 9K11 Malyutka) (incl. some self-propelled) # # # AT-5 Spandrel (Russia) # # # # RPG-7V (Russia) # # # # SAGHEGH 80-mm (Iran) (improved RPG-7) # N/A N/A N/A RPG-22 (Russia) # N/A N/A N/A NAFEZ 73-mm recoilless (Iran) (based on Russian SPG-9) # # 200 106-mm M-40 recoilless rifle (U.S.) # # # 107-mm B-11 recoilless anti-tank gun (Russia) # # # 75-mm M-20 recoilless rifle (U.S.) # # # 82-mm B-10 recoilless rifle (Russia) # # # # Shahin 1 (Hawk) (Iran)

Surface-to-Surface # 300 300 300 SS-1 Scud B/Scud C (Russian R-17E) (up to 18 launchers) (incl. IRGC) # 12 12+ 12+ Scud Mod B variants (North Korea) (8-15 MAZ-543 TELs)(Shahab-1) # # # # Shahab-2 (extended range Scud Mod C variant) # N/A N/A N/A Iran-700 (North Korean Nodong-1 SSM) (see Shahab-3) # N/A N/A N/A FROG-7 (Russian 9K21 Luna-M) # N/A N/A N/A CSS-7 (Chinese DF-11/M-11) # 175 175 175 CSS-8 (Chinese M-7) (30 launchers) (Mushak-120, Iran-130, Nazeat-10) # N/A N/A N/A MGM-52 Lance (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A RIM-66B Standard (U.S.) (modified for land attack mission, fired from HAWK) # # # # Shahab-3

MRBM # # # # Shahab-4 (derivative of N. Korean Nodong-2) # # # Shahab-5 (derivative of N. Korean Taepodong-2) # N/A N/A N/A BM-25 (North Korea) (reported)

Surface-to-Air # N/A N/A N/A FIM-92A Stinger MANPADS (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A MIM-23A Hawk launchers (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A MIM-23B I-Hawk (U.S.) # N/A N/A N/A RBS-70 (Sweden) # HQ-7 self-propelled (China) (reported) 10 SA-22 Greyhound self-propelled

(Russian Pantsyr S-1) # # # # SA-16 Gimlet MANPADS (Russian 9K310 Igla-1) # # # # SA-14 Gremlin MANPADS (Russian 9K34 Strela 3) # # # # SA-7 Grail MANPADS (Russian 9K32 Strela-2) # # N/A Misagh-1 man-portable SAM # # N/A Misagh-2 man-portable SAM # N/A N/A N/A HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) # N/A N/A N/A HN-5A MANPADS (China)

Army Aviation

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database. Equipment is of U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)

AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 AIRCRAFT Utility/Observation 2 2 2 2 F27 Mk 400M Troopship/F27 Mk 600 Friendship transport (Netherlands) 4 4 4 4 Turbo Commander 690 liaison 10 10 10 10 Cessna 185A Skywagon utility (U.S. U-17) 1 1 1 1 Dassault Falcon 20E-2 (France)

Helicopters 50 50 50 50 AH-1J Cobra attack 20 20 20 20 CH-47C Chinook heavy transport 50 50 50 50 Bell 214A/C Isfahan transport/SAR (U.S. Bell 214 Super Transporter) 68 68 68 68 AB205A-1 transport (U.S. UH-1H Huey) 10 10 10 10 AB206A/-B Jetranger scout (OH-58A Kiowa) 25 25 25 25 Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles # # # # Mohajer III/II/IV

Deployment

1st Army Headquarters Tehran 2nd Army Headquarters Isfahan 3rd Army Headquarters Shiraz 18th Armored Division Tehran 23rd Special Forces Division Tehran

28th Mechanized Division Kerman 30th Infantry Division Tehran 40th Infantry Division Hamadan 55th Airborne Division Tehran 58th Infantry Division Ahvaz 64th Infantry Division Bandar e Mah Shahr 77th Infantry Division Tabriz 81st Armored Division Qazin 84th Mechanized Division Khorramabad 88th Armored Division AhvazIranian army aviation operates a handful of airbases. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:

Aircraft Battalion Command Tehran-Mehrabad Transport squadron (F27) VIP squadron (Falcon 20) Support squadron (RC690)Helicopter transport squadron Tehran Ghale-Morghi (Bell 214)Helicopter transport squadron (CH-47) BadrHelicopter assault and transport Badr Squadron (x4) (Bell 214)Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) BadrHelicopter training squadron Badr (AB205, AB206, AH-1)Central Training School Isfahan Helicopter training and reconnaissance squadron (x2) (AB205, AB206) Helicopter training and transport squadron (x2) (CH-47)1st Support and Assault Group Isfahan Helicopter assault squadron (x2) (Bell 214) Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) Helicopter reconnaissance squadron (AB206)2nd Support and Assault Group Masjed Suleyman Helicopter assault squadron (Bell 214) Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) Helicopter reconnaissance squadron (AB206)3rd Support and Assault Group Kerman Helicopter assault squadron (x2) (Bell 214) Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) Helicopter reconnaissance squadron (AB206)Provisional Support and Assault Group Zahedan (part of 3rd S&A Group) Helicopter assault squadron (Bell 214) Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) Helicopter reconnaissance squadron (AB206)

5th Support and Assault Group Mashhad Helicopter assault squadron (Bell 214) Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1) Helicopter reconnaissance squadron (AB206)

Plans and Programs

Ground Combat Vehicles

Mass production of the locally built Zulfiqar main battle tank for regular army and Pasdaran units continues, but the exact status of the program is not publicly known. According to Iranian officials, the tank weighs 40 tons and has a top speed of 43 mph (70 kph) over flat terrain. During test-firings, the main gun did not appear to be stabilized and there do not appear to be any sighting mechanisms on the turret. Production timetables and numbers have not been made public. The Iranian army announced in May 2010 that it would soon reveal an upgraded version of the Zulfiqar .

A large number of T-54 MBTs captured from Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) have been rebuilt and modernized using locally produced parts. Renamed the Safir-74 (Messenger-74), the modified T-54 incorporates an upgraded engine, transmission, internal fire extinguishing systems and fire control systems. According to Iranian officials, target acquisition and accuracy against mobile and static targets have been greatly improved. The Safir-74 can reportedly operate in water up to 16.4 feet (5 m) deep when fitted with special underwater equipment, and up to 4.9 feet (1.5 m) without special equipment.

Iran is also mass-producing the Boragh IFV, a simplified derivative of the BMP-1.

Iran announced the production of the indigenous Tosan "quick reaction" tank in July 2008.

*Editor's Note: For information on Iran's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, see the Issues and Notes section of the Iranian Overview.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Islamic Republic of Iran is bordered to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to the west by Pakistan and Afghanistan, to the north by Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to the west by Turkey and Iraq.

Historical Background

Iran's Western-backed monarchy was overthrown in 1979 and replaced with a Shi'ite Muslim theocracy. The government has since been guarded in its relations with the West, and hostile toward the United States, which has been propagandized as the "Great Satan ."

Soon after the revolution, Iran began a bitter eight-year war with Iraq and the Sunni-dominated government of Saddam Hussein.

Terrorist Activity

The Iranian government has been a long-time supporter of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah and several Palestinian groups -- including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC -- providing them with funding, safe haven, training and weapons. Iranian agents are even known to operate as senior officials in some of these organizations, such as Muhammad Riza Zahdi, an Iranian intelligence official who succeeded the assassinated Imad Mughniyeh as Hezbollah's military chief.

The United States levied imposed economic sanctions against Iran in 1995, calling its government a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. State Dept. has named Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world, saying that Tehran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support terrorist groups in planning and executing attacks around the globe.

U.S. President George Bush in 2002 called Iran, Iraq and North Korea an "axis of evil." In mid-2007, the State Dept. declared the IRGC a foreign terrorist organization. The IRGC became the first government agency on the list.

After Israel's three-week offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that ended in mid-January 2009, Iran almost immediately began to reinforce the terrorist group with weapons and supplies lost during the conflict. Iran and Hamas utilized tunnels from Egypt to Gaza to smuggle the supplies. Iran also reportedly encouraged Hamas to confront Israel and pressured the group not to accept a truce.

Nuclear Ambitions

Adding to the instability of the Persian Gulf region has been Iran's conventional military buildup and suspected ongoing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development programs.

In December 2000, Russia and Iran agreed to launch a new long-term program of political and military co-operation. This bilateral agreement included military-technical co-operation (including the 2002 development of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr -- a cause of great concern for the United States and countries in the region), consultations on mutual security threats such as terrorism and drug-smuggling, as well as exchanges of service personnel, including the training of Iranian military officers in Russian academies.

During 2003, concerns from the international community led by the United States prompted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to call for immediate inspections of suspected atomic weapons programs in Bushehr and other sites. While this round of inspections turned up no evidence of an underground nuclear program, the IAEA rebuked Iran in June 2004 for not fully cooperating with its investigation. Iran maintains its nuclear capacity development is strictly for civilian energy purposes.

Tehran's nuclear program and apparent desire for regional dominance continue to cause concern among Iran's neighbors and the international community. Western countries have offered economic incentives to get Iran to cease uranium enrichment, to no avail. The U.N. Security Council levied sanctions against Iran in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 for its continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA and its failure to suspend uranium enrichment activity. Throughout, Tehran has maintained its right to develop nuclear energy, and has continued to enrich uranium on an increasingly industrial scale.

In August 2007, Tehran agreed on a timetable of cooperation with the IAEA designed to answer questions about its nuclear program. The schedule called for all issues to be resolved by the end of the year. However, the U.S. and French governments criticized the agreement as part of Iran's strategy to give up little information while it drags out the process to avoid further punishment by the U.N. Security Council.

Iran on occasion does offer the IAEA access to declared nuclear sites. Inspectors had reported finding "no evidence on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies." They also said they could not verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program until Iran adopts requested "transparency measures," such as access to centrifuge manufacturing sites.

Testing began at the Bushehr nuclear plant in February 2009, around the time that a new IAEA report indicated that Iran had stockpiled enough nuclear fuel for a weapon. A November 2009 IAEA report suggested that Iran was working on an advanced nuclear warhead that could be equipped on ballistic missiles. Agency documents have indicated that Tehran has mastered many aspects of constructing a nuclear warhead, including uranium metallurgy, heavy-water production and the high-precision explosives used to trigger a nuclear detonation.

In April 2009, Iran was invited to join six other nations -- the United States, Britain, Russia, China, France and Germany -- for joint nuclear talks. The so-called G5 +1 talks began in October 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland. Iran ultimately rejected an offer to export its low-grade uranium in exchange for enriched uranium to be used in a medical reactor. This refusal led to the U.N., E.U., U.S. and other members of the international community imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran in the summer of 2010.

Days before the talks began, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA disclosing the existence of a second uranium-enrichment facility at Qom. Tehran apparently revealed its existence because the U.S., the U.K. and France were about to disclose details of the mountain facility.

In January 2010, the New York Timesreported that much of Iran's nuclear program is hidden in underground tunnels similar to the the facility at Qom.

Election Unrest

Incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed victory in June 12, 2009, elections amid widespread claims of fraud. Reform candidate Mirhossein Mousavi and his supporters took to the streets in protest.

The government reacted swiftly, employing police and the Basij militia to crack down on protesters. The government said there were 36 deaths in the following three months; Mousavi's Green Movement said at least 72 were killed. Hundreds were arrested.

The international community, including the U.S., France and Britain, condemned the crackdown. Independent think tanks and observers, including Chatham House in the U.K., also suggested fraud took place in the elections.

Nine Iranian employees of the British Embassy were arrested for allegedly playing a role in the protests, although eight were eventually released. The final worker was sentenced to four years in prison in October 2009.

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami endorsed Ahmadinejad in late June, reportedly calling for the execution of the leaders of the demonstration. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in for his second term on Aug. 5.

Other Issues

Officially, the Iranian government has been neutral during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the U.S. has accused Iran of interfering in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and supplying weapons to Iraqi Shi'ite militias. The U.S. has also maintained that Tehran is arming and training the Taliban f ighting NATO forces in Afghanistan.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is notorious. He has questioned the veracity of the Holocaust and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

Iran has worked to establish closer military ties with Sudan, Iraq and Syria. Tehran has also worked to increase ties with Venezuela, which has allegedly assisted Iran with its nuclear program.

In an attempt to deter a possible strike against its nuclear facilities, Iran has threatened to destroy U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East if attacked. Potential Iranian targets could include U.S. bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Dimona, the Israeli nuclear site.

In August 2009, three American backpackers were arrested in the border area near Iraq's Kurdish region. It is unclear if the hikers crossed the border as Tehran has alleged. As of this update, the three remain in an Iranian prison.

In October 2009, Tehran said the U.S. kidnapped an Iranian nuclear researcher, Shahram Amiri, while he was on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Amiri eventually surfaced in Washington, D.C., and returned home to Iran in July 2010. Via Iranian media, he claimed to have been kidnapped by the CIA. American officials said he had been a willing informant. Upon his return, Iran said he was a double agent.

DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

The constitution of 1979, drafted after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi, established a Supreme Defense Council (SDC) to govern all Iranian defense matters. The council consists of the President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contains the three regular armed forces commanders. The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) commander and the commander of the Basij (volunteer militia) are also members of the council.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Faqih, supervises the Supreme Defense Council. The Faqih names two representatives to sit on the council.

The position of armed forces commander-in-chief (Wali Faqih) is also technically assigned to the Faqih under the 1979 constitution. In 1980, the Faqih delegated the title to the office of the President, with the Faqih retaining supervisory privileges. In 1989, however, the post was returned to the Faqih.

ARMED FORCES

The regular armed forces include the army, air force and the navy, including a naval infantry/marine corps.

For additional information on the individual services, see separate database entries for Iran

Ground ForcesAir ForceNavy/MarinesSpecial Operations Forces (Revolutionary Guard Corps)

CONSCRIPTION

Service in the regular military is by conscription. The period of conscription is 16 months for all services, including the Pasdaran. Iran has been gradually reducing the length of its mandatory service from a high of 24 months at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

The army is the only service to maintain an active reserve. Reservists form battalion-sized units known as "quds" during time of war.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The armed forces currently number 545,000 personnel, of which roughly 220,000 are conscripts.

Paramilitary Forces

The paramilitary order forces, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Army of 2 Million" or the "Mobilization of the Oppressed," are under the operational control of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran). The two main paramilitary forces are the Basij (volunteer militia) and various law-enforcement forces under the Ministry of Interior. The exact size of the Basij is not known, but could be as low as 1-2 million or as high as 12.5-20 million.

Ministry of the Interior

The 40,000-strong Ministry of Interior security forces is available to be mobilized for military action if required. In peacetime, interior land and naval border guard units are under the operational control of the Ministry of Interior where they carry out law enforcement in rural areas and in towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Equipment reported to be in use with the interior forces includes: AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 AIRCRAFT # # # # Cessna 185 utility # # # # Cessna 310L utility 24 24 24 24 AB205/206 JetRanger helicopters 2 Iran-140 transport

SHIPS 90 90 90 90 coastal patrol craft 40 40 40 40 harbor patrol craft

Opposition Forces

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO)The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), also known as the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), includes the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK) and the Muslim Iranian Student's Society (a front organization used to garner financial support). College-educated offspring of Iranian merchants founded MEK in 1965. Its ideology, a mixture of Islam and Marxism, emphasizes the need for social change within Iran.

Iran carried out strikes against MKO strongholds throughout the 1990s, forcing the MKO leadership into self-imposed exile in France.

In late April 2003, the U.S. concluded a cease-fire agreement with the MKO in Iraq, despite the fact that the group has been placed on the State Dept. list of foreign terrorist organizations. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. allowed the MKO to keep its arms, stay in Iraq and continue to fight. The agreement drew sharp criticism from Tehran.

The U.S. later in 2003 offered group members protection in return for disarming. By early 2009, the Iraqi government was stepping up pressure to expel the group from Iraq. For more information on the MEK, see Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.

Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was founded after World War II as a splinter of an Association for the Resurrection of Kurdistan. The party was practically liquidated when a Kurdish rebellion was crushed in 1966-67. It was reinstituted after 1973, when Abd ar-Rahman Qasemlu was elected as the party's secretary-general. The KDPI is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish opposition groups, and seeks autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. It operates in northwest Iran and from Kurdish areas in Iraq and Turkey, saying its seeks a socialist democratic society within an Iranian federal republic.

Kurdish Communist Party of Iran (Komala)The Kurdish Communist Party of Iran is a small opposition group concentrated around Sanandaj. Komala seeks a secular autonomous region under Kurdish control. For more information on the Kurdish Communist Party of Iran, see Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) The Kurdish PKK operates mainly in Turkey and northern Iraq, but the Iranian government has accused it of launching attacks on Iranian border troops. For more information on the Kurdistan Workers' Party, see Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.

JundallahThe Baluch separatist group Jundallah is primarily active in Iran's southeast, near the border with Pakistan. A Jundallah attack on Oct. 18, 2009, killed more than 40 people, including 15 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, in Sistan-Baluchistan province.

Group leader Abdolmalek Rigi was arrested in February 2010 on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan when Iranian jets intercepted the aircraft over the Persian Gulf and forced it to land. Rigi's brother was executed in May. Rigi himself was executed on June 20, 2010.

A pair of Jundallah suicide bombers attacked a mosque in the southeastern city of Zahedan in July 2010. The attack was said to be in revenge for their leader's execution.

Iran claims that Jundallah is backed by the U.S.

Budget

Defense Budget for FY08: $9.6 billionDefense Budget for FY07: $7.2 billionDefense Budget for FY06: $6.6 billion

Issues

Iranian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Programs

Chemical Weapons

Despite being a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has reportedly developed and stockpiled a large arsenal of chemical weapons (CWs) -- including nerve, blood, choking and blister agents -- as well as their delivery systems.

Iran began producing chemical weapons in response to Iraqi CW attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Recognizing its inability to respond effectively to Baghdad, Tehran began placing a high priority on CW programs in the early 1990s. This culminated in the building of the country's major CW production facility at Damghan, 186 miles east of Tehran. Other major reported CW facilities include sites at Isfahan, Parchin and Qazvin.

The U.S. government believes Iran is able to produce as much as 1,000 tons of weapons-grade chemicals a year; including sulfur-mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) maintains that Iran has mastered shell and bomb delivery systems and may be producing CW warheads for its short- and medium-range missiles. After 2003, U.S. intelligence began to downplay such assertions, suggesting that dual-use facilities could quickly field chemical agents but were not necessarily active in their production.

Iranian officials insist the CW program was abandoned after the Iran-Iraq War.

Biological Weapons

The Iran-Iraq war was also the catalyst for Iran's biological weapons (BW) program, despite its ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Tehran is thought to be in the advanced research and development stage, though the program's existence and current status are unconfirmed. Most of the information on such a program comes from CIA reports, uncited writings of experts and claims made by Iranian dissidents.

Iran may have small quantities of weaponized BW agents.

Nuclear Weapons Programs

In April 2003, the U.S. called on the international community to stop all trade in nuclear material with Iran. Washington urged the 187 members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare that Iran violated IAEA regulations when it secretly built two nuclear facilities. The IAEA directive states that signatories to the NPT must declare the existence of nuclear facilities before construction.

Iran has received Russian support on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This arrangement was formalized in February 2005 and the reactor is reportedly nearing completion. The resulting expertise and technology, as well as the establishment of contacts and commercial channels, could be used to supplement the country's nuclear weapons program, according to analysts at the Dept. of Energy.

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only.

Iran has also been enriching uranium since 2006. The enriched product can fuel nuclear generators, while highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons. Iran reported in December 2008 that it has at least 5,000 gas centrifuges working to enrich uranium and plans to have at least 6,000.

An unclassified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran released in December of 2007 concluded with "high confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Other countries,

including Israel and France, disagreed, judging that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon by 2009. The United States has continued questioning Iran's intentions. Reports in January 2010 indicated that the NIE about Iran was being revised.

In November 2008, the IAEA announced that Iran has produced 1,390 pounds of low-enriched uranium, enough to make one bomb, assuming Iran has other technologies in place to do so. Iran's nuclear chief announced in June 2010 that his country had produced more than 37 pounds of 20 percent enriched ura nium.

The Iranian government announced in November 2009 that that it would build 10 new enrichment plants. Construction on two of those sites is scheduled to begin by March 2011.

Nuclear Research Facilities (reported)

Bushehr

The Bushehr nuclear research facility originally contained two incomplete Siemens 1,250-MWe nuclear reactors built by the Germans in the 1970s. Both reactors, only 75 percent complete when the project was abandoned in 1979, were heavily damaged by Iraqi bombers during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). According to reports, the reactor core areas of Unit 1 and Unit 2 were completely destroyed in the attacks. In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed an $800 million contract calling for completion of Unit 1 by 1999 and Unit 2 one to two years later. Two Russian-built VVER-1000 reactors were to replace the destroyed reactors. Construction of two new N-213-type VVER-440 Mwe reactors (Units 3 and 4) at an adjacent site was also studied. By mid-2002, 600 Russian specialists were working at Bushehr alongside hundreds of Russian-trained Iranian technicians. The sprawling 6th Fighter Base, home to two squadrons of F-4 and F-7 fighter aircraft, is located north of the Bushehr facility. Bushehr is also the site of Iran's "Nuclear Energy College."

In December 2002, the Russian Atomic Energy Agency said it had manufactured 180 fuel rods for the first reactor unit. The agreement calls for the spent fuel rods to be returned to Russia. Spent fuel rods can also be easily converted into plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear warheads.

The Bushehr facility is not yet operational, but it is anticipated it will be ready in September 2010. Russia apparently slowed its work on the facility in 2007, saying Iran had not paid its bills in full. Moscow did, however, begin delivering uranium to the facility in December 2007.

Natanz

Natanz is the location of Iran's main uranium enrichment facility. By mid-2007, Iran had assembled and begun using more than 1,300 centrifuges into eight cascades. By early 2009, there were at least 5,000 centrifuges. The large facility is built partially underground, leading to questions about its declared peaceful purpose. When completed, Natanz is expected to be capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to build several nuclear weapons per year.

Qom

The existence of the enrichment facility at Qom was revealed in September 2009. Construction apparently began in 2005. Western intelligence agencies maintained that they had been monitoring the site for years. Iran publicly admitted to the site after discovering the surveillance. U.S. President Obama said the facility is designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges; it is built into a mountain.

Arak

Arak is the site of two heavy water facilities. One is a heavy water production facility, first disclosed by Iranian opposition groups. After the IAEA visited the site in February 2003, Iran said that it intended to use the heavy water to moderate a prospective research reactor in Arak. This facility opened in August 2006.

The second facility is a 40 MW heavy water reactor. Construction was scheduled to begin in 2004. Exactly when construction began is unclear, but commercially available satellite imagery indicated that it was well under way by early 2005. When completed, the Arak reactor will enable Iran to produce plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons assembly, perhaps one to two nuclear weapons annually per year. In August 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that the reactor was scheduled to be opened in 2009, although the IAEA gave an expected commissioning date of 2011. The Iranians say the plant is intended for medical research and development.

Isfahan (GEMA Energy Center, University of Isfahan)

This facility contains a small 27-kW Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor, electromagnetic isotope separator and "desk-top-sized" calutron. Construction of the underground facility began in late 1991 and was reportedly completed with Chinese assistance in March 1994. A related site near Isfahan reportedly houses a Chinese-built "nuclear starter device."

The center has a total of four small research reactors. A deal with the Chinese to build a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan was suspected to be part of Iran's nuclear weapons program, because Iran's civilian reactor at Bushehr does not require the uranium product that would be derived from the conversion plant.

Uranium hexafluoride gas is produced at Isfahan. The gas is then transferred to Natanz for enrichment.

Saghand, Yazd Province

A uranium mine and processing facility is located in Saghand, Yadz Province. Identified uranium ore deposits at this site exceed 3,000 tons, and undiscovered reserves are estimated at 7,500 tons. A yellowcake uranium plant also is located at Saghand. Smaller uranium deposits are located near Isfahan and in Azerbaijan, Khorasan and Sistan-va-Baluchestan.

In 2005, U.S. State Dept. officials used the capacity and production capabilities of Saghand to suggest that Iran could did not possess sufficient uranium reserves to achieve nuclear power self-sufficiency. They argued that Tehran would have to import outside sources of uranium if it truly intended to construct nuclear reactors for energy purposes, tending to discredit Iran's assertions it could profit from nuclear energy by opening up oil and natural gas reserves to the world market.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Iran has advanced capability in the area of ballistic missile production. Tehran's missile program includes copies of the Russian-made Scud (Shahab-2 in Iranian service) and North Korean No-dong (Shahab-3). Iran has also imported the Chinese M-7 solid-fuel missile, which has a 93-mile range. Iran's long-range rocket arsenal reportedly tripled in 2008.

Iran is also developing the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, based on the North Korea's Taepo-dong missile, according to a report on foreign-missile development produced for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The acquisition in 2006 of BM-25 surface-to-surface missiles from North Korea increased the range of a potential Iranian strike. The BM-25 has a range of approximately 2,500 km.

Iran launched a satellite into orbit using a suborbital rocket in February 2007. Western analysts are concerned that the launch vehicle could be converted into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of up to 2,500 miles (4,023 km).

"A reconnaissance satellite of reasonable performance should weigh about 300 kg (660 lb.)," said the former head of the Israel Missile Defense Organization Uzi Rubin, in a report for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. "Once Iran learns how to put 300 kg. into earth orbit, it could adapt the satellite launcher into an ICBM that could drop more than 300 kg anywhere in the world." U.S. intelligence reported that Iran failed to put a dummy satellite into orbit on Aug. 16, 2008.

In September 2007, Iran displayed its new Ghadr -1 missile for the first time. The missile is believed to be an improved version of the Shahab series. Iran said the missile has a range of 1,800 km (1,100 miles).

The government announced the construction of the Ashura ballistic missile in November 2007. It reportedly has a range of 2,000 km (1,240 miles).

The solid-fuel Sajjil missile was successfully test-fired in November 2008. The Sajjil-2 was successfully test-fired in May and December 2009. Both have a range of 2,000 km (1,250 miles).

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency informed Congress in late 2006 that Iran could develop an ICBM with a range of 3,000 mi. (4,828 km) by 2015.

In July 2008, Iran released a photo purportedly showing the successful test-launch of four Shahab-3 missiles. The photo turned out to be a poorly Photoshopped image, a suspected attempt to cover up the misfiring of at least one weapon.

Plans and Programs

See separate ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, and SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES entries for additional information.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.

Navy

Armed Forces StructureEquipmentDeploymentIssues and NotesPlans and Programs

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The maritime forces of Iran consist of the regular navy, a naval air arm and a naval infantry force. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) or Pasdaran operates a separate naval force to reinforce the navy and marines. (See separate database entry for Iran/Special Operations Forces for additional information.)

The Iranian navy is organized into three operational zones: the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Iran's operational headquarters is at Bandar Abbas, as is its primary ship-repair facility. A second operating base and ship-repair facility is located at Bushehr.

The naval infantry/marine force consists of two battalions with approximately 2,600 active troops. Although the marines are responsible for amphibious operations, it is the Revolutionary Guard Marine Force that carries out most of the amphibious special operations.

Three navy brigades and one Pasdaran brigade make up Iran's extensive coastal defense anti-ship missile system. At least 12 batteries of HY-2/HY-4 Silkworm and SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile sites are operational at sites along the Strait of Hormuz and on Kharg Island.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The total active strength of the Iranian navy is approximately 18,000 personnel, including the 2,600-strong naval air arm and 2,600 marines.

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database.) AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 SHIPS Submarines 3 3 3 3 TAREGH class (Russian Kilo design) 1 1 3+ AL SABIHA-15 swimmer delivery vehicle 10 10 10 North Korean swimmer delivery vehicles (unconfirmed) 7 GHADIR class (Iran) Destroyers 1 MOWDGE-class destroyer (Iran) Frigates 3 3 3 4 ALVAND class (U.K. VOSPER Mk 5 design) Patrol Boats 1 1 1 JOSHAN class torpedo boat (Iran) 1 1 1 ZOLFAQAR class (Iran) 2 2 2 2 BAYANDOR class (U.S. PF 103 design) 10 10 10 13 KAMAN-class

missile craft (France LA COMBATTANTE II design) 3 3 3 3 PARVIN class (U.S. Improved PGM 71 design) 2 KAIVAN class (U.S. CAPE class) 3 N/A N/A N/A ZAFAR class 15 PEYKAAP I class (Iran) 11 PEYKAAP II class (Iran) Patrol Craft # N/A N/A N/A Boston Whaler 6.7-m design motorized launches # 9 9 9 U.S. Mk III class (Marinette Marine 20-m design) # 6 6 6 U.S. 50-ft class (Peterson Builders design) # N/A N/A N/A U.S. Swift Mk II class (Peterson Builders 15-m design) # 6 6 6 U.S. Enforcer class (Bertram Yacht 9.5-m design) # N/A N/A N/A MAHNAVI HAMRAZ class (Stewart Seacraft 40-ft design) # N/A N/A N/A MIG-G-1900-class coastal (Iran 20-m design) # N/A N/A N/A MIG-S-1800-class coastal (Iran 19-m design) # N/A N/A N/A PBI-type coastal (Iran 15-m design) Amphibious 2 2 2 CHAVOUSH-class LST (Iran) 2 2 2 ARYA SAHAND class (Japanese Teraoka Shipyards design) 3 3 3 3 FOQUE-class landing craft (Iranian 36-m design) 3 N/A N/A N/A 37-m Iranian-design landing craft (Iran) 4 4 4 4 HENGAM-class logistic landing ship (ex-U.K. Yarrow 92-m design) 3 N/A N/A N/A IRAN HORMUZ 24-class LST (South Korean 73-m Inchon design) 3 N/A N/A N/A IRAN HORMUZ 21 class (Netherlands 65-m Ravenstein design) 6 N/A N/A N/A Type 412 Sea Truck utility landing craft (U.K. Rortork 12-m design) Mine Countermeasure 2 1 1 2 RIAZI-class inshore minesweeper (ex-U.S. CAPE class) 2 N/A N/A 2 Type-292 MSC Mine Laying 3 N/A N/A N/A HEJAZ (LST) Auxiliary 2 2 2 2 BANDAR ABBAS-class oiler (German 108-m Luhring design) 1 1 1 1 KHARG-class replenishment oiler (U.K. OLWEN- class design) 1 N/A N/A N/A 47-m Iranian-design logistics ship (Iran) 5 7 7 6 DELVAR-class support (Karachi SY 63-m design) 2 2 2 2 KANGAN-class water tanker (Indian Mazagon Dock 148-m design) 1 0 0 0 KISH training ship (German 37-m design) (stricken) 1 1 1 N/A ABNEGAR-class survey (Malahide SY 20-m design) 12 12 12 12 BAKHTARAN-class tender (Damen, Gorinchem 47-m design) 1 1 1 1 HAMZEH-class training ship (U.S)(ex-SHAHROKH- class minesweeper) 1 1 N/A CHAH BAHAR-class repair ship (ex-U.S. AMPHION) MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # # # # TONDAR anti-ship (improved C-802) # N/A N/A N/A MM38 Exocet (France) # 0 0 0 RGM-84A Harpoon (U.S.) # # # # C-801 (CSS-NX-4 Sardine) (China) # # # # C-802 (CSS-NX-8 Saccade) (China) # # # # HY-1 Silkworm (SS-N-2B/C Styx)(China) (incl. coastal batteries) # # # # HY-2 Seersucker (Chinese

CSS-3)(8-10 mobile launchers/coastal batteries) # # # # HY-4 Silkworm (China) # N/A N/A N/A Gabriel (Israel) # 0 0 0 Sea Killer Mk 2 (Italy)(non-operational) # C-701 Kosar (China) Surface-to-Air # # # 0 Standard SM-1 MR (U.S.)(non-operational) # # # # SA-7 Grail MANPADS (Russian 9K32M Strela-2) # # # N/A Seacat (U.K.) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems # # # # 107-mm Fajr self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese Type 63) # # # # 107-mm Haseb self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese Type 63)

Naval Aviation

(For additional information on the equipment listed below search our Weapons Database.)

AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 AIRCRAFT 4 4 4 4 Turbo Commander 690 liaison (U.S.) 4 4 4 4 F27 Mk 400M Troopship/Mk 600 Friendship transport (Netherlands) 3 3 3 3 Falcon 20E VIP transport (France) 5 3 3 3 P-3F Orion (U.S.) 5 5 5 5 Do-228 (Germany) Helicopters 2 2 2 2 AB206A-1 Jetranger liaison/training (U.S.) 5 5 5 5 AB205A-1 transport/SAR (U.S.) 10 10 10 10 AB212AS ASW (U.S. UH-1) 10 10 10 10 SH-3D Sea King ASW (U.S. UH-3) 3 3 3 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion MCM/transport (U.S.) # # Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)

Deployment

Iranian navy ports and facilities are located at: Navy Headquarters Tehran Operational Headquarters Bandar Abbas Naval Aviation Headquarters Tehran 1st Naval District Tehran 2nd Naval District Bushehr 3rd Naval District Bandar-e-Khomeini 4th Naval District (Caspian Sea) Noushehr Coastal Defense Missile Sites: 8 SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile sites near Bandar Abbas At least 12 Silkworm anti-ship missile sites near Bandar Abbas and Kharg Island Additional Bases: Abadan Abu Musa Asalouyeh Bandar-e-Anzali Chah Bahar (Bandar Beheshti) Chalus Farsi Isfahan Jask Kharg Island Mahshahr Shiraz Sirri Iranian naval aviation operates two airbases. Operational units are assigned to the following locations: Helicopter ASW squadron (SH-3) Bushehr Helicopter Transport and SAR squadron Bushehr (RH-53, AB212) Transport and Navy Patrol squadron Bandar Abbas (F-27) Helicopter ASW squadron (SH-3) Bandar Abbas Helicopter Transport and SAR squadron Bandar Abbas (RH-53, AB212) Helicopter Transport squadron (Mi-17) Bandar Abbas (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps)

Issues

Iran has adopted a swarm strategy for its navy in the Persian Gulf. Hardened terminals have been constructed that can deploy large numbers of small assault vessels to overwhelm enemy targets. The fast boats are reportedly armed with cruise missiles, mines, torpedoes and rocket-propelled grenades. As of mid-2007, the U.S. Navy estimated that Iran's navy and IRGC had deployed more than 1,000 fast patrol boats in and around the straits of Hormuz.

"The Iranian navy is fully ready to confront any enemy threat or designs," said Iranian navy commander Rear Adm. Sajad Kouchaki in April 2007. "The navy's strategy is based on all-out defense of Iran's territorial waters, national interests and islands in the Persian Gulf region."

By early 2009, an Iranian warship was serving in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast on an anti-piracy mission. The Iranian government announced in May 2009 that it would send two warships to the region on five-month anti-piracy tours.

Plans and Programs

The navy has planned three new corvettes to be known as the ZOLFAQAR class. The first ship in the class, the MOUJ, entered service in 2006. The expected delivery date of the other ships is unknown.

A new indigenously developed torpedo boat called the JOSHAN entered service in September 2006.

An Iranian-built destroyer was reportedly commissioned in November 2007, along with a new class of submarine. Another submarine and two small missile boats were commissioned in November 2008.

The Iranian navy said it had successfully tested an indigenous high-speed torpedo during large-scale exercises in the Persian Gulf in early April 2006. The underwater missile travels at speeds up to 350 km/hour (217 mph), according to Iranian navy leaders.

In February 2008, the Iranian navy announced the delivery 74 new domestically produced gunboats intended for logistic and patrol operations in the Persian Gulf.

The GHADIR-class midget submarine began operations with the Iranian navy in 2009.

Iran's navy said it launched the first of its MOWDGE-class destroyers in February 2010. The vessel, dubbed the JAMARAN , is equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare capabilities. It can reportedly carry 120 to 140 personnel, has a top speed of 30 knots and is equipped with a helipad.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.

Special Operation Forces

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Pasdaran Inqilab, was formed following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new regime, and to counter the influence and power of the regular military.

The Pasdaran consists of ground, naval and aviation units that parallel the structure of the regular military.

The Pasdaran's naval wing operates largely from bases along the coastline of southern Iran and from many of the islands and oil production platforms that dot the Persian Gulf. Naval assets once under the control of the Pasdaran, including many small patrol boat and numerous coastal defense missile batteries, were transferred to or placed under joint operational control of the regular navy beginning in 1991. Many jointly controlled assets continue to be manned by Pasdaran personnel. In September 2008, Iran specifically charged the Pasdaran with the defense of the Persian Gulf.

The Basij (also known as the Popular Mobilization Army) is under the operational control of the Pasdaran, as are a number of units drawn from 175 of Iran's ancient tribes and clans.

A secret military organization known as the Guards Special Quds Force also is also under Pasdaran control. This force reportedly plays a role in Iran's network of external terrorist activity.

Basij forces are organized into two regionally based commands comprising 741 Ashura (male only) light infantry battalions and 134 al-Zahra (female only) light infantry battalions of 300-350 personnel each, plus a number of local reserve battalions. Ashura and Zahra battalions are named for the day marking the death of Mohammad's grandson Hussein and Mohammad's daughter and the mother of Hussein, respectively.

These battalions are supplemented by 2.2 million college students organized into reconnaissance and advance guard units. Most Basijis are now given regular military training. Volunteers range from 14 to 70 years of age and are usually lightly armed.

In the early 1990s, the Basij was "reconstructed" with substantial grants from the federal treasury to act as a moral police force and defender of fundamentalist Islam's code of conduct. New uniforms and weapons were issued and an accelerated recruitment drive undertaken within universities and secondary schools. Beginning in early 1993, the Iranian government allotted 40 percent of available university admissions to Basij members as an incentive to join and as a reward for service.

At full strength, Pasdaran has the following structure:

13 regional commands 2 armored divisions 5 mechanized divisions

10 infantry divisions 1 special forces division 15-20 independent brigades, incl. special forces brigades infantry brigades armored brigades parachute brigades 6 artillery groups 5 artillery/surface-to-surface missile groups border defense brigades aircraft units independent infantry groups 1 marine brigadeNote: The size of these units vary greatly, and some are only lightly manned during peacetime.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The Pasdaran currently numbers more than 125,000 personnel, including at least 100,000 ground forces personnel, 20,000 naval personnel and 5,000 marines. The Basij paramilitary forces can number up to 1 million upon mobilization, although figures as high as 12.5 million to 20 million have been mentioned by Iranian officials.

Equipment

The Pasdaran primarily operates equipment that is attributed to the regular armed forces. The following list contains equipment operated independently of the regular armed forces.

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database.)

AUG06 OCT07 FEB09 AUG10 SHIPS

40 32 32 40+ BOGHAMMAR-type fast-attack craft (Sweden) 10 10 10 10 HUDONG-class missile patrol boats with C-802 SSM (China) 6 6 6 9 CHINACAT-class catamaran (China) 3 3 3 IRAN HORMUZ 24-class medium landing ships (South Korea) 3 3 3 HEJAZ-class medium landing ships (Netherlands) 8 8 8 TYPE 412 SEA TRUCK-type landing craft

Coastal Patrol Boats 6 6 MIG-G-2600-PB-class (Iran 26-m design) (aka ZAFAR-class) 10+ 10+ MIG-G-1900-class (Iran 20-m design)

50 50 MIG-G-1800-TRB-class (Iran 19-m design) # # MIG-G-1200-SC-class (Iran 12-m design) # # MIG-G-0900-CPB-class (Iran 9-m design) # # MIG-G-0790-PB-class (Iran 8-m design) # # MIG-G-0700-PB-class (Iran 7-m design) # # MIG-G-0500-PL-class (Iran 5-m design)

MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # Shahab-1/2 IRBM (12-18 launchers) (Iran) 6 20 # # Shahab-3 IRBM (up to 12 launchers) (Iran)

Deployment

The Pasdaran ground and air forces are relatively mobile, operating from established military bases and at least five island bases in the Persian Gulf, including Larak (Silkworm sites), Abu Musa (Silkworm sites), Sirri, Al Farsiyah islands and the Halul oil platform. The Pasdaran naval headquarters and main operating base is located at Bandar Abbas.

Pasdaran land and air defense units are concentrated for the most part in and around Tehran and the military districts adjacent to the Iraqi border.

Coastal defense batteries equipped with Silkworm and Sunburn anti-ship missiles are located at several sites along the Strait of Hormuz.

Issues

The extent of Iran's participation in the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is a matter of dispute. The U.S. has accused the IRGC of supplying advanced weaponry to Shi'ite militias in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Washington added the IRGC to the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations in mid-2007.

In December 2008, Tehran proposed the creation of a Basij naval arm designed to patrol the Persian Gulf in coordination with the Pasdaran maritime force.

In March 2009, the IRGC commander boasted that all Israeli nuclear sites were within range of the Shahab-3 missiles.

In December 2009, the Iranian government gave the Revolutionary Guards full responsibility for naval operations in the Persian Gulf in the event of a conflict.

Plans and Programs

In August 2008, the IRGC said it had successfully tested a new indigenous anti-ship weapon capable of striking targets at a range of 300 km (186 miles).

The elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps said in February 2010 that it developed a weapon designed to shoot down U.S. Apache attack helicopters. There were no other details provided.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

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