Air Force History - FALL 2003 - Volume 50, Number 3 · 2017. 5. 1. · AIR POWER History / FALL 2003 3 Did you ever wonder why the best close air support plane of World War II—the

FALL 2003 - Volume 50, Number 3

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COVER: Adapted from the painting of two P-47 Thunderbolts by Stan Stokes in the USAF Art Collection (1986.301)

Remembrance Richard C. LinebergerBook Reviews

Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politicsby Edward Teller Reviewed by Donald R. Baucom

Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Koreaby Xiaoming Zhang Reviewed by David F. Crosby

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945

by Tami Davis Biddle Reviewed by Guillaume de SyonAmerica as a Military Power: From the American Revolution to the Civil War

by Jeremy Black Reviewed by Jim GatesWingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story

by R. Dale Reed with Darlene Lister Reviewed by I. B. HolleyThe Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum Directory of Airplanes:

Their Design and Manufacturersby Dana Bell, Ed. Reviewed by Steve Horn

American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diariesby John W. Huston Reviewed by Alfred F. Hurley

Hijackings and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorismby J. Paul de B. Taillon Reviewed by Stéphane Lefebvre

The American Fighter Planeby Amy E. Williams & Ted Williams Reviewed by William A. Nardo

In the Shadows of War: An American Pilot’s Odyssey through Occupied France and the Camps of Nazi Germany

by Thomas Childers Reviewed by Jacob NeufeldBackwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945

by Edwin P. Hoyt Reviewed by James A PainterUncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941

by Thomas G. Mahnke Reviewed by James A PainterAir Force One

by Robert F. Dorr Reviewed by Lawrence H. RichmondVoices from Vietnam: The tragedies and triumphs of Americans and Vietnamese

—two peoples forever entwined by the legacy of warby Charlene Edwards Reviewed by George M. Watson, Jr.

Reaper Leader: The Life of Jimmy Flatleyby Steve Ewing Reviewed by Thomas Wildenberg

Books ReceivedHistory MysteryComing UpLetters, News, Notices, Reunions, and In Memoriam

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Why the U.S. Air Force Did Not Use the F–47Thunderbolt in the Korean WarMichael D. Rowland

“Big Ben”: Sergeant Benjamin F. Warmer III,Flying AceJohn W. Hinds

The Dark Ages of Strategic Airlift: the Propeller EraKenneth P. Werrell

Towards a Place in HistoryDavid G. Styles

2 AIR POWER History / FALL 2003

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Trustees and members are grateful for theirsupport and contributions to preserving, perpetuating,and publishing the history and traditions of Americanaviation.

BenefactorMrs. Ruth A. (Ira C.) Eaker Estate

PatronMaj. Gen. Ramsay PottsQuesada Foundation

SponsorsMaj. Gen. William LyonMaj. Gen. John S. PattonGen. William Y. Smith

DonorsMr. John F. DonahueEmerson ElectricRockwell InternationalGen. Bernard A. Schriever

SupportersThe Aerospace CorporationAllied-Signal Aerospace CorporationArthur Metcalf FoundationCSX CorporationBrig. Gen. Brian S. GundersonMaj. Gen. John P. HenebryGen. & Mrs. Robert T. HerresMaj. Gen. Harold E. HumfeldMcDonnell Douglas FoundationMaj. Gen. Kenneth P. MilesNorthrop-Grumman CorporationMr. William O’RourkeMr. James PartonMr. George PendeltonPratt & WhitneyUnited TechnologiesCapt. William C. WardMaj. Gen. Richard A. Yudkin

Annual Contributing MembersANSERARX, Inc.ASTECH/MCI Manufacturing, Inc.Beech Aircraft CorporationBoeing Defense & Space GroupGeneral Electric CompanyInstrument Systems Corp.Litton IndustriesLockheed Martin Corp.The Mitre CorporationNorthrop CorporationVinell Corporation

Officers

PresidentGen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)Vice-PresidentGen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Secretary-TreasurerMaj. Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Executive Director Col. Joseph A. Marston, USAF (Ret)

Advisors

Gen. John P. Jumper, USAFLt. Gen. John R. Dallager, USAFLt. Gen. Donald A. Lamontagne, USAFBrig. Gen. Ronald T. Rand, USAFCMSAF Gerald R. Murray, USAF

Board of Trustees

Col. Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Mr. F. Clifton Berry, Jr.Lt.Gen. John Conaway, USAF (Ret)Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret)Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF(Ret)Maj.Gen. John P. Henebry, USAF (Ret)Col. George A. Henry, Jr., USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. James A. Jaeger, USAF (Ret)Mr. John Kreis, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Kathy La Sauce, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Hon. Hans MarkCMSgt Norman A. Marous, USAF Hon. John L. McLucasGen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF(Ret)CMSgtAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)Gen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Dr. George K. TanhamCol. Robert E. Vickers, Jr., USAF (Ret)Col. George Weinbrenner, USAF(Ret)

Trustees Emeriti

Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Devol Brett, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. William E. Brown, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert J. Dixon, USAF (Ret)Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Mr. John E. GreenwoodBrig.Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret)Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.Maj.Gen. Jeanne M. Holm, USAF (Ret)Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Donald S. Lopez, USAF (Ret)Col. Kenneth Moll, USAF (Ret)Col. Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Hon. Verne OrrMaj.Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret)Gen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)MSgt. Charles J. Warth, USAF (Ret)Col. Sherman W. Wilkins, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of theAir Force Historical Foundation

Fall 2003 Volume 50 Number 3

PublisherBrian S. Gunderson

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorScott A. Willey

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingMark D. Mandeles

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsi-bility for any damage to or loss of the man-uscript. The Editor reserves the right toedit manuscripts and letters.

Address Letters to the Editor to:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 10328Rockville, MD 20849-0328e-mail: [email protected]

Correspondence regarding missed issuesor changes of address should be addressedto the Circulation Office:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 151150Alexandria, Virginia 22315Telephone: (301) 981-2139Fax: (703) 923-0848e-mail: [email protected]

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3AIR POWER History / FALL 2003

Did you ever wonder why the best close air support plane of World War II—theF–47 Thunderbolt—did not fly in the Korean War? Michael Rowland asked himself thesame question and then decided to search for an answer. His penetrating article leadsoff this issue of Air Power History.

Another frequently asked history question concerns air victory credits. For exam-ple, "Were any men in the enlisted ranks 'aces?'" (That is, that they destroyed at leastfive enemy planes.) Most historians would say, "No." In his article about "Big BenWarmer," John W. Hinds presents documentary and photographic evidence to supportWarmer's claim to fame.

Kenneth Werrell characterizes the "propeller era," that ran through the 1960s, as"The Dark Ages of Strategic Airlift." The turning point, he says, came at the start of theKennedy administration with the introduction of jet-powered airlifters and their assign-ment to higher operational priority.

In April 2003, aviation writer-photographer David Styles attended the sixty-firstDoolitle Raiders' reunion at Travis Air Force Base, California. He writes of the raid'simpact on both American and British forces in stopping the Japanese onslaught. It isfor these reasons that Styles appeals to air enthusiasts to support the Doolittle Air andSpace Museum at Travis AFB.

While the Doolittle Raiders attacked Japan near the beginning of the Pacific War,Richard Lineberger flew against Japan at the end of the war. In a brief, but detailed,reminiscence Lineberger reveals the secret mission's target—the supposedly off-limitsImperial palace. And he supports his claim with a photograph of the Emperor's palacetaken during the July 1945 attack.

The year 2003 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Air Force HistoricalFoundation and its journal, Air Power History. In this issue [on page 43] we trace thejournal's evolution and list past executive directors and chief editors.

There are more than dozen reviews on a variety of new books, ranging from Dr.Edward Teller's autobiography to the National Air and Space Museum's airplane direc-tory. The customary departments include Bob Dorr's "History Mystery," letters, news,notices, reunions, and upcoming events.

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.


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AIR POWER History / FALL 2003 5

Michael D. Rowland

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� uring World War II, the Republic P–47Thunderbolt gained an enviable reputationfor accomplishment and toughness. With a

skilled pilot at its controls, it was a formidablefighter—the two highest-scoring American aces inthe European Theater, Francis “Gabby” Gabreski,with 28 victories, and Robert S. Johnson, with 27victories, flew Thunderbolts. However, the Thun-derbolt gained its greatest fame and biggest nume-rical successes as a ground-attack aircraft. InEurope alone between D-Day on June 6, 1944 andthe surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945,Thunderbolt groups claimed the destruction of6,000 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, 9,000locomotives, 86,000 items of rolling stock, 68,000trucks, and huge numbers of enemy troops killedor wounded. According to air power historian W. A.Jacobs, “All authorities agreed that the P–47 wasthe best fighter-bomber.”1

The P–47 equipped Air Force squadrons for anumber of years after World War II and in 1948was redesignated the F–47.2 The F–47 was alsoused by Air National Guard squadrons and did notcompletely pass out of service until the mid-1950s.Nevertheless, after North Korean forces attackedthe Republic of Korea on Sunday, June 25, 1950,the United States Air Force turned to the NorthAmerican F–51 Mustang to fly close-support mis-sions against the communist forces instead of theF–47. In fact, the Thunderbolt did not see combat

during the Korean War even though it was a moreeffective and survivable close air support aircraftthan the F–51. Why didn’t the Air Force use theF–47 in Korea? There are several reasons, includ-ing budget limitations and shortages of spareparts, a nearly complete focus by the Air Force onstrategic nuclear bombing in the post-World War IIyears, and the transition to jet-powered aircraft.

The Mustang was one of the best fighter planesof World War II because of its range, speed, andmaneuverability. Rendered obsolete by the latestjet-powered fighters, the F–51 gained a new lifeduring the Korean War as one of the Air Force’sprincipal ground attack aircraft. The Mustang hadbetter range and payload than the jet-poweredLockheed F–80C Shooting Star and could be oper-ated from rough airstrips close to the front. As aresult, a small number of Mustangs were retrievedfrom storage in Japan and more F–51s wereshipped from Air National Guard units in the U.S.By August 11, 1950, six fighter units had transi-tioned from F–80s to F–51s. Many pilots were notexcited about the change. The historian of the 8thFighter-Bomber Group, the last of the six units tocomplete the conversion, wrote that “A lot of pilotshad seen vivid demonstrations of why the F–51was not a ground-support fighter in the last war,and weren’t exactly intrigued by the thought ofplaying guinea pig to prove the same thing overagain.”3


Michael D. Rowland graduated from Brigham Young University in 1996, with a BA in humanitiesand was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force through the Air ForceROTC program. He served for six years as an Aircraft and Munitions Maintenance Officer, withassignments at Kirtland and Sheppard Air Force Bases. He separated from the Air Force in May2002 and is currently a full-time graduate student in the Museum Studies Program at theUniversity of Florida, Gainesville.

(Overleaf) The F–47Thunderbolt.

(Below) The F–51 Mustang.

THEREPUBLICP–47THUNDER-BOLT... WAS A FORMIDABLEFIGHTER

AUTHORITIESAGREEDTHAT THEP–47 WASTHE BESTFIGHTER-BOMBER

The F–51’s liquid-cooled engine, coolant lines,and radiator were extremely vulnerable to enemyfire. Edgar Schmued, chief designer of the F–51,explained that using the Mustang for groundattack was “absolutely hopeless, because a .30-cal-iber bullet can rip a hole in the radiator and you flytwo more minutes before your engine freezes up.”4Not surprisingly, more Eighth Air Force Mustangswere lost during strafing attacks than in air com-bat in World War II.5 The Mustang suffered thehighest combat losses of any Air Force warplaneduring the Korean War, with 172 F–51s shot downby enemy ground fire. A total of 164 Mustangpilots were either killed or declared missing dur-ing ground-attack operations. For World War IIThunderbolt pilots who flew the F–51 in Korea,the F–47 was definitely the better plane for groundattack. The F–51 was derisively nicknamed “SpamCan” and left many pilots in Korea wishing theywere flying the Thunderbolt instead. Colonel BillMyers, who flew Thunderbolts in World War II,admits that every time he took off on a mission inKorea in his Mustang, he would pray, “Please, God,make this a Thunderbolt.”6

The F–47 was dramatically different from thesleek and graceful Mustang in many ways.Originally conceived as a lightweight interceptor,the Thunderbolt ended up being the heaviest sin-gle-engine fighter of World War II. It was designedand built around its engine and the turbo super-charger that provided high-altitude performance.The engine was the Pratt and Whitney R-2800Double Wasp, an 18-cylinder, air-cooled radial that

produced over 2,000 horsepower.7 The plane had astubby appearance and some say the Thunder-bolt’s nickname of “Jug” came from its resemblanceto a milk jug. Others claim it was derived from“juggernaut.”

The Jug entered combat in April 1943 escortingbombers over Europe, and it quickly demonstratedthe ability to take on the lighter and more maneu-verable Luftwaffe fighters. The Thunderbolt alsoestablished itself as a tough and effective groundattack aircraft. From 1944 on, the Thunderboltwas the primary Army Air Forces fighter-bomber,particularly in Italy and northwestern Europe. By1945, more than 40 percent of all Army Air Forcesfighter groups serving overseas were equippedwith the big fighter. The Thunderbolt, praised bysome as the most versatile plane of the war,escorted bombers, fought enemy fighters, per-formed ground-attack missions, and even droppedrafts to ditched aircrews.8 Britain, the SovietUnion, Brazil, and a number of other allies alsoused the Jug during the war. After World War II,the air forces of nearly twenty nations flewThunderbolts.

The F–47 held many advantages over the F–51in the ground attack role. For starters, it was capa-ble of delivering much greater destruction. TheThunderbolt carried eight wing-mounted .50 cal-iber Browning machine guns and enjoyed 33 per-cent more firepower than the Mustang and manyother Army Air Forces and Navy fighters of WorldWar II, that were typically armed with six .50 cal-iber guns. A full load of ammunition for an F–47


(Right) The P–47.

EDGARSCHMUED,CHIEFDESIGNER OFTHE F–51,EXPLAINEDTHAT USINGTHEMUSTANGFOR GROUNDATTACK WAS“ABSO-LUTELYHOPELESS”

MOREEIGHTH AIRFORCEMUSTANGSWERE LOSTDURINGSTRAFINGATTACKSTHAN IN AIRCOMBAT INWORLD WAR II

MUSTANGSUFFEREDTHE HIGHESTCOMBATLOSSES OFANY AIRFORCE WAR-PLANE DUR-ING THEKOREANWAR

consisted of 425 rounds per gun, enough for 30 sec-onds of continuous fire. In contrast, the six-gunF–51D carried 400 rounds for each of its outboardguns and 270 rounds for each of the other fourguns; the 270 rounds lasted about 20 seconds. TheThunderbolt’s long nose limited visibility duringlow-level attacks but the Jug was still a fearsomestrafer. American fighter-bomber groups often car-ried out strafing runs with flights of four Jugs in aline-abreast formation, and the thirty-two guns fir-ing together was usually devastating.9 Forinstance, Jugs of the 78th Fighter Group set anEighth Air Force record by destroying 135 Germanaircraft on the ground on April 16, 1945.10

Thunderbolts had one bomb rack fitted under eachwing and another under the fuselage, as well asshort launch stubs under the wings for unguidedrockets, allowing late-model Thunderbolts to carryup to 2,500 pounds of external stores. A typical fullload for an F–47N might consist of three 500-pound bombs, 10 3-inch rockets, and full ammuni-tion for all of its guns.

The F–47 was also known for its toughness andcapacity to absorb damage. The Jug’s combat lossrate per sortie was only 0.7 percent, considerablybetter than the Mustang’s 1.2 percent. One WorldWar II study indicated the F–51 was three timesmore vulnerable to ground fire than the F–47.11

Thunderbolts brought their pilots back home aftertaking numerous hits in the fuselage and wings,having cylinders shot off their engines, and evenafter flying through the blasts of their own bombs

and rockets and the debris of exploding targets.12

One admirer called the F–47 “an airborne foxhole.”13 Considering the danger of their missions,Thunderbolt pilots felt relatively safe in theirheavily built fighters and often said they wouldnot have survived their more harrowing missionsif they had been in any other airplane. Robert S.Johnson, the fourth highest scoring Army AirForces ace during World War II, related a particu-larly dramatic example of the Thunderbolt’sruggedness:

When I was badly shot up [in a dogfight] on June26, 1943, I had 21 20mm cannon shells in that air-plane, and more than 200 7.92-mm machine-gunbullets. One nicked my nose and another enteredmy right leg, where the bullet split in half. I stillhave those two little pieces, by the way; they went injust under the skin. I had been hurt worse playingfootball and boxing.”14

The Jug was durable but not invulnerable, andmany were shot down during ground-attack mis-sions. But even in those circumstances, aThunderbolt pilot had a good chance of survival.The pilot of a mortally wounded fighter-bomberoften had to try a crash landing, since the low alti-tudes of ground-attack work frequently eliminatedthe option of bailing out. This was especially trueof the Mustang; Col. Jesse Thompson, who flew D-model Mustangs with the Eighth Air Force’s 55thFighter Group, explained that:


January 14, 1951, Gen.Hoyt S. Vandenberg (left),USAF Chief of Staff, and Lt.Gen. George E.Stratemeyer chat after theformer’s arrival at HanedaAir Base. Vandenberg’sWorld War II experiencemade him well aware of theF–47s capabilities.

THE JUG’SCOMBATLOSS RATEPER SORTIEWAS ONLY0.7 PERCENT,CONSIDER-ABLY BETTERTHAN THEMUSTANG’S1.2 PERCENT

ONEADMIRERCALLED THEF–47 “AN AIRBORNEFOX HOLE”

Once the canopy was jettisoned the air circulationaround the cockpit was such that it tended to trapthe pilot behind the armor plate against the radio.How this came about I have never fully understood,but it did happen. I’m sure level flight bale-outswere accomplished, although I never knew of one,but so far as I was concerned the only certainmethod was from inverted flight.15

The Mustang’s air scoop located under the wingwas a distinct liability during belly landings, since itcould dig into the earth or catch on obstacles. TheF–47 had internal crash skids installed in the bot-tom of the fuselage to help maintain structuralintegrity during wheels-up landings. This feature,along with the Jug’s heavy construction and thecushioning effect provided by the supercharger pip-ing running through the lower fuselage, helped savethe lives of pilots during crash landings. With sur-prising regularity, shaken, but uninjured Thunder-bolt pilots climbed out of their smashed planes afterbellying in through forests, ditches, buildings, andeven stone walls.16 Jacobs declares, “If the P–47’sdesigners had set out to build a high-performanceaircraft for close support, they could hardly havedone better within the existing technology.”17

The F–47 was kept out of the Korean War for avariety of reasons, but the two most significantwere the extreme budget limitations of the post-

war years and the focus on strategic nuclear bomb-ing. After World War II, the Air Force createdStrategic Air Command, Air Defense Command,and Tactical Air Command as part of a postwarreorganization. Air Force leadership announced agoal of 70 groups, with significant funds to be ded-icated to research and development and acquiringnew aircraft. The creation of Tactical Air Com-mand indicated that close air support would con-tinue to be an important component of the AirForce mission. Unfortunately, their plans were fartoo optimistic, with dramatic funding and man-power cuts in the postwar years threatening theAir Force’s ability to meet its mission require-ments. At the same time, the United States’defense strategy focused on strategic nuclearbombing, and so the Air Force concentrated itsbudget on Strategic Air Command.

Many air power strategists argued that allforces had to be evaluated on their ability to con-tribute to a general, nuclear war.18 For instance,Col. William Momyer proposed, in 1948, that theonly missions for fighter aircraft during a nuclearwar were air defense and bomber escort. Heargued that if a nuclear offensive failed it wouldtake up to two years before tactical air powerwould be required to support a conventional war.Momyer’s influential report and the tight budgetled to a further downgrade in the tactical forces.19

Close support training was neglected and the “A”classification for Attack aircraft was dropped in1948. “As a result” notes historian I. B. Holley,“hard-won lessons were lost and had to be acquiredall over again, as the experience in Korea revealedso pointedly.”20

With the Air Force’s post-war fighter aircraftfunctioning almost exclusively as bomber escortsand air defenders, the Mustang was the fighter ofchoice during the transition to an all-jet force.During World War II, the Mustang was the pre-mier long-range bomber escort. The Thunderboltwas limited in the long-range escort role by itsnotorious thirst for fuel, although Republic engi-neers did develop the F–47N, a long-range versionof the Thunderbolt designed to escort B–29s in thePacific. The N-model could fly 800 miles on inter-nal fuel and as much as 2000 miles with externaltanks, but it achieved this with a high fuel bill. TheF–47N was similar to earlier models of the Jug infuel consumption, burning 100 gallons an hourwhen cruising and as much as 300 gallons perhour at full power. The Mustang burned 120 gal-lons per hour at full power and as little as 64 gal-lons per hour at lower settings.21

As for the air defense role, Thunderbolt chroni-cler Warren Bodie acknowledges that the Jug“never was a good interceptor.”22 The F–47 couldnot boast a great rate of climb, though with widepaddle blades and engine power boosted withwater injection, late-model F–47Ds could reach20,000 feet in nine minutes. The F–47N took 14.2minutes to reach 25,000 feet, while the F–51Dclimbed to 30,000 feet in 13 minutes. The F–47Dhad a top speed of 428 miles per hour at 30,000


Col. William W. Momyereventually rose to com-mand Tactical AirCommand from 1968 to1973.

THE F–47WAS KEPTOUT OF THEKOREANWAR [DUE TO] THEEXTREMEBUDGET LIMITATIONSOF THEPOST-WARYEARS ANDTHE FOCUSON STRATEGICNUCLEARBOMBING

feet compared to the F–51D’s 437 miles per hour at25,000 feet. The F–47N was able to achieve animpressive 467 miles per hour, but the F–51H wasfaster still, with a top speed of 487 miles per hour.Thunderbolt pilots in World War II were able todefeat their opponents through teamwork andcareful exploitation of the Jug’s strengths—espe-cially its diving speed, zoom climbing ability, andheavy firepower. Maneuverability was less criticalagainst lumbering bombers but the F–47 could notmatch the F–51’s all-around ability in air-to-airengagements against enemy fighters. An excep-tional Thunderbolt pilot like Robert S. Johnsonmight claim he could beat a Mustang “anytime Iwanted to, and I did, many times,”23 but Jug pilotsoften lost to the more agile Mustangs in mock dog-fights.

Years of lean budgets and the neglect of tacticalair power meant that by 1950 there were simplynot enough Thunderbolts and associated spareparts left to support long-term combat operations.During World War II, 15,683 Thunderbolts wereproduced—more than any other American fighter.Of this total, an estimated one third weredestroyed in combat, a third were scrapped afterthe war, and the remaining third went into stor-age, served with the Air National Guard, or weresold to foreign governments. Late-model F–47Dsand F–47Ns remained in service with a few active-

duty Air Force units until the late 1940s, and theAir National Guard did not retire its lastThunderbolts until 1955. When the Korean Warbegan, there were 1,167 F–47s on hand, but mostof these were in storage—only 265 Thunderboltswere active in ANG units and they were all con-sidered second-line aircraft.24 Additionally, therapid demobilization after World War II affectedthe supply system and the availability of sparesfor the Thunderbolts throughout the post-waryears. For instance, the 23rd Fighter Group sta-tioned on Guam in 1947 had pilots who had notaccumulated the required night time flying hoursbecause their Jugs lacked functioning flightinstruments. The group’s historian noted “theinstallation of these instruments is contemplatedin the near future, depending of course, upon TechSupply.”25 Historian Kenneth P. Werrell was toldthe F–47 was not used in Korea primarily becauseof the lack of spare parts.26

A few suspicious pilots in Korea argued that theAir Force went with the F–51 instead of the F–47simply to save money, since the F–47 was expen-sive to build compared to its lighter stable mate.27

In 1945 dollars, the cost of a single Thunderboltwas $83,000 compared to about $51,000 for anF–51. However, production of both aircraft endedin 1945, and the fact that more Thunderbolts werebuilt during World War II than any other Ame-rican fighter before or since is an acknowledgmentof the Jug’s capabilities. Certainly, it would havecost less to operate an F–47 in Korea than to losean F–51 and its invaluable pilot to ground fire.

In April 1951, Communist ground fire claimed40 Air Force fighter-bombers, including 25 Mus-tangs. As a result, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer,commander of the U.S. Far East Air Forces, sent arequest to Air Force headquarters asking if anyF–47s were available for use in Korea. He noted atremendous increase in small arms fire and flak,but added that “All here know that [the] F–47 cantake it.”28 Stratemeyer explained that the situa-tion was so desperate he would gratefully acceptjust 25 F–47s then serving with the Hawaii AirNational Guard. In response to Stratemeyer’srequest, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chiefof staff, explained that considering the currentavailability of F–47s, the lack of spare parts, andthe problems of introducing another type of fighteraircraft, “we fail to see any appreciable results tobe gained by the substitution.”29 Vandenbergadmitted the F–47 would likely confirm its repu-tation from World War II and prove less vulnerablethan the F–51, but he believed that “the disparitybetween the F–47 and your jet types would bealmost as great as the disparity between the F–51sand jets.”30 He concluded that the problem couldreally only be solved by replacing the Mustangswith jets, adding that exchanging the F–51s forF–47s would require a complete change in thefamiliarization training pilots received prior to fly-ing combat missions in Korea.31 Unfortunately forthe pilots who continued flying missions in theF–51, the jets came slowly—the last Mustangs


Francis “Gabby” Gabreski,third highest scoring ace ofall wars, made 28 of his38.5 victories in theThunderbolt.

STRATE-MEYER ...SENT AREQUEST TOAIR FORCEHEADQUAR-TERS ASKINGIF ANY F–47SWERE AVAILABLEFOR USE INKOREA

were not withdrawn from combat until January22, 1953.

The U.S. Navy’s operations in Korea offer aninteresting perspective into the F–51’s experience,since the Navy and Marines relied heavily on twoF–47-like airplanes to provide carrier-basedground attack throughout the war: the ChanceVought F4U Corsair and the Douglas AD Sky-raider. The Corsair had earned a reputation as anoutstanding ground attacker during World War II.The versatile Skyraider arrived too late to seecombat in World War II, but provided yeoman ser-vice in Korea. The Navy also used jet fighter-bombers, but carrier-based Grumman F9F Pan-

thers did not hit targets in Korea with bombs untilApril 1, 1951. Another Navy jet, the McDonnellF2H Banshee, did not even appear in Korea untilAugust 1951 when the U.S.S. Essex (CVA-9)arrived with its powerful new steam catapults. Asa result, Corsairs alone flew 82 percent of the Navyand Marines’ close support missions during thefirst 10 months of the Korean War.

The F4U and AD experienced heavy losses inKorea—almost all of the 312 Corsairs and 124Skyraiders lost to enemy action fell to ground fire.The Corsair, in spite of its rugged construction andradial engine, had a number of weaknesses,including vulnerable, wing-mounted oil coolers. Tocorrect these deficiencies, Vought produced 110examples of the AU–1, a dedicated ground-attackversion of the Corsair. The AU–1 had 25 pieces ofarmor plating installed and the oil coolers wererelocated; 17 of the 25 pieces of added armor pro-tected the underside of the AU–1’s engine andaccessory section.32 Additional armor was alsoinstalled in the Skyraider. The F–51 Mustang, onthe other hand—a plane without the inherent sur-vivability of the F4U or AD—never received addi-tional armor plating to increase its protection inthe ground attack role.

Yet the Mustang, in spite of its weaknesses as afighter-bomber, still made a fantastic contributionto the Air Force’s effort in Korea. F–51s flew62,607 missions and almost all of these were forclose support of ground forces or for tactical recon-naissance. They fired 183,221 rockets and dropped12,909 tons of bombs and 15,221 tons of napalm.Additionally, Mustangs shot down 19 enemy pro-peller-driven aircraft and destroyed another 28 onthe ground. The Mustang filled a crucial gap in AirForce ground attack capabilities in the days beforethe installation of mid-wing bomb racks on theF–80C and the arrival of the F–84 Thunderjet.Particularly in mid-July 1950, Mustangs operatingclose to the front from the rough airfields at Taeguand Pohang proved invaluable in helping to bluntthe North Korean advance. Brigadier General E. J.Timberlake, Deputy Commander of Fifth AirForce, which was responsible for tactical opera-tions in Korea, stated, “One F–51 adequately sup-ported and fought from Taegu Airfield is equiva-lent to four F–80s based [in Japan].”33 Lt. Gen.Walton H. Walker, Commander of the Eighth


Edgar Schmued, a Germanimmigrant, designed one ofthe best piston-engine airsuperiority fighters ever.

Maj. Murrit H. Davis, com-mander of the 39th FIS,releases a pair of napalmtanks during a low-levelattack on Pyongyang onAugust 14, 1951.

Army, summed up the Army’s sentiments. Duringan interview on November 25, 1950, Walker said “Iwill lay my cards right on the table and state thatif it had not been for the air support we receivedfrom the Fifth Air Force we would not have beenable to stay in Korea.”34 While many F–51s andtheir pilots were lost in Korea, these losses wereactually light considering the tremendous destruc-tion they inflicted on the Communist forces.35 In aparticularly effective close air support strike onOctober 25, 1951, Mustangs killed or woundedabout 200 enemy troops36—more than the totalnumber of F–51 pilots killed in ground-attackoperations during the entire Korean War.

The Thunderbolt would have been a more sur-vivable ground-attack aircraft than the F–51 inKorea, and pilot losses would have been lower inthe Jug. However, the plane did have limitations.The Jug needed a lot of runway to get into the air,which meant the F–47 simply could not have oper-ated from some of Korea’s short, rough runwayswithout reducing weapon or fuel loads. One of theMustang’s greatest assets in Korea was that itcould fly with a heavy weapons load from under-sized dirt runways just a short flight from the front.Fully loaded, the F–47D and F–47N weighed in at19,400 and 20,700 pounds respectively; the rela-tively lightweight F–51D topped the scales at11,600 pounds. Perhaps most significantly, theThunderbolt, like all other piston-engine fighters,was outclassed by the straight-wing jet fighters ofthe late 1940s. The situation became even worse asswept-wing jets entered service. Futrell notes theperformance of the Soviet-built MiG–15 jets that


(Above) Stacks of 5-inchhigh-velocity aerial rockets(HVARs) await loading onthe 67th FBS Mustangs inthe background.

(Right) F–84 Thunderjets.

THE JUGNEEDED ALOT OFRUNWAY TOGET INTOTHE AIR

1. W. A. Jacobs, “The Battle for France, 1944,” in B.Franklin Cooling, Case Studies in the Development ofClose Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of the AirForce Historian, 1990), p. 250.2. On June 11, 1948, the USAF implemented a newduty prefix letter for its fighter aircraft, changing from“P” for Pursuit to “F” for fighter. As a result, the P–47became the F–47. For the sake of continuity, I generallyuse F–47 throughout this essay.3. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force inKorea (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Muse-ums Program, 1991), p. 112.4. Ray Wagner, Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued andthe P–51 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian InstitutionPress, 1990), p. 184.5. Roger A. Freeman, Mustang at War (Garden City:Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1974), 82-83.6. Jennie Ethell Chancey and William R. Forstcher,eds. Hot Shots: An Oral History of the Air Force CombatPilots of the Korean War (New York: Harper Collins,2000), pp. 57, 115-116.7. The R-2800 also powered other prominent WorldWar II combat aircraft, including the Douglas A–26Invader, Grumman F6F Hellcat, Martin B–26 Marauder,Northrop P–61 Black Widow, Curtiss C–46 Commando,and Chance Vought F4U Corsair.8. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., Menand Planes, vol 6 of The Army Air Forces in World War II(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p.216.9. Jerry Scutts, Republic P–47 Thunderbolt: TheOperational Record (Osceola, Wisc.: MBI Pub Co., 1998),p. 70; Frederick A. Johnsen, Republic P–47 Thunderbolt(North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 1999), p. 82.10. Warren M. Bodie, “Thunderbolt,” Wings Special Edi-tion Number 1 (Granada Hills: Sentry Books, Inc.), p. 41.11. Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: AShort Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), pp. 75-76.12. William N. Hess, P–47 Thunderbolt at War (GardenCity. N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 63.13. Frederick A. Johnsen, Republic P–47 Thunderbolt, p.36.14. Colin D. Heaton, “Wolfpack Ace Robert S. Johnson,”Military History, vol 13, number 3, Aug 1996.15. Norman Franks Aircraft Versus Aircraft (New York:Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), p. 139.16. Jeffrey L. Ethell, Wings of War: Fighting World WarII in the Air (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,1994), p. 79.17. Jacobs, “Battle for France,” p. 250.

18. William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), p. 1.19. Philip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life ofa General (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 2000), p. 167.20. I.B. Holley, Jr., “A Retrospect on Close Air Support,”in Cooling, Development of Close Air Support, p. 542.21. Scutts, Operational Record, pp. 38, 130; Robert W.Gruenhagen, Mustang: The Story of the P–51 Fighter(New York: Arco Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), p. 102.22. Warren M. Bodie, Republic’s P–47 Thunderbolt:From Seversky to Victory (Hiawassee: WidewingPublications, 1994), p. 350.23. Jon Guttman, “What Was the Best Fighter?” MilitaryHistory, vol 13, number 3, Aug 1996.24. William T. Y’Blood, ed., The Three Wars of LieutenantGeneral George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museum Pro-gram, 1999), p. 119. For comparison, there were 764 Mus-tangs in use by the Air National Guard and another 794in storage in June 1950 (Futrell, p. 69). Wagner assertsthat 897 F–51 and 38 RF–51s were in the Air Force inven-tory at that time (Wagner, Mustang Designer, p. 181.)25. Johnsen, Republic P–47 Thunderbolt, p. 87.26. Werrel, Archie, p. 76.27. Chancey, Hot Shots, p. 115.28. George E. Stratemeyer to Nathaniel F. Twining, May4, 1951, Y’Blood, Three Wars, pp. 501-502.29. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to George E. Stratemeyer, May10, 1951, Y’Blood, Three Wars, pp. 509-10.30. Ibid, p. 510.31. Ibid.32. Jay Frank Dial “The Chance Vought F4U–4 toF4U–7 Corsair” in Aircraft in Profile 7 (Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 70, 75.33. Futrell, Air Force in Korea, pp. 94-95.34. Wayne Thompson, “The Air War in Korea,” in WingedShield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States AirForce, vol 2 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseum Program, 1997), p.20.35. Futrell, Air Force in Korea, p. 69236. A. Timothy Warnock, ed., The USAF in Korea: AChronology, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Air ForceHistory and Museum Program, 2000), p. 53.37. Futrell, Air Force in Korea, p. 244.38. Wagner, Mustang Designer, p. 184.39. Vandenberg to Stratemeyer, May 10, 1951, Y’Blood,Three Wars, p. 510.40. Futrell, Air Force in Korea, p. 388.41. Ron Dick, American Eagles (Charlottesville, Va.:Howell Press, 1997), p. 270.42. Y’Blood, Three Wars, p. 119.


NOTES

appeared over Korea on November 1, 1951 “ren-dered obsolete every American plane in the FarEast.”37 In air combat with the MiG–15, the Mus-tang had to depend on its maneuverability to sur-vive, since trying to speed or dive away was usuallyfatal.38 Vandenberg, in his response to Stratemey-er’s request for F–47s, said the Thunderbolt wouldbe much less desirable for aerial combat than theMustang in the event of a MiG attack.39 The Jugcould have made an important contribution to theAir Force effort in Korea, but like the Mustang, itwould have been replaced eventually by more sur-vivable jet fighter-bombers.

Although it did not participate in the Korean

War, the Thunderbolt was well represented by itsjet-powered successor, the F–84. The Thunderjetarrived in Korea in December 1950, and quicklybecame the Air Force’s primary fighter-bomber.Shortly after the Thunderjet entered service inKorea, the 27th Wing commander, Col. Ashley B.Packard, asserted that the F–84 was the “bestground-support jet in the theater today.”40 TheF–84 was tough and effective—Vice Air MarshalRon Dick describes it as “a fearsome fighter-bomber and the champion hauler of bombs andnapalm in the Korean War”41 and Stratemeyerpraised it as being “just about as rugged as theF–47 as a ground support airplane.”42 �

THETHUNDER-BOLT WASWELL REPRE-SENTED BYITS JET-POW-ERED SUCCESSOR,THE F–84THUNDERJET


��


John W. Hinds

� he secret dream of every American fighterpilot in combat was to shoot down five ene-my aircraft. Any “throttle bender” accomp-

lishing this feat was assured instant fame, aDistinguished Flying Cross, and some press offi-cer-generated news stories to immortalize hisexploits “in the vastness of the wild blue yonder.”Even today the title “Ace” conjures up specialimages of aerial dogfights between resolute pilotsperforming aerial daring-do far beyond the eyesand ears of mere earthlings. Aviation writer GeneGurney described becoming an ace as, “Five Down

and Glory.” The phrase aptly describes what hap-pened to most of the more than 1,100 officer acesin the two World Wars and Korea.

Among this pantheon of aerial heroes is a loneenlisted gunner who, in the decades following hisexploits, has earned a twenty-three-word footnotein one history and an error-riddled account inanother. History’s oversight of Staff SergeantBenjamin Franklin Warmer III is unfortunate forhe was a Flying Fortress gunner of incredible skill.One memorable day, while on a bomb run at21,000 feet over Sicily, he accomplished what noAmerican fighter pilot has done in any war.During a frenzied fifteen-minute air battle on July5, 1943, Warmer fired 1,200 rounds of carefullyaimed 50-caliber ammunition and bagged seven ofGermany’s best fighter aircraft.

Physical bigness and a cool, reserved—but notunfriendly—personality may have been BenWarmer’s greatest assets as a B–17 waist gunner.Just how big he was is uncertain, but the recordsof his physical exam near the end of his fifty-mis-sion combat tour measured him as six feet fiveinches tall and weighing 215 pounds. He may eas-ily have lost 25 pounds by the end of this six-month stint for he and the officers and airmen ofthe 99th Bomb Group at Navarin Air Base, Alge-ria, subsisted on a diet that guaranteed weightloss: powdered eggs, “Corn Willie,” Spam, and fear.This regimen was periodically relieved by neverfrequent enough “CARE” packages from loved onesat home. Besides his size, Ben Warmer had some-thing else going for him; a seniority which almostmade him an “old man” in the eyes of his twenty-something gunner peers.

In 1933, when he was 19 years old, Warmerreceived an athletic scholarship from theUniversity of California, Berkeley. The scholar-ship was withdrawn almost immediately whenWarmer suffered a disqualifying injury. Slowed,but undeterred, Ben Warmer continued his edu-cation part time at Berkeley, while working fulltime as an industrial plant security guard andboiler fireman. In eight years he completed allof his undergraduate classes for a degree inpolitical science except the mandatory two yearsof foreign language. Among a handful of surviv-ing documents is one in which he lists his ath-letic skills as football, basketball, track, volley-ball, and boxing. He also found time to coachathletics for four years at the San FranciscoYMCA. His skill as a boxer would give him hisfinal victory on V–J Day. In the fall of 1940, hejoined the uniformed division of the Secret


Col. John W. Hinds, USAF (Ret.), was a World War II B–17 pilot who later flew B–29s and B–47s.He is a graduate of Syracuse University and holds an MA from George Washington University. Hewas trained in psychological warfare and intelligence operations and served as a public affairs offi-cer in the Pentagon. In 1966-1967 he was the senior air liaison officer and FAC with a Vietnamesearmy division in III Corps. After reading a footnote mention of Ben Warmer’s war record in MartinCaidin’s book Flying Fortress, Hinds researched Warmer’s military records and interviewed hiswidow in San Diego. Hinds is the author of two naval histories, The Invasion and Conquest of NorthCarolina and The Hunt for the Albemarle.

(Overleaf) Fingers tell thestory—Staff SergeantBenjamin Franklin Warmer,III, third from right, andother gunners of the 99thBomb Group, 15th AirForce give a finger countof the aerial kills they werecredited with on July 5,1943.

(Above) In the hands of an"ace"—Staff Sergeant "BigBen" Warmer, III, com-mands a 65-pound, 50 cal-iber machine gun in thewaist position of a B–17Flying Fortress. Warmerearned the DistinguishedService Cross and theDistinguished Flying crossfor his skill in shootingdown nine enemy aircraftin 1943.

Service in Washington, D.C. but did not like thejob and left after two months.

Sometime in early December 1941, Ben Warmermatriculated at Hastings Law School, in San Fran-cisco. The school granted him an exception to theirentrance requirement of a baccalaureate degreeprobably because of his long academic persever-ance at Berkeley. The fact that his father was aCalifornia Superior Court judge also may haveinclined the admissions committee to ease theentrance rules in his favor.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor endedBen Warmer’s civilian education. Despite the quietanxiety of his wife of four years, he was like tens ofthousands of other young men who wanted toenlist. Unlike most of his peers, who simplystrolled into recruiting offices and enlisted, BenWarmer had trouble finding a service that wouldaccept him. His widow later said that he wasturned down by some military services because hewas too tall.

The Army Air Corps enlisted Warmer on April18, 1942. There is a colorful, but questionable,story that the Air Corps signed him up because ithad athletic gear to fit him. (Warmer’s service his-tory, in part, is uncertain because his official servicefile was among the tens of thousands destroyed inthe 1973 St. Louis Federal Records Center fire, butother records and newspaper clippings survive and

these reveal some of his background.)Warmer passed through the replacement center

at Monterey, California, and took basic training atSheppard Field, Texas. He then went to gunneryturret specialist’s school at Lowry Field, Coloradoin September 1942.

In early 1943, he became the right waist gunneron the ten-man, B–17F crew of 2d Lt. J. H. Drake.The crew was assigned to the 348th BombSquadron of the 99th Bomb Group. Theirs was oneof 35 crews that flew the South Atlantic route toMarrakech, Morocco, in early March 1943.

The crew flew their first combat on a seven-hour mission to Lake Bizerte on May 3. The mis-sion was not a propitious beginning for a fifty-mission combat tour. For openers, they becamelost and, when their Fortress ran out of gas, thecrew parachuted into the blackness of a desertnight. Ben Warmer and his crew were lucky.They bailed out not many miles from their homebase at Navarin, Algeria, and soon made theirway home.

Just a month earlier, on April 3, the crew of theB–24 bomber, Lady Be Good was not so lucky. Thiscrew, operating at night and above a cloud layer ontheir return from a mission to Naples, Italy, over-flew the Libyan coast and parachuted deep intothe Sahara Desert. They perished as they tried towalk north to the seacoast.


Staff Sergeant BenjaminFranklin Warmer, III, chatswith an unidentified ballturret gunner, possibly acrew mate on the sameB–17F.

THE ARMYAIR CORPSENLISTEDWARMER ONAPRIL 18,1942

After the heart thumping “nylon letdown” oftheir first of sixteen missions that followed forWarmer and his crew mates probably seemed likemilk runs, but that pattern changed with missionnumber 18 on July 5. The day happened to be BenWarmer’s seventh wedding anniversary. When theday was just half over, Ben Warmer may have beenwondering if he would be around to celebrate hiseighth year of marriage.

The Fifteenth Air Force mission assignment forthe 99th and two other bomb groups that day wasto carpet bomb Gerbini Aerodrome, Italy, and itssatellites. The headquarters planners hoped thethree-group strike force, that numbered fewerthan 100 aircraft, would knock out the Luftwaffe’slargest fighter base on Sicily. Twenty-eight bom-bers of the 99th Group lifted a total of 37.4 tons of120-pound fragmentation bombs across the Medi-terranean.

The German and Italian Air Force commandersat Gerbini ordered a maximum effort against the

invading bombers. The fighter commanders mayhave suspected that the mission of the Yanks,approaching their well-dispersed fighter complexeast of Catania, was a prelude to an Allied inva-sion of the island

In the adrenaline pumping-minutes just beforehigh noon on July 5, 1943, more than 100 enemyfighters—Me–109s, FW 190s, and Italian Macchi-202s—swarmed to repel the American aerial inva-ders. The Luftwaffe pilots started the battle bypressing home head-on attacks in flights of fromfour to sixteen fighters. Some roared into the bom-ber formation, while flying line abreast. Othersbarreled towards the Fortresses in line astern for-mation. Some of the most daring German pilotspassed completely through the bomber formation.

Within seconds, the Fortresses were envelopedin a swam of twisting, climbing, diving, lead-spit-ting hornets. Fifteen minutes later, when the thinblue air around them was silent again, the 99thBomb Group had lost Tail End Charlie, the threebombers of its rearmost element. But in thatshort, intense fight, the 99th Bomb Group alsoearned a gold-rimmed blue ribbon, the Presiden-tial Unit Citation.

During the babble of crew debriefings back atNavarin Air Base, the 99th’s gunners claimed tohave destroyed sixteen and probably destroyedthree more German fighters. The electrifying newsin the debriefing room was that Ben Warmerclaimed the destruction of seven Luftwaffe air-craft.

Gunners of all three groups claimed a total offorty-five enemy aircraft destroyed. Later a topturret gunner who had bailed out, was capturedand then escaped and rejoined the 99th reportedthat, “The Italians told us we shot down 51 of theirplanes in that fight.”

Throughout World War II, many Air Corps gun-ners, possibly over excited in the heat of battle,submitted exaggerated claims for enemy kills. Theproblem was that most gunners were physicallytoo small to fully master their lethal, but ponder-ous, weapons. It took muscle for a gunner to be infull command of his sixty-five pound 50 calibermachine gun, when the slipstream of a 150-mile-per-hour Flying Fortress was pushing against it.

Had Ben Warmer been the average five-foot,eight-inch, 140-pound gunner of World War II, hisclaims might have been greeted with considerableskepticism. But Staff Sergeant Warmer quite lit-erally lived up to his nickname of “Big Ben.”Although he was not the six feet six and 275-poundman the New York Times described, he was still avery big fellow. (The Stars and Stripes more accu-rately weighed in Warmer at 225 pounds.)

Decades later, aviation writer Martin Caidinwrote in his book, Flying Fortress, “It would beunusual not to experience raised eyebrows overthe confirmed seven kills of this one air battle,especially since earlier in these pages we haveexamined the problems of gunner claims duringthe frenzied action of aerial combat.”

Yet, there is no question that the seven kills


Staff Sergeant BenjaminFranklin Warmer, III, towersover Lt. Gen. Carl A."Tooey" Spaatz who is dec-orating the gunner with theDistinguished Servicecross for accomplishingwhat no U.S. airman did inany war: shooting downseven German Bf 109s on asingle mission.

THE SEVENKILLS ...WERE SUB-JECTED TOTHE MOSTEXHAUSTIVESCRUTINY

claimed by Ben Warmer, on July 5, 1943, were sub-jected to the most exhaustive scrutiny possible.Every pilot and crewman of the accompanyingplanes was questioned. Witnesses were interro-gated again and again to sift out possible errors orduplications. When the intelligence officers com-pleted their work, they were delighted and not alittle in awe of what their meticulous examinationhad revealed. They concluded that Ben Warmerhad indeed ‘’shot down seven enemy fighters dur-ing a single aerial battle.”

Lieutenant Ben Kaplan, the 5th Wing publicrelations officer, rushed to release three badlyposed pictures, whose cut lines announced to theworld Ben Warmer’s gunnery prowess. The cutlines added that, “Sgt. Warmer, former body guardfor Hans Morganthau, U.S. Treasury Secretary,has named his 50 caliber machine gun “Judge” inhonor of his father the Hon. Ben F. Warmer, supe-rior court judge of Ontario, California. The NewYork Times and Stars and Stripes carried detailedstories on Warmer’s victories in their July 6 edi-tions.

On August 27, 1943, which happened to be BenWarmer’s twenty-ninth birthday, Fifteenth Air

Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz deco-rated the tall, blond, green-eyed gunner with theDistinguished Service Cross. Maj. Gen. JimmyDoolittle listened attentively as the citation wasread:

For extraordinary heroism while participating inaerial combat...on a mission to Gerbini Aerodromehe shot down an Me-109 in flames as a formationof thirty enemy fighters attacked his element. A fewminutes later he destroyed two more Me-109’s, forc-ing the pilots to bail out. Again two more attacked.One of these exploded by the accurate fire ofSergeant Warmer’s guns; [sic] the other went downin flames. Replenishing his ammunition afterdestroying five enemy aircraft, Sergeant Warmershot down a sixth victim. Then, as five more Me-109’s attacked, he destroyed his seventh fighter.Such extraordinary heroism and superb marks-manship reflect great credit upon Sergeant Warmerand the Air Corps of the United States Army.

“Tooey” Spaatz, who believed in giving a goodman full recognition for a job well done, designatedSergeant Warmer an ace and a twenty-three-wordfootnote in one history book documented the gen-eral’s order: “7 in one day. Gunners are not nor-mally considered aces, but [he] is so listed becausehe was so designated by his command.”

Warmer completed his fifty-mission combattour on October 10, 1943. He returned to theStates on a freighter and was reunited with hiswife, Helen, who was living in San Francisco.Headquarters Fourth Air Force, in San Francisco,assigned Warmer to a command theatrical produc-tion unit called “Bonds Away!” The group’s missionwas to tour industrial plants promoting increasedwar production and Savings Bond sales. Warmeralso spent time at the Tonopah, Nevada, AdvancedGunnery School as a guest lecturer. Warmer wasgranted a direct commission as a second lieu-tenant on September 30, 1944. He was dischargedon July 2, 1945.

In addition to his Distinguished Service Cross,he also earned a Distinguished Flying Cross, pos-sibly for the two additional enemy fighters he shotdown. He also held the Order of the Purple Heart,twenty Air Medals, a Presidential Unit Citationwith two oak leaf clusters, the Good ConductMedal and the European, African, Middle EastService Medal.

The only combat for which “Big Ben” Warmernever received one word of official or public recog-nition for came during the V-J Day celebration onMarket Street in San Francisco. According to hiswidow, “he was then a civilian. He had to fight hisway out [of the crowd]—the men in uniform weregoing to get the big SOB in civvies.” Helen Warmeradded laconically: “He won that one.”

After the war, Ben Warmer was a successfulbusinessman in southern California. He spent hisretirement years doing what he liked best—deep-sea fishing—where his only combat was with afighting denizen of the deep blue sea. �


Staff Sergeant BenjaminFranklin Warmer, III, theright waist gunner on the10-man B–17F crew of 2dLt. J.H. Drake, 348theBomb Squadron, 99thBomb Group, 15th AirForce.

GUNNERSARE NOTNORMALLYCONSIDEREDACES, BUT[HE] IS SOLISTEDBECAUSE HEWAS SO DESIGNATEDBY HIS COMMAND


��


Kenneth P. Werrell

��

� f the many facets of air power, airlift getsless than its fair share of attention. Onlyrecently has interest shifted away from

solely bomb dropping to other aspects of militaryaviation. Unlike any other country, and fitting forthe world’s lone superpower, today America has alarge and effective organization able to transportheavy cargo and troops great distances. Strategicairlift adds “global reach” to American power andcapabilities. But this has not always been the case.

The history of American airlift can be divided intotwo phases. During the first fifty years or so of avia-tion airlift was low in priority, unappreciated, andthus neglected. During this time, American airmenhad a pecking order that put the delivery of bombsand bullets well above all other functions of airpower. Consequently members of the “combat” arms,had a corner on both the glamour of flying andadvancement. Another factor that degraded airliftwas that in contrast to fighters and bombers thatflew a distinctive air force mission, airlift served as asupport function. The status of airlift can be gaugedfurther by two measures. First, transports were notan assignment of choice for newly graduated pilots.1Second, airlift status was clearly reflected in theequipment of the air lifters. While modern, cuttingedge equipment went to the bomber and fighterunits, the transport command soldiered on withequipment no better than, and increasingly (in themid to late 1950s) inferior to, the airlines. Buttoward the end of that decade, there were signs thatdecision makers wanted to improve America’s airliftcapabilities. This trend began during the secondEisenhower administration, but can be clearly seen(in the airmen’s expressive language, “with rubberon the ramp”) in the 1960s. What follows is a discus-sion of this period of prop airlift, when airlift wasneglected: The Dark Ages.2

Overall, strategic airlift is the easiest for thelayman to understand. Its function is seeminglyidentical to that of commercial air transport.Indeed, aircraft flown by commercial airlines andmilitary airlifters look alike. This similarity makesthe distinction between military and civilian appli-cations more difficult for the layman to determine.Nevertheless, these differences have generatedimportant issues that directly affect strategic air-lift, specifically, who provides the service and theequipment to be used.

A major issue for the Air Force concerned therelationship between strategic and tactical airlift.

In short, would the same organization and thesame aircraft perform both missions? While bothinvolve delivery of troops and military equipment,strategic airlift is conducted at greater range, as inthe case of the U.S., intercontinental range (thou-sands of miles), whereas the tactical airlift missioncan be measured in hundreds of miles. While theseranges sometimes overlap, the means of deliverycan be markedly different. Normally, strategic air-lift operates from long and wide, hard-surfacedrunways accessible to extensive support facilities.On the other hand, tactical airlift may require airdrops of men and equipment into the target area,perhaps under enemy fire, or operations fromshort, rough (or perhaps soft), hastily-preparedairstrips that are close to the front and the enemy.To build aircraft to effectively operate in both envi-ronments is expensive and requires compromisesof other performance aspects, such as payload andspeed. Yet to maintain and operate two differenttypes of aircraft is costly.

Another significant issue stems from the factthat civilian aircraft cannot perform certain mili-tary airlift tasks. Strategic airlift involves morethan moving passengers and cargo between air-ports. Some military equipment exceeds the capac-ity of civilian aircraft due to size (missiles, forexample), weight, or density (tanks). Militarydemands may require operations into airfieldsthat are below commercial standards. Anotherfunction foreign to commercial airlines is the abil-ity to airdrop equipment and personnel, requiringspecialized aircraft, equipment, and training.Some missions may include flying at ranges thatnecessitate aerial refueling, again mandating bothspecial equipment and training. These specializedaircraft are expensive, particularly when pur-chased in small numbers, and therefore are diffi-cult to justify.

There is a great temptation to use commercialaircraft for airlift. Such aircraft have been techni-cally proven and can perform many of the requiredtasks. Lower costs result from the fact that devel-opment expenses have already been paid and tolong production runs. If the transport is currentlyin production, quick delivery is also ensured.

U.S. Airlift

The development of military airlift was slowcompared to that of both military and civilian avi-


Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell graduated from the USAF Academy in 1960 and went on to pilot WB–50s beforeresigning his Air Force commission. He earned his graduate degrees at Duke University and thentaught U.S. and military history at Radford University for twenty-six years. Werrell also lectured at theU.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, the Canadian Forces Staff College, and the USAF’sSquadron Officers’ School; Command and General Staff College, and Air War College. He has pub-lished numerous articles on air power history, including five in this journal as well as frequent bookreviews. Werrell has also written six books on aviation history, the most recent of which were publishedby the Smithsonian Institution Press, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II(1996) and Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam to DesertStorm (2003). Currently he is working on a study of the development of the F–86 and its employmentin the Korean War.

(Overleaf) A collection oftransports; C–47s in front,C–119s in the center, andC–54s in the rear.

AIRLIFT GETSLESS THANITS FAIRSHARE OFATTENTION

MILITARYDEMANDSMAYREQUIREOPERATIONSINTO AIR-FIELDS THATARE BELOWCOMMERCIALSTANDARDS

STRATEGICAIRLIFTADDS“GLOBALREACH” TOAMERICANPOWER ANDCAPABILITIES

ation. The limited performance of early airplanesand the emphasis on fighting activities duringWorld War I meant that little followed the firstpassenger flight in September 1908. While com-mercial air transport grew in the years betweenthe wars, these were difficult times for the militaryairmen, who were hardly able to keep their orga-nization together and barely able to maintain anddevelop their combat skills. Thus, little effort wasdevoted to military airlift.

When World War II came, American militaryairlift was severely limited compared to bomberand fighter aviation. The airmen had neither spe-cial aircraft nor doctrine, and perhaps most telling,no strong institutional or individual spokesman.With the exception of transporting high valueitems, there had been no thought of airliftingtroops or supplies. Not anticipated prior to the war,military airlift arose from the demands of thatgreat conflict.3

American military airlift over long distancesbegan as a result of the sales of U.S. aircraft to theBritish. To ease the shortage of Royal Air Force(RAF) pilots, American airmen began to ferry air-craft to Britain in November 1940. The airmenorganized Air Corps Ferrying Command to handlethis task in May 1941, and in July 1941 estab-lished round-trip passenger service.4

America’s entry into war in December, foundthe airlift unit very small, consisting of only 2,800officers and men, and 20 aircraft. The war ignitedan explosive growth of airlift; by December 1944,

Air Transport Command, as it was then known,expanded one hundred-fold, to over 227,000 offi-cers and men who operated 3,090 aircraft. Theseaircraft were civilian airliners and convertedbombers; of the 697 four-engine Army Air Forces(AAF) transports in December 1944, 347 wereC–54s (the military version of the Douglas DC–4),46 were B–17s, and 301 were B–24s. These aircraftleft much to be desired as military transportsbecause they had limited cargo carrying and load-ing/unloading capabilities. This hodgepodge of air-craft was thought to be “good enough,” a refrainthat dominated the airlift business for decades.5

The demobilization following World War IIgreatly cut U.S. military strength, of course includ-ing airlift. In December 1947, the airlift commandhad shrunk to 60 percent of its four-engine aircraftand 22 percent of the personnel strength of 1945.Congress established the USAF in September1947, and in May 1948 the new Department ofDefense (DoD) formed a joint command for strate-gic airlift, the Military Air Transport Service(MATS). Some have viewed the creation of MATSas a move toward unification, a paper victory forthe new DoD.6 This then was the situation whenthe next major challenge arose.

The Berlin Airlift

In June 1948 the Soviets cut surface trans-portation between Berlin and the west in an effortto force the western Allies out of the city. It seemed


A line of C–47 transportsawait unloading atTempelhof airport duringthe Berlin airlift.

AMERICANMILITARYAIRLIFTOVER LONGDISTANCESBEGAN ... INNOVEMBER1940

THE WARIGNITED ANEXPLOSIVEGROWTH OFAIRLIFT

as if the Allied alternatives were either war or sur-render. Fortunately, there was a middle course: anairlift into the blockaded city in what theAmericans called “Operation Vittles.” There werethree major obstacles to the successful air supplyof the city. First, the task was enormous. Prior tothe blockade, the two million Berliners hadimported 15,500 tons daily. They required an aver-age of 3,800 tons of food and coal per day duringsummer, and 4,500 tons in winter. Second, theweather was bad, very bad. In brief, the worst U.S.flying weather in winter was better than the bestof Germany’s winter weather, and Berlin had theworst weather in Germany. Third, airfields, espe-cially in Berlin, limited the airlift, as did the capa-bilities of the available aircraft. The Soviets—reflecting on these facts and their World War IIexperience with airlift, especially the Germaninability to supply their garrison at Stalingrad—believed a successful airlift operation was impossi-ble.

Almost immediately MATS and the RAF begana modest airlift with the available men andmachines. By 20 July 1948, the Americans had 54C–54s and 105 C–47s in action, with a potentialmaximum daily lift of 1,500 tons, to which theBritish could add 750 tons a day. This was inade-quate.7 The USAF made changes to accomplish themission, most noticeably replacing the twin-engineC–47s with the larger four-engine C–54s by theend of September. Eventually the USAF had asmany as 287 of its 456 C–54s involved in the air-lift, while the British used an average of 140 mili-tary and civilian aircraft.8

The support elements involved in airlift areoften overlooked. Critical to this operation was theground-control approach radar that aided bothcontrol and landing operations. Each aircraft hadone shot at landing in Berlin, and if unsuccessfulon its initial approach, returned to its home basein West Germany. The Americans used three air-fields in Berlin, one built during the crisis. Takeoffprocedures were carefully choreographed, withtaxi and takeoffs timed to the second. The Alliesalso labored to increase the efficiency of loadingand unloading the aircraft, cutting times forunloading by two-thirds and refueling by three-quarters. The airmen developed techniques to getthe most out of their aircraft; for example, “marry-ing” high-volume, light cargo (macaroni for exam-ple) with denser goods. The airlifters used dehy-dration to reduce the daily potato requirementfrom 900 to 180 tons. In addition, the Air Forceremoved equipment from the C–54 to increase itspayload by 2,500 pounds.9

Despite Soviet harassment10 and the infamousGerman winter weather, the Allies increased theairlift’s tempo and payload, so that by April 1949they were delivering an average of 8,000 tons aday. (To make a point, on April 16, 1949, “EasterParade”, the airmen flew 1,398 round trips todeliver 12,941 tons without an accident, landingon average every 63 seconds.) The Soviets endedthe blockade on May 12, 1949. When the Allies offi-

cially halted the airlift at the end of September1949, the 463-day operation had delivered 2.3 mil-lion tons of cargo and 228,000 passengers on277,600 flights to the city. The airlift, however, wasnot without cost; 25 aircraft were destroyed and 31Americans, 39 Britons, and 12 Germans died inthe operation. Nevertheless, the accident rate wasless than the Air Force average.11 Western airpower had waged a peaceful campaign and won.

The Berlin Airlift was a great victory for thewestern Allies and certainly a high point for thenewly created USAF. The airmen demonstratedtheir ability to build and sustain an airlift opera-tion despite many problems. One lesson learnedfrom the exercise was the limitations of Air Forceaircraft. The airlift commander, General WilliamTunner, stated that 68 of the newer, larger C–74scould have done the same job as the more than twohundred smaller C–54s that delivered an averageof 4,500 tons a day to Berlin. Fewer types andnumbers of aircraft would have rendered opera-tions both cheaper, and easier on maintenance andtraffic control.12

The Berlin Airlift succeeded for a number ofreasons. First, and usually unstated, was the loca-tion of Berlin and Allied airfields in West Germanythat made high tempo airlift operations doable.The distances between the onload and offload air-fields were short, and there was a highly developedinfrastructure in place: airfields, communications,repair facilities, and navigation aids. High caliberleadership, very capable, experienced air andground crews, innovative organization and tech-niques were crucial. Engineering and constructionteams that repaired runways and built a new air-field were important. Technology played a lesserrole. The transition from the popular C–47 to themore efficient C–54 was significant. Effectiveradar and radios allowed the operation to functionin poor weather conditions, as did the addition ofapproach lights. Despite its success, the Berlin air-lift did highlight the need for specially designedaircraft and loading equipment to increase effec-tiveness. Such changes would take considerabletime.

MATS began to upgrade its equipment duringthe early 1950s. By December 1953, it had a totalof 470 four-engine transports, mainly the faithful,but aging, C–54 (263). With one exception, all of itsaircraft traced their roots to either commercialtransports or military bombers. The DouglasC–118 was the military version of the DC–6, itselfa development of the DC–4 (C–54). The LockheedC–121 was an improved C–69, the military versionof the Constellation. The Boeing C–97 was thetransport version of the B–29 (really B–50), whichis best known for its service as a Strategic AirCommand (SAC) tanker (KC–97). Although theseaircraft served well, because of their origins, theywere limited for military cargo service. The crux ofthe problem is that people are easier to handlethan military cargo. The transports’ narrow cargodoors and high, off-the-ground fuselage, madeloading and unloading both slow and difficult, as


THE BERLINAIRLIFT SUC-CEEDED FORA NUMBEROF REASONS

THERE WASA HIGHLYDEVELOPEDINFRA-STRUCTUREIN PLACE

well as restricted the size of items that could becarried. In addition, while these aircraft couldcarry numbers of people, they lacked strong floorsto haul dense cargo. In short, effective airliftrequired specialized aircraft designed for militaryoperations. It was not until the early 1950s thatthe USAF acquired an aircraft to better serve itsairlift needs. The Douglas C–124 Globemaster IIfilled that role and became the backbone ofAmerican strategic airlift for a decade.

Airlift Work Horse: The C–124

In contrast to existing airlift aircraft, the C–124was designed from the start as a strategic militarytransport. It traced its design and name to theWorld War II C–74 Globemaster, a development ofthe company’s C–54. The C–74 had two unusualfeatures, one that proved to be a curiosity, theother, useful. Initially, the pilots were seated inseparate bubble canopies that cut drag, but theairman soon discarded this arrangement as it hin-dered crew coordination. The more useful innova-tion was a built-in elevator that facilitated loading.

The AAF did not receive the first C–74 untilOctober 1945. Powered by four of the largest pistonengines of the day (R4360), it could carry almost 28

tons of cargo or 125 passengers, and had a maxi-mum range of 7,250 miles. It was the first aircraftto cross the North Atlantic with more than 100persons, which it did in November 1949. MATSemployed 11 of the 14 built by Douglas, until theplane went out of service in 1956.13

Douglas began development of the C–124 in1947, using the C–74’s wing, engines, and tail. Themajor difference between the two aircraft was toenlarge the fuselage, changing its shape from cir-cular to oblong. To facilitate loading and unload-ing, the Globemaster II adopted the C–74’s eleva-tor hoist and added large, clamshell nose doors anda built-in nose ramp. This aircraft first flew inNovember 1949. The last versions (C–124C)mounted more powerful engines and could carryas much as 38 tons of cargo or as many as 200 pas-sengers; it could lift 13 tons of payload 4,000 miles.In May 1955 Douglas delivered the last of 447C–124s to the USAF.14

The C–124, officially “Globemaster II,” or “BigShaky,” served with a number of Air Force com-mands. In its day it was the best prop-poweredcargo transport in the USAF and the world, butwas much less than what MATS desired. While itcould air drop men, the forward door precludeddropping equipment. And, although it could landat forward airfields, it was difficult to maneuver onthe ground and required a lot of runway to get air-borne, at least 5,000 feet. The C–124 was slow(cruising at 180 kts), and lacked pressurization,which limited it to operations at lower altitudes.The aircraft’s main cargo deck was more thaneight feet above the ground that hindered loadingand unloading. The giant aircraft was alsorestricted in range when carrying its maximumload. For example, on the West Coast-Hawaii runof 2,200 nm, its heaviest load was 25 tons, consid-erably less than the aircraft’s advertised 38-tonmaximum. The first C–124 went on the MATSbooks in 1950 and its numbers peaked at 319 in1957. In the late 1950s, Tactical Air Command(TAC) turned over three wings of C–124s to MATS,centralizing the USAF’s heavy lift fleet. Just as the


(Right) The C–124Globemaster II.

(Below) The C–74Globemaster.

THE C–124,OFFICIALLY“GLOBE-MASTER II,”OR “BIGSHAKY,” ...WAS THEBEST PROP-POWEREDCARGOTRANSPORTIN THE USAFAND THEWORLD, BUTWAS MUCHLESS THANWHAT MATSDESIRED

C–54 was the Air Force’s strategic airlift mainstayduring World War II and into the mid-1950s, theC–124 served in that role well into the 1960s. TheUSAF retired the aircraft from duty with the reg-ular Air Force in 1970. It had already entered theAir Force Reserve inventory in 1961, and contin-ued to serve there for many years.15

The Air Force used the C–124 during the KoreanWar. For example in 1952, when F-86 drop tankswere in short supply, the Douglas transport flew thatcritical item from the factory to Korea. However, theaircraft did have problems. During the periodNovember 1952 through April 1953, the USAFrestricted its load to only 18 tons of cargo (it aver-aged only 24,300 pounds) because its great weighttore up Korean airfields. Nevertheless this wasabout twice the payload of the C–54. The aircraftalso suffered difficulties with fuel leaks, propellers,and generators. In the mid-1960s, the Air Forcefound structural problems with the wing.Although arelatively safe aircraft, it wrote a tragic page in thehistory books in a fiery takeoff crash at Tachikawa,Japan, in June 1953. A C–124 lost power on takeoff(due to a generator failure that caused an enginefire), crashed, burned, and killed all 129 aboard.Thiswas the first aircraft accident killing more than 100people, and the largest number killed in a singleaccident until December 1960.16

Turboprop Success: C–130

In the early 1950s, MATS flew only piston-pow-ered, propeller aircraft; in contrast to USAF com-bat commands that were about to introduce a thirdgeneration jet fighter (F–100, 1953) and a secondgeneration strategic jet bomber (B–52, 1955) intotheir inventories. In 1953 RAND investigatedabout 1,000 future aircraft designs and concludedthat one powered by a large turboprop would pro-vide lower operating costs in the performanceenvelope of greatest interest to MATS: 1,500 to3,500-nm range, 12.5 to 75-ton payload, and 130 to490-kt speed. But in contrast to the Soviets, whosuccessfully employed a number of turboprop pow-ered bombers and transports, the USAF had

mixed results with the turboprop aircraft it stud-ied and the two it put into service. With this excep-tion, the Air Force skipped the turboprop stage,jumping from piston to jet-powered aircraft.17

The Lockheed C–130 Hercules is perhaps themost successful transport of all time, eclipsingeven the legendary C–47 (DC–3) Skytrain. Thealmost unparalleled success of the C–130 alreadyspans over four decades and continues to this day.It should be noted that the C–130 is not only inservice in great numbers almost a half centuryafter its maiden flight, but it remains in first lineservice.

In February 1951 the USAF issued a Requestfor Proposal for an aircraft to carry 90 paratroop-ers 2,000 miles or 30,000 pounds of cargo for ashorter distance. It also called for the ability tooperate from short, unprepared airstrips and to flyas slow as 125 kts in order to airdrop men andequipment. The Air Force awarded the contract toLockheed, and in August 1954 the C–130 made itsinitial flight. Powered by four turboprop engines, itwas designed around a boxy fuselage that had arear ramp to ease loading and unloading, as wellas airdrops. Lockheed built the high-wingedHercules low to the ground by mounting the maingear in pods on the fuselage, which eased loadingand unloading. It could carry a maximum payloadof 40,000 pounds. In brief, the C–130 was an unat-tractive, yet very efficient and functional aircraft.18

MATS, which became Military Airlift Command(MAC) in 1966, had a “love-hate” relationship withthe C–130, or perhaps better put, an “on-again/off-again” relationship. MATS considered the “A” and“B” models unsatisfactory due to their short range.The command got its first C–130s in 1958, but itsinventory did not exceed 16 aircraft until 1962, and then in late 1963 it got the longer range C-130E. Thenumber of MATS C–130s grew to a peak of 164 in1966, but by 1968 the command had lost all of these.

Lockheed proposed the long-range “E” versionto the USAF in 1960, undoubtedly seeing an easysale from the support evident in Congress. Thisversion increased internal fuel from 5,050 to 6,960gallons, and changed the two 450-gallon externalwing tanks to two 1,360-gallon tanks. The C–130Ehad more powerful engines that boosted the maxi-mum takeoff weight from 124,000 to 175,000pounds. Thus it could carry 16 tons non-stop fromthe U.S. to France in just over ten hours.19

The C–130 returned to the Command in 1974,when the USAF integrated strategic and tacticalairlift and numbered approximately 270 until1980, then their numbers trailed off to under 220in 1990. In 1994 the USAF carried 677 C–130s onits books for the regular Air Force, Air NationalGuard, and Air Force Reserve. Its overall success isevident in that the Lockheed transport served, oris serving in 64 countries.20

Turboprop Problems: XC–132 and C–133

The Air Force did not do as well with other tur-boprop aircraft. They began work on the giant


The C–130 Hercules.

THELOCKHEEDC–130HERCULES ISPERHAPSTHE MOSTSUCCESSFULTRANSPORTOF ALL TIME

IN AUGUST1954 THEC–130 MADEITS INITIALFLIGHT

IN 1994 THEUSAF CARRIED 677C–130S ONITS BOOKS

XC–132 in 1951, and by December 1952 hadawarded a contract to Douglas for an aircraftintended to serve both as a cargo transport and asa tanker. The Air Force canceled the tanker versionby mid-1956; severe difficulties with both theengines and the aircraft’s size led the Air Force toterminate the entire project in 1957. Some wouldlater criticize this decision, but in view of the prob-lems with the smaller C–133, such criticisms havelittle merit.21

The C–133 Cargomaster was another very largeturboprop transport built by Douglas, althoughsmaller and lighter than the C–132. From afar theC–130 and C–133 looked similar with their four,turboprop engines, high mounted straight wing,main landing gear pods on the large circular fuse-lage, and rear loading ramp. But the Douglas air-craft was much larger than the C–130, proved tohave many more problems, and in the end wasmuch less successful. Despite their similar appear-ance, concurrent development, and the popularbelief of their relationship, there was no directconnection between the two.

Rather, the C–133 evolved from the C–124. InJuly 1950 Douglas contracted to install turbopropengines on the C–124 (YC–124B). This effort failedbecause it proved impractical to meet thatSeptember 1951 USAF requirement to pressurizethe transport’s fuselage. Thus, the Air Force lookedfurther. Douglas studied an aircraft with a circularcross section fuselage and extended wingspan, adesign it formalized in January 1952. The AirForce liked the aircraft that featured pressuriza-tion of the flight and cargo decks, a high wing,truck-bed height cargo deck (50 inches from theground), and a rear-loading ramp. In February1953, the USAF elected to go with that design itdesignated C–133A.22

Douglas rolled out the first Cargomaster inJanuary 1956, and the aircraft made its first flightthat April. Initial tests showed the need for alarger dorsal fin. After the first seven aircraft werebuilt, Douglas changed the shape of the rear fuse-lage from a tail cone to a “flat beaver tail.” Latermodel C–133As also had more powerful engines

that permitted a gross weight increase from255,000 pounds to 282,000 pounds. To transportthe Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile(ICBM), the USAF added rear clamshell doors,starting with the thirty-third production aircraft,and increased the size of the ramp and the dooropening, which lengthened the aircraft’s usablecargo hold by three feet. Douglas built 35C–133As.23

The company delivered the first C–133B toMATS in March 1960. The “B” model varied onlyslightly from the “A.” Bigger engines enabled theCargomaster to carry a 36-ton payload at an aver-age speed of 277 kts out to a radius of 1,500 nm; ortransport 25.5 tons, 3,500 nm. The Air Forcebought fifteen of the “B” models, with the lastdelivered in November 1961.24

The Cargomaster seemed to be what the AirForce wanted and needed, that is, a new andfaster aircraft capable of lifting heavy and largecargo. But two aspects about the C–133 indicatethat the Air Force still was not completelyfocused on the airlift mission. First, the aircrafthad to be modified to carry ICBMs, although sup-port of SAC was the Air Force’s primary missionin the 1950s. Second, although the C–133 couldcarry a heavy load, due to the structure of theplane’s floor, it was unable to transport a denseload (tanks, for example).25 The aircraft had otherproblems as well.

When the giant aircraft entered the MATSinventory in 1957 it was the most modern aircraftand had the highest speed and load carrying per-formance of any transport in the Command. Clearlyit promised much. But within two years MATS lead-ers realized they faced more than the normal“teething” problems for a new aircraft, and saw theC–133 as a “problem bird.”26 Even before the firstaircraft reached operational units in August 1957,the Air Force knew it had problems. A report fromthe Air Force Flight Test Center in February 1957bluntly stated that the aircraft “has several seriousdeficiencies which must be corrected before the air-craft becomes operational.”27 The evaluatorsreported, “the aircraft does not meet the contractorguaranteed values of takeoff, maximum speed,range, and service ceilings, primarily because ofhigh drag and high specific fuel consumption.”28 Toremedy these problems Douglas made a number ofchanges. In an effort to reduce drag, the manufac-turer fitted a leading-edge filet at the wing root.They also increased the size of the dorsal vertical finto improve directional control.29

Compared to the USAF flying safety record dur-ing the period 1957 to 1964, the C–133s recordwas, in the words of the aircraft’s historian, “rela-tively good.” “Relatively” is the key word, as the AirForce lost ten Cargomasters along with 55 crew-men between August 1957 and August 1971. Moreto the point, the C–133’s accident rate was higherthan any other USAF four-engine cargo aircraft.Even more disturbing was that the airmen neverdetermined the cause of seven of these accidents.30

The Air Force suspected stalls were the cause of


The C–133 Cargomaster.

THE [C–133]WAS MUCHLARGERTHAN THEC–130,PROVED TOHAVE MANYMORE PROBLEMS,AND IN THEEND WASMUCH LESS SUCCESSFUL

THE C–133’SACCIDENTRATE WASHIGHER THANANY OTHERUSAF FOUR-ENGINECARGO AIRCRAFT

the unexplained losses. The C–133 had marginalto poor stall characteristics that gave no warning,so stall recovery was considered unlikely. The situ-ation was exacerbated by the accumulation of ice,false autopilot signals, and pitot-static system defi-ciencies as well as inaccurate weight and balancemeasurements.31 Late in the production run,Douglas installed a Giannivi stall-warning devicethat shook the control stick when it sensed the air-craft was approaching a stall. This system provedunsatisfactory in service as the pilots frequentlydeactivated the system due to its many false indi-cations. The engineers developed two other sys-tems to deal with the problem that the Air Forcesuccessfully flight tested in December 1966. Yetthe USAF did not install these devices into theC–133 fleet until early 1970, shortly before the air-craft was phased out of the inventory.32

The C–133 appeared to have endless problems.Some attributed many of these to its design, point-ing out that it was developed in the early 1950swhen turboprops were very new. Also cited was theaircraft’s large size. Vibration, corrosion, fatigue,as well as poor workmanship adversely affectedthe airframe. Component failures and shortage ofparts created an excessive maintenance workloadthat made operating the aircraft very expensive.To note that reliability was lacking is an under-statement.33 The engines and propellers were amajor source of difficulty, with the engines consid-ered the most troublesome system of the aircraft.In late 1961 these failures led to flight restrictions,which MATS believed would “render the aircrafteverything from undependable to practically use-less.”34 These restrictions periodically limited theaircraft to stateside missions at reduced power.The shortage of spare engines made mattersworse. The Air Force grounded the Cargomaster ona number of occasions, three times before the air-craft completed its first year of service. In sum, theAir Force was unable to master the technology of ahigh-power, turboprop engine and its correspond-ing propeller system and field a reliable powerplant.35

One major issue that the C–133 highlightedand became increasingly importance to the AirForce was the aircraft’s life expectancy. Lifeexpectancy was not a consideration early in thehistory of aviation because the rapid advance oftechnology and high attrition rates limited thelifespan of combat aircraft. Airlift aircraft, how-ever, were less affected by technology and attritionas shown by the longevity of the C–47 and C–54.And, as the Air Force drove down the accident rate,aircraft life spans became more important. TheC–133 was designed with a 10,000-hour antici-pated life span for the aircraft structure.36 Toreach that goal, designers faced new problems.Compared to existing MATS aircraft, the gianttransport flew at much higher speeds and alti-tudes, and operated at much heavier weights. Acomplicating factor was the vibrations andstresses created by the turboprops. Initially, theAir Force planned to retire the C–133s when they

reached their optimum design life of 15,000 hours,at about the same time as its new heavy lifter, thejet-powered C–5A, entered service. Nonetheless, asa result of a series of tests, the Air Force concludedthat the aircraft’s life could be extended to 19,000flight hours with four stages of modifications start-ing at 12,000 hours. In 1968, the Air Force decidedto implement the program, which began in fiscalyear 1970. The C–133 became more importantwhen the C–5s arrived late and in fewer numbersthan originally planned. Fearing delays of theC–5A, MATS wanted to extend the life of at least20 Cargomasters to 25,000 hours, but wererebuffed by higher authority. The Air Force deacti-vated the first C–133 squadron in January 1971,and retired the last aircraft in August.37

On balance, the C–133 was a disappointment tothe Air Force. “This aircraft had never fulfilled itspotential,” wrote a USAF historian midway in theaircraft’s service, “because throughout its opera-tional history it had been plagued with numerousserious deficiencies.”38 The aircraft had a high acci-dent rate for its type and encountered considerablestructural and engine problems. Nevertheless, fora time it was the only Air Force aircraft that couldlift the huge USAF ICBMs. Unlike the C–130, theC–133 was soon and mercifully forgotten. Its rolewould be taken over by the C–5, an aircraft thatwould be even more controversial than theCargomaster, although in the end far more suc-cessful.

New and Improved Loading and UnloadingSystem: 463L

Although aircraft dominate the airlift story, thereare other important technologies that require dis-cussion. Ground handling equipment is a crucialitem, albeit unglamorous, complex, and difficult. Forjust as most airline passengers believe the drive tothe airport, the walk to and through the terminal,and boarding seem to take as much time (certainlymore effort) than the flight itself, this is even truerfor aircraft cargo. From the beginning of air trans-port until the early 1960s, cargo loading and unload-ing changed little; that is, it consisted mainly of man-ually handling various sized containers. An excep-tion to this generalization were high-lift loadersmounted on the back of a flat bed 2.5-ton truck insome areas at the end of World War II, and portableroller conveyors used with C–74 and C–97 trans-ports during the Berlin Airlift.39 While mostobservers would look to higher performance aircraftto improve airlift capabilities, expediting loadingand unloading was a primary factor in cutting turn-around time. Improved ground handling methodswould speed the handling of individual aircraft andmore quickly clear terminals, although newer air-craft carried increasingly heavier weights and morediverse cargoes.

A 1961 Air Force Systems Command studyclearly described the problem. It observed that theAir Force used a conglomeration of non-standardequipment, overly heavy packing, and individually


THE C–133APPEAREDTO HAVEENDLESSPROBLEMS

THE AIRCRAFTHAD A HIGHACCIDENTRATE ANDENCOUN-TERED CON-SIDERABLESTRUCTURALAND ENGINEPROBLEMS

handled each item numerous times. “The presentsystem,” it noted, “requires more personnel andheavy equipment than necessary and consumesunnecessary resources and potential aircraft fly-ing time.”40 Prior to the appearance of the C–130,Air Force transport aircraft were built first for fly-ing, with essentially no attention given to cargohandling. Even within the Air Force there were dif-ferences, for example MATS and TAC had theirown standards for the required aisle space, thatwould affect the width of the fuselage and thus thesize of containers.41

Turboprop transports brought with them amodern loading and unloading system. Lockheedand Douglas, builders of the C–130 and C–133,came up with similar systems consisting of large,pre-loaded plywood pallets that moved on con-veyor rollers into the aircraft and across its floor,and then were restrained by overhead cargo nets.Encouraged by these developments, in 1957 theAir Force issued a set of requirements for a mod-ern cargo handling system and in May 1959awarded a contract to Douglas for “MaterialsHandling Support System 463L.” It went wellbeyond merely loading and unloading the aircraft,and extended from the source to the user. The AirForce expected the system to use maximum mech-anization and include movement through the ter-minal and control of the cargo.42

The key to the system was the use of pre-loadedpallets. There is no indication that the USAF con-sidered the alternative of containerization duringthese studies done in the late 1950s and early1960s. It was not until 1971 that a military reportrecommended a DoD containerization effort.Containers could be loaded faster, more tightly,and offered greater protection against both the ele-ments and theft than pallets. However, theyweighed and cost more. The ISU-90 containerweighed 1,800 pounds and cost $7,500, while acomparable pallet weighed 400 pounds and cost$1,300. Perhaps most important, the pallet systemwas very flexible and offered ease of handling andlow storage requirements.43

The 463L project was more than just hardware;it was an entire system of cargo handling. At theprocessing terminal, cargo would be weighed,automatically sorted, and routed along conveyorsto an area where the pieces would be placed on pal-lets. The pallets were constructed on aluminumand wood frames with two standard bases (88 by108 inches and 88 by 54 inches) with the larger onerated to carry 10,000 pounds and the smaller 5,000pounds. There were indentations in the frames fortying down nylon web cargo nets to maintain theintegrity of the pallet load, and to secure the loadto the aircraft structure. There were also threesizes of insulated food containers, holding 600 to3,000 pounds, that fit onto the pallets. The airmenused a family of ground equipment, including25,000 and 40,000-pound capacity wheeled cargoloaders, pallet trailers, 6,000 and 10,000-poundcapacity forklifts, and tracked, rough-terrain load-ers to move the pallets.44

By fall 1961, the Air Force had successfullytested the 463L system on its Atlantic routes. Thefollowing year the USAF began to fit both theC–124 and C–133 with the roller system. As theresult of further successful tests that concluded inMarch 1962 on Pacific runs, MATS began to inte-grate the new system into its major terminals atTachikawa Air Base (Japan) and Travis Air ForceBase (California). At Travis, the system that cost$60 million, could process 60 tons of cargo an hour.45

The system worked well in general; however, suc-cess varied from aircraft to aircraft. There were nomajor complaints concerning the C–130 or C–135,although the 135’s floor was ten feet from theground and it had an inconvenient, short side-cargoloading door.46 The 463L system reduced the Boeingaircraft’s loading time from the previous 4-6 hoursto 20-30 minutes. The loading time for a C–124 wascut from 4 hours to 1. There were problems with theC–133, however, as it took 20 man-hours to installthe roller system and another 10 to remove it.Nevertheless, the system reduced the time to load36 tons of cargo aboard the Cargomaster from asmuch as 8 hours, down to 30 minutes.47 Under-standably the overall assessment of the system wasvery positive, “The efficiency that this program pro-vides in many facets of cargo handling and move-ment has surpassed the expectations of the mostoptimistic proponents of the system.”48

As might be expected, there were problems andcomplaints. One was that pallets and tie-downstraps were lost during the course of the flights.This tendency was foreseen from the start,although a 1959 recommendation that these itemsbe regarded as expendable did not sit well with theAir Force.49 Another problem was that the 463Lsystem was a total system, from start to finish.This was made clear in a USAF airlift operation inNovember 1962, when four C–135s ferried 1,000tons of arms and munitions to India during its bor-der fight with China. The C–135 and 463L per-formed well, each aircraft requiring only 30 min-utes to load in Germany and then just over 11hours of flying time to reach India. However, asIndia lacked the necessary 463L unloading equip-ment, each pallet had to be dismantled inside theaircraft and the cargo individually removed, whichgreatly increased unloading time and effort untilthe requisite 463L equipment arrived. In addition,the Navy criticized the system’s lack of flexibilityand responsiveness.50

Overall, the 463L system has been very suc-cessful. The objective of turning an aircraft aroundin 30 minutes on the ground was approached, ifnot achieved. Certainly loading and unloadingtimes were dramatically cut, probably from aboutsix hours to 30 or even 20 minutes. With simulta-neous refueling, the ambitious half-hour turn-around goal was within reach.51

A New Day for USAF Strategic Airlift

As the 1950s closed, MATS continued to be aunit lacking both official priority and modern air-


THE 463LPROJECTWAS MORETHAN JUSTHARDWARE;IT WAS ANENTIRE SYSTEM OFCARGO HANDLING

THE AIRMENUSED A FAMILY OFGROUNDEQUIPMENT,INCLUDING ...WHEELEDCARGOLOADERS,PALLETTRAILERS,[AND] FORK-LIFTS

craft. With the exception of the handful of turbo-props, 16 C–130s (that MATS found wanting) and44 C–133s (that caused great problems), the com-mand flew piston-powered aircraft that had beenin the inventory a decade earlier. In December1960 MATS fielded 567 four-engine piston-pow-ered aircraft, mostly C–124s (299), along with 75C–54s, 123 C–118s, and 70 C–121s.52 This con-trasted with the B–52 bombers and Century seriesfighters of the combat commands, as well as theeven more modern aircraft scheduled to come intothe inventory. While the increased American capa-bility in limited war and air mobility would belargely credited to the Kennedy administration,the impetus to improve airlift had already begun.

During the late 1950s, the airline industry tookaim at MATS, which, along with increasing pres-sure from the Army, helped focus Congress on thesubject of airlift. Beginning in 1956, the size andfunction of MATS came under scrutiny, and mostof this attention was critical. One set of hearings inJanuary-February 1958, under the chairmanshipof Congressman Chet Holifield, recommended thatthe command concentrate on special military mis-sions (outsize cargo and unusual missions), whilethe airlines flew the passenger and routine cargomissions. From the MATS perspective, the one pos-itive recommendation was the committee’s call formodernization. Later Senate hearings, headed bySenator A. S. Monroney, echoed the sentiments ofthe Holifield Committee. A special subcommitteeof the House Committee on Armed Services andunder the gavel of L. Mendel Rivers chided the AirForce for its slow modernization of MATS with tur-boprop and jet powered aircraft. Meanwhile, therewere other calls from Congress for MATS to mod-ernize, specifically in the 1959 appropriations billpassed in August 1958.53

In 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower directedthe DoD to study airlift aircraft. The resultingreport submitted in February 1960 upheld the

industry view, namely that MATS should empha-size the “hard core” military requirements, use theCivil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) for augmentation,and focus on developing the wartime airlift capa-bilities of CRAF. It also proposed a joint, civil-mili-tary project to develop a long-range jet cargo trans-port. Another special study by the executivebranch recommended in April 1960 that MATSmaintain an inventory of 332 transport aircraft,that would consist of 50 C–133s, 50 swing tail jets(bought “off-the-shelf”), and 232 specially designedcargo jets.54

At the same time, the military held a major air-lift exercise almost certainly, not by coincidence.During the March 1960 BIG SLAM maneuver, theUSAF lifted over 21,000 Army troops and 11,000tons of equipment to Puerto Rico from 14 U.S.bases and back. The 15-day exercise was superfi-cially impressive, as it consisted of large numbers,dramatic pictures, and no major mishaps. But, infact the operation demonstrated that the U.S. hadlittle capability beyond moving troops and theirpersonal weapons. Only one light tank was lifted,and some of the few vehicles moved were shippedwith empty gas tanks to reduce weight. Littleartillery was included and only limited amounts ofammunition. Additionally, the operation took halfof the MATS fleet and involved a year of planning.As intended by the airlift supporters, the inade-quacies of the effort were not lost on either thepress or the politicians. Planes carried both toobserve the exercise, including 352 correspon-dents.55 Clearly BIG SLAM demonstrated the lim-ited capabilities of American airlift in 1960.

Congress picked up the challenge. ChairmanRivers noted there was no support for the modern-ization of MATS within DoD and even open hostil-ity to it in some quarters outside the defenseestablishment. Unlike the bulk of the previouscongressional committees, the Rivers Committeesupported the military airlifters, subtly criticizingthe airline industry’s position. More important, thecommittee made a number of key recommenda-tions that changed MATS inventory. It recom-mended the development of an uncompromised,cargo-only jet aircraft that might be used by theairlines. Then, to deal with the interim situation, itcalled for the purchase of 100 “off-the-shelf” air-craft: 50 jets (“swing-tail” C–135s) and 50 turbo-props (C–130Es). Finally, the committee recom-mended that CRAF be upgraded with long-range,cargo jet aircraft.56 Unlike most congressionalreports, this one had a direct and positive impact.The 1961 Appropriation Act of July 1960 set aside$311 million to develop, build, buy, and modify air-lift aircraft, with the only reservation that none ofthese aircraft be used for scheduled passenger ser-vice. Later, Congress was even more specific, allo-cating $200 million for interim modernization and$50 million for the development of the new air-craft.57

John F. Kennedy’s election, in November 1960,further aided strategic airlift. The young Presidenthad campaigned on a military policy that moved


Secretary of DefenseRobert S. MacNamara.

THE ...REPORT SUBMITTEDIN FEBRUARY1960 UPHELDTHE INDUS-TRY VIEW, ...THAT MATSSHOULDEMPHASIZETHE “HARDCORE” MILITARYREQUIRE-MENTS

THE RIVERSCOMMITTEESUPPORTEDTHE MILITARYAIRLIFTERS

AT THE SAMETIME, THEMILITARYHELD AMAJOR AIRLIFTEXERCISE

AUL indicates Air University Library; HRA HistoricalResearch Agency, both located at Maxwell Air ForceBase, Alabama.

1. This is the author’s personal observation of USAFflying training in the early 1960s. Some sought flyingtraining assignments to build up jet flying time. Onlyhelicopters were less regarded than transports.

2. For a discussion of the next period that saw thetransformation of U.S. airlift to jet aircraft, see the chap-ter on airlift in the author’s Chasing the Silver Bullet,(Washington and London: Smithsonian Books, 2003.)3. Robert Owen, “Creating Global Airlift in the UnitedStates Air Force, 1945-1977: The Relationship of Power,Doctrine and Policy,” Ph.D. dissertation, DukeUniversity, 1992, pp. 13-14.4. Wesley Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air


NOTES

away from a nuclear-only strategy (“MassiveRetaliation”) toward one that increased limitedwar capabilities, a policy called “FlexibleResponse.” Kennedy enunciated this policy in hisFebruary 1961 State of the Union address thaturged prompt action to increase airlift capabilityto “assure the ability of our conventional forces torespond with discrimination and speed to anyproblems at any spot on the globe at a moment’snotice.”58 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamararesponded within days, issuing orders to buy

C–135s with deliveries to begin that June and thelong-range C–130Es to be delivered betweenAugust 1962 and March 1963.59 A new era in air-lift was about to begin.

U.S. airlift emerged from the Dark Ages in theearly 1960s as it received higher priority and jetaircraft. First it acquired the C–135, which servedonly a short period as an interim transport. Thenit got jet-propelled aircraft specifically designedfor strategic military airlift: the C–141 and theC–5. Both have served long and well. These werelater joined by the KC–10 and C–17.

Clearly strategic airlift suffered from low prior-ity and neglect during the first half of the twenti-eth century. This came from a narrow and oftenparochial view of air power. During this periodcivilian aircraft and converted bombers were seenas being “good enough” for airlift. Certainly thisattitude and action constrained the airlifters.Another problem was that the Air Force gave lit-tle attention to the ground support equipmentthat could speed and simplify loading and unload-ing. Since then the USAF has gotten its acttogether. Today, the USAF has in service first classairlift aircraft manned by well-trained crews,combined with effective ground support, and cou-pled with aerial refueling that provides the U.S.with strategic airlift capability far superior to anyother country in the world. This enables Americato project its power, anywhere on the globe. �

(Right) The C–5.

(Below) The C–141.

KENNEDYURGEDPROMPTACTION TOINCREASEAIRLIFTCAPABILITY

Forces in World War II: vol.7, Services around the World(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), p. 8; AlfredGoldberg, ed., A History of the United States Air Force:1907-1957 (Princeton, N.J.: Nostrand, 1957), p. 53;Roland Hinds, “The Development of Strategic Airlift forthe Armed Forces of the United States, 1941-1965,” Jul1968, p. 1 AUL 358.44 A298d; Betty Kennedy, ed.,Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History ofMilitary Airlift Command: 1941-1991 (Scott AFB, Il.:Hqs, Military Airlift Command, 1991), p. 12.5. Craven and Cate, vol.7, pp. 5,1 2; Hinds,“Development of Strategic Airlift,” pp. 2-3; Owen,“Creating Global Airlift,” pp. 15, 22-23; Kennedy,Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 276-79.6. Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 68, 276-78; Owen, “Creating Global Airlift,” pp. 59, 62.7. Goldberg, History USAF, p. 235; Daniel Harrington,The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!: A History of theBerlin Airlift (Ramstein AB, Germany: USAFE Office ofHistory, 1998), pp. 18, 76; John Harrington, “UnitedStates Strategic Doctrine and the Evolution of MilitaryAirlift,” MS thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1988, p.51; Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, p. 69;Charles Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 1988), p. 177; William Tunner, Over theHump (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History),1985), p. 114.8. To facilitate the precision required, the transports’airspeed indicators were calibrated in flight with a stan-dardized “chase” aircraft. Roger Miller, To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (Washington, D.C.: AirForce History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 32, 86,89, 92.9. Coal was the principal cargo, making up 68 percentof airlift tonnage. It was important not only for heat, butto generate electricity and keep the factories functioning.The airmen attempted novel means of delivery, includinglow-level drops of coal sacks out of B–29s, but this provedimpractical as the landing impact reduced the coal tocoal dust. Kenneth Werrell, “Who Fears?”: The 301st inWar and Peace, 1942-1979 (Dallas, Tex.: Taylor, 1991), p.130; Bruce Callander, “The Evolution of Air Mobility,” AirForce Magazine (Feb 1998), p. 71; Goldberg, HistoryUSAF, pp. 235-41; Harrington, “The Air Force CanDeliver Anything!” pp. 78,98; Kennedy, Anything,Anywhere, Anytime, p. 71; Miller, Airlift Doctrine, p. 180;Owen, “Creating Global Airlift,” p. 70; Tunner, Over theHump, pp. 198, 202.10. The Allies noted 733 incidents of harassment includ-ing 173 cases of buzzing or close flying, 54 incidents offlak, 14 of air-to-air fire, and 82 examples of radio inter-ference. Roger Launius, “The Berlin Airlift: ConstructiveAir Power,” Air Power History (Spring 1989), 18. A laterstudy concluded that only half (360) of these incidentswere harassment. There were also four documentedcases of sabotage. Harrington, The Air Force Can DeliverAnything, 103. In his memoirs, Tunner claims thatSoviet jamming of the navigational aids would not havestopped the airlift. Tunner, Over the Hump, pp. 115, 173-74, 214.11. U.S. aircraft delivered 77 percent of the tonnage andlost 17 aircraft and 31 killed. There were seventy majorU.S. accidents on the operation. In all, the U.S. used afleet of 441 aircraft (309 C–54s) and the British another101. Stewart Powell, “They Deliver,” Air Force Magazine(Aug 1991), 53; Goldberg, History USAF, p. 241; Launius,“The Berlin Airlift,” pp. 16-17, 19; Kennedy, Anything,Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 69-72; Tunner, Over the Hump, p.218.12. Goldberg, History USAF, p. 241; Launius, “TheBerlin Airlift,” p. 20. To move 135,000 tons per monthinto Berlin required 178 C–54s, 18,800 trips, and 14 mil-lion gallons of gas. The same job could have been done by68 C–74s on 5,400 trips consuming 7 million gallons of

gas. Owen, “Creating Global Airlift,” p. 72.13. Rene Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since1920, vol. 1 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 1988), pp.392-93; Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 278,280; Gordon Swanborough and Peter Bowers, U.S.Military Aircraft since 1908 (London: Putnam, 1971), p.557.14. Owen, “Creating Global Airlift,” p. 85; Swanboroughand Bowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, pp. 270-71.15. Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 278, 280,282; Miller, Airlift Doctrine, pp. 210, 212; Owen,“Creating Global Airlift,” pp. 85-86, 167; Swanboroughand Bowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, p. 270.16. This unfortunate record stood until two commercialaircraft collided over Brooklyn, N.Y., in December 1960,killing 134. The record for fatalities on a single aircraftaccident was broken in June 1962, when 130 died in atakeoff crash of a Super Constellation at Paris. JohnTaylor, et. al., eds., Air Facts and Feats (N.Y.: TwoContinents, 1973), pp. 264-65; Robert F. Futrell, TheUnited States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (N.Y.: Duell,Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 388, 526, 529-30;Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, vol. 1, p. 437;Military Airlift Command History, Jan-Jun 1967, vol. 12,pp. 221, 223-31 HRA K300.01.17. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, pp. 221, 223: Swanboroughand Bowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, pp. 122, 435.18. Rene Francillon, Lockheed Aircraft since 1913(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 354-55.19. Francillon, Lockheed Aircraft, p. 359; Kennedy,Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, p. 282; Military AirTransport Service History, Jan-Jun 1961, vol. 1, p. 242HRA K300.01; MATS History, Jul-Dec 1963, vol. 1, p. 32.20. Robert Dorr, “Lockheed C–130 Hercules,” World AirPower Journal (Fall 1994), p.52; Kennedy, Anything,Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 282-84.21. With a usable cargo volume of 12,400 cubic feet, theC–132 would have been larger than both the C–133(10,600 cubic feet) and the C–124 (6,300 cubic feet).“Standard Aircraft Characteristics, XC–132, 1 Dec1953,” pp. 1, 3; “Standard Aircraft Characteristics,XC–132, 28 Jun 1954,” pp. 1, 3 both HRA K243.01 (1949-56), vol. 4; Gen. Howell Estes, “The National StrategicAirlift Dilemma,” final draft HRA 168.7132-474;Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, vol. 1, p. 509;Owen, “Creating Global Airlift,” pp. 122-23; C. R.Sturdevant, “Transport Aircraft Characteristics andPerformance,” RAND RM-1685, Apr 1956, pp. 13, 24HRA K146.003-205.22. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, p. 221; “Standard AircraftCharacteristics, YC–133, 12 Oct 1953,” pp. 2-3 HRAK243.01 1949-56, vol. 4; Richard Maltais, “C–133Cargomaster, 1953-1971,” Warner Robbins HistoricalStudy No. 26, 1973, pp. 4-8 HRA K205.14-41. The turbo-prop-powered YC–124B first flew in February 1954 andlost out to the KC–97 as SAC’s aerial tanker. It went onto serve as an engine test bed for the C–133. Francillon,McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, vol. 1, pp. 438-39;Swanborough and Bowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, p. 271.23. The C–133B was modified to carry the ICBMs. TheAtlas was such a tight fit that it required a surveyor’stransit to position the aluminum rails inside the aircraftwith a tolerance of 1/16 of an inch. The C–133 also car-ried other missiles as well as space capsules for NASA.Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, vol. 1, p. 510;Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 10, 45-48; Swanborough andBowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, pp. 272-73.24. Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, vol. 1, p.510; MAC History, Jul 1968-Jun 1969, vol. 1, p. 138;Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 10-12, 16; Swanborough andBowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, p. 273.25. Harrington, “U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” p. 70; Owen,“Creating Global Airlift,” pp. 66, 122, 133.


26. MATS History, Jan-Jun 1960, vol. 1, p. 7; MATSHistory, Jan-Jun 1961, vol. 1, p. 259; MATS History, Jul-Dec 1961, vol. 1, p. 134; MAC History, Jul 1968-Jun 1969,vol. 1, p. 138.27. Vincent Capasso and Jones Seigler, “C–133A PhaseII Flight Evaluation,” Feb 1957, in “The History of theAir Force Flight Test Center, Jan-Jun 1957,” vol. 7 HRAK286.69-33.28. The C–133A exceeded the estimates for both specificfuel consumption (8 percent) and drag (more than 20percent). Little wonder then that the aircraft failed tomeet the high speed, altitude, and takeoff distance guar-antees and perhaps most tellingly, could only fly 3,075nm with the specific load of 46,700 pounds not the 3,500nm called for by the contract. Capasso and Seigler,“C–133A Flight Evaluation,” pp. i, 19, 25.29. Capasso and Seigler, “C–133A Flight Evaluation,” p.19; Swanborough and Bowers, U.S. Military Aircraft, p.272.30. The USAF accident rate for this period was 7.1major accidents per 100,000 hours flying time. TheC–133 had a rate of 2.7, the C–124 1.2, the C/KC–1351.4, the KC–97 1.6, and the C-130 1.9. Between 1965 andthe end of 1970, five more C–133s were lost and the air-craft’s accident rate varied between a low of 1.5 per100,000 flying hours (1967) to a high of 3.8 (1970).Maltais, “C-133,” pp. 49, 63, 268-70.31. Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 79-82.32. Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 177, 180-81. The last unknowncase of a C–133 loss was in January 1965 (accident num-ber 8). Ironically the last two losses were not due tostalls, but instead attributed to prop failure (number 9,April 1967) and structural failure (number 10, February1970). Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 56-58.33. MATS History, Jan-Jun 1961, vol. 1, pp. 258-60;MATS History, Jul-Dec 1961, vol. 1, p. 138; MATSHistory, Jul 1962-Jun 1963, vol. 1, pp. 216, 246-47.34. MATS History, Jul-Dec 1961, vol. 1, pp. 136, 140;MAC History, Jul 1965-Jun 1966, vol. 1, p. 249.35. Estes, “National Strategic Airlift Dilemma”; MATSHistory, Jul-Dec 1961, vol. 1, p. 137; MATS History, Jan-Jun 1962, vol. 1, pp. 68-70; MATS History, Jul 1962-Jun1963, vol. 1, p. 246; MAC History, Jan-Jun 1967, vol. 12,p. 199.36. Maltais, “C–133,” p.84.37. MAC History, Jul-Dec 1966, vol.1, p. 137; MACHistory, Jul 1969-Jun 1970, vol. 1, p. 102; MAC History,FY 1971, vol. 1, p.140; Maltais, “C–133,” pp. 89, 91, 93,198-203, 208-209; In 1973 a humanitarian organizationbought four C–133As and intended to outfit them as fly-ing hospitals. But the FAA withheld certification due tothe fatigue problem. One C–133B, however, was used inthe mid-1970s to airlift equipment for the building of thetrans-Alaska pipeline. Francillon, McDonnell DouglasAircraft, vol. 1, p. 512.38. MAC History, Jul 1965-Jun 1966, vol. 1, p. 248.39. Robert Henderson, “Ground Handling of the C–5A inthe Objective Area,” Air Command and Staff College, Jun1967, p. 9 AUL MU35582-7 H4971g; Miller, AirliftDoctrine, p. 180.40. Joseph Konopik and Jack Young, “The AutomatedMaterials Handling Support System (463L): A ModernCargo System for the Military Air Transport Service,”U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, MS, 1965, p. 12 AUL358.44 K82a.41. TAC wanted enough room to allow a man wearing aparachute to pass by, while MATS required a minimumof 20 inches. “Minutes of the 463L Support SystemPhasing Group Meeting Held at Long Beach (Douglas)California 3-4 November 1959,” Nov 17, 1959, p. 2 AUL358.8 M425m.42. Henderson, “Ground Handling C–5A,” 10-11,41;William Howe, “The 463L System: Current Concept ofOperations, Problems and Its Future Application to the

C–5A,” Air Command and Staff School, Jun 1968, pp. 10-11, 41 AUL MU35582-7 H858f; Konopik and Young,“Automated Materials,” p. 13.43. Containers could be loaded in half to a quarter of thetime as a pallet and required fewer trained personnel.One estimate is that it took one to two people 45 to 60minutes to load a container, while two to four peoplerequired one to two hours to build a full pallet. DaveMohr, et. al., “Air Cargo Containerization Study,” AirForce Logistics Management Center, Dec 1991, pp. 3-11AUL MU43192-5#LT912089.44. Air Force Systems Command, Aeronautical Division,“463L Materials Handling Equipment,” Apr 1967, pp. 18,21, 27, 32, 39-42 HRA K243.0113-5; Howe, “463LSystem,” pp. 10-11; Konopik and Young, “AutomatedMaterials,” pp. 16, 18-19; Billie Mills, “System 463L andForward Area Resupply,” Air Command and Staff School,Jun 1965, pp. 24, 27-28 AUL MU35582-7 M657s.45. AFSC, “463L,” p. 6; Konopik and Young, “AutomatedMaterials,” pp. 24, 27; MATS History, Jul-Dec 1961, vol.1, p. 122.46. The Stratolifter’s door was only marginally narrowerthan comparable cargo aircraft (C–124, C–130E, C–133,C–141, CL-44, DC–8F, and 707-320C), 9.7 feet comparedto the next narrowest at 10 feet (C–130E) and the widestat 11.8 (C–133). But its door was only 6.5 feet high com-pared with the next shortest military door at 9 feet(C–130E and C–141), whereas the C–124 was 11.6 feethigh and the C–133, 12.5 feet high. Konopik and Young,“Automated Materials,” p. 22a.47. MATS History, Jul-Dec 1961, vol. 1, pp. 123, 131n;MATS History, Jan-Jun 1962, vol. 1, pp. 139, 139n;MATS History, Jul 1962-Jun 1963, vol. 1, p. 278; MATSHistory, Jan-Jun 1964, vol. 1, 144; Ninth Air ForceHistory, Jul-Dec 1963, vol. 2, appendix 7 HRA K533.01-3.48. Konopik and Young, “Automated Materials,” p. 33.49. MATS History, Jul 1962-Jun 1963, vol. 1, p. 277;“Minutes of 463L Meeting,” p. 23.50. MATS History, Jul-Dec 1963, vol. 1, pp. 63-65;Konopik and Young, “Automated Materials,” pp. 13, 27,34-35, 39.51. Konopik and Young, “Automated Materials,” p. 34;MATS History, Jul-Dec 1963, vol. 1, p. 63.52. Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 277-78,280.53. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, pp. 251-53; Kennedy,Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, pp. 95-96, 105.54. Hinds, “Development of Strategic Airlift,” p. 16;Kennedy, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, p. 98; Miller,Airlift Doctrine, pp. 272, 274-75. The “swing-tail” jet wasto be a civilian airliner built with a tail that could beswung open to allow easier loading and unloading. It wasmentioned at several congressional hearings in 1959 and1960. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, pp. 248, 262, 271.55. The number of troops reported lifted varies, from alow of 11,000 in the MATS History, to 21,000 in theCassidy article and Tunner memoir, and 29,000 in bothKennedy and Miller. Cassidy, “MAC’s Moment of Truth,”Air Force Magazine (Sep 1986), 116, 119; Harrington,“U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” p. 79; Kennedy, Anything,Anywhere, Anytime, p. 102; MATS History, Jul 1964-Jun1965, vol. 1, p. 118; Miller, Airlift Doctrine, pp. 265-66;Owen, “Creating Strategic Airlift,” pp. 240-41, 244;Tunner, Over the Hump, pp. 308, 310, 313.56. In response to the congressional initiative, in May1960 MATS planned to procure 332 new aircraft over afive-year period and (correctly) assumed that the interimaircraft would be 50 C–130s and 50 C–135s. MATSHistory, Jan-Jun 1960, vol. 1, pp. 5-7, 81; Miller, AirliftDoctrine, p. 271; Owen, “Creating Strategic Airlift,” p. 180.57. MATS History, Jan-Jun 1960, vol. 1, pp. 13-14.58. MATS History, Jan-Jun 1961, vol. 1, p. 243.59. Ibid., pp. 243-44.



Towards a Pla


David G. Styles

ace in History

� pril 18 th was an important day in avia-tion history, for on that day in 1942,seventy-nine courageous young men fol-

lowed Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle into the prospectof either a place in the annals of military aviationhistory or oblivion. Without knowing which ofthose two options would be the outcome of theirfolly, all seventy-nine volunteered to follow one ofAmerica’s greatest pioneering aviators into a mis-sion that would not only guarantee them as nearimmortality as an aviator can get, but literallyturn the tide of war in the Pacific theater of opera-tions and start the road to victory in World War II.How did they achieve this place in history? By tak-ing sixteen North American B–25B twin-enginedbombers off the flight deck of an aircraft carrier forthe first time in history. The carrier was the 1941-commissioned USS Hornet, a Yorktown Class ves-sel of 20,000 tons displacement. A number ofstrategic targets in five cities of Japan: Kobe,Nagoya, Tokyo, Yokohama and Yokosuka werebombed. The Doolittle Raid was, in its own way,every bit as audacious as the Japanese attack onPearl Harbor which provoked it less than fourmonths earlier. Of particular significance to thisevent is the effect it had on British military moraleand the fact that, for the British as well as for theAmericans, victory really did “start here.”

April 18, 2003 was another important day inhistory, for that was the day upon which the sixty-first anniversary of that courageous raid on Japantook place. Why should a sixty-first anniversaryhave any particular significance when the mile-stone sixty was just a year ago? Well, this one has

a great significance because it heralds a major stepforward in the development of the new JimmyDoolittle Air and Space Museum at Travis AirForce Base, California, as well as marking theAnniversary of the Doolittle Raid.The Travis AirMuseum is already the largest military aviationmuseum in California and has the distinction ofbeing located in the late General Doolittle’s own“back yard”, for he was born in Alameda, not fiftymiles from Travis. What’s more, the successor toCV-8 USS Hornet (CV-8 was sunk in the Battle ofSanta Cruz in October 1942), CV-12 USS Hornet,which was launched in 1943 in honor of CV-8, istoday moored at Pier 3 at Alameda Point.

This year’s Raiders’ Reunion was a week packedwith activity for the nine Raiders who were able toturn up for the very full itinerary and for all themembers of the public who turned out, especiallyon the air day on Thursday. Each day, fromTuesday onwards, the Raiders gave time to auto-graphing items people bought from the memora-bilia store in the Hilton Garden Inn at Fairfield.On Wednesday morning, there was the very mov-ing goblet ceremony, in which the attending sur-vivors held a roll-call of all those who took part inthe raid, then drank a toast to those absent. Thiswas something set up back in the fifties, when theyacquired a set of silver goblets, all in a fitted caseand now kept at the USAF Academy at ColoradoSprings, Colorado. Each goblet has one of theeighty crew members’ names engraved on it – onone side upright and on the other inverted. As aRaider passes on, his goblet is inverted in the casewith the name showing. Then came a parade


Dr. David Styles has written numerous articles on early aviation subjects and published the story of208 Squadron RAF, entitled: All the Eights. Styles is also a vice-president of the Naval Eight/208Squadron Association and he edits and publishes its newsletter. He provided expert research andediting for the Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts book, Enola Gay: Mission to Hiroshima(Dalton Watson Fine Books, 1995). A picture cameo in that book was devoted to the Doolittle Raidbecause of the importance it had in the editor's mind to the whole morale of the United States andthus, the outcome of the war. He has won many awards for his work, including five premier(Gold/Moto) Awards from the International Automotive Media Conference, ten Silver Medals, andfour Bronze for his automotive history books, articles and illustrations, as well as a Cugnot Awardand an Award of Distinction from the Society of Automotive Historians. The Vintage Motor CycleClub of Great Britain has twice awarded him its Bob Currie Memorial Award for his editorial workon its 14,000 circulation monthly journal. He is the only person ever to have won that award twice.Styles was a media representative at the 60th Anniversary Raiders Reunion last year and wasappointed International Correspondent to the 2003 Reunion at Fairfield in California."

(Below left) The pictureshows “Sunday Punch”,one of the three B–25s thatfinally made it to Nut TreeAirport.

(Below right) “MarthaJean” is taxiing in to herallotted space on the ramp.

(Overleaf) The two aircraftfly out from Nut Tree, eachcarrying four or five payingpassengers. Most of themoney went to the JimmyDoolittle Air and SpaceMuseum fund and inthat respect, the air daywas a huge success. Thethird aircraft in the groupwas “Executive Sweet” –all three B–25Js. (All pho-tos courtesy of the author.)

THEDOOLITTLERAID WAS, ...EVERY BITAS AUDACIOUSAS THEJAPANESEATTACK ONPEARLHARBOR

FOR THEBRITISH ASWELL AS FOR THEAMERICANS,VICTORYREALLY DID“STARTHERE”

through downtown Fairfield, ending up at cityhall, while a flypast took place overhead of manyWorld War II aircraft, which turned up for thepageant. Included in that parade was retired Col.John Doolittle, son of our late hero, as well as threeof the four surviving members who returned fromthe Japanese prison in Shanghai – the Rev. Jacobde Shazer, Col. Robert “Bob” Hite, and Col. ChaseNeilsen.

As if the Raiders hadn’t had enough excitementand activity for one day, there was then a wine andcheese party held on Wednesday afternoon onTravis AFB, in the museum. This gave many localdignitaries an opportunity to express their supportfor the development of the new museum and allthose who attended a chance to see the museum asit is and its aircraft exhibits standing outside.Today, the museum is housed in the old base com-missary, which is bursting at the seams with a fas-cinating collection of artifacts of military aviationfrom its very early days—but all the bigger aircraftstand outside and face Northern California’s some-what variable weather—they range from a Beech-craft C–45, to a Boeing B–29 and even one oftoday’s giants of aviation, the B–52.

A barbecue and fly-in took place on ThursdayApril 17th at the Nut Tree Airport, Vacaville’s localairport—and this was what the public came to see,nearly 20,000 of them. Sadly, only three B–25s

made it to the event – Martha Jean, ExecutiveSweet, and Sunday Punch. Martha Jean had flownin on the preceding Tuesday to bring the gobletsfrom the Air Force Academy. Considering the factthat this day was emphatically not an air show, thedisplay of airplanes flying in front of the crowdwas pretty spectacular. Nut Tree Airport is one ofthose typical mid-Twenties fields, where thereseems to be very little red tape (though the controlis actually as strict as any commercial airport). Ithouses several vintage aircraft, including a beauti-ful ex-Royal Navy Stinson Reliant and, as one ofthe pictures shows, as you walk into one of thehangars, you could easily be walking back seventyyears in as many steps. Confronting you is a mod-ern hangar with two Boeing PT–17s inside, aModel A Ford and a period bicycle.

There was a photo-shoot with the attendingRaiders and Martha Jean, then to add to theatmosphere, three Ryan PT–19s flew in, togetherwith a Curtiss C–46 Commando, three AT–6/SNJTexans(Harvards to the Brits), a number of P–51Mustangs, a T–28 and other fun machines, like aPitts S2a and a number of those odd little one-offsportsters and racers that you only find onAmerican rural airfields. The B–25s also ran a pas-senger experience series of flights for those braveenough to risk their ear drums. It was Raider BobHite who remarked how noisy the B–25 was,reminding me that passengers would needearplugs (I remembered how good that advice wasfrom last year after a ride in the back section ofPanchito)—he went on to comment that if younotice, almost all former B–25 crewmen wearhearing aids, so be warned! Sadly, before the end of


(Above) Two pictures ofthe Goblet Ceremonywhich takes place at everyDoolittle Reunion. Aboveon the left Frank Kappelertakes his goblet from thecase, watched by TomGriffin and Chase Neilsen,while at top Bob Hite,Nolan Herndon and BillBower toast those Raidersno longer with us.

(Right above) SteveStopher, a Vietnam veteranand travelling exhibitor ofmilitaria, presented thispicture to the Museum incommemoration of theRaiders’ Reunion atFairfield/Travis/Nut TreeAirport.

(Right) The entrance to theexisting Museum, with aCessna 195 guarding it.


On this page we have, atthe top, “Martha Jean”flying out from Nut TreeAirport, then “SundayPunch” starting finals toland. Below that we havethe Raiders and a group ofre-enactors in front of“Martha Jean.”

the day, we were down to only one B–25 flying, buteverybody went home happy. On Thursdayevening, there was the “Dine With the RaidersEvening,” attended by over 300 people before theday finally came to its close.

Friday was a quieter day, leading up to thefinale, the gala dinner – a fundraiser and tribute tothe Doolittle Raiders sixty-one years to the dayafter their heroic mission. The guest of honor wasfilm star Cliff Robertson, himself an aviator ofsome note and the former owner of a Spitfire 9 andtwo Tiger Moths. He admitted he never flew theSpitfire, but he did have fun with the “Moths” andhas the distinction of having flown a glider to26,000 feet (an experience he felt more notablethan winning an Oscar or an Emmy!). It was atremendous evening, with 350 people paying $300a seat for the privilege of dining with the DoolittleRaiders—the bulk of the money going to theDoolittle Museum project. One of the sponsors ofthe event, Koerner Rombauer, a Napa Valley wine-grower and member of the Museum Trust Board,stood up just before the end and held an auctionwith a difference—there was nothing to buy andthe bids started high working down—the proceedsagain going to the Doolittle Museum Foundation.Starting at $10,000 and coming down to $100 abid, he raised something over $70,000 in about fiveminutes! A pretty good finale.

So what was this Doolittle Raid that makes areunion so significant? Well, it was conceived inresponse to President Roosevelt’s insistence thatAmerica had to retaliate swiftly to the “ date thatwill live in infamy” and strike at the heart ofJapan. It was the brainchild of a submariner,Captain Francis Low, to whom the concept of flyinga squadron of twin-engined bombers from the deckof an aircraft carrier was “straight out of the comicbooks.” Low had seen Army bombers flying over-head near to a naval air station in Norfolk,Virginia, where there were carrier decks markedout on the runways for Navy pilots to practice car-rier landings on the safety of dry land and wherethe occasional over-run would not end in disaster.He put the two together in his mind and came upwith this hare–brained idea. Captain Low was per-sonal staff officer to the crusty Admiral King, whotook the idea, and Low, to General Henry H“Hap”Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces. Arnoldhad just the man for the job – Jimmy Doolittle, fly-

ing ace of the Twenties and Thirties, multiplespeed and distance record holder and possessed ofthe qualities of leadership to persuade a squadronof men to follow him into to such an unknown pro-ject.

Doolittle had a doctorate in aeronautical engi-neering from MIT and was an Army test pilot, sohe knew the needs of the task that faced him andthe airplane that would do the job—North Ameri-can’s B–25, a new type in service which he believedcould have the range, take-off distance and load-carrying capacity for the task—as yet not clearlydefined. Within the ninety days between him beinggiven the job and taking his crews to Alameda,near San Francisco, the plan had to be hatchedand several tests carried out in the utmost secrecy.Firstly, how far would they have to fly in total?Next, could a B–25 actually get off the deck of acarrier? And finally, could they get enough payloadinto the aircraft to make such a raid worth-while?The admirals, generals and politiciansarrived at an optimum flying distance and a rea-sonably safe proximity to Japan within which thecarrier might sail. Doolittle and a team of engi-neers got down to establishing the real prospectsof making such a lunatic plan work technically.They established that a B–25 could fly off the deckof the Hornet, by putting it to the test in calmwaters off the Virginia coast. Between them all,they came up with the conclusion that fifteen or soB–25s could sail to within 400 miles of theJapanese coast, take off for their targets andrecover to an airfield in Chuchow, China. The clos-est location would have been Vladivostok in theSoviet Union, but Josef Stalin would have none ofit and so, with a lot of persuasive pressure, Gen.Chiang Kai Shek agreed to the use of Chuchow. Sothe mission was on.

Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle assembled his menand machines at Columbia Army Airfield, recrui-ted a team of volunteers to take twenty-four air-craft down to Eglin Field, in Florida, for whatamounted to just three weeks training. Theyworked long and hard to get their aircraft off theground in just five hundred feet. “Do it in five hun-dred feet and you’ll make it—do it in five hundredand one and you’re dead!” said Doolittle. They didit and after extensive work on low-level flying overwater at speeds that yielded the maximum fueleconomy, thus range, it was time to pick just six-teen aircraft and twenty-two crews. On March 23,1942, Jimmy Doolittle received a signal from Gen.Henry H. “Hap” Arnold with the simple message:“Get on your horse!.” Just over a week later, theHornet slipped her moorings and sailed out,underthe Golden Gate Bridge, in typical San Franciscoearly morning fog. The plan was to sail to within400 miles of Japan and take off, hit their targetsand fly on to Chuchow. But they were spotted by apicket boat 650 miles from the Japanese coast.Amazingly, after taking off 250 miles earlier thanplanned, of the eighty men who left the flight deckof the Hornet, sixty nine escaped capture by theJapanese. Not one aircraft was shot down in the


(Near right) The author inthe back seat of the SNJ(T–6 “Texan” to the Army)from which the air-to-airshots were taken.

[THE]DOOLITTLERAID WASCONCEIVEDIN RESPONSETOPRESIDENTROOSEVELT’SINSISTENCETHATAMERICAHAD TORETALIATESWIFTLY

DOOLITTLERECEIVED ASIGNALFROM ...“HAP”ARNOLDWITH THESIMPLE MES-SAGE: “GETON YOURHORSE!”

raid and though some took damage, all flew out ofJapanese air space intact. That raid was hugelysignificant to both the American and British peo-ples,turning the tide of the War in the Pacific.Significantly, only six weeks after the DoolittleRaid, the Americans won the Battle of Midway andthe procession to victory over Japan had begun.

The great significance of this raid to the Britishpeople has probably never been fully realized, notleast by the British people themselves, for it hasrarely been a component of taught history aboutBritain in the Far East in World War Two. At the

time the raid became public knowledge, it was cov-ered by the British press, but certainly not giventhe importance it actually had to the British wareffort. It has to be remembered that the day afterPearl Harbor, December 8, 1941, Hong Kong wastaken by the Japanese. Hong Kong was a signifi-cant center of trade and banking for the wholeBritish trading machine in the Far East and itsloss was a further blow to the British government,which was already coping with military losses inEurope. Things were not going well in Scandi-navia, convoys were being mauled in the Atlantic,and the British forces were being driven out ofGreece, to say nothing of Rashid Ali’s uprising inIraq. But it would get worse for the British beforeit got better.

The Japanese were now part of the Axis alliancewith Germany and Italy and they had a strongfoothold in China, from which they took HongKong and then, soon afterwards, Malaya. Theimpregnable garrison of Singapore, which had astring of heavy guns pointing out to sea to thesouth, was surely unassailable! Not to the Japa-nese, who took the simple expedient of coming inthrough the back door, hopping across fromMalaya, in which direction the guns of Singaporecould do them no harm. Worse, those guns weretaken intact, such was the speed of the invasionand the unpreparedness of the British defenders,so they now provided the invaders with a defensefrom the sea. The Japanese left nothing to chance,for they were not possessed of the complacency ofthose they had conquered and they had a hugemilitary machine running all the way back intomainland China. For those able to receive thenews, then,when it came, about the Doolittle Raid,it was like manna from Heaven. Just like AdmiralYamamoto after Pearl Harbor, the British forcesstill fighting believed that the Japanese had awo-ken a sleeping giant, and this raid on Tokyo andneighboring cities was a demonstration of the firststirrings from that giant’s slumber. While theBritish had a much larger presence in the Far Eastbefore World War Two, the American war machinewould far outsize the British military presence bythe time it came to its end.

The British Empire had already actually goneby the time the Japanese rise in the Far Eastbegan, for the Commonwealth had taken its placeat the behest of South Africa’s leader, Jan Smuts.But the Japanese were very cautious in their stud-ies of the British Imperial war machine, beingunsure of its true potential as their tenuous expan-sion into China took place. But when they weresatisfied that the British were not invincible, theyset about proving that to their own huge advan-tage. It has been said that the Japanese them-selves were surprised at the ease with which theydisplaced the mighty British from Hong Kong,Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. But that surprisewas nothing compared with the utter shock andgreat loss of face the Japanese generals and admi-rals suffered as Jimmy Doolittle’s sixteen B–25swrought havoc over those five cities of Japan. It


changed the whole strategy of the Japanese war, asit marked the road to victory. Consolidated by thechain of success from Midway to Okinawa, victorywas now assured for the Americans, who took own-ership (and more casualties than anyone but the

Japanese) of the Pacific War. The surrender ofAugust 15, 1945 was precipitated by the events ofApril 18, 1942.

From this reunion just past comes the inspira-tion to create, in the Jimmy Doolittle Air andSpace Museum, the most significant aviationmuseum outside the United States Air Force’s ownMuseum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base inOhio. It will cost around $55 million to build andthe money is to be raised entirely by private sub-scription. It will be a true milestone in the cele-bration of military aviation history. Travis AirForce Base and its museum personnel havealready demonstrated their commitment to theirtask by staging what one Doolittle Raiderdescribed to me as: “the best reunion we’ve everhad since 1945!” Some testament—to somemuseum! �


(Opposite page) Moreshots from the Air Day atNut Tree Airport inVacaville. At the top is“Sunday Punch” and“Martha Jean” on the ramptogether. The second shotshows “Sunday Punch” onfinals just before we lefther to land in safety. Nextis “Executive Sweet”, thethird aircraft to turn out tothe Doolittle Reunion.

(Right) At the Gala Dinner,Cliff Robertson chattingwith “Rosie the Riveter.”

On the right is a cleardemonstration that theatmosphere of Nut TreeAirport was exactly rightfor this event. It is oneof the many vintage aircraftto be seen there – a RoyalNavy Stinson Reliant (“theonly aircraft the Brits sentback after WW2 under theLend-Lease plan.”)

(Right) The logo designedfor the 61 st DoolittleRaiders’ Reunion. It showsa B–25, the image of GenJimmy Doolittle, theGolden Gate Bridge, thetrack of the USS Hornet asit left for its mission andthe badge of the Raiders.Quite a tribute.

(Far right) The art of theJelly Belly Company, whichcreated this image ofJimmy Doolittle in jellybeans. The original isabout five feet square andis to be placed in theDoolittle Air and SpaceMuseum.

Richard C. Lineberger

I remember this mission especially well; every-thing was different, so to say. It started when theMPs [Military Police] came to our enlisted men’sQuonset hut and roll-called us. The six of us werethe crew of Capt. Harrison M. Harp, Jr. We were allthere and they took us to the big briefing Quonset.Five minutes later our crew officers arrived:Captain Harp, the aircraft commander; JesseHendrickson, the bombardier; and a third officer, acaptain, who was the radar operator. While wewaited, we were joined by our regular co-pilot,Flight Officer Bob Hollinger, and a first lieutenant,who turned out to be a navigator. Our regular nav-igator and radar operator, both second lieutenants,were not there. Hendrickson had flown a tour inEurope in B–17s.

After the briefing, the MPs drove us to theplane. As usual, we looked into the bomb bays tosee what we were dropping. Both were full of 2,000-pounders—not mines. Most of us had never seen a2,000-pound bomb before.

That was when Hendrickson asked to borrowmy camera. Seven and a half hours later, CaptainHarp told us that when we got on the bomb run, wewere to maintain absolute silence no matter whathappened—even if we were hit, attacked by fight-ers, or whatever. Absolute silence.

When we got over the Japanese mainland, Icould see from my tail gunner’s position that wewere extremely low, maybe 500 feet. Tokyo was notblacked out and I could see cars and trucks moving,almost as if in my lap. The trucks were like our twoby fours, with canvas rear covers. There were nosearch lights or fighters or ack-ack. We made thebomb run, fast it seemed. It felt like a “milk run.”

As soon as it was over, Captain Harp, our bom-bardier, and the radar operator held a quick inter-com conference. Harp instructed “Red,” our radiooperator to send a voice transmission, “Missioncomplete, 100 percent as briefed” and to await con-firmation. This was the only time we broke radiosilence. Even when we were shot at, we did notbreak radio silence until asking Iwo Jima for land-ing instructions.

Even while en route home to Tinian Island, wewere not told the target—and we did not ask. As wegot back and taxied onto our pad, only the groundcrew chief and the MPs were there to meet theplane. Amazingly, there wasn’t a hole in our plane.

At the debriefing, the MPs stood guard outside.Only our crew was inside the Quonset. The bar-tender was a lieutenant. (Usually bartenders werecorporals or sergeants, but not this time). Mostoften at a debriefing, intelligence officers asked ifwe saw fighters, what types, how many engaged us,did we see any hits, damage, smoke, or fire? Did we

see any of our B–29s hit or go down? Did they loseany parts? Strangely, none of these questions wereasked. Instead our shots of booze lay on the strikephoto tables; there was not much talking at all.

Then we heard excited voices from the dark-room. An officer came out and laid down the bombrun photos on the table in front of us. He exclaimedthat we had bombed the Emperor’s Palace itself!The photos were still wet. In the darkroom theyhad crayon colored the photos. The Emperor’sPalace was in one color and the 2,000-pounders hit-ting it in another color. I could see the moat outlinearound the palace. Then, a full colonel—no one rec-ognized him, he wore no wings—walked over to themajor in charge and asked if there were any copiesof the photo. The major answered, “No.” The colonelscooped up the still-wet photos, stuck them into hislarge briefcase, and hurried out to get into his wait-ing jeep.

The Emperor’s Palace was totally off limits.But fifty-one years after the mission, I learned thatPresident Harry Truman had ordered it bombedbefore the August 6, 1945 attack on Hiroshima.Truman hoped for Japan’s surrender before theplanned invasion.

Except for the officers, our crew did not knowwhat we had bombed. Curiously, this mission wasnever logged. Except, of course, in Captain Harp’spersonal log, which he maintained since his servicewith the Royal Canadian Air Force. Harp flewHurricanes, Spitfires, and Lancasters. The captainhad thirteen confirmed kills in the “Battle ofBritain.”

Captain Harp always insisted afterward thatwe had hit the palace due to “navigational error,”and he stuck to this story until he died in October2000.

At top above is an actual size picture taken ofthe Emperor’s Palace on July 29, 1945, at theinstant our eight 2,000-pounders hit the palace. [Itwas] taken by our bombardier on my 2-1/4 by 3-1/4Kodak camera.


The Night We Bombed the Emperor’s Palace

Over the last fifty years, the magazine pro-duced by the Air Force Historical Foundation hasbeen renamed once or twice. It began life as AirPower Historian, and kept that name from 1954until 1965. In that year, it was renamed theAerospace Historian, and it remained so until1989. In 1989, it was once more renamed, to itspresent title Air Power History.

The magazine has had only eight editors dur-ing these fifty years, and they are identified here:

Albert F. Simpson (1956-1958)Brig. Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, Jr. (1958-1965)Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith (1965-1967)Col. Bryan K. Enyart (1967-1970)Robin Higham (1970-1988)F. Clifton Berry, Jr. (1989-1991)Henry S. Bausum (1991-1993)Jacob Neufeld (1993-present)

Similarly, the Foundation has had eight execu-tive directors in that time, and they are listedbelow:

Maj. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson (1956-1965)Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith (1965-1967)Brig. Gen. Monro MacClusky (1968-1974)Col. William C. Moore (1974-1981)Col. James L. Cannell (1981-1983)Col. Louis H. Cummings (1983-1997)Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge (1997-2000)Col. Joseph A. Marston (2000-present).

These directors have striven mightily to carryout the wishes of the presidents (listed in theSummer 2003 issue of the publication) and theBoard of Trustees. In the column to the right, thelast three directors are shown(top to bottom):

Col. Joseph A. Marston, USAF (Ret.)Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret.)Col. Louis H. Cummings, USAF (Ret.)


50 Years of Executive Directors and Editors


Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Jour-ney in Science and Politics. By EdwardTeller, (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publish-ing, 2001). $35.00 ISBN: 073820532X

Known as “the father of the Americanhydrogen bomb,” a title that he hardly rel-ishes, Edward Teller is one of the giants whoshaped the twentieth century. In Memoirs,he gives us his perspective on some of themost crucial, controversial events in twenti-eth-century history. In telling his story,Teller divides his life into two basic phases.

The first period covers Teller’s life to agethirty-five. These were salad days in whichhe grew to intellectual maturity during oneof the most exciting periods in the history ofphysics. Yet, this was also a time in whichTeller, like other Jewish scientists, washaunted by the specter of anti-Semitismthat drove him from his native Hungary toGermany where he found full acceptanceamong the small, select community that wasteasing out the implications of the quantumrevolution that had overthrown classical,Newtonian mechanics. After a sojourn inGerman universities where he establishedhimself as one of the masters of quantumesoterica, Teller was again forced to fleebefore anti-Semitism, this time to Englandwhere he first secured a teaching job inEngland. Shortly after arriving in England,he was awarded a Rockefeller fellowshipthat took him to Copenhagen, “the firstassembly point of the Diaspora of theGerman physicists.” (p. 95) When his fellow-ship ended, he returned briefly to Londonprior to immigrating in 1935 to the UnitedStates where he became a full professorshipat George Washington University, lecturingon quantum mechanics.

From his position at George Washing-ton, Teller watched excitedly with the rest ofthe world’s scientific elite as the pieces of thenuclear fission puzzle came together one byone. When the final piece dropped into place,this being a 1939 experiment that verifiedfission in uranium, the news “spreadthrough the world of physicists like wild-fire.” (p. 141) Four years later, with the worldengulfed in the flames of World War II,Tellerwas working at the Los Alamos Laboratorywhere the world’s first atomic bomb wasbeing designed.

His work at Los Alamos marks theboundary between the first and second phas-es of Teller’s life. During the second phase,Teller transforms himself to what we mightcall a “statesman of science,” a scientist whomoves in the top levels of government advis-ing presidents and other senior leaders oncritical scientific and technical issues. Theselater years, he wrote, were marked by threegreat controversies. The first of these washis advocacy for the hydrogen bomb.

Teller’s interest in the possibility of afusion bomb was first piqued by EnricoFermi, who suggested, in the fall of 1941that the heat from a fission bomb might pro-

duce a fusion reaction in deuterium. At first,Teller rejected the idea thinking that most ofthe energy of a fission blast would be quick-ly radiated away by x-rays and would not,therefore, produce the conditions needed forfusion. Then in early 1942, Teller and a col-league completed calculations indicatingthat the x-ray radiation would not occurimmediately and that there might beenough energy in the right form for a suffi-cient time to produce a fusion reaction.During the summer of 1942, Teller traveledto Berkley, California, where he participatedin a workshop led by J. Robert Oppenheimer.The participants in this workshop concludedthat a thermonuclear reaction was indeedfeasible.

Later, when the Los Alamos ScientificLaboratory was up and running, Oppen-heimer made the hydrogen bomb part of thelaboratory’s agenda. At first, Teller thoughthis work at Los Alamos would be focused onthe Super, as the hydrogen bomb was called.However, he found that the bulk of his ener-gies had to be devoted to the atomic bomb.

After the war, work on the Super lan-guished. At Los Alamos, the work proceededin a “leisurely fashion” that irked Teller.Moreover, the two men most qualified to leada continuation of the hydrogen bomb project,Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe, refused toaccept the responsibility. As a result, Tellerconcluded “if there was to be research doneon the hydrogen bomb in the United States,I would have to work on it with all mymight.” He did just that, and his efforts werea major factor in President Harry Truman’sJanuary 1950 decision that the UnitedStates would continue work on the Super.

Truman’s decision notwithstanding, LosAlamos still was not prosecuting the Superproject with the vigor Teller consideredappropriate. As a result, he began campaign-ing for a second national weapons laboratoryto provide a competitive nudge to LosAlamos, thus triggering the second majorcontroversy of the second phase of Teller’slife. The result of Teller’s efforts was theestablishment in 1952 of the LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory. But evenhere, Teller had to intervene to ensure thatnuclear weapons research was accorded thepriority Teller deemed appropriate, for, left tohis own devices, the laboratory’s first direc-tor, Herbert York, would have made con-trolled fusion the laboratory’s top priority.

All of this is not to say that Los Alamosdid nothing on the hydrogen bomb. Evenwhile working at a leisurely pace, LosAlamos had already laid the foundation forthe Super by the time Livermore was estab-lished. Indeed, the first test to produce afusion reaction took place on 9 May 1951.Codenamed George, this test used a massivefission explosion to produce a small fusionreaction.Although this was the equivalent ofusing a blast furnace to light a match, it wasan important first step in demonstrating thetechnical feasibility of a fusion-based

nuclear weapon.As the first leader of Livermore’s ther-

monuclear programs, Dr. Harold Brownbuilt upon the foundation laid by LosAlamos. Later to serve as Director of theLivermore Laboratory, then Secretary of theAir Force and later still Secretary ofDefense, Brown reoriented the design ofthermonuclear weapons. Teller notes thatBrown understood that the most importantaspect of the H-bomb design was to “opti-mize cost, yield, and weight. The mostimportant aspect of the H-bomb was notthat it offered the possibility of explosions ofunlimited sizes, but that the hydrogen bombwas based on a cheap, virtually unlimitedfuel supply. Therefore, nuclear weaponsbecame plentiful and cheap.”

The third major controversial affair ofTeller’s life came thirty years after the start-up of LLNL when President Ronald Reaganlaunched the missile defense programknown as the Strategic Defense Initiative.Teller had known Reagan since his days asgovernor of California, when Reagan visitedLLNL and discussed missile defense withTeller. While no one factor was decisive inconvincing Reagan to launch the SDI pro-gram, Teller did provide the president withan expert’s enthusiastic assessment of thetechnologies that indicated missile defenseshad become technically feasible. Further-more, Teller’s laboratory provided a numberof key concepts for the SDI program. Whenthe x-ray laser failed to pan out, two ofTeller’s protégés conceived of BrilliantPebbles (BP), a space-based interceptor thatwas to destroy its target by physically collid-ing with it. A technically promising concept,BP became the central system in the U.S.missile defense architecture until it waskilled under the Clinton administration pri-marily because it would have violated theABM Treaty of 1972.

To these three controversies, I would adda fourth: Teller’s role in the 1954 hearingsthat resulted in Oppenheimer losing hissecurity clearance. Indeed, this fourth con-troversy seems to have overshadowed virtu-ally everything Teller did after his April1954 testimony before the Gray Board of theAtomic Energy Commission (AEC) con-tributed to the AEC’s decision not to renewOppenheimer’s clearance. This event openeda huge chasm in the American scientificcommunity. On one side were those who sup-ported Oppenheimer. After 1954, they tend-ed to shun work on defense projects andwere often among the most vocal critics ofAmerican defense programs. On the otherside were those who continued to feel anobligation to support the development ofnew weapons for the American defenseestablishment. Hans Bethe became the sym-bolic head of the first group, while EdwardTeller became the leading spokesman for thesecond group.

In a 1950 article in the Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists, Teller revealed the views

Book Reviews


that led him to assume his leadership role.scientists must find a modest way of lookinginto an uncertain future. The scientist is notresponsible for the laws of nature. It is his jobto find out how these laws operate. It is thescientist’s job to find the ways in which theselaws can serve the human will. However, it isnot the scientist’s job to determine whether ahydrogen bomb should be constructed,whether it should be used, or how it shouldbe used. This responsibility rests with theAmerican people and with their chosen rep-resentatives.(Quoted p. 264)

There is to the latter part of this bookcertain melancholia as Teller recounts thepassing one by one of his closest colleagues.The first to go was Enrico Fermi, whomTeller greatly admired and who remainedTeller’s friend and older confidant despitethe hostility Teller faced following his testi-mony before the Gray Board. Seven yearsTeller’s senior, Fermi was only fifty-threewhen he died in 1954. The next to go was fel-low Hungarian-American John von Neumann,who died in February 1957. Teller was espe-cially close to von Neumann and consideredhim “the foremost (but largely ignored) sci-entific contributor to the development of theatomic bomb.” (p. 188) Then, in 1964, LeoSzilard died of a heart attack. Teller had dri-ven Szilard to his August 1939 meeting withAlbert Einstein during which Szilard askedEinstein to sign the famous letter that alert-ed President Franklin Roosevelt to thepotentials of nuclear fission.

To some extent, this autobiography is

also a history of the Cold War and remindsus of the important, if controversial, roleEdward Teller played in shaping the policiesand weapons that allowed the United Statesto prevail in its fifty-year struggle with theSoviet Union. It is hard to imagine how theU.S. might have fared in the Cold War with-out Teller’s leadership in the developmentand refinement of the weapons in America’snuclear arsenal.

Lt. Col. Donald R. Baucom, USAF (Ret.)

Red Wings over the Yalu: China, theSoviet Union, and the Air War in Korea.By Xiaoming Zhang. College Station: TexasA&M Press, 2002. Maps. Tables. Diagrams.Notes. Photographs. Appendices. Bibliogra-phy. Index. Pp. xii, 300. $30.95 ISBN: 1-58544-201-1

The son of a veteran of the People’sLiberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) andholder of a Ph.D. in history from theUniversity of Iowa, Xiaoming Zhang offers aChinese view of the air war over Korea. Heused recently declassified Chinese andSoviet military documents and also inter-viewed a number of PLAAF veterans.Further, Zhang compared USAF recordsagainst those of the Chinese and Soviets inan attempt to discern the truth—a targetoften more elusive than either an F-86 or aMiG-15.

The Korean War played a critical role inthe PLAAF’s development. When the warbegan in June 1950, China had an army ofsome 5,000,000 men, but very few pilots andaircraft. By war’s end, it had assembled theworld’s third largest air force and survivedcombat with the largest and most proficientair force—the USAF. This short period ofrapid growth and baptism to modern air warcreated a view of air power quite differentfrom the American view.

The Chinese military believed that menaccustomed to hardship and willing to sacri-fice themselves could defeat an enemy thatpossessed superior weapons and technology.Following this man-over-weapons doctrine,the PLAAF recruited pilots from theinfantry and selected men more for politicalreliability than piloting skills. These pilotspaid a high price to validate the man-over-weapons doctrine, but the PLAAF ended thewar believing they had.

Zhang begins with the role military avi-ation played in the Communist conquest ofChina. The American trained and equippedNationalist air force was never used effec-tively against Communist ground forces.This experience only validated the Commu-nists’ belief in their doctrine. But when theNationalists withdrew to Taiwan, their airforce proved decisive: the Communists couldnot invade Taiwan without air superiority.Mao Zedong, the Communist leader, thenrequested Soviet assistance in building anair force capable of wresting air superiorityfrom the Nationalists.

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Frank Cass PublishersNorth American Orders: ISBS, 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,

OR 97213 3644, USA Tel: 800 944 6190 Fax: 503 280 8832

UK/RoW Orders: Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP Tel +44 (0)20 8920 2100 Fax: +44 (0)20 8447 8548

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Stalin provided Soviet air units to pro-tect Chinese cities and infrastructure fromNationalist air attacks, while the Chinesetrained and equipped their own air units.This process was repeated when Chinaintervened in the Korean War. The People’sLiberation Army (PLA) suffered under thisarrangement; the Soviets would not let theiraircraft fly far enough forward to supportChinese ground troops for fear of losing anaircraft or pilot and exposing the extent oftheir involvement. The fledgling PLAAF didnot yet have enough trained pilots andadvanced aircraft to effectively intervene.Despite heavy losses to American air power,the PLA enjoyed success in the groundwar—an experience that once again validat-ed the Chinese belief in the man-over-weapons doctrine.

The synergy of the Soviets limiting theirdepth of attack and the PLAAF’s inexperi-ence limited most air-to-air combat to anarea stretching from the Yalu River south tothe Pyongyang-Wonsan line known as MiGAlley. It could be patrolled by Soviet andChinese aircraft flying from runways locatedin the sanctuary of China. American aircraftquickly and consistently destroyed any air-fields under construction in North Korea,but American policy prevented them fromdestroying airfields across the Yalu. Despitethe sanctuary advantage, the PLAAF neverwrested air superiority from the USAF.

The final chapter details the Chinesebelief that their doctrine resulted in victory.It also reinforced their belief in the politicalcommissar system, which they believed nec-essary to build the morale of the troops andimprove the performance of commanders.They also left the conflict aware that to suc-ceed in air combat one needed the mostadvanced aircraft—a seeming contradictionto their man-over-weapons doctrine.

Most Western defense analysts woulddisagree with the Chinese validation of theirdoctrine. Had the U.S. not limited its use ofair power, the destruction of Chinese airbases north of the Yalu would have sweptChinese aircraft from the North Koreanskies. While the PLAAF grew into one of theworld’s largest air forces, it left the conflictwith a completely different view and direc-tion than the USAF. The Chinese viewed airpower as primarily an air defense force,while the Americans continued to view airpower as an air superiority force. Chineseleaders ended the war believing that groundforces remained the future of warfare withair forces supplementing the power of thearmy (a view not changed until the GulfWar). American leaders continued to believethat air power played a decisive role in win-ning wars. Both sides ended the war believ-ing theirs had “won,” a belief that reinforced,rather than changed, their differing viewsand doctrines.

While a good book to read if one wants tounderstand the development of the PLAAF,the author tends to incorporate Chineseclaims into the text as if they were fact.

Some claims such as kill ratios—and theauthor’s inference that the Chinese mayhave taken greater pains to verify aerial vic-tories—may irritate readers.

David F. Crosby, writer, Ninth Air ForceHistory Office, Shaw AFB, South Carolina.

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare:The Evolution of British and AmericanIdeas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. By Tami Davis Biddle. Princeton andOxford: Princeton University Press, 2002.Notes. Index. Pp. viii, 406. $ 45.00 ISBN: 0-691-08909-4

The use of strategic bombing in recentAmerican engagements from the Gulf Warto Kosovo and Afghanistan has promptedconsiderable discussion about the effective-ness of military aviation and how air strate-gy has evolved historically. In a fresh andlucid look at the evidence,Tami Davis Biddleanalyzes the factors affecting British andAmerican decisions in both world wars touse aircraft to bomb nations, and why expec-tations never matched results. Her contextu-alization helps her prove that while strate-gic bombing serves important purposes, it isfar from solving all problems associated withmodern warfare. Biddle’s approach relies ona combination of cognitive psychology meth-ods to clarify the social, military, and politi-cal context in which strategic bombing ideasdeveloped. Although they differed on severalgrounds, the British and American outlookson bombing did share such assumptions asthe notion that modern societies wereextremely fragile due to their complexnature and could, therefore, be disruptedthrough aerial attack.

This general notion and its many corol-laries were widely expressed—though oftenhaphazardly—by such aviation pioneers andwriters as Clément Ader, Thomas Sopwith,or even H. G. Wells. But it was their testingin World War I, in the hope of breaking thetrench war stalemate that showed both thepotential and limitations of the airplane.Zeppelin bombings were followed by air-plane raids, and all demonstrated the pecu-liar nature of the aerial weapon. However, intheir evaluation of its impact, British ana-lysts stressed less the material damage(often limited due to poor navigation), pre-ferring to emphasize the “moral impact” onthe civilian population. Their Americancounterparts preferred to focus on economicdamage but often joined British thinking on“moral effect.” In so doing, they actually laidthe groundwork for what would become asubstantial gap between claims about, andactual results from, strategic bombing.

Biddle makes very clear that therhetoric was built in the interwar years onseveral bases. The personal background ofstrategists such as Hugh Trenchard, theRAF’s first postwar chief of Air Staff, played

a role in formulating an offensive theory ofpower, but so did skewed statistics fromWorld War I bombings as well as public sup-port for punishing the enemy at home. Therush to emphasize attack potential carriedon in the 1930s and used the regional warsof that decade to further support “moraleffect” as grounds for bombing. In so doing,though, it overlooked technical and naviga-tional hindrances that would become the“seeds of later troubles.” As for the UnitedStates, differing geography and war experi-ence and lack of an independent air arm(and limited public support for one, as BillyMitchell soon discovered) influenced anemphasis on the bomber as a suprememeans to destroy economic or industrial tar-gets in support of army strategy.

Thus, the first three chapters beautiful-ly set up the issues that surrounded strate-gic bombing in World War II (discussed inturn in chapters four and five). These rangedfrom lack of preparedness to deal with alter-natives to long-range attacks (and a nearfailure on the British side to accomplish anyof its early objectives) to tensions betweentheater commanders and civilian leadersover who should be in charge. Biddle findsnot only that both British and Americanplanners had to adjust plans and tacticsthroughout the war, but also that closing thegap between rhetoric and reality called formore and more indiscriminate bombing ofcivilian targets: by the end of the conflict,despite differing strategic projections, bothAllies were carrying out similar kinds ofattacks. The lessons she derives in her con-clusion are quite telling, as many of the fac-tors she identifies have become recurringones in subsequent conflicts.

Biddle’s emphasis on the need for widercontextualization of the air war might worrysome readers, but the extremely clear struc-ture of her work and her careful analysisshould put such concerns to rest. By synthe-sizing so many complex issues, Biddle offersa landmark piece of scholarship that shouldappeal to both experts and history enthusi-asts through its balance, lucidity, and clarity.

Guillaume de Syon, Associate Professor ofHistory, Albright College, Reading, Pa.

America as a Military Power: From theAmerican Revolution to the Civil War.By Jeremy Black. Westport Ct: Praeger, 2002.Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 231. $26.95ISBN: 10-275-97706-4

Renowned British military historianJeremy Black turns his attention from strat-egy to the topic of America’s wars in his newwork from Praeger. Black brings a uniqueperspective to the topic by placing America’swars in the larger setting of world militarypower, and this is perhaps the most valuablecontribution of America as a Military Power.For example, Black ignores the colonial peri-

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od and begins with an examination of theAmerican Revolution. American patriotscould lose battles and territory (as indeedentire colonies were knocked out of the con-flict or cut off from the remainder of thenascent republic), but the British could notwin as long as there remained popular sup-port in the New World and possible supportfrom the Old. Even the capture of the capitalof Philadelphia did not collapse the rebel-lion. Taking Philadelphia consumed enoughtime and resources to allow rebellion toregroup in other areas. Each time theBritish achieved success in one area, theysuffered loss in another. This resiliency, duein large part to the generalship of GeorgeWashington, eventually convinced theFrench that the Americans actually stood achance of success and tipped the balance infavor of armed support. As Black points out,Washington did not win many battles butchose his battlegrounds carefully so as toinflict casualties on the enemy and keep hisarmy in the field. Americans have largelyoverlooked the fact that once France enteredthe war, British soldiers stopped crossing theAtlantic. Without France, George III wouldprobably eventually have overwhelmed thecolonies.

Perhaps, though, the most unique and

original aspect of the book has to do withBlack’s conclusions. Citing “exceptionalism”as a way to explain America’s first century ofmilitary history, Black argues that internal,not external, factors impacted militarypower. Our neighbors to the north and southhad either European or European-stylearmies, leading us to mirror their doctrineand plan for European Napoleonic-stylewarfare. However, relatively peaceful rela-tions, coupled with our inherent distrust ofgovernment and reliance on state militias,led to a very small professional army.

Throughout Black compares and con-trasts the U.S. with other nations. Althoughseparated from hostile powers by theAtlantic, the American military mirrored themilitaries of Europe. For instance, a U.S. reg-iment on parade would have looked muchlike any regiment in Europe. Both Americaand Europe resorted to conscription by themid-1800s, although the U.S. abandoned itafter the Civil War. He attributes Europe’smaintenance of the practice to the fact thatwhile the American Civil War resolved our“power relationship,” Europe’s wars did not.Although Black attributes our mirror imag-ing to the “threat” from British Canada andMexico, he perhaps overstates his case. TheU.S. military probably developed more

because of European heritage of its mem-bers rather than any threat from Britain orMexico.

Black has made a serious contribution tothe study of the military history of this coun-try’s first century offering his independentviews as a European. Those interested in thedevelopment of militaries in the context ofboth external and internal factors will findthis book of value.

Maj. Jim Gates, USAF HQ U.S. Air Force

Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story.By R. Dale Reed with Darlene Lister. Lex-ington: University of Kentucky Press, 2002.[paperback edition of a 1997 hardback]Notes. Glossary. Appendix. Bibliography.Index. Foreword by Brig. Gen. Chuck Yeager.Pp. xxvi, 226. $29.95 ISBN: 0-831-9026-6

When the United States first put man inspace. the need for a means to return safelyto earth led to the development of a capsulecapable of withstanding the heat of reenter-ing the earth’s atmosphere and parachutingto a safe landing. But a number of engineerssuggested perfecting some sort of glider that

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could return to earth in a horizontal landing.Among them was Dale Reed, a young aero-nautical engineer at the NASA FlightResearch Center, Edwards Air Force Base,adjacent to the vast hard clay Rogerslakebed at Muroc, California. Reed, a modelbuilder and private pilot, was intrigued withthe idea of a lifting body vehicle, essentiallya wingless aircraft that flies from the liftgenerated by the flat bottom shape of itsfuselage. Between 1963 and 1975, eightwingless configurations were flown atEdwards. These ranged from the unpoweredplywood model, M2-F1, based on Reed’spaper half-cone models, tested in the lab cor-ridors at Edwards, to the all-metal,rocket-powered, supersonic X-24B aftertwelve years of experimentation.

This excellent study presents threethemes: one is a chronological account of thesuccessive models of lifting bodies and theproblems encountered in perfecting them;another is an account of the exhausting andexacting series of test procedures, which notonly perfected them, but did so with only oneserious accident in the twelve years of thelifting body program; and, finally, the authoroffers insights on the importance of person-alities, the motivations, attitudes and attrib-utes of the individuals involved. He is gener-

ous in crediting, by name, the full range ofvolunteers who contributed their time, imag-ination, expertise, and enthusiasm to theproject, from the courageous administratorwho diverted funds from other programs forthis largely shoestring effort to the manyengineers who ran wind tunnel tests, spenthours in simulators exploring the envelopeof the different designs, and to the many testpilots who risked their lives flying the oftencranky vehicles.

A particularly rewarding aspect of thisbook is the clarity of the description of thesequential testing which has made theUnited States the world leader in space. Onegets insights on such problems as the dis-parities between wind tunnel computationsand the radioed sensings of instrumentedflights. Do they result from flaws in theinstrumentation or real anomalies of flight?How many maneuvers may a test pilotundertake to test the characteristics of thevehicle with only five or six minutes of glid-ing time available? For this reviewer, themost important insight was the author’semphasis on the motivations of the partici-pants. Almost all were volunteers contribut-ing their time between the peaks and valleysof their regular assignments. Many were notonly model builders, but also hobbyists

building light airplanes at home for the funof it. The “buff factor” is evidently a signifi-cant element in the teams of NASA and AirForce engineers working at Edwards .

The lifting body program came to an endafter Congress mandated production of theboxcar sized shuttle, an escape vehicle withwings made possible by the development oflightweight ceramic tiles to meet the ther-mal threat of reentry. But the 100 publishedtechnical reports, the 222 flights, and the20,000 hours of wind tunnel studies thatsubstantiated the feasibility of winglessflight offer a precedent for a rising genera-tion of engineers in the twenty-first century.

I. B. Holley, Jr., Emeritus Professor ofHistory, Duke University

The Smithsonian National Air andSpace Museum Directory of Airplanes:Their Design and Manufacturers. ByDana Bell, Ed. London: Greenhill Books,2002, and Mechanicsburg, Pa.: StackpoleBooks, 2002. Photographs, Pp. 382. $49.95ISBN: 1-85367-490-7

Many books claiming to be encyclope-

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Air Power History (along with its predecessor Aerospace Historian) is one ofnearly 350 publications indexed and abstracted in the bibliographic databaseLancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature. This informationis produced by Military Policy Research Ltd., of Oxford, England, and can befound at www.mpr.co.uk. It contained over 90,000 citations and abstracts as ofthe end of May 2002, and is increasing at the rate of around 10,000 per year.

The Lancaster Index database is primarily designed for information profes-sionals in the defense and security sector, and can appear somewhat dauntingto the casual visitor. A look at the User Guide, downloadable from the site, isrecommended. Free access, using the global index, scans the whole database,but returns literature citations that exclude the volume, issue, and page refer-ences. Researchers who need these references for serious research purposeswill need to take out a paid subscription. Individual rates range from $9.95 fora 24-hour pass to $99.95 for a 365-day pass.

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dias of aircraft exist, but all of them fall farshort of the mark. A true, accurate encyclo-pedia of all aircraft may never be published,because the task of gathering accurate infor-mation about such a vast subject is far tooformidable. However, any attempt to pro-duce such an encyclopedia should begin withBell’s work. While it also is not an encyclo-pedia, it is an attempt to provide a “singlereliable authority for aircraft names anddesignations.”

The National Air and Space Museum(NASM) recognized the need for an airplanedirectory in its effort to process and describethe Aircraft Reference Files in the Museum’sArchives division. Bell (a NASM curator ofarchives, author, and leading authority onaviation history) led the Museum’s taskforce to produce a listing of the world’s air-craft manufacturers and the aircraft theyproduced. He admits this is still a “work inprogress” and invites any aviation experts tocontribute to “improve future editions.” Thisunique book strives to catalogue every air-plane produced by every manufacturer ordesigner in the world. The research wasmeticulous and the scope of the book is stag-gering in its magnitude. The research

focused on “human-carrying, heavier-than-air vehicles that are supported primarily bydynamic lift. This includes airplanes, glidersand hang gliders, helicopters, autogiros, andornithopters.” These criteria allowed the list-ing of the flight of Icarus and the designsLeonardo da Vinci made in 1486. However,lighter-than-air balloons and dirigibles, mis-siles, rockets, drones, remotely piloted orunmanned vehicles, and spacecraft are notincluded. “Successful flight is not a prerequi-site for inclusion in the Directory” nor is com-pletion of a design to reach production. Mostaircraft included were never produced be-yond one prototype or even a mock-up. Pro-posals or plans for some of the aircraft notbuilt were included only if the proposals had“historical significance.” Even with theselimitations, 25,000 aircraft and 5,000 com-panies and designers are listed. Extensivelycross-referencing makes it easy to find anyaircraft’s designation or name. The researchstaff labored to eliminate honest errorsmade by otherwise trustworthy sources. Bellcites a 1946 air attaché report describing anew Italian Velivolo company aircraft. Ittook two years for a correspondent to recog-nize the aircraft as the Bestetti C.3;

“Velivolo” was the Italian word for “air-plane.”

Every aviation enthusiast can spendhours poring over these listings and be fas-cinated by the information. For example, theJacuzzi Brothers of Berkeley, California,makers of well-known hot tub pumps,turned out two aircraft designs in 1920.Some of the most useful information comesfrom the brief histories given the world’smajor producers of aircraft. The reader caneasily trace convoluted and confusing namechanges, mergers, buyouts, licensing agree-ments, and homebuilt and kit planes, alongwith major modifications to existing aircraft.The researchers followed labyrinthinechanges to properly credit each aircraft tothe correct company or designer.

The book is divided into two major sec-tions: the “Directory” (manufacturers, theirlocation, and designations assigned to air-craft they built), and the “A-Z of AircraftNames.” This section provides names suchas “Spitfire” and “Mustang.” All Allied codenames given to Japanese aircraft duringWorld War II are included, as are NATOcode names for Cold War Soviet aircraft.Some of the other names are amazing: the


Airmax GmbH Wild Thing; Pterodactyl Ltd.Pterodactyl NFL (Not Foot Launchable), orthe Rubberworks Rubber Bandit (Piloted,Rubber-Band Powered.) How about theDPCA (Romania) DK-10 Dracula? Unfortu-nately, illustrations of these interesting air-craft are not provided.

Photograph selection was, at first, some-what baffling. Upon closer examination,however, it became obvious that Bell clever-ly used the photos to explain in more detailsome of the vagaries of aircraft designationsand names.

This work is a very comprehensive andup-to-date reference. It should find its wayinto the libraries of all aviation historiansand airplane enthusiasts. It will probablysettle many arguments, but it may also starta few.

Lt. Col. Steve Horn, USAF (Ret.), aviationhistory researcher and writer.

American Airpower Comes of Age:General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s WorldWar II Diaries. 2 Vols. By Maj Gen John W.Huston, USAF (Ret.), Ed. Montgomery, Ala:Air University Press, 2002. Photographs.Notes. Bibliography. Index. (Vol. l) Pp. 568,(Vol.2) Pp.440. ISBNs: 1-58566-093-0, 1-58566-094-9

Readers of this journal, especially activeduty and retired Air Force members, wouldbenefit from investing the time required toread and reflect on this 2-volume study ofGeneral Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s leadershipin World War II. Service schools are the mostlikely settings for this kind of reading, butthe insights in this study will reward thosewho spend the time, whether they are aspi-rants to high command, veterans of WorldWar II, military historians or buffs, or simplyanyone who wants to know more about howthe Air Force came into being.

The editor brings strong credentials tothis work. A professional historian, he was along-time faculty member at the NavalAcademy and a visiting professor at the AirForce Academy. After gaining first-handcombat experience as a B–17 navigator,Huston capped vigorous involvement as areservist with an active-duty tour as Chief ofthe Air Force History Program from 1976 to1981.

Huston hit on the idea of using twelvewartime diaries Arnold kept during tripsabroad as the starting points for these vol-umes. Arnold, the only top American mili-tary leader to keep such diaries, would usu-ally note briefly at the end of each day’stravel—but within security restrictions—hisimpressions of the day’s events, people met,places visited, and items to be acted on. Thefirst diary recorded his April-May 1941 tripas an “observer” to an England already atwar. Five diaries deal with his participationin most of the major US-UK political-mili-

tary conferences. The rest cover Arnold’sinspections of Army Air Forces activitiesabroad.

Huston put them into a much fuller,although occasionally repetitive, contextwith the help of his heavily documentedresearch into a vast array of materials onWorld War II. The result is a strong case forhis conclusion that this “unpretentious air-man contributed more than any other singleindividual to the creation of the UnitedStates Air Force....”

The diaries support Huston’s view ofArnold as “unpretentious” but understand-ably show his life in that period to be cen-tered on his work. That focus was a sign ofthe relentless drive that Huston empha-sizes as the key reason for Arnold’s successin developing the Air Corps he began tohead in 1938 into the world’s most powerfulair arm by 1945. Proclaiming himself “neversatisfied,” and reluctant to delegate author-ity, Arnold took on an ever-increasing work-load that most likely cost him four heartattacks during the war. That same relent-less drive made Arnold a difficult boss, mostnotably for senior subordinates. Hustonpays particular attention to Arnold’s tensewartime relationships with two of his oldfriends, Gen. Carl Spaatz and Ira Eaker,whom he had charged with achieving quickresults in a strategic bombardment cam-paign against Germany that began withminimal preparation and resources. Therelief of Eaker as commander of the EighthAir Force is sympathetically examined indetail.

As Huston suggests, heavily influenc-ing Arnold’s concerns about the effective-ness of the strategic bombardment effortwas its relationship to the prospects for apostwar Air Force. Fortunately, in thecourse of time, strategic bombing as well astactical and transport forces made the caseArnold sought through their major contri-butions to victory. Also, as this studydemonstrates, Arnold’s effectiveness inwinning the backing of his political andmilitary superiors (despite his rocky startwith President Roosevelt) was a major fac-tor leading to the creation of the Air Force.Their acceptance of Arnold as a participantat the highest level of decision-making fore-shadowed the coming of the separate airarm that he had wisely deferred seekinguntil after the war.

In short, Huston’s work offers a richexperience for readers interested in anauthoritative study of the World War IIroots of today’s Air Force.

Brig. Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret),Professor of History, University of NorthTexas.

Hijackings and Hostages: GovernmentResponses to Terrorism. By J. Paul de B.Taillon. Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger,

2002. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 233.$64.95 ISBN: 0-275-97468-5

This book is a rare study of governmentresponses to hijackings and hostage-tak-ings. It is based upon three carefully nar-rated case studies: the successful rescueoperations conducted at Entebbe (1976) andMogadishu (1977), and the failed rescueattempt at Malta (1985). In looking compar-atively at these cases, the author’s intent isto determine the key contributing factors tosuccess in the resolution of hijacking andhostage-taking situations. His scope, howev-er, is rather narrow, being focused solely onthe use of national counterterrorist unitsagainst international terrorists.

Taillon examines the available evidencesystematically and concludes that success-ful rescue operations are dependent on sev-eral key factors. These include effective andsecure communications; the availability ofsolid background and current all-sourceintelligence on the terrorists; the hostages;the aircraft and buildings involved; a highlytrained, well-led, and rapidly deployablecounterterrorist unit; and excellent coopera-tion and coordination between the differentgovernments and counterterrorist unitsinvolved in the operation. Taillon’s discus-sion on the importance of intelligence shar-ing between governments in hostage rescueis particularly insightful, for it highlightsthe major elements hampering or enhanc-ing intelligence exchanges (e.g., quantity,quality, security, and quid pro quo).Available at relatively low cost, humanintelligence, according to Taillon, is mostuseful in such operations and should bemade available to the rescuers.

While Taillon succeeds at identifyingand justifying the lessons learned from hiscase studies, his overview of terrorism andthe international aspects of counterterror-ism in the first two chapters of the bookappears disconnected from them. He simplydoes not tell us why he decided to write thebook (intellectual debates, practical issues),does not discuss his methodology (why hehas chosen these three cases rather thanothers), and does not offer a critical reviewof the available literature on the subject ofhijacking and hostage-taking.

With respect to sources, it is obvious thatTaillon exploited all open sources availableon his three case studies and conductedfirst-class interviews with key players.However, his use of government sources issparse (six Canadian diplomatic telexes anda few more documents only) and could havebeen enhanced through archival searchesand Freedom-of-Information requests.Thereare no indications that either was undertak-en. I found particularly annoying theauthor’s reliance on secondary sources,where primary sources were easily avail-able. For instance, he quotes the media onthe USS Cole incident’s report rather thanthe report itself, which is widely available onthe Internet, or in a library.

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These weaknesses aside, the case stud-ies and the lessons drawn from them byTaillon are assuredly worth reading, and forthat alone I would recommend the book toprofessionals and students interested in gov-ernment responses to terrorist hijackingsand hostage-takings or terrorism in general.

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre, former civilian strate-gic analyst and army intelligence officer,Department of National Defence, Canada.

The American Fighter Plane. Text byAmy E. Williams and Illustrations by TedWilliams. N.Y.: Metro Books, 2002. Dia-grams. Illustrations. Photographs. Bibliogra-phy. Index. Pp. 176. ISBN: 1-58663-175-6

Amy E. Williams is a writer, marketingprofessional and English teacher with amaster’s degree in English from BowlingGreen State University. This is her firstbook. Ted Williams, the writer’s father, is amarketing communications executive,award-winning illustrator, and notedauthority on aviation history. Most of hiswork is found in magazines and journals. Hehas spent a considerable amount of timechronicling the evolution of the Americanfighter plane.

The American Fighter Plane traces engi-neering developments from the firstAmerican fighter planes to the high-perfor-mance fighters of today. Forty aircraft werechosen as turning points of fighter develop-ment, starting with the Thomas-Morse MB-3 and ending with the Lockheed Martin F-22Raptor. These aircraft are viewed in terms oftheir advancements in aerodynamics, pro-pulsion, construction, avionics, and weaponssystems. In addition, the book speaks notonly about the pilots who flew these magnif-icent aircraft but also addresses the engi-neers who designed the aircraft and thecompanies that built them.

This broad approach made the bookmore interesting to read. The author ex-plains why an aircraft meeting particularspecifications was needed. Frequently thestory continues with what company won thecompetition and why. This is followed by adescription of the technical advancementsmade in the featured aircraft and why itsuperceded previous types. Often, the authordiscusses problems encountered during thedevelopmental period and how designerssuch as Leroy Grumman and Jack Northropwere able to overcome them. Several exam-ples that Ms. Williams addresses are theproblems of compressibility, the transitionfrom props to jets, and the swept-back wing.By no means are these explanations overlydetailed or technical; they are satisfactoryfor non-technical readers to understandwhat was happening and why.

Each of the forty aircraft is given fourpages in the book. Along with the text, there

are photographs, a diagram of the aircraftwith specifications, and a beautifully illus-trated painting by Ted Williams. The illus-trations alone are worth the price of thebook. The only technical inaccuracy I noticedwas in the description of the Vought F4UCorsair. Here Ms. Williams stated—as havemany other books—that the gull-shapedwings were designed to shorten the length oflanding gear, as the propeller itself was thir-teen feet in diameter. My father worked forVought Aircraft on the F4U program duringWorld War II and stated that the gull wingdesign was adopted to reduce drag andincrease the speed of the aircraft; all otherdesign factors were secondary.The outstand-ing performance of the Corsair bears thisout.

The American Fighter Plane is a descrip-tive book that gives the reader a quick butcomprehensive overview of the world of U.S.fighter aircraft. It neither advances new the-ories nor expresses novel ideas, but it is easyand fun to read. Any aviation buff who needsto “get smart fast” about American fighterswould enjoy this book.

William A. Nardo, Docent, National Air andSpace Museum.

In the Shadows of War: An American Pi-lot’s Odyssey through Occupied Franceand the Camps of Nazi Germany. ByThomas Childers. New York: Henry Holt andCo., 2002. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xiii, 443. $27.50 ISBN: 0-8050-5752-8.

On June 14, 1944, an American B–17 ofthe 457th Bombardment Group, flying amission from England, was shot down overoccupied France. The pilot, Roy Allen, was aPhiladelphia native who had attended DukeUniversity and was married a year earlier.Allen’s plane fell some 100 km southeast ofParis. The last one to jump from the strickenaircraft, Allen lost contact with his crew-mates. A young member of the FrenchResistance risked her life to help hide him ina girls’ school. After his rescue, Allen suf-fered from intense back pain and a greatlonging to get back to England. In August,against the advice of his rescuers, he wastransported to Paris, from where he hoped toreturn to his base. Unfortunately, Allen anddozens of other downed Allied airmen werebetrayed by undercover Gestapo doubleagents. The Gestapo did not honor Allen’smilitary status, but treated him and theother airmen as “terrorists,” which allowedthe Nazis to subject them to the most hor-rendous, inhumane treatment. They werefirst kept at Fresnes, a prison south of Paris,and then shipped via cattle car to the hell-hole known as Buchenwald concentrationcamp. There, they endured the maddeningroutine of prolonged roll calls, torture, expo-sure, savage beatings, starvation, filth, and

disease depicted in countless films and doc-umentaries on the Holocaust. In December,following the German defeat in the Bulge,the Luftwaffe interceded and sent Allen andthe other survivors to Stalag Luft III, a pris-oner of war camp, where they were bettertreated. However, the fortunes of war turnedonce more and, at the end of January 1945,the prisoners were evacuated to Nuremberg.In April, the poor souls were subjected to along forced march and were later liberated.

In this book (his fourth), ThomasChilders again demonstrates his rare blend-ing of accomplished historian and superbwriter. Critics have given the book ravereviews: “a masterful example of non-fictionbrought to life not merely through ‘literarydevices,’ ... but through exhaustive researchinto British, French, German and Americanarchives, personal files, memoirs and end-less interviews.” “An extraordinary, grippingbook, exciting, remarkably adhering to thehighest standards of scholarly truth.” And “ahaunting book, a page turner of the highestorder, history at its very best.” I agree com-pletely with these and recommend the bookto anyone interested in World War II history.

But, the story ends prematurely; itneeds a sequel. Permit me to sketch the out-line of what radio personality Paul Harveycalls, “the rest of the story.” Roy Allen camehome in June 1945; he died in 1991. Inbetween those years, in addition to raising afamily, he and the other American survivorsof Buchenwald struggled exhaustively toconvince the Veterans Administration abouttheir horrific mistreatment. Surely, theywere entitled to reparations or other bene-fits for their singular experience or, at thevery least, recognition that they had beenthere. Inexplicably, the U.S. Governmentremained deaf to their pleas.

In 1992,Allen’s son contacted the Centerfor Air Force History and asked for help inverifying the story. The veterans, who hadformed the Krieger Lager Buchenwald(K.L.B.) Club, were now too old enjoy anybenefits and sought only to have their ordealacknowledged. The Center’s historians andarchivists plunged into research, retrievingdocuments from the National Archives andthe U.S. Holocaust Museum that substanti-ated the story, and learned that other Alliedgovernments—Great Britain, Canada,Australia, and New Zealand—had recog-nized and honored their countrymen’s mis-treatment. Congress appeared to be the onlyavenue available to grant our airmen a mod-icum of honor to recognize their ordeal. Withthe help of the Air Force’s General Counsel,the Center provided the K.L.B. veterans’story and supporting documents toRepresentatives Sonny Montgomery, of Mis-sissippi, and Constance Morella, of Mary-land, who sponsored a resolution on their be-half. Subsequently, on November 8, 1993,Congress passed House Concurrent Reso-lution 88, “Commending American AirmenHeld as Prisoners at Buchenwald Concen-tration Camp in World War II,” recognizing

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the men’s “faithful service, personal bravery,and exceptional fortitude.” Nearly half a cen-tury after the event, the men of the K.L.B.Club were justly honored.

Jacob Neufeld, Editor, Air Power History.

Backwater War: The Allied Campaignin Italy, 1943-1945. By Edwin P. Hoyt.Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger Publi-shers, 2002. Photographs. Notes. Appendi-ces. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 224. $27.95ISBN: 0-275-97478-2

This book, by prolific author Edwin Hoyt(more than 150 books written), is a history ofthe fight for Sicily and Italy during WorldWar II. It is intended for the general readerand tells the story at all levels, ranging fromthe most senior political level down throughthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels.There is a continuing need for such books tointroduce new readers to history. Presuma-bly, they can then go to the original sourcematerials for more detailed informationabout what has piqued their interest.

Unfortunately, this book fails at themost fundamental level: getting the factsstraight and making them intelligible to thereader. First, there are no maps. For a histo-ry of combat at the infantry battalion-regi-ment level, a reader must know the terrainor have access to maps. The action in thisbook ranges from Sicily to the Alps in Italy.Very few people know that area well enoughto follow battles presented only in text—nomatter how well written.

A second fatal flaw is that units aremisidentified. For U.S. armored divisions,the author seems to have no knowledge ofthe Combat Command (CCA, CCB, andCCR) structure used in World War II. Thereis not even an entry for “Combat Command”in the index. For U.S. infantry divisions,there is random confusion in the bookbetween the terms “division,” “regiment,”and “battalion.” For example, the threeParachute Infantry Regiments of the 82dAirborne Division, the 504th, 505th, and509th are identified in different places asbattalions, divisions, and regiments. The 7thInfantry Regiment of the 3d InfantryDivision is correctly identified once but lateris identified as the 7th Infantry Division(which fought in the Pacific and later inKorea). Such confusion precludes any seri-ous attempt at understanding and soonleads to merely counting the number of obvi-ous errors. There are also a number of typosthroughout, but they are manageable com-pared to the other faults.

At the political level, Mr. Hoyt empha-sizes the difficult relations between theAmericans and British. Since the onlysource material is a collection of postwarmemoirs, each more or less self-serving, hisinterpretation is worth noting, although onemay not agree. Allies are like relatives: they

are what you have, not what you necessarilywant or need.

Finally, there is some hyperbole in thebook, the title being the first example.Surely the campaigns in the Aleutians or inBurma were more deserving of the title“Backwater War.” As a second example, inthe preface, the claim is made that ifRoosevelt had not agreed with the Britishposition of “Europe First,” the Philippineswould not have fallen and the Pacific Warwould have been shortened. Where the rein-forcements for MacArthur were to comefrom, how they were to be transported to thePhilippines, and how their logistics were tobe provided is not revealed.

Lt. Col. James A Painter, USA (Ret.), 7thInfantry Division, Korean War.

Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelli-gence and Foreign Military Innovation,1918-1941. By Thomas G. Mahnken. Ithaca,N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 2002.Photographs. Notes. Tables. Index. Pp ix,190. ISBN: 0-8014-3986-8

This book is one of approximately fiftymonographs published to date in the CornellStudies in Security Affairs series. Mahnken,a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval WarCollege, has presented a well researchedstudy of nine intelligence efforts againstthree countries, (Japan, Germany, and GreatBritain) between the two World Wars. Foreach, he describes the target, the effort, andthe results obtained, then compares the nineresults and assigns causes for success or fail-ure. The nine targets are Japanese carrieraviation, German rocketry, British integrat-ed air defenses, Japanese naval surface war-fare, German tactical aviation, Japaneseamphibious warfare, British armored war-fare, German armored warfare, and Britishtank experiments. The first three are ratedas intelligence failures, the next two as par-tial successes, and the last four as successes.Success or failure is based upon U.S. knowl-edge and understanding of the topic ratherthan combat success or failure. One conclu-sion of his analysis is that the causes forintelligence success or failure are psycholog-ical and organizational, rather than theamount of resources applied or foreign coun-terintelligence efforts.

One interesting aspect of the practice ofmilitary intelligence discussed is changes inmethodology. During the 1920’s, it wasinvariably military attaches who collectedintelligence—and did it more or less openly.It was very “gentlemanly” in that everybodyrecognized their duties but put few drasticlimitations upon them. Reciprocity fromother nations was deemed more importantthan any temporary advantage. BothGermany and Japan went so far as to admitU.S. military officers to their military schoolsand arrange for temporary posting to appro-

priate active duty units. By the end of the1930s, with war looming, counterintelligencerequirements overcame reciprocity. Attacheswere routinely under surveillance. Theyrequired host-nation approval to tour sensi-tive manufacturing plants, ports, or othertypes of targets. As attaches lost utility,other techniques were pressed into use (e.g.,signals intelligence (SIGINT) and secretagents). In Great Britain, recognition of thedesirability of having the U.S. as an ally ledto the deliberate passage of information tothe Americans. Attaches became collectionpoints rather than active intelligence collec-tors.

One aspect of the perils of being anattache is shown by the story of MajorTruman Smith, military attache in Berlinduring the mid-1930s. He arranged for threevisits by Charles Lindbergh to inspect theLuftwaffe. Intelligence gained from thesevisits was significant, although not fullyappreciated at the time. U.S. Army Air Corpsemphasis on strategic bombing blinded ana-lysts to the fact that the Luftwaffe was a tac-tical air force only. Unfortunately for MajorSmith, Lindbergh received a German medaland gave several public speeches that dia-metrically opposed President Roosevelt’spolicies at the time. As a result, Rooseveltpersonally intervened against Major Smith’spromotion.

Mahnken closes the book with an appre-ciation of today’s situation. The U.S. stillrequires good intelligence to survive; lessonsfrom the past are still appropriate; and theproblems of the future are still daunting.Recent news about intelligence failures fromSeptember 11, 2001, shows we still have notstudied enough history nor learned the rightlessons. This book is a good place to start.

Lt. Col. James A Painter, USA (Ret), Docent,National Air & Space Museum

Air Force One. By Robert F. Dorr. St. PaulMinn.: MBI Publishing Co., 2002. Photo-graphs. Index. Pp. 156. $29.95 ISBN:: 9-7603-1055-6

While driving near Andrews AFBrecently, I saw a huge airplane crossing thehighway on final approach. I recognized itinstantly: Air Force One. Having experi-enced the real thing’s considerable impact—if only briefly—I was eager for more. Dorr’sbook on Presidential aircraft does not disap-point. He satisfies the airplane enthusiast’sthirst for detail, while succinctly tracing theevolution of Presidential flying.

In 1910, just seven years after theWright brothers first flew, Theodore Roose-velt became the first President to fly. Thatthe flight occurred after he had left officehardly diminished its impact. Roosevelt’spost-flight comment showed he was a trueairplane aficionado: “You know I didn’tintend to do it, but when I saw the thing

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there, I could not resist it.” Presidential fly-ing ran in his family: Theodore’s cousinFranklin became the first sitting Presidentto fly when he avoided the U-boat menace byflying to Casablanca.

The first airplane designed and builtspecifically for Presidential travel was a C-54 (DC-4) procured for FDR’s use. Informallynamed Sacred Cow, it was equipped with apicture window and an elevator for FDR’swheelchair. But Roosevelt used it only once,on his 1945 trip to Yalta. Harry Trumanused it more before a C-118 (DC-6) replacedit. Concerned that taxpayers might thinkthe plane extravagant, officials named itIndependence, invoking both Truman’shometown and a “national flavor.” They neednot have worried. Americans have alwaysbeen proud to see their Presidents flying inthe best planes available.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower usedLockheed Constellations (named Columbineafter the state flower of First Lady Mamie’shome state of Colorado) and then oversawthe transition to Boeing VC-137 (707) jets. Itwas during Eisenhower’s Presidency thatthe “Air Force One” radio call sign wasadopted after, as one story has it, there wasbrief confusion with a commercial airlinercarrying the same flight number assigned tothe presidential plane. Whatever its trueprovenance, the call sign stuck and is nowsynonymous with the plane itself, eventhough any Air Force plane carrying thePresident is called “Air Force One.”

Dorr enlivens his narrative with a seriesof interesting sidebars on “almost” Presiden-tial aircraft. These little known airplaneswere used in a variety of supporting roles,including carrying First Ladies. PresidentJohn F. Kennedy particularly enjoyed flyingto Massachusetts on the same C-118 onceused by President Truman. The author doesnot neglect Presidential rotary wing aircraft,explaining how Presidential helicopter fly-ing came to be the province of MarineSquadron HMX-1.

All of this leads up to the detaileddescriptions of the two Boeing VC-25As(747-200) that have carried America’s chiefexecutives since 1990. Heavily modified within-flight refueling, advanced communica-tions, and secret defensive countermeasures,these aircraft can remain aloft almost indef-initely. Dorr’s information culled from opensources and interviews, ranges from how thetail numbers were derived to the built-instairs at the front of the plane. Before read-ing this book I had never noticed that, asrequired by custom, the union on the planes’American flags faces forward on both sidesof the aircraft.

Excellent photographs complement thetext at every turn. They include interiorshots of the current airplanes, along withfull color photos showcasing the planes’enormous size, beautiful shapes, and thewonderful color scheme created by famedindustrial designer Raymond Loewy duringthe Kennedy administration. Among the

more unusual pictures are some takenbefore one of the 747s was delivered, when itsported a temporary civilian tail numberand the blotchy green color of an unpaintednew airliner.

While plainly a big fan of presidentialaircraft, Dorr still asks some thought pro-voking questions about them. For example,should the Air Force have bought more capa-ble and expensive Boeing 767s instead ofless ostentatious 757s for jobs like carryingthe Vice President? He also questionswhether the Presidential flying units aretending to become too isolated from the restof the military.

I recommend this book for anyone whowants to go behind the allure of Air ForceOne. As for me, fortified by the book’s wealthof details, I am eagerly looking forward tomy next sighting of Air Force One.

Lawrence H. Richmond, federal governmentattorney and docent, National Air and SpaceMuseum

Voices from Vietnam: The tragedies andtriumphs of Americans and Vietnamese—two peoples forever entwined by thelegacy of war. By Charlene Edwards.Bayside, N.Y: Journeys, 2002. ResourceGuide. Chronology. List of Color Plates.Index. Pp. 264. $25.00 ISBN: 0-9714020-3-5.

Voices from Vietnam represents tenyears of work and three journeys, duringwhich Charlene Edwards photographedhundreds of beautiful scenes of life inVietnam and talked to many citizens of, andveterans from, both the United States andVietnam. This experience taught her thefutility of war and that war does not stopwhen the shooting stops, but permeates theconsciences of the generations that follow.

These are not the author’s stories, how-ever, but the recorded narratives of peoplewho were directly affected by the warthrough the loss of a relative, friend, or otherloved one, or indirectly by fleeing to anothercountry to avoid military service or beingforced from their land by the realities of anencroaching enemy.

The book is not about political policy ormilitary strategies. It is about human beingsand their trials in coping with the VietnamWar and its aftermath. But inherently, thereare the contrasting views of the war that willbe debated long after the last person affect-ed by the war dies. Cardinal John O’Conner(pp. 189-91), who served as a Marine Corpschaplain in Vietnam, dealt with the com-mandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill” by accept-ing the U.S. government’s views of the war—that our soldiers killed out of self-defenseand to protect the South Vietnamese fromthe Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.O’Connor’s view contrasts sharply with theview of deserters and other protesters who

earnestly believed that our government’spolicy was composed of contradictions, lies,and deceit and that their country was askingits soldiers to commit war crimes.

The returning combatants from bothsides and all races receive mention, as do thewar leaders. Gen. William Westmoreland,who commanded nearly 200,000 U.S. sol-diers in Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh, the ven-erable leader and symbol of Vietnamese uni-fication and focal point for ridding his coun-try of foreign domination, are both giventheir space.

Also included are vignettes about nurs-es, MIAs and POWs, refugees, and heartwrenching accounts of the plight of Amer-asians and Montagnards. There are storiesthat could be repeated a hundred times byother soldiers. Charlie Fink, later MonsignorFink, after graduating from college in 1968,went to his draft board to apply for a defer-ment for graduate school. He will never for-get the reception he got from the womenbehind the desk. “In between laughs, shesaid to me—‘You must be kidding! I suspectyou’ll be in the army within six months.’”That total insensitivity exhibited by those incharge of Fink’s plight is unforgivable. Thathe, or any draftee, could be in a body bag inseven months had not penetrated the brainof that draft board employee. A war that wasdaily covered by the newspapers and televi-sion was not real to most Americans. Theinsensitivity shown by draft boards as to therights of individuals could only incite thewrath of the U.S. antiwar movement.

Among the more striking features of thebook are the myriad scenarios expressed bydivergent groups of people affected by thewar who were able to resurrect experiencesor images about the war that were longburied deep in their minds and hearts.

Heart wrenching, too, is the story of theadoptive parents Lana and Byron, waitingapprehensively for the arrival of Heather,their Vietnam baby girl who was among the3,000 babies carried to the States by the U.S.Air Force’s Operation Babylift. Heatherarrived with a series of maladies. Her newparents stayed with her for several weeks inthe hospital as she fought to live. The photoof the parents and Heather and the accom-panying narrative of her death can tear atthe strongest stomachs.

The stories of the many South Vietna-mese who were sent to reeducation campsfollowing the North’s victory definitely showthat atrocities of war do not suddenly endwhen the last shot is fired. Many neverreturned from their camp ordeal, while oth-ers, some of whom returned after years ofinternment, suffer feelings of horror, aban-donment, and despair.

Charlene Edwards’s compilation of nar-ratives will provide future generations witha real sense of how the Vietnam War affect-ed so many lives on several continents. Herwork reveals how many people on both sidescoped with their private terrors, both duringthe war and after. It is like life itself: Some of

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Edwards’s interviewees met with tragedy,while others triumphed or overcame theirpersonal disasters.

George M. Watson, Jr., author of Voices fromthe Rear: Vietnam 1969-1970.

Reaper Leader: The Life of JimmyFlatley. By Steve Ewing. Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 2002. Maps. Photo-graphs. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xix, 384. $36.95. ISBN: 1-55750-205-6.

Steve Ewing has used his extensiveknowledge of naval aviation to produce aninformative book about the life of one of themost highly decorated Navy fighter pilots ofWorld War II. Jimmy Flatley was a 1929Naval Academy graduate who earned hiswings in 1931. Assigned to VF-42, he wasone of the key participants in the Battle ofthe Coral Sea—the first carrier-vs.-carrierduel in the history of naval warfare. He sur-vived the action with two kills to his creditand then served successive tours in thePacific, as a squadron leader and air groupcommander, ending the war as the opera-tions officer for Admiral Mitcher’s fast carri-er task force (TF-58). Flatley spent most ofhis postwar years in training commands, ris-ing briefly to flag rank before being struckdown by cancer in 1958, three weeks after

celebrating his fifty-second birthday.The author, an experienced naval histo-

rian, is curator of the Patriots Point Navaland Maritime Museum and has written orco-authored several pictorials and books.“The purpose of this biography, is to traceFlatley’s leadership evolution, while at thesame time reliving air combat and the tribu-lations of command through his eyes [and]actions….” Ewing aptly accomplishes thistask via judicious use of an extensive collec-tion of personal papers amassed by Flatleybefore his death. He supplemented thesewith relevant records in the NationalArchives and the oral history and personalpapers of one of Flatley’s closest friends, anda contemporary fighter pilot, “Jimmie”Thach. Flatley passed away before histori-ans were able to capture his oral history,thus leaving the written record as the solesource for Ewing’s efforts to document hissubject’s experiences in the air. Aviationenthusiasts intent on reliving these excitingmoments will be disappointed in the cold,matter-of-fact after-action reports thatEwing relies upon to document this criticalaspect of Flatley’s military career. Regretta-bly, this format leaves much to be desired.Readers seeking to experience a betteraccount of naval air action in the Pacificshould stick to Lundstrom’s First Teambooks, which remain the preeminent sourceson this subject.

As one would expect, Ewing chose to fol-low the standard chronological approach

used in traditional biographies. To his cred-it, he provides a good balance of prewar,wartime, and postwar material. Ewing feelsstrongly that Flatley was one of a handful ofmiddle-grade officers with combat experi-ence whose vision and wisdom helped deter-mine the direction of Navy fighter doctrineduring the fast moving campaign in thePacific. Not surprisingly, he devotes thegreatest number of pages to this aspect ofFlatley’s career.

Ewing relies heavily on personal inter-views and letters to document the highregard in which Flatley was held by his con-temporaries. Unfortunately, evidence ofFlatley’s impact on fighter doctrine is lesscompelling. Ewing’s cites no official docu-ments describing Flatley’s influence on themakeup of the Navy’s air groups or their tac-tics.

Ewing missed an opportunity to make amuch stronger book. Nevertheless, he haswritten a competent biography that providesgood insights into the professional life of aNavy fighter pilot during World War II andthe workings of naval aviation during thisperiod.

Thomas Wildenberg is the author of twobooks on naval aviation and serves as thecollection manager for the National Museumof American Jewish Military History inWashington, D.C.

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THEAIR FORCEPublished by: The Air Force Historical Foundation

and Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, Inc.

General James P. McCarthy, USAF(Ret)Editor-in-ChiefColonel Drue L. DeBerry, USAF(Ret)Editor

For members of the Air Force Historical Foundation, a very special offer. Purchase thisfine volume for only $60— 20% off the bookstore price of $75.For details contact the Foundation’s Executive Director, Col. Joseph A. Marston,USAF(Ret) at:Voice:(301) 981-2139Fax: (301) 981-3574E-mail: [email protected]

Mets, David R. and William P. Head, Eds. Plottinga True Course: Reflections on USAF StrategicAttack Theory and Doctrine—The Post-World WarII Experience. Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger,2003. Tables. Photographs. Notes. Glossary. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. viii, 351. $74.90 ISBN: 0-275-07717-X

Singer, Bayla. Like Sex with Gods: An UnorthodoxHistory of Flying. College Station: Texas A&MUniversity Press, 2003. Illustrations. Photographs.Notes. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 219.$29.95 ISBN: 1-58544-256-9

Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: DevelopingAir Power for the United States Air Force during theFirst Century of Powered Flight. Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio: Aeronautical Systems Center HistoryOffice, 2003. Maps. Charts. Tables. Notes. Illustra-tions. Photographs. Appendices. Glossary. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xvii, 507. ISBN: 0-16-067599-5

Thole, Lou. Forgotten Fields of America, Volume III:World War II Bases and Training, Then and Now.Missoula, Mont.; Pictorial History Publishing Co.,2003. Photographs. Appendix. Pp. 178 $17.95ISBN: 1-575510-102-5

Werrell, Kenneth P. Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S.Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam toDesert Storm. Washington and London: Smith-sonian Books, 2003. Photographs. Notes. Glossary.Index. Pp. vi, 346. $37.95 ISBN: 1-58834-116-X


Alexander, Thomas E. The Wings of Change: TheArmy Air Force Experience in Texas during WorldWar II [Military History of Texas Series]. Abilene,Tex.: McWhiney Foundation Press, McMurryUniversity, 2003. Maps. Illustrations. Photographs.Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 229. $29.95ISBN: 1-893114-35-X

Batsch, William H. December 8, 1941: MacArthur’sPearl Harbor. College Station: Texas A&M Univer-sity Press, 2003. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Index. Pp. viii, 557. $40.00 ISBN: 1-58544-246-1

Boyne, Walter J. The Influence of Air Power uponHistory. Graetna, La.: Pelican Publishing, 2003.Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 447.$29.95 ISBN: 1-58980-034-6

Darling, Kev. Combat Legend: F–16 Fighting Fal-con. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Books, 2003.

Hall, R. Cargill and Clayton D. Laurie. Early ColdWar Overflights. Chantilly, Va.: NRO History Of-fice, 2003. [2 Vols.]

Jackson, Robert. Combat Legend: de HavillandMosquito. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Books, 2003.Photographs. Appendices. Index. Pp. 96 $14.95Paperback ISBN: 1-84037-338-X

Meilinger, Phillip S. Airwar: Theory and Practice.London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003.Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp.x, 234. $27.50 Paperback ISBN: 0-7146-8266-7

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listedabove is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)3704 Brices Ford Ct.Fairfax, VA 22033Tel. (703) 620-4139e-mail: [email protected]

Books Received


The "What is it?" aircraft in our last issue wasthe Republic XP-47H Thunderbolt.

The Thunderbolt was the most numerousAmerican fighter ever built, but the H model wasnot the familiar "Jug" that fought in every theaterof World War II. A colossal Chrysler XI-2220-IIinverted-V 16-cylinder liquid-cooled, in-line engine—rated at about 2,300 horsepower—powered thisversion of the Thunderbolt.

Two aircraft were covered by this contract(serials 42-23297 and 42-23298).The Chrysler pow-erplant changed the appearance of the Thunderboltconsiderably, but Republic's famous fighter wasbeing used only as a test bed for the engine. TheArmy Air Forces never seriously contemplatedmanufacturing a version of the Thunderbolt withthis arrangement.

According to Roger Freeman, in Thunderbolt:A Documentary History of the Republic P-47, thetwo XP-47H airplanes began on the Evansville,Indiana, production line as P-47D models. Freemanwrote that creation of the H model entailedredesigning the aircraft forward of the firewall,with new duct work to the General Electric CH-5turbosupercharger and modifications to associated

equipment, including intercooler outlet doors. TheXP-47H used a thirteen-foot, four-bladed CurtissElectric propeller.

Construction of the XP-47H took longer thanplanned. The first ship made its initial flight at theEvansville factory on July 27, 1945. By then, theUnited States was on the verge of canceling dozensof aircraft contracts. Fighting ended less than threeweeks after that maiden flight.

Chrysler continued developmental work on theXI-2220 and another, even larger, engine well intothe postwar years. Very little has been publishedabout how the XP-47H contributed to this effortbut, in the end, no production engine ever reachedAir Force units.

Our follow-up photo, obtained from Republic inthe 1950s, shows the first XP-47H running up onthe ramp at Evansville.

Twenty-one readers sent in "History Mystery"postcards. All identified the XP-47H correctly.

Our History Mystery winner is Roland Planteof Bettendorf, Iowa. Roland receives a copy of thebook Air Force One, by the author of this column.Copies of the book are available from Bob at [email protected]

Once more, we present the challenge for our ever-astute readers. See if you can identify this month’s“mystery” aircraft, shown in a photo by DouglasE. Slowiak. This time around, you must identifythe exact model of the aircraft shown.Remember,postcards only. The rules, once again:

1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail thepostcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124.

2. Correctly name the aircraft shown here.Also include your address and telephone number,including area code. If you have access to e-mail,include your electronic screen name. Rememberthat a telephone number is required.

3. A winner will be chosen at random from thepostcards with the correct answer. The winner willreceive an aviation book by this journal’s technicaleditor.

This feature needs your help. In that attic or

basement, you have a photo of a rare or little-known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?Send your pictures or slides for possible use as“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.

And, yes, Bob’s latest book, Air Force One, isstill available in bookstores or directly from Bob.

Contact Bob at [email protected]

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mystery by Robert F. Dorr

REPUBLICXP-47HTHUNDER-BOLT

September 4The Marine Corps Association and the U.S. NavalInstitute will co-host “Forum 2003” in Arlington, Virgi-nia. Contact:

U.S. Naval InstituteBeach Hall291 Woods RoadAnnapolis MD 21402(410) 295-1067, Fax x1048e-mail: [email protected]://www.usni.org/

September 10-11The League of World War I Aviation Historianswill hold its annual meeting in Dayton, Ohio. Contact:

Membership SecretaryLeague of World War I Aviation Historians3127 Penrose PlaceCincinnatti, OH 45211http://www.overthefront.com/

September 12-13The Institute of Contemporary British History willhost a conference on "Britain and the Cold War," at theUniversity of London. Contact:

Tony Shaw Humanities Faculty University of Hertfordshire Watford, Hertfordshire WD2 8ATUnited Kingdom e-mail:[email protected], [email protected]://www.ihr.sas.ac.uk/icbh/bulletinboard.html

September 12-14The US Air Force Museum will host its annual GreatWar Aeroplanes Dawn Patrol Fly-In and display at theMuseum adjacent to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.Contact:

USAF Museum1100 Spaatz St.Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433(937) 255-3286http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/usafm.htm

September 13-17The Air Force Association will hold its annual natio-nal convention at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel inWashington, D.C. This year's theme is "Up From KittyHawk—the 100th Anniversary of Powered Flight."Contact:

AFA1501 Lee HighwayArlington, VA 22209-1198(703) 247-5800http://www.afa.org

September 18-21The Tailhook Association will hold its 46th AnnualConvention at the Nugget Hotel and Casino in Reno,Nevada. Contact:

The Tailhook Association9696 Businesspark Ave.San Diego, CA 92131(858) 689-9223 / (800) 322-4665e-mail: [email protected]://www.tailhook.org

September 19-21The United States Branch of the Western FrontAssociation will hold its annual national seminar atthe Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia.Contact:

Len Shurtleff6915 NW 49th St.Gainesville, FL 32653-1152e-mail: [email protected]

September 23-25The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-nautics will host a Space 2003 Symposium and Exhi-bition in Long Beach, California. Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500Reston, VA 20191-4344(703) 264-7551http://www.aiaa.org

September 24-27The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will hold its47th Annual Symposium and Banquet at the WestinBonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, California. Thisyear's theme is "the Celebration of 100 Years of PoweredFlight." Contact:

SETPP. O. Box 986Lancaster, CA 93584-0986(661) 942-9574, Fax (661) 940-0398e-mail: [email protected]://www.setp.org

October 1-3The USAF Academy Dept. of History will host its20th Military History Symposium, “Winged Crusade:The Quest for American Aerospace Power,” on thegrounds of the USAF Academy in Colorado Springs,Colorado. Contact:

Maj. Mike Terry, USAF (Ret.)2354 Fairchild Dr., Ste. 6F101USAF Academy CO 80840-6246(719) 333-8593, Fax x2970e-mail: [email protected]://www.usafa.af.mil/dfh/sympo20

October 1-4The Northern Great Plains History Conference willhold its annual meeting at the Radisson Hotel in Fargo,North Dakota; the Society for Military History willsponsor NGPHC conference sessions. Contact:

http://personal2.stthomas.edu/jcfitzharris/NGPHCe-mail: [email protected]


Compiled by George Cully

October 6-8The Association of the U.S. Army will hold its annualconvention and symposium at the Washington Conven-tion Center in Washington, DC. This year’s theme is “TheArmy – At War and Transforming.” Contact:

Association of the United States Army2425 Wilson Blvd.Arlington, VA 22201(800) 336-4570e-mail: [email protected]://www.ausa.org/

October 8-9The United States Naval Institute will host its 8thAnnual Naval Institute Warfare Exposition and Sym-posium in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Contact:

U.S. Naval InstituteBeach Hall291 Woods RoadAnnapolis MD 21402(410) 295-1067, Fax x1048e-mail: [email protected]://www.usni.org/

October 17-19The Conference of Historic Aviation Writers willhold its 12th biennial meeting in Oklahoma City, Okla-homa. Contact:

Mathew Rodina, Co-Chair (340) 773-4669orDr. Erik Carlson, Co-Chair(972) 883-2570e-mail: [email protected]

November 18-19The American Astronautical Society will hold its50th Annual Meeting and National Conference at theSouth Shore Harbour Resort in Houston, Texas.Contact:

American Astronautical Society6352 Rolling Mill Place, Suite #102Springfield, VA 22152-2354(703) 866-0020, Fax -3526e-mail: [email protected]://www.astronautical.org

December 15-18The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-nautics will host its 12th International Symposium onSpace Planes and Hypersonic Systems and Techno-logies in Norfolk, Virginia. Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500Reston VA 20191-4344(703) 264-7551http://www.aiaa.org

2004

January 8-11The American Historical Society will hold its 118thannual meeting in Washington, DC. This year’s themeis “War and Peace: History and the Dynamics ofHuman Conflict and Cooperation.” Contact:

The American Historical Societyhttp://www.theaha.org


January 8-11The annual meeting of the American Association forHistory and Computing will be held at the MarriottWardman Park and Omni Shoreham hotels in Wash-ington, DC. This year's theme is "Digital Scholarship:'Doing History' with Technology." Contact:

Dennis Trinkle Executive Director, AAHC DePauw University 603 S. College Julian Center, Room A106 Greencastle, Indiana 46135-1669 Tel.: (765) 658-4592, Fax (877)828-2464e-mail: [email protected]://www.theaahc.org

March 25-28The Organization of American Historians will holdits annual meeting at the Boston Marriott Copley PlaceHotel in Boston, Massachusetts. This year’s theme is“American Revolutions—Transformations in AmericanHistory.” Contact:

OAH Annual Meeting112 North Bryan Ave.Bloomington IN 47408-4199(812) 855-9853e-mail: [email protected]://www.oah.org/meetings

May 5-9The Council on America’s Military Past will holdits 38th Annual Conference at the Eastland Park Hotelin Portland, Maine. Contact:

Col. Herbert M. Hart, USMC (Ret.)Executive DirectorCouncil on America’s Military PastPost Office Box 1151Fort Myer, VA 22211(703) 912-6124. Fax (703) 912-5666e-mail: [email protected]

May 20-23The Journal of Policy History will host a Conferenceon Policy History to be held in at the Sheraton ClaytonPlaza in St. Louis, Missouri. Contact:

Journal of Policy History Saint Louis University 3800 Lindell Blvd. P. O. Box 56907 St. Louis, MO 63156-0907 http://www.slu.edu/departmens/jphand

June 3-6The Historical Society will hold its National Confe-rence in the Spruce Point Inn, near Boothbay Harbor,Maine. The theme of the conference is "Reflections onthe Current State of Historical Inquiry." Contact:

2004 ConferenceThe Historical Society656 Beacon StreetMezzanine, Boston MA 02215-2010e-mail: historic.bu.eduhttp://www.bu.edu/historic

If you wish to have your event listed, contact:George W. Cully230 Sycamore Creek DriveSpingboro, OH 45066-1342(513) 748-4737e-mail: [email protected]


Out of Print!

After reading the review of PraetorianStarship, a history of the C–130 CombatTalon, in the Summer 2003 issue [Vol. 50,No. 2, p. 48], I contacted the publisher—Air University Press. But I was told thatthe book is out of stock (print?) and thatthey don't intend to reprint it. While Iappreciate your calling attention to inter-esting, little known titles on air powerhistory, but in the future, could you try toget the word out a little earlier?

Ron Nass, Ellicott City, MarylandEditor: The book may be obtained by writ-ing to Air Force Special OperationsCommand (AFSOC/HO), 229 Cody Ave.,Bldg 90382, Hurlburt Field, FL 32544-5273 FAX (850) 884-2877.

General Dixon

Gen. Robert J. Dixon's obituary [AirPower History, Summer 2003, Vol. 50, No.2, p.62] contains unexplained biographi-cal data I find intriguing; to wit: "heentered pilot training in the U. S. ArmyAir Corps, followed by training in theRoyal Canadian Air Force and was com-missioned a pilot officer [equivalent of 2dLt., U.S.] in the RCAF." Did the generalwash out of USAAC training, then subse-quently succeed in Canada? If so, it's astory of perseverance worth telling, espe-cially considering his illustrious career.

Col. R. J. Powers, USAF (Ret.)

Yamamoto and Bin Laden?

In your Summer 2003 issue, Vol. 50, No. 2Air Power History magazine there is anarticle titled, "The Yamamoto Mission,"by Daniel Haulman. On page 32, in themargin, is a statement "Japanese Admi-ral Isoroku Yamamoto was the OsamaBin Laden of World War II." However, inthe article the author's point was thatAmericans in '43 hated Yamamoto asmuch as Americans hate Osama BinLaden today.

To only select this particular portion ofthe author's words for insertion into themargin is reckless, to say the least. Don'tyou have a clue as to how inflammatorythis is and what it states by itself?Yamamoto was not a terrorist! Plus thiswas not the point the author was tryingto make in the first place.

You need to correct this gross negli-gence soon and in your next issue.

Lt. Col. Michael J. Yaguchi, USAF

Editor: Let me remind you that the unpro-voked, dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor,on a Sunday morning, while many ser-vicemen and women slept, resulted innearly as many murders as those slain byBin Laden on September 11, 2001. Theperpetrator of the December 7, 1941attack, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, onthe "date which will live in infamy," willget no apology from me! You may quibbleover the term "terrorist," inasmuch asYamamoto's terrorism was "state spon-sored," but the innocents killed can't tellany difference. The article author's verba-tim phrase is used in the pull quotewhich, incidentally, adjoins the first sen-tence. No meaning was changed and thiswas one of eleven such quotes.

Airplane Aloft at National Air andSpace Museum's Udvar-Hazy Center

On April 30, 2003, the Smithsonian'sNational Air and Space Museum began thedelicate work of hanging historic aircraft atthe Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center, its newcompanion facility at Washington DullesInternational Airport in Northern Virginia.The center opens to the public December 15.

The Loudenslager Stephens Akro La-ser 200 was lifted by crane and hung bycable from one of the aviation hangar's

Letters

News


Canyon County, CA 91351-5417(661) 250-@115

or John Devney #002, Director90 Kimbark Rd.Rochester, NY 14610-2738(585) 381-6174

The 49th Fighter Group Association re-union will be held September 11-14, 2003,in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Contact:

Lt. Col. Ralph Easterling, USAF (Ret.)3800 Shmarock Dr.Charlotte, NC 28215(704) 532-7259

The 390th Strategic Missile Wing (TitanII) will meet September 29-October 3,2003, in Tucson, Arizona. Contact:

AAFMP.O. Box 5693Breckenridge, CO 80424(970) [email protected]

The Air Force Photo Mapping Asso-ciation reunion will be held October 1-3,2003, in Nashville, Tennessee. Contact:

Dwayne and Betty FlattPO Box 3536Jackson, TN 38303-3536(731) 427-7783e-mail: [email protected]

The 306th Bomb Group Associationreunion will be held December 4-7, 2003,in Savannah, Georgia. Contact:

Savannah Marriott Riverfront100 Gen. McIntosh Blvd.Savannah, GA 31401(912) 233-7722; FAX (912) 233-3765e-mail: [email protected]

2004The Association of Air Force Mis-sileers (AAFM) will meet May 19-23,2004, in Omaha, Nebraska. Contact:

AAFMP.O. Box 5693Breckenridge, CO 80424(970) [email protected]

The 610th Air Control and WarningSquadron (618th, 527th, and allSouthern Japan Radar GCI sites).Proposed reunion at Branson, Missouri,in September 2004. Contact:

Marvin Jordahl(904) 739-9337e-mail: [email protected]

ten-story-high arched trusses. The avia-tion hangar—with a length of three foot-ball fields—will ultimately display some200 aircraft. On opening day, seventy willbe in place including thirty-eight suspend-ed at two levels and the remainder at floorlevel. For visitors to experience the sensa-tion of soaring, elevated walkways in theaviation hangar will run parallel to thetwo tiers of suspended airplanes.

With the Laser 200—which he built—pilot Leo Loudenslager performed innova-tive tumbling and twisting routines, win-ning an unprecedented seven U.S. Natio-nal Aerobatic Champion titles and the1980 World Champion title.

The Udvar-Hazy (pronounced OOD-varHAH-zee) Center will eventually housesome 80 percent of the museum's aircraftand large space artifacts, many storedaway for decades. The museum's flagshipbuilding on the National Mall displaysabout 10 percent of the collection. Artifactdeliveries for the center began March 17and will continue on an almost-daily basisleading up to the opening.

The first layer of roofing is nearly com-plete on the center's James S. McDonnellSpace Hangar, which will house America'sfirst space shuttle, Enterprise. The spacehangar will be finished by opening daywith the Enterprise installed and visible,however, the structure will not be accessi-ble to the public until 2004, while Enter-prise undergoes refurbishment. During theinterim, some fifty large space artifacts willbe previewed in the aviation hangar. Thespace hangar will ultimately house some135 large space artifacts.

The National Air and Space Museum,comprised of the Udvar-Hazy Center andthe museum's building on the NationalMall, will be the largest air and space muse-um complex in the world.The Mall buildingis the most popular museum in the world,attracting more than 9,000,000 visitors eachyear. Attendance at the Udvar-Hazy Centeris projected at 3 million people a year.Contact:Peter Golkin, Office of Public AffairsNational Air and Space Museum, MRC 321Smithsonian InstitutionP.O. Box 37012Washington D.C. 20013-7012(202) 633-2374; fax (202) 633-8174www.nasm.si.edu

"Disaster" Scores Victory

We are pleased and proud to announcethat Dr. Edgar F. Raines's article, "Disas-ter off Casablanca: Air Observation Postsin Operation Torch and the Role of Failure

in Institutional Innovation," [Air PowerHistory, Vol. 49, No. 3] was selected as thewinner of the "2002 Distinguished Wri-ting Award" by the U.S. Army HistoricalFoundation. Dr. Raines can be seen in thephoto below.

The Recon Rendezvous 2003 reunionwill be held September 3-6, 2003, inFairborn, Ohio. Co-sponsored by theUSAF Museum and 55th SRW Asso-ciation, all USAF units that flew or sup-ported reconnaissance during the ColdWar are invited. Contact:

John H. Kovacs564 Satrell Dr.Fairborn, OH 45532e-mail: [email protected]

or Bill Ernst410 Greenbriar Ct.Bellevue, NE 68005e-mail: [email protected]

The 27th Air Transport Group (310th,311th, 312th, 325th Ferrying Sqs.;86th, 87th 320th, 321st TransportsSqs.; 519th, 520th Service Sqs.)reunion will be held September 11-13,2003, in Spokane, Washington. Contact:

Fred Garcia6533 W. Altadena Ave.Glendale, AZ 85304(810) 798-8758e-mail: [email protected]

The 459th Bomb Group (World WarII), 15th Air Force reunion will be heldSeptember 18-21, 2003, in Las Vegas,Nevada. Contact:

Harold Sanders #503, Chairman18071 Beneda Lane No. 207

Reunions


General Robert M. Lee1909–2003

Gen. Robert Merrill Lee, USAF (Ret.) died of nat-ural causes on June 29, 2003 in Rockledge, Florida.

Born in Hinsdale, New Hampshire, he grew up inAugusta, Maine, and graduated from the U.S.Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., in June 1931.After attending Air Corps Flying Schools at Randolphand Kelly Fields, Texas, General Lee earned his wingsin October 1932.

Assigned to the 55th Pursuit Squadron (20th Pur-suit Group), at Barksdale Field, Louisiana, he per-formed pilot and squadron officer duties. In early 1934,he was among the Air Corps pilots who flew the per-ilous airmail routes in the central zone.

In May 1937 he was assigned to the First Cavalry(Mechanized) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where he com-manded detachments guarding gold shipments to thefort. The following year he was assigned to the 12thObservation Squadron, Godman Field, also at FortKnox. During 1939 and 1940, Lee served as an aide toGen. Adna R. Chaffee, the "father" of the ArmoredForce. During this time, Lee helped develop coopera-tion between air and ground forces. In 1940, CaptainLee attended the Air Corps Tactical School at

Maxwell Field, Alabama. During 1940-1941 he commanded the 12th Observation Squadron.In late 1941, Major Lee became chief of corps aviation, Headquarters, I Armored Corps, and

later air officer for Armored Force headquarters. Back to Godman Field in 1942, LieutenantColonel Lee organized and commanded the 73d Observation Group. In January 1943, he was pro-moted to colonel and became chief of staff of the First Air Support Command at Morris Field, NorthCarolina. He continued in this position through successive reorganizations and redesignations ofthis command as I Tactical Air Division and the Third Tactical Air Command.

In August 1944, Lee joined the Ninth Air Force in France, where he served as deputy com-mander for operations under Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg and shared credit for defeating Germanyin four major campaigns: Northern France, the Rhineland, the Ardennes, and Central Europe. Herose to brigadier general in January 1945. After the war, the Ninth Air Force took up its occupa-tion role, Lee served as chief of staff.

Late in 1945, General Lee was assigned to the air section of the Theater General Board at BadNauheim as it completed its analyses and reports on the European campaigns.

In January 1946, Lee returned to the United States and in April he became the first chief ofstaff of the newly organized Tactical Air Command (TAC) at Langley Field, Virginia, where heremained until August, when he entered the first class of the National War College. In July 1947,after graduation from the NWC, Lee was assigned to TAC, as deputy commanding general. Duringthis assignment, in February 1948, he was promoted to major general. He served as commandinggeneral from November 1948 until July 1950.

In Memoriam


From Langley AFB, Lee went to Eglin AFB, Florida, and assumed command of Air Task Group3.4, a special assignment to Operation Greenhouse that culminated in the atomic bomb test atEniwetok, during spring 1951. Following this assignment, General Lee was named the deputydirector of plans under the deputy chief of staff for operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force,Washington, D.C., with a simultaneous duty as the Air Force member of the Joint Strategic PlansCommittee. Shortly thereafter he became the director of plans.

In November 1953, General Lee was assigned to command the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forceand the Twelfth U.S. Air Force in Europe. The former constituted the largest tactical air forces inAllied Command Europe, consisting of all United States, French, and Canadian air forces on thecontinent of Europe committed to the Supreme Allied Commander. In June 1956, command of thetwo air forces was separated. General Lee retained command of the Allied Tactical Air Force. Whenhe returned to the United States in July 1957, he became commander of the Ninth Air Force, (TAC)

One year later, on July 15, 1958, General Lee assumed the rank of lieutenant general andarrived at United Nations Command, headquarters, Seoul, Korea, to become chief of staff, UnitedNations Command and U.S. Forces, Korea. In September 1959 he returned to the United States tobecome vice commander of the Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, becomingcommander in March 1961. He was promoted to general on June 4, 1963 and became air deputy tothe supreme allied commander, Europe, on August 1, 1963.

A command pilot with more than 9,000 hours flying time, General Lee included among hisawards and decorations the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, AirMedal and Army Commendation Medal. He also wore the French Legion of Honor in the grade ofCommander and the Croix de Guerre with Palm.

General Lee is survived by his wife, Mary F. Lee, of Rockledge, Florida.

We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which arewell-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articlessubmitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publicationat the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate thisat the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historicalcontext, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.

Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manualof Style (University of Chicago Press). Use civilian dates and endnotes. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously,the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographicaldetails, to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages,including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables mustbe clearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should benumbered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.

If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the man-uscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with thename of the author, title of the article, and the software used. WordPerfect, in any version number, is preferred. Otherword processors that can be accommodated are WordStar, Microsoft Word, Word for Windows, and AmiPro. As a lastresort, an ASCII text file can be used.

There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, P.O. Box

10328, Rockville, MD 20849-0328, e-mail: [email protected].

Guidelines for Contributors


Documents

Air Force History - FALL 2003 - Volume 50, Number 3 · 2017. 5. 1. · AIR POWER History / FALL 2003 3 Did you ever wonder why the best close air support plane of World War II—the