2
12 • Fires, March-April, Fires strong This year marks the 100-year anniversa- ry of the U.S. participation in World War I. It was in 1917 that Gen. John Pershing and his American Expeditionary Force embarked onto the shores of France to begin training and readiness into what became known globally as The Great War. As America en- tered World War I, new technologies from the Industrial Age were introduced into combat. These became overwhelming com- bat force multipliers to those who mastered their lethality; one such asset was the intro- duction of the aero-plane. The aero-plane soon became adapted by war planners to serve in a variety of missions ranging from aerial observation to long-range bombing missions deep behind enemy lines. By 1915, the Germans developed bombers that ter- rorized Paris and by 1917 Germany’s Goth bombers were crossing the English Chan- nel and successfully bombing London. To counter this new emerging threat, the war department reached out to the coastal artil- lery and elected Brig. Gen. James Shipton to be the first chief of the Anti-Aircraft Service. Shipton soon departed for France where he stood up the first American Anti-Aircraft School Sept. 26, 1917, while in theater with the AEF. Original class of 1917 The first course of 25 coastal artillery officers, received their anti-aircraft instruc- tion from French officers. After completing their training, this first group of officers served as cadre for the artillery section of the American AA School. Two more sec- tions of instruction were soon added to the school: a machine gun section and the searchlight section. Shipton augmented these two courses of instruction by out- sourcing other branches within the AEF. The machine-gun training was provided by infantry officers and the searchlight in- struction was taught by engineer officers. In all, the American AA School produced 659 officers and 12,000 enlisted Soldiers by war’s end. Doctrine and tactics The AA Service had a maxim that “fir- ing should not be adjusted, but prepared.” This maxim was adopted because of the inaccuracy of the 75 mm cannon and aim- ing adjustments became an impossible task. American gun crews developed the practice of preregistering their guns. This pre-registration consisted of firing a volley of rounds into the air, to determine where the desired air burst would occur. With multiple gun systems concentrating on the same avenue of approach, “volume of Fires” soon became the solution to the aeri- al problem. This solution was also a result of how the aircraft was typically employed. Aircraft pilots used terrain features to nav- igate, and they preferred linear routes. These observations of aircraft techniques allowed AA units to develop plans that employed their guns along these predicted routes. Diversity of Fires along these routes was also important. Machine guns were used against low-altitude targets, while air bursts delivered from the 75 mm engaged the high-altitude threat. The Anti-Aircraft Service also devel- oped a doctrine of deterrent Fires. It had become widespread knowledge that “al- though hiing a plane was common, bring- ing one down was regarded as a fortunate incident.” From this lesson learned, American AA students were instructed on techniques to deter the aircraft and keep it at a distance. Instructors drilled into the students that forcing an aircraft to fly at a higher alti- tude would decrease their accuracy, as was the belief that a successful volume of fire would discourage the pilot from reaching their objective. The American AA Service was the prin- cipal user of searchlights during World War I. In all, the AA Service had 34 searchlight platoons activated while in theater. Most Europeans believed searchlights were im- practical and would give frontline positions away to enemy targeting. The Americans however, adopted the searchlights primari- ly for rear defense. The searchlight made an impact as a deterrent to nighime-bombing raids. Their success was achieved, in part, by the ability to track and highlight a threat. However, the nighime tracking of aircraft by a searchlight hindered a pilot’s ability to see and would cause them to become dis- oriented and ineffective, often abandoning the target. The highlight for the newly formed service came to fruition May 18, 1918. A German observation plane was crossing be- tween the security of the German lines and into the buffer of no-man’s land, trying to collect information on AEF and French unit positions. An alert crew of the 2nd Anti- aircraft Baery was located approximately 2,700 meters away and was armed with two French 75 mm guns. As the crew prepared the shell fuses for the desired altitude, Lt. A. T. Slaten calculated the necessary data on range, location and speed. Soon the air was filled with the burst of powder and fragmentation, and the effects provided results. The German observation plane went into a dive, followed by an un- controlled spiral, finally crashing into the 500 meters of ground known as no-man’s land. The crew managed to survive the crash and was viewed scrambling from the wreckage and behind German lines. That night, a French infantry patrol ventured across friendly lines to strip the enemy plane of its machine guns and other useful equipment. The patrol was also successful in cuing away a piece of the aircraft underbelly and later presented it to the American baery commander, Capt. E. A. Mellon, as a souve- nir and confirmation of the American’s first recorded kill. By the end of the war, America’s AA Ser- vice was the most successful anti-aircraft service among the allies. The success was aributed to the tenets of good training, the developed doctrine and to the skill and dis- cipline of the crews operating the weapon systems. When comparing the data, it took a British gun crew 10,000 rounds and the French crew 6,000 rounds to down a single plane. But, it took only 600 rounds for the Americans to bring one down. First to fire! David Christensen is the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School historian at Fort Sill, Okla. Air defense artillery in World War I By David Christensen 12 • Fires, March-April, Fires strong

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Page 1: Air defense artillery in World War I in WWII.pdfglobally as The Great War. As America en-tered World War I, new technologies from the Industrial Age were introduced into combat. These

12 • Fires, March-April, Fires strong

This year marks the 100-year anniversa-ry of the U.S. participation in World War I. It was in 1917 that Gen. John Pershing and his American Expeditionary Force embarked onto the shores of France to begin training and readiness into what became known globally as The Great War. As America en-tered World War I, new technologies from the Industrial Age were introduced into combat. These became overwhelming com-bat force multipliers to those who mastered their lethality; one such asset was the intro-duction of the aero-plane. The aero-plane soon became adapted by war planners to serve in a variety of missions ranging from aerial observation to long-range bombing missions deep behind enemy lines. By 1915, the Germans developed bombers that ter-rorized Paris and by 1917 Germany’s Goth bombers were crossing the English Chan-nel and successfully bombing London. To counter this new emerging threat, the war department reached out to the coastal artil-lery and elected Brig. Gen. James Shipton to be the first chief of the Anti-Aircraft Service. Shipton soon departed for France where he stood up the first American Anti-Aircraft School Sept. 26, 1917, while in theater with the AEF.Original class of 1917

The first course of 25 coastal artillery officers, received their anti-aircraft instruc-tion from French officers. After completing their training, this first group of officers served as cadre for the artillery section of the American AA School. Two more sec-tions of instruction were soon added to the school: a machine gun section and the searchlight section. Shipton augmented these two courses of instruction by out-sourcing other branches within the AEF. The machine-gun training was provided by infantry officers and the searchlight in-struction was taught by engineer officers. In all, the American AA School produced 659 officers and 12,000 enlisted Soldiers by war’s end.Doctrine and tactics

The AA Service had a maxim that “fir-ing should not be adjusted, but prepared.”

This maxim was adopted because of the inaccuracy of the 75 mm cannon and aim-ing adjustments became an impossible task. American gun crews developed the practice of preregistering their guns. This pre-registration consisted of firing a volley of rounds into the air, to determine where the desired air burst would occur. With multiple gun systems concentrating on the same avenue of approach, “volume of Fires” soon became the solution to the aeri-al problem. This solution was also a result of how the aircraft was typically employed. Aircraft pilots used terrain features to nav-igate, and they preferred linear routes. These observations of aircraft techniques allowed AA units to develop plans that employed their guns along these predicted routes. Diversity of Fires along these routes was also important. Machine guns were used against low-altitude targets, while air bursts delivered from the 75 mm engaged the high-altitude threat.

The Anti-Aircraft Service also devel-oped a doctrine of deterrent Fires. It had become widespread knowledge that “al-though hitting a plane was common, bring-ing one down was regarded as a fortunate incident.”

From this lesson learned, American AA students were instructed on techniques to deter the aircraft and keep it at a distance. Instructors drilled into the students that forcing an aircraft to fly at a higher alti-tude would decrease their accuracy, as was the belief that a successful volume of fire would discourage the pilot from reaching their objective.

The American AA Service was the prin-cipal user of searchlights during World War I. In all, the AA Service had 34 searchlight platoons activated while in theater. Most Europeans believed searchlights were im-practical and would give frontline positions away to enemy targeting. The Americans however, adopted the searchlights primari-ly for rear defense. The searchlight made an impact as a deterrent to nighttime-bombing raids. Their success was achieved, in part, by the ability to track and highlight a threat. However, the nighttime tracking of aircraft

by a searchlight hindered a pilot’s ability to see and would cause them to become dis-oriented and ineffective, often abandoning the target.

The highlight for the newly formed service came to fruition May 18, 1918. A German observation plane was crossing be-tween the security of the German lines and into the buffer of no-man’s land, trying to collect information on AEF and French unit positions. An alert crew of the 2nd Anti-aircraft Battery was located approximately 2,700 meters away and was armed with two French 75 mm guns. As the crew prepared the shell fuses for the desired altitude, Lt. A. T. Slaten calculated the necessary data on range, location and speed.

Soon the air was filled with the burst of powder and fragmentation, and the effects provided results. The German observation plane went into a dive, followed by an un-controlled spiral, finally crashing into the 500 meters of ground known as no-man’s land. The crew managed to survive the crash and was viewed scrambling from the wreckage and behind German lines. That night, a French infantry patrol ventured across friendly lines to strip the enemy plane of its machine guns and other useful equipment.

The patrol was also successful in cutting away a piece of the aircraft underbelly and later presented it to the American battery commander, Capt. E. A. Mellon, as a souve-nir and confirmation of the American’s first recorded kill.

By the end of the war, America’s AA Ser-vice was the most successful anti-aircraft service among the allies. The success was attributed to the tenets of good training, the developed doctrine and to the skill and dis-cipline of the crews operating the weapon systems. When comparing the data, it took a British gun crew 10,000 rounds and the French crew 6,000 rounds to down a single plane. But, it took only 600 rounds for the Americans to bring one down.

First to fire!David Christensen is the U.S. Army Air

Defense Artillery School historian at Fort Sill, Okla.

AirdefenseartilleryinWorldWarI

By David Christensen

12 • Fires, March-April, Fires strong

Page 2: Air defense artillery in World War I in WWII.pdfglobally as The Great War. As America en-tered World War I, new technologies from the Industrial Age were introduced into combat. These

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13

A group of U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Service Soldiers demonstrate their weapon system on the National Mall, Washington, D.C., 1918. (Harris and Ewing/Library of Congress)

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13