AIPD Subcourse CA0033: Principles of War

8/16/2019 AIPD Subcourse CA0033: Principles of War

1/87


2/87

GENERAL

INSTRUCTIONS

This subcourse consists

of three lessons and an examination.

You

will

find

the three

lessons

in this lesson book; the examination

will be

sent

to

you separately when you have completed all lessons.

Check

all

contents of

this

envelope as i t e m i z e d ~ e ; l o \ V t Q e n s u r e that you have all

the texts , materia ls , lessotts', and

'answer

sheets

req)l ired

to

solve

lessons

one

through

three.,

The

answer sheets for

individual

lessons are grouped

together

in

the

back

of the lesson book. They,i;l:reiii:reyerse order

to

ass is t in

their

removal.

Be certain

that the n u ~ b ~ : J i o 1 l J ~ 'answer sheet corresponds

with

the lesson you are completing.

' , , , , ,

You may submit

any

or all of the sson's'lutions for grading at one

t ime. Mail the answer shee, t \n the addressed enyelope inclosed.

- I

i

. / /

s r i c . ; ~ . e s s f u l l y completed the


3/87

Q t J E ~ r ) Q N N A . I R E

YOUR ASSISTANCE IS NEED:F:b

CA

SUBCOURSE

33, PRINCIPLES

OF

WAR

Y

our'ev!"luaiion of

this slibcourse

is

i r r i p o t i a l l - ~ t o U $

i'n

our

effort

to

give you the best nonresident

instruction

possible.

: P I ~ a ~ e

ar iswerthe

items on this questionnaire after you have

completed

all of

the

lessons.

Your comments and suggestions will assis t in improving the quality of

this subcourse and

the

Army

Extension Course Program in

general. t

is ~ g g e s t e d

that you

~ k n o t s as Y ~ t 1 study this subcourseandthen

sub-

m i t ' t \ y : q F ' ~ B p l e t e d

~ u e , t i , o n n ~ i , ~ ~ . ~ i l ' h , y?,;r

' s o ~ t 1 i : i o ~ t o t ~ E f

~ ~ a t t l i n ~ t i o n .

I f

m o ~ ~ ~ p , ? c ; : e , i s n ~ ~ d ~ d f01 Y ? t 1 ~ , . c ~ m m e n t s US!! additio,ria1t>aper.

1.

Are ,You satisfied with

what

you have

l e a ~ r i e d as a

result "ftakirig

this

subcourse? (Strike out one; i f answer

is

"no", explain.)

(Yes) (No)

Z. Do

you

feel that this subcourse has adequately covered the purpose

prescr ibed

for i t in the introduction?

(Strike

out one;

i f

answer is

"no",

l ist

that which

':'las

not cover

ed. )

(Yes) (No)

3.

Was

there sufficient r e £ ~ i ~ i i \ ~ k j r i i a : t e ~ d . i l k ~ i ~ d e d with the

subcourse

to

enable

you to answer

the questions correct ly? (Strike out one; i f

answe r is

"no" I

g ~ v t , , ~ p : ~ cific i ~ ~ ~ ~ : ; e e s , b e ) / ? ] , , \ , ,

))

(Yes)

(No)

.

/

-:1

i\:J

1 November 1959


4/87

4.

5.

6.

Are there

any

questions t requirements

t

situations

t

or ins truc tions

that

are in

er ror , confusing

t

ordifffcult

to

understand? If

SOt

l ist

the

specific

cases

h ~ r e

List

h e r ~

any

suggestions

you

have

for making this

sul;>course

more

i n t e r e i l t i n g ~ n d l o ~ informative;

j

• ,

I f yPu d e s ~ x ~

a

reply

t o ~ p e i £ i comments

you

have m.ade above

t

l ist

j : :

.

• > • , • _ ; .; .: . l .

be low the o m m ~ n t s o n which

you

want.more information

t

and

PRINT

your

n a m ~ ~ ~ d

a d c i ~ e s s in

the

space p r ~ v i d e d l ino reply is

desired

t

you+

signature

i s

optionaL

.

. L. ; :

,

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MAILlNG

ADDRESS

CITY

DATE MAILED

STATE

,


5/87

CA SUBCOURSE 33

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

An

understanding of

the

principles

of

war is essential to professional

understanding

of military

history. Military history

is

of

interest to

the

professional officer because of

the lessons which

can be learned f rom past

mili tary successes

or failures.

Any

reader

of military history can grasp

the sequence of events

which led to

a

particular victory

or

defeat, but

the

professional must

evaluate and analyze the events if

he is

to

profit f rom

past

mili tary

experience.

This evaluation and

analysis must be conducted

within the framework

of

the

principles

of

war, because these

are the

prin-

ciples which

regularly operate in

war, and any lesson

taught in a

particular

operation

will

reveal itself

as

an application,

or

lack

of

application,

of

the

principles.

The

principles of war

are not confined to the combat rms in the

presence

of an

enemy, but

are

applicable to

all branches

of

all

services in

operations, combat or otherwise, and

at all

echelons of command.

Each

principle

complements

the

other,

and in some

instances

they even conflict.

One principle

cannot

be

applied to the

neglect

of the others.

Sometimes

the application of one or

more

principles

may

have to

be

p,artially sacrif iced

because

of

the

circumstances

existing at the

t ime.

The considered

balance

of

these principles,

to

best

meet

any

specific situation, is the

aim

of

the

successful

military leader.

This

subcourse consists

of

three lessons and an exam ination,

as

follows:

Lesson 1, Principles of War.

2,

Fundamentals

of

Offense.

3, Fundamentals of Defense and Retrograde.

Examination

Eight· 8) credit

hours

are given for

the

successful completion of this

subcourse.

You

are not l imited as to the

number of hours that

you

may

spend on anyone

lesson

or the examination. For statistical purposes you

re

requested

to enter

in

the space provided on

the

answer

sheet

the

total

number

of

hours

spent on each lesson.

1


6/87

Credit Hours - -

Text Assignment

LESSON 1 -

PRINCIPLES

OF

WAR

- 3

- - - - - - - - - FM

100-5,

para

69-78.

Attached Memo. , App. 1-4.

Materials Required

- - - - - - - - - -

None

Lesson Objective - - - - - - -

- - To acquaint you w ith the principles

o wa r and the ir .

a.pplication;a)},d

to

examine some con tempora ry wri ti ngs

tha

critically

analyze

the principles

o war.

Detach

the

ans vversheet,

enter

your solutions

as

indic ated, and

mail

in

the addressed envelope provided.

ATTACHED

M:E:MORANDUM

. . . : : .:.

.

1.

GENERAL. The

ar ts

sciences ,

and professions have thei r basic

principles ,

axioms,

and laws. The a rt and science

of

war

are

not excepted.

P.riP,c:iplesapplicabl to wa.rfare hilyellvQlved thro\ lgh the

centuries

. . Their

o r ~ g ~ l l , c l e : r i v e

from both successes

and fa ilu re s in war.

Some p r i n c i p l ~ s

date

back

to

the

writings

of

the

pre

-Chris t ian

e ra

(Sun

Tzu,

505

B.

C.

,

had

13 p : r i n c ~ i J i l ~ e s ) . NapolQn l is ts 1 1 5 J ; n a ? ' ~ m Clausewitz 71 r inciples, and

NelsonJ. ).. .

:The

p r i l l , c i p ~ l l s

war are officially

enunci l ted

in one form

or

another

by all majoll;w,ilitary serv ices , American

and

foreign. The US

Navy, in

i ts NWP

10, Naval

Warfare,

l is ts 12 principles

of war

applicable

to naval warfare.

The US

A ir F orce in

i ts

AFM 1-2,. USAF Basic Doctrine,

l is ts n i ~ e

principles . The

US

Army

l is ts nine pr inHpte sClf war .

Some

allied

mil it a ry se rv ices

have

more ,

others

less .

The

FreMh:);

£ o · r e ~ a m p l e ha.

e.

y.

tWQ

p:dnl:ipIe

s -

-unity

9 £ . , w i l ~ a n , ~ ; ,freedom

of action -,V b,ile

,r e c o g n i ~ i n g e c o n ( l m y o f .

£ol , ce.Nqt

~ l

~ a . t i ~ l i l

u ~ ~

t h ~

same

terms; US t erminology di ffe rs somewha.t

among

the t h r ~ e n i i j o r ;

Services .

The following l ist shows

the t i t les of US

p r i n c i p l e s ~ r War nd

,th0.S¢.pf rsqme,.otb,er: m ~ l ~ t a r y powers : r : :

2


7/87

US

Army

uSNavy USAF

.

British

Soviet

a. Objective Objective Objective

Selection

and

Advance and

maintenance consolidation

of aims

b. Offensive

.

Offensive

.Of:fensive

Offensive

Offensive

action

c. Simplicity

Simplicity Administr ation

d. Unity of

'dontrol

'Control

Cooperation

Combined

,corIim.arid

Cooperation arms

(listed as

"separate

principles)

e. Mass

Concentration Concentration Concentration Concentration

"

of force

£.

Economy of

Economy Economy of Economy of Economy of

force

~ f f R r t

I'lffort

force

g.

~ e u V l l r

Mobility

Flexibility Flexibility

Maneuver

and

' •

•

: :

r, -','

" , -',

,

!';

:irlitilitive

;

.:;

h. s..irprise'·

s:ufprise

\'Surpri'se"

Surpiis'I'l' SUi-prise arid

c

",

1 ,

: j ' _ ~

','.f,

,

I :

'.I,:,. .;

'I

deteption

,'(

'"

i

i .

Security

Security

Sebur'lty'

Security A'de

quate

r ~ s e r v e s

j .

Morijle

Mairitenanc'El',

"d'Morale

'of1rt


8/87

all

branches of all

services

in all

operations, combat

or otherwi,se, and at

all echelons

of

command.

Innovations, whether in the

category of

materiel , organi:;;ation,

or techniques, have had a profound effect on tact ics and techniques.

Each

new

developm,mt (bow and arrow, gunpowder, poison gas, tanks, airplanes,

parachutes,

divisions, corps, nuclear

weapons, to

name

a few) has pro -

voked

two

questions:

How

can,the

maximum

advantage be gained from the

e ~ p l o i t a t i ; m of the

developmeI).t? What

is the best

,defense

against i t?

In

each

instance,

solution

is found

in the

application of

common

se,nse. The

resul ts have brought

changes in

emphasis

in

application of

the

principles

of ~ wit)1out fundamental change

in

the principles

themselves.

A principle of

war

is a basic mili tary

rule

or guide which,

if

applied

~ n t e l l i g e n t l y increases ,the probability of

producing

favorable re -

suits. The

principles

of war

are

aids

in

grasping

the

essent ials of the art .

In

essence,

the

principles

of

war

constitute

a

collection

of

i tems

of

comiinon

sense

and they

mljst be

understood

ip

their

entire,ty

in

that light-not as

dogma

to

be rigidly

applied.

AlLnine

pripciples most often complement

each other

apd

I\qrmally aremljtua,lly depeJJ.dent.

However, in some

situa

tions

they

conflict.

The

copsidered balance of

these principles

to best

meet

each, specific situation is ,the ' a imof the successful mili tary leader.

These

principles

may

be

learned in a, short

t ime,

but a whole lifetime cap

be spent in the study of their application

ip war.

Me,re

knowledge

and understanding of the principles of war will

certainly

not

provideus

with the solution

of

a

problem

of

war.

The

humap

elem.ept-cqurage,

morale, discipline, leadership-has a direct bearing ort

the outcome of aPy operat ion andis s 9 ~ i t a l to success

tha t i t

deserves our

copstant

~ t t e n t i o n . Bowever, k n ~ w l e d g e and understanding of the principles

of war will

lend

order and guidance to a mind t rained to analyze facts,

form

C O P c ~ 1 l I ~ i o p s a n c 1 a ~ l . ~ v e at a

decision.

In the#nc\l a n ~ l y s i s ,

sound

judgmeptapd t a c t i c ~ , sepseare of vital imPortance to the successful appli

cation

of t h ~ ,

p r i n c i p l e s o tw a l \ . ,

"

Presepted below are

key

thoughts

applicable

to each

pripciple,

witbra l:)J;iefhistorical e ~ < l . m p l ~

ot,

eachan;d,further

p e r t ~ n e n t

discussion.

3., ,Pl3,j"ll:CTIVE.

Every I l 1 . ~ 1 i t a r Y , 9 p e t a , t i o n

must be, directed toa,

clearly taipable Q b ~ e c t i v e . ' The

de trt1ction of

the enemy's armed

f o r c e s l l . I ) . d l l i s V i l l t 9 A ~ l ; l . t j . s

the ultim'lte

m ~ l i ~ a ; y

ob

jective

of war. The objective 'of each operation mustcontrtbute ,to

this

ultimate

objective. ,

Each,

inte,rmediate objective must

be such tha.t its

attainrnent

will'

most

directly';

quickly, \1.nd economi'cally

'contribute

to

the

, , : _

.

. , . ,.

4


9/87


10/87


11/87

Because

of

the immense destructive effort

of nuclear

weapons,

great

imbalances of forces may be

quickly eliminated

or

even reversed,

Thus,

a

commander

must be prepared to shift

more

qUickly and

more

f re-

quently

f rom

the defense to

the

offense than has been

true

in the

past.

Those quick

changes

f rom

defensive to

offensive

and back again may

tend

to obscure

the

dividing line

between

these two

types

of combat as we know

them today,

but the offensive, the

retention of the initiative

and

freedom of

action,

will

remain

as

a

principle.

The role of Civil Affairs

in

the offensive is to control ,the civilian

population, prevent

them from interfering

with combat

operations

and

dis-

ruptingsupply l ines, and to marshal

local

resources to

assist

the command-

er in

his mission.

5. SIMPLICITY.

Simplicity

is

a quality

or

state.

of

being clear and

uncomplicated and is

essential

in plans if they are to

be effectively executed.

A

simple

plan

is easier to execute

than a complicated

plan

and thus

more

likely to

be su'ccessful.

Plans must

work the

first

t ime

in

battle.

Rarely

is there

opportunity

for rehearsal and the stakes are high.

Simple

plans

facilitate retention of

flexibility,

enhance control and coordination of fires

and

movement,

and

decrease support

problems.

Simple

plans permit con-

tinuation

of

execution

in the

face

df

interruption of

control

means.

Simplicity takes on added significance with the advent

of nuclear

weapons. Simplicity

helps

to

create

order and the

ato

. c

battlefield

will

be

a

more disorderly place

than the

nonatomicone.·

Iso, ,the

simple plan

is

the

£lexibleplan ,and

flexibility is

paramount wh the entire

balance

of

forces may be

altered'in an

instant,

o r a

comma

a

echelon be' wiped

out

in a

flash. Operations must

go

6n 'anopportlUli ie's mus.j:ibee'Jtploited in

spite of misslng echelons or ackof


12/87

6.

UNITY

OF COMMAND.

The

principle of

unity of

cOnUnand re -

quires that

for

every task there should be

unity of effort

under one respon-

sible

commander.

Unity of effort is the

coordinated action

of o ~ r forces

toward a cOmmon

goaL

Unity

of

command should

ensure

unity

of

effo;rt

and thus apply the maximum power of available

forces

against

the

objective

at

the

decisive t ime and place.

The unity of

effort achieved

by UN forces

in Korea is an

example of

the principle

of

unity

of

command.

A ,nuclear weapon will have effect not only

in

the zone of a

division,

including the air space over it, but may well spread over

into

the

zones

of

the adjacent

divisions. Therefore, the

decision to employ such

a V/eapollmust

res t in

t,he hands

of

the

commander who

is

in

the

position

of

having

overall knowledgl'l of the situation

and control

of all

affected units.

The successful attack

of

fleeting targets

with

nuclear weapons means that

t h ~ i n t e l ~ ~ g e n c e system, the communication system, the supply

of

weapons,

and

the

delivery means must come

directly

under

a

single commander.

There

will

not be

t ime for conference,

compromise, and vague

cooperation.

Unity of

effort

must be ensured by unity

of command.

All commanders

secur

, \

the

effect

of unity of command by

conducting operations in

the

absence

of

specific instructions as their knowledge

indicates

their

higher

command woul

dire

ct if

able.

The military nature of

Civil

Affairs

operations

requires

that

responsibility

and

authoriWfor the establishment

and

conduct of

those

activi-

t ies

be vested

in

the senior

commander.

The

commander

must a,ppreciate

that

the

establishment of

good

public relations, which underlies all civil

affairs,

is

a

command

responsibil i ty.

SUbo;rdinates

may

be

charged

with

s p e c i £ i c , , , ~ s i g n m e n t s or missions

but, the c0:tnn'l.aIlder himself must establish

the tone

of civil affairs.

t is a profound

c,ommand

responsibility

at

all level

of command.,

7. MASS.

The

principle

of

mass demands

the

achievement

of

super i -

ority o P9vver at

the

decisive place and t ime for

the

decisive purpose.

The

principle

of

mass

involves

more than

Just

superior numbers. t includes

use

of all, ava,ilable .facilities, superiority of firepower, supply, supporting

services, fighting skill,

r , e s o l \ l t i o n , d , i s c i p l ~ n e ,

c;ourage, administration, and

leadersh,ip.

For,

the

Allied

c r o s s ~ c h a ~ e l o p e r a t i o n i n

9 4 ~

to

,knock

German

out of

the war,

the

largest

invasion force

the

world

had

ever known was con-

c e n t r a t e d ~

,the United Kingdom. was a

carefully

balanced, team

of

Army,

N a v y ; a n d ~ i ; r ;Force

elements, thorOughly trained

for

i ts tasks, superbly,

equipped,

,and l l ~ p p o r j ; e d

The

focusing

of

thee££ort

of this '

:forc;euP9n the

beac;hes,

of Nq;rrnand,Y'\lIldertaken

even

though

t w ~

eJC.Pec;ted t,9reduC;,e

potential

result,S in j;he Med;te;rranean Theater is, anillu,stratiQn6f the a,)ilpli

cation

of the

principle of mass.

8


13/87


14/87

Necessary supplies are

moved

f rom

unaffected areas

to

points

of need

and

only where such

supplles

are

inadequate

are

they

augmented by United

State

s stipplie

s.

Civil Affairs operat ions

contribute

materially to the mili tary

operat ion. ' l : 'heresources 'of the

area

are mobil ized in support

of

our

forces

as well as fo r

the

sat isfact ion

of the

comma nder 's responsibil i ty to meet

minimum

essential

civilian

requirements.

Assis tance

is

provided the tech-

nical

services

in

the

local

procurement

of

required

supplies at

a

considerable

saving in

t ime, shipping space,

and, often, money. Civil Affairs

elements

ass is t in the

procurement

of port and rai l

facil i t ies, communicat ions, storage

facilities,

necessary housing and

utili t ies.

They a.ssist in

obtaining local

civi l ian

labor

for

essential labor that would

'otherwise

require

the

diversion

of combat

troops.

The

extensive

Civil Affairs

organizat ion

functioning

COn-

stantly

at

the grasSrocits level conStitutes

an effective

source of informa.tion

and intelligence whie:h is of vital importance in the pursuit of

combat.

9. MANEUVER.

The

principle

of maneuver states that

one's mili tary

resources must

be

posi t ioned

to favor the

accomplishment

of

the

mission.

Maneuver is the mdvement

of

combat power to provide the necessary mass

at the proper tim ll arid place for a:ttaintnentof the objective. Maneuver en-

hances combat power

since

orily

through

maneuver can

we

so

position

Our

mili tary

resources

that

they can

apply their full

power,

or

mass , at the

decisive

point

and t ime. The encirclement of some

300,000

German t roops

in the Ruhr

by

the

t s Army

during World

War II is an outstandirig 'example

of

the principle

of manettver. Maneuver ls most

effective

when not disclosed

to the

enemy.

The principle of maneuver is not l imited to the movement

or

maneuver

of troops

alone. There is maneuver

of

fires and maneuver

of

logistics,

ma:nemver

of the

means

for controlling'

areas

and populations, and

maneuver of

poli t ical force.

In applying

this p:t'inciple;

t ime, distance,a.nd

the means and power

of

maneuver must

be

~ o n s i e r

Toappl)T maneuver

to establish

the cbncentrat ion

of

forces or

mass required

at

the decisive point

and

t im.e,mobility is essential.

This

mobil i ty

may

be achieved by improvement

in ground

means

but

will be l imited

in flexibility

uhle'ss' it exploits, increasingly a i r mearisof t ransport . t

mearis that 'a .r'suppl'y

or even

air lines of corrimuriication must

be

used to full

capacity routinely

ra ther than

considered as

an

emergEmcy means ofs,upply.

Small, mobile, bat t legroups of all a rms containing their own fire and logis-

t ical support , triav

be

isolated for longpet iods Qf t ime deep' in the enemy

rear .

Their

coritinuEtdexistence m ay'

welT 'depend upon their mobility. <

i· l

10


15/87

The application of

even

such force as is required to win a war

has a

t remendous

effect

upon the civil population,

and

the affected civil

population, in

turn, can have

a tremendous

effect

upon the commander 's

ability

to

continue the application of

required

force. A previously

normal

populac,," can

become

an.uncontrolled

mob,

a

multitude of

scared,

hurt,

and

disrupted people who. seek only to flee from further injury with what

ever possessions as are intact and obtain, by any

means

possible" that

which is

necessary

to remain alive. They clutter the roads and interfere

with.,

or

preven,t, the

movement

of

troops and supplies.

Their

injured ring

about the combat corrunander's medical facilities in numbers beyond their

capacity to treat . They take from

his

supplies, i f for no other reason than

to

stay

alive. Their numbers screen enemy agents and saboteurs who

harass troops f rom the rear They do all

this

and more; they all

but

s'top

the milit,l.ry

operation in

its tracks,

unless proper

action is ta) ::en to anti

cipate and plan

in

advance such civil affairs controls as will effectively

prevent

civilian interference with military operations and meet

the

emer-

gency requirements of

a war - torn people.

10. ,SURPRISE.

The

principle of

surprise connotes striking

the

enemy

when,

where, and,i ). a manner for

which

he is unprepared. Secrecy

of plans, concealment of

movements and

strengths,

feints and

demon

strat ions,

and

rapidity of

movemel).t

all con,tribute

to

surprise as

do

resourcefulness

and

aring

•

Combat e e p t i ~ n and psychological warfare contribute to

surprise . There may be. surprise in. t ime ,

place, direction,

size of force,

tact ics,

weapons,

or supply considerations. Surprise can be effected by

varying operating

procedures,

by

making

use

of

unfavor;l.ble

terrain,

by

the

employment

of new

weapons, or

by operations in

unfavorable

weather. Sur,

prise can

have the effect

of increasing combat

power.

n excellent

example

of initial surprise is

Washington's

crossing

the Delaware River

on Christmas

night,

1776,

and

his attac) ::against the

Hessian garrison in Trenton on

the

mOfIl;ing,of?6

pecember,

f we can .surprise the enemy with our atomic attacks, we may

incre.ase the effectiveness Of

tl:wse

attacks

severalfol.d

aI).d thus hasten the

destruction

of

his forces

and

his

will to

fight.

Civil Affairs

can

assis t in surprise by keeping civilians off,

certain roadli to allow

rapidity

of movement. In their

operations

against,

guerri l la action, Civil

Affairs has the

basic

objective

of

separating

guerri l la

forces from civilian support and preventing their getting infor

mation.


16/87

11.

SECURITY. The

principle of

securi ty argues for the

prevention

of

surpr ise . Through

security,

we retain freedom

of

action.

Through

proper

application

of security, the

enemy is prevented

f rom

interfering

with

our freedom of

action.

The

prevention of surpr ise and

the

retention

of

freedom

of action

are accomplished by. calculated

and continuous readi

ness

including use of essential securi ty forces,

suitable

formations and

dispositions, and continuous and aggressive

efforts

to

secure and

evaluate

information.

At

the

beginning

of World War II,

the

first concern o

the

United

States

was its own

securi ty while preparing to

launch its own

offensive.

Thus bases in Greenland,

Iceland, Alaska,

and Hawaii

were

secured.

With

the

present rate of

improvements

in rangeaild speed of

the riiodern

im -

plements of w;;l.r, such

bases

assume

greater

importance to a nation's

se -

curity.

On

the

atomic

battlefield, when the enemy

has

the

power

to des

troy a force of almost any

size

once he has located

i t ,

forces must be

dispersed

and

concealed,

and their

vulnerability-' to atomic. attack reduced.

The

extent of dispersion must,

however,

be balanced with mpbility to

avoid

defeat.

Securi ty depends primarily 'on the s\lcceS s of civil securi ty

measures for the 'control

of

the civilian population inCluding the prompt

establishment of reliable

local police

forces,

registration

of

civilians,

con

t rol of

circulation and communications, and the

fostering

of friendly re -

lations

with

the

civilian population;

mili tary

se'curity

operations

includlng

counterintelligence measure's 1 opreventdisclosure

of

information to the

enemy,

espionage, ands'abotage; 'and ·oper'a.tions

to

separate guerril las from

civilian support.

n our brief analysis of the US Arriiy

principres

·of

war we

have

examined some of the problems essentially civilian in nature which will

confront a combateomttllander

on

the battlefield, and

'ha J'e

Witne s sed

that

' ( ' . : '

the p r i n c i p l e s a l i e a ~ p 1 i c a b l e to CivilAffairs 'as 1 h ~ y V I 6 u l . d a p p l y

to factors

dealingwithpersonnel; ' inteUigenee, operations.

mCf/logistics.

12


17/87

APPENDIX 1 TO .LESSON 1,

CA

SUBCOURSE

33

PRACTICAL EXERCISES ON PIUNCIPLES OF WAR

1.

GENERAL

SITUATION. In

June

19

Aggressor launched

an

invasion

of SOUTH KOREA. US Forces

w r ~ i t t

piecemeal into

the

struggle as units became available. The

l imited

number

of t roops

availa

ble to defend the position required the assignment

of

large sectors to the

units

in the

forward

positions.

To adequately garrison

its

sector the 10th Infantry Division

placed three

battle

groups

onl

ine

with the 2d

BG, 7th Inf

as

division reserve.

The 2d BG, 10th Inf had.

been

retained

as Army

reserve.

2.

SPECIAL

SITUATION.

a. On

29 Aug

the

1st BG, 87th Inf

occupied

its sector

without

enemy contact (see

Figure 1). Only

minor

guerilla

activity

occurred

in the

area.


18/87


19/87

3. FIRST REQUIREMENT.

In

the

occupation of this defensive

position,

which

principles of war did Col,

1st

BG, 87th Inf emphasize and

which did he

violate?

4.

SITUATION CONTINUED. On

the night

of 30

Aug the enemy

attacked

in

formce

across

the

WARRIOR River against

the

defensive po

sitions

of

the 1st

BG,

87th

Inf. The main crossing

was

made in

the vicinity

of

the

northern

ford

and the positions in

that

area

were

quiclq'y

overrun

with

heavy casualt ies

to the

defending

force.

Co

A

and

B

fought

a delaying

action

and by dawn they had organized a defense in conjunction with

the

battle

group reserve north of BIG MARSH. The enemy secondary

attack

in

the

vicinity

of

southern

ford

forced

the withdrawal of Co D to positions just south

of BIG MARSH. Minor probing attacks against GoC were r p u l s ~ and at

dawn

Co C occupied

its original defensive

positions; however, several

enemy groups of

4-7 men

each had been observed to its rear

Capt,

Co

C

requested

permission to withdraw but was

directed by Col,

1st

'BG, 87th

ln to remain in present positions and hold at

all

cost. See

Figure

2

for

dispositions.

5. SECOND REQUIREMENT. In this

situation,

which principles of

war

did

Col,

1st BG,

87th Inf emphasize

and which did he nJ ost seriously

violate?

6. SITUATION CONTINUED. Co

C

was ordered to withdraw to po

sitions north of

BIG MARSH

on

afternoon

of

31 Aug. The withdrawal and

occupation of

a

reserve defensive position was completed by morning of

1 Sep.

Each

night f rom

2-6

Sep, the enemy

attacked along

the

entire front

against

1st BG, 87th Inf while remaining in hiding during the day. These

night

attacks

were

successfully repulsed. On.8

Sep.

Capt, Co

D

was noti

fied

that a small enemy

group of3

-4 men was

operating

in his

rear

area.

To handle

this

problem,

Capt,

Co

D

directed each of

the

three forward rifle

platoons t9. lend two

men

to the Co

CP for

use in a combat patrol to

be

organized under the

comm


20/87


21/87

pr ior to darkness, Col, 1st BG. 87th Inf forIned

a

task

force by attaching

to Co C the following:

(1) Sufficient Infantry carr iers to

Inechanize the

foot

eleInents.

(2)

One tank

platoon.

(3)

One

platoon

4.2

Inortars .

4)

Section

assault gun platoon.

b. This task force was given the Inission of breaking through

the

Aggressor

rear guard

and

seizing

the division

objective. 5

miles to the

west.

c. The task

force

attacked an hour after dark

and

successfully

sInashed through

the eneIny

rear

guard

and

overran

the

enemy

forces

re -

treating along the Inain road. By Inorning (15Sep) the task force

was on

the

division objective.

9.

FOURTH REQUIREMENT. In

this situation,

which

principles

of war did

Col, 1st

BG,

87th Inf emphasize

and

which did he violate?

17


22/87

APPENDIX 2 TO LESSON 1

CA

SUBCOURSE 33

The following

article

is reprinted from The Military

Review,

'May

1955. The

views

expressed

in

this article

are the

author's, Lt Col

Fallwell,

and not necessarily thos,eof the

Department

of

the

Army or the US .Army

Civil Affairs School.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEM

A BASIC aim of the

Command

and General Staff College is to develop,

in potential commanders and staff

officers,

the ability to solve military

problems. This the College attempts to

do--and

does quite successfully-

by

presenting the basic

factors

ef, and

theirin£luence

on, the

problem

and,

through the use

of

appropriate

forms"

a .sound, logical approach to the

solu

tion of problems is reached,

Yet commanders

and

staff officers--including some graduates

of

the

College--domake'wrong decisions. There

are

many

reasons for th is-

mental ,emotional ,

and

physical. The factors and their influence may

be

incorrectly estimated. The

problem itself

may not

be

fully recognized. The

logic may

be

faulty.

The thought

processes

by which

a problem is solved

may be misunderstood.

At

the

r isk

of

over-simplification, it

can be

stated

that

the basic 'mental

reasons

for

poor decisions

are

three

in number: lack

of understanding

.of the problem, lack

of knowledge of

the

factors

and their

influence on the

preblen'!.,

and incomplete

knowledge and

use

of

thought

pre

cesses

in solving the

problem.

Adequate

knowledge of

the factors involved in a military situation and

their influence

on

the

de.cision

require's

years. of experience and·

study. Al

though our

military colleges

can

help

provide knowledge,

they

can

never

completely

r,eplace personal experience.

On'the

other hand,

our schools

can and do provide

instructionandPl: ' .actice in sound

methods of

recognizing

problems and arriving at decisions.

ESTIMATE OF THE

SITUATION

The'best'eocampleof such a method is the cemmander 'sest imate of

the

situation

which receives great emphasis at the

Command

and General

Staff

Col1ege' .>Theestimate --its pre,sent form i s a product of many years

study and experience-·provides for, a natural ,souridapproach to thesolu_

tion of a tactil:calproblerni Following:astaternent of tae mission,

the

18


23/87

significant

conditions of weather, terrain, and

the

opposing forces are

listed.

Next are

l isted

those

courses of action

which

appear feasible and

.which, if successful, will accomplish the

mission.

Then

the commander

mentally "war -games" each of his courses of action against each enemy

capability and

determines

the probable

outcome,

while

further

testing the

feasibility ofhis courses of action and determining the factors which

are

most significant.

After

the "war -gaming" the commander

compares

his

courses of action in the light of the

significant

factors. Finally, he selects

the best course of action and embodies

i t

in his decision.

Thus, in our estimate of

the situation,

we

have

followed what

the

United States

Naval War College terms the

"natural mental

process

for

solution

of

any problem." (See Figure 3).

n

orderly process? Yes.

Sound?

Yes.

Simple? No.

The

complexity

of the estimate

process

ar ises

from the numerous

chances

of

er ro r

which

present

themselves.

Firs t

of

all,

the

estimate

must

contain

a number of

subordinate estimates.

At the outset, the mission

must be estimated.

This,

of course, is a relatively simple matter if

one

has been

ordered

to

seize

and hold a certain hill, but is

it

a simple matter

when a commander

must

decide whether to t t ~ or defend? f the com

mander does not

state his mission

correctly, then any decision he

reaches

is

l ikely

to be a bad

one.

The·statements

of the

conditions

of weather, terrain, and

opposing

forces

constitute not

only factsbut-- in

a large

measure--estimates. ,as

well.

Here,

staff

estimates

are

usually involved--personnel, intelligence, op

erations,

and logistical estimates.

Perhaps the

intelligence

estimate offers

the

greatest

chance for

error -but our

own capabilities can

also be mis-

understood.

The

selection

of courses of action involves another estimate

-or

serie

of estimates. f

only

one

or

two courses are listed, there is the possibility

that the best will not be considered. f tOCil many courses of action

are

con

sidered, then the estimate will be very long and involved.

Finally, there is the

estimation involved

in analyzing and comparing

the

various courses of

action

in

order to select

the best.

According to the Naval

War

College's Sound

Military Decision:

"Lo,gical thought

separates the rational f rom

the

irrational.

l t suse

avoiCils

the,\wastefulness

of t r ia l-and-error method. By its insistent

m ~

ployment •

dormant powers of reasoning are

awakened,

and the dangell'that

9


24/87

SOLUTIONOFA PROBLEM

TheNatural

Mental

Process

Step

1. The establishmentof

the

properbasis for solution

of

the

problems,

including

(a)

a

grasp

of

the

salient

features of

the situation,

(b) a recognition

ofthe

incentive.

and (c)

anap-

preciation

of

theeffect

desired.

Step

2.

The

actual

solution

of

the

problemthroughthe em -

ploymentof

the

reasoning

power

in

the

consideration

of

various

possible

solu-

t ions.

and

the selectionof

thebest solution.

Step3. The conclusion

ofdecision

embodying

the

best solu-

tion.

Figure

3

The

Commander 's

Estimate

(a) Determinationofthemission.

(b)

St;Ltement

of

the

factors of

weathe.r, terrain, .and

own

and

opposing

forces.

(c)

Determinationofthose suitable

coursesofactionwhich, i suc

cessful, will

accomplish

the

mission.

(d) Analysis ofeachcourse

of

actioninlight

ofeach

enemy

capability.

(e)

Comparisonofcourses

of

action.

(f) Conclusionas

tobest

courseof

action.

(g)

Decisionembodyingthe best

courseQfaction.

20


25/87

attends

instinctive, spontaneous, impul'slve, Or emotional acceptance of

conclusions is

lessened.

The evil effects of

an

inclination to dodge

the

issue or of a disinclination to face

the

facts are thus also avoided.

Man is a

rational

~ n i m l Man's rationality, however , is unfortu

nately

influenced strongly by t radit ion, habit , bias,

and

a lazy

tendency

to accept

plausible

suggestions.

Too

often

what little, reasoning m an doe

s

is concerned

with

just if ication

,of a

decision already reached.

A notable

character is t ic

of the

human

mind is a constant

search

for

rel iable rules of action inspired by an

intuitive

belief in cause and effect.

f

not provided with

sound rules ,

man

will

devise

his

own'out of

his

own

experience

and

follow them, although

they

may be faulty.

This

drive for

valid

guides has given us a mass

of

proverbs,

adages,

and

aphorisms

dating

f rom antiquity. '

THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

WAR

We must reckon,

then, with

this

psychological

drive for

valid guides;

and the

bes t

solution is to provide

ourselves

with valid rules.

Since

war -

fare

is a

science

- -that

is ,

since the

phenomena of

war

follow

the natural

law

o f

cause and effect -

-we

should

be

able to

state

the general

relationships

between'causes and effects in. war, althoughuot with the quantitative

pre -

cision customary in

the

phySical

sciences.

In other sc iencessUth s ta te-

ments are known as principles --they are also natural laws because ' they

express facts

of nature.

The search

for

valid

rules of conduct by

the armies

of

the

world

has

led

to the formulation of

principles,

rules ,

maxims, and

doctrine in an

effort to capitalize on past experience. A vast number of causal relat ion

ships and

historical examples

form

thE "science of war.

However,

the mere

compilation

of knowledge

is not

enough. Too

many commanders have failed

because

they blindly applied methods

which--however successful in

the pas t -

were inadequate in

a

new

situation. The resulting

disillusionment led

to two

schools of thought. One group

averred

that brilliantly

successful

generals

l ike Napoleon and Alexander were geniuses whose successes were

due

to

intuition ra ther than

methods, and

that warfare could never be reduced to a

science.

Maurice

de

Saxe,

Marshal General of the

armies

of

France,

once

stated

that:

"War is a

science

so

involved in darkness ,

and attended with so much

imperfect ion,

that

no

certain

rules

of conduct can

be

given concerning i t ;

custom

and

prejudice,

the

natural

consequence of

ignorance,

are its sole

foundation.

21


26/87

Ful ler in his Foundations of the

.5c1< nc< of. War, quoted Dragomirov

as

stating:

Firs t of

all,

science

and

theory are two different things, for

every

ar t may and must be in possession of its. own

theory,

but it would

be

preposterOUS to claim

for it

the name

of

a science

Nobody

will

venture today to asse r t

that

there could be a

science

of war. t would be

as

absurb as

a

science

of

poetry,

of

painting,

or

of

music .

In

the

opposing

camp are men

l ike

Clausewitz and

most

modern mil i

t a ry leaders who believe that there are

p r i n c i p ~ l s which can

be discovered

. .

Jomini

believed:

"The fundamental

principles

upon

which res t

all

good

combinations

of war have always existed, and to them all others

should

be referred for

the

purpose of,

arriving

at their respect ive meri ts . These principles are

unchangeable; they

are

independent of the

arms

employed,

of

t imes,

and

of

places.

Napoleon'advised:

PerUIl


27/87

CURRENT PRINCIPLES OF W R

United States

Objective

Simplicity

Unity

of

Command

Offensive

Maneuver

Mass

Economy

of

Force

Surprise

Security

British

e l e t ~ o n and

Maintenance

of the im

Co operation

Offensive

ction

Flexibility

Concentr

ation

of

Force

Economy of

Effort

Surprise

Security

Maintenance

of Morale

dministration

French

Liberty

of

ction

Concentration

of

Effort

Surprise

Soviet

dvance

and

Consolidation

Combined rms

Offensive

Maneuver

and

Initiative

Concentration

Economy of

Force

Surprise and

Deception

dequateReserves

Morale

nnihilation

Figure

4


28/87

No one will say that British plans and orders are

likely

to

be complicated

because

they have ignored the

principle of

simplicity. Similarly, tactics

of

the

French

are not

defective because they

profess to find only 3

princi

ples rather

than

the 9 United States

or

10 British

principles.

All of the

concepts embodied in the principles are taught

in

all armies ,

but

with

differences in interpretation

and

emphasis.

The

United States

official

l ist

of principles is

a

product

of the

twentieth

century. Our Field Service Regulations

of

1904 are reported to have con

tained the

following

statement

- -but

not

a

list of principles:

While

the fundamental principles

of

war are

neither

very

numerous

nor

complex, their

application may be difficult

and

must

not

be limited

by set rules. Departure from prescribed methods is at

times

necessary.

A thorough knowledge of

the

principles of war and their application

enables

the leader to decide

when

such departure should

be

made and to determine

what methods should bring success.

Training

Regulations

10-5

of

1921

contains

what

is apparently the

first

official

l ist of principles, but

the

publication gave

the

names only with

out explanation and the list .was rescinded in 1928. The Field S.ervice e g u ~

lations of 1923

t reated the

principles without

naming them. Its successor,

Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations,

Operations,

continued this

approach until our present

edition

of

1954

which both

names

and discusses

the principles.

Although our Army was

apparently

late in its

official acceptance

o

the

principles,

they

were

taught much earl ier ,

as

evidenced

by

General

Pershing's statement:

But

the

principles of warfare as I learned

them

at

West

Point

re

main unchanged. They were verified by my experience in our Indian

wars,

and

also during

the campaign

against the

Spaniards

in Cuba. I

applied

them

in the

Philippines and

observed

their

application in

Manchuria

during the

Russo-Japanese

War.

In the British

Army.a

very

similar

procedure

took

place . General

Fuller

has

related

how, in

1911, he

read in

the British. r r ~ y

Field

Service

Regulations

that the

fundamental

princi}?les of war are neither

vllry

numerous nor

in

themselves very abstruse •

;

but that he searched for

them n vain. Spurred

by

t4e

need

for

valid

principles, he

f ieUy

evolved

nine principles; in. 1923, he realized the satisfaction

of

seeing most of them

printed in a

service

man\l al

T4e

origillal

British

principles remained sub

stantially unchanged until after

World

War II when

two

o t h r ~ .

.A.dministration

4

http:///reader/full/man/l.alhttp:///reader/full/man/l.al


29/87

and Maintenance of

Morale,

were

added,

due, one may guess, to the

in -

f luenceof

Field Marshal Montgomery.

Within the

United

States

Army,

the

principles

of

war

have been

regarded

as basic t ruths, applicable

to

al l s'ituations, intelligent appli

cation

of which will aid success . Although apparent conflicts between '

principles are recognized-,-mass and securi ty for example - ~

teach that

a

principle

should

be

violated

or disregarded

only

after mature considera

t ion of all

factors

involved. The

principles

have

never been stated

as

laws

of cause and effect.

They

represent , in

fact,

certa in

durable, proved

concepts

which, in

the opinion

of

the t imes,

deserye emphasis over al l

other concepts. Interpretation of

the

concepts has

varied, of course ,

and

will doubtles'sly vary in the future.

CRITICISM OF THE

PRINCIPLES

Captain

Frank L. Johnson,

United

States Navy, wrote, "The mere

mention

of the

t e rm 'principles

of

war ' brings

out the

semantic

beast in

cer tain

individuals. "

As'

soon

as

the

principles

were published, an

argument

began which

has

cohtinued'unti the present day.

For

every artiCle ih a service journal

which

expounded

the official line , ' th:ere appeared another artiCle attacking

one or more of

the

principles . Most 'early

objections were

based-on

the

grou.nds

that

the

principles weCl'e a

me Ie Hstofnouns or

noun substantives

which could be interpreted in many ways.

Some wanted

to expand the Hst.

Others

- -appealing to the

dictionaries

- -wished to

discard al l

which

were

not

basic to

e'Very

situation.

As

anexample, 'Br ' igad,er

General Charles

M.

u n d e l ~ f o r m e r C b m m a n d a n t o f the

Commahdand

Gerieril:l

Staff

School-

could find

only five

basic

principles--offensive, simplicity, ' objective, su-

perior i ty,

and se curity.

The

others he

thought valid as

doctrine

but not as

principles ,

Later cri t ics

ccnotably the Naval

War

College and Colonel

S.

'

Johnston, former ' instructor and' l ibtar iah a t

'Fort

Leavenworth-cattatke'd the

principles on f i rmer ground. While

not

denying their value as c'dh'c:ej:>l:s,

they

Claimed the

principles

were not

stated properly-- that is , that

re la t ion

ship between:

caus'e


30/87

General Harbord says

that to

induce acceptance of the American

original

idea of unity of control of supply, our General

Headquarters

had

l ikened

it

to unity of command. Foch then seized

upon this

opening to

press for the

project--not

so

bad

for the French, but

certainly

undes ira

ble

for

us

-

Of

complete

unity

of interallied

supply. ' It

was' a bit awkward,

Harbord

te l ls us, 'foi'

General

Persh lng tourge

the

principles and

the

l imitat ions

at the

same

t ime. - - I t

was awkward,

no

doubt of that. It

was

awkward because

our

Ceneral Headquarters had mistaken a method for a

principle.

In a

search

for t rue principles, these la ter writers 'were led

to

expand on the

old

adage, It depends on the

si tuation, and to

produce such

statements of causal relat ionships as appear in the

Naval War

College's

Fundam'ental

Principle of

War:

The attainment of a mili tary objective

(the creat ion

or maintenance

of a

favorable

mili tary situation) depends

on

effective operations involving

the

salient

feature s of

(1) effective action with relation

to

correct physical

obJectives;

(2) projection of

action

f rom

advantageous

relat ive positions;

(3) proper

apportionment

of

fighting strength;

and

(4)

ensurance

of adequate

f reedom

of action:

each fulfilling the requirement of

(a)

suitability, as determined by

the

factoi' of the appropriate

effect desired;

(b)

feasibil i ty, byreas6t\ .

of

relative

fighting

strength as

dete rmimidby tile

factors

of the means available and

opposed,

irifhiertl::ed by

the f ador of the'

characteris t ics

of 'the' ' theater of opera.t ion:and

:i

(c) ac,cep1iibil i ty,asd:etermined by the factoi' of'l;1\.'e canse; '

quence

s as

to

costs , -whi


31/87

yesterday's

conditions

in l ieu of

tomorrow's .

Still,

causal principles

are

in accord with the

Natural

Mental

Process

described

earlier.

Their further use

should be

studied

by

our service schools.

Their first application could

be

to

the

solution

of two

problems inci

dent to

the commander's estimate of the situation--the

determination

of

a

suitable mission,

and the formulation. of

courses

of action

to

be

considered

at length. In this

connection, the

following propositions apply.

1.

The

determination

of

a suitable objective

depends

upon

the

a. suitability

of

the

objective

in

light of

the

future

mission

of

the

command;

b.

feasibility of

the

objective as determined

by the

means

available and opposed,

the

t ime

available,

and

the

condition of

the

theater;

and

c. acceptability of

the

costs

involved.

Z. The selection of a suitable

course

o action for accomplish

ment of an objective

depends

upon the

a.

suitability

of the course of action with regard to the ob

jective

and

the future mission of the command;

b.

feasibility of the

course

of

action,

as

determined

by the

means available and opposed, the time available, and the conditions of the

theater;

and

c.

acceptability

of the

costs

involved.

There

is

nothing new here, of c o u r s e ~

Our first

proposition merely

states that

an

objectiVll must further

the

mission.ofthe command, must

be capable of achieveIIlent in

the t ime available,

and must be

acceptable

as

to

costs.

This

last .statement

i$

correct and the

language

is

familiar to

all;

so,

why

change i t? One must admit there is no

great necessity.

The

advantage of the

proposition, however, is

that it points out the relationships

of the

factors;

involved and

thereby

contributes to a

frame

of

mind--a

method

of

thinking--which is a distinct asset to

the

service

officer.

Intheremaining'pages,

the

author proposes to examine our principles

of

war

and

determine

their

application to the solution

of

military

p l o b ~ e m s

..

Z7


32/87

OBjECTivE

"Theultirp.ate objectiv,

of

ail mili tary

operations is

the' d ~ s h u c t i o n

oftlle enemy's

armedforces

and

his 'will

to

fight:

Selection of i ~ t e r

~ e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e s

~ h o s e attainment contributes most decisiv


33/87

We have

no

analogous

cri ter ia

in our f ield manuals regarding the

selection of an objective in the sense of the

mission,

but certa in guides can

be

determined.

Earl ie r ,

we

stated'that

a suitable

objective or

mission of

the

command will

be

capable

of achievement

in

the t ime available. and will

be

acceptable as

to' costs. Other

desirable characteris t ics

could be

deduced,

but these

are

the basic

6nes which

must be Present in

all

.cases.

We

are

striving

to

produce

leaders

who

use

their

reasoning powers

ra ther than

rely

on

set rules of

action.

The

danger in

this

principle - -and

the

others as w ell- is

that the u w ~ y may convert . i t into an invariable rule

of action or slogan,

such

as

"seek out

and

destroy

the

enemy's main force .

Views

such as

this were

at

least partially responsible

for the

bloody and

indecisive fighting during

most of

World War

1.

Dr.

Bernard Brodie cites

the

more

recent example

of the

,United States

Third Fleet a t

Leyte

Gulf.

Following the U{"ted States landings c;m Leyte.

the

Japanese

ini t iated a

naval

counterattack involving

two

task

forces , .

comprised mainly'

of batt leships

and cru isersuwhich we,re to

encircle

the island f rom the east and converge

on the ianding

areas .

A

small

decoy

force

of

car r i e rs

approached

f rom

the

north ana

west.

The United

States

naval

commander decided

to s team north

and

attack the car r i e rs

because

of the

then

current

concept

that

"the

enemy's

main

force

is

where

his car r i e rs are .

Dr. Brodie

then said:

"But

the question asked wa,s.

'Where are

t h ~ enemy"s car r i e rs? That

is

where

his main force. must 'be. I subJ;Ilit that this

was

t rue

for

the pre

ceding 2

years of

the war . but at the

t ime

of

Leyte

dul£ i twas no longer

t rue ,

an,d

I

s u b m ~ t

also that

the

intelligence

was

available to

the

fleet

which

should have indicated

that

it alii no longer t rue .

:

.

n that

batt le the

enemy's n;tain

fqrce,comprised

in factllilil batt leships. That

would

have been

clear, e x ~ e p t for, th , existence of the

slogan.

TBE OlfF'ENStVE

. .

,

,

• . L L . .

,

"Through offensive action,

a

commander preseryes hisf;ree,d9I,"};of "',

action

and

imposes his

will

on the

enemy. The

selection by

the commander

of

the:right timeiiUld place for offens.ive action ~ de ililive, factqr

in

the

s l l c c e ~ l : l ,of

th ,

operlltion.

A

defensive attitude

J;Ilay

, ~ m 7 e l i ; o n a , c o ~ m a t l ; < ; \ e r

by many

liIituations;

but . ' . shol l ld be d e l i b ~ r ~ ~ e t j , 1 l ~ ~ P ~ ~ , t , c ? n l Y as, il: teJ:nPC1 -

ra ry expedient . . . - F i ~ l d M a n u ~ l l O O - , ~ , Fi 'l 'l


34/87

Our

doctrine of the

offensive is

'as

basic

as any concept in the

United States

Army; for

only

through

offensive

action

can

we ultimately

destroy the enemy"s armed

force's'.

Only

through the

offensive can

we

re ta in 'the initiative.

Therefor 'e, we are

taught

that

even when forced

to

assume

the defensive we should condU ct

an aggressive

or

offensive

defense.

The

'basic

nature

of

this principle

,

however, has

misled

many

commanders who elevated it

to the" ' rule

of

war"

by insisting on the

attack

at

al l t imes.

Marshal Foch,

whose early

writings on this princi-

ple had much

influence

in

World

War

I,

had the following

to

say in his

postwar Memoirs:

f

•••

the doctrine of the offensive

ended

to

impose an invariable

rule leading too often to tactics that were blind and brutal

and

for that

very

rea"son

dangerous. t also produced a

strategy

that

was bare

and

uniform,

easily steri le , unproductive of results , 'and

costly.

,I

This degenerat ion of

a

sound concept into

a

fau:lty rule of

action

is

a

very

human

'failing. Man

seeks

invariable ru . lesofact ion and i s i m -

menselycomfor ted when he thinks

'he

'has

discOvered

one. No

bit terer

condemnation of

a

commander of

this

type

has

been

writ ten

,than ,the

following

words

by

General

Fuller

i t tspeakirig

of

a

high British, comman.

der during

World

War

I:

"His

(Haig's) theory of

fighting

was

as simple as

General U. S.

Gran t s , and

he never

once

budgedfromit ' ,

whilst Grant did: F r o m

history

he (Ha.igr had lea.rned

that ba.ttles passed,throughthefo11owin.g phases:

ihe maneuver

for

posi t ion, the , f i rs t

clash

,of battle

, thewearin 'g*out

fight

of varying duration;

and

theeventualdeC'isiveMchv', 'vJhich would give

victory.

t had bee'i'l, so and, cOnsequently, i t l'a,ust be so

ina11

,circumstances

and i r respect ive of changes in armaments . As the, decisive ,blow in fOil'me'r

wars

had been

delivered by cavalry,

cavalry

remained the

decisive

arm;

con'&eq:uently, ,they fig


35/87

wearing

-out

fight,

o f

whatsoever

character

it might be, had exhausted

and re.duced the.

enemy'spow


36/87

manpower

and their

callous

acceptance of huge losses. Although numer ical

super1qrity is

often.desirable.

the.re are other factors which may be equally,

or more , important in

obtaining mass

- -a rmor ,

art i l lery,

a i r , the

state

of

t raining, and

·mo.rale,

to

mention but a

few. In

'solving mili tary problems,

we must ~ o n s i r the principle ,of mas s at all t imes.

In

the formulation of

courses of

action,

mass .£01' the main effort is usually stated in:

general

t e rms only.

In

the analysis of opposing courses of action, the degree and

nature

of

mass,

both

that

necessary

and

that available,

can

be

visualized,

Finally details are developed in the complete plan

to

ensure the desired

mass

at all

foreseeable s tages

of the operation.

Mas

s is not

achieved

for i ts own

sake

. . For a modern example, le t

US re turn

to

Dr. Brodie 's

comments

on the

Battle

of Leyte Gulf. The

American naval

commander tells uS

that

after discov,ering the three Japa

nese

task

forces moving toward ,Leyte,

he

formulated three courses of

action, to

remain,where

he was; to

attack the carr ie rs

to

the north with.

all

his .force;· or,

to ,divide

his

force, keeping

par t

inothe.

area

and

sending

par t

to

attack

the

carr iers .

He

,decided

against splitting his force because

this

would

conflict with the

principle

of concentration of force . Dr.

Brodie

has, the

following'

to $ayconcer:nirtg

this'

reasoning:

The purpose of the principle of

concentration

of force is

to

suggest

that one

should

so

allocate

one 's forces

,that

one

can

hope

to be

superior

to the enemy

somewhere, preferably

in,

the

most

important place,

or

at

least minimize,

one 's inferiority

in

thedecis lve place.

I submit

that

the

commander of

the Third Fleet had forces so overwhelmingly superior to

those

of the

enemy that he

could have

divided his

forces between

San Ber

nardino

Strait

and the

north

and

have'

remained

overwhelmingly

superior

locally

to

each

enemy

force.

An

when you

are

overwhelmingly superior -

howmuchmor .e

superior

do you, want to get?

ECONOMY

OF

FORGE

The principie

of

economyo£

force

rs'

a cor'ollary to the principle

of mass.

In

o r ~ r

to,

concentrate supei ' ior

'combat

strelllgth in

one place,

econ.omy o£foil1ce

' lnustbe exercised in

other

pla'ces. - -Fie ld Manual 100

Field Service Regulations, Operations.

Here the 'dependence:of this principle of

war

is recognized. Proper ly

:speaking, it.;.s a methodo£,achievingmass.

The

t e rm

economy of £orce has wide acceptance ah'J.bng armie's of the

world but is not always interpreted the same way . Ofie''iri£1u:ential wri ter .

32


37/87

has r a ~ s e d

t 4 ~ s

p r ~ n c i p l e to

the

status of "the law of war . To the

Brit ish

a \d C.ap.adianArmies, e.conomyof force implies,.

"a

balanced

employment

of forces and a

Judicious, expenditure

of

all

resources

with the objective

of

a c h i e v ~ n g a n effective concentration at the dedsive

time'

and place ." Here

economy.is interpreted in the,nmeteenth century

sense

of

"utilizing

a l l r e

sources

ra the r

than in,the twentieth c entury

sense

of "to

economize;

to

save.

The inexactness ~ n h e r e n t in the use

of single

nouns

or

noun sub

stantives to signify concepts or principles is well i l lustrated.

In the

1;>roadsense,

economy of force pertains to the

proper

apportion.

ment

of

forces

and resources

between

main

.and

secondary efforts and

re

serves. W,eightingthe.main

effort is naturally

s tressed in our

Army

schools

At t h i s . p o ~ n t i t might

;>e well

to

show

that

secondary efforts must

also be

weighte.d

at least

to

the

extent

necessary

to

enable them to accomplish their

mis.sions. Secondary

efforts

are not only d e s i r a b l e ~ t h e y are required.

"Everyatti l-ck

,must

have

a

main

and .secondary

effort .

"

In solving mili tary

problems

then',

we

must, c leadysta te . the mlmmum

objectives

to

be attained by the

secondary effort

and to

allot

the

minimum

forces required.

,Any

r e m i n ~ n g

re .sourcesare .u'sed,to strengthen, in priority,.

,the

main

ap.ds.econdar.y jef!or,ts:., ,T,lle.

quest·ion

is ,

where can we affowd .to

econo

mize, and.towhat.degree/?

UNITY

,OF

COMMAND

"Unity

of command obtains thil-tunityof effort

.which

is essential . to

the decisive

application

of the full combat power of the

available

forces. -

Field Manual

100

-5,

Field ,Ber.vic.e ·Reg,Ul-a:tioI1>S.,..Operations.

,He.re'iof cou:rse" .UJliity.of effort - -or 'cooperation in' ' the

Bri t ish 'Army

and Unit.¢:dState,s:.A,iil·,Fo,rce.,.is the·,·de:sired'end,or principle, and unity,of .,

cOmmand is u t ~ e n s ,to,t.b!at ,eJ;1(l. 'Ce,rtainly., unity of. cotll1'mariCll i lnot

fundamental to

all

situations.

To

bear

,out

,this

statementvv,e, neel hcite

only

two

examples: the normal relationship between a

regimental commander and

his l I ~ p p o r t i n g

a:rtillery i

,al'ld.thJe relatironship

between

a f i e ~ C l a'1'iny command

and the

supporting

tactical air force . . .

qJ;lemay.bei.llempted,to

;r,eply

that,urrity

of

command

in these

situations is

exercised

by

the division commander and

the,ithea!ier"cQmma,J;ldElr, "res.p i'ctively. If.,$O'I.. ·olllie

\also:m1


38/87

On the other

hand,

unity of

effort, or

cooperation,

is highly

desi ra -

ble

and

should be fundamental in every situation. History

affords

us many

instance s of opportunitie s lost be

caus

e unity of effort was not

achieved.

Two

examples which

readily

come

to

mind are Stuart 's cavalry at Gettys

burg and the

lack--un.ti lI918--of

an effective

high

command

among

the

Allies in World

War

I .

World War II

will doubtlessly furnish other exam

pIes.

,One potentially

bad

situation

was

that described by General

H. H.

Arnold

regarding

conflicting

zones

and

interests

between

theaters

of

operations

in the Pacific and the Far East .

Unity of

effort

depends

on a number of factors.

Firs t of all,

various

units and services must be working toward a

common goal if

complete cooperation

is

to

be achieved. There must be no

discordant

jealousy

or

rivalry.

Common

training

and equipment--expecial

ly

signal

communications means - -are

also

vital

to

full cooperation.

Cooperation between

all ies--which

has become

more

and

more

impor

tant-;-introduces Iiltill

other factors

such as national aims", divergent customs

and language difficulties. In dealing witJ; allies one cannot do

better

than

remember that "allies are at t imes difficult to

deal

with; when this occurs

it

is

well

to

remind onself that one is also an ~ l l y

The

degree

of unity of

effort achieved

by a

plan

of action is a

test

of the validity of the plan. Therefore, unity oI.effort can be used as an aid

in solving military problems. The state,ment o the mission, the selection

of physical objectives, and the selection of possible courses of action

all

effect the cooperation to be

achieved.

In general, i t

can

be stated

that

the

maximum cooperation

shol lld. be developed in the

x u t ~ o n

of a plan, but

that

the

degree

of

inherent

urlitY,of

effort

is not the dominant

factor

in de

ciding on one of several courses of

action.

On the other hand, the ability

of

the

corp.mand,to

achieve

the unity of effort

required

in

a

particular cours.e

of action

i s a

dominant factor in the rete,ntion

or rejection.

of that course of

action. In

this last

statement, we

can see a

close relationship to the appli

cation,of surprise,and simplicity. InJhis sense, the t e s t for required umty

of effort

is

a

feasibiUtytest .

For

example" we

may

consider an

att


39/87

seriously considered.

In solving military problems then, we can

ask

the

following

questions.

1.

Does

the formulation of the

missionallowfor full

development

of

cooperation?

2.

Is the command capable of achieving the degree of

cooperation

required by

the proposed courses

of

action?

I f

the answer to either question is

negative,

then there has

been an

error

MANEUVER

"Maneuver in i tself can produce

no decisive

results , but i f properly

empl'oyed

i tmakes decisive results

~ o s s i b l e through

the

application of the

principles of the offensive, mass, economy

of

loree, and surprise. "- -F ie ld

Manual 100 -5, F'ielcf Service Regulations, Operations.

,

.

• i

This quotation shows thatmaneuver-- l ike unity of command

and

econo'

my of

force-- is

properly

a

method of achievingcombat superiority.

I t

is,

however, an importarit coricept which deserves emphasis. Manetlver is, of

course; not to b e so ught fbr i ts o\Vns

ake.

Like a l l ~ h e d t h e r prifllriple s ;

exc"!pt

the.

objective and p'cissibly

security, maneuv et may'not!)e appHcable

.

to

every occasion. . '

;i

Maneuver is

mdvernent toplace

' tf 'oopsand

fire

a t a mO'lle',advantageous

position

with

re spec t td theenemy. The'comparableBl ' i t ishprineiple, flexi

bility, is somewhat

more

inclusive than the UriitE,'d States ' term, l:'naneuver.

What

is

meant

il i

not

only

maneuver of

tactica1units';, 'b'ut

such'consi'derations

as'

m.obility

of

mind'

ih'culcated

dining trairiing, and 'rho'li>Hlty

or

upply;

.\

;J e :.;

Altholigh i t

i sha td

to imagine N\'at'

anyohe"vould

turn' this"princt4ple ;

into

an

end

to be sought,

the

United

States Naval

War

C o l i e g e h a s ~ e e f l / f i i t

to

warn:,

"Avoidance

of

movemeJ:lt

~ a n e u v e r )

i s

frequently

the

correct decision

becap.se m o ~ e r n e n t ,

if

i t

( i W i r ' s n o ' a d l j a i i f a g e s ~

i s scarcely' l l

iiltlfi

i

abYeeven i f

it

entails 'nd

material'lo'ss'.

",.

' .:

k : , · · . ,

I

, , : , ,

. ,

1liispcrinciple ha:sconsfd'e':fa'bTe"ippHcationo in thes'bate'thent afpos

sible

cour'Jes ola·ction and 'in'de"iiloptne'nt8:f the plan'of l ie t ion;The following

i -j

. ;

, : ,'j

.

. , f l , i :l ',' . )

35


40/87

questions are useful in

selecting

mis,sions, objectives, and

courses of

action.

1. Is th

Documents

AIPD Subcourse CA0033: Principles of War