Newsletter, Edition 8, Vol 2, Oct 2013

Editor’s Welcome

Welcome to the latest edition of the AIIA newsletter. October was a very exciting time for the AIIA Qld Branch. We had a seminar presented by Professor Alex Bellamy on the Syrian Tragedy, as well as a seminar by Dr Kim Bonghyun, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Australia.

I am very grateful to the AIIA interns for contributing such varied and high-quality articles to this mega-edition of the newsletter. I would also like to express my appreciation for the work done by the new sub-editors, Camden Luxford and Joseph Power.

In this edition, we get a run-down of the latest AIIA events, thanks to Manasa Addepalli. Joseph Power presents us with a very interesting article on the role of al Shabaab after the Westgate incident. Camden Luxford takes us on a captivating journey through her photo-essay on Cuba. This edition also places Syria in the spotlight. Alexander Carpenter provides us with an impressive “who’s who” of the players in the Syrian conflict. Finally, Celine Attal analyses the status of international law and the current power game played out in Syria.

I would also encourage you all to attend the Annual Lecture presented by Professor Michael Wesley on November 12. This is a fantastic opportunity to enjoy a high-profile speaker and engage in debate in a dinner setting. There is also a public lecture by former Attorney-General Gareth Evans on November 6 at the University of Queensland. He will be discussing Syrian atrocities and the future of responsibility to protect. For more information, please visit the Queensland Branch of the AIIA website.

If you have any feedback or wish to contribute, please email us at qld.branch@aiia.asn.au. Milly Arsic | AIIA Council Member

Joseph Power & Camden Luxford | Sub-editors

UPCOMING EVENT: Australia’s Foreign Policy and Aid Priorities in the

Asia-Pacific WHEN: Tuesday, 12th November from 11.45 am to 12:30 pm WHERE: Hilton Surfer’s Paradise Hotel The panel will be chaired by Mr. Geoffrey Ewing, President, Queensland branch, AIIA and will feature members that include Emeritus Professor, Colin Power, former Deputy Director of UNESCO; Dr. Michael Fullilove, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Mr. Russell Shields, Qld and NT State Manager, ANZ Bank, and Mr David Costello, AIIA Qld Branch secretary. The key focus areas of the 2013 Congress include: 1) the support and organisation of analytics and big data, 2) the efficacy of international policy transfer, 3) technological advances and disruptive innovation regarding the environment, and 4) increased community engagement for policy implementation. These issues are all affected in one way or another by the potential implementation, or lack thereof, of austerity measures. To register for the Congress, head to the following link: http://www.eidoscongress.com/register/

EVENT REVIEW: The Syrian Tragedy and the Fight against

Mass Atrocities

Presented by Professor Alex Bellamy

Words and photos: Manasa Addepalli At the event held at Harris Terrace on October 22nd, Professor of International Security at the Griffith Asia Institute, Alex Bellamy, provided an overview of the crisis in Syria. The presentation began with an outline of the humanitarian situation in the region and some statistics about the scale of the crisis. Professor Bellamy attributed the main cause of the war to the March 2011 uprising. Since protests began, the government responded with violence and from this cycle of protests and government attacks, the war escalated. Assad is currently on the offensive, though rebels have been able to hold some ground due to foreign support. However, the opposition remains divided and has not managed to present itself as a cohesive group. An overview of key opposition players included the Syrian National Coalition, Kurds and Islamists, all with a different vision for Syria. This situation is further complicated by the demographics of the country which includes an Arab Sunni majority who largely support the rebels but also includes sizeable Christian and Alawite populations who support Assad. Professor Bellamy divided the international response into three phases. The first involved a four-point plan set out by the Arab League that began with a ceasefire and included a period of negotiations. The second involved Kofi Annan working for the UN with a six-point plan that covered similar ground. However, in both phases, the plans collapsed with a ceasefire never being fully achieved. The last and current phase concerns the destruction of Assad’s chemical weapons stockpiles with inspectors currently in the country.

It was asserted that the response has been limited due to the extremely complex situation on the ground. A key issue is Russia and China’s continued resistance to any UN resolution. Professor Bellamy held that there are close personal ties between Russian and Syrian elites but another key reason that Russia is opposed to a resolution is that it views the Arab Spring less as a move towards democracy and more as a revival of radical Islamism. Professor Bellamy maintained that the outlook for Syria is grim and while there are currently a number of initiatives to deal with the conflict in place, these focus on the issue of chemical weapons and do not address the broader violence. The recommendations that were laid out focused on two different aspects of the conflict. The first was to induce a stalemate between all parties involved by hindering their ability to fight. This would be achieved by imposing an arms embargo on all sides, economic sanctions, and increased monitoring and documenting abuses. The second addressed the humanitarian crisis and stated the need to make it easier for civilians within Syria to found a path of escape but also to ease the burden on neighbouring states through temporary resettlement programs. After the presentation, audience questions were answered about a range of issues such as Israel’s ambivalence regarding the conflict, the impact of the breakthrough in Iran-US relations and the implications for Responsibility to Protect in the future.

Al Qaeda’s terror debut in Kenya came in 1998, when the US Embassy in Nairobi was obliterated by a truck bomb exactly eight years after the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia. This was as insurance against Saddam Hussein’s forces after their attempted annexation of Kuwait (the Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was also attacked). In 2002, jihadists attacked an Israeli-owned hotel with a car bomb, killing 13 and injuring 80. Additionally, two surface-to-air missiles were fired at an Israeli charter plane departing from Mombasa airport, but, thankfully, missed.

Al Shabaab Post Westgate

Words: Joseph Power

After their time in the international spotlight following the massacre at Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, the threat of al Shabaab—and more broadly, al-Qaeda—isn’t over. Members of U.S. SEAL Team Six, the group who carried out the raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound in 2011, recently carried out an amphibious raid on a coastal villa in the heart of territory controlled by al Shabaab. The target of the raid, a man named Ikrima who was associated with the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, evaded capture. Al Shabaab’s time in the international media has not, until now, been front page news. Who exactly are al Shabaab, and why should we care? The group, “The Youth” in Arabic, was responsible for last month’s massacre in Nairobi. They emerged as a youth offshoot of the Islamic Union (IU) and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), formally splitting from both the IU and the ICU in 2007. They have waged a terror campaign of almost 550 attacks that have killed more than 1,600 people and injured over 2,100. In February 2012, their leader formally declared their allegiance to al Qaeda in an Internet broadcast. This is significant because the group is split into two factions: those with global jihadist aims, and those with a focus on local, Somali issues.

Kenya’s 33-year history of modern terror attacks has two main commonalities: Israel, and the United States. In 1980, Arab militants attacked the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi in reprisal for Kenya allowing Israeli troops to refuel there en route to rescuing hostages from a hijacked aircraft.

“Turmoil has made it lash out”. What’s to say the globalist faction has not won

out?

Terrorism is, in part, a form of public relations. Targets are chosen for many reasons, symbolism being one of them. The Westgate shopping centre is part-Israeli owned, frequented by foreigners and the rich, and is a symbol of global Western-style capitalism. Much as Mohamed Atta’s crew flew jetliners into the World Trade Centre, the symbol of US financial hegemony, the attack itself is symbolic. To date, the attack at Westgate is the group’s only recorded hostage-barricade attack, with 72.6 per cent of their previous attacks involving bombings and armed assaults. The attacks in Nairobi last month are significant in two ways beyond their immediate horror: firstly, al Shabaab’s formal merger with al Qaeda split the group into two wings, which, until recently, were caught up in infighting between those concerned with “local” Somali issues, and those sympathetic to al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad. As Robin Simcox from the Henry Jackson Society pointed out a few days after the attacks, “the factors that give the impression that al Shabaab is in turmoil are making the group even more dangerous. Turmoil has made it lash out”. What’s to say the globalist faction has not won out? Secondly, the presence of international fighters among al Shabaab’s ranks. Former-head of M15, Jonathon Evans, warned in 2010 that foreign fighters—in this case, British—who train and fight alongside terror groups abroad will one day return to their respective societies, with grave consequences. The ABC reports that Australian intelligence agencies are tracking around 100 Australians fighting in Syria. At least four Australians have been killed in the fighting, and last month an Australian, Abu Asma al Australi, drove a truck loaded with 12 tonnes of explosives into a checkpoint close to a military airport, killing 35 government troops. While we know of no Australians presently in the ranks of al Shabaab, a victory of the globalist faction within their numbers heralds a new group in the region who can link up with a plethora of groups from across the Gulf of Aden in the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and further afield in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Egypt. Watch this space.

It’s a romantic sort of a dictatorship, Cuba. The mojitos are strong and cheap, and there’s no shortage of tropical sunsets or salsa bands to sip them in front of. The cigars are smooth; the only place you can’t light up is in one of the oft-photographed old American muscle cars doing rounds as collective taxis. Cuban ingenuity has kept them on the road well into their golden years, but in such precarious condition that they’re rather more explosive than not. These photos are from my first trip to Cuba, two years ago. On my third, I was detained by State Security for almost eight hours. I had first been spotted several days before, approaching the home of Antonio Madrazzo, who was hosting a forum on Afro-Cuban identity. This is problematic in Cuba, for two reasons. First, there is little or no space for a civil society independent of the Communist party; second, when the Cuban revolutionaries overthrew the Batista regime they made racial discrimination illegal. The fact that structural and societal racism continues to exist in the workers’ paradise is something they do not appreciate being pointed out. When I arrived at Madrazzo’s home that morning, he and three colleagues had been detained, in one of the “express detentions” the Cuban state has become so fond of. By the time the international community works itself up to disapproval, the activist has been released – until the next time.

Photo Essay: The Cuba That Is

Words and photos: Camden Luxford

I hoped I had not been identified, and continued visiting others over the next few days. I gave away USB drives full of resources for democracy activists, and took video testimonials and photos. Before leaving each home I hid that vital memory stick and put another in my camera, full of these images of Romantic Cuba. Then I left Havana, went to a small town in the province of Villa Clara where no tourist has any reason to be, and was picked up by two uniformed policemen shortly after leaving the home of Librado Linares, who had been a member of the Group of 75 political dissidents arrested in the Black Spring of 2003. Most were released on condition of going into exile; Linares and 20 others chose not to leave their home, and he was not released until 2011. I spent most of that afternoon in the company of two officials from State Security, who declined to provide me with their surnames or ranks (it’s unlikely, I’m told, the first names they gave me were even correct). I feigned naivety: “in my country tourists can talk to whomever they wish”, I said. “That’s true in Cuba, too, of course, señorita, just not those people. And anyway, why are you trying so hard to see bad things in this beautiful country?” Cuba is a beautiful country, but the Cuba that is packaged and sold as a source of much-needed hard currency, much like the exhilarating egalitarian dream of Cuba clung to by the Latin American left, obscures the fundamental lack of freedom on the island. There was much that was good in those first heady days, and much to admire still in the rhetoric of universal health care and education. But my lasting impression is of a creaky and corrupt bureaucracy; a country decaying and stagnating. And now that a return visit is unwise, my most treasured memories are not of smoky jazz clubs or pristine beaches – although they are there, and they are wonderful – but of the people I met who are demanding their freedom. A refusal to engage with the Cuba that is does a great disservice to its people, and to democracy.

The Syrian Winter

Words: Alexander Carpenter

For the past two years, a battle has been raging in Syria to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad. What began as peaceful protest escalated into open rebellion, and eventually bloody civil war, in what is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the ‘Arab Spring’. Syria was born out of an Anglo-French carve-up of the Ottoman Empire, grouping together people of diverse races and creeds – many of whom have longstanding rivalries and grievances. It was a recipe for complete disaster, with the consequences of this folly being most vividly (and horrifically) illustrated in the present day. In this kaleidoscopic conflict, there are many players and factions.

INSIDE SYRIA

Ba’athists/Syrian Military

The Syrian state is an authoritarian regime ruled by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, which is in itself controlled by Bashar al-Assad and his family. Ba’athism is an ideology that welds the concepts of Arab unity (pan-Arabism) together with socialism, in other words, nationalist socialism. This unnerving semantic similarity is not a coincidence. The founders of Ba’athist thought essentially borrowed elements of both Nazism (perhaps most strikingly the hatred of the Jews), communism, then fused it with the rising sense of Arab self-determination of the 20th Century. Iraq is the only other state to have been ruled by Ba’athist philosophy, mostly under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, who employed Stalinist policies that mutated the once-promising country into an Orwellian police state. The Syrian model shared many of the traits of Saddam’s Iraq, but was mildly less brutal. The most notable dualities are the lethal suppression of minorities (most notably, the Kurds); a one-party dictatorship based (politically and militarily) around a minority religious group (the ‘Alawites’), tribe and family and a brutal non-professional militia (the ‘Shabiha’). The forensic evidence examined in the UN report on August 21 Ghouta chemical weapons attack indicated that it was used by the regime.

Alawites (Arab) The nominally Shi’ite Alawite sect comprises 11% of the Syrian population and were historically persecuted. Conversely under the Assad regime and its entrenched, corrupt system of tribal patronage, they enjoy the lion’s share of power. The majority of senior figures in the government and military are Alawites. Like many of their Syrian compatriates however, a significant number of them remain poor and disenfranchised, with the majority of privileges going to Assad’s (Alawite) Kalbiyya tribe. This has naturally led to resentment from the Sunni Arab majority, and there are widespread fears in the Alawite community of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by extremist Sunni Islamists. This fear is one of the primary factors for their primarily continuing support of Assad.

Sunni Arabs

The bulk of the population (65%), they have for many decades been denied a proportionate voice in government. It is in fact the exclusionary nature of the regime that has led so many to support the opposition, further exacerbating interdenominational tensions, giving the war a more sectarian slant. Some Sunnis continue to support Assad as they prefer a secular state to the possibility of an Islamist government. Many members of the Sunni economic elite also have ties to the current government.

Kurds/Kurdistan

A racial minority (10%) long oppressed under the Ba’athist government, the Kurds have exploited the situation to claim de facto autonomy in northern Syria (Syrian Kurdistan), with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) becoming the dominant political authority. This group is an offshoot of the Turkish PKK, a militant Kurdish organisation which has waged a long war for autonomy from the central Turkish government. The most troubling development for these people over the past year was the outbreak of fighting with Islamist militants, who harbour supranational dreams of a global Caliphate. Staunchly secular, nationalistic and lacking to some extent the misogynistic streak of their Arab counterparts (40% of Kurdish YPG fighters are women), the Kurds inherently clash with Islamist doctrine. There are reports of beheadings and ‘ethnic cleansing’, if the latter is proven true, this could be indicative of a future bloodbath. Fortunately, the Kurds enjoy the home ground advantage and superior training, and demonstrated their skill on the battlefield in the recent victories of Ras al-Ayn and al-Yarubiya – two valuable border crossings with Turkey and Iraq.

Christians and Druze

Inhabiting Syria since time immemorial, the various Christian denominations comprise 10% of the population. It is difficult to ascertain who the majority of them support, but there is widespread fear of Islamist persecution. This fear is very real, with multiple reported atrocities being committed against civilians and clergy. The Druze (3% of the population) have no discernible overall preference.

Assad Family

The Assad’s have been described as ‘the Sopranos’ of Syria – a title not lacking justification. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad (the incumbent despot’s father) staged a coup d’état, ruling the nation with an iron fist until he passed in 2000, upon which time Bashar assumed the throne. The family belongs to the Kalbiyya tribe, from whom the bulk of regime power holders descend. They were unpopular amongst some prior to the civil war – from 1976 to 1982 a series of uprisings and insurgency by Sunni Islamists was bloodily suppressed by Hafez in which 10,000s were killed. Surpassing his father’s legacy, Bashar, his brother Maher, and (late) brother-in-law masterminded the brutal crackdown that has sparked open rebellion. The ‘toxic brand’ the family has amongst the majority of Syrians makes it difficult to imagine them having any future in a new government.

Lebanon Lebanon is separated into Sunnis, Shia and Christians. The Sunnis support the opposition, the Shi’ites support the regime, and the Christians appear to somewhat prefer Assad, for the sake of the Syrian Christian population and not wanting hardline Islamists on their doorstep. It currently has approximately 800,000 Syrian refugees in camps, in addition to the roughly 225,000 Palestinians who already live in camps too, causing serious strain on the government. Hezbollah – a powerful Shi’ite Lebanese terrorist organisation, has been sponsored by the Iranian and Syrian regimes for years. It proved its worth in the battle for the strategic town of al-Qusayr, where it played a vital role in reinforcing the Syrian army against the FSA.

Superpower Allies – Russia and China

President Putin’s Russia has been Assad’s staunchest international ally throughout the war, continually obstructing UN efforts to act on or even condemn the daily atrocities being committed in the country. It has several reasons for this. First, it has a longstanding economic relationship with Syria, which is one of the largest purchasers of Russian arms. Second, the naval base of Tartus is the only one Russia possesses outside of the former USSR. Third, it has genuine fears about Islamic extremism and how that can impact on the restive Muslim Caucasus region at home. Fourth, it allows them to increase diplomatic influence. Last, having witnessed the overthrow of Gaddafi partially as a result of their inaction, the Russians fear an internationally adopted, Western-defined concept of ‘regime legitimacy’, given the authoritarian nature of their own government. However the deal by which it defused US momentum to take military action after the August chemical weapons attack signaled a new phase in its diplomatic handling of the situation.

China has similar fears, and like Russia, wants to check Western influence in the oil-rich region. The two superpowers alongside Iran officially extend $500 million in oil and credit per month.

ALLIES OF THE REGIME The Shia Crescent

The ‘Shia Crescent’ is an Iranian-dominated axis that consists of Iran, elements of Iraq and Lebanon as well as Syria. If it were not for this regional support network, it is questionable as to whether the embattled regime would still be alive.

Iran

A powerful regional actor, theocratic state and de facto leader of the Shia world, Iran has become increasingly isolated in recent years. If Assad falls, then the ‘Shia Crescent’ it has carefully cultivated collapses, severely hampering Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah, and leaving it even more alienated in the international community. It doubtlessly also fears the possibility of a hostile Sunni Islamist regime assuming power.

Nations Divided – Iraq and Lebanon

Iraq

Iraq is divided into three primary factions: the southern Shi’ite majority, the central Sunni minority, and the northern Kurdish minority. In post-Saddam Iraq, the Shia hold the greatest share of power, with authoritarian PM Nouri al-Maliki and others steering the country into the Iranian sphere of influence. Sunni jihadists – battle-hardened by the Iraqi near-civil war, are travelling to Syria in droves. The same is occurring with Shia arriving in Syria to support the regime. It currently has approximately 200,000 Syrian refugees.

Iraqi Kurdistan

An autonomous region predominated by Masoud Barzani and the KDP, the area has been inundated with 10,000s of Syrian Kurdish refugees fleeing the conflict with Islamists. Barzani recently announced the possibility of military intervention to protect Syrian Kurds. This is possibly a move designed to expand KDP influence in the region as they vie for international leadership of the Kurdish nationalist movement with the Turkish PKK.

THE OPPOSITION Inside Syria

Syrian National Coalition (SNC)/Free Syrian Army (FSA)

The Syrian National Coalition was formed in November 2012, representing an alliance of various opposition groups to the Assad government. Based in Istanbul, Turkey – the largest faction in the coalition is the Syrian National Council, which was formed in October 2011 as a result of the regime’s violent suppression of protestors, and is plagued by factional infighting. The rebels, like the government, are also guilty of numerous atrocities. The largest rebel bloc is the Free Syrian Army, which is not a military wing of the SNC so much as an independent entity who coordinates with them. Headed by the Supreme Military Council under General Salim Idris, the FSA has recently fractured somewhat, with various militant Islamist groups exiting the organisation to either go it alone or join the ‘Islamic Alliance’.

Islamists

In the Syrian opposition, there are many disparate Islamist factions, some whose aim is to have a legal system based more around Sharia law, and those who want a complete theocracy. They comprise nearly half of the opposition forces. Some are loosely allied with the FSA; some have completely broken off, or never joined to begin with. The most powerful groups and coalitions are the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front. A devastating blow to the SNC occurred when eleven Islamist militias (including al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham) denounced them and declared a new ‘Islamic Alliance’, who called for the opposition to reorganise under “an Islamic framework based on Sharia”. They have, however, pledged to continue coordinating with the FSA to some extent. The intolerant nature of the armed groups inevitably leads to infighting, which is aggravated by the fact that some of the brigades are composed of foreign fighters (e.g. ISIS) and some are local organic movements (al-Nusra).

Regional Opposition Jordan The Kingdom of Jordan is a relatively small country, currently hosting approximately 550,000 Syrian refugees in addition to the several hundred thousand Palestinians still in camps. There is a real possibility that the government will collapse. The government is not (visibly) active in supporting the opposition, though it does favour regime change.

Turkey

Turkey’s exact goals in this conflict are difficult to ascertain. Undoubtedly one of them is to ensure the new government is friendly to them; also it seeks to expand its sphere of influence in the Middle East, as under Prime Minister Erdogan it turns away from Europe. It’s other goal will be to ensure that the Syrian Kurds do not gain autonomy, as this sets a greater precedent for its own Kurds (lead by the militant PKK), who comprise roughly a quarter of the population, and who have been denied any form of self-determination. They currently host approximately 515,000 Syrian refugees.

The Islamist’s Bankrollers – Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) Saudi Arabia is intimately involved in supporting the Islamist rebels, as it is a hard-line Sunni theocracy. In recent days, the kingdom announced a “major shift” from the US in terms of cooperation over Middle Eastern foreign policy, likely extending to the nature of support for Syrian rebels. It is competing for influence amongst the opposition with Qatar, another Gulf monarchist state that is also using funds to influence both the SNC and hard-line Islamists.

Israel Syria’s old enemy has confined itself to spectating from the Golan Heights – exceptions to this being when it’s launched airstrikes on munitions suspected of being sent to Hezbollah. They have recently called for Assad’s downfall, as this would weaken their most menacing foe, Iran.

The West

Europe The motives of the EU appear straightforward: Syria is a state-sponsor of terror and autocratic regime guilty of horrendous crimes against its own people. There is the possibility of an economic motive, though. In the last couple of years there was work underway to build a gas pipeline that went through Syria onto Europe – a pipeline that would challenge Russia’s effective supply monopoly. Many countries, such as France and Britain, are doubtlessly also keen to see one less nation in the region under the sway of Iran. France has been the fiercest Western proponent for action since the crisis began, Britain also demonstrated enthusiasm, however this was curbed when in August the British parliament outright rejected the prospect of military action. Various EU nations have been funding and arming the opposition, as has the US.

US The US has, in all, been rather reluctant to overtly act on the Syrian civil war. In 2012 President Obama referred to the use of chemical weapons as a ‘red line’ that would force America’s hand if it were crossed. In August this year, the line was crossed, and the US was galvanised into action, with the Obama administration preparing the armed forces and making the case to Congress and the American public on the necessity of intervention. However, it did appear that there was little domestic appetite for American involvement in yet another Middle Eastern conflict. Vladimir Putin may have come as Obama’s blessing in disguise, proposing an UN-administered solution by which inspectors would assess and terminate the chemical weapons, as well as production and mixing equipment and facilities. The US stands to gain from a fall of the Assad regime, as it would further weaken Iran, giving it even less leg-room in nuclear negotiations amongst other things.

References

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Syria: The United Nations Resolution on Chemical Weapons

Words: Celine Attal

After two and a half years of civil war and over 100,000 dead, the international community has finally decided to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria. On September 27, 2013, the United Nations (UN) unanimously opted for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program. Resolution 2118 is the first UN action passed against Syria, directly reacting to the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta agricultural belt outside Damascus on August 21, 2013 - an attack which is believed to have led to the death of more than 1,300 people. After long and difficult negotiations on a possible military intervention, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally adopted the Russian plan for the dismantling of Syrian chemical weapons caches.

I – Intervention and State Sovereignty: Legitimacy vs. Legality

The regime of Bashar Assad was accused of using chemical weapons against its own people on August 21 and could be considered outlawed in regards to international law on the use of chemical weapons. According to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, this attack constitutes a war crime1 and the UN report considered it “the most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them”.2

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. This treaty, adopted by states including Syria which nevertheless never ratified it, has the force of international law. Also, the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, a treaty which was ratified by Syria in 1968. In addition, the attack on Ghouta violates international humanitarian laws and could therefore be qualified as a war crime and a crime against humanity.

However, could international law justify a foreign intervention in Syria? According to the UN Charter, any armed attack against another nation is illegal unless authorised by the UNSC or carried out in self-defence. So, even though a military intervention in Syria would be legitimate, would it be legal? Since the beginning of the civil war until September 27 this year, not a single UN resolution dealing with the issue has been adopted, due to the extremely different opinions of the permanent UNSC members regarding the conflict. On one hand, Russia and China have considered that the only option to solve this issue is to use diplomacy and negotiation with the regime of Bashar Assad and has considered any intervention as a breach of State sovereignty.3 On the other hand, Western countries, in particular the U.S and France, consider a military action as the only way to protect civilians in Syria and end the civil war.4

Therefore, all resolutions proposed at the UNSC have been vetoed by Russia and China. Without a UN resolution, there would be no legal grounds to military intervention as well as no precedent. Indeed, even though there have been international treaties banning the use of chemical weapons since World War I, a violation of those laws has never been cited as a reason for intervention within a State.5 Otherwise, if there is no legal basis to use external force against a target State as well as no precedent, it would still be possible to intervene if the action is justified as ‘necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe’. This was the justification for NATO forces to intervene in Kosovo in 1999.6 Even if the legality of that intervention has been questioned, it was described afterwards as ‘soft law’ and the resolution put forward by Russia condemning NATO was defeated. The use of force for humanitarian purposes, such as protecting civilians from abuses perpetuated by the state, is supported by the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’.

That principle allows for a last resort of military intervention under a series of conditions such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity perpetrated on civilians. Thus the legitimacy of military action with the aim of protecting Syrian civilians from future use of chemical weapons was used by Western countries, especially the U.S and France, as a reason to react without the approval of the UN. It was also a way to prevent any other chemical attack by another country. For the former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs and Founder of Doctors without Borders, “sometimes you have to break the law to change it”: here he considers that legitimacy is often more important than legality, citing the Kosovo example.7

“Playing its cards perfectly, Russia has stayed the course with respect to its strategy, leading to, as it sees it, victory in this diplomatic battle.”

Eventually, by renouncing a military intervention and adopting the UN resolution, the international community saved the common governance approach of the UN. Member states, and in particular the US, decided that any intervention should not only be legitimate but also legal. In doing so, they preserved the credibility of the UNSC. The international community decided that legality should be a prerequisite of intervention.

II – The New Power Games and the Rise of Russia

After harsh negotiations between the U.S and Russia in particular, the international community has finally agreed to adopt the Russian response to the use of chemical weapons: specifically, to destroy Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons by the first half of next year.8 Under the agreement, President Bashar Assad must provide a complete list of the types, quantity and locations of his country's chemical-weapons stockpiles to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The resolution does not rely on a threat of military action for enforcement. The US, France and Western allies had favoured arming any UN resolution with a threat of force for noncompliance, but opposition from Moscow forced the Obama administration to drop the demand. Playing its cards perfectly, Russia has stayed the course with respect to its strategy, leading to, as it sees it, victory in this diplomatic battle. Indeed, Russia has been forthcoming in its intentions and has always considered intervention in Syria as illegal. Protecting its ally and its own interests (it is well known that the Syrian regime is one of Russia's major arms customers), Putin has called on

the international community to use diplomacy and subsequently vetoed any resolution that would see political or military pressure on Syria at the UN. This duel between the US and Russia has been seen as an exceptional victory for Moscow. Alexei Pushkov, head of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, called the Geneva pact “a merit of Russian diplomacy”.9 It has played directly to President Vladimir Putin's goal of perceived Russian imperialist resurgence10 and has won him much credibility with his respective statesmen. Indeed, many analysts agree that Moscow’s maneuver has been a personal win for Putin and consequently damaged Obama’s image (Sergei Komkov, the head of the All-Russia Education Fund, has already sent the Nobel committee a letter suggesting Putin be considered for the peace prize)11.

Unlike the Russian leader, President Obama has failed to make good on promises to the international community, especially with regards to the “red line” presented to Syria's regime, which has been crossed without Western repercussions. Finally, the Russians have presented President Obama a way out of confrontation. But more importantly, behind this defeat, the US gave insight into their new vision of diplomacy. After describing themselves as world leader and diffusing their value of democracy over the world, they seem less interested in inspiring the world today. Can we say they have given up on their world stewardship? President Obama recently warned the UN Assembly that the world faces the danger that the U.S “may disengage, creating a vacuum of leadership”.12

Thus, he followed the opinion of the street since recent polls show that the American public is very reluctant to commit to any engagement beyond US borders (68% of Americans considered that U.S has no responsibility to directly become involved in the Syrian crises). Congress, too, was reluctant to authorise military action in Syria.

Yet Americans may do well to consider that the idea of isolationism could be, in the long term, counterproductive. Indeed, the U.S could then risk experiencing a higher foreign threat level within their borders. History is the witness, as President Reagan has said: “We, in America have learned bitter lessons from two World Wars: It is better to be ready to protect the peace than... rushing to respond only after freedom is lost”.13

It is better to be cautious and keep some relativity on the Russian victory. After all, we could even say that Resolution 2118 is actually a victory for the West. With this resolution, we can see that not only will the chemical weapons be destroyed, but Islamic extremism may well be removed.

If there is a topic Russia and the US agree on, it is the rise of extremist Islam in Syria. Throughout 2012 there was increasing radicalization among the opposition groups, with increased arms shipments coming from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The resolution does not require that Assad step down. With this omission, a major part of the opposition is left aside. In addition, the Russian proposal is even worse for Assad as it has the potential to delay possible strikes. If Assad cooperates, he has to turn over all his chemical weaponry while allowing the UN inspectors to comb through his entire defense. If he does not, then US strikes could be even heavier than predicted originally, as it will be based on much-improved intelligence, unlike strikes at the current t ime: “the US-led strike that would likely ensue [currently] could very easily overlook important installations and stock piles and leave at least part of his chemical arsenal intact and available for use”.14

To conclude, will the Russia-US plan stop Syria's civil war? Many agree that with the complexity of Syria's ethnic and religious map and as each group claims its own alliances and arms sources “animosity among ethnic and religious groups”, 15 will continue militarily with or without the use of chemical weapons. The plan has the potential to simply delay a military intervention and shift responsibility from the international community to respond to this conflict.16

Finally, with the Syrian conflict, it appears that the question of reforming the UNSC has to be raised once again. The right to veto showed the failure of the UN Security Council to be effective for more than two years in this matter. Is this ‘blocking power’ as it is conferred to the permanent members a necessity to the UN Security Council framework? This question is even more crucial when we know that only five nations (US, Russia, China, UK and France) have this right, which consequently reduces significantly the voice of other member states. Is it really accurate to use a power map based on the creation of the UNSC? And can we really talk about equality at the UNSC when one voice means more than another? References 1 “Syria: inspectors say sarin used as Ban Ki-moon says gas attacks were “war crime”, David Blair, Chief foreign correspondent for the Telegraph, telegraph.co.uk

2 “War crime: UN find sarin used in Syria chemical weapons attack”, Josh Levs and Holly Yans, journalists for CNN, cnn.com

3 “Russian Foreign Minister comments on international legal issues, Syria”, BBC, London, October 11 2013, bbc.com

4 “Syria: Minister for Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius” Press conference, Paris, September 10, 2013, ambafrance-au.org

5 “Legitimacy of intervention in Syria: 3 things to know” Matthew C Waxman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign relations, August 29, 2013, cfp.org

6 “Syria: Military intervention is illegal but may be legitimate”, Rebecca Lowe, Senior reporter at the International Bar Association, ibanet.org

7 “Syria: Military intervention is illegal but may be legitimate”, Rebecca Lowe, Senior reporter at the International Bar Association, ibanet.org

8 “US, Russia agree on plan on Syrian chemical weapons”, Jay Solomon, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, online.wsj.com

9 “Landmark US-Russia deal on Syria: a diplomatic victory”, Natalya Krainova, reporter for The Moscow times, themoscowtimes.com

10 “The world according to Putin”, Simon Shuster, reporter for The Time, September 16, 2013

11 “Landmark US-Russia deal on Syria: a diplomatic victory”, Natalya Krainova, reporter for The Moscow times, themoscowtimes.com

12

“Engagement led to Syrian progress”, Lawrence Grossman, teacher at Yeshiva University and American Jewish Committee's director, author for USA Today, 9 Oct. 2013

13 “Engagement led to Syrian progress”, Lawrence Grossman, teacher at Yeshiva University and American Jewish Committee's director, author for

USA Today, 9 octOct. 2013 14

“The myth of Russia's diplomatic victory or with allies like this who needs enemies?”, Paul du Quenoy, researcher for the Wilson Center ,wilsoncenter.org 15

“Putin's diplomatic victory on Syria will do little to stop the war”, Andrei Odinets, author for Worldcrunch,worldcrunch.com

EVENT REVIEW: Recent Developments on the Korean Peninsula

Presented by Dr Kim Bonghyun, Ambassador of

the Republic of Korea to Australia

Words and photo: Manasa Addepalli Dr Kim Bonghyun, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the Commonwealth of Australia, was the presenter for the event on Tuesday, 29th October held at Harris Terrace. The key themes discussed were about Australia’s relationship with Korea, particularly with regards to trade and also recent developments on the Korean peninsula. The Ambassador stated that there was a strong trade, political and diplomatic relationship between Australia and Korea. He said that the Korean people were grateful for Australia’s government and people for their assistance in the Korean War and Australian support on the North Korean provocation issue. His Excellency also spoke about the importance of the 2+2 Dialogue Meeting between Korean and Australian foreign and defence ministers, and how Australia is only the second country after the United States to have such a meeting with Korea. One of the top priorities for the Ambassador was to help establish a free trade agreement between Australia and Korea. The trade relationship between the two countries is currently in favour of Australia and it is the only country Korea has a deficit with. It was pointed out that while Australia has a larger market share in Korea of key exports such as beef, the United States is gaining ground. Thus, a free trade agreement is essential for Australia to regain a larger share. With Prime Minister Abbott committed to establishing such an agreement by next year, it was said that this was close to being achieved , with only one or two more issues left to negotiate.

The need to make the Korean economy more competitive through innovation was emphasised. It was said that Australia had a good tradition of innovation and as such, would make a good partner for Korea. The Ambassador spoke about meeting with the director of CSIRO and several state and federal government officials about cooperating in terms of innovation and establishing a framework agreement for future partnership. Lastly, the Ambassador spoke of the need in the Asia Pacific region for a regime for peace and prosperity and how Australia can have a large role to play. As democratic states sharing similar values, Australia and Korea can be partners on these security issues, both in developing this regime and working together on the Security Council. Finally, questions were answered, mainly on the topic of North Korea. It was said that it was the President’s firm belief that trust should be the basis of future relations with North Korea and it would take a long time to restore trust. The Ambassador said that policies based on Trustpolitik were working. On the question of the possibility of the North Korean regime collapsing, the Ambassador said it was unlikely as long as it continued to receive support from China. China is unsure whether reunification would be a benefit. It was emphasised that there is a need to reassure China that reunification would not result in a strategic loss.