Agrawal and Gibson-1

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Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of

Community in Natural Resource Conservation

ARUN AGRAWALYale University, New Haven CT, USA

and

CLARK C. GIBSON *

Indiana University, Bloomington, USASummary. The poor conservation outcomes that followed decades of intrusive resourcemanagement strategies and planned development have forced policy makers andscholars to reconsider the role of community in resource use and conservation. In abreak from previous work on development which considered communities a hindranceto progressive social change, current writings champion the role of community inbringing about decentralization, meaningful participation, and conservation. But de-spite its recent popularity, the concept of community is rarely dened or carefully ex-amined by those concerned with resource use and management. We seek to redress thisomission by investigating ``community'' in work concerning resource conservation andmanagement. We explore the conceptual origins of the community, and the ways the

term has been deployed in writings on resource use. We then analyze those aspects ofcommunity most important to advocates for community's role in resource management community as a small spatial unit, as a homogeneous social structure, and as sharednorms and indicate the weaknesses of these approaches. Finally, we suggest a morepolitical approach: community must be examined in the context of development andconservation by focusing on the multiple interests and actors within communities, onhow these actors inuence decision-making, and on the internal and external institutionsthat shape the decision-making process. A focus on institutions rather than ``commu-nity'' is likely to be more fruitful for those interested in community-based natural re-source management. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

World Development Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 629649, 1999 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd

All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain0305-750X/99 $ see front matter

PII: S0305-750X(98)00161-2

*We would like to thank the following individuals for their patient and thoughtful comments on various drafts and

earlier versions of this essay: Charla Britt, Walter Coward, Sabine Engel, Julie Greenberg, Michael McGinnis,

Donald Moore, Nancy Peluso, Kimberly Pfeifer, Jesse Ribot, Steven Sanderson, Suzana Sawyer, Marianne Schmink,

James Scott, K. Sivaramakrishnan, and James Walker. We also wish to acknowledge insightful conversations with

Elinor and Vincent Ostrom in the course of writing this paper. Presentations to audiences at the Workshop in

Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University and in the department of Political Science and the School

of Forestry at Yale University have helped improve the quality of arguments. Responses from members of the board

of the Conservation and Development Forum also prompted rethinking on several parts of the paper. An earlierdraft of this paper was written by the rst author as a report for and supported by the Conservation and

Development Forum, University of Florida. Final revision accepted: 22 September 1998.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The poor conservation outcomes that fol-lowed decades of intrusive resource manage-ment strategies and planned development have

forced policy makers and scholars to reconsiderthe role of community in resource use andconservation. In a break from previous workon development which considered communitiesto hinder progressive social change, currentwriting champions the role of community inbringing about decentralization, meaningfulparticipation, cultural autonomy, and conser-vation (Chambers and McBeth, 1992; Chitere,1994; Etzioni, 1996). But despite its recentpopularity, the concept of community rarelyreceives the attention or analysis it needs from

those concerned with resource use and man-agement.

We seek to redress this omission by investi-gating ``community'' in work concerning re-source conservation and management.1 Webegin by exploring the conceptual origins of thecommunity, especially as it relates to writingson resource use. The ensuing analysis revealsthat three aspects of community are most im-portant to those who advocate a positive rolefor communities in resource management community as a small spatial unit, as a homo-

genous social structure, and as shared norms.We suggest a more political approach. Com-munity, we argue, must be examined in thecontext of conservation by focusing on themultiple interests and actors within communi-ties, on how these actors inuence decision-making, and on the internal and external in-stitutions that shape the decision-making pro-cess. A focus on institutions rather than``community'' is likely to be more fruitful forthose interested in community-based naturalresource management. We conclude by sug-

gesting that research and policy move awayfrom universalist claims either for or againstcommunity. Instead, community-based conser-vation initiatives must be founded on images ofcommunity that recognize their internal dier-ences and processes, their relations with exter-nal actors, and the institutions that aect both.

2. COMMUNITY IN HISTORY

To understand the current widespread pre-

occupation with community requires an un-derstanding of at least some history of theconcept's use. Such a history shows the ways in

which ``community'' has moved in and out offashion, and prompts caution in acceptingcommunity as a panacea to problems con-cerning the conservation of natural resources.

Current perceptions of community appear

strongly linked to analyses of 19th and early20th century scholars attempting to understandthe portentous transformations that rockedtheir world.2 The source of these changes wasthought to lay in the economic sphere in-dustrialization, monetization, and productionto satisfy material needs. Sir Henry Maine, forexample, saw the world moving from relation-ships based on status, kin networks, and jointproperty to one based on contract, territory,and individual rights.3 Maine's underlying im-age of societal evolution inuenced Tonnies's

formulation of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft,or community and society.4 Tonnies's view ofcommunity as an organic whole continues tocolor present conceptions to a signicant de-gree, and accounts for some of the attractioncommunity holds for many conservationists.

Most of these scholars of social changehighlighted the disappearance of communityand its replacement by other forms of socialorganization. Their theories of classication, inthis sense, were also theories of evolution.5 ForMarx and Engels, Spencer and Comte, and

even for Weber and Durkheim, society movedalong an evolutionary path. Status, tradition,charisma, and religion would increasingly giveway to equality, modernity, rationality, and ascientic temper. This theorization of socialchange automatically pits community againstthe market, since marketization and urbaniza-tion erode community.

Modernization theorists shared this evolu-tionary view. Under the strong inuence ofParsonian structuralism, they characterizedwhole societies using the evolutionary labels of

``underdeveloped,'' ``developing,'' and ``devel-oped.'' The dichotomous pattern variables ofParsons were not only presumed to describeexisting realities and directions of historicalchange, but also the desirability of movementin that direction.6 Analytical categories repre-senting discontinuous social states overshad-owed the real processes of historical change.

While scholars of social change generallyaccepted the ongoing nature and irreversibilityof change, they diered in their judgementsregarding the benets of progress and the de-

sirability of traditional community. A strongcorrelation exists between those who viewprogress positively and community negatively:

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Marx, Spencer, and the early Durkheim sawongoing social changes as liberating humanityfrom the coercive and limiting world of thepast, from the ``idiocy of rural life,'' that com-munity, in part, embodied. The same is true of

most modernization theorists.7

Other scholarswith less sanguine views about the benets ofprogress did not abandon community alto-gether. Writers such as Tonnies, the laterDurkheim, and Dewey did not see any utopiaat the end of the social changes they described.Instead of liberation from the tyranny of cus-tom, they saw ``progress'' dissolving the tiesthat anchor humans to their milieu, providing asense of selfhood and belonging. Writers duringthis period and after made impossible searchesfor the community that they believe existed,

fully formed, just prior to the disruptive set ofsocial changes they experienced.

3. COMMUNITY AND CONSERVATION

Like more general works on community, thehistory of community in conservation is also ahistory of revisionism. Images of pristine eco-systems and innocent primitives yielded overtime to views of despoiling communities out ofbalance with nature, mostly due to the double-

pronged intrusion of the state and market. Arecuperative project on behalf of the indigenousand the local (community) has attempted torescue community. But the rescue project hasitself come under attack by new anthropologi-cal and historical research which suggestscommunities may not, after all, be as friendly tothe environment. The practical and policy im-plications that accompany these changing im-ages are immense.

The basic elements of earlier policy andscholarly writings about local communities and

their residents are familiar. ``People'' were anobstacle to ecient and ``rational'' organiza-tion of resource use.8 A convincing logic un-dergirded the belief that the goals ofconservation and the interests of local com-munities were in opposition: Conservation re-quired protection of threatened resources:wildlife, forests, pastures, sheries, irrigationows, and drinking water. Members of localcommunities, however, rely on these resourcesfor their fodder, fuelwood, water, and food andthus exploit them without restraint. This sche-

matic representation, popularized by GarrettHardin and bolstered by several theoreticalmetaphors that served to (mis)guide policy,

provided a persuasive explanation of how re-source degradation and depletion took place.9

Empirical evidence about the context withinwhich most rural communities are locatedhelped prop up the view. The population of

many rural areas in tropical countries hasgrown rapidly, even with outmigration to cit-ies.10 Demographic growth, it was argued,could only increase consumption pressures.Penetration by market forces, which linked lo-cal systems of resource use to a larger networkof demand, further increased the pressure onnatural resources.11 At the same time, manybelieved that poorly articulated and enforcedproperty rights arrangements provided disin-centives for individuals to protect resources.

These factors implied that even if people had

successfully managed resources in some har-monious past, that past was long gone. Instead,the way to eective conservation was throughthe heavy hand of the state or through theequally heavy, if less visible, hand of the marketand private property rights. Such ideas sup-ported conservation policies that aimed to ex-clude locals. National parks and otherprotected areas are the most obvious result ofthis thinking. International conservation agen-cies backed many of these policies.12

While many of these beliefs persist,13 most of

the current ideas about the community's role inconservation have changed radically: commu-nities are now the locus of conservationistthinking.14 International agencies such as theWorld Bank, IDRC, SIDA, CIDA, WorldwideFund for Nature, Conservation International,The Nature Conservancy, The Ford Founda-tion, The MacArthur Foundation, and USAIDhave all ``found'' community. They directenormous sums of money and eort towardcommunity-based conservation and resourcemanagement programs and policies. A ood of

scholarly papers and policy-centric reports alsofeature community-based management (e.g.,Arnold, 1990; Clugston and Rogers, 1995; Dei,1992; Douglass, 1992; Perry and Dixon, 1986;Raju, Vaghela and Raju, 1993; Robinson,1995). Exemplifying the swing toward com-munity, a recent collection of essays on com-munity-based conservation tells us,``Communities down the millennia have devel-oped elaborate rituals and practices to limit otake levels, restrict access to critical resources,and distribute harvests'' (Western and Wright,

1994, p. 1).15A host of other more specic factors have

aided advocates of community-based conser-

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vation. The past several decades of planneddevelopment and top-down conservation prac-tices have made one fact amply clear: the ca-pacity of states to coerce their citizens intounpopular development and conservation pro-

grams is limited. These limits are seen starklywhen state actors attempt to discipline resourceusers.16 Where resources such as fodder, fuel-wood, sh and wildlife are intrinsic to everydaylivelihood and household budgets, even well-funded coercive conservation generally fails.Faulty design, inecient implementation andcorrupt organizations have played an equallyimportant role in the poor outcomes associatedwith state-centered policies. Combined withlocal intransigence and lack of livelihood al-ternatives, this mix of factors has pushed most

enforced conservation projects into spectacularfailures. In their review of 23 conservation anddevelopment programs, Wells and Brandon(1992) argue that the weaknesses of state-cen-tric policy means few options other than com-munity-based conservation exist.17

Some contextual factors have also focusedthe attention of conservationists on communi-ty. With the spread of democratic politicalstructures and the increasing insistence onparticipation,18 unrepresentative developmentand conservation projects have become as un-

attractive as they are impractical. The increas-ing prominence of indigenous and ethnic claimsabout the stewardship role of native popula-tions in relation to nature (Clay, 1988; Redfordand Mansour, 1996) assists those who advocatea central role for community.19 In addition,nongovernment organizations (NGOs) at dif-ferent political levels have helped to amplify thevoices of local, indigenous, and communitygroups (Borda, 1985; Borghese, 1987; Bratton,1989a).

The recognition of the limits of the state and

the emphasis on popular participation havecome roughly at the same time as new revi-sionist ecological research began to questionthe two other main planks of coercive conser-vation. The rst was that pristine environmentsuntouched by human hands existed until thevery recent past. The second was the belief thatindigenous and other local communities hadbeen relatively isolated in the past (and there-fore used their resources sustainably). Ques-tioning these two beliefs has thrown theromantic image of the ``Ecologically Noble

Savage'' into disarray (Redford, 1990).20Historical ecologists emphasize that envi-

ronments have histories from which humans

cannot be excluded. To categorize landscapesas natural or human-inuenced is a false di-chotomy since humans have modied ecosys-tems greatly for millennia. Many of the morerecent studies that question the notion of

``virgin forests'' received at least part of theirinspiration from Darrell Posey's work on theforest islands of the Kayapo in Brazil (1984,1985).21 Denevan (1992) argues that most for-ests are, in fact, anthropogenic. An increasingnumber of scholars have marshaled evidenceabout how humans manipulate biodiversityand inuence the species composition andstructure of forests around them (Alcorn, 1981;Bailey and Headland, 1991; Balee, 1992, 1994;Brookeld and Padoch, 1994; Conklin, 1957;Hart and Hart, 1986; McDade, 1993; Posey

and Balee, 1989; Roosevelt, 1989). The inten-tional clearing of central African forests forcultivation may have begun more than 5000years ago (Clist, 1989; Phillipson, 1985). Tra-ditional swidden agriculture, like small-scaledisturbances in the forest, can enhance biodi-versity (Bailey, 1990, 1996; Park, 1992; Spon-sel, 1992; Sponsel, Headland and Bailey, 1996;Yoon, 1993).22

Such studies undermine arguments that por-tray communities only as despoilers of naturalresources. If humans have shaped and used

their environments in sustainable ways forthousands of years, it may be possible to es-tablish partnerships that accomplish the sameresults today. Indeed, as anthropologists beginto pay greater attention to the historical expe-riences of ``people without history'' (Wolf,1982), it has become increasingly obvious thatif local communities in the past had used re-sources without destroying them, they haddone so even as they remained in contact withother peoples. Such contacts contributed tosurvival and helped to conserve resources by

allowing foragers, hunter-gatherers, and pas-toralists to get starches and other foods fromfarmers and traders.23

In addition to empirical and historical worksthat have helped resurrect community and localparticipation in conservation, a choice-theo-retic foundation for the role of community inconservation has become available as well.Research from scholars of common propertyhas shown communities to be successful andsustainable alternatives to state and privatemanagement of resources. Scholarship regard-

ing the commons (Berkes, 1989; Bromley, 1992;McCay and Acheson, 1989; McKean, 1992;Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Peters, 1994; Wade, 1987)



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has highlighted the important time- and place-specic knowledge that members of localcommunities possess and the institutional ar-rangements they forge to achieve successful,local level resource management.

In light of the signicant symbolic, theoreti-cal, and intellectual resources available to ad-vocates of community, it is somewhatsurprising that claims on behalf of community-based conservation often retain a rather simplequality. One such form such claims assume isthat ``communities'' have a long-term need forthe renewable resources near which they live,and they possess more knowledge about theseresources than other potential actors. They are,therefore, the best managers of resources.24

Some renements to this view can be found: if

communities are not involved in the activemanagement of their natural resources, theywill use resources destructively (Sponsel,Headland and Bailey, 1996; Western andWright, 1994). Still other work includes thenotion of interests, in addition to that of needs:since it is in the interest of a community toprotect its resources, it will.25

In its prescriptive form, this thesis of com-munity-based conservation and resourcemanagement uses new beliefs about the suit-ability of communities to suggest policy rec-

ommendations. The implicit assumptionbehind these recommendations is that com-munities have incentives to use resources un-sustainably when they are not involved inresource management. If communities are in-volved in conservation, the benets they re-ceive will create incentives for them tobecome good stewards of resources (if onlythe state and the market would get out of theway).26

This vision of community as the cen-terpiece of conservation and resource man-

agement is attractive. It permits the easycontestation of dominant narratives that fa-vor state control or privatization of resourcesand their management (Li, 1996). Such posi-tive, generalized representations of communi-ty make available ``points of leverage inongoing processes of negotiation'' (1996, pp.505, 509).27 But such representations ofcommunity ignore the critical interests andprocesses within communities, and betweencommunities and other social actors. Ulti-mately, such representations can undermine

their advocates' long-term goal of increasingthe role of community in natural resourcemanagement.

4. WHAT MAKES COMMUNITY?

The vision of small, integrated communitiesusing locally-evolved norms and rules to man-age resources sustainably and equitably is

powerful. But because it views community as aunied, organic whole, this vision fails to at-tend to dierences within communities, andignores how these dierences aect resourcemanagement outcomes, local politics, andstrategic interactions within communities, aswell as the possibility of layered alliances thatcan span multiple levels of politics. Attention tothese details is critical if policy changes on be-half of community are to lead to outcomes thatare sustainable and equitable.

Although current writings on community-

based conservation assert that community iscentral to renewable resource management,they seldom devote much attention to analyzingthe concept of community, or explaining pre-cisely how community aects outcomes.28 Someauthors refuse to elaborate on what it mightmean, preferring to let readers infer its contoursin the descriptions of specic cases (e.g., Wes-tern and Wright, 1994). Most studies in theconservation eld however refer to a bundle ofconcepts related to space, size, composition,interactions, interests and objectives. Much of

this literature sees community in three ways: asa spatial unit, as a social structure, and as a setof shared norms. It is on the basis of one or acombination of these three ideas that most ofthe advocacy for community rests. But theseconceptions fail to explain the cause of thesefeatures or articulate their eect on naturalresource use. They oer, therefore, a weakfoundation upon which to base policy.

(a) Community as a small spatial unit

Small size and territorial aliation have beenproxies for community since the very begin-nings of writings on the subject. Tonnies, forexample, saw Gemeinschaft as existing in vil-lages, and characterized it by ``intimate, pri-vate, and exclusive living together'' (cited inBender, 1978, p. 17). Such closeness was im-possible in large cities, and impractical if notimpossible to achieve at a distance. Increasedmobility and larger settlements that accompa-nied urbanization and industrialization, it wasbelieved, weakened communal bonds naturally

found in small villages. These two aspects ofcommunity smallness (of both area andnumbers of individuals) and territorial attach-



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ment also mark many current writings oncommunity-in-conservation. Instead of exam-ining and drawing out the possible connectionsof shared space and small size with the politicalprocesses of local conservation, they tend to

assume a link between the territorial concep-tion of community and successful resourcemanagement.29

The popularity of this view of communitycan be traced, at least in part, to the fact thatthe renewable resources that communities use,manage, and sometimes protect, are themselvesusually located near territorially xed homesand settlements. If top-down programs toprotect resources failed because of the inabilityof governments to exercise authority at a dis-tance, the reasoning goes, then decentralization

of authority to those social formations that arelocated near the resource might work better.There may be other contributing factors atwork. Members of small groups, sharing thesame geographical space, are more likely tointeract with each other more often. Such reg-ular, more frequent interactions can lower thecosts of making collective decisions. These twoaspects of community fewer individuals andshared small spaces may also contribute togroup distinctiveness. Because of continuinginteractions among members over time, terri-

torially circumscribed communities might alsobe able to develop specic ways of managingthe resources near which they are located.These advantages have led some policy makersand analysts to dene strictly the size of``communities'' that should be participating incommunity-based resource programs.30

Because many small, territorially containedgroups do not protect or manage resourceswell, and because some mobile, transitionalgroups manage them eciently, importantprocesses are at work that are not captured by

spatial location alone (Agrawal, 1999). Indeed,the territorial attachment of small groups maymake them inappropriate managers for partic-ular resources because the geographical spreadof the resource (large watersheds, forests, lakes,etc.) could be larger than a small communitycould ever hope to control. Consequently, itbecomes important to consider the negotiationsand politics to which common spatial locationand small size might contribute.

The bounded and stationary character ofterrestrial resources such as forests and pas-

tures does not imply a consequent ease in theirallocation to particular spatial communities,e.g., a piece of forest or pasture for every

community. Because more than one community(in the spatial sense) may be located near agiven patch of forest or pasture, and becausethe members of each would have an interest inthe resources nominally belonging to the other

community, spatial bases for allocating re-source management rights can prove untenable.For fugitive resources such as wildlife and sh,an added dimension of complexity might beintroduced (Naughton-Treves and Sanderson,1995). The literature on community-basedconservation also often elides the thorny ques-tion of densities: does the success of a conser-vation practice depend on the density ofindividuals per hectare of land, per hectare ofproductive land, or per hectare of a certainnatural resource (Matzke and Nabane, 1996)?

Focusing on a community's shared space andsmall numbers alone, therefore, is necessarilyincomplete and possibly misleading to analyzelocal level management of resources.

(b) Community as a homogeneous socialstructure

Much of the rhetorical weight of communitycomes from papering over the dierences thatmight prevail within actually existing commu-nities. Indeed, the feature of community re-

ceiving the greatest attention in its constructionas a social artifact is its homogeneous compo-sition. Typically, observers assume communi-ties to be groups of similarly endowed (in termsof assets and incomes), relatively homogeneoushouseholds who possess common characteris-tics in relation to ethnicity, religion, caste, orlanguage. The relationship proceeds both wayssince ethnic, religious, or linguistic homogene-ity is often presumed to lead to community aswell. Such homogeneity is assumed to furthercooperative solutions, reduce hierarchical and

conictual interactions, and promote betterresource management. Outside the communityconicts prevail; within, harmony reigns.31

The notion that a community is homoge-neous meshes well with beliefs about its spatialboundaries. In the rural areas of poorer coun-tries (the sites where most advocates of com-munity-based resource management locatetheir analyses and projects) people living withinthe same location may indeed hold similar oc-cupations, depend on the same resources, usethe same language, and belong to the same

ethnic or religious group. These similaritiesmay facilitate regular interactions among groupmembers.



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Even if members of a group are similar inseveral respects, however, it is not clear at whatpoint the label ``homogeneous'' can be applied,nor is it clear that these shared characteristicsare critical to conservation. Because all human

groups are stratied to some extent or theother, it becomes important to analyze the de-gree of homogeneity and those dimensions of itthat are important to resource conservation.Few studies, however, wrestle with the dicultyof operationalizing what social homogeneitymight be.32 Most studies, when they do focuson the social composition of a communityrather than assume it to be homogeneous, in-dicate intentionally or unintentionally thatwithin the same group (e.g., Masai, or pas-toralist, or women), multiple axes of dieren-

tiation exist.33

Recent studies of resource use atthe local level have recognized the salience ofintracommunity conicts (Agrawal, 1994a;Gibson and Marks, 1995; Ilahaine, 1995;Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 1995; Moore,1996a, b). Yet even highly dierentiated com-munities may be able to take steps to use localresources sustainably (e.g., Agrawal, 1994b).These studies show that there is no easy cor-respondence between social homogeneity andsustainable resource use.

(c) Community as common interestsand shared norms

The concept of community as shared normsand common interests depends strongly uponthe perceptions of its members; in this sense allcommunities are imagined communities. Thisimagined sense of community attracts scholarsof conservation to community. It is this notionof community that is supposed to grow out ofcommon location, small size, homogeneouscomposition, and/or shared characteristics. As

Ascher puts it, community exists among indi-viduals who share ``common interests andcommon identication... growing out of sharedcharacteristics'' (1995, p. 83). Common andshared rather than individual and selsh is whatmakes successful resource management morelikely. In a community, ``individuals give upsome of their individuality to behave as a singleentity to accomplish goals'' (Kiss, 1990, p. 9).

Internalized norms of behavior amongmembers of communities can guide resourcemanagement outcomes in desired directions.

Community as shared norms is itself an out-come of interactions and processes that takeplace within communities, often in relation to

those perceived as outsiders. But community asshared norms also has an independent positiveeect on resource use and conservation.

Shared community level norms can promoteconservation in two dierent ways. First, norms

may specically prohibit some actions. In manyvillages in semi-arid western Rajasthan, forexample, existing norms impede villagers fromcutting khejri trees (Prosopis cineraria), espe-cially when these trees are present in the localoran, a common area set aside for grazing, andoften dedicated to a religious deity.34 In thesame region, the Bishnois have strong normsagainst the killing of wild animal species suchas deer. Cook (1996, pp. 279282) details howthe Amung-me in Irian Jaya protect certaingroves of trees as sacred, and a marsupial

(amat) that plays a role in the propagation ofthe Pandanus trees. Mishra explains thatwomen belonging to Juang and Saora tribalcommunities in Orissa follow strong normsabout the timing and season for collecting non-timber forest products (1994). Other examplesof ``conservationist'' norms also exist.35

Second, it is possible that the existence ofcommunal norms will promote cooperativedecision-making within the community. Ifmembers of a community believe in sharedidentities and common experiences, they also

may be willing to cooperate over more formaldecisions to manage and conserve resources.The presence of community-level norms canfacilitate resource management by preventingcertain behaviors, or encouraging others (Co-leman, 1990).

Although community as shared norms, es-pecially when such norms are about the man-agement of resources or conservation, may bethe hope of conservationists, the extent towhich norms aid conservation needs to bequestioned.36 At a minimum, current research

indicates that conservationist norms cannot beequated with particular identities such as``woman,'' or ``the indigenous.''37 Norms, infact, may be a signicant part of the problem toa conservationist if a norm promotes exploita-tion (posing an enormous obstacle for thoseinterested in community-based conservation).38

For example, as a result of land laws in theearly colonial periods of many countries inLatin America, there is a strong norm that landis only useful when cleared of trees and used foragriculture.39 In many parts of Africa, wildlife

is considered a threat to crops and human lives,not a resource to be conserved (Marks, 1984;Naughton-Treves, 1997). Further, norms can-



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not be taken as a set of beliefs that communitieshold, never to give up. They come into being inrelation to particular contextual factors, andeven when codied and written do not remainstatic.40 Just because some small social groups

hold conservationist norms today, they will notnecessarily hold them in the future.

Those who conceptualize community asshared norms may fail to recognize the di-culties this position poses for conservation.Unlike the factors of community size, compo-sition, and links to a specic territorial spacewhich can all be directly inuenced throughexternal intervention, community as sharedunderstandings is probably the least amenableto such manipulation. Conservationist normscannot be easily introduced into a community

by external actors (although the current em-phasis on participation and conservation bystate actors means that at least the attempt isbeing made in many locations).41 Indeed, wehardly know which strategies successfully alterthe norms people hold about conservation, es-pecially when the resources in question are acritical part of the family income.

5. ACTORS, INTERACTIONS, ANDINSTITUTIONS

To summarize, advocates of community-based conservation forward a conceptualiza-tion of communities as territorially xed, small,and homogeneous. These characteristics sup-posedly foster the interactions among membersthat promote desirable collective decisions.Figure 1 depicts the connections between dif-ferent attributes of community and conserva-tion outcomes indicated by the literatureregarding community-based conservation.

While certain types and levels of these charac-teristics might facilitate collective action, how-ever, few studies demonstrate that thiscollective action is necessarily connected withconservation behavior. Most important, few

social scientists or policy makers have system-atically tested these propositions in the eld.

In fact, some community characteristicsconsidered important to collective action mayactually thwart conservation eorts. Smallsized groups may be unable to defend theirresources in the face of strong external threats,or be unable to manage resources if they arespread over large areas. Strongly held normsmay support exploitative behavior, or be re-sistant to outside attempts at their modica-tion.

To be more accurate in our eorts to depictcommunities and their relationship with theirnatural resources and thus to be more rele-vant to policy-making we argue greater at-tention be focused on three critical aspects ofcommunities: the multiple actors with multipleinterests that make up communities, the pro-cesses through which these actors interrelate,and, especially, the institutional arrangementsthat structure their interactions. These threeproposed foci for the study of community-based conservation allow for a better under-

standing of the factors critical to the success orfailure of eorts aimed at local-level conserva-tion.

(a) Multiple interests and actors

A growing number of studies that explorenatural resource management at the local leveldo not nd communities comprising just onegroup of individuals who possess similar en-dowments or goals. Instead, they nd many

Figure 1. A conventional view of the relationship between community and conservation.



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subgroups; and within subgroups they nd in-dividuals with varying preferences for resourceuse and distribution. These authors bring tolight the politics of the local: economic elitesmay vie with religious elites; chiefs may battle

with their advisors; women may contest therights of their husbands; the politically mar-ginalized may dispute the acts of the politicallydominant. Recognizing and working with themultiplicity of actors and interests is crucial forthose advocating community-based programs.Such recognition indicates that empoweringlocal actors to use and manage their naturalresources is more than the decentralization ofauthority over natural resources from the cen-tral government to ``a'' community. The farmore challenging task is to understand patterns

of dierence within communities.42

Recognizing that multiple actors exist at thelocal level is a useful step forward because itforces researchers to consider their dierentand dynamic interests.43 A more acute under-standing of community in conservation can befounded only by understanding that actorswithin communities seek their own interests inconservation programs, and that these interestsmay change as new opportunities emerge.

(b) Local-level processes

Within communities, individuals negotiatethe use, management, and conservation of re-sources. They attempt to implement the agreed-upon rules resulting from their negotiations.And they try to resolve disputes that arise in theprocesses of implementation of rules. Thesethree types of local interactions are irreduciblyinuenced by the existing distribution of powerand the structure of incentives within a givensocial group.44 Because the exercise of powerand incentive-oriented behavior are variable

over time and space, and because all groupshave members who can be strategic in theirbehavior, planned conservation eorts cannever address all contingencies completely.

Analyses of only local-level phenomena areinsucient to explain interactions at the locallevel. All local interactions take place within thecontext of larger social forces. Attempts bygovernments to implement community-basedconservation and specic projects of NGOsthat seek to involve communities are examplesof directed inuence on local level conserva-

tion. Such initiatives bring into the local con-text those larger political forces that generatedthe programs. Other pressures changes in

prices of dierent resources, development as-sistance, demographic shifts, technological in-novations, institutional arrangements atdierent levels also impinge on local inter-actions.45

Local interactions may also prompt re-sponses from macro level actors. Local reac-tions to conservation programs can lead tomodications in the shape of these programs.Thus, although it is convenient to talk aboutthe community and the state, or about the localand the external, they are linked together inways that it might be dicult to identify theprecise line where local conservation begins andthe external (that helps construct the local)ends.

(c) Institutional arrangements

Institutions can be seen as sets of formal andinformal rules and norms that shape interac-tions of humans with others and nature.46 Theyconstrain some activities and facilitate others;without them, social interactions would be im-possible (Bates, 1989; North, 1990). Institutionspromote stability of expectations ex ante, andconsistency in actions, ex post. They contrastwith uncertain political interactions amongunequally placed actors, and unpredictable

processes where performances of social actorsdo not follow any necessary script. Strategicactors may attempt to bypass the constraints ofexisting institutions, and create new institutionsthat match their interests. But institutions re-main the primary mechanisms available tomediate, soften, attenuate, structure, mold, ac-centuate, and facilitate particular outcomes andactions (Ensminger, 1992; Alston, Eggertssonand North, 1996; Agrawal, 1995b; Gibson,1999). This holds whether change is radical,moderate, or incremental.

When actors do not share goals for con-serving resources and are unequally powerful,as is likely the case in most empirical situations,institutions are signicant for two reasons. Onthe one hand, they denote some of the powerrelations (Foucault, 1983, pp. 222, 224) thatdene the interactions among actors who cre-ated the institutions; on the other they also helpto structure the interactions that take placearound resources. Once formed, institutionsexercise eects that are independent of theforces that constituted them. Institutions can

change because of constant challenges to theirform by the actions of individuals whose be-havior they are supposed to inuence. No



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actual behavior conforms precisely to a giveninstitutional arrangement. Everyday perfor-mances of individuals around conservationgoals possess the potential to reshape formaland informal institutions. Institutions can also

change when explicitly renegotiated by actors.Institutions should be understood, therefore, asprovisional agreements on how to accomplishtasks. Rather than setting the terms of inter-actions among parties with varying objectives,they help the behavior of actors congeal alongparticular courses.

Authority to manage resources eectively atthe local level requires the exercise of authorityand control by local actors over three criticaldomains mentioned previously: (i) making rulesabout the use, management, and conservation

of resources; (ii) implementation of the rulesthat are created; and, (iii) resolution of disputesthat arise during the interpretation and appli-cation of rules.47

The authority to make rules denes who hasthe rights to access, use, and conserve resourcesand exclude others from carrying out theseactivities. It also includes the determination ofthe ability to transfer these above rights. Theauthority to implement implies the rights andthe abilities to meter and monitor the use of theresource, and specify sanctions against those

who violate existing rules. The authority toresolve disputes includes the rights and capac-ities to ensure that sanctions are followed, andadjudicate in the case of disputes.

The problem of analyzing community-basedconservation, thus, requires exploring a three-step process of institutional formation. At eachstep, two issues must be addressed: Who willexercise the authority to make the rules? andWhat will be the content of the rules? Typically,community-based conservation programs de-volve to local actors only the authority to im-

plement rules created elsewhere. Governmentagencies generally reserve for themselves theright to create rules and to arbitrate disputes.

6. INSTITUTIONS AS SOLUTIONS

A focus on institutions, conceptualized assets of rules describing and prescribing humanactions in three related domains, leads to asubstantially dierent focus for locally-orientedconservation policies in comparison to policies

that result from an acceptance of the ``mythic''community. Rather than feature the primacy ofsize, space, or norms, an institutional approach

focuses on the ability of communities to createand to enforce rules. Institutional analysis re-quires identifying the possibly multiple andoverlapping rules, the groups and individualsaected by such rules, and the processes by

which the particular sets of rules change in agiven situation. In some cases, the homogeneityof a settlement's members or the norms theyhold may be crucial to explaining the rules thatpeople follow and the outcomes that their be-havior engenders. In other cases, formal andinformal rules may have little to do with theconventional view of community, and an in-stitutional analysis instead notices overlapping,multilevel, and dierentiated sets of rules thathelp explain resource outcomes.

There are substantial arguments in favor of

recognizing that actors in the local space maybe the more appropriate source of rule-makingfor a signicant range of problems because oftheir specialized information about the localcontext and resources. Government agenciesand bureaucracies are unlikely to be familiarwith the specics of local resource systems.Community actors and their representativesmay possess far greater knowledge, as a raft ofliterature on ``indigenous knowledge'' has be-gun to indicate.48 But it is also important toensure that local-level institutions for making

rules about resource use have representativesfrom the multiple groups that are aected bythe rules in question. Members of these groupsshould also have opportunities to exercise aright to remove their representatives if theperformance of the representatives is unsatis-factory as deemed by those aected by rules(Ribot, 1996).

Further, vesting the authority to arbitratedisputes in distant government agencies canonly increase the costs of dispute resolution.Arrangements to decide local disputes within

the community by community representativeswould be far more cost eective. Appealsagainst these decisions, and disputes involvingindividuals from multiple communities, couldbe settled in meetings attended by governmentocials and representatives from concernedcommunities in a far more cost-eective man-ner.

This does not eliminate the need for nationalor regional government involvement. Localcommunities often do not possess the materialor political clout to fend o invasive actions by

outsiders. Indeed, intracommunity conictsthemselves may need the arbitration or en-forcement eorts of formal government agen-



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cies. In addition, there is almost always roomfor nonexploitative technical assistance fromextension agents regarding management tech-niques.

To say that communities with assistance

from state actors should possess the authorityto make rules, to implement them, and to re-solve disputes, already species some of whatthe content of these rules should be: It shouldbe what specic communities and their repre-sentatives decide. Such an answer to the ques-tion, one might argue, leaves very real concernsunresolved. What if communities are dominat-ed by elites? What if they have scant interest inconservation?

To such concerns, one response may be thatspecifying the concrete content of rules at dif-

ferent stages goes against the very notion ofcommunity-based management. A second re-sponse is more realistic and more pointed. It isprecisely because of the deciencies of central-ized, exclusionary policies (``Communitiesshould protect wildlife, stop cutting trees, stopovergrazing, leave protected areas, etc.'') thatwe have now begun to talk about community-based management. The attempts to imposeconservation have often failed. A focus on in-stitutions does not necessarily lead to betteroutcomes (more biodiversity, more biomass,

sustainable stock levels, etc.) but it does oerthe tools for understanding local-level processesand outcomes better. It also oers more con-crete points of intervention and design than ageneral reliance on community. It is importantto recognize that not all local institutions canbe changed in desired directions through anexternal intervention. Especially dicult tochange would be deep-seated informal norms.Especially impotent in bringing about changewould be policies that do not allow resourcesand authority for local-level management, en-

forcement, and dispute resolution.

The plea to establish a partnership betweenthe state and the community comes with twocrucial qualications. First, we must recognizethat state ocials and community representa-tives are located within asymmetric organiza-

tional structures. They enjoy access to verydierent levels of resources and power. Forcommunity actors to possess some leverage intheir dealings with state ocials, it would beimperative that they organize themselves intolarger collectives or federations that can spanthe gap between the local and the national.Second, external forces, such as new state pol-icies in relation to community-based conserva-tion, can drastically change the shape ofexisting local institutions (e.g., Agrawal andYadama, 1997; Peluso, 1996). On the other

hand, introduced changes will themselves becontested in the local context, their limits tes-ted, and their meanings transformed by thecommunities whose actions they are supposedto alter.

In light of the above discussion of multipleactors and interests, political processes, andinstitutional arrangements around conserva-tion, a dierent conceptualization of the rela-tionship between dierent aspects ofcommunity and resource management out-comes is possible. In contrast to Figure 1, the

emphases of this review on multiple interests,processes, institutions, and outcomes are sum-marized in Figure 2. The gure does not pres-ent a theory of community-based conservation;rather, it summarizes the main thrust of thisessay by indicating some of the directions inwhich we can seek insights about the devolu-tion of power to actors in community-level in-stitutions.

In Figure 2, community characteristics (e.g.,size, composition, levels of dependence on theresource, prevailing norms, types of technology

employed to use resources, etc.) have an impact

Figure 2. An alternative view of community and conservation.



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on resource management because they aectinteractions of dierent actors around conser-vation. Their interactions are shaped by andsimultaneously shape prevailing institutions.Viewed at any one point in time, institutions

may be seen as constraints on political pro-cesses and the actions of individuals. Over time,however, they are under constant contestationand (re)formation through the performancesand negotiations of actors.

7. CONCLUSION

To analyze community-based conservation,this essay began by casting a critical historicaleye at the notion of community. Current works

on community borrow extensively, if uncon-sciously, from past writings. Visions of com-munity as an organic whole, as small andterritorially xed, as under siege and eroding,or as standing in opposition to markets andstates, can be traced directly to writings fromthe 19th and the early 20th century. A longer-term perspective on community prompts cau-tion before one embraces it as a general answerto conservation-related woes.

An analysis of the perceptions of communityin the literature on conservation reveals strong

oscillations over time in the recognition andvalue accorded to it. The current valorizationof community should be viewed in the contextof a general loss of faith in progress and futureutopias. It also stems from the disillusionmentof conservationists with two other gross con-cepts the state and the market. In addition,revisionist historical ecological research andcontributions from the scholars of the com-mons have also played a role in bringing com-munity to the fore.

The celebration of community is a move in

the right direction. But the implications ofturning to it are little analyzed in most writingson community-based conservation. The exist-ing literature on community-based conserva-tion reveals a widespread preoccupation withwhat might be called ``the mythic community'':small, integrated groups using locally evolvednorms to manage resources sustainably andequitably.

Such characteristics capture the realities offew, if any, existing communities. The vision of``the mythic community'' fails to attend to

dierences within communities. It ignores howdierences aect processes around conserva-tion, the dierential access of actors within

communities to various channels of inuence,and the possibility of ` layered alliances''spanning multiple levels of politics. Small,territorially attached, and relatively homoge-neous communities, where they exist, might

nd it easy to make decisions collectively.They would still nd it dicult, however, towithstand external threats (even from othercommunity groups competing for access to thesame resources), or manage resources thathave a wide geographical spread. A focus onthe shared norms of community is also in-complete because norms may not preventoverexploitation of resources, and they arescarcely amenable to change through externalinterventions.

We propose a shift in emphasis away from

the usual assumptions about communities:small size, territorial xity, group homogeneity,and shared understandings and identities. In-stead, we suggest a stronger focus on the di-vergent interests of multiple actors withincommunities, the interactions or politicsthrough which these interests emerge and dif-ferent actors interact with each other, and theinstitutions that inuence the outcomes of po-litical processes.

Our advocacy is for a changed emphasis forthose of us who believe in locally-oriented

management of resources and a move awayfrom states and markets. Greater autonomy tolocal groups means that external actors wouldhave to relinquish control over the rules and theoutcomes of community-based conservation. Inaddition, the directions in which institutionaloutcomes in local spaces will unfold cannot beplotted precisely, they can only be roughly as-sessed. Demands for greater certainty suerfrom the same utopian longings that identify``community as shared norms'' as the solutionto problems of conservation.

We conclude our analysis by discussing fourpossible areas for new research. In the preced-ing text of the essay we have only hinted at eachof these following four points. They requireconsiderable more development. We state themhere as issues for future work.

First, community-based conservation wouldmore protably be founded on principles ofchecks and balances among various parties local groups, government actors, even NGOsand aid agencies rather than faith in theregenerative capacities of any one of them.

Unchecked authority for community-level de-cisions is likely to lead to perverse conservationoutcomes.



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Second, local groups are usually the leastpowerful among the dierent parties interestedin conservation. Community-based conserva-tion requires, therefore, that its advocates makemore strenuous eorts to channel greater au-

thority and power toward local groups. Onlythen can such groups form eective checksagainst arbitrary actions by governments andother actors. Critical to such attempts is theneed to forge federated structures of commu-nity user groups that can negotiate with gov-ernment ocials and aid agencies on moreequal terms than those prevailing today. Ne-gotiations on terms of equality are founda-tional to hold government actors accountable.

Networked structures, bringing together theresources of several communities, are also im-

portant for other reasons. They may prove farmore eective in resolving intercommunityconicts in comparison to distant, time-con-suming legal mechanisms that are, in any case,biased against marginal groups. They may alsobe useful in addressing challenges from mem-bers of local elites to community-based con-servation.

Third, those interested in community-basedconservation should seek to implement rea-sonable processes of decision-making ratherthan focus upon guarantees about outcomes.

``Reasonable'' implies that (a) dierent inter-ests, especially those that are usually marginal,are represented in decision-making, (b) mech-anisms exist to ensure that the outcomes ofcurrent decision processes are going to form

part of the data on which future decisions willbe based, and (c) the performance of those whomake decisions is periodically reviewed bythose aected by decisions. Local representa-tives of communities, and those elected as o-

cials in federated structures of communitygroups must themselves be accountable to theirconstituents if a new understanding of com-munity-based conservation is to have any teeth.Regular and open elections in which decision-makers submit to choices made by their con-stituents may be indispensable to ensure suchaccountability. Without mechanisms of ac-countability, federations of community groupsmay become yet another channel for centraliz-ing tendencies.

Finally, eective institutionalization of com-

munity-based conservation requires that localgroups have access to adequate funds for im-plementing the rules they create. The sourcesfor these funds should also be local, raisedthrough contributions of users rather thangranted by central governments. Over time, thiswould mean that government agencies not justcede their authority to make rules about con-servation, but that community groups also de-mand control over the resources themselves.

The points outlined above do not provide ablueprint for community-based conservation.

Rather, they emphasize the importance of in-stitutions, the ubiquity of political processes,the need to institute checks to contain arbitraryexercise of power, and the impossibility of es-cape from an uncertain future.

NOTES

1. Throughout the article we use the terms conserva-

tion, resource use, and resource management inter-

changeably: renewable resources such as forests,

pastures, wildlife, and sh have been, are being, andwill always be used by people; those who wish to

conserve must incorporate use and management in their

strategies (Robinson and Redford, 1991, p. 3).

2. The quick review that follows pays little attention to

the earliest scholars of community such as the Greek

philosophers. For an introduction to these writings, see

Booth (1994). The ensuing discussion on community is

strongly inuenced by Bender (1978) and Guseld

(1978).

3. Maine (1871, 1905) was focused primarily on issues

of law and political economy, including a comparative

study of property in village communities. But the

distinctions he drew were equally inuential in under-

standing social changes related to urbanization and

modernization.

4. We note that community and society are not exact,

but only close translations of Gemeinschaft and Gesellsc-

haft.

5. For an introduction to how classical theories of

cyclical change in Europe gave way to evolutionary

beliefs in progress during the nineteenth century, see

Cowen and Shenton (1995).

6. Parsons expanded the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft di-chotomy into four parallel dimensions (Bender, 1978, p.

21; Parsons, 1951, 1960; Parsons and Shils, 1962). These



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comprised: aectivity versus aective neutrality; partic-

ularism versus universalism; ascription versus achieve-

ment; and diuseness versus specicity. Initially, Parsons

included a fth, collectivity-orientation versus self-

orientation. Parsons (1966) shows his interest in apply-

ing his pattern variables to social systems.

7. Writing to address concerns about the direction of

change in the newly emerging nations of the so-called

Third World, these theorists argued against particular-

istic aliations of kinship, religion, and ethnicity. These

arguments were also explicit arguments against tradi-

tional community. Lerner (1962), perhaps, provides the

classic statement on the apathy, fatalism, passivity, and

static nature of traditional communities. But he is

certainly not alone. Almond and Verba (1963), Black

(1967), Deutsch (1961), Geertz (1963), and Shils (1962)

wrote inuential studies of modernization, forming the

viewing lens for an entire generation of scholars.

8. See, for example, Eckholm (1976). Ives and Messerli

(1989) present a discussion of some of the literature,

especially in the Himalayan context.

9. See Ostrom (1990) for a discussion of how the

metaphors of the ``Prisoner's Dilemma'' and the ``Logic

of Collective Action'' have been important in shaping

understandings about the (im)possibility of cooperation.

10. Given the large literature on the negative impact of

population growth on resource conservation, it is

perhaps unnecessary to refer to it at length. For some

general statements, see Mee, Ehrlich and Ehrenfeld

(1993, and Myers (1991) and essays in the journal

Population and Environment. Dissenting views are avail-

able in Lappe and Shurman (1989), and Simon (1990).

Arizpe, Stone and Major (1994) provide a thoughtful

summary.

11. For a critical review of some of the literature onoverpopulation and market pressures, and an emphasis

on institutions in the context of resource management,

see Agrawal and Yadama (1997).

12. See Ascher (1995), Fairhead and Leach (1994), and

Gibson and Marks (1995) for discussions of examples

and brief reviews of the relevant literature.

13. Although new beliefs have entered the picture, not

all who think about the role of community in resource

use have begun to subscribe to new views. The result is a

complex mosaic of notions about how villages or othernonurban groups may be connected to the resources

upon which they depend. The ensuing lines on commu-

nity in conservation attempt to pick on the most

important beliefs that depart from earlier themes.

14. An enormous outpouring of literature bears wit-

ness. See Bhatt (1990), Ghai (1993), Gurung (1992), and

Lowry and Donahue (1994). See also Wisner (1990) for a

review.

15. Scholars in developed countries have also argued

for the importance of community in resource manage-

ment. See Huntsinger and McCarey (1995) for a study

of the state against the Yurok in the United States, and

Hoban and Cook (1988) for a critique of the conserva-

tion provision of the US Farm Bill of 1985 for its

inadequate involvement of local communities.

16. A number of works are available that point to theinadequacies of state-centric policy in general. See, for

example, Bates (1989) and Repetto and Gillis (1988).

17. Ecologists have also underscored the limits of the

state in protecting resources. Even if states had the

power to enforce perfectly, some ecologists argue that

protected areas are often too small to maintain valued

biological diversity (Newmark, 1995, 1996).

18. A number of writings have focused on the impor-

tance of participation for sustainable democratization.

Many of them have also highlighted the (potential) role

of NGOs in the process (Bratton, 1989b; Clark, 1991;

Fernandes, 1987; Kothari, 1984; Warren, 1992). The

Fall 1996 special issue of Cultural Survival Quarterly

edited by Pauline Peters (Vol. 20, No. 3) contains a

number of useful essays on the role of participation in

conservation and development.

19. Agrawal (1995a) questions the possibility of sepa-

rating indigenous forms of knowledge from western or

scientic forms while stressing the political signicance

of claims on behalf of the indigenous.

20. On the subject of the ``Ecologically Noble Savage,''

see also Alvard (1993).

21. Anderson and Posey (1989) present a later work on

the same group of Indians. For a strong critique of

Posey's work, see Parker (1993).

22. A signicant body of research argues against

indigenous peoples being natural conservationists (Al-

corn, 1993; Edgerton, 1992; Hames, 1991; Parker, 1993;

Rambo, 1985; Robinson and Redford, 1991; Redfordand Stearman, 1993). But as Sponsel, Headland and

Bailey conclude after an extensive survey, there is



15/21

relatively widespread agreement that values, knowledge,

and skills of indigenous peoples and many local com-

munities ``can be of considerable practical value'' (1996,

p. 23).

23. See Fox (1969), Morris (1977), and Parker (1909)

for early arguments highlighting contacts between local

groups and ``outsiders.'' Bailey et al . (1989), and

Wilmsen (1989) present similar arguments more recent-

ly.

24. For two examples of this view, see Lynch and

Talbott (1995) and Poenberger (1990). Often the last

part of the claim is probabilistically modied, ``Com-

munities are likely to prove the best managers.''

25. McNeely (1996, p. xvii). See also the various issuesof the inuential Indian news magazine Down to Earth,

published by the Center for Science and Environment,

New Delhi.

26. See the various chapters in Western and Wright

(1994) for an elaboration of this perspective, and Gibson

and Marks (1995) for a critique.

27. Zerner's, 1994 essay on sasi, a highly variable body

of practices linked to religious beliefs and cultural beliefs

about nature in Indonesia's Maluku islands, also makes

the same point (cf. Zerner, 1994). Current images of sasi

depict it as a body of customary environmental law

promoting sustainable development. Sasi has, thus,

emerged as a site and a resource for social activists to

contest an oppressive, extractive political economy. In

sasi, the rhetoric of local environmental management

can be united with culturally distinctive communities.

The result is an unusually potent political metaphor. See

also, Baines (1991) for a similar argument in relation to

assertions on the basis of traditional rights in the

Solomon Islands.

28. One exception can be found in Singleton and

Taylor (1992, p. 315). They conceive of community as

implying a set of people with some shared beliefs, stable

membership, who expect to interact in the future, and

whose relations are direct (unmediated), and over

multiple issues. Signicantly, they do not include shared

space, size, or social composition, a concern of many

other writers, in their discussion.

29. See, for example, Donovan (1994), Hill and Press

(1994), and Poenberger (1994). The point is not that

links between group size and the emergence of commu-nity are nonexistent. It is, rather, that such links, if

present, require substantial attention and institutional-

ization if they are to become a foundation for commu-

nity-based conservation.

30. For example, Murphree refers to the ``optimal''

size for communities (around 90 families) for revenue-

sharing schemes incorporated within the CAMPFIRE

wildlife program in Zimbabwe (Murphree, 1993). See

also Agrawal and Goyal (1998) for a game theoretic

argument about the relationship between group size and

successful collective action in the context of resource

management by village residents.

31. Such dicult-to-believe notions of community, in

part, become possible owing to the conventional sepa-

ration of market, state, and community from each other,

and the erosion of community that is presumed to

proceed apace when external forces impinge upon it.

32. Taylor (1982) uses anthropological and historical

sources to provide an extensive survey of hierarchy and

stratication within even supposedly egalitarian com-

munities. See also Rae (1981) and Sen (1992) for related

arguments about the nature and existence of inequality.

33. See Western (1994) whose study of the Amboseli

National Reserve shows, even though this is not a focus

of the study, the dierences within the putative commu-

nity of ``Masai.'' Agrawal (1999) and Robbins (1996)

point to stratication within raika pastoralist groupswho see themselves as distinct from landowners within

their villages.

34. For similar proscriptions on cutting particular tree

species, see Dorm-Adzobu and Veit (1991) and Mato-

wanyika (1989).

35. See for example, Nikijuluw (1994) for a discussion

of sasi and Petuanang which inuence harvests of sh;

and Rajasekaran and Warren (1994) for a discussion of

sacred forests among the Malaiyala Gounder in the Kolli

hills in India.

36. Dove demonstrates how developers, planners, ac-

ademics, and bureaucrats working with the Kantu of

Kalimantan incorporated their own desires, hopes, and

fears into the construction of a local ``community''

(Dove, 1982).

37. The history of massive deforestation that occurred

even prior to industrialization, and recent empirical

literature that shows wasteful practices among indige-

nous groups shows that ``the indigenous'' cannot beidentied with a conservation ethic. See Abrams et al.

(1996) for a review of evidence in the case of the early



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Mayans; Fairservis (1975) for the Harappan civilization;

and Meilleur (1996) and Steadman (1989) for Polynesia.

38. Western and Wright broach this idea in their rst

chapter (1994). See also the discussion in Wells and

Brandon (1992) who point out that sometimes commu-

nities may not be as eective as state ocials in

protecting resources or ensuring conservation.

39. Tully (1994) presents a clear argument about how

Western theories of property, which provided the

justication for taking over lands from native Ameri-

cans, were founded on land being used for agricultural

purposes.

40. For insightful discussions of how tradition may

often be only recently created but change throughpoliticized memory into a timeless, unchanging tradi-

tion, see Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). Related work

on how the past may be constituted in the present, or

exert a strong inuence to shape contemporary regimes

of conservation, see Saberwal (1996) and Sivaramak-

rishnan (1995). In various forms these points are also

being made in several recent writings on community, but

rarely together. For some representative works, see

Anderson and Grove (1989), Baviskar (1995), Fairhead

and Leach (1996), and Sivaramakrishnan (1996).

41. For example, sta from the Game Department ofNorthern Rhodesia had a publicity van that traveled in

rural areas trying to foment values for conservation in

the early 1950s. Poaching rates remained unaected.

42. Those who have worked with community-based

projects in the eld recognize this multi-actor reality,

and are forced to deal with complex webs of interests on

a daily basis. It is curious why this reality has not found

its way into those papers and studies which advocate

community-based conservation. Watts (1995, p. 60)

approvingly cites Eagleton's concern (1990, p. 88) about

the attention to dierence, as if ``we have far too little

variety, few social classes, that we should strive to

generate `two or three new bourgeoisies and a fresh

clutch of aristocracies.''' Eagleton's worry about too

many dierent groups is explicable, perhaps, as the

worry about not being able to carry out neat Marxist or

rational choice analyses.

43. See for example Agrawal (1994b, 1995b).

44. The reverse also holds true. Power is visible only

when it is put in action its workings cannot be

imagined or understood outside of the trace it leaves on

processes. See Foucault (1983, pp. 219220).

45. Indeed, the list of the possible political-economic

factors that impact upon processes at the local level can

be increased several times without redundancy. See

Sanderson (1994) and the other essays in Meyer and

Turner (1994) that examine land use and cover changemore generally.

46. See Bates (1983), Riker (1980), and Shepsle (1989).

We dene institutions in keeping with the large literature

on the subject. But we underline that institutions in the

shape of informal norms are dicult if not impossible to

change in desired directions through external interven-

tion.

47. For this conceptualization of the dierent domains,

we have drawn upon a number of dierent works, even if

the manner in which we state them might dier from the

works we have consulted. See, especially, Agrawal

(1995b, 1996), Dahlman (1980), Ostrom (1990), Ostrom

and Schlager (1995), and Schlager and Ostrom (1992).

48. The local knowledge of dierent members in a

community, also often called ``time and place informa-

tion'' (Hayek, 1937; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne,

1993), may be invaluable to the success of conservation

projects. The entire corpus of writings on indigenous

knowledge is based precisely on this premise (Chambers,

1979; Richards, 1985). For the signicance of such

information and the need to incorporate local expertise,

see also Jagannathan (1987), and Tendler (1975).

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