SocLeg | 1Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM Luz Farms,petitioner,versusThe Honorable Secretary Of The Department Of Agrarian Reform,respondent.[G.R. No. 86889.December 4, 1990.]

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform. On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657. Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.Issue: Whether the inclusion of lands devoted to raising livestock, poultry and swine within the term agriculture as used in R.A. No. 6657 constitutional.Held: Supreme Court: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.Ratio Decidendi: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.Separate Opinion concurring (Justice Sarmiento):There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor landlords, only employers and employees. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land." Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking, business or otherwise. The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature. These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers, blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced appurtances. How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied by these structures? The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others. Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as free housing privileges, light and water. Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal).

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, cannot be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Sharp International Marketing,petitionerversus.Hon. Court Of Appeals (14th Division), Land Bank Of The Philippines And Deogracias Vistan, respondents[G.R. No. 93661 September 4, 1991]

Facts: This case involves the aborted sale of the Garchitorena estate to the Government in connection with the CARP.

The subject-matter of the proposed sale is a vast estate consisting of eight parcels of land situated in the municipality of Garchitorena in Camarines Norte covering an area of 1,88.819 hectares. On April 27,1988, UCPB entered into a Contract to Sell the property to Sharp International Marketing (Sharp), with the agreement that it be converted to a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) upon payment of the full price of P 3,183,333.33. Even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner, through its President Alex Lina, offered to sell the same to the Government for P 56,000,000.00 which was later increased to P 65,000,000.00 On December 1, 1988 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between UCPB and Sharp, where the former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated consideration of P 3,183,333.33. When the property was registered in the name of the petitioner, DAR Secretary Juico, issued an order directing the acquisition of the estate for the recommended amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to Sharp, 30% in cash and the balance in government financial instruments negotiable within 30 days from issuance by Sharp of the corresponding muniments of title.

When the DAS was signed, LBP received a copy of the order issued by Secretary Juico. LBP president Vistan, taking into account the reservations and discovery that Sharp had acquired the property for only P 3.1M and requesting the Secretary to reconsider his order. On April 18, 1989 Sharp filed a petition for mandamus with the court ot compel DAR and LBP to comply with the contract, prompting Juico to issue an order for re-appraisal and re-evaluation of the subject property. On appeal, The CA dismissed the petition stating that mandamus is not available to control discretion. Moreover, the sale was null and void ab initio because it violated section 6 of RA 6657, which was in force at the time the transaction was entered into.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to writ of mandamus.

Held: Yes. The act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion. Sec. 6 of E.O 229 stresses that even if already approved and signed by the DAR Secretary, it will still be transmitted to the LBP for its review, evaluation and approval. Respondent cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.

In RA 6657 with respect to the indispensable role of LBP in the determination of the amount to be compensated to the land owner. Under section 8 thereof, "the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided, or may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land."

Association of Small Landowners, petitionerversus Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, respondent [Consolidated Cases G.R. No. 78742, G.R. No. 79310 & G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989]

Facts: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, they also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229. In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violatethe constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners. In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy theirright ofretention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far notissuedthe implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.2. Whether the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative of the Constitution.3. Whether the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation

Held: 1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

Engracia Vinzons-Magana,petitioner,VersusHonorable Conrado Estrella In His Capacity As Minister Of Agrarian Reform, Salvador Pejo, As Regional Director, Ministry Of Agrarian Reform, And Juana S. Vda. De Paitan, respondents.[G.R. No. 60269.September 13, 1991]

Facts: Petitioner challenges in this petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order the validity and constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 and likewise seeks the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0046145 issued to Domingo Paitan by the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Petitioner Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay, Camarines Norte. The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan, husband of private respondent herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold agreement. On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of Domingo Paitan to do the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the land holding to third parties. On June 2, 1978, the former Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to whether or not it was proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316, but said office failed to act upon the request for certification, for a period of more than three (3) years. On July 10, 1980, the riceland was instead placed under the Land Transfer Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which implemented Letter of Instructions No. 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of 7 hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate areas under the Land Transfer Program of the government. The prescribed procedures therein were subsequently undertaken and thereafter, on July 10, 1980, a certificate of Land Transfer was finally awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to Magana but were deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn of events, Magana took the present recourse.

Issue/s:1. Whether the said Letter of Instructions and Memorandum Circular are unconstitutional.2. Whether the Certificate of Land Transfer issued to Domingo Paitan is valid.

Held: 1. No, the petition is bereft of merit. This Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families". It was held that LOI 474 is neither a class legislation nor does it deprive a person of property without due process of law or just compensation. Moreover, LOI 474 was duly published in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976 and has therefore complied with the publication requirement.As to the constitutionality of DAR Memo Circular No. 11, it is evident that DAR Memo Circular No. 11 merely implements LOI 474 whose constitutionality has already been established, clarifying for DAR personnel the guidelines set for under said LOI 474. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.2. No. The issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and or heirs, is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the Constitution.

Natalia Realty Inc,, petitionerversus Department of Agrarian Reform, respondent[G.R. No. 10330217 August 1993]

Facts: Natalia Realty Inc. (NATALIA) is the owner of a 125-hectare land in Antipolo, Rizal. On April 18, 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the reservation. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) granted NATALIA the necessary permit to develop the land into a subdivision. When the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law took effect on 15 June 1988, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of Coverage on the underdeveloped portions of the subdivision. NATALIA sought the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage on the ground that the land in question ceased to be agricultural lands when Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 transformed it into a townsite reservation.

Issue: Whether the underdeveloped portions of the NATALIA properties are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Held: The underdeveloped portions of the NATALIA properties are not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law because they are not agricultural lands. Agricultural lands do not include commercial, industrial or residential lands. The NATALIA properties ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the townsite reservation.

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc.,petitioners, versusThe Honorable Court Of Appeals, Credito Asiatic, Inc., et al, respondents.[Consolidated Cases G.R. No. 142359 & G.R. No. 142980.May 25, 2004]

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari. Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel ofland,issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito Asiatic, Inc. (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two parcels. LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into 3 phases and secured a locational clearance for the project from the HumanSettlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Projectbut the project was stymied by a Complaint forDamages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession oftheir farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of theproperty In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and cultivate the landholding withfixed rentals Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the otherplaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI CAI was stymied anew when aPetition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged thatthey are farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancy rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the bulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or a status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.

Issue/s:1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by RA No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)2. Whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction overthe complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent;3. Whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause ofaction against the private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit;4. Whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-members of the PBFAI; and5. Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review inCA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

Held:1. The contention of the petitioners hasno merit.2. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.3. With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members.4. Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent forpossession of the landholding to maintainpossession thereof and for damages.5. When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) ofthe thirty seven (37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, afterreceiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, themembers of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same.Petition denied.

Jose, Julio and Federico, All Surnamed Junio,petitioners, versusErnesto D. Garilao, in His Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform,respondent.[G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]

Facts: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court. In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) by complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners), identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991. It is prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622. Petitioners claim that Sta. Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling the subject property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision; that as prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in question, being former laborers, actual occupants and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal conversion of the land into a residential subdivision. On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to [Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for appropriate action. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September 13, 1994 in RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by Atty. Angel Lobaton, Jr., Petitioners, portions of which read as follows:After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the parties, this Office finds the petition for exemption to be well founded. Under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that lands which has already been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from CARP coverage. To this, it is an inescapable conclusion that the subject property is exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the same was classified as residential as evidenced by the Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as per Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued by the said Commission. The Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9, 1994 stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the service area of the irrigation system in the locality. In effect the said application had conformed to the requirements of the law on exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr. Espanola that the portion, which he planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by CARP, is beyond recognition as the program does not apply to those which are already classified as residential lands prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it is confined only to agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated definition, it is beyond reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and factual basis.The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. It found that prior to June 15, 1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from agricultural to residential land. It relied on the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reformthat lands were outside the coverage of the CARL if they had been converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies, other than the DAR, prior to the effectivity of that law.Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991 had nullified the reclassification of Lot 835-B. The appellate court noted that the land had been validly reclassified from agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the effective date of both laws. It added that neither of those two laws could be applied retroactively, since they contained no provision authorizing their retroactivity

Issue: Whether the subject landholding has been reclassified as residential land.Held: Yes. The subject landholding was in fact reclassified as residential before June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL. The Exemption Order of the DAR secretary pointed out that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as residential under Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod. This reclassification was later affirmed by the HSRC. The courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.It must be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies the power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL. There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations are conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. InHalili v. Court of Appeals,we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation purposes, once a local government has reclassified it as residential, that determination must prevail for zoning purposes.

Celso Pagtalunan & Paulina P. Pagtalunan,petitioners,versusHon. Roque A. Tamayo, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and Turandot, Traviata, Marcelita, Marlene Pacita, Matthew And Rosary, All Surnamed Aldaba, respondents.[G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990]Facts: On January 17, 1978, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for expropriation of a parcel of land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by private respondents herein as evidenced by TCT No. 24006, issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan. On March 2, 1978, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of the land, upon its deposit of the amount of Php7,200.00 as provisional value of the land. On June 8, 1978, petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been thebona fideagricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance compensation asbona fidetenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per hectare. On December 8, 1978, respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an order denying the petitioners' supplemental motion, holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a claim against the State. On December 22, 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal, as well as a first motion for extension of thirty (30) days from January 12, 1979 within which to file record on appeal which was granted by respondent court. The Solicitor General was appealing from that portion of the December 8, 1978 decision of the Court of First Instance which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter. Counsel for private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. On August 13, 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal interposed by the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, public respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari, prohibition andmandamuswith preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders of the Court of First Instance. On April 29, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing public respondent's petition. On October 24, 1980, public respondent filed with this Court a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886, asking this Court to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether the petitioners have the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject property.

Held: The petition is denied for lack of merit. In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand, petitioners have not been issued anemancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent. In fact, petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.

Department of Agrarian Reform represented by Sec. Jose Mari Ponce, petitionerversusDelia Sutton, et al., respondent[G.R. No. 162070 19 October 2005]

Facts: Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the Agrarian Reform Program at that time, they made a Voluntary Offer to Sell their landholding to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to avail of the incentives in 1987. In 1988, a new law, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included farms used for raising livestock under its coverage. In light of Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a formal request to withdraw their Voluntary Offer to Sell. As their land was outside the coverage of CARL. DAR ignored their request. In 1993, the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that only lands used for raising livestock, poultry, and swine are outside the coverage of CARL. In 1995, the DAR ordered a part of the Suttons landholdings to be segregated land and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Issue: Whether the assailed Administrative Order is constitutional.

Held: No. The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or"agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells, elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlierone. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent ofthe 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

Compiled by: Georgia Dawn C. Gacus