26
4th International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony 31 May-1 June08 Do not cite without author’s permission Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian Himalayas Saravanan.V.S Department of Political and Cultural Change Centre for Development Research (ZEF) Walter-Flex Strasse 3 D-53113 Bonn Germany EMAIL: [email protected]

Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

  • Upload
    vanphuc

  • View
    212

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

4th International Workshop on

Hydro-Hegemony 31 May-1 June08 Do not cite without author’s permission

Agents Negotiating Water Management in the

Indian Himalayas

Saravanan.V.S

Department of Political and Cultural Change

Centre for Development Research (ZEF)

Walter-Flex Strasse 3

D-53113 Bonn

Germany

EMAIL: [email protected]

Page 2: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

POWER is the ability of A to carry out his / her will despite resistance from B, regardless of the basis on which this

probability rests.

Power is a material capacity, neither the exercise nor the

vehicle of that capacity – Lukes 2005:479

Power is a property of interaction– Giddens , Foucault,

Bourdieu

‘Power ‘may be defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the

realisation of these outcomes depends on the agency of others.

(Giddens, 1976:111, cited in Mollinga, 2003:39) .

Power is the success in decision-making

Page 3: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Why is so much of contestation over ‘what power

does’?

Does this represent dominance of particular discipline

over the other?

Or does this represent different dimensions of power

in social reality?

Page 4: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Stakeholders Passively influence the decisions in the arena, from outside – do not

use the rules to take part in the decision-making process. But can be drawn

by agents into the arena, as an actor.

Actors Structural Actors –incrementally and cumulatively structure agents capability and their negotiations – implement rules.Strategic actors –process social experience and devise coping strategies – Follow or break rules

Agents Are individuals who have a transformative capacity by pursuing aproject - draw on rules.

Page 5: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Rules are patterned behaviour of a social group that forbids, permits or requires some actions or outcomes to enable actor to derive benefit (or loss) from certain resources (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 1998).

Types of Rules (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995)

1. Statutory Public

2. Statutory Private

3. Socially Embedded (norms, values)

4. Shared Strategies

Page 6: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Resources are of two kinds (Giddens, 1984:xxxi):

Allocative Resources:

Resources derived from the coordination of the activity of human agents.

Authoritative Resources:

Resources that stems from the control of material products or of aspects of the material world. They can be texts, skills and monetary resources (Callon, 1991).

Page 7: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Arenas are social locations or situations where agents interact to contest over issues, values, exchange goods and services and solve problems (or fight).

Alternatives Implementation

Policy Crisis

The Interaction is adaptive (Dorcey, 1986; Holling and Gunderson, 2002)

Page 8: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

FRAMING

THE

PROBLEMWATER

ALLOCATIONCAPABILITY OF

STRATEGIC

ACTORS

HUMAN

ENTITIES(Stakeholders & Actors )

WATER RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT

PROBLEM

AGENTS &

AGENCY

Saravanan, VS (forthcoming) Systems approach to unravel complex water management institutions. Ecological Complexity.

Page 9: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

The framework was empirically applied in a water-related

‘problem context’ of the hamlet Khairwala, in the Indian

state of Himachal Pradesh in the year 2004 (March-

December).

Why Problem Context?

� Human entities having a shared vision are triggered to make a well-informed strategic choice;

� Helps to focus on the ‘process’ of integration;

� Understand complexity in manageable form.

Page 10: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

� Hamlet Khairwala under the Revenue Village Bikrambagh, in Sirmaur District, HP

� Physiography – highly fragile landscape (soil and water erosion), and landslides.

� Population: about 3000; two dominant caste

� Economic activity: agriculture, salaried employment, labour employment and dairy marketing

� Irrigation: Lift irrigation (irrigation based on lifting water from

a stream (here river Markhanda) that irrigates about 4 hamlets

in the region)

Page 11: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

The core water related problem in the hamlet

‘inadequate availability of water to irrigate the

command area in the lift-irrigation systems’

– as framed by farmers and local actors during semi-structured interviews, group discussions and in public

forums.

Page 12: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

FRAMING

THE

PROBLEMWATER

ALLOCATIONCAPABILITY OF

STRATEGIC

ACTORS

HUMAN

ENTITIES(Stakeholders & Actors )

WATER RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT

PROBLEM

AGENTS &

AGENCY

Saravanan, VS (forthcoming) Systems approach to unravel complex water management institutions. Ecological Complexity.

Page 13: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

These strategic actors adopt diverse forms of

actions.

1. Resistance-based– stealing, using force, annoying and so on (12% of sampled farmers).

2. Negotiation-based – informing others or the leaders of KLIS, if they don’t get water (30%).

3. Dissemination-based – informing their concern, but do not wait for the solution (27%).

4. Resignation – Withdraw from taking any action, if they don’t

get water (31%).

Page 14: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

These strategic actors adopt diverse forms of

actions.

1. Resistance-based– stealing, using force, annoying and so on (12% of sampled farmers).

2. Negotiation-based – informing others or the leaders of KLIS, if they don’t get water (30%).

3. Dissemination-based – informing their concern, but do not wait for the solution (27%).

4. Resignation – Withdraw from taking any action, if they don’t

get water (31%).

Page 15: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

� Two persons were contacted by the farmers adopting negotiation-based actions to get water:

� Mr. Abdul Ali (AA), the President of KLIS, and

� Das Gupta (DG) a member of the KLIS, but leader of Rajputs.

� Both these agents take an active role as agents by pursuing a ‘Projects’ - is a plan developed out of actor-defined issues or problematic

,due to inadequacy of existing institutional and bio-physical resources.

AA: Demands installing an additional lift irrigation to solve the problem.

DG: demands for efficient water distribution, which can only be done by

DoIPH, and not KLIS.

Page 16: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

National

Level

State Level

District level

Block/

Constituency

Village/ Hamlet Das Gupta

Suresh Kumar, SDO,

DoIPH, Nahan

Deputy

Commissioner,

Nahan

Executive

Engineer, DoIPH

State Legislative

Assembly, GoHP

KHAIRWALA

Parliament

House, GoI

Fig. 5. AGENTS AND ACTORS NEGOTIATING CHANGE

Abdul Ali

Parmesh, Water

Operator

Page 17: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

EDUCATED AND

YOUNG MEMBER

OF RAJPUT

ELECTED AS

WARD MEMBER INFORMAL LEADER

OF RAJPUTS

INFORM THE

PRESIDENT OF

KLIS

INADEQUATE

DISTRIBUTION

OF WATER

INADEQUATE RESPONSE

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF

LIS

INFORM THE

WATER OPERATOR

OF DOIPH

EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTION

OF IRRIGATION WATER

VARIABLES INFLUENCING DAS GUPTA

Page 18: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

WATER OPERATOR

INADEQUATE DISTRIBUTION

OF WATER

MONITOR WATER

DISTRIBUTION

NO OPPORTUNITY FOR

CONSENSUAL

DECISION

WALKING OUT OF

THE PRESIDENT OF

KLIS

CALL FOR A GENERAL

BODY MEETING

DoIPH

VARIABLES INFLUENCING PAREMESH

Page 19: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

VARIABLES INFLUENCING ABDUL ALI

AVAILABILITY OF

IRRIGATION SCHEMES

ELECTED

PRESIDENT

OF KLIS SUPPORT FROM

GUJJAR COMMUNITY

LEADER OF

GUJJAR

COMMUNITY

DEMAND FOR ADDITIONAL

LIFT IRRIGATION

SCHEME

PROSPECTS TO

RECONSOLIDATE

LEADERSHIP

LARGE

LANDHOLDERASSOCIATION WITH

JUNIOR ENGINEER

Page 20: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

MAINTAIN COMMUNITY-

BASED PROGRAMMES

RETAIN KLIS

REDUCED COST AND

SHOWCASE COMMUNITY-

BASED IRRIGATION

MANAGEMENT

RESIDENT

OF SUKETHI

PANCHAYAT

NO DECISIVE SOLUTIONS

FROM THE GENERAL

BODY MEETING OF KLIS

HIGH COST

OF MAINTAINING

LIFT IRRIGATION

PROJECTS

SDO, IN-CHARGE OF

IRRIGATION

DEVELOPMENT

DoIPH

VARIABLES INFLUENCING SURESH KUMAR

Page 21: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Implication of this Negotiation

PARMESH

(WO)

SURESH

KUMAR

(SDO,

DoIPH)

DAS

GUPTA

(member

of WUA)

ABDUL ALI

(President)

Page 22: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Power is everywhere and with everyone (Foucault), but

is realised when:

Structural Actors by constraining water management

offers context for the emergence of agents.

+

Strategic actors through their actions provide an opportunity for the agents.

+

and habitus or practical consciousness of agents that legitimises their transformative capacity or power.

Page 23: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

But it is displayed, revealed, maintained or renegotiated, using the prevailing rules and resources, only during the

interaction with other agents.

Just by playing in this political power game, agents attempt achieve their goal, which makes them as a ‘cunning player’

(Randeria, 2003).

Page 24: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Agents are ‘cunning’ players (Randeria, 2003)

DG– Represents the interest of Rajputs and his own interest to

be a future leader.

AA– Represents the Muslim Gujjars and to retain his position as

President of KLIS.

Parmesh – Supportive role to Rajputs.

SK – Represents the DoIPH and his position as SDO.

Page 25: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Agents play an important role in being adaptive

and in their ability to integrate different rules.

By creating opportunities for sharing and debating on

the available heterogeneous information, their agency

can facilitated for an informed decision-making.

But facilitating agents alone will not address sustainable

water management, or address poverty.

Page 26: Agents Negotiating Water Management in the Indian … · Does this represent dominance of particular discipline ... (modified from Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 1. ... goods and services

Saravanan.V.S

Department of Political and Cultural Change

Centre for Development Research (ZEF),

University of Bonn

Walter-Flex Strasse 3

D-53113 Bonn

Germany

Email: [email protected]

Thank You