Agenda: 1.Safety Climate and designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance. David M. DeJoy, Ph.D., University of Georgia, Athens; Todd D. Smith,

Agenda:

1. Safety Climate and designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance. David M. DeJoy, Ph.D., University of Georgia, Athens; Todd D. Smith, Ph.D., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical U., Daytona Beach, FL; and Aimee A. Dyal, Ph.D., University of Georgia, Athens.

2. Complementary Perspectives on the Role of Safety Climate in Preventing Workplace Injury. Ted Scharf, Ph.D., NIOSH, Cincinnati, OH.

3. Promoting First Responders’ Resilience Resources through Safety Climate and Safety Management Systems. Bengt B. Arnetz, M.D., Ph.D., Wayne State University School of Medicine, Detroit, MI.

4. Assessing Safety Climate in the U.S. Fire Service. Jennifer A. Taylor, Ph.D., Drexel University School of Public Health, Philadelphia, PA.

Discussant: Dov Zohar, Ph.D., Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Technion City, Haifa, Israel

Complementary Perspectives on the Role of Safety Climate in Preventing Workplace Injury

Ted Scharf, DART, NIOSH

Acknowledgements:

Grateful acknowledgements to Jennifer Taylor (Drexel University), Scott Schneider (Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North America), Linda M. Goldenhar (CPWR – The Center for Construction Research and Training), and to the entire membership of the NIOSH Safety Climate/ Culture Working Group, for their assistance with the content and presentation of this session.

disclaimer –

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

DEFINITIONS (emphasis added):

1. “Safety climate refers to shared perceptions of employees about the safety of their work environment, and provides a background against which day-to-day tasks are performed. These shared perceptions derive from several factors, including management decision making, organizational safety norms and expectations, and safety practices, policies, and procedures which together serve to communicate organizational commitment to safety.” (Hahn & Murphy, 2008).

2. “Organizational climate is made up of shared perceptions among employees concerning the procedures, practices and kinds of behaviors that get rewarded and supported with regard to a specific strategic focus. When the strategic focus involves performance of high-risk operations, the resultant shared perceptions define safety climate. “A key attribute of organizational climate is that it involves employee perceptions regarding selected characteristics or features of their organizational environment. Given the availability and variety of perception-based constructs in safety management research (e.g. risk perception, management style, organizational flexibility), climate perceptions must be distinguished from other types of organizational perceptions. The foregoing discussion highlights a number of distinctions qualifying organizational perceptions as safety climate perceptions.” (Zohar, 2010).

Organization / Management

Social Support / Leadership

Hazards

Safety Equipment / Training / PPE

Safety Climate

Safe Work Practices / Safety Behaviors

(NO) Incidents, Illnesses, or Injuries

Safety Climate embedded in the causal chain:



Hazards


Safety Climate



Safety Climate as an indicator, but outside of the immediate causal chain:

time 1- time 2



Hazards




Safety (and productivity) Management System:



Hazards


Safety Climate (Embedded)



Safety Climate Hybrid:

Safety Climate (Indicator)

time 1- time 2

Principal Mechanism: Espousal vs. Enactment (Zohar, 2010).

Safe work practices and procedures ( + )

Organizational and safety policies ( + )

Exemplary

Proactive

Contradictory orDysfunctional

Unsafe work practices and procedures ( -- )

Espousal

Enactment

Work group perceptions

CompliantReactive

Uninformed

Contradictory policies, or policies that blame the worker for organizational safety failures ( -- )

Espousal-Enactment Alignment Line labels, see: Goldenhar (2014), and Gillen, et al. (2014).




Exemplary

Proactive



Espousal

Enactment


CompliantReactive

Uninformed


(Esp: 1, Enact: 3)




Exemplary

Proactive



Espousal

Enactment


CompliantReactive

Uninformed


(Esp: 1, Enact: 3)

(Esp: 3, Enact: 1)




Exemplary

Proactive



Espousal

Enactment


CompliantReactive

Uninformed


(Esp: 1, Enact: 3)

(Esp: 3, Enact: 1)

(Esp: 3, Enact: -1)




Exemplary

Proactive



Espousal

Enactment


CompliantReactive

Uninformed


(Esp: 1, Enact: 3)

(Esp: -2, Enact: 3)

(Esp: 3, Enact: 1)

(Esp: 3, Enact: -1)

Rubric category Manage-ment

Policies

Safe Work Prac-tices

Criteria

Exemplary (safety and productivity fully integrated) 5 5

Safety is integrated into policies and procedures, formally and informally, and communicated vertically and horizontally throughout the company. Safety is never compromised for productivity. Employees and supervisors actively plan all tasks including safety. General and subcontractors are selected based on safety practices/climate rather than low bid.

Proactive (active commitment to safety)

4 4

Management actively involves workers in identifying hazards and solving safety problems by including them in daily pre-job safety and crew task/ hazard analysis. Employees are encouraged to report safety concerns and issues either to their supervisors or directly to management. Company includes safety and health in bids. Safety is not compromised for the sake of productivity.

Off-diagonal, Quadrant I

3 1

Strong statements of safety policy from management and supervisors. However, the safest equipment may not be available when needed, e.g. an aerial lift is the appropriate tool but only extension ladders are available. Nevertheless the workers are expected to complete the task without waiting for the manlift. Crews may work short-handed with no adjustment to the schedule.

Off-diagonal, Quadrant II

3 -1

Strong, written safety policies conflict with the production schedule. Safety training and safe work practices are emphasized. The next sentence from the supervisor is: “I need this task finished today….” Employees quickly get the message that the production goal supersedes any conversations about safety. It is common practice on this worksite that OSHA regulations are quietly suspended when the job is behind schedule.

Off-diagonal, Quadrant I

1 3

Management safety policies aim for OSHA compliance. Supervisors adhere to OSHA minima. Intact crews within each trade establish and maintain safety standards that reflect their training and experience. Journeymen enforce their standards on new apprentices and helpers. This scenario is more likely in any crew that has worked (and trained) together frequently over the years, particularly within a union local. Safety and health training provided by the union.

Compliant 1 1

Minimum OSHA requirements are set as the company standard. Safety indicators focus solely on lagging indicators. Company collects injury and illness data, but they are not shared with supervisors or workers. Incident investigations are conducted but not in a “blame free” manner. Owner/client relies exclusively on federal, state, and local safety laws (industry average lagging standards) for pre-qualification criteria but still use low bid for selecting general and sub-contractors.

Rubric category Manage-ment

Policies

Safe Work Prac-tices

Criteria

Reactive 0 0

Safety rules are enforced only after an incident or when audit results are negative. Management often blames workers for injuries, leading to suspension or even termination. When a project falls behind schedule, production becomes valued more than safety. Workers are automatically punished (e.g., fined or fired) for poor safety performance. Contractors with poor safety records are excluded from bidding. Data aren’t reviewed for trends.

Uninformed -1 -1

Safety is not integrated within policies/procedures; it is a cost. Primary focus is on productivity. Employees who take shortcuts in safety are rewarded for meeting production goals. Accidents are viewed as human error and are punished. There are no written safety or health policies. There is no formal safety training provided to workers, supervisors, or managers. Fraudulent training cards may be accepted for hiring. Investigations into incidents result in punitive action toward employees. Bids include a budget for OSHA fines. Owner/client does not require safety pre-qualifications from general contractors or sub-contractors and only makes selections based on lowest bids.

Off-diagonal, Quadrant IV -2 3

A worker reports a safety problem associated with equipment failure to his foreman. Both report the incident to the site superintendent. Both the worker and foreman are fired.

Contradictory or Dysfunctional

-2 -2

Management statements or policies regarding safety are for show. Office paper work complies with OSHA minima; however, these records are often creative fabrications. Maximizing profit through high productivity and tight scheduling is the norm. Work schedules encourage trades to work over top of each other (literally). OSHA regulations are ignored unless an inspector comes on site. Injuries and other incidents are blamed on the workers or sub-contractors. Sub-contractors may hire employees as “independent contractors,” in an attempt to avoid safety responsibilities altogether. Supervisors urge injured workers to put the hospital treatment on their personal healthcare (with the promise of paying any deductible and light duty during recovery). Previously injured workers are typically the first ones selected for a layoff, after which their names are placed on a “do not hire” list at the company.

Notes:Espousal-Enactment Alignment Line labels (rubric categories), see: Goldenhar, (2014), and Gillen, et al., (2014). The criteria listed for the rubric categories (“exemplary” through “uninformed”) are excerpts taken directly from Goldenhar, (2014).

The “contradictory or dysfunctional” and the “off-diagonal” criteria/descriptions/scenarios all derive from focus group discussions with journeymen and apprentice members of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Iron Workers. These discussions took place in Springfield, New Jersey, and in St. Louis, Missouri, 2008-2010.

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Thank you . . . .

Documents

Agenda: 1.Safety Climate and designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance. David M. DeJoy, Ph.D., University of Georgia, Athens; Todd D. Smith,