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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

AGAINST ALL ODDS:RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND

THE MENA REGION

Florence Gaub

August 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-535-6


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FOREWORD

The Middle East and North Africa might not be therst region that comes to mind when one contemplatesthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Tomany, the Alliance was founded largely to unite Europeand North America, and to counter threats emergingfrom the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War changedthese assumptionsnot least to be proven by NATOsOperation in Libya in 2011, sanctioned by the League of

Arab States.In this monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub describes how

the region has moved from the rim of the Alliances se-curity perspective toward a more nuanced vision thatrecognizes the regions role in an ever-changing andmore-complex world. NATO has understood the securi-ty implications emerging from the changes taking placeamong its southern neighbors and the need for dialogue

and cooperation. Dr. Gaub gives not only an overview ofthe different frameworks of cooperation that NATO haswith the Middle East and North Africa, but also explainstheir evolution and potential.

As the Arab world is undergoing change on an un-precedented scale, NATOs need for dialogue and ex-change with this part of the world is even more impor-tant than before. Yet, there are obstacles along the way:burdened by historical precursors, NATOs strategiccommunication, and the use of antagonistic rhetoric tap-ping into the Clash of Civilizations, the Alliance faces anumber of challenges in its cooperation with its south-ern partners.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FLORENCE GAUB is a researcher and lecturer inthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) De-fense Colleges Middle East Faculty. Her areas ofinterest include the Arab world, military sociology,post-conict reconstruction, and intercultural com-munication. Previously, she has served as a researchfellow in the German Parliament, focusing on issuesof defense, internal security, and development. Shehas also held positions with the French Defence Min-istrys Research Centre in the Social Sciences of De-fence (Centre dtudes en sciences sociales de la de-fense), the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo, theCentre for Applied Policy Research in Munich, as wellas with the United Nations Institute for Training andResearch in New York, where she coordinated courses

for diplomats posted at the United Nations. She hasconducted extensive eld studies in Lebanon, Iraq,Nigeria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. She has publishedseveral articles and two books on these topics, and haslectured widely with The NATO School, Oberammer-gau, Germany; Allied Joint Forces Command Naples;and several think tanks and universities in the MiddleEast, Europe, and the United States. Dr. Gaub gradu-ated from Sorbonne University in Paris, France, andthe Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, Ger-many. She holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Po-litical Science at Humboldt University of Berlin.


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SUMMARY

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) was founded in 1949 rst and foremost tostrengthen the transatlantic link in the wake of the So-viet threat, one of the immediate neighboring regionswas left largely unnoticed for the Alliances rst 4decades. Although some of the Allies had recognizedthe importance of the Middle East and North Africa(MENA) region, it was dealt with largely on a bilateralbasis. Events such as the Suez crisis of 1956 and thewars of 1967 and 1973 did have an impact on NATOand its cohesion, overall its focus remained on theCentral Front in Germany. This was where a Soviet at-tack would have likely occurred, and led to an Alliedbias in geographic terms.

Although the southern allies recognized the im-

portance of the region for NATOs security, they failedto set the agenda within the Alliance to a signicantextent. This was not helped by the fact that some ofthe southern allies (such as Greece and Turkey) hadtheir own conicts to deal with, or were not part ofNATOs integrated command structure (such as Spainand France). The Alliance blindness to the strategicrelevance of the Middle East and North Africa is thusan outcome of not only a strategic bias in favor of theCentral Front, but also of issues internal to the Alli-ance.

These situations changed with the end of the ColdWar. The invasion of Kuwait and subsequent waragainst Iraq, promising developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the establishment of

the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program designed forEuropean states all created circumstances conducivefor the launch of a similar network with the Alliancessouthern neighbors.


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As the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was born in1994, it counted initially ve member states (Maurita-

nia, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Israel) and had nopolitical ambitions beyond the exchange of views andinformation. Yet, as the MD grew with the inclusionrst of Jordan and later Algeria, it served as an impor-tant platform for the Alliances other outreach efforts,which received further input in 2004. Following theterrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the invasion ofIraq, and the discovery of a potential nuclear programin Iran, the region received renewed attention fromthe Allies. While the MD was elevated to the statusof partnership, a separate program was developed forthe members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).The invitation to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative(ICI) has been accepted by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but has received

no ofcial response from Saudi Arabia and Oman.Both frameworks are decidedly more ambitious thanthe original dialogue and aim not only for political butalso military cooperation and interoperability. In ad-dition, the Alliance initiated its rst training missionin Iraq. A small endeavor of 150 people, it contributedparticularly to the formation of the new Iraqi securityforces ofcer corps. Initial contact was also estab-lished with the League of Arab States. By the time theArab Spring began, NATO had established relationswith half of the Leagues member states.

Yet a few states remain outside of NATOs networkwith the MENA region; this fact alone reects accu-rately the binary relations most Allies, particularly theUnited States, have with the regions governments.

The fact that Libya, Lebanon, and Syria (and origi-nally Algeria) were excluded from the MD althoughthey are Mediterranean states is a clear indication of

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political relationships in disarray. While the absenceof Lebanon and Syria is clearly connected to the unre-

solved Israeli-Palestinian conict, the Libyan case is aresult of decades of support to international terrorism.

As a result of these difculties, NATO has at-tempted to work around existing conicts withinand without the region, be it the Western Sahara is-sue between Algeria and Morocco or the Palestinianconict. In spite of these attempts, the Alliances re-lationships are affected by low levels of political andeconomic integration in the region proper as a resultof high- and low-intensity conicts. In addition, theexisting partnerships are hampered by NATOs rathernegative image on the public level. This is in part dueto a lack of distinction between the Alliance as a col-lective and its individual member states. A historyof colonization (France, Spain, Italy, and the United

Kingdom) and bilateral interventionism has createdwith the wider public an ambiance of distrust, whichaffects NATO as well, although the Alliance itself in-tervened in the region only in 2011, and then with amandate from the League of Arab States. Neverthe-less, NATO is frequently seen as an expansionist tooland not to be trusted. This image is particularly fu-eled by the Alliances mission in Afghanistan, whichis seen as an anti-Muslim operation, as well as by thelack of support for the Palestinian cause. In addition,NATO itself has struggled to adjust to the region inpartnership terms: translations into Arabic as well asArabic-speaking personnel are scarce, and within theAlliance there are divergent views of the regions rel-evance to Allied security.

Yet, in times of transnational challenges, such asterrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction, migration, climate change, and energy se-


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curity, NATO has no other choice but to extend itsunderstanding of security beyond traditional lines.

Defense and security cannot be understood in ter-ritorial terms any longer; only in a comprehensivemanner can both NATO and its partners confront thechallenges of the 21st century. It is precisely for thisreason that the Alliance will continue to improve theexisting relationships and overcome the remainingchallengesconict, war, and security are not mattersof choice, but of necessity.


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AGAINST ALL ODDS:RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND

THE MENA REGION

An analysis of current relations linking the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the MiddleEast and North Africa (MENA) prompts the observa-tion that the likelihood of such ties developing in therst place must have seemed at best remote. Too sub-stantial were (and still are) the differences betweenthe institution embodying the Transatlantic Link andthe Arab world; too extensive were the mutual suspi-cions; and too great was the historical burden, whichweighed on such relations from the outset. And yet,against all odds, a web of relationships developedfrom 1991 onward and continues to grow, culminat-ing in 2011 in the rst NATO operation in an Arab

countryOperation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP)in Libya, sanctioned by the League of Arab States,and assisted by four Arab countries (Morocco, Jordan,United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Qatar). Relationsbetween the Alliance and the Arab world have thusmade an about-turn in the space of 2 decades. Yet,while profound progress has been made, a number ofobstacles remain on the way to a comprehensive rela-tionship between NATO and the vast region rangingfrom Mauritania to Iraq.

NEIGHBORS WITHOUT CONTACT: NATO ANDTHE MENA REGION BEFORE 1991

To say that the Middle East and North Africa at

one time did not matter at all to NATO would be anexaggeration, and yet, it is to a certain extent true. AsNATOs creation in 1949 was intended to counter the


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threat of the Soviet Union to the Free World, the Medi-terranean and adjacent regions occupied a secondary

place among the priorities of the Alliances foundingfathers. Yet, they were not completely absent from theagenda: the question of Italian membership was close-ly connected to Mediterranean security, as was thatof the French territories in North Africa. AlthoughNATO felt that a Member State mostly surroundedby the Mediterranean Sea would distract from theAtlantic outlook of the Alliance, Italy was includedamong the founding Allies, since it was feared thatits exclusion would strengthen the countrys Commu-nist party.1 Thus, NATO had a denite Mediterraneancomponent with French, Italian, and later Greek andTurkish membership. This ultimately resulted in thecreation of Armed Forces South (AFSOUTH), a com-mand dedicated solely to the Mediterranean region.

Yet, although almost a third of NATOs members dur-ing the Cold War bordered on the Mediterranean (ascompared to a fth today, following large intakes fromEastern Europe), they failed to formulate a coherentvision and strategy for the adjacent MENA region andthus shape NATOs approach to it as a whole. Francesand Spains long-standing absence from the Alliancesintegrated military structure contributed to this, as didthe tensions between Greece and Turkey, mainly overCyprus. In addition, the Allies with a strong interestin the region, such as France, Great Britain, and theUnited States, favored engagement with the MENAregion outside the NATO context.

This attitude was fueled by the perception thatNATO as a mutual defense alliance was not supposed

to act outside the territory of its Member States (theso-called out-of-area debate). The MENA region, be-ing outside the territory of NATO member states, did


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not play an independent role during the Cold War,when security was envisioned in a rather classical

perspective. Territoriality, and attacks on it, were thedominant theme, and thus left no room for a graspof security going beyond this. As a consequence, theMENA region was seen rst and foremost as a possi-ble sideshow in the antagonism between communismand capitalism. After attempts to create a Middle East-ern counterpart to NATO failed, Greece and Turkeywere invited to join the Alliance in 1952as in thecase of Italy, concern with potential expansion of So-viet inuence overruled the Alliances vocational con-centration on Western Europe.2 By the same token, theEisenhower Doctrine, issued in 1957 as a reaction tothe Suez War of 1956, offered military and economicsupport to Middle Eastern states threatened by Sovietinuence.3 This followed the example of the Truman

Doctrine of 1947, which had offered the same sort ofassistance to Greece and Turkey. The MENA regionwas thus seen, in Western eyes, only as an area whereexpanding Soviet inuence could cause a greaterthreat to the West.

Indeed, within the North Atlantic Alliance, secu-rity and defense were seen solely through the prismof the Soviet threat, and major emphasis was placedon the so-called Central Front (known as the CentralFront bias) to the detriment of other regions such asthe South. Structurally, this perspective could be seenin the limited attention NATO Headquarters gave tothe MENA region, monitored by an Expert WorkingGroup that later evolved into a slightly more politicalAd Hoc Group. Meeting only twice a year for 2 days

at the expert level,4 neither group proved as active,informed or forward-looking as events warranted.5


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The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 slightlychanged the stance on out-of-area concerns: the Soviet

Unions strong support to Egypt and its breaking offof relations with Israel in 1967 enhanced the regionsstatus as a Cold War sideshow. As a reaction to Amer-ican military support to Israel, the Arab members ofthe Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) imposed an oil embargo, highlighting Euro-pean dependency on the regions energy suppliesatthe time, 80 percent of Europes oil came from Arabcountries.6 Most importantly, the conict also broughtto the forefront the rift that ran through the Alliancewhen it came to Middle Eastern policy: most Euro-pean Allies (except for Portugal and the Netherlands)denied the United States access to their national facili-ties to supply Israel, whereas the United States put itsglobal forces on nuclear alert without prior consulta-

tion in the North Atlantic Council.7

While neither crisis led to an active NATO role in

the region, the Alliance nevertheless acknowledgedthe importance of world regions other than EasternEurope, thereby reducing its strict in-area policysomewhat. The 1974 summit declaration included theAllies statement of their resolve to keep each otherfully informed and to strengthen the practice of frankand timely consultations by all means which may beappropriate on matters relating to their common in-terests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mindthat these interests can be affected by events in otherareas of the world.8 The Alliance realized that theArab world could no longer be overlooked as a stra-tegic region.


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A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO ANDTHE ARAB WORLD: AN OVERVIEW

The established vision of the Middle East andNorth Africa as a mere sideshow in the Cold Warchanged in the early 1990s: the collapse of the SovietUnion removed the threat of the Warsaw Pact, theGulf War against Iraq highlighted the importance ofthe MENA region for Allied security (independent ofany Soviet threat), and the Israeli-Palestinian peaceprocess was thought at the time to indicate an era ofstability ahead.

Thus, the Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 inRome acknowledged the region as a whole for therst time in Alliance history: The Allies also wishto maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relationswith the countries in the southern Mediterranean and

Middle East. The stability and peace of the countrieson the southern periphery of Europe are importantfor the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf warhas shown.9 In addition, the Concept recognized theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)in the region as a potential threat. Forty-two years af-ter NATOs creation, the region thus emerged in theAllied strategic vision, as stated in the North AtlanticCouncil Communiqu of 1993: Security in Europe isgreatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.10The interdependence of security had nally been ac-knowledged by the Alliance, and an out-of-area rolefor NATO was soon after conrmed with its engage-ment in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.


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The Mediterranean Dialogue.

After the Cold War came to an end, the Allianceentered a new era in which concepts of security, ter-ritoriality, and defense were rethought. Former War-saw Pact members entered rst the Partnership forPeace (PfP) program, and eventually the Allianceitself. A timid engagement with the Mediterraneanregion emerged in the form of the Mediterranean Dia-logue (MD), which came into being toward the end of1994. While some Allies, particularly Italy and Spain,were pushing for a full-blown partnership structurelike the far-reaching PfP program dedicated to Euro-pean states, most were concerned that NATO wouldbe overburdened by reaching out in two differentdirections. This meant that the MD was at rst littlemore than a consultative forum, its stated aims being

to contribute to security and stability in the Mediter-ranean as a whole, to achieve better mutual under-standing and to correct any misunderstandings of theAlliances purposes that could lead to a perception ofthreat.11 In other words, the goal of the Dialogue is todeconstruct the myth of an Alliance searching for newenemies, and to dispel fears that a new European secu-rity structure might excludeand harmits southernneighbors. By the same token, the Dialogue seeks toimprove Allied understanding of Partner Countriessecurity perceptions and concernsa feature that hadnot existed throughout the Cold War, when the Al-liance understood Middle Eastern security merely asan extension of East-West antagonism, or worse, of itsown security.12

The original members of the MD were chosen byconsensus in the Alliance. This is an important point,as it explains why the rst MENA partners of NATO


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were all states considered stable and friendly towardthe WestEgypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Israel

and, a few months later, Jordan. The criterion has beenbemoaned by MD members, who would have liked tosee Syria, Lebanon, and Libya (under Gadda) invitedas well.

The Dialogue started timidly and was designedfrom the outset to evolve. Originally limited to twice-yearly meetings between Brussels, Belgium, embassies,and members of NATO Headquarters internationalstaff, the bilateral forum developed over the years intoa more substantial cooperation. First elevated into aseparate Committee involving representatives of theAlliances Member States, the MD progressively be-came more signicant in both military and politicalterms. In 2000, Algeria was invited to join; in 2004, theDialogue was elevated to the status of a full partner-

ship. A policy document called for a more ambitiousand expanded framework, including high-level po-litical meetings, military interoperability, and defensereform.13 The menu of practical cooperation activitieswas increased from just a handful of items to severalhundred, offering seminars, workshops, and coursesin areas such as civil emergency planning, scienticand environmental affairs, crisis management, defensepolicy and strategy, small arms and light weapons, andproliferation. A number of meetings have now beenheld at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and ofDefense, as well as of Chiefs of Defense. In addition,ofcers and civil servants from MD countries have forsome years been attending seminars, workshops, andcourses at NATO Headquarters, the NATO Defense

College, and the NATO School Oberammergau. MDcountries can observe NATO military exercises, andtheir participation can be funded by the Alliance.


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When the Alliance drafted its new Strategic Con-cept in 2010, MD member states were consulted. A

trust fund was created to contribute to the eliminationof explosive remnants of war in Jordan, and anotherfund exists to destroy obsolete and unserviceable mu-nitions, build adequate storage sites for remainingmunitions, enhance specialized personnel skills, andprovide training for the reintegration of military per-sonnel returning to civilian life.14 Most importantly,MD countries (Morocco and Jordan) have contributedto NATO operations in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghani-stan. Six of the seven MD countries have concludedIndividual Partnership Cooperation Programs, de-signed to deepen their relationship with NATO by of-fering tailored advice on reforms.

Overall, the MD thus seems like a successfulprogram, especially when one considers the circum-

stances in which it was initiated. However, the com-parison with efforts like the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC) involving the 28 Allies and 22 PfPPartners makes it clear that the Dialogue is more ofa condence-building measure than a real partner-ship. The Alliance has failed so far to develop jointlydened challenges with its Mediterranean partners,or determine the benets for both sides involved inthe partnership. As a result, NATOs intentions in theregion are not always clear; this continues to be a hin-drance, particularly at the political level.

As the MD is based on an imbalance between sup-ply and demand, NATO remains its driving force. Thisis partly the result of the Partners not understandingfully what the Alliance can offer, but also of the silence

maintained by their security community and theirtotal lack of a common strategic voice. In addition,though the Alliance is politico-military in nature, 90


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percent of its cooperation with these countries is mili-tary, indicating difculties in improving the political

aspect of the partnership. Despite the considerableprogress made between the Alliance and its Mediter-ranean partners, there is thus room for improvement.Possible synergies could be developed with a secondpartnership that NATO created in the MENA regionin 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

September 11, 2001 (9/11) affected the Alliancesrelationship with the MENA region signicantly.Where some Member States (particularly Germany,Canada, and the Scandinavian countries) had previ-ously doubted the relevance and importance of theMD, the tragic events of that day spurred the realiza-

tion that dialogue and cooperation with this regionwere vital for Allied security. The invasion of Iraq in2003, its subsequent instability, the shift of the balanceof power toward Iran, and Irans likely quest for a nu-clear weapon added to the perceived need for stabilityin the Gulf region, encouraging the hope that trans-atlantic engagement would foster it. As then NATOSecretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared on avisit to Qatar in 2005, This region faces formidable se-curity challenges. Several countries in this region havebeen the target of terrorist attacks. And your immedi-ate neighborhood remains a ashpoint of unresolvedregional issues, of proliferation risks, and of politicaland religious extremism.15

As a consequence, the Istanbul Summit of 2004

launched a partnership with the countries of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC), inviting all of them tojoin. To date only Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait


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have done so, while Saudi Arabia and Oman (whichtogether account for 70 percent of the Gulf peninsulas

defense spending) have so far proved reluctant.Compared to the MD, the Istanbul Cooperation Ini-

tiative (ICI) focuses less on mutual understanding anddispelling of misperceptions; instead, the emphasis ison contributing to regional security and stability16in the broader Middle East region. From the outset,the Initiative thus took a noticeably more practical ap-proach in the security area rather than focusing on thedeconstruction of mutual suspicions. In part, this wasdue to the previous engagement with the MD, whichallowed the Alliance to build on established mecha-nisms and tools. In addition, the Gulf States initialinterest in NATO was rather greater than in the caseof the MD: since they had already pursued a strategicinternationalization of their security (e.g., by conclud-

ing bilateral agreements with France, Britain, and theUnited States), a relationship with the Alliance couldbe seen as another card in the deck to achieve this goal.Yet, there is also distrust and a lack of understandingregarding the way NATO functions, which ultimate-ly has prevented the Initiative from reaching its fullpotential. The Initiatives rather prominent practicalcomponent and its bilateral rather than multilateralframework are what distinguish it from the MD.

NATO outreach in the MENA region is furthercomplemented by its Training and Cooperation Initia-tive, launched in 2006 with the aim of making NATOstraining expertise more widely available to its region-al interlocutors.17 This was what had been done afterthe end of the Cold War in offering advice and sup-

port on security sector reform to all former WarsawPact members seeking to join the Alliance, a rathersuccessful contribution to transformation in the states


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concerned. Niche expertise of this kind has resultedin education and training, effectively becoming a dip-

lomatic tool in the Alliances portfoliothe trainingmission in Iraq being an important example of suchactivity. Education and training are attractive tools,as they allow for a certain level of engagement whenthe time might not be ripe for political acceptance of apartnership agreement. As an example, Saudi Arabia,which has so far not accepted the invitation to join theICI, is participating in seminars, courses and confer-ences, which could be seen as indicative of tentativeengagement.

So far, the ICI has failed to develop the depth andstrength anticipated. There is to date no frameworkdocument and no established military forum; in spiteof the Initiatives strong emphasis on military coop-eration, the level of participation in the activities con-

cerned (such as seminars, workshops, mutual visits,and participation in exercises) is low. In 2008, the ICIstates participated in 57 cooperation activities (25 bythe UAE, 13 by Qatar, 12 by Bahrain, and 7 by Ku-wait)while this is a 72 percent increase comparedto 2005, it is still only 10 percent of the total activitiesoffered.18 At the same time, NATO has tripled its offeron activities that are largely (85 percent) of a militarynature. To date, there have been no regular meetingsat the level of Defense Ministers or Foreign Ministers,and no Individual Partnership Cooperation Programhas been concluded with any of the states involved.

This stands in stark contrast to active participationby three of the four ICI states in NATOs operationsQatar and the UAE in the Libya Operation, and the

UAE and Bahrain in the International Stabilizationand Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In addi-tion, NATO has intelligence-sharing agreements with


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the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain. This seems to indicatethat the problem in deepening military cooperation

is not merely political but also structural. The Gulfarmed forces engaged with NATO are rather small insize, ranging from 8,200 troops in Bahrain, to 11,800in Qatar, 15,500 in Kuwait, and 51,000 in the UAE.19Hence, their personnel pool is rather limited, particu-larly when it comes to the ofcer level.

More importantly, the ICI suffers from the absenceof Oman and, to an even greater extent, Saudi Ara-biathe Gulf giant in terms not only of size, but alsoof political and economic inuence. The inclusion ofthese absentees would give the Initiative the cred-ibility and visibility necessary for its success. For thisreason, the Alliance has kept the door open to bothstates, and Saudi Arabia has started sending ofcersto attend the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at

the Alliances Defense College.There are several reasons that explain why these

countries have not joined. Omans foreign policy tra-ditionally seeks to maintain the fragile balance en-tailed in its close relations with Iran and its peninsularneighbors, while Saudi Arabia prefers bilateral tiesand is generally concerned about foreign military onits territory.

Overall, the Gulf States have failed to devise acoherent strategic vision themselves: the commondefense force Al-Jazeera Shield, consisting of 7,000troops and theoretically designed as an interventionforce in the event of an attack, has therefore remainedweak, although it was used in 2011 to quell uprisingsin Bahrain. Strategic cooperation remains limited if the

parties involved have unclear ideas about the overallgoal.


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This explains, in part, why the MD and the Istan-bul Cooperation Initiative remain separatedespite

the cultural and historic connections, the security con-cerns, the strategic vision, and therefore the approachto defense in the states concerned are not the same.

The Special Case: The Structured SecurityCooperation Framework in Iraq.

Although the invasion of Iraq did not take placeunder the NATO ag, some might argue that it hurtthe Alliances cohesion more than anything else sinceits foundation, since the Allies disagreed over the jus-tication for it. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador toNATO at the time, termed the invasion a near-deathexperience.20 Nevertheless, the Allies agreed in 2005to respond to a request by the Iraqi government to as-

sist with the training of its new security forces. NA-TOs Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is not only therst of its kind, it is also the gateway to a stronger andlonger-lasting relationship between the Alliance andthe so-called Eastern gate of the Arab world.

NTM-I is small in size (150 troops), and not a com-bat mission. Folded into the American training effort(the two share a commander), its niche contributionfocuses almost exclusively on the Iraqi Armys ofcercorps, although a substantial number of Italian Cara-binieriabout two thirds of the mission overallcontribute to training the Internal Security Forcesunder this umbrella as well. Assistance in rebuildingthe different levels of ofcer education, be it the StaffCollege, the War College, or the National Defense

College; advice in the development of education pro-grams; and the establishment of a noncommissionedofcer (NCO) corps are all part of NTM-Is portfolio.


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Despite its limited size, this mission works at acrucial junction in the newly emerging Iraqi security

sector. Armed forces rely for their functioning on theofcer corps; large numbers of enlisted personnel can-not fulll their duties without the leadership and guid-ance provided by the ofcers commanding them. Yet,this is exactly where the Iraqi Armed Forces are cur-rently challenged; 157 percent of its enlisted personnelrequirements are lled, as opposed to only 73 percentcoverage at the ofcer level.21 Since the disbanding ofthe old Iraqi armed forces, the new security structureshave had to grow at an impressive speed; 14,000 newtroops were brought in every 5 weeks in 2007, and thecomprehensive De-Ba'athication program, originallydesigned to dismiss all former Iraqi military membersabove the rank of colonel, had to be curtailed. Today,about 70 percent of the countrys ofcer corps had

served in the old Iraqi military.In this context, training and education are the

key elements in securing the new structure. NTM-Is efforts seem to pale alongside the American con-tribution: 2,500 ofcer cadets, 200 NCOs, 460 JointStaff College ofcer graduates, and 1,800 individu-als trained abroad at the NATO Defense College,the NATO School Oberammergau, the Joint WarfareCenter Stavanger, and the Center of Excellence in theDefense against Terrorism22 seem a rather limited con-tribution, considering the overall manning level ofnearly 200,000 troops and about 20,000 ofcers. Yet,training can be effective only in units with existingstructures and experienced ofcers, NCOs, and teammembersall of which are currently understaffed by

the Iraqi army. NATOs limited efforts are thus pro-viding a contribution where it really counts. In total,NTM-I is a rather inexpensive mission, with a budgetof 22.5 million euros per year. The missions future,


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both in terms of scope and nances, will depend onthe situation after the U.S. withdrawal at the end of

2011.As the mission has relied heavily on U.S. force

protection and logistics, it is not clear how it will beaffected by the American withdrawal from Iraq. In thecontext of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iraqigovernments regarding the stay of American trainerson Iraqi soil beyond the withdrawal (approximatelybetween 8,000 and 25,000 trainers), Baghdad indicateda possible extension under the NATO mission.23 Thishints at a preference for the Alliance, as its multina-tional character and its low level of visibility in Iraq ingeneral have made it more acceptable to the popula-tion. Politically and legally speaking, the mission hasmoved from United Nations (UN) Resolution 1546 toa Structured Cooperation Framework between NATO

and Iraq; this very likely serves as the rst steppingstone toward a more comprehensive relationship be-tween the two, which could ultimately result in a part-nership within, or outside, the ICI framework.

The Missing Links: Libya, Syria, Lebanon,Palestine.

While it is useful to assess NATOs existing rela-tions with the MENA region, it is equally interestingto take a closer look at the states with which it hasnone. Although the Alliance has now developed somekind of relationship with 11 Arab countries (which ishalf of the Arab Leagues members) plus Israel, andhas extended invitations to two more (Oman and Sau-

di Arabia), a number of states are missing from thenetwork. These states fall broadly into two categories:those that can be deemed as politically unreliable or


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unfriendly to NATO, and those that are too weak intheir statehood to forge a relationship with the Alli-

ance.The rst category comprises Syria, Libya (before

the 2011 operation), and Iraq (before 2004). Not sur-prisingly, these were all part of the list of roguestates established in the late 1990s and, as such, con-sidered a threat to world peace.24 The list coincidedto a considerable extent with what John R. Bolton,then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, referred to in 2002as the Axis of Evil25states seen to be sponsors ofterrorism and in pursuit of WMDs. The absence ofSyria and Libya clearly reects the bilateral relation-ship most Allies have, or had, with those two statesoutside the Allied context. While programs similar toNATOs outreach initiatives into the region, such asthe Five plus Five Dialogue between ve European

and ve Maghreb countries or the European Unions(EU) Union for the Mediterranean, do not ostracizeLibya or Syria, the Alliances approach to both of thesestates has been strongly inuenced by two elements:continuing American reservations about them, andtheir own reservations toward the Alliance.

This becomes particularly evident in the case ofLibya: while UN sanctions for the support of terror-ism and pursuit of a program to develop WMDs madeinitial Libyan membership of the MD out of the ques-tion at the inception of the MD in 1994, things changedafter 2003. Colonel Muammar Gadda had alreadyagreed a few years earlier to hand over the suspectscharged with the Lockerbie terrorist attack to a courtin the Netherlands, and to compensate the families of

the victims of Lockerbie and Niger. Eventually, he alsoagreed to destroy all chemical, nuclear, and biologi-cal weapons. The state was thus considered repentantand welcomed back into the international community.


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Yet, while the suggestion that Libya be invited tojoin the MD circulated briey, it never materialized

because the regime was not interested; consideringthe very negative attitude the Libyan government ex-pressed at the time of the Dialogues foundation, thiscan hardly be considered a surprise. Gadda eventhreatened to launch a jihad in the event of NATOexpansion into North Africa, warning his Maghrebneighbors of foreign interference in their affairs as aresult of the MD.26 Prospects are different under a newLibyan government, which has beneted greatly fromthe Alliances support. In March 2011 NATO decidedto implement the military aspects of UN Resolution1973, adopted after an appeal to the UN SecurityCouncil by the League of Arab States, calling for a no-y zone, a maritime arms embargo, and the protectionof civilians.27

The position adopted by the Arab League follow-ing a violent uprising against the Gadda regime wasthe regional green light that enabled the UN SecurityCouncil to issue the resolution calling for the protec-tion of civilians, and prepared the way for NATO toaddress the military needs arising as a consequence ofthis resolution. Politically, it seems very unlikely thatthe Alliance would have taken on this mission withoutthe strong regional support shown in this case. DuringOperation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the Alliance wasassisted by partner states from the region, namely, theUAE, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar. It is important topoint out that the mandate ruled ground troops out,and was enacted solely from the air and sea.

Gaddas regime nally fell after 7 months of

operations, and a new provisional government hasemerged that seems to have a rather positive attitudetoward the Allianceso much so that the head of the


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Libyan Transitional National Council has asked theAllies to extend their mission until the end of 2011 in

order to control surplus weapons and deal with possi-ble Gadda loyalists who might still be active.28 Whilefurther engagement by the Alliance will be limited (atraining mission, as in Iraq, is conceivable), Libyan in-volvement in the MD or in a different framework ofpartnership is now a distinct possibility, thus closingthe North African gap in the program.

The foreseeable evolution in Libyas relations withthe Alliance is unlikely to repeat itself in the case ofSyria. Although some Syrian opposition memberscalled on NATO to act following the violent crack-down on the wave of protests in late 2011,29 there isno appetite in the Alliance to engage in a situationthat is very different from that in Libya in a numberof respectsabsence of a UN or League of Arab States

mandate, an immediate, neighborhood with a NATOcountry (Turkey), strong relations with Iran, muchmore developed military capabilities, and a possiblespillover effect into a region already under tension areall reasons not to engage in this case. Most importantly,in contrast to the Libyan National Transitional Coun-cil, the Syrian opposition has not made a concertedcall on NATO. Regardless of the events surroundingthe Arab Spring, Syria has not had any relations withthe Alliance, although it did have some contacts withthe EU. Syrias isolation, particularly vis--vis theUnited States, stems among other things from its bel-ligerence toward its neighbor Israel, but also from itslong-standing occupation of Lebanon and its hostilitytoward other Arab states (such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia,

and Jordan). In this context, Syrian absence from anyAllied framework is a logical continuation of its ownforeign policy.


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The case of the three other states that have no re-lationship with NATOLebanon, the Palestinian

Authority, and Yemenis slightly different; theirabsence can be understood as a result of their weakstatehood rather than a denite stance toward the Al-liance. Lebanon, a multi-religious state that brought15 years of civil war to an end in 1990, only to remainoccupied by Syrian forces and various militia groups,wasand still isconsidered a Syrian vassal state inspite of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The presenceof the Shia militia organization Hezbollah, an ally ofSyria and Iran, was not only the reason for Israelsinvasion in 2006, but it has also undermined Leba-nons credibility as a strong state that acts indepen-dently from Syria. Lebanons opposition toward a UNresolution condemning the violence in Syria in 2011continues a long tradition of aligning its politics with

those of its neighbor. It thus comes as no surprise thatneither NATO nor Lebanon are really at all interestedin a partnership with each other. In addition, Leba-nonlike Syriais still ofcially at war with Israeland, while all three states are members of the Unionfor the Mediterranean, relevant business within theUnion has been largely blocked because of the ongo-ing conict.

Nevertheless, a possible role for NATO was voicedin the media in 2006 for a Lebanon peacekeeping forceafter the war between Israel and Hezbollah.30 Actual-ly, nothing came of the proposal as a result of budget-ary restrictions, NATOs engagement in Afghanistanand, most importantly, the absence of regional sup-port for such an option. Instead, the existing UN In-

terim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was expanded, with15,000 troops from 36 nations (of which 14 happen tobe NATO Allies).31


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Another case in point is the Palestinian Author-ity, also absent from formal relations with NATO.

While Palestine has been recognized by eight NATOAllies,32 there is no unied position in the Allianceon the conict, or, rather, on its resolution. Thoughall Allies support the two-state solution, there is nounanimous consensus on how to achieve it. Neverthe-less, NATO opened exploratory information contactswith the Palestinian Authority in 2005, as the IstanbulSummit declaration had clearly stated that it wouldnot exclude its future participation in any of the Alli-ances partnership frameworks.33 Yet, this never mate-rialized, because the Israeli war with Lebanon in 2006and the hostilities on the Gaza strip in 2008 and 2009brought the peace process to a complete halt after ithad been kept on hold for some time.

However, a role for NATO in the resolution of the

conict has been mentioned several times, more out-side than inside the Alliance. For example, the optionof an international peacekeeping force for Palestineafter a peace agreement featured in the 2000 Clintonparameters, and New York Times journalist ThomasFriedman suggested that such a role would be perfectfor NATO. The idea has been pushed several times by,among others, former National Security Advisor toPresident Barack Obama and former Supreme AlliedCommander Europe James Jones; however, it remainsunpopular with a number of NATO Allies, who fearthe political danger of such a mission.34 As a conse-quence, then NATO Secretary General Jaap de HoopScheffer declared in January 2009 that three precondi-tions would have to be fullled before one could even

think about a role for NATO in Palestine. These area comprehensive peace agreement, the consent of theparties, and a UN mandatenot to mention NATO


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consensus.35 Considering the high political visibilityof such a mission, and its difculties in terms of mili-

tary feasibility, the time is not ripe for the Alliance totake on a mission in Palestine, or on the Golan Heightsfor that matter.36

The last state missing from the web of relations isYemen, alone among the Arabian Peninsula states innot being invited to join the ICI in 2004. The reasonthat Yemen was left out is that it is not a member ofthe GCC, despite its repeated attempts to join. Fromthe perspective of both the GCC and the ICI, prospectsfor stabilization are grim in a state as close to collapseas Yemen. Half of its population lives below the pov-erty line, its petroleum resources are declining, and itssecurity sector is in disarray. Yemen is thus hardly in aposition to become a viable partner, particularly sincethe uprisings of 2011 that brought it close to another

civil war.In addition to these missing states, NATO has no

formal relations with the League of Arab States, anorganization that represents 22 Arab countries andwas founded in 1945. Yet, in 2008, the Leagues thenSecretary General, Amr Moussa, visited NATO Head-quarters; visits to the League Secretariat by NATOdelegations of different levels have taken place, andthe League has been sending course members to theNATO Regional Cooperation Course at the AlliancesDefense College in Rome since 2010. While the rela-tionship is timid at this stage, the Leagues call for ano-y zone over Libya was seen as the regional greenlight for NATO to take action there. Therefore, theLeagues political support cannot be overestimated.


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OBSTACLES ON THE WAY AHEAD

Formally, NATO has achieved a lot in the space of17 years: it has increased its relations with the MENAregion from 0 to 11, has regional partners participat-ing in a number of its operations and, in 2011, evenstarted hosting permanent missions of these partnersin its Headquartersthe UAE was the rst to openone.37 Yet, while all looks good on paper, relations arenot as profound as they could be, especially in com-parison with the Alliances PfP program. To date,there is no founding document between NATO andits southern partners; there is no standing multilateralconsultation forum like the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil, which brings the Alliance and its PfP part-ners together on a monthly basis at the ambassadoriallevel, and annually at the level of Foreign or Defense

Ministers and Chiefs of Defense. There is no militaryforum with the partners of the ICI, and no high-levelmeetings. In other words, there is room for improve-ment.

Three main reasons have obstructed the deepen-ing of existing relations: the Alliances negative im-age in the region; a limited understanding of it withinNATO; and the low- (and high-) intensity conictsand diverging security interests that characterize theregion.

Addressing the Problems of a Negative Image.

The Alliance was well aware of its own image inthe region when it created its rst timid outreach ac-

tivities there in the form of the MD, as its stated goalincluded the correction of misunderstandings.38 Earlyon, NATO Headquarters had realized that diplomatic


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or military cooperation with these states would bevery difcult, given the many negative connotations

associated with the Alliance in the region. A numberof root causes were, and still are, responsible for this:the historically burdened relationship with a numberof NATO Allies, the lack of differentiation betweenthe Alliance as a collective and its individual memberstates, the impact of the Cold War, inadequate strate-gic communication by NATO, and a general percep-tion in the Arab world that the Alliance had identiedIslam as the next enemy now that the Soviet Union hasfallen.

Although the North Atlantic Alliance as such wasof course not a colonial enterprise, a number of Mem-ber StatesFrance, Great Britain, and Italy as founderAllies, later joined by Spainhad colonized parts ofNorth Africa and the Middle East. Almost all the Arab

states, except for Saudi Arabia, had been occupied atsome point in the 19th and 20th centuries by one orseveral European powers; many of them had previ-ously been part of the Ottoman Empirein a sensethe forerunner of modern Turkey, also a NATO na-tion. It goes without saying that experiences with co-lonialism have not been positive. Algeria, at the timeof the Alliances creation still a part of France andspecically mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty,fought a bloody and protracted war for independence;Britain oversaw Jewish migration into Palestine andsanctioned the creation of a Jewish state with the Bal-four Declaration of 1917; Italy fought a long war ofsuppression in Libya.

American inuence on the Alliance meant that, as

a collective, it took a clear stand toward colonialismearly on. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty speci-es that the Allies collective defense agreement ap-


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plies in the event of armed attack on the territory ofany of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the

Algerian Departments of France [this section becameinapplicable as of June 1962], on the territory of or onthe Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Par-ties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic ofCancer.39 While the Tropic of Cancer lies just south ofAlgeria, Egypt, and Libya, the explicit reference to theNorth Atlantic area makes it clear that mutual defensein practice excludes territories such as Morocco, Tu-nisia, Libya, or Egyptalthough Allied forces at thetime of the Treaty were posted in them (British forceson the Suez Canal), controlled them in part or com-pletely (France in Tunisia and parts of Morocco), orclaimed ownership over them (as in the case of Italy,which accepted the end of its Libyan territories onlyin 1949, when the Bevin Sforza Plan failed).40 This ex-

clusion from the treaty area did not take into accountthe strong interest of the European colonial powers,particularly France, in including the territories con-cerned.41 Nevertheless, the Alliance should not be seenas an anti-colonial club either; while the Algerian warwas not actively supported by NATO, NATOs silentacquiescence is seen by Algerians today as a form ofsupportregardless of the fact that the war frustratedFrances relations with the other Allies and eventuallyled to its withdrawal from NATOs integrated militarystructure in 1966.42 When decolonization became im-minent, France and Britain agreed at a NATO Councilmeeting to secure control of strategic installations inthe MENA regionfor the Alliances security, not justtheir own.43 While the era of colonialism came to an

end (except in the case of Portugal) rather early in theAlliances history, its heritage nevertheless affected,and continues to affect, the Alliances relations withthe former colonies of individual Allies.


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This is exacerbated by the fact that there is sig-nicant conation of the West and NATO, as well

as by action within the MENA region by individualMember States and by the Alliance as a whole. In 1956,Great Britain and France conspired with Israel againstEgypt, which had just nationalized the Suez Canal; in1967, the United States supported Israel logisticallyduring the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; in1986, the United States bombed Libya as a reaction toLibyan-supported terrorist attacks in Berlin; in 1991,an international coalition including almost all NATOAllies at the time (except for Germany and Turkey)liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Likewise, Op-eration ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan andOperation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq are conducted bya number of states that are also members of NATO. Itwas not NATO, the collective Alliance, that undertook

these actions, but in the general Arab public eye thismakes no difference. These actions are seen as part ofa larger paradigm in which the West conspires againstthe East, seeking to control its trade routes and accessto oil.44

The sense of grievance that has permeated theregion since the end of World War I and the doublestandards applied to international law (be it for theIsraeli-Palestinian conict or the pursuit of WMD)have resulted in a difcult relationship marked by dis-trust on the Arab side. The sense of victimization hasbeen further exacerbated by the sensation that 9/11has been exploited to initiate a crusade (as formerPresident George W. Bush named the War on Terror)45against Muslims. The death of over 10,000 civilians in

Afghanistan,46 where NATO has led the ISAF since2002, combined with the statement of then NATOSecretary General Willy Claes that Islamic fundamen-talism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to


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Western security since the collapse of communism inEastern Europe,47 did much to strengthen the impres-

sion that the Alliance was hunting Muslims.This impression disregards several facts. To be-

gin with, Claess comment caused a strong reactionamong the Allies (particularly Turkey, a largely Mus-lim country), forcing him to retract his statement im-mediately and declare that Islamic fundamentalismwould not even be on the agenda when we talk tothese countries [the countries of the MediterraneanDialogue],48 since as religious fundamentalism ofany kind was not a concern for NATO. Second, theAlliance has in Albania (since 2009) and Turkey twoMember States that are largely Muslim. Third, NATOintervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and inKosovo in 1999, to save Muslim lives. However, thecurrent perception, built on decades of mutual dis-

trust, is that NATO is an imperialist, militarist blocseeking the domination of Arab states. NATOs imageis thus the victim of a more widespread antagonismbetween the Western and the Arab worlds.49

Improving Understanding of the Region.

It is not just the population of Arab states that hasmisperceptions about NATO. There is an equally in-completeand to a certain extent mistakencompre-hension of the region in general by NATO, or rather,by the various Allies. While the Alliances headquar-ters has built up a dedicated (albeit small) division forits MD and ICI partners, and an equally small facultyin its Defense College in Rome, there is difculty in

focusing on a region so diverse and yet so homoge-nousa challenge that Edward Said has famouslytermed as Orientalism, the difculty of Western schol-


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ars and thinkers in understanding and analyzing theregion for what it is rather than for what one wants it

to be.50

While such a perspective has been criticized,misunderstandings between East and West do exist.

The difculty of understanding the combination ofsimilarities and differences characterizing the regionas a whole emerges in a number of respects. Apartfrom Iran, Turkey, and Israel, the region includes alarge number of Arab states. These share a range oflinguistic, social, and cultural traits, as well as a com-mon history, but at the same time differ vastly withregard to such parameters as size, economy, politicalsystems, ethnic and religious makeup, internationalrelations, geography, and educational standards. Inother words, while looking similar on the surface,these states differ markedly along crucial points. Asa result, approaches to the region have to strike a dif-

cult balance between adopting too broad or too nar-row a perspective. This is particularly visible in NA-TOs partnership programs, which divide the regionalong geographic lines according to whether the statesconcerned border on the Mediterranean or the Ara-bian Gulf. While critics see this division as a refusalto deal with the region as a whole in a comprehensivemanner, some Arab states actually show a preferencefor this separation.

Overall, partner states have complained that theirsecurity needs and their strategic cultures have notbeen sufciently understood by NATO; this is par-ticularly the case in relation to the Israeli-Palestinianissue, which most regional states view as a platformfor other security issues, such as terrorism, political

fundamentalism, migration, and nonstate security ac-tors. The fact that the Alliance prefers to work aroundthe issue rather than solve it is seen as a failure to un-derstand how much is at stake.


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A Region of Crisis.

Finally, the relationship between NATO and itsArab partners is marred by the same factors that haveimpeded the regions development in the past: thepresence of a number of ongoing or recent conicts (beit the Israeli-Palestinian conict, the Western Sahara,Iraq-Iran, or Iraq-Kuwait) and protracted instability(best seen during the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia,Syria, and Yemen) make cooperation with the statesconcerned difcult. Conict and instability not onlyengender political issues such as lack of legitimacyand human rights abuses, but also impede economicdevelopment by discouraging investors, prompting abrain drain, and slowing infrastructure development.In the Arab world, this has led to the worlds lowestrates of political and economic integration (less than

2 percent of the North African countries trade is in-ter-Maghreb51). Conict also affects cooperation withNATO in a number of ways.

For a start, the limited nances of a number of theMD countries impede participation at seminars andworkshops. The self-funding principle of the Alliancehas been curtailed as a result, with NATO occasion-ally funding between 80 percent and 100 percent ofparticipation for countries below a certain Gross Do-mestic Income. Another issue is an educational con-cern, a direct outcome of the generally underperform-ing educational sector in the Arab world. English at aworking level is not widespread in the Arab partnercountries; in North Africa, French is widely spokento a reasonably good level,52 but the same is not true

of NATO Member States (although French is one ofthe Alliances two ofcial languages). In small frame-works, such as the NATO Defense Colleges dedicated


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Middle East faculty, continuous interpretation intoEnglish, Arabic, and French is provided at a consider-

able cost; the same is not always possible during op-erations and exercises, with obvious effects on com-munication and, ultimately, on the effectiveness of theAlliances outreach efforts.

NATO has (albeit still to a very limited degree)started to feature translation into Arabic of some itemsit posts on the Internet, reecting the Alliances aware-ness that language remains an issue when communi-cating with this region. This was particularly visibleduring the Alliances Operation UNIFIED PROTEC-TOR in Libya: while the Arabic content of the NATOwebsite itself remained minimal, as the Alliance doesnot have a standing team of Arabic interpreters andtranslators, videos in Arabic were posted on a separateYouTube Channel named Natoarabic.53 That access

to the channel remained relatively infrequent3,300visits after the beginning of the operation, as com-pared to almost 1 million in Englishand can be part-ly explained by the low level of Internet access in theregion (estimated at 10 percent in North Africa and 57percent in the Gulf, compared to about 80 percent inthe Western world54), but also by the absence of directlinks to this channel on NATOs main website.

The nal section of this monograph will brieyexamine the reasons for which, notwithstanding thechallenges to be addressed in the MENA region, itsrelationship with NATO is one that will continue todevelop.


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AGAINST ALL ODDS: RELATIONS BETWEENNATO AND THE MENA REGION

In spite of the obstacles listed above, the relation-ship between NATO and the MENA region is expect-ed to deepen. To begin with, geographic proximity isnot a matter of choice: Syria and Iraq both border ona NATO country; it is no more than 468 miles fromAlgiers to Marseille, 375 miles from Rome to Tunis,and 477 miles from Ankara to Damascus. In addition,the region boasts 65.4 percent of the worlds oil re-serves and is one of the most important trade routeslinking the Western to the Eastern Hemisphere. Notonly oil but also goods from Asia nd their way toEurope along this routeone that is quite vulnerable,since it harbors seven chokepoints between the Straitof Hormuz and Gibraltar, making it very easy to shut

the whole route down, as Egypt did in 1967.These are not the only reasons for which the re-

gion is important. Political turmoil in the form of wars(both civil and interstate), coups dtat, insurgencies,and terrorism shook the region to the core in the lastcentury, accelerating transformation and resulting inan unstable construct that is of strategic concern toNATO. Allies are concerned about the proliferation ofWMDs in the region, about new interstate wars, failedstates, immigration, civil war, and, of course, terror-ism spilling over from this region into NATO MemberStates. All of this is taking place in NATOs immediateneighborhood, along its southern ank. The Alliancethus has more strategic interest in this region than inany otheras recognized by the Americans in par-

ticular, though they are geographically far removedfrom it.55 In other words, the Southern Front is nowthe Central Front of the Alliances strategic interest.


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This explains why the Alliance has, in the past 15years, shown great adaptability to circumstances in

its two partnership programs. NATO realized earlyon that further cooperation with the region was ham-pered by a range of misunderstandings, giving the Al-liance a rather negative image. The aim of the MD wasthus, from the outset, the deconstruction of mutualmisperceptions rather than military cooperationasthe latter could not be achieved without the former.The correct identication of the problem was the rststep toward closer cooperation, and eventually part-nership.

Most importantly, both NATO and the states in theregion have a long list of common security interests;partnership can create a win-win situation that aimsat a cooperative rather than an antagonistic securityscenario. Security across the globe is now interlinked;

in the complexity of the modern world, it is no longerdivisible but needs to be tackled collectively. In spiteof historical and cultural obstacles, the Alliance andits immediate southern neighborhood will thus cometogether out of strategic necessity for their mutualbenet.

In order to achieve this, NATO will have to nego-tiate the hurdles detailed above. Improving StrategicCommunication with this region of the world wouldbe a rst step toward overcoming the rather negativeimage of the Alliance; as the Internet is not wide-spread in the region (with the exception of the Gulf),public diplomacy should focus on television as theprimary means for communication. In addition, theAllies should develop a coherent visionand thus a

strategyfor the Middle East and North Africa. Whathas hampered NATOs engagement in the past was inpart a result of the Allies divergent visions of the re-


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gion, or the preference for bilateral engagement. TheAlliances operation in Libya could be an indication

that there is readiness now to manage relations withthe MENA region within NATO. Furthermore, Alliesshould invest in subject matter expertise within Alli-ance structures and draw on this in times of crisis.

ENDNOTES

1. Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1983, p. 73.

2. George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connec-tion, London, UK: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 1934.

3. The American Presidency Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower:Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the MiddleEast, January 5, 1957, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11007&st=&st1=#axzz1bbBVKpTF.

4. F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser, and Mi-chele Zanini, NATOs Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Di-lemmas, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998,p. 45.

5. NAA, Presidential Task Force, Final ReportAmerica andEurope: The Future of NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship, Co-Chairmen Loic Bouvard and Charlie Rose, Brussels, Belgium: In-ternational Secretariat, September 1993, p. 21.

6. Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsberg, The EconomicBackground, R.A. Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis, New York: W. W.Norton and Co., 1974, p. 21.

7. Sten Rynning, NATO and the Broader Middle East, 1949-2007: The History and Lessons of Controversial Encounters, TheJournal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 6, December 2007, p. 916;Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: Dilemmas of

Security, London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 167.


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8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Declaration on Atlan-tic Relations: 18-19 June 1974, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-AAB10714-03575DFE/natolive/ofcial_texts_26901.htm.

9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliances NewStrategic Concept, November 7-8, 1991, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial_texts_23847.htm.

10. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Final Communi-que, Athens, Greece, June 1993, available from www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930610a.htm.

11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (95)12,Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATOs MediterraneanInitiative, February 8, 1995, available from www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-012.htm.

12. NATO, Mediterranean Dialogue, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-31C3338B-27980DD9/natolive/topics_60021.htm?

13. NATO, A More Ambitious and Expanded Frameworkfor the Mediterranean Dialogue, March 8, 2007, available fromwww.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-meddial.htm.

14. NATO, New NATO Trust Fund Signed with Jordan,November 19, 2009, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59333.htm.

15. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATOs Role inGulf Security, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de HoopScheffer, December 1, 2005, available from www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051201a.htm.

16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Istanbul Coopera-tion Initiative, June 28, 2004, available from www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm.

17. NATO Review, The NATO Training Cooperation Initia-tive, Spring 2007, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/art3.html.


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18. Pierre Razoux, What future for NATOs Istanbul Coop-eration Initiative? NATO Defense College Research Paper, n. 55,January 2010, p. 3.

19. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili-tary Balance 2011, London, UK: Routledge, 2011, pp. 304, 317, 327,333.

20. BBC News, NATO turns to terrorism ght, October 18,2003, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3201578.stm.

21. Florence Gaub, Building a New Military? The NATOTraining Mission-Iraq, NATO Defense College Research Paper,No. 67, April 2011, p. 2.

22. Gaub, p. 3.

23. BBC Monitoring, Iraq: National consensus possibly need-ed to keep US trainers under NATO umbrella, October 10, 2011,Al-Iraqiyah TV; Iraqi premier comments on future ties with USafter pullout, October 22, 2011, Al-Iraqiyah TV; USA said seek-ing to keep six army bases in Iraq after 2011, August 24, 2011,Al-Hayat; Iraqi experts says US trainers to gain partial immunityafter troop pullout, October 10, 2011, Al-Jazeera TV.

24. Inter Press Service English, Who Are Todays RogueNations? May 30, 2001, available from www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-44881194.html.

25. BBC News, US expands axis of evil, May 6, 2002, avail-able from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1971852.stm.

26. Gareth M. Winrow, Dialogue with the Mediterranean: TheRole of NATOs Mediterranean Initiative, New York: Garland Pub-lishing, 2000,p. 173.

27. United Nations, Security Council Approves No-FlyZone over Libya, Authorizing All Necessary Measures to Pro-tect Civilians, March 17, 2011, available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm; Arab League Urges Libya No-Fly Zone, The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2011, available fromonline.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704838804576196681609529882.html.


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28. BBC News, Libyas Mustafa Abdul Jalil asks NATO tostay longer, October 26, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15459473?print=true.

29. Ynetnews.com, 22 killed in Syria; activists urge NATOaction, October 28, 2011, available from www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4140641,00.html; Zeit Online, NATO must helpus!, August 31, 2011, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2011-08/syrien-homs.

30. Israeli Leaders Open to NATO Force in Lebanon, Wash-ington Times, July 23, 2006, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/jul/23/20060723-115255-5159r/; Forbes.com, LargeNATO Role Unlikely In Lebanon, Oxford Analytica, August 3,2006, available from www.forbes.com/2006/08/02/nato-lebanon-israel-cx_0803oxford.html.

31. United Nations, United Nations Interim Force in Leba-non, available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unil/facts.shtml.

32. Turkey, Albania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (notseparate states at the time), Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Po-land recognized Palestine as an independent state in 1988, after itwas proclaimed in Algiers by the Palestine National Council. Inall cases except Turkey, this predated NATO membership.

33. NATO, NATOs Mediterranean Dialogue and IstanbulCooperation Initiative, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9F468A4D-435FA6A1/natolive/topics_59419.htm?

34. Thomas L. Friedman, How About Sending NATOSomewhere Important? TheNew York Times, September 4, 2001,available from www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/opinion/foreign-affairs-how-about-sending-nato-somewhere-important.html; Jolyon Ho-worth, ESDP and NATO? Wedlock or Deadlock? Cooperationand Conict, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2003, p. 243; Kevin Peraino, NATOin the West Bank, Newsweek, December 6, 2008, available fromwww.newsweek.com/id/172638.

35. NATO, Speech by NATO Secretary General at an eventjointly organized by the Institute for National Security Studies


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and the Atlantic Forum of Israel, January 11, 2009, available fromwww.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FA832B39-70CC352E/natolive/opinions_49673.htm?selectedLocale=en.

36. Florence Gaub, NATO: Peacekeeping the Holy Land?NATO Defense College Research Paper, No. 57, March 2010, avail-able from www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=182;Celine Touboul, Planning Ahead for a Peacekeeping Mission onthe Golan Heights: a Role for NATO? NATO Defense CollegeForum Paper, n.19, September 2011, available from www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=305.

37. Al-Arabiya, UAE to be rst Arab country with NATOembassy, May 19, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/05/19/149686.html.

38. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (95)12,Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATOs MediterraneanInitiative, February 8, 1995, available from www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-012.htm.

39. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North AtlanticTreaty, April 4, 1949, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial_texts_17120.htm.

40. Ronald Bruce St John, Libya: Continuity and Change, Lon-don, UK: Routledge 2011, p. 36.

41. Henderson, p. 81.

42. Irwin M. Wall, France, NATO and the Algerian War,in Wilfried Loth, ed., Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965,Hove, East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press, 2004, pp. 5262.

43. Christopher Coker, NATO and Africa 1949-89: An Over-view, in Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO: The First FiftyYears, Vol. 1, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Publishers: 2001, p. 155.

44. Mohamed Abdel Salam, The Modes of Arab ConspiracyTheories, Arab Insight, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 89-101,available from www.google.it/url?q=www.arabinsight.org/aiarti-cles/200.pdf&sa=U&ei=UsSyTuGQLMTHtAbGvqGYBA&ved=0CBIQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNFM_8omB6S1rHTBrtXe_llRhRYqWw.


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45. Europe Cringes at Bush Crusade Against Terrorists,The Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2001, available fromwww.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html.

46.Afghanistan civilian casualties: year by year, month bymonth, The Guardian, available from www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics.

47. NATO Chief under Fire for Islamic Remark, Internation-al Herald Tribune, February 15, 1995.

48. NATOs Agenda for New European Order, FinancialTimes, February 20, 1995.

49. Arab Perspectives on NATO, NATO Review, Spring2005, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/art3.html.

50. Edward Said, Orientalism, London, UK: Vintage Books,1979.

51. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, The Costof non-Maghreb: Achieving the Gains from Economic Integration, Ad-dis Ababa: African Trade Policy Center, November 2006, p. 1.

52. United Nations Development Program, Arab Human De-velopment Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society, New York: Re-gional Bureau for Arab States, 2003, p. 54.

53. NATO Arabics Channel, available from www.youtube.com/user/NATOArabic.

54. Internet World Stats, Middle East and Africa Data for2011, available from www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.

55. David Capezza: Iraq Training Mission Shows NATOsFuture, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, October 28, 2008.


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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo IIICommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

AuthorDr. Florence Gaub

Director of PublicationsDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


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Documents

Against All Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region