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ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09 14 May 14 AG Copy to: ARTD DRT (Ops)* DM(A)* D Ed Cap* D Trg(A)* Comdt SCHINF* ARTD COS* ARTD AD Strat* ARTD AD Trg Ops* ARTD RG CAR* ARTD Hd RP&F* DM(A) AD Man Analysis* D Ed Cap AD Cap* Comd ARMCEN* D Trg(A) AD Itrg* CO AFC(H)*

ARMY JUNIOR ENTRY (JE) TRAINING – COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS1

Issue 1. To examine the Junior Entry cost benefit analysis2. Recommendations 2. AG is invited to note that:

a. Junior Entry (JE) is marginally cheaper (circa £1M pa) than Standard Entry (SE); calculated on a collective through career investment3. (para 5) b. There are no PFI financial benefits gained from transferring JE training to SE training. (paras 6 &7)

c. JE is required in order to fully man the Army against the A2020 demand4. (para 10)

d. JE investment builds stronger cultural, emotional, physical and educational foundations than SE training which improves the return of service. (paras 12-15)

And Agree that JE offers better value for money than SE in the longer run whilst also being essential for manning the Army. Timing 3. Routine. AG was asked to reply to CDP by 31 May 145. Background Training 4. Training Costs6. JE and SE courses deliver recruits to the same standard set by the single Operational Performance Statement (OPS)7. The cost per recruit on the SE course (14 weeks) is £21K; for the JE (Long) course (52 weeks) it is £67K and for the JE (Short) (26 weeks) it is £38K. If

1 JSP 507 ‘Investment Appraisal and Evaluation’ has been consulted. Much is beyond the parameters of this paper, but guidance has been used where appropriate. 2 HCDC – Future Army 2020 Ninth report of Session 2013-14 Volume 1; paras 128-130. 3 Through career costs: recruiting, training and length of service. 4 15% of the annual DM(A) inflow requirement is provided by the JE cohort. 5 ArmyHQ/AG/05/14 dated 16 Dec 13. 6 All costs have been calculated or modelled by HQ ARTD Business Support team. 7 If the Army formally requires more in capability terms from the investment made into JE, then the output standards for JE require clearer definition. If there is a requirement for JE to provide an enhanced capability, a period of consultation will be necessary to define its overall purpose, consider the process of selection, and develop an alternative training pathway through Ph1 and Ph2.

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SE were trained at AFC(H) it is estimated that the cost per recruit would be circa £28.6K. In parallel with this it is noted that JE average wastage rates are greater than SE by an average of 11% over the past four years. However the most recent statistics show an encouraging downward trend and ITG are continuing to refine their approach to reduce this further; see Annex A. Whilst JE is more expensive during initial training, in cost and wastage, they have a greater Length of Service (LoS) compared to SE. In 20138 TESRR, using Def Strat Stat statistics from TY11/12 observed that: ‘There are indicators of longer Lengths of Service (LoS) and higher performance, based on earlier promotion, from those joining the Army as U18s’. Def Strat Stat (formerly DASA) has completed three medium scale studies on JE, the most recent in 20109. This finding was also reinforced by a response to a PQ in Jan 1310 which found that the mean LoS for a soldier who joined under 18 was approximately three years longer than a soldier who joined when over 18. Therefore, assessing the overall training costs to sustain the long term manpower capability requires an assessment of inflow, wastage in training and LoS; see Table 1.

Table 1. Recruitment and Initial Training Cost investment shown against LoS per year of Service12

5. Training Cost Analysis. Table 1 demonstrates that whilst it may be cheaper to train SE individually (column f) the Army would need to train far greater numbers (column b) in order to make up for the difference for the JE cohort who have a greater LoS (Column e). Therefore the overall Army training through career costs are more efficient for JE than SE by circa £1M pa. The recruitment costs have been shown as neutral, however it is likely that costs would rise if greater SE numbers were required. AFC(H) retention analysis is at Annex B. Infrastructure and Estate 6. PFI at AFC(H) and Value for Money. There is insufficient training capacity for the A2020 structure at ATC(P) and ATR(W) to permit the closure of AFC(H), even if the cost of ending the PFI early was acceptable. The original investment appraisal into the AFC(H) PFI project declared that the ‘value for money decision is quite clear cut’13. The continued relevance of the original IA is threefold; the recruiting and manning pressures that caused JE to be re-established still endure; the AFC(H) occupancy levels are now surpassed14 and the PFI is market tested every 5/615 years to ensure continued commercial competitiveness. The current PFI contract makes the Army

8 D/TESR/01.02.04 dated 14 May 13: TESRR submission to SofS – POLICY OF RECRUITING UNDER-18s. 9 JE v SE Project dated May 2010, author sparksj124. This project was requested in 2010 by Col A J Shephard of ARTD. The overall objective was to compare the success rate of the JE AFC recruit to that of other enlistment types. 10 G:\Army\PQs\PQs 2013\20130417-PQ03556A-LOS_by_age\20130101-LOS_PQs-U1. 11 These are ‘full costs’ and include expenses borne directly borne by ARTD (ammunition, T&S etc), plus manpower costs for all permanent staff, the Initial Trainees Budget (salary paid to a trainee) and infrastructure costs from DIO. The figures have been calculated using the numbers forecast for TY 15/16 RAP and an assumed 85% First Time Pass Rate. 12 Statistics taken from TESRR submission: POLICY OF RECRUITING UNDER-18s dated 14 May 13. D/TESR/01.02.04. 13 Army Foundation College PFI Project – Full Business Case letter Dated 19 May 99. HQ ITG20/11/40. 14 1996 during the set up of the AFC(H) PFI, 2002 during the Nicholas Blake QC investigations, 2007 within ROSCTE, and now in 2014. 15 The contract is due for relet 31 Dec 2029.

Entry Type

Input Training Numbers required

Recruiting Costs

Ph 1 Training Cost11

Average LoS

(years)

Through career

cost per head pa ((c+d)/e)

Cost distribution across the

LoS (bxf)

Total

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

AFC Long 800

£10k

£67k 8.2 £9.4K £7.5M £10M

AFC Short 590 £38k 11.4 £4.2K £2.5M

Or SE at AFC(H) SE (Long

Capbadge equiv) 1032 £28.6k 5.4 £7.1K £7.3M

£11.1M SE (Short

Capbadge equiv) 807 £28.6k 8.1 £4.7K £3.8M

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contractually obliged to pay for a minimum of 37440 Army Student Weeks (ASW) per financial year; the fixed costs of the PFI and establishment payroll element remain consistent at approx £34.7M per TY. The replacement of JE with SE at AFC(H) would only be possible and financially viable in terms of accommodation availability. 7. AFC(H) Facilities. Even if AFC(H) (Uniacke and Hildebrand Barracks) could accommodate these numbers of recruits and so be financially efficient for the PFI, there are insufficient training facilities. There are only 2 x 25m ranges on site, and no ‘back door’ training area which could cope with the increased throughput required of the shorter, higher tempo SE course. The training estate used currently for JE at AFC(H)16 would continue to be available but the lack of time within 14 weeks to travel to these facilities would constrain SE training at AFC(H) to Ripon, Catterick and Otterburn, resulting in increased competition with other users; in each TY the requirement for FTX days on local training areas would increase from 150 to 319. The current annual recruit transport cost at ATR(W) and each ATC(P) training regiment is circa £200K and £250K respectively. AFC(H) currently run an annual recruit transport budget of £500K. Recruiting 8. The Recruiting and Inflow Requirement. The cost benefit of JE versus SE must be seen in the context of the current and future recruiting climate. Currently RG assess that the DM(A) input demand plan could not be filled exclusively by SE17. Although it is too early to forecast in detail the likely fill of the SE and JE RAP in TY 14/15, the experience of TY13/14 offers an indication. In sum, 91% of the JE RAP (both long and short) was successfully filled, whilst only 64% of the SE RAP was filled18. The cessation of recruiting Foreign and Commonwealth soldiers makes recruiting of SE even more challenging. The recruitment of JE fulfils c15% of the annual DM(A) inflow requirement; if JE ceased, SE would have to cover the 15% shortfall to maintain DM(A) targets. Past inflow statistics show that the anticipated future inflow requirement has previously been generated entirely from within the SE cohort only once in the last seven years (TY 07/08). In short, the JE provides greater assurance that annual DM(A) inflow requirements can be met in order to man the A2020 proposition. An illustration of JE v SE inflow is at Annex C. To inform future judgement, further understanding is required regarding through life cost comparisons, Army manning structural requirements, predicted UK demographic trends and UK economic trends. 9. Infantry Requirement. Of the Arms and Services that recruit JE, it is judged that only RA would be able to meet recruiting targets with SE only. The largest recipient of JE is the Infantry c20% (most notably SCOTS, KINGS, PoW, QUEENS, GUARDS). 10. SE Main Target Audience (MTA). Other factors related to the MTA of recruits, specifically health and availability, are applicable in determining the ability of the DM(A) requirement to be met by SE recruits only. Analysis of the future MTA trends for availability, at Annex D, suggests that by 2025 there will be an increase in the UK population MTA, but there will be an upward increase in the age distribution. It is unclear whether this is reflected in DM(A) planning projections for inflow, and the place of the JE within this. In addition the likely obesity and body composition trends within the UK population will decrease the available SE MTA, thus making SE recruitment more challenging; 60% of men, 50% of women and 25% of U20 year olds could be obese by 205019. Recruiting, training and educating younger individuals helps create the appropriate physical and mental approach. 11. RPP contractual limitations. Any changes to the current recruiting requirement will also incur Contract Variation Order (CVO) costs. If the parameters were changed, and recruiting became more challenging (because of an increased demand on the SE MTA), the current recruiting cost of approx £10K per recruit could increase; this represents decreasing cost effectiveness in the ‘attract’ phase.

16 Ripon, Catterick, Otterburn, Garelochead, Kirkudbright, Galloway and Barry Budden. 17 ARTD/RG/PST/JE: RG Insight and Intelligence Unit – JE SITREP dated 13 Nov 13. 18 Inclusive of ITG and ITC RAPs. 19 Government Office for Science, Foresight Report, Tackling Obesities: Future Choices – Project Report, 2nd Edition, October 2007.

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Additional benefits 12. Value over Cost. Articulating the benefits of JE initial training in pure value for money terms masks the wider benefits to the Army, the individual and society as a whole. JE provides the Army a unique opportunity to ensure individuals are imbued with the Army Values and Standards in order to deliver a more rounded and confident character20. In addition, the Army is the largest provider of apprenticeships in the UK. The education content in the JE programme provides the grounding from which all recruits progress onto trade specific apprenticeships. 85% of JE leave AFC(H) with Level 2 qualifications in literacy and numeracy, so achieving the standard necessary for promotion to Sergeant.21 Furthermore, the provision of education and training for 16 year old school leavers provides a governmentally compliant22 route into Army service, whilst also offering a number of wider benefits for the individual, the Army and society, as noted in the Deepcut Review. JE training provides significant foundation for emotional, physical and educational development throughout an individual’s career. There are significant wider benefits beyond costs associated with this developmental programme. 13. Benefits for the individual. The precise measurement of the benefits accrued for the individual who has undergone training as a JS is challenging, but it is apparent that JE training provides emotional, physical and educational development. This is most obviously manifest in the recognition afforded to AFC(H) by OFSTED in 2012 with a grade of Outstanding as a result of the excellent standard of training, education and welfare provided.

a. The JE education offer. The Army is the largest provider of apprenticeships in the UK. The education content in the JE programme provides the grounding from which all recruits progress onto trade specific apprenticeships. A key theme in the Richards Review23 was that all young people should reach a good level in English and maths before they undertake their apprenticeship. The JE education programme provides Functional Skills (FS) in maths, English and ICT at L1 and L2, plus an IT diploma. Within the JE(L) course, most recent stats show that 73% arrive with an English qualification below L1. After Ph1, 100% of the JS hold L1, and 85% also achieve L2. Within maths, 74% arrive with qualifications below L1. On completion of Ph1, 96% of JS achieve L1 and 72% also achieve L2. b. Raising the Participation Age (RPA)24. The JE route fully complies with the Education and Skills Act 2008. The JE opportunity gives 16 and 17 year olds an additional (and sometimes critical) avenue through which they can comply with RPA direction.

14. Deepcut Review. The societal benefits generated for the JE are unlikely to ever be statistically or financially evidenced. However, JE receive 50% more lessons on Values and Standards than SE. In addition, the increased time spent in training allows PS to offer more role modelling, and thus engender a deeper understanding of appropriate moral awareness. The Deepcut Review highlighted this important area, and firmly recommended the continuation of JE.

a. The Deepcut Review para 12.39. “Civilian society has not been notably successful in providing the opportunities for rewarding life-long careers for young people whose talents are not in the field of GCSEs and higher academic qualifications but lie, rather, in the technical trades or other careers offered by the Army. To deny these young people the chance to start training for such a career when they are of school-leaving age may deprive them of the opportunity they need to get away from difficult social circumstances and acquire new skills,

20 Reliable statistical data to correctly compare JE and SE, and so derive meaningful analysis, will only be available once the original AFC(H) cohorts have completed their full term of service in 2024. 21 The majority of SE achieve only Entry Level 3 by the end of the course. 22 Department for Education. Raising the Participation Age regulations. Effective from Aug 2013. 23 Department of BIS. The Richards Review of Apprenticeships Summary. Published 27 Nov 12. 24 Department for Education. Raising the Participation Age regulations. Effective from Aug 13.

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and social discipline, before it is too late to adapt.” b. The Deepcut Review para 12.40. “Until educational opportunity for 16-18 year olds in the UK becomes so diverse and well-resourced that it provides everyone the opportunity of acquiring better life skills in civilian society, this Review is of the opinion that there is not a sufficient case to prevent the recruitment to the Army of those over 16 but under 18………”

Enduring Constraints and Limitations 15. Age. Trained soldiers become a true capability on completion of Ph2 training and on turning 18 years old. The current JE model of Ph1 Long/Ph2 Short or Ph1 Short/Ph2 Long25 ensures that the fixed amount of time imposed upon JE recruits prior to moving into the Field Army is most efficiently used. 16. ‘Exclusive’ training environment for JE26. Nicholas Blake QC made an explicit recommendation that recruits U17 should be trained in establishments exclusive to this age group. This limits the locations available to ARTD in which JE can be trained. The location must generate the right numerical throughput, but also be exclusive to JE training. The delivery of JE on one site at AFC(H) addresses this recommendation. 17. Training design and development. The Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) ensures regular training assurance. The Ph1 Trained Soldier OPS27 training course received external validation during TY 12/13, and a review of the Formal Training Statement occurred in TY 13/14. Specific to JE, a DIF28 analysis reinforced that there are KLPs within Ph1 training that a 16 year old recruit will demand a longer duration to learn, and a higher frequency to achieve competency. This gives some DSAT justification to the longer length of training course. However, the elements of the JE courses that are indirectly linked to the Ph1 Trained Soldier OPS have never been formally endorsed as ‘directed training’. These elements cannot be aligned to the requirement, until the true definition of the overall capability of the JE has been defined. Summary

18. Past evidence of requirement. The JE route into the Army was dismantled in the early 1990s. A reversal of this decision occurred after the 1996 Strategic Defence Review initiated the ‘Manning the Army Strategy’ to achieve an additional 3300 regular personnel. The re-opening of the school leaver recruiting source was a large part of the strategy and the AFC(H) PFI project was signed off in 1999. Regular directed scrutiny occurs regarding the ongoing need to recruit from the school leaver demographic. The repetitive and consistent answer is that recruitment of the 16 year old school leaver is necessary in order to fully man the Army. 19. Deduction. The Army must maintain junior Entry because of the wider opportunities and Governmentally compliant educational route it affords young people. In addition, it is a key asset for manning the A2020 liability against a potentially shrinking SE MTA. 20. Presentation. JE attracts ongoing external scrutiny. The political campaign groups ‘Child Soldiers International’ and ‘Forces Watch’ seek to end the military recruitment of U18s globally. The reports listed at the footnote29 are associated with JE business and have been published in the last 2 years. Recent media coverage30 depicted the positive educational achievements of the JE cohort.

25A Ph2 ’long’ course, is matched against the 22 week Ph1. A Ph2 ‘short’ course is matched against the 48 week Ph1. 26 Extract from Recommendation 2 of the Deepcut Review – “U17 should be trained in establishments exclusive to this age group”. 27 The requirement against which all Ph1 training (SE & JE) is planned. 28 Duration, Importance, Frequency. 29 Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, ‘Young age at enlistment is associated with greater war zone risks’. Dated Aug 13. Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, ‘One step forward: the case for ending recruitment of minors by the British Armed Forces’. Dated Apr 13. Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, ‘Mind the Gap: Education for minors in the British Armed forces’. Dated Jul 12. 30 The Guardian, Fri 21 Feb 14. ‘Why an Army education is hard not to admire’. Zoe Williams.

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(Original signed)

H A WATSON Brig CITG Annexes: A. Training Wastage Statistics. B. Previous Statistical Analysis. C. Comparison of ITG Planned Inflow Cohorts D. Illustration of MTA Future Population Trends.

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Annex A to ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09 Dated 13 May 14

TRAINING WASTAGE CALCULATIONS

2009/10 Ph1 Ph2 Pipeline

JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC

AAC 14.3% 38.5% 8.8% 0.0% 0.0% 9.6% 14.3% 38.5% 17.5%

AGC SPS 30.4% 26.7% 15.1% 12.5% 9.1% 1.7% 39.1% 33.3% 16.6%

AGC RMP 14.7% 7.2% 20.9%

CAMus 5.4% 2.9% 8.1%

HCAV 27.8% 9.6% 0.0% 4.5% 27.8% 13.7%

INF 52.5% 40.0% 35.9% 8.7% 17.2% 56.4% 49.9% 35.9%

Int Corps 4.5% 0.0% 4.5%

QARANC 6.1% 0.0% 6.1%

R SIGS 14.3% 27.6% 15.2% 5.6% 7.0% 8.2% 19.0% 32.5% 22.1%

RA 29.0% 31.5% 18.3% 16.4% 8.3% 6.0% 39.8% 37.0% 23.2%

RAC 5.1% 31.8% 23.7% 16.2% 6.9% 8.9% 20.5% 36.4% 30.4%

RADC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

RAMC 30.3% 13.5% 4.3% 8.5% 33.3% 20.9%

RAVC 26.9% 0.0% 26.9%

RE 23.0% 22.6% 16.2% 6.0% 9.0% 12.5% 27.6% 29.6% 26.6%

REME 21.6% 25.4% 17.0% 20.0% 12.3% 15.0% 37.3% 34.2% 29.3%

RLC 21.5% 19.0% 21.8% 20.3% 11.8% 11.7% 37.4% 28.6% 30.9%

Total 30.3% 32.4% 17.9% 35.9% 13.5% 11.5% 9.9% 0.0% 39.5% 39.9% 26.0% 35.9%

2010/11 Ph1 Ph2 Pipeline

JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC

AAC 2.4% 5.1% 7.3%

AGC SPS 0.0% 11.7% 8.3% 7.5% 8.3% 18.2%

AGC RMP 19.0% 3.9% 22.2%

CAMus 3.6% 0.0% 3.6%

HCAV 25.0% 17.2% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 17.2%

INF 38.7% 35.4% 16.8% 48.8% 35.4%

Int Corps 5.0% 1.6% 6.5%

QARANC 5.3% 0.0% 5.3%

R SIGS 11.3% 0.0% 12.4% 3.2% 22.2% 4.6% 14.2% 22.2% 16.5%

RA 20.7% 14.6% 4.3% 4.1% 24.0% 18.1%

RAC 25.2% 29.4% 14.1% 5.4% 35.7% 33.2%

RADC 5.9% 0.0% 5.9%

RAMC 8.3% 12.2% 9.1% 2.7% 16.7% 14.6%

RAVC 9.4% 0.0% 9.4%

RE 10.0% 20.4% 7.9% 7.2% 17.1% 26.1%

REME 8.2% 15.6% 11.9% 7.7% 19.2% 22.0%

RLC 13.5% 22.1% 17.9% 12.4% 8.8% 7.0% 24.2% 28.8% 23.6%

Total 10.8% 32.5% 15.9% 35.4% 8.9% 13.1% 5.3% 0.0% 18.8% 41.1% 20.3% 35.4%

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2011/12 Ph1 Ph2 Pipeline

JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC

AAC 14.3% 7.7% 0.0% 3.4% 14.3% 10.8%

AGC SPS 31.0% 14.3% 5.3% 1.5% 34.5% 15.5%

AGC RMP 15.4% 4.7% 19.4%

CAMus 5.3% 0.0% 5.3%

HCAV 28.6% 19.8% 5.0% 8.0% 32.1% 26.0%

INF 30.7% 36.0% 14.2% 40.4% 36.0%

Int Corps 8.3% 1.1% 9.4%

QARANC 12.5% 0.0% 12.5%

R SIGS 13.6% 13.4% 2.2% 2.5% 15.5% 15.6%

RA 28.3% 18.3% 5.8% 3.7% 32.4% 21.3%

RAC 31.4% 29.2% 14.9% 7.2% 41.6% 34.3%

RADC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

RAMC #DIV/0! 13.5% 18.8% 3.6% #DIV/0! 16.6%

RAVC 20.0% 6.3% 25.0%

RE 12.5% 18.3% 11.5% 2.6% 22.6% 20.3%

REME 11.4% 15.4% 11.7% 8.3% 21.6% 22.4%

RLC 18.6% 29.1% 14.8% 10.4% 4.6% 27.1% 36.4% 18.8%

Total 14.9% 30.2% 16.4% 36.0% 9.8% 13.5% 4.4% 0.0% 23.4% 38.8% 20.1% 36.0%

2012/13 Ph1 Ph2 Pipeline

JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC JE(S) JE(L) SE CIC

AAC 4.5% 11.9% 0.0% 1.7% 4.5% 13.4%

AGC SPS 0.0% 13.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 14.4%

AGC RMP 14.8% 4.6% 18.7%

CAMus 6.7% 0.0% 6.7%

HCAV 30.0% 21.8% 11.1% 4.4% 35.0% 25.3%

INF 24.2% 27.8% 3.9% 26.1% 27.8%

Int Corps 8.7% 0.0% 8.7%

QARANC 12.8% 0.0% 12.8%

R SIGS 6.6% 13.8% 1.8% 0.5% 8.2% 14.2%

RA 22.1% 18.0% 2.8% 2.7% 23.5% 20.2%

RAC 17.6% 23.1% 3.7% 3.6% 19.6% 25.9%

RADC 33.3% 0.0% 33.3%

RAMC 14.3% 15.0% 3.4% 2.7% 17.1% 17.3%

RAVC 7.1% 5.1% 11.9%

RE 11.2% 12.5% 8.4% 2.3% 18.7% 14.6%

REME 9.5% 9.6% 5.9% 2.0% 14.8% 11.4%

RLC 12.7% 19.7% 17.5% 4.0% 6.5% 4.0% 16.2% 23.0% 20.8%

Total 9.7% 22.9% 15.3% 27.8% 4.6% 4.0% 2.6% 13.8% 24.9% 17.5% 27.8%

Overall Wastage Summary

JE(S) JE(L) SE JE(S) JE(L) SE JE(S) JE(L) SE

Wastage Phase 1 Wastage Phase 2 Wastage Pipeline

2009/10 30.3% 32.4% 17.9% 13.5% 11.5% 9.9% 39.5% 39.9% 26.0%

2010/11 10.8% 32.5% 15.9% 8.9% 13.1% 5.3% 18.8% 41.1% 20.3%

2011/12 14.9% 30.2% 16.4% 9.8% 13.5% 4.4% 23.4% 38.8% 20.1%

2012/13 9.7% 22.9% 15.3% 4.6% 4.0% 2.6% 13.8% 24.9% 17.5%

Average 16.4% 29.5% 16.3% 9.2% 10.5% 5.5% 23.7% 36.1% 21%

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Annex B to ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09 Dated 13 May 14

PREVIOUS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS31

Entry Type

Intake Cohort Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6

Total 19,820 78.9% 63.4% 56.8% 52.1% 44.2% 35.9%

AFC(H) 4,250 86.1% 70.6% 61.4% 56.2% 51.6% 44.0%

JE other (eg ATR Bassingbourn) 2,030 75.7% 58.9% 50.0% 45.6% 41.4% 34.4%

SE 13,540 77.1% 61.8% 56.3% 51.7% 42.3% 33.6%

Table 1. Numbers still on Regular Army strength at each 1 Jan point after entry.

(All soldier intakes from July 2001 to September 2004)

Entry Type

All AFC(H) JE Other SE

2001 Initial Intake

All

Pte

LCpl

Cpl

Sgt

3,400 100.0%

840 24.6%

230 6.8%

340 10.0%

260 7.7%

~ ~

850 100.0%

240 28.3%

40 5.3%

110 12.7%

90 10.3%

- -

400 100.0%

100 25.4%

40 8.8%

50 11.6%

20 5.0%

- -

2,160 100.0%

490 23.0%

150 7.0%

190 8.7%

150 7.1%

~ ~

2002 Initial Intake

All

Pte

LCpl

Cpl

Sgt

6,320 100.0%

1,650 26.2%

540 8.6%

700 11.2%

390 6.2%

10 0.1%

~ ~

1,320 100.0%

380 28.6%

120 9.3%

170 12.9%

80 6.4%

- -

- -

550 100.0%

120 21.6%

50 9.6%

50 9.1%

20 2.9%

- -

- -

4,451 100.0%

1,160 26.0%

370 8.3%

480 10.9%

290 6.6%

10 0.2%

~ ~

2003 Initial Intake

All

Pte

LCpl

Cpl

Sgt

Lt

6,460 100.0%

1,950 30.1%

860 13.4%

800 12.4%

280 4.3%

~ ~

~ ~

1,161 100.0%

370 32.2%

160 13.7%

170 14.6%

40 3.8%

- -

~ ~

660 100.0%

170 26.2%

100 14.4%

60 9.5%

20 2.3%

- -

- -

4,640 100.0%

1,400 30.2%

610 13.1%

570 12.3%

220 4.7%

~ ~

~ ~

2004 Initial Intake

All

Pte

LCpl

Cpl

Sgt

Lt

Capt

Lt

3,650 100.0%

1,340 36.7%

720 19.7%

530 14.5%

90 2.5%

~ ~

~ ~

~ ~

920 100.0%

400 43.7%

210 22.8%

180 19.4%

10 1.5%

- -

- -

- -

430 100.0%

150 34.7%

90 22.0%

40 10.5%

10 2.1%

- -

- -

- -

2,300 100.0%

790 34.3%

410 18.0%

300 13.3%

70 3.0%

~ ~

~ ~

~ ~

Table 2. Numbers still on Regular strength in January 2010 by Substantive Rank achieved

31 Findings from DASA\G:\Scoping projects\JE SE Project\Workings\ JE v SE Report

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

B-2

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

Entry Type

Numbers required

Recruiting Costs

Ph 1 Training Cost32

Average LoS

(years)

Through career

cost per head pa ((c+d)/e)

Cost distribution across the

LoS (bxf)

Total

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

AFC Long 800

£10k

£67k 8.2 £9.4K £7.5M £10M

AFC Short 590 £38k 11.4 £4.2K £2.5M

Or SE at AFC(H) SE (Long

Capbadge equiv) 1032 £28.6k 5.4 £7.1K £7.3M

£11.1M SE (Short

Capbadge equiv) 807 £28.6k 8.1 £4.7K £3.8M

Table 3. Investment per year of Service33Recruitment and Initial Training Cost investment shown against

LoS

32 These are ‘full costs’ and include expenses borne directly borne by ARTD (ammunition, T&S etc), plus manpower costs for all permanent staff, the Initial Trainees Budget (salary paid to a trainee) and infrastructure costs from DIO. The figures have been calculated using the numbers forecast for TY 15/16 RAP and an assumed 85% FTPR. 33 Statistics taken from TESRR submission: POLICY OF RECRUITING UNDER-18s dated 14 May 13. D/TESR/01.02.04.

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

C-1

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

Annex C to ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09 Dated 14 May 14

COMPARISON OF INITIAL TRAINING GROUP34 PLANNED INFLOW COHORTS

RAP Year SE Total JE Total ITG Total Actual inflow SE total

(Inc SCHINF35)

07/08 7480 (71%) 3050 (29%) 10530 -

08/09 4891 (65%) 2634 (35%) 7525 -

09/10 6846 (75%) 2304 (25%) 9150 9870

10/11 5048 (70%) 2193 (30%) 7241 5880

11/12 6688 (72%) 2624 (28%) 9312 8050

12/13 5576 (76%) 1788 (24%) 7364 7880

13/14 5017 (77%) 1440 (23%) 6457 -

14/15 5320 (75%) 1824 (25%) 7144 -

18/19 5582 (78%) 1536 (22%) 7118 -

Table 1. Past and projected overall cohort distribution.

RAP LOADING

% of Target

achieved RAP Loaded Unfilled

09/10 JE (S) 92.9% 768 714 54

JE (L) 98.5% 1,340 1,320 20

10/11 JE (S) 96.8% 626 606 20

JE (L) 99.0% 1,229 1,217 12

11/12 JE (S) 98.4% 850 837 13

JE (L) 100% 1,344 1,344 -

12/13 JE (S) 97.2% 659 641 18

JE (L) 100% 868 868 -

Table 2. JE RAP figures and achievement (2009 – 2013).

34 Initial Training Group is responsible for all Phase 1 Soldier training (Regular and Reserve), less Standard Entry Infantry. 35 Total figures (inc SCHINF) Figures provided by Def Strat Stat.

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

D-1 OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

ILLUSTRATION OF MTA FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS

2012 2015 2020 2025

Age

18 802,033 784,556 700,585 796,869

19 814,027 792,461 730,734 792,651

20 848,818 803,773 763,150 776,767

21 875,604 840,828 799,684 777,667

22 867,263 856,373 825,795 773,393

23 864,675 893,619 862,442 779,406

24 875,872 921,712 874,075 813,506

25 858,052 908,626 883,164 843,930

26 867,964 897,232 914,448 874,925

27 873,210 900,250 920,966 892,086

28 854,443 877,610 947,707 918,228

Sub Total

9,401,961 9,477,040 9,222,750 9,039,42836

29 864,176 885,582 965,976 920,088

30 865,702 888,093 945,424 921,591

31 874,149 865,857 928,537 947,113

32 875,653 872,281 926,340 948,216

33 840,123 871,612 898,849 969,754

34 784,281 878,930 902,223 983,170

35 772,418 878,862 900,818 958,609

Total MTA

15,278,463 15,618,257 15,690,917 15,687,96937

NOTE: Data received from Office for National Statistics, via Def Strat Stat. ‘2012 Based National Population Projections by single year of age and sex’.

36 4% decrease in 18 – 25years MTA from 2012 figures. 37 2.5% increase in total available MTA from 2012 figures.

Annex D to ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09 Dated 14 May 14

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

MTA Age DistributionM

TA

Po

pu

lati

on

2012

2015

2020

2025