Aftermath

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

AftermathAuthor(s): Robert AndersonSource: Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 182-184Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147852 .

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AFTERMATH

"Behind The Vietnam Cease-Fire Agree- ment," by Tad Szulc, appeared in FOR- EIGN POLICY 15 and was reprinted in its entirety or in part by the Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, London Sunday Times, L'Express, Asia Magazine, Sekai Shuho, and several other leading news- papers around the world. On June 3, 1974, the following discussion took place during the daily press briefing between Robert An- derson, the official State Department spokes- man, and journalists.

Q: Bob, over the weekend, there was an interesting account of secret negotiations on bringing the war in Vietnam to an end. May we request that these documents be made public?

A: 'Well, Spencer, let me get into this a little bit, if you want, on Tad Szulc's article. On the question of secret commitments, that we didn't make any secret commitments. And all of our legal obligations are set forth in the published Agreement and its protocols. And during the negotiations which involved many, many hours, hundreds of hours of meetings, each side made statements of its intentions.

Q: Made what kind of statements? A: Made statements of its intentions, each

side. Now, as the Secretary said, I believe it was on January 24 in a press conference, he said that there were no secret understandings in the sense of secret commitments, but there were statements-

Q: What was the date on that? A: January 24, 1973. There were no se-

cret understandings in the sense of secret commitments, but there were statements by each side of its intentions or interpretation of the Agreement on which the other side might-

Q: Can you go a little slower please? A: Yes. There were statements by each

side of its intentions or interpretation of the Agreement on which the other side might or might not choose to reply.

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State Department

Now with regard to the secret understandings, let me make this one comment. None ... none of them involved added obligations on the part of the United States. And some of them interpreted formal agreements or put those formal agreements into a specific time frame.

.*. Most of them . . . let me just volunteer this-that they were oral and a few of them were reduced to writing merely to insure that they were clearly understood by both sides.

Now, those that were reduced to writing, none of them were initialed or signed.

... We just don't think any useful pur- pose would be served and would raise the question in the minds of those who negotiate with the United States in the future, wheth- er their confidential statements of intention would be kept confidential.

Q: Bob, what about the interpretation, or the legal interpretation, that George Aldrich apparently wrote for the Department itself? Why couldn't it be made public now, after Szulc's quote from it?

A: . . . I am not going to comment on the accuracy of leaks of classified information. And on that, in direct answer to your question, we don't believe it would be in the public interest either to confirm or deny the accuracy of Szulc's quotations.

Q: . . . Can't you get us anything ... a little more specific on this thing?

There are a number of questions in that document and in that story. When, if ever, was Thieu told that the United States never envisaged the withdrawal of all North Viet- namese forces, and things like that? If he wasn't told, how was it in the public interest? . . . Can you have another shot at this upstairs and see if they won't be a little more precise?

A: Well, let me say this on the article in general. Some of the facts in the article are true. Some are distorted. Some are not true. And I am not going to get into any of the discussion of the detailed points. I'll . . . go back upstairs ....

Q: I think it would be helpful if you

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could make another try, because if you are saying that some of that article is distorted and some of it is inaccurate, that is a strong charge to make against an article that appears to be so well documented. So you might make another try at that. And if you could, tell us what you think is inaccurate.

A: Uh-hum.

Letters

To the Editors: Tad Szulc's article on the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement in the Sum- mer issue of FOREIGN POLICY is a valu- able contribution to our understanding of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy in Vietnam which offers a wealth of new and important data. Understandably, press reports have fo- cused on revelations in the article which are

embarrassing to the Administration. For ex- ample, Kissinger's claim in his January 24, 1973 briefing that there were "no secret understandings" is contradicted flatly by the official State Department document quoted at length by Szulc. Sources close to Kissinger make it clear that there is great consterna- tion at Szulc's revelations, none of which has been denied.

The most important point in Szulc's account, however, is one which deserves greater emphasis and elaboration. The differences between the October 1972 and January 1973 briefings that there were "no secret un- to raise the question of why the Nixon Ad- ministration carried out saturation bomb- ing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in Decem- ber 1972. This question is crucial to an un-

derstanding of the political dynamics which produced the Agreement and which help to explain why it did not bring peace. Several key points are worth recalling in answer to this question, based on Szulc's account and the published record.

1. The concessions which Kissinger was

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Documents

Aftermath