Africa Report, Nr. 39: God, Oil and Country - Changing the ...s e ri o u s l y would include the U. S . , i n d i s p e n s a bly, and key Europeans i d e a l l y the UK re p r esenting

GOD, OIL AND

C O U N T RYChanging the Logic of War in Sudan

GOD, OIL AND

C O U N T RYChanging the Logic of War in Sudan

International Crisis Group Press, Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

PART I. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. CONFLICT WITHOUT END? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3B. Sudan Before 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7C. The 1989 Bashir Coup and its Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14D. Current Battle Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21E. 11 September and Beyond:A Window of Opportunity for Peace? . . . . . . . . . . 24

2. UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33A. Within Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33B. With Friends Like These:The Regional Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53C. Other Key International Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

3. THE TERRORIST CONNECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71A. Terrorism and the National Islamic Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71B. The Impact of 11 September on the Terrorism Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

PART II. THE CIVIL WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4. CAUSES OF THE WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93A. Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93B. Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99C. Governance and Self-Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115

A. Conduct of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115B. Forced Displacement and Slave Raiding in Bahr al-Ghazal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

C. Scorched Earth in the Upper Nile Oilfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132D. Population Clearing in the Nuba Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144E. Use of Food as a Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

PART III. CONSTRUCTING PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

6. THE TRAFFIC JAM OF PEACE INITIATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153A. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process . . . 155B. The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160C. The Eritrean Gambit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165D. Nigeria’s Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166E. The European Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168F. U.S. Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169

7. CONSTRUCTING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177A. Shaping a Viable Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177

Conclusions and Recommendations on the Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196B. Laying the Groundwork for Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Conclusions and Recommendations on Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202C. Countering Human Rights Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Conclusions and Recommendations on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214D. Peace,Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Conclusions and Recommendations on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

8. CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE LOGIC OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

APPENDICES

A. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223B. ABOUT ICG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225C. ICG REPORTS SINCE JANUARY 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227D. ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235

MAPS

MAP 1.SUDAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2MAP 2.SUDAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32MAP 3.RECENT BATTLES AND KEY INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99MAP 4.SUDAN’S ETHNIC GEOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237

VI INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

FOREWORD

The International Crisis Group (ICG) works to prevent and contain deadlyconflict through a unique combination of field-based analysis, policyprescription and high-level advocacy. Few countries are more deserving ofsuch attention than Sudan, where the scale of human suffering has beenmind numbing, and where the ongoing civil war continues to severelydisrupt regional stability and desperately inhibit development.ICG launcheda Sudan project in 2001 because we felt the country was at a crossroads,andthat now was the time when concentrated attention by the internationalcommunity could make a decisive dif ference.

As this report shows,a small window for peace has opened.The reasons forthis include the shock effect of the 11 September terror attacks in theUnited States (U.S.) and their aftermath on policy debates within theKhartoum government;the military calculations of the government and itsmain opposition, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency; adifficult economic situation; and the increasing desire of the Khartoumauthorities to escape international isolation and enjoy their new oil wealth.Importantly also, the U.S. government, by appointing distinguished formerSenator John Danforth as Special Envoy, is showing some willingness tobecome more engaged.

P ro gre s s , n o n e t h e l e s s , will not be easy. This re p o rt makes clear that theSudan situation is far more complex than norm a l ly port rayed in them e d i a , or by advocates of particular causes. It is a stru g g l e , to be sure ,b e t ween a nort h e rn gove rnment that is large ly A rab and Muslim and as o u t h e rn insurgency that is large ly bl a ck and signifi c a n t ly Chri s t i a n , but itis also incre a s i n g ly a contest between a non-democratic centre andh i t h e rto peri p h e ral groups from all parts of the country. It is a contestover oil and other natural re s o u rc e s , but also one about ideologi e s ,i n cluding the degree to which a gove rnment's radical Islamist agenda canbe moderated and a rebel movement's authori t a rianism can embra c ecivilian democra c y.

The Sudanese gove rnment faces stark ch o i c e s , b rought into sharp re l i e fsince 11 September. It can build on the pro gress that has been made onc o u n t e r - t e rro rism and commit itself to negotiate peace seri o u s ly.Or it can

VII

t ry to pocket the go o dwill it has gained and intensify the war whileremaining shackled to the ideology that was the inspiration of its 1989c o u p .

The Sudanese opposition faces difficult choices and ch a l l e n ges of itsow n . The SPLA can remain a re l a t i ve ly limited rebel gro u p , with are s t ricted ge o graphic base and a low - risk minimalist part n e rship with itsallies in the National Democratic A l l i a n c e ,i n cluding a number of nort h e rnpolitical part i e s . Or it can deepen its commitment to a hearts and mindscampaign in the south and its cooperation with National Democra t i cAlliance part n e rs around a cre d i ble peace age n d a .

Among the main conclusions we re a ch , and recommendations wea d va n c e ,a re these:

❏ a compre h e n s i ve peace may be possible but only if the intern a t i o n a lc o m munity for the fi rst time makes its ach i evement a signifi c a n to b j e c t i ve , and commits the necessary political and diplomaticre s o u rc e s ;

❏ t h e re will be no success if the parties can continue to play onei n i t i a t i ve off against another, w h i ch means the major existing effo rts -the Egy p t i a n - L i byan Joint Initiative , and that led by Ke nya in the Inter-G ove rnmental Au t h o rity on Development (IGAD) - must either beu n i fied or a single new peace process cre a t e d ;

❏ a unified peace process should be built around the vital element ofIGAD's Decl a ration of Pri n c i p l e s , n a m e ly self-determ i n a t i o n ,recognising all the room this leaves for cre a t i ve negotiation onc o n t ex t , detail and timing;

❏ a unified peace process needs to be energised from outside: the ideal teamto coordinate both incentives and pre s s u res for the parties to nego t i a t es e ri o u s ly would include the U. S . , i n d i s p e n s ably, and key Europeans —i d e a l ly the UK re p resenting the European Union (EU) joined by Norway —with a meaningful degree of buy-in from key neighbours and otherc o n c e rned states such as China, M a l aysia and Canada;

❏ c o n c e rned members of the international community should purs u ev i go ro u s ly and concurre n t ly four major interests in Sudan: stopping thewa r, l aying the gro u n d - wo rk for democra c y, p rotecting human ri g h t sand winning cooperation in the fight against terro ri s m ;a n d ,

VIII INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

❏ the top pri o rity should be a compre h e n s i ve peace, grounded in there s t o ration of democra c y, w h i ch is the circumstance most like ly tob ring both fundamental human rights improvements and guara n t e e sagainst backsliding on terro ri s m .

ICG developed this re p o rt , as alway s , t h rough ex t e n s i ve fi e l dwo rk .T h ep ri m a ry author,A f rica Pro gram Co-Director John Pre n d e rg a s t , made thre et rips between June and November 2001 and conducted many scores ofi n t e rv i ews in Sudan - both Khartoum and wa r - t o rn areas of the south - aswell as in Egy p t , E ri t re a , E t h i o p i a , Ke nya , E u rope and North A m e ri c a .M a ny others on the ICG team helped with writing and pro d u c t i o n ,i n cluding Mirna Galic, R e gina Dubey, Philip Roessler, and Macgre go rD u n c a n . ICG Senior Adviser John Norris played a major role in the editingp ro c e s s ,s u p p o rted by ICG Vice President (Pro grams) Jon Gre e n wald and,at the production stage , by Research A n a lyst T h e o d o ra Adekunle andFrancesca Lawe Dav i e s . I thank them all for inva l u able contri b u t i o n s .

This book-length re p o rt is not the ICG's last wo rd on Sudan. It will befo l l owed by a series of furt h e r, s h o rt e r, field-based re p o rts as we staye n g aged with future deve l o p m e n t s . We hope ve ry mu ch that an end toSudan's ago ny is near, and that this re p o rt will help the intern a t i o n a lpolicy community to accelerate that pro c e s s .

G a reth Eva n sP re s i d e n t

B ru s s e l s , 10 Ja nu a ry 2002

FOREWORD IX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The State of the War

Sudan's long civil war rages on, claiming a terri ble toll of death andd i s p l a c e m e n t .While the decades of destruction are too complex to tra c eb a ck to a single sourc e ,s eve ral fo rces propel the wa r, p ri n c i p a l ly disputesover re l i gi o n , re s o u rc e s , gove rnance and self-determ i n a t i o n .C o n c e n t ration of power in a small group of competing elites that has notgranted the majority of Sudanese broader economic and political ri g h t shas only deepened the country's considerable ge o gra p h i c , re l i gi o u sc u l t u ral and ethnic divisions.

The main wa rring parties - the Islamist gove rnment and the oppositionSudan People's Liberation A rmy (SPLA) - show little interest in a seri o u speace pro c e s s , and the international community has shown little intere s tin constructing one until re c e n t ly. None of the dominant national andre gional actors have believed they would reap short - t e rm gains fro mp e a c e . Recent events and trends have created new opport u n i t i e s ,h oweve r, to pursue the creation of such a serious peace pro c e s s .

The stereotype of an A rab Muslim north battling an A f rican Chri s t i a nsouth is an anach ro n i s m . O ver the last decade, the war has evo l ved fro ma large ly north-south conflict into a contest for power that invo l ve sgroups from across the nation. Since the coup that brought Genera lBashir and the National Islamic Front to power in 1989, political andm i l i t a ry organisations from Sudan's nort h , east and west have joineds o u t h e rn groups in armed and unarmed opposition to the gove rn m e n t .

Sudan's civil war has been prosecuted with stark bru t a l i t y, p ri n c i p a l ly bygove rnment fo rc e s . The gove rnment has unleashed indiscriminate aeri a la t t a ck s , used famine as a weapon of wa r, fo rc i bly displaced civilians ands u p p o rted para m i l i t a ry fo rces engaging in the slave tra d e .The SPLA andits allied militias have indiscri m i n a t e ly attacked civilian populations,d i ve rted relief supplies and fo rc i bly re c ruited soldiers ,i n cluding ch i l d re n .D i re c t ,l a rge-scale combat is not the norm .M o re often, gove rnment fo rc e sa t t a ck civilian targets as part of an effo rt to we a ken support for the

XI

i n s u rge n t s , and the SPLA relies on guerrilla tactics against governmentsupply lines or, increasingly, oil infrastructure.

Successive Sudanese governments have deployed the classic counter-insurgency tactic of attempting to "drain the water to catch the fish" byputting military pre s s u re on the SPLA's civilian base of support .Unfortunately, instead of a hearts and minds strategy, repeated raids haveburned villages,stolen cattle and enslaved Dinka civilians that constitute thepredominant ethnic group within the SPLA. The systematic strategy ofsupporting militias to attack the civilian bases of SPLA support has resultedin the partial depopulation of northern Bahr al-Ghazal and the resumptionof institutionalised slavery. This strategy to dislodge the SPLA appears tohave backfired, however. The SPLA has held its ground and is increasingattacks on the oilfields,and popular sentiment in the south is radicalising infavour of a war for independence.

The government has pursued a divide and conquer strategy throughintensive efforts to sow conflict among southerners. These have beenp e ri o d i c a l ly effe c t i ve : war and subsequent famine during the 1990sweakened southern resistance, divided the SPLA, led to the emergence oflocal warlords,split the south along ethnic lines and destroyed much of theregion's assets.The strategy established the foundation for resumption ofoilfield exploration and, finally in 1999,development.

During the last several years, there have been increasingly active efforts topromote reconciliation among communities in the south.This bottom-upp ro c e s s , k n own as the Pe o p l e - t o - People Peace Initiative , is the mostpromising vehicle for promoting southern unity and ending the bitter legacyof division.It has also indirectly put the government under greater militarypressure in the oilfields.

The SPLA and southern Sudanese generally are increasingly committed tousing a potential referendum on self-determination as a vehicle either forsouthern independence or as a means to pressure the government intomaking significant concessions in the context of a unified state at thenegotiating table. Stepped-up military activity in the oilfields is the SPLA'sprincipal point of leverage. Politically, the SPLA is the major player in theNational Democratic Alliance,a broad coalition of more than a dozen groupsfrom both north and south opposed to the government.

Another key member of the National Democratic Alliance is the DemocraticUnionist Party, a northern opposition group with close ties to Egypt whose

XII INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

leader, Muhammad Osman Mirghani, holds the symbolically importantposition of National Democratic Alliance chairman.The party has withstoodpressure from Khartoum and Egypt to leave the Alliance.

Sudan's neighbours - particularly Egypt,Libya,Ethiopia,Uganda,Eritrea andKenya - have too often been willing to stoke the conflict. Deep distrust,disputes over oil,water and land,and long running concerns about religion,secessionism and military adve n t u rism create an env i ronment ofantagonism.Regional divisions have blocked any serious peace process andled to two counter-productive initiatives,the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiativeand the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) process.

An activist U.S. Congress and some officials in the Clinton and Bushadministrations have pressed to further isolate Sudan by proposing capitalmarket sanctions against foreign companies doing business in the countryand providing non-lethal aid to the National Democratic Alliance. Growinggrassroots support in the U.S. is largely driven by portrayals of Sudan'sgovernment as waging a brutal anti-Christian campaign,including throughthe taking of slaves.However, the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorattacks creates a new dynamic in the bilateral relationship betweenWashington and Khartoum.It is an open question as to whether the leveragethe U.S.has developed over the years,combined with the increased bilateralc o o p e ration on counter-terro ri s m , will translate into serious U. S .engagement in a peace process in Sudan.

The European Union (EU) pursues a policy of "constructive engagement"with Khartoum. A number of its member states invest in the oil industry. In1999,the EU launched a "Critical Dialogue" aimed at influencing the regimeon human rights,humanitarian aid,political liberalisation,terrorism and thepeace process. However, Sudanese opposition and civil society groups aredeeply sceptical about the intent and effectiveness of the Critical Dialogue.The EU and the U.S.will need to resolve some of their differences if they areto work together to help create an effective peace process.

This report argues that a unique window of opportunity for peace is slightlyajar, and a new international peace effort, with close regional involvementor partnership, must be created to pry this window open. Peace is possiblein Sudan, but only with a major international investment in diplomacy,incentives,and pressures. And although there must be a continuing parallelfocus on human rights and counter-terrorism issues, the best means toensure an end to the worst human rights abuses and the potential forterrorist cooperation is a comprehensive peace agreement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XIII

Toward Peace

There has never been a multilateral,high-level,sustained international effortto build a viable peace process for Sudan.President Bush's appointment inSeptember 2001 of former Senator John Danforth as U.S.special envoy maypresage such an effort,but much remains to be done.

A number of internal and external factors are converging to create amoment that is ripe for resolving the conflict in Sudan.These include theregime's desire to end its international isolation once and for all so that itcan enjoy its new oil wealth and become the regional power it believes itcan be;the effective battlefield performance of the insurgents over the pastyear that has sobered Khartoum's assessment of its capacity to convert oilrevenues easily into decisive military victory; growing interest in Sudan forboth oil and human rights reasons in many Western countries;and,above all,the change in the international landscape created by the terror attacks of 11September 2001 in the U.S.and their aftermath.

Existing peace initiatives, including the IGAD process, the Egyptian-LibyanJoint Initiative, distinct efforts by Nigeria and Eritrea, and supplementaryefforts by the U.S. and Europe, reflect competing priorities.They have notbeen coordinated and undermine one another. None involve continuousnegotiations. The warring parties simply do not believe that any has achance of success.

IGAD, the longest running,is chaired by Kenya,with involvement of Uganda,Ethiopia and Eri t re a . In 1994 it produced the Decl a ration of Pri n c i p l e s ,s eve nb rief propositions that have fo rmed the basis of subsequent nego t i a t i o n s .T h eye nvision a peace agreement stru c t u red around a democratic and secularSudan and call for the sharing of national wealth and re s o u rc e s . Failing that,t h ey support negotiations over modalities of a self-determination re fe re n d u mfor the south.The gove rnment has since back-pedalled from the Decl a ra t i o nof Principles as the basis for nego t i a t i o n .

European and North American countries belong to the IGAD PartnersForum,which is divided about how best to exert pressure.IGAD itself hasnot worked seriously with the Partners Forum, which is too large andpoorly led to wield any influence over the process or the parties.

The U.S.has also made unilateral efforts, including a failed attempt to hostan IGAD session in Washington in late 2000. In addition, the U.S. haspromised to help the National Democratic Alliance build negotiating

XIV INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

c a p ab i l i t y. The Danfo rth appointment re p resents the highest-leve lcommitment to supporting peace in Sudan that any administration inWashington has made.

The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative was launched in, 1999, largely toundercut support for the IGAD Declaration of Principles emphasis on self-determination.Its minimum objective is to draw northern parties back intogovernment as a moderating influence on the National Islamic Front.TheSPLA will not support this initiative without major changes.

Sudanese are nearly unanimous in arguing that the most valuable immediatecontribution the international community could make would be to addressthe schism between the competing peace initiatives. The most intenseopposition has in the past been from Kenya and Egypt,although U.S.envoyDanforth has made some progress in this regard.There is total unanimityaround the need to construct a unified peace process backed by seriousinternational leverage.

A unified forum will need at a minimum a new joint secretariat, expertm e d i a t o rs and sufficient re s o u rces to convene fa c e - t o - face talks. T h emediation team should include a clearly identified lead negotiator ofsufficient gravitas and authority to report directly to relevant heads of state.Given the concerns of countries like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa,China and Malaysia, as well as the institutional mandate of groups like theArab League and the Organisation of African Unity, some form of observerstatus should be considered. Widening the external stakeholders should beaccompanied by a widening of Sudanese participation in the process,principally to include the National Democratic Alliance and the Umma Party.

Any peace agreement should include external guarantees, likely a robustinternational peacekeeping or observer force and pre-defined sanctions thatthe international community would apply if the agreement were violated.Anagreement should also include a transparent wealth sharing mechanism thatwould allow both sides to fund their own development and governanceefforts.

The expansion of oil development has complicated the search for peace,raised the stakes of the war and given both sides an increased commitmentto the battlefield.Any equitable peace deal will require oil revenue sharing.The government enjoys a rapidly increasing defence budget since 1999 andimproving relations with countries eager to develop lucrative oil contracts.Despite strong rhetorical support for religious fundamentalism,maintaining

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XV

the unity of the country and keeping control of the oilfields is now itsp redominant objective . The SPLA considers it must disrupt the gove rn m e n t ' sc o n t rol of oil by mounting substantial attacks on the oil fields or face defe a t .

China and Malaysia are the most assert i ve fo reign inve s t o rs ,c o m p rising over 60per cent of the consortium developing the oil industry. Sudan is a grow i n gm a rket for Chinese arms and other industrial goods as we l l . Sudan needs thei n t e rnational cre d i t ,a rm s , and oil market that China prov i d e s , as well as politicalc over in the UN Security Council. It needs bri d ge loans from Malaysia fo rI n t e rnational Monetary Fund (IMF) pro gram debt servicing re q u i re m e n t s .T h ei n fluence exe rcised by both China and Malaysia means that a signifi c a n tcommitment by them to the peace process would be ex t re m e ly helpful, and intheir own best long-term stra t e gic intere s t s .

G i ven the stand-off between the re gional peace initiative s , an ex t ra - re gi o n a li n i t i a t i ve with intensive re gional part i c i p a t i o n , or a part n e rship between ex t ra -re gional actors and IGAD, is the option for moving fo r wa rd that holds thegreatest pro m i s e . The wa rring parties are urging that the U. S . consider such aro l e . G i ven the window of opportunity that has opened for peace in Sudan,P resident Bush must consider seri o u s ly the necessity of a more direct role inp e a c e m a k i n g , in close coordination with re gional actors .

The broad stro kes of a peace deal could potentially include the fo l l ow i n gfundamental compro m i s e s :

❏ a fe d e ral constitution neither based on re l i gion nor labelled secular,with eachre gional entity or state able to craft its own law s ;

❏ a s y m m e t rical fe d e ralism (with a higher degree of autonomy for the south)d u ring an interim peri o d , b a cked by cre d i ble international guara n t e e s , w i t hmu t u a l ly agreed bench m a rks that if not met would tri g ger a self-determ i n a t i o nre fe rendum for the south; a n d ,

❏ an intern a t i o n a l ly monitored mechanism for wealth sharing that ensures thatall sides benefit from implementation.

The elements needed in a fresh initiative are cl e a r, and will need to include ac o m p re h e n s i ve age n d a , re p resentation of all the key parties and leadership fro moutside the re gion with the serious invo l vement of the re gional nations.T h i se ffo rt will also need to be built around a set of principles on which nego t i a t i o n swould re ly, i n cluding all those elements outlined in the IGAD Decl a ration ofP ri n c i p l e s , in particular the right of self-determ i n a t i o n , but with some altera t i o n

XVI INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

of the appro a ch and sequencing to allow for a more rational negotiating effo rt .The international community will also need to develop a fo rum for constru c t i n gi n t e rnational incentives and pre s s u res in order to maximise mu l t i l a t e ral leve rage .

E ven if the U. S . u l t i m a t e ly chooses not to mediate between the part i e s , or isbl o cked from that role by Sudanese gove rnment bilateral concern s , it re m a i n sthe best positioned to lead, along with key Europeans (ideally the UKre p resenting the EU joined by Norway ) ,the development and implementation ofthe peace stra t e gy,with a meaningful degree of buy-in from key neighbours andother concerned states such as China, M a l aysia and Canada.

Without a major diplomatic effo rt to build mu l t i l a t e ral leve rage ,peace is unlike ly.Consensus is needed on a mu l t i l a t e ral pack age of incentives and pre s s u re s .T h i swill re q u i re intensive U.S.-EU talks - the outcome of which should be the U. S .becoming more fo rthcoming on incentives and the EU becoming tougher ina p p lying pre s s u re - fo l l owed by consultations to engage China,M a l aysia and keyA rab League and A f rican countries in a larger peace advocacy stra t e gy.

D o n o rs could construct a meaningful platter of incentive s , but deve l o p i n gs e rious pre s s u res will be mu ch more contentious. U. S . E nvoy Danfo rth mightd e l i ver a useful unilateral message that without pro gress towa rd peace the Busha d m i n i s t ration will soon no longer be able to withstand demands for capitalm a rket sanctions or U. S . assistance to the opposition. H oweve r, if Sudanc o n t i nues meaningful counter-terro rism coopera t i o n , some in the U. S .a d m i n i s t ration will advocate accommodating,not confro n t i n g ,K h a rt o u m .

Other pre s s u res that could be applied to the gove rnment include bl o ck i n gaccess to the IMF and the World Bank, e s p e c i a l ly for help in re d ressing a hugedebt ove r h a n g , and keeping it out of the World Trade Org a n i s a t i o n . A ny supportthat helps reduce divisions within the south and between communities on then o rth-south border will add pre s u re on the gove rnment to nego t i a t e ,whether itis support for commu n i t y - l evel peace talks, n e gotiations between southernfactions or the proposed Southern Sudan Peace and Unity Dividend Fund. M o rerobust diplomatic effo rts could also be aimed at reducing the virt u a l lyunimpeded fl ow of arms to the gove rn m e n t . N o n - m i l i t a ry assistance toopposition political party and civil society groups is also a useful leve r, i n cl u d i n gaid to strengthen the civil defence capacity of southern Sudanese village s .D i re c tm i l i t a ry assistance to the SPLA, h oweve r, would like ly be too small to affect them i l i t a ry balance and would be used by the gove rnment to solicit more moneyand weapons from the Islamic wo r l d . If the Danfo rth mission fa i l s ,h oweve r, a n dc o u n t e r - t e rro rism cooperation ceases, the Bush administration may no longe roppose arming the opposition.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XVII

The incentives that might help persuade Khartoum to embrace an agre e m e n tm o s t ly should be tri g ge red when a compre h e n s i ve peace agreement is re a ch e d .R e m oval of U. S . opposition to Pa ris Club fi n a n c i n g , IMF lending and Wo r l dBank credits for Sudan would pro b ably be the stro n gest and should await theb e ginning of implementation of a peace agre e m e n t . Other incentives incl u d elifting U. S .u n i l a t e ral sanctions and providing major re c o n s t ruction assistancet h roughout Sudan.

P re s s u re points on the opposition include reducing arms tra n s fe rs byp re s s u ring re gional suppliers .N e i g h b o u ring countries that support the SPLAand the National Democratic Alliance militari ly have considerable leve rage ,a sdo other A f rican countries providing arm s . At key juncture s , it will be cru c i a lfor the U. S . and re gional SPLA political allies to be willing to apply seri o u sdiplomatic pre s s u re on the movement to participate constru c t i ve ly. If theSPLA becomes the obstacle to a peace agre e m e n t , its treatment within theUN's Operation Lifeline Sudan fra m ewo rk should be dow n gra d e d , and anyinstitution-building support ended.

I n c e n t i ves for the opposition include promises of support for implementationof a peace agre e m e n t ,s u ch as creating a peacekeeping or observer fo rce andm o n i t o ring any wealth sharing prov i s i o n s . A bl u e p rint for the re c o n s t ru c t i o nof the south would be a major incentive for southern nego t i a t o rs .

Conclusions and Recommendations on the Peace Process

❏ A fresh peace initiative, stimulated and guided from outside the region, but alsoclosely involving Sudan's neighbours, is needed.

❏ The U.S. and key Europeans (ideally the UK representing the EU joined byNorway) should take the lead in the development and implementation of the peacestrategy, with a meaningful degree of buy-in from key neighbours and otherconcerned states such as China, Malaysia and Canada.

❏ The elements needed in a fresh initiative include: a comprehensive agenda;representation of all key parties; a set of principles including the essentials of theIGAD Declaration of Principles, in particular the right of self-determination, butallowing some flexibility in approach and sequencing to facilitate a more rationalnegotiation; and a forum for constructing international incentives and pressuresin order to maximise multilateral leverage.

❏ The international community has substantial leverage (both positive andnegative incentives relating to political support, economic and military

XVIII INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

assistance, and the conferral of legitimacy) that it can use with the parties toencourage movement toward a comprehensive, viable peace. Those who wish top a rticipate in a new eff o rt to achieve such a peace need to discuss urgently astrategy for exercising that leverage.

❏ Since most participants in an international strategy will be more willing to useincentives, the U.S. should be pre p a red to act unilaterally when addressing theSudanese government with the consequences of negative behaviour.

❏ I n t e rnational leverage should be applied solely in pursuit of a comprehensive peacea g reement, not used up for the achievement of lesser or incremental objectives.

❏ On a ceasefire, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace negotiations are a useful source of lessonsl e a rned. Rather than seek a ceasefire before any agreement or postpone that stepuntil everything is agreed, the international community could encourage aninitial agreement on separation of forces and cessation of hostilities that wouldinclude a security protocol with international guarantees and, possibly, definitionof an internationally guaranteed autonomous administration in opposition-c o n t rolled areas during a clearly limited interim period. Fundamental to such ap re l i m i n a ry bargain would be a serious deal over the sharing of oil re v e n u e s .A l t e rn a t i v e l y, time-specific cessation of hostilities could be tied directly to peacen e g o t i a t i o n s .

Building Democracy

It would be a grave mistake for the international community to overlook thei m p o rtance of a re s t o ration of democracy as a key element of anyc o m p re h e n s i ve peace agreement in Sudan,as well as any sustainable counter-t e rro rism policy. Peace will only be viable if democratic principles take ro o t .While mu ch international assistance will continue to focus on the mostp ressing humanitarian needs, s u p p o rt for democracy and pro - d e m o c ra c yelements could have an important impact over time.

The international community needs to understand not only that Sudand e s p e ra t e ly re q u i res a re i nv i go rated peace pro c e s s , but also that peace willo n ly be viable if democratic principles take ro o t . P ro - d e m o c racy elements -whether civil society org a n i s a t i o n s ,f ree press advocates and pra c t i t i o n e rs ,o rpolitical parties - are beleag u e re d .A ny peace agreement will have a mu chbetter chance of being implemented if democratic institutions are in place.Institutions that demonstrate the tangi ble benefits of popular part i c i p a t i o n ,re s p o n s i ve n e s s ,t o l e rance for dive rsity and respect for basic freedoms wo u l dprovide the underpinnings for a Sudan that can eventually be stable.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XIX

Some of the most worthwhile forms of aid would include training andtechnical assistance for civil society organisations and leadership andorganising training for political parties, universities, trade unions, women'sand community groups. Equally important will be institutional support tohuman rights groups and support for independent media and provision ofradio broadcasting equipment and training.

Consideration should be given to making a substantial investment in thecivil administration capacity of National Democratic Alliance organisationsin opposition-controlled areas, predominantly in the south. This capacitywill be key in carrying out any peace agreement. However, the governmentwill regard such assistance as a direct threat to its authority. In general,aidto civil society groups should be carefully framed and delivered in a low-keyfashion to avoid allowing it to become a pro p aganda tool for thegovernment depicting outside actors meddling in Sudan. The model ofWestern assistance to civil society groups in Serbia during the rule ofPresident Milosevic is a useful one in this regard.

Conclusions and Recommendations on Democracy

❏ Restoration of democracy needs to be an integral component of a comprehensivepeace. Working democratic institutions are vital to maintaining a viable peace.

❏ The international community should provide support for democratic forces inSudan, which for years have been bludgeoned by the government and, to a lesserextent, by the SPLA.

❏ Assistance programs should give high priority to institutional and capacity-building support for political parties working for a return to democracy and tocivil society and local institutions that can demonstrate the benefits of popularp a rticipation, responsiveness, tolerance for diversity and respect for basicfreedoms.

❏ Much can be done to organise community groups accustomed to operating on ashoestring. Small amounts of aid to civil administration and civil society in bothopposition and government-held areas, north and south, would go much fartherthan equivalent aid to the government.

❏ The international community should encourage the SPLA through politicalmessages and assistance programs to move from military to civilian rule in theterritory it controls and democratise itself as a party and governing structure.

XX INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

Protecting Human Rights

Slave Raiding.A critical element in curbing slavery will be direct pressure onthe government. It recruits,trains,arms and supplies militias who conductmost raids that result in large-scale abductions,and turns a blind eye to theiratrocities.If the government is serious about ending slavery, it must rein inthe militias and be held accountable if it does not.The government hasrepeatedly denied that slavery exists in Sudan and indicated it is willing toallow a full and unimpeded investigation. The international communityshould take this up and conduct such an investigation to create a registryidentifying and cataloguing alleged cases of slavery, help locate theseindividuals and advocate for their freedom. The government has alsoindicated that it will establish courts to address allegations of slavery. Thisinitiative should be closely followed and supported if it is serious.

The SPLA has responded to slave raiding,often carried out by Arab Baggaramilitias, by redeploying units to protect these areas, strengthening civildefence and facilitating local peace agreements between Dinka and Baggaracommunities. One of the most important initiatives the internationalcommunity could take to stem slave raiding would be to create a SouthernSudan Peace and Unity Dividend Fund to support these local peaceinitiatives.The Fund should support consolidation of local peace agreementsby focusing development aid in the major market towns where African andArab merchants converge and vaccinate cattle when the Baggara bring theiranimals into Dinka areas,targeting both Dinka and Baggara cattle.The Fundwould also provide communication between Dinka and Baggara chiefsthrough such low-tech,inexpensive means as radios and bicycles.

Donors should also consider targeting support to buttress civil defencemechanisms that deter slave raids. This aid requires careful monitoring,however, because the SPLA will be tempted to appropriate communicationequipment,fuel and vehicles for its own military needs.

Human Rights and Oil. North American and European Non-GovernmentalOrganisations, legislators and human rights activists have spearheaded agrowing campaign for a more robust international response to abuses inSudan, including denying access to U.S. capital markets for companiesinvolved in oil development. Significant pressure has been placed on theshare price of Talisman,the Canadian company participating in the Sudaneseoil consortium,leading it to seek a buyer for its Sudan holdings.Oppositionto capital market sanctions within the U.S. has also been vigorous, led byWall Street lobbying firms and the Bush administration.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XXI

Following the 11 September attacks,Congress decided to hold off action oncapital market sanctions for six months to give time for progress onterrorism, human rights and peace agendas. It abruptly reversed course,however, in mid-November:active consideration of capital market sanctionsby Congress gives the executive branch useful additional leverage in anynew effort to end the war.

Other Human Rights Issues. M u ch of the effo rts towa rds unity andreconciliation in Upper Nile are built around the New Sudan Council ofChurches' grassroots peacemaking initiative. The international communityshould support these efforts and expand the Council's capacity by fundingproject managers to oversee its initiatives. Donors and diplomats shouldalso more actively seek ways to support both the Wunlit Peace Council andthe East Bank Peace Council, s t ru c t u res created by successful localprocesses.

The international community should likewise ex p l o re ave nues fo rpromoting southern unity with the remaining holdout Nuer commanders ofthe splinter Sudan People's Democratic Front. Once again, creation of aSouthern Sudan Peace and Unity Dividend Fund is critical to buttressprogress. Where local agreements have been reached, the internationalcommunity could provide radios to improve communication betweenborder chiefs who serve as trouble-shooters and establish schools andtraining opportunities bringing together people from communities formerlyin conflict.Efforts should also be made to create a demobilisation programfor militia members, substantially increase humanitarian assistance andprovide logistical help for chiefs, church officials, SPLA leaders and factionrepresentatives in support of implementation of agreements.

The SPLA must also be held accountable for treatment of civilians in its areasof control and for how it prosecutes the war. Governments and humanrights organisations should continue to monitor the SPLA's human rightspractices,condemn abuses and apply pressure for improvement. If the SPLAendeavours to establish a foundation for future government in the south andother areas it administers,it must adhere to a higher standard than it doescurrently.

The international community can influence reform within the SPLA bys u p p o rting civil administration and strengthening civilian leaders h i p ,including through expanded training and assistance to the judicial system,and in support of management of local budgets and taxation systems.Reform would also be bolstered by help in establishing delivery systems in

XXII INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

primary health care, veterinary services and agricultural extension andsupport for expanded primary and secondary education throughout thesouth, including continuing education for civil administrators. Technicalassistance for creating more democratic structures,including promotion oflocal elections, would also be welcome.

Better access for humanitarian assistance is also vital. The U.S. negotiatingteam was able to break the logjam and convince the government to allowaid to go to the Nuba Mountains via the UN. Early success here can providea building block for further expansion of access. Donor governments andthe UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs, TomVraalsen, should follow up on Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha'sstatement that restrictions on aid access could be ended if there was amonitoring mechanism to ensure no military or other direct support wasbeing given to the SPLA.

In sum, this is a brutal war in which massive human rights violations arecommitted regularly. As long as this war continues,so will these abuses,andso will the instability that provides a breeding ground and potential havenfor terrorists. Although the international community should continue tofocus on ending these abuses, the surest way to stop them is to focus onresolving the conflict. There is an opportunity now to do so, and theinternational community - and the Sudanese parties - must not miss it.

Conclusions and Recommendations on Human Rights

❏ Gross human rights abuses, substantially but by no means exclusively committedby the government, are a fundamental result of the civil war but also constitutehindrances to peace and reconciliation.

❏ The international community should be more active in counteracting humanrights abuses but it should seek to do so in ways that are at least consistent with,and wherever possible complementary to, the priority attempt to carry through acomprehensive peace process which, if successful, would best address the worstabuses.

❏ Slavery exists in Sudan, and the taking of slaves through regular raiding by pro-government militias has been at least tolerated by Khartoum as an element of itsstrategy to neutralise the areas of greatest SPLA support and protect the oil fields.

❏ The most effective action the international community could take to combatslavery and slave raiding (other than achieving a comprehensive peace), as well

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XXIII

as to promote an end to inter-communal fighting in the south, would be to establisha Southern Sudan Peace and Unity Dividend Fund to encourage local peacea g reements between the Dinka and Baggara communities in Bahr al-Ghazal andbetween Dinka and Nuer and within Nuer communities in the Upper Nile.

❏ If support is provided to enhance the civil defence capabilities in communities mostvulnerable to slave-raiding, the international community should also seek toc o n s t ruct a multilateral, negotiated, low-cost monitoring eff o rt both to ensure that itss u p p o rt for civil defence eff o rts are not misused by the SPLA for military purposesand to keep pre s s u re on the government to end or at least disassociate itself fro mheinous practices. It should test professed government willingness to permit anextensive international investigation of slavery allegations.

❏ The international community should press both sides, but especially the govern m e n t ,which has been a consistent and long-term off e n d e r, to end the use of food as aweapon. If the government breaks the promising agreement bro k e red by the U.S. inNovember 2001 to allow UN aid to the Nuba Mountain areas controlled by theSPLA, the matter should be re f e rred to the UN Security Council.

❏ While its re c o rd has improved, the SPLA has also committed human rights abuses,p a rticularly in the conduct of its struggle with breakaway southern factions, and ithas shown only limited interest as yet in developing genuinely democraticinstitutions. The international community should hold the SPLA accountable forits behaviour, apply pre s s u re for further improvement and support independentvoices and traditional stru c t u res within southern Sudan as a means of expandingp a rticipation and building SPLA accountability.

Te r ro r i s m

After the National Islamic Front seized powe r,it established Khartoum as a basefor militant Islamist intern a t i o n a l i s m , and radical move m e n t s , i n cl u d i n gt e rro rist org a n i s a t i o n s , fl o cked to Khart o u m . In re t u rn for financial support ,Sudan provided Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida netwo rk logistical aid and as a fe haven from 1991 until 1996.

The imposition of United Nations sanctions in 1996 for alleged connections toan assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt marked the nadir ofSudan's isolation. At this time the gove rnment discussed with the U. S .a rre s t i n gbin Laden,and it ultimately asked him to leave the country,p ri n c i p a l ly becauseof increasing pre s s u re on the re gi m e . With growing oil reve nu e s , Sudan hasbecome less dependent on pri vate Islamists for financing and support andm o re eager to avoid international condemnation and sanctions.

XXIV INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

In the wa ke of the 11 September attack s ,h a rd-line and moderate elements ofthe National Islamic Front conve rged around a tactical effo rt to re d u c ei n t e rnational isolation through early and ag gre s s i ve cooperation on terro ri s m .H oweve r, this also sparked a struggle for the soul of the ruling part y. T h e re ispotential for diffe rent outcomes, i n cluding an evolution and liberalisation ofthe Front or an Islamist re t re n chment and rev i va l .

In the immediate term ,f u rther steps that Khartoum must take to cut ties witht e rro rism and match its rhetoric of cooperation with reality include cl o s i n gt e rro rist bank accounts and shutting down and liquidating terro ri s t - re l a t e dc o m m e rcial intere s t s . Sudan will also need to end the ease of access toSudanese consular support for those with links to terror organisations andp rovide full info rmation about and terminate any support to Sudanesep h i l a n t h ropic organisations that have fronted as terro rist fundraising org a n s .The gove rnment should also scrutinise school curricula for hate pro p ag a n d aagainst non-Muslims and expel or apprehend those suspects identified byi n t e rnational inve s t i g a t o rs .

T h e re is some risk that the desire to wo rk with the gove rnment in the fi g h tagainst terro rism will dive rt We s t e rn attention from other pri o ri t i e s . T h ech a l l e n ge for the U. S . and others will be to use the relationship suchc o o p e ration is producing to also move fo r wa rd the peace,d e m o c ratisation andhuman rights age n d a s .

A stable peace and re t u rn to democracy are the best guarantees that Sudan willnot reve rt to past patterns of cooperation with terro rist org a n i s a t i o n s . I tshould also be re m e m b e red that ch a n ges in the re gime's relationships withi n t e rnational terro rist organisations have come pri m a ri ly as a result of pre s s u reand partial isolation, a lesson that has major implications for moving the peacep rocess fo r wa rd as we l l .

Conclusions and Recommendations on Te rro r i s m

❏ Sudan should move beyond information sharing support for counter-terrorism andact to cut its remaining links to extremist organisations and i n d i v i d u a l s .

❏ As the immediate crisis produced by the 11 September 2001 terror attacks onthe U.S. is resolved, priority in bilateral relations of We s t e rn countries withSudan should be directed toward achieving a comprehensive and viable peacein that country, which is the best guarantee that Khartoum will not backslide onterrorism.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XXV

PART I.

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

1

2 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN

SUDAN

Source: United Nations

1 As recounted to ICG in southern Sudan,12 Ju ly 2001.Dates and locations of certain interv i ews are witheld for security re a s o n s .2The U.S.Committee for Refugees conducted a quantitative analysis of all resources on Sudan since the war began to derive

this estimate,and it has become a commonly accepted number in the absence of any better data. For an estimate of morethan 1.9 million deaths,see Millard Burr, Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983-1998, U.S.Committee for Refugees,December 1998.

3 U.S.Committee for Refugees, USCR World Refugee Survey 2001, June 2001,and its 1999 edition,September 1999.

1. CONFLICT WITHOUT END?

"Liberation is better than peace".Southern Sudanese proverb1

The civil war in Sudan continues to further fragment large parts of a countrydecimated by long running conflict. Recent international developments and eventson the ground now mean that there is a window of opportunity for peace in Sudan.However, this will require constructing a serious peace process, which will only proveeffective if backed by vigorous multilateral leverage.

A . I n t ro d u c t i o n

S h a r p ly divided by ge o gra p hy,c u l t u re , ra c e , ethnicity and re l i gi o n ,Sudan is theworld's fo remost example of a seemingly intra c t able and endless civil wa r.C o n flict has consumed the country for 34 of its 45 ye a rs of independence andremains the only constant factor in a land whose population has re p e a t e d lybeen deva s t a t e d . S u c c e s s i ve civilian and military re gimes have been draw ni n ex o rably into further bloodshed and escalating violence.The catalogue ofm ayhem in this sprawling country of 36 million people cove ring a terri t o ryabout the size of We s t e rn Euro p e ,e s p e c i a l ly since the civil war resumed in1 9 8 3 , ri vals that of any seen since World War II.

An estimated two million people have died as a result of the fighting over thepast eighteen ye a rs ,victims of direct violence or related starvation and disease.2

Half a million re f u gees have spilled into neighbouring countri e s , and ro u g h lyfour million people have been displaced and dri ven from their homes withinSudan - the largest such dislocation in the world today. I n d e e d ,one out of eve ryeight people re n d e red homeless by war around the world is from Sudan.3

While it was once fa s h i o n able to talk of a "lost ge n e ration of ch i l d ren" inS u d a n , even this bleak notion now seems inadequate. The reality is that

3

4 For consistency within the report,National Islamic Front is used rather than the pre-party title of "Muslim Brotherhood" orthe recent name change to the "National Congress Party".

5 SPLA will be used throughout the text to denote the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, the principal armedopposition group in Sudan.

ge n e rations of ch i l d re n , p a rt i c u l a r ly in the southern re gi o n s , h ave neve rhad sustained opportunities to access basic education, health care , cl e a nwater or adequate fo o d . C h i l d ren across the country do have access tog u n s , h oweve r, and opportunities to join militias, rebels groups and thegove rnment military.The culture of the wa r l o rd is pre d o m i n a n t , and fo rm a ny young people, it re p resents the only live l i h o o d .

The international community has poured humanitarian relief into Sudanon a massive scale - billions of dollars since 1983 - but this has bare lya d d ressed the symptoms while doing nothing about the causes of thec o u n t ry's suffe ring - re l i gious intolera n c e , racial discri m i n a t i o n , ra p a c i o u sre s o u rce ex t raction and elite domination. For God,oil and country, S u d a nis being ripped apart at the seams.

This re p o rt argues that now is the right time to rectify this histori cimbalance in international commitment. A window of opportunity fo rpeace has opened slightly in the aftermath of the 11 September terro ri s ta t t a cks and other, S u d a n - s p e c i fi c , t rends and deve l o p m e n t s . A newi n t e rnational peace effo rt with close re gional invo l vement or part n e rs h i pmust be fo rged now to take adva n t age of this unique confluence offa c t o rs . Peace is indeed possible in Sudan, but only with a majori n t e rnational investment in diplomacy, i n c e n t i ves and pre s s u re s . It wo n ' tbe easy.

The major foes - the National Islamic Fro n t4 gove rnment and theopposition Sudan People's Liberation A rmy (SPLA)5 - have prosecuted thecivil war with stark bru t a l i t y, although the gove rnment has usually carri e dout the wo rst ab u s e s , and each has the capacity to continue indefi n i t e ly.A t rocities are perpetrated with impunity, though again pri n c i p a l ly bygove rnment fo rc e s .Tactics including indiscriminate aerial bombard m e n t ,the use of famine as a we a p o n , fo rced displacement and support fo rp a ra m i l i t a ry fo rces engaging in the slave trade are ro u t i n e . T h eWashington-based Holocaust Museum's Committee of Conscience hasmade Sudan the fi rst and only country on its fi ve - year-old "ge n o c i d ewa t ch list". Both sides have proved more adept at encouraging others tofight than in broadening their own appeal. Sudanese society isf ragmenting into smaller and smaller shard s , making any process of peaceor reconciliation more diffi c u l t .


6 ICG interview in southern Sudan,11 July 2001.7 ICG interview, 17 July 2001.8To prevail in this context means either to win outright or to render the SPLA irrelevant,particularly in the oilfields.9 "Calling [Sudan's civil war] a north-south conflict disadvantages the cause of the southerners and those marginalised

throughout the rest of the country",says one southern Sudanese community leader. "Because people are Muslim does notmean they are Arab". ICG interview in southern Sudan,30 September 2001.

The SPLA and southern Sudanese political fo rces ge n e ra l ly arei n c re a s i n g ly committed to self-determ i n a t i o n .The SPLA's ability to surv i veon the battlefield and the gove rnment's unwillingness to negotiate ingood faith have convinced southern e rs that an independence re fe re n d u mis the only goal that justifies the enormous cost of the wa r, and re m a i n ss o u t h e rn e rs' best leve rage to ensure that Khartoum lives up to anyagreement it signs. As one front line SPLA commander told ICG, " E i t h e rwe are defeated militari ly or we gain our total fre e d o m . We cannots u rre n d e r. T h e re is no middle gro u n d " .6 Another senior SPLA commanderon the other side of the country conveyed almost the same message ," T h eissues between us are irre c o n c i l able...The war will continu e . T h e re is nomiddle way " .7

The gove rnment is equally determ i n e d . Exploitation of major oil depositssince 1999 has increased its belief that it can preva i l8 m i l i t a ri ly and ra i s e dthe stakes of the war dra m a t i c a l ly. Despite strong rhetorical support fo rre l i gious fundamentalism, its pri m a ry objectives are now maintaining theunity of the country and keeping control of and protecting the oilfi e l d s .R e l i gious fundamentalism of the type witnessed early in the rule of theNational Islamic Front re gime is ero d i n g , though still potent.

The gove rnment has ge n e ra l ly controlled ro u g h ly the nort h e rn two - t h i rd sof Sudan, while the SPLA has large ly been based in the southern third ,with some pockets of resistance in the nort h . Sudan is 65 per cent A f ri c a nand 35 per cent A rab .O ver 70 per cent of Sudanese are Muslim, of whoma large perc e n t age is of A f rican descent. Most of the rest fo l l ow tra d i t i o n a lre l i gi o n s , with 5-10 per cent being Chri s t i a n . Up to two million ori gi n a l lys o u t h e rn Sudanese live in the nort h , f u rther dive rsifying the picture .T h ereality is thus mu ch more complex than the stereotype of an A rab Muslimn o rth battling an A f rican Christian south.9

L i kew i s e , the issue of southern self-determination is only one of ap ro fo u n d ly divisive group of fa c t o rs fuelling the civil wa r. O u t s t a n d i n gpoints of conflict also include the role of re l i gion and the state, the natureof the political system (authori t a rian vs. d e m o c ra t i c ) , re s o u rce shari n g ,b o rder disputes and racial and economic discri m i n a t i o n .

CONFLICT WITHOUT END 5

10 Ironically, competition between the major regional peace initiatives threatens to turn the conflict back into a north-southissue,thus making the war even more difficult to resolve.

11 Competing groups of northern,Ar ab Muslim oligarchies have vied for access to the benefits of the Sudanese state for overa century. The National Islamic Front is the latest hegemonic faction to emer ge from this narrow competition for power.

Indeed,the war has evolved over the last decade into a contest for powerthat involves groups from across the nation.Since the coup that brought thepresent government to power in 1989, political and military organisationsfrom the north,east and west have joined southern groups in opposition.10

Driving this wider national war is a conflict between the centre and theperiphery, as groups outside a small clique of traditionally favoured northernArab Muslims11 begin to react against their historic marginalisation, andgroups throughout the country seek to repudiate the gove rn m e n t ' sdominance.

The costs of the conflict to the international community are much higherthan the humanitarian bills it has been paying.The turmoil is destabilisingneighbouring states,many of which struggle with violence and secessionismthemselves.Sudan's agony is also inextricably linked to the country's long-standing ties to terrorist organisations. At least in the recent past,Sudan hasaided and abetted representatives and businesses of terrorist groups,and itprovided Osama bin Laden refuge until U.S.pressure led to his departure in1996.As long as violent despair and opportunism remain the national norm,Sudan, much like Afghanistan, will provide a rich breeding ground forinternational terrorism and extremism.

For a variety of reasons,however, Sudan's neighbours and the internationalcommunity at large have often been content to allow the war sufficient fuelto continue its long burn.The nine countries that border Sudan - the CentralAfrican Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya and Uganda - have frequently supportedSudanese factions, hoping to keep their large neighbour destabilized or toremove perceived threats to their own governments.

The past two decades have produced a graveyard of failed internationalpeace initiatives. However, there has never been a multilateral, high-leveleffort to build a viable peace process and create coordinated leverage toencourage serious engagement by the parties. Until that happens, no oneknows if genuine compromise or even a substantive dialogue might bepossible.

The human rights abuses of the civil war have elicited an interest fromgrowing constituencies in North America and Europe not seen on an African


12 See Francis Deng and Stephen Morrison,"U.S. Policy to End Sudan's War",Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), February 2001,and "U.S.Government Must Adopt a 'Peace First' Policy Towards Sudan:A Joint Statement by CARE,World Vision,International Rescue Committee,and Save the Children",22 June 2001.

issue since the fight against apartheid in South A f ri c a . This coalitionseeks greater pre s s u re on the Khartoum gove rn m e n t . M e a n w h i l e , t h e reh ave been increasing calls for the international community - part i c u l a r lythe U. S . - to make a compre h e n s i ve peace agreement a major policyp ri o ri t y.1 2 The September 2001 appointment of fo rmer Senator Jo h nD a n fo rth as a special U. S . peace envoy suggested this might be a re a lp o s s i b i l i t y.

The 11 September 2001 terro rist attacks on New Yo rk and Wa s h i n g t o n ,h oweve r, h ave added a new complication. T h ey make Sudan, as a statewith a history and a certain affinity towa rd ex t remist Islamic groups andm ove m e n t s , of even greater international intere s t .H ow this will tra n s l a t einto longe r - t e rm policies, both in Khartoum and in We s t e rn capitals, i sthe great unknow n . What is becoming cl e a r, h oweve r, is that ac o n fluence of events and fa c t o rs provide a window of opportunity fo rpeacemaking effo rts in 2002. The U. S . , with its new special envoy,fo rmer Senator Danfo rt h , is best positioned to act as a catalyst for peaceat this moment, whether in support of other effo rts or more dire c t ly.

This re p o rt examines the prospects for peace in Sudan. It runs thro u g hthe historical context of war in Sudan, and suggests why a window ofo p p o rtunity for peace has opened at this juncture . It also offe rs adetailed analysis of the parties to the civil wa r, the economic, s o c i a l ,political and re l i gious fo rces that dri ve the conflict and the potentiall eve rage that each side believes it has. Special attention is also gi ven tothe role of re gional actors and the prominent - but large ly ineffe c t i ve -p a rt played by the broader international commu n i t y. The oftencompeting peace processes are considered in detail, and practical stepsto break the impasse are re c o m m e n d e d , with the responsibilities fo rlocal actors , re gional states and the major international playe rs cl e a r lyi d e n t i fi e d . In short , this effo rt is intended to provide a compre h e n s i vea n a lytical fra m ewo rk for the sources of conflict in Sudan and re a l i s t i cpolicy pre s c riptions for its re s o l u t i o n .

B . Sudan Before 1989

L i ke many colonial cre a t i o n s , Sudan amalgamated terri t o ry and peoplesthat had never prev i o u s ly been a coherent entity. M u ch of nort h e rnSudan is an arid desert , while the south has large areas of rain fo rests and


13 Britain became involved in Egyptian affairs in the 1870s but did not declare a protectorate over Egypt until 1914.14 Peter Woodward,"Sudan: War without End",in Oliver Furley (ed.) Conflict in Africa (New York,1995).15 Robert Collins, Shadows in the Grass (New Haven,1983).16 History of Sudan, Britain's Southern Policy ,p.1.17 Francis M.Deng, War of Visions, Brookings Institution,Washington D.C.,1995.

swa m p s . Some places in the far north re c e i ve only a week of ra i n ,w h i l ethe far south can get nine months of ra i n fa l l .The ex p e riences of those inn o rth and south have often been as sharply different as Sudan's climate andgeography.

Many difficulties arise from the colonial legacy.When Sudan fell under thecontrol of Britain and its quasi-protectorate13 Egypt in 1898,a joint-authoritygovernment was formed.Britain took over management of southern Sudan,leaving the north under nominal Egyptian rule (largely as a nod to formerEgyptian territorial claims). Britain developed a "Southern Policy", theprimary aim of which was to prevent economic integration of the tworegions in order to curtail the north's Arabic and Islamic influence.14 TheBritish saw a distinct south as a buffer that could preserve English valuesand beliefs, such as Christianity, and eventually either be developed into aseparate political entity or integrated into British East Africa.15 A Christianmissionary presence was encouraged in the south, as were the Englishlanguage and legal traditions. The southern provinces were largely closedoff to northern contact and increasingly isolated.16

In the north, where Egypt encouraged Islamic values, Britain focused itsefforts largely on economic and social development. Consequently, asdisproportionate economic and political power came to be centred in thenorth, the two regions' cultural and religious identities became moredivisive, and the stage was set for discord. In 1947, after realizing theinevitability of Sudanese independence, the British fused the separatelyruled zones and gave political power to the northern elite. This transfer atthe expense of the south sowed the seeds of war within newly independentSudan. As former Sudanese Foreign Minister Francis Deng, currently ap ro fessor at the City Unive rsity of New Yo rk , w ri t e s : " For theSouth...independence was to prove merely a change of outside masters,with the northerners taking over from the British and defining the nation inaccordance with the symbols of their Arab-Islamic identity".17

With independence imminent, the nort h e rn elite commenced"Sudanisation"- replacing British officials with Sudanese nationals. Almost allcolonial administrators were removed between June and November 1954.


18 Of the eight hundred posts granted by the Sudanese Public Service during this period,southerners received only six juniorpositions.Taisier M.Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa (London,1999),p.203.

19 Francis M.Deng,"Negotiating a Hidden Agenda:Sudan's Conflict of Identities" in I. William Zartman (ed.) Elusive Peace:Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Brookings Institution,Washington D.C.,1995,p.86.

20 Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (London,1968),p.84.21 Dunstan Wai,The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan(NewYork,1981),p.90.Mohamed Omer Beshir,The Southern Sudan: From

Conflict to Peace (London,1975),p.87.

This massive infiltration of northerners into the government greatly alarmedsoutherners.18 In September 1956, the Legislative Assembly appointed acommittee to draft a national constitution,only three of whose 46 memberswere southerners. The southern delegation walked out after its repeatedcalls for a federal constitution were outvoted.19

Violent conflict broke out even before independence in January 1956. In1955,as independence approached,southern apprehension led to riots anda bloody rebellion.After hearing rumours that they were to be disarmed andtransferred to the north,soldiers from the army's Southern Corps mutinied,and at least 300 people (mostly northerners) died. Mutineers who evadedimprisonment fled into the bush or neighbouring countries.

In November 1958, the army, led by General Ibrahim A bb o u d , s e i z e dp owe r. The military re gime suppressed opposition, i m p ri s o n i n gp o l i t i c i a n s , t rade unionists, students and commu n i s t s . A bboud alsol a u n ched a controve rsial effo rt to accelerate "Islamisation" of the southt h rough an ag gre s s i ve pro s e lytising campaign. His re p ression fo rc e dthousands of southern e rs into exile in Uganda, Ke nya , E t h i o p i a , and theC e n t ral A f rican Republ i c . These re f u gees fo rmed opposition org a n i s a t i o n s ,the most significant of which came to be known as the Sudan A f ri c a nNational Union. It petitioned the United Nations and the Organisation ofA f rican Unity (OAU ) ,a rguing for self-determination and a peaceful solutionto the southern Sudan pro bl e m .

While the Sudan African National Union was emerging as a political voice, asouthern Sudanese military movement, the Anya-Nya ("snake poison"),composed mainly of former soldiers and policemen from the 1955 mutiny,materialised out of the bush. Feeling underrepresented and discriminatedagainst, the southern civilian population supported Anya-Nya. GeneralAbboud responded with a sweeping military campaign, and over half amillion southerners fled as refugees.20 As the war intensified and thegovernment refused to acknowledge its root cause was the lack of southernpolitical and economic power, even the Sudan African National Union,which initially condemned the Anya-Nya's violent tactics,organized guerrillaattacks.21 By 1963,there was full-fledged civil war.


22 Hizkias Assefa,Mediation of Civil Wars (Boulder, 1987),p.65.23 Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London,1975),p.93.24 Taisier M.Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa (London,1999),p.207.25 Cecil Eprile,"Sudan:The Long War", Conflict Studies, March 1972,p.12.26 P.M.Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan (New York,1988),p.199.

A northern civilian uprising forced Abboud from power in October 1964,and the opportunity for peace looked more promising until a roundtableconference in Khartoum the next year failed to bring a political settlement.The war intensified and became dange ro u s ly intern a t i o n a l i s e d , w i t hincreasing numbers of foreign powers supporting either the government orthe Anya-Nya, and sometimes both.

For example,in 1965 rebels from the Congo (DRC) provided Anya-Nya witharms.22 Israel became a key financier of Anya-Nya after the Six-Day War ofJune 1967 and shipped weapons captured from Egypt,23 hoping this wouldencourage the government to limit its assistance to Middle East nations.Israel established a base in Uganda and began training and supporting Anya-Nya troops,who also relied on Ethiopia as a sanctuary.

Khartoum responded to Israeli support for Anya-Nya by strengthening itsalliance with Egypt. Other Muslim nations - the United Arab Emirates,Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - aided the war effort by providing arms,ammunition and funds.24 The government's main financier,however,was theSoviet Union. Soviet aid increased dramatically after the Six-Day War, and inJanuary 1968 Sudan and the Soviet Union signed a U.S.$100 millionagreement.25

In 1969,General Jaafar al-Nimeiri came to power in a coup d'état. Given thatSudan straddles the Nile and has access to the Red Sea,it increasingly cameto be seen as a Cold War battleground.Nimeiri actively courted the SovietUnion and other communist states. He increased trade with the Easternbloc and came to rely on Moscow for financing and armaments to wage thecivil war.26 The government also moved to distinguish itself as an ardentsupporter of the Arab cause against Israel, having broken relations withmanyWestern countries after the Six-Day War.27 Israeli support for Anya-Nyapeaked after al-Nimeiri brought Sudan into the Arab Federation with Egyptand Libya.Soviet military and financial assistance also peaked. Prospects forpeace were dim.

A failed communist coup in July 1971, however, set in motion events thatdramatically altered both Sudan's domestic political landscape and itsinternational alliances. Relations with the Soviet bloc deteriorated, while


27 Francis M.Deng, War of Visions, Brookings Institution,Washington D.C.,1995,p.161.28 P.M.Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan (New York,1988),p.209.29 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell,"The Peace Process in the Sudan,1971-1972" in Roy Licklider (ed.) Stopping the

Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York,1993),pp.74-75.30 Ibid.31 Hizkias Assefa,Mediation of Civil Wars (Boulder, Colorado,1987),p.62.32 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell,"The Peace Process in the Sudan,1971-1972" in Roy Licklider (ed.) Stopping the

Killing:How Civil Wars End (New York,1993),p.72.33 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990),p.137.

those with Western Europe, the United States, China and most of the Arabstates improved.28 The Soviet Union terminated its support for the wareffort.Without his largest military backer,Nimeiri came to see peace as moreattractive than fighting an unpopular war backed by a weak army.

With fragile domestic support , N i m e i ri began to address the civil war andi m p rove re gional relations to bolster his hold on powe r. In March 1971, h esigned an agreement with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in which bothl e a d e rs promised to cease assisting the other's separatist move m e n t s . L a t e rthat ye a r, N i m e i ri signed an agreement with Ugandan dictator Idi A m i nending support of Ugandan rebels in ex ch a n ge for similar action on theA n y a - N y a. Amin ejected the Israelis from Uganda,2 9 and the loss of ex t e rn a ls u p p o rt devastated the A n y a - N y a's war capab i l i t i e s , fo rcing southernpoliticians to consider Nimeiri's peace ove rt u res in late 1971 and early 1972.

With a monopoly of power,Nimeiri faced little opposition to ending the warin the south. This accelerated the peace process at a time when Anya-Nyawas changing from a disparate group plagued by ethnic and personalrivalries into a more unified political force. Colonel Joseph Lagu seizedauthority in Anya-Nya, united its officers under his command,and declaredthe formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement.30 The unity ofthe Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Anya-Nya proved invaluable inthe peace negotiations that began at Addis Ababa in 1971.

Whereas the 1965 roundtable failed because southern representatives weresplit between those favouring secession or a federal system,31 a settlementwas achieved this time because Lagu convinced his followers to acceptNimeiri's proposal for peace "within the framework of one Sudan".32

Ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972 inaugurated apeaceful and cooperative era. The agreement included power-sharing andsecurity guarantees for southerners and,most importantly,granted the southpolitical and economic autonomy. Former Anya-Nya soldiers were to beincluded in the national army in proportion to the national population,and6,000 southerners were to be recruited into the army's Southern Command,an important security provision.33


34 An organisation composed of radical religious fundamentalists that would evolve into the National Islamic Front in the mid-1980s.

35 From 1978-1983 there was not a single southerner in the cabinet of the central government.Bona Malwal, The Sudan: ASecond Challenge to Nationhood (New York,1985).

36 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990),p.175.37 Ibid.38 Ann Mosely Lesch,The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington,1998),p.48.39 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990),p.222.

However, Sudan's peace was short lived, as Nimeiri increasingly facednorthern opposition to the Addis Agreement. With Libyan backing andsupport from the Ansar movement, whose supporters follow the strictteachings of the Mahdi (who ruled Sudan in the 1880s), the former PrimeM i n i s t e r, Sadiq el Mahdi, u n s u c c e s s f u l ly attempted to ove rt h row thegovernment in July 1976. The abortive coup had a profound effect onNimeiri,who introduced a policy of national reconciliation in an attempt towin over the north and increase his political base.

The process of national reconciliation led to the appointment of a numberof opposition leaders to prominent government positions,including Mahdi.The majority of the Ansar and Muslim Bro t h e r3 4 exiles re t u rned toKhartoum,and the leader of the Muslim Brothers,Hassan al-Turabi (Mahdi'sbrother in-law), became attorney general. Southerners were squeezed outof the national political process,35 and the political landscape took on anincreasingly Islamic tilt.

In 1977, Mahdi and a coalition of northern opposition parties demandedthat Nimeiri review the Addis Agreement, especially its provisions forsecurity, border trade,language,culture and religion,36 and Nimeiri appeasedthem by making unconstitutional revisions. The discovery of oil in the southalso increased nort h e rn pre s s u re to jettison the Addis A gre e m e n t ,particularly those provisions allowing the south a degree of financialautonomy and the right to collect all central government taxes on industrial,commercial and agricultural activities in the region. 37

Nimeiri conceded to many wishes of his increasingly hard-line cabinet andreplaced southern troops with northerners at Bentiu, the site of extensiveoil deposits.He personally pocketed proceeds from an oil licensing deal thatthe Addis Agreement stated should go to the regional government38 anddiscussed building a pipeline so that oil could be transported out of thesouth to the Red Sea for export or to northern refineries for processing.Though this never materialised due to SPLA military pressure,the intentionto bypass the Addis Agreement and favour northern interests infuriated thesouth.39


40 Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier, "The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army" in M.W.Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds), Civil War in the Sudan (New York,1993),p.124.

41 Ibid.42 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, (Exeter, 1990),p.224.43 Ann Mosely Lesch,The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington,1998),p.55.

With southern grievances rising,Nimeiri became increasingly apprehensivethat half of the Southern Command was controlled by former Anya-Nya. InJanuary 1983, southern troops of the 105th battalion refused orders toabandon their weapons and be transferred north. They feared they wouldbe sent to Iraq to join another Sudanese contingent fighting in that country'swar against Iran and leave the south vulnerable to an all-northern unit.40

After negotiations failed, Nimeiri ordered an attack on the insubordinatesoldiers in May 1983. The southern unit fled, taking weapons andequipment and inspiring a succession of desertions and mutinies in thesouth throughout the year.41 The mutineers found sanctuary in Ethiopia,where they united to form the SPLA.

On 5 June 1983,Nimeiri issued "Republican Order Number One",abrogatingthe Addis A greement and re t u rning re gional powe rs to the centra lgovernment.42 The Republican Order explicitly destroyed the south'sautonomy and carved it into three powerless administrative provinces. Ittransferred the south's financial powers to the central government anddeclared Arabic, not English, the region's official language. The orderabandoned direct secret ballot elections for the Southern Regional Assemblyand dissolved its power to veto central government law. It also cancelledthe sections of the Addis Agreement that guaranteed local control of thearmed forces in the south and transferred this responsibility to the centralgovernment.

In addition to dramatically re-centralising political and economic power,Nimeiri officially transformed Sudan into an Islamic State, decreeing inSeptember 1983 that sharia or Islamic law "be the sole guiding force behindthe law of the Sudan".43 Though one-third of the population was non-Muslim,Islamic penal codes were imposed on the entire country.

Southerners were infuriated by abrogation of the Addis Agreement, andviolent protest soon followed.Southerners mobilised around the SPLA,andJohn Garang emerged as its leader. Unlike the Anya-Nya, the SPLA definedits objectives more broadly than southern autonomy, arguing that all ofSudan needed to be transformed into a multi-racial,multi-religious and multi-ethnic democratic state. The success and overwhelming popularity of theSPLA in its first years is a testament to the scope of southern grievances.


44 Political parties,not the government,issued the Koka Dam Declaration.The military was supportive of a peaceful settlementat the time but did not increase its advocacy for this objective until the 1989 coup.

45 Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Requiem for the Sudan (Boulder, 1995),p.157.46 Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan, Human Rights Watch (New York,1996),p.168.47 Millard Burr and Robert O .Collins, Requiem for the Sudan (Boulder,1995),p.214.

Once again Sudan's government was changed by military coup, withLieutenant General Swar al-Dhahab ousting Nimeiri in 1985,and once againthere was halting impetus toward peace.Popular pressure brought the SPLAand an alliance of professional and trade unions and political parties,including the Umma Party, together for peace talks. In 1986 they agreed tothe Koka Dam Declaration,which called for a peace process spearheaded bya National Constitutional Conference.44 However, the Declaration wasunable to resolve the contentious issue of sharia, which was left to a newincoming civilian government to be headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi. Political andm i l i t a ry turmoil persisted for seve ral ye a rs as successive coalitiongovernments headed by Mahdi were dissolved due to disagreements overeconomic,social and peace initiatives.

C. The 1989 Bashir Coup and its Aftermath

By June 1989, however, conditions favoured peace. The SPLA controlledalmost the entire south and was exerting considerable military pressure onthe government.The army calculated that it was in its best interest to cutlosses and negotiate. John Garang recognised the SPLA would never winand that his strong tactical position would be best used to achievefavourable terms in negotiations.When Mahdi swiftly met its preconditionsfor a constitutional conference,the SPLA announced a cease-fire and reactedpositively to the expulsion of hard-line National Islamic Front elements fromthe cabinet. Mahdi began to refer to the SPLA as an "armed movement"rather than "terrorists".45

However, on 30 June 1989 Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashirseized power in a coup d'état and immediately cancelled all pri o ragreements, including the proposed constitutional conference. Bashir alsoacted quickly to consolidate his power and destroy the political opposition.He imposed a state of emergency and created the Revolutionary CommandCouncil,which he chaired,to serve as a cabinet. It revoked the transitionalconstitution of 1985, abolished the parliament, banned political parties,detained all political party leaders and closed the newspapers.46 The leadersof student groups, unions, professional associations and political partiesfaced arbitrary ar rest and disappeared in "ghost houses" and prisons wherethey were tortured or killed.47 The government also intensified the war.


48 Ibid,p.234.49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.

Despite rhetorically embracing calls for peace Bashir demonstrated littleinterest in serious negotiations.Two sessions,in Addis Ababa in August 1989and in Nairobi in December 1989, failed, with Islamic law again a keysticking point. SPLA demands to revoke sharia were anathema to theNational Islamic Front - the Islamist political movement behind the Bashircoup - and the crackdown on opposition parties and non-governmentalgroups silenced some of the most forceful peace advocates.

Bashir, who had served in the south, promised new resources for themilitary and declared soldiers to be fighting as martyrs for the imposition ofGod's law. He increasingly referred to pan-Arab and Islamist values whentalking about the war in hopes of garnering support from Arab countries.Iraq soon sent arms,and the government revived its military agreement withTripoli,bringing in Libyan armaments and oil. 48 As the Gulf War took its tollon the assistance Iraq could provide, Bashir turned to Iran. The SPLA,questioning President Bashir's commitment to talks,also stepped up militaryefforts and forged ties with the National Democratic Alliance.

The National Islamic Front government perceived Garang's refusal tonegotiate without strict preconditions as indicative of a commitment toresolve the conflict on

Documents

Africa Report, Nr. 39: God, Oil and Country - Changing the ...s e ri o u s l y would include the U. S . , i n d i s p e n s a bly, and key Europeans i d e a l l y the UK re p r esenting