Africa Progress Report 2011

The Transformative Power of Partnerships

AfricaProgressReport 2011

AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

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abouT The africa Progress Panel

The Africa Progress Panel brings together a unique group of leaders under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan. The Panel monitors and promotes mutual accountability and shared responsibility for progress in Africa. Its three focus areas are economic and political governance, finance for sustainable development, and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The work of the Panel aims to track progress in these areas and draw attention to critical issues and opportunities.

While the Panel does not purport to be speaking for Africa, it can speak with an African voice, with the continent’s concerns and priorities as its guiding principles, and with the combined expertise, experience and knowledge of its members. It calls for the fulfilment of commitments to Africa, without ever forgetting that the main responsibility for progress rests with the continent’s leaders and that they themselves have entered into a series of commitments that they need to fulfil.

abouT The africa Progress rePorTEvery year, the Panel, with support from the Secretariat, draws on the expertise of a wide range of institutions and actors to compile a concise overview of the progress Africa has made over the previous year. The report is divided into two sections. The first highlights progress as well as the main obstacles to it in seven areas, namely economic growth, governance, peace and security, social development, food and nutrition security, climate change, and development cooperation and finance. The second section looks at the year ahead and identifies key trends and obstacles. On that basis, the report provides a series of practical recommendations for policy makers to catalyze action and accelerate much-needed progress.

Dawda Jobarteh, Acting Director

Violaine Beix

Sandra Engelbrecht

Benedikt Franke

Kwame Okyere

Temitayo Omotola

Carolina Rodriguez

This report may be freely reproduced, in whole or in part, provided

the original source is acknowledged

africa Progress PanelP.O. Box 157

1211 Geneva 20Switzerland

secreTariaT

WHAT AREPARTNERSHIPS FOR

DEVELOPMENT? For the purpose of this report we define partnerships as voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits.

The basic concept of partnerships is simple and straightforward – to identify common ground between different actors and to combine their skills, resources and expertise. Partnerships for development focus on the many areas where actors, including private and public institutions, companies and civil society organizations, can engage in win–win relationships around development objectives such as poverty reduction, health, education, access to opportunities and service delivery.

Effective cross-sectoral partnerships can make it possible to overcome challenges that are too difficult or complex for one organization or sector to address alone. Partnerships can also make efforts more effective by combining resources and competencies in creative ways. Collaboration can enable governments, companies and organizations to improve achievement of their own individual objectives through leveraging, combining and capitalizing on complementary strengths and capabilities.

Source: Based on the definition used by the UN Global Compact.


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FOREWORD

INTRODUCTION

PART I: LOOKING BACK: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Economic Growth

Africa’s Swift Recovery from the Economic Crisis

The Low Quality of African Growth

Growth Outlook and Economic Potential

Governance

National Governance

Regional Governance

Global Governance

Peace and Security

Social Development

Poverty Alleviation

Education and Skills Formation

Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

Health

Access to Water and Sanitation

Food and Nutrition Security

Volatility of Food Prices

Structural Barriers to Food Security

Agricultural Productivity

Climate Change

The Impact of Climate Change

Climate Change Politics

Climate Change Finance

Adaptation and Mitigation

Development Finance and Cooperation

Domestic Resource Mobilization

Traditional Bilateral Partners

Bilateral Partners from the Global South

Institutional Partners and Country Groupings

Philanthropy and Private Giving

Debt Relief

From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness

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14

20

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TABLE OF CONTENTS


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PART II: LOOKING AHEAD: PARTNERING FOR PROGRESS

How Partnerships are Already Contributing to Development

How Partnerships could be Driving Further Progress

Basic Service Delivery

Access to Opportunities

Access to Finance

Access to Health

Infrastructure

Agriculture

Low-Carbon Growth

Obstacles to Success

The Trust Gap

The Information Gap

The Imagination Gap

The Resources and Capacity Gap

The Perceived Benefits Gap

Who Needs to Do What

African Governments

International Donors

Private-Sector Actors

Civil-Society Actors

CONCLUSION

LIST OF ACRONYMS

NOTES

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Partnerships have already proven their transformative power.

The last year has been particularly eventful for the continent, and the world as a whole. A growing

debt mountain in the United States, uncertainty around Europe’s common currency and the consequences of the earthquake in Japan are reordering the industrialized world’s priorities. This and the lingering repercussions of the global financial crisis, accelerating shifts in the balance of economic and political power, high food and fuel prices, and political change in North Africa have transformed the policy space in which African leaders and their partners operate. By compounding existing challenges, but also by creating new opportunities, these dynamics are transforming prospects for ordinary Africans across the continent.

The events of the last year have also accelerated changes in how Africa is perceived – and perceives itself. The broader aftershocks of the financial crisis, including currency and price volatility, fiscal crises and asset-price collapse, have proved that no region, for better or worse, can be seen as exogenous to the world economy. They have also highlighted the need for new growth poles and markets to sustain the economic order in the developed world. As a result, countries and companies are increasingly shifting their attention from Africa’s problems to its vast potential and abundant opportunities. In the process, they are redefining the continent’s image.

On the continent, these shifts in perception are accompanied by a heightened appreciation of the need for African self-reliance in an uncertain world, and by a palpable spirit of optimism despite some high-profile setbacks. The fast recovery and strong growth rates of many economies, plus numerous examples of social and political progress, are feeding a remarkable “can-do” spirit. This is reinforced by events such as the Football World Cup in South Africa, the peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the adoption of new constitutions in Kenya and Niger, and unforeseen political change in Egypt and Tunisia.

What was termed “the hopeless continent” ten years ago has now unquestionably become the continent of hope.1 Hope that strong growth rates will translate into

jobs, incomes and irreversible human-development gains; that the continent’s enormous wealth will be used to foster equitable and inclusive growth and generate opportunities for all; that economic transformation and social progress will drive further improvements in democratic governance and accountability as the middle classes grow and demand more of their politicians and service providers; and hope that rulers who abuse their power to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor and of democratic processes are, at last, seeing the writing on the wall.

That many of these hopes actually seem attainable shows how far the continent has come. Hope, however, is not enough. Positive trends are being offset in too many countries by structural governance deficits. Violence, political turmoil, and uncertainty still scar too many parts of the continent and add to the challenges already at hand. The slow progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the difficult task of providing productive employment for rapidly growing numbers of young people, increasing inequalities and food insecurity, the risk of contagion through increasingly interconnected systems and the effects of climate change all threaten past and future gains. Despite repeated promises of reform by the world’s most powerful countries and institutions, Africans also remain heavily marginalized in world affairs, with little say in and control over how decisions affecting their countries are taken. The continent’s enormous potential remains constrained by unfair global rules and the ambivalent behaviour of many partners, particularly with respect to tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, distorting quotas and bloated subsidy regimes.

Given these obstacles and challenges, it is all the more remarkable that some countries in Africa have shown such solid progress towards sustainable growth and development. They offer clear proof that, with the right combination of leadership, focused development plans, and international support, enormous advances are possible in even the most difficult circumstances. However, all African countries face the increasingly difficult task of mobilizing resources in an age of austerity. As pressures on aid budgets increase, and

FOREWORD

With the right combination of leadership, focused development plans, and international support, enormous advances are possible.


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climate change adds new financing demands, African leaders and international donors are realizing that they cannot drive development on their own. Official development cooperation remains vitally important to build capacity, leverage other flows and achieve specific results. Yet, there is also a growing need for partnerships harnessing a broader range of actors and their energy, creativity and resources to fill the gaps.

Such partnerships have already proven their transformative power. Collaboration between the private sector and international philanthropists has led to significant reductions in malaria deaths. Partnerships between mobile-phone providers and governments have resulted in greater access to credit in rural areas and transformed business across entire regions. Partnerships between civil society and intergovernmental organizations have led to vastly improved agricultural methods and inputs for smallholder farmers. By mobilizing resources, improving efficiencies, or extending services, access and opportunities to previously marginalized segments of the population, partnerships can clearly complement, expand and improve government-led development efforts. If scaled up, they can even affect sustainable structural change.

Current dynamics are highly favourable for strengthening cross-sectoral collaboration. Over the last years, new spaces have opened up for engaging actors around their comparative advantages and respective interests as the benefits of partnering have become more obvious. The private sector understands that it needs the access and knowledge of local partners and national governments to grasp the enormous commercial opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid. Governments and civil society organisations are recognizing the value of the resources, capacities, and expertise the private sector can bring to their development efforts. As the interests of the various sectors continue to converge and improvements in regulatory environments make cooperating easier and safer, opportunities for partnerships continue to grow.

The core elements of effective partnerships are well established, even though their combination may vary: political leadership and vision from governments, along with a supportive regulatory, legal and fiscal environment; a private sector incentivized to invest capital and ideas not just for immediate returns but for longer-term change that will strengthen markets, value chains and social stability; civil society afforded the space by business and government to keep both accountable for socially and environmentally responsible behaviour; and international organizations, African or otherwise, able to advocate global standards and share best practices, especially from other parts of the global South.

The idea of partnerships for development is hardly new. For over a decade, MDG 8 has been calling for stronger partnerships as a basis for achieving all other goals. Despite the existence of many encouraging examples, and valuable lessons learned, we are still not seeing enough success stories replicated or brought to scale to effect lasting structural change. Too many actors still see the risks of engaging in partnerships rather than the opportunities, and too many states still fail to harness the developmental potential of their civil society organizations or to provide the enabling environment and incentive structures to make partnerships attractive for private-sector actors. This results in missed opportunities to tackle problems and drive progress. Given the transformative power of partnerships, it will be crucial to overcome these blockages and convince all sides of the inherent benefits of partnering for progress. This is the main purpose of this report.

Kofi A. AnnanChair of the Africa Progress Panel

Partnerships have already proven their transformative power.


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In last year’s Africa Progress Report, we called for Africa’s resources to be turned into results for its

people. This continues to be an imperative as the continent’s enormous wealth of human and natural resources, strong economic growth, and windfall from rising commodity prices are still not sufficiently converted into socially productive ends such as reduced poverty and inequality and the provision of health, education and other public services.

We also argued that Africa’s progress needs to be measured in tangible improvements to people’s lives, and not only in figures of GDP and the growth of trade and foreign direct investment. We stand by this, and renew our call for African leaders to convert economic progress and natural wealth into social and political progress, achievement of the MDGs and greater accountability to their people.

The way to do this is well charted. We know that peace, stability, and the rule of law are the basic conditions for progress. We also know that growth must lead to job creation and diversification of the economic base; that greater regional integration and better infrastructure provide the foundation for trade expansion and private-sector-led growth; that empowering women increases household incomes, nutrition and education levels, as well as agricultural productivity; that transparency helps to spread the benefits of Africa’s natural wealth more widely; and that good governance, strong institutions and political leadership are central to all of the above.

The revolutions in Northern Africa show that the information age has changed the dynamics of accountability and increased pressure on leaders to deliver results for all their citizens. But, of course, African leaders are not in this alone. They share some of the responsibility for progress with their international partners, many of whom have made extensive

financial and political commitments to the continent. The continent’s capacity to drive inclusive and sustainable growth depends on the fulfilment of these commitments, as well as on reformed global policies and systems that support Africa’s special needs – particularly in climate change, international trade and technology transfer.

As domestic resource mobilization and international aid budgets fail to keep up with multiplying needs, African countries and international donors must look beyond traditional strategies and stimulate development efforts additional and complementary to their own. Partnerships for development are a prime example of such efforts. Recent years have shown that they can achieve tremendous results by pooling the capacities, resources and expertise of various actors around specific development challenges. If designed and implemented carefully, such partnerships can deliver more than the sum of every partner’s input and bring much-needed versatility, creativity and pragmatism to development efforts.

Against this backdrop, we begin our report by looking back to assess the progress Africa has made over the last year, looking particularly at how partnerships have contributed. We then look ahead to assess how to replicate and scale up successful partnerships and how to create the policy framework and incentives needed to spur further collaboration for progress. Given the diversity of Africa’s 53 states (soon to be 54 with South Sudan) and their economies, societies and policy environments, these recommendations are broad and must be adapted and adjusted for each country. We are nonetheless convinced that, if implemented, they will accelerate progress by filling crucial gaps in existing efforts, increasing resources for development, and spreading access to opportunities, goods and services across the continent.

INTRODUCTION

Africa’s progress needs to be measured in tangible improvements to people’s lives.


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PART I

LOOKING BACK: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Looking back at the last year, we note that impressive progress, stagnation and discouraging regression continue to coexist on the continent. Widespread advances in economic growth and social development contrast with a dangerous erosion of democratic governance as well as the increasingly evident reluctance of major international donors to fulfil their commitments on aid and climate finance. This section summarizes major developments in the areas of (1) economic growth, (2) governance, (3) peace and security, (4) social development, (5) food and nutrition security, (6) climate change, and (7) development finance and cooperation.


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Many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth policies focusing on natural resources rather than value addition and diversification.

When it comes to economic growth, three issues stand out: Africa’s comparatively swift

and broad recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, its continuing dependence on narrow, commodity-driven growth that has had only limited social benefits, and its positive growth outlook.

Africa’s Swift Recovery from the Economic Crisis

In the 5 years before the financial crisis, Africa grew faster than most other world regions, with

more than 40 per cent of its countries enjoying an average annual GDP growth rate of 5 per cent or more.2 While a favourable global environment of strong external demand, ample liquidity, extended concessional financing and higher commodity prices accounts for much of this growth, structural changes within the continent’s economies are beginning to take effect and are helping accelerate growth across countries and sectors.

Among the most significant changes are a broad-based surge in domestic demand for basic consumer goods as a result of growing middle classes and rapid urbanization, lower public debts, increased openness to trade and higher investments into enabling infrastructure. Many African countries have also continued with deregulation, privatization and other structural reforms that have significantly improved the business environment (notably Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Liberia), the financial sector (Nigeria), as well as administration and governance (Sierra Leone). Dynamic private sectors have appeared across the continent, including the flower business in Uganda, leather processing in Ethiopia and the film industry in Nigeria, which have helped underpin growth driven by the export of primary commodities.3 Encouragingly, African as well as international companies are taking advantage of the improving enabling environment, and vantage points like direct access to natural resources, a large labour force and a fast-growing

population, unencumbered by legacy technology and systems.4

The global financial and economic upheavals of 2008–2010 interrupted Africa’s impressive growth spurt.5 While the impact through financial channels was generally weak, given the continent’s limited financial integration and low level of cross-border lending, many African countries were badly affected by declining exports and foreign direct investment (FDI).6 However, most countries proved more resilient than during previous crises and the continent as a whole avoided recession due to the prudent counter-cyclical policies of national governments and well-targeted support from the international community.

Propelled by the strong performance of several large economies, including Brazil, China, Germany, France and India, most of Africa is now resuming its growth spurt. While FDI inflows are recovering only slowly from the global credit crunch,7 both total exports and imports have picked up again, with growth rates of 15.3 and 11.3 per cent respectively.8 Remittances, the continent’s second-largest source of net foreign inflows after FDI, are also beginning to recover from the slump in 2009, reaching nearly $40 billion in 2010.9 Not least because of the Football World Cup in South Africa, tourism revenues have also rebounded, with the continent receiving more visitors over the last year than ever before.10

Based on these trends and global dynamics, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP to grow by 5.5 per cent in 2011 and 5.8 per cent in 2012 (in real terms).11 However, this masks substantial differences between countries. While the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia are all expected to be among the world’s ten fastest-growing economies, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea are projected to grow at rates far below the average.12 There are, however, two notable economic realities that seem to apply to most of the continent: the low quality of recorded growth, and the enormous untapped potential.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Most African countries proved more resilient than during previous crises and the continent as a whole avoided recession.


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The Low Quality of African Growth

Africa’s current economic growth is not all positive. It is generally not accompanied by much-

needed structural transformation and diversification, and often does not translate into equitable human development and public services.

Because of the immediacy of benefits, a lack of viable alternatives and credit for long-term investments, as well as distorted incentives, many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth policies focusing on the extraction of natural resources and raw materials rather than value addition and diversification.13 While natural-resource extraction has accounted for only about a third of Africa’s real GDP growth in the last decade,14 more than 80 per cent of the continent’s export earnings come from primary, generally unprocessed commodities. The economies of several countries are geared towards the export of single commodities, including copper (Zambia) and aluminium (Mozambique). This has resulted in unbalanced development, with weak links between export-orientated and other sectors. With the notable exceptions of Egypt, Tunisia and South Africa, where manufacturing and services account for 83 per cent of combined GDP,15 non-extractive sectors and competitive industries remain heavily under-developed in most African countries.16

The problem is caused, driven and compounded by the poor quality of Africa’s economic relationships, with both African and other countries. Despite the increasing prominence of non-European partners, and China in particular, the disadvantageous pattern of Africa exporting unprocessed commodities and importing manufactured goods persists. In fact, it is becoming ever more entrenched as the resource thirst of emerging partners continues to grow.17 With FDI concentrating in extractive industries, the Doha Development Round unresolved, and protectionism and other discriminatory measures

against Africa unbroken,18 the continent has little opportunity to escape this pattern and drive much-needed economic transformation through trade diversification.19

The one-dimensionality of Africa’s global trade is all the more harmful, because trade between African countries remains too weak to offer sufficient alternative incentives for economic diversification. Slow regional integration, a lack of connecting infrastructure, and insufficient resource and production complementarities between countries currently limit intra-African trade to a mere 10 per cent of total exports. In comparison, trade within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounts for about 60 per cent of the region’s total exports, and trade within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) accounts for 56 per cent of total exports.20 Without similar opportunities to profit from enlarged markets, greater economies of scale and “prosper thy neighbour” policies, African countries remain prey to disadvantageous geographies and unfavourable global dynamics.

The lack of economic diversification, in terms of both export products and destinations, explains the high volatility of African trade in recent years, and the strongly adverse impact of the global economic crisis through trade. It also explains why so little of the continent’s high GDP growth translates into social development and tangible improvements to people’s lives. Driven by capital-intensive extractive sectors, the current type of economic growth has little positive impact on employment and income levels and virtually no effect on employment-intensive sectors such as agriculture.21 It is thus hardly surprising that, despite a decade of strong economic growth, poverty remains pervasive throughout the continent and only one of Africa’s 34 Least Developed Countries (Cape Verde) has managed to graduate from this category since the adoption of the Brussels Programme of Action in 2001.

Many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth policies focusing on natural resources rather than value addition and diversification.

Most African countries proved more resilient than during previous crises and the continent as a whole avoided recession.

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COMPOUND ANNUAL REAL GDP GROWTH2000-2008%, constant exchange rates

AFRICAN ANNUAL REAL GDP, 2008USD billions

Compound annual growth rate, %

4.21.9

2.4

3.6

4.9

5.5

5.6

1970

461

1980

694

1990

839

2000

1,067

2001

1,108

2002

1,144

2003

1,191

2004

1,258

2005

1,323

2006

1,400

2007

1,483

2008

1,561Emerging

Asia8.3%

4.8%Central and

Eastern Europe

3.0%World

5.2%Middle East

4.9%Africa

4.0%Latin America

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2010); World Bank, World Development Indicators (2011); and McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move

2.0%Developed Countries

2009* 2010*

Below 0%

Between 0% and 2%

Above 5%

Between 2% and 5%

Insufficient data

Source: IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook: Rebalancing Growth

AVERAGE PROjECTED REAL GDP GROWTH FOR 2010-2011(in per cent)

2011*

1,464*

*GDP figures for 2009-2011 are combined from actual, estimated and projected amounts from the IMF

1,684*

1,816*

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2009

Sour

ce: W

orld

Dev

elop

men

t Ind

icat

ors

Dat

abas

e (2

011)

2000

GDP PER CAPITA AND GROWTH RATES 2000-2009 IN SSA

3.0

3.5

-3.7

6.6

3.6

3.7

1.8

4.3

6.1

0.9

4.8

5.8

5.4

13.5

2.3

-7.9

3.1

5.1

4.2

3.2

8.1

-1.4

1.1

1.6

25.7

0.6

1.9

7.5

-0.9

10.1

-1.9

-6.9

3.2

5.9

n/a

-13.1

-0.9

5.7

4.2

-0.8

5.5

7.6

9.0

3.8

GDP per capita 2000(Current USD)

GDP 2009(USD millions)

639

2,143

603

1,211

309

255

224

7,579

125

374

254

339

368

2,371

256

530

253

307

3,020

474

218

163

233

147

199

404

371

165

110

1,380

4,109

85

230

3,270

n/a

173

165

395

635

253

323

1,061

3,861

150

0.7

n/a

3.6

2.8

6.3

4.7

3.5

-7.6

8.7

12.3

0.4

3.8

5.6

-5.4

2.4

n/a

7.1

5.5

-1.8

2.2

5.3

1.0

6.3

7.7

4.6

2.6

-0.3

3.0

3.5

1.2

-1.0

2.7

4.3

-3.7

4.0

n/a

-1.6

0.9

2.0

2.5

4.6

7.6

2.1

4.0

GDP per capita 2009(Current USD)

4,081

4,267

1,106

3,064

990

1,098

517

8,688

344

812

438

745

1,118

15,397

454

449

490

503

5,786

1,023

522

352

428

310

222

738

407

519

160

2,533

7,502

160

691

6,064

1,171

369

610

764

1,136

431

430

2,601

6,735

341

Congo

Angola

Namibia

Côte d’Ivoire

Cape Verde

Zambia

Ghana

Burkina Faso

Seychelles

Ethiopia

Comoros

Madagascar

Benin

Nigeria

Equatorial Guinea

Central African Republic

Zimbabwe

Uganda

Tanzania

South Africa

Senegal

Rwanda

Niger

Mozambique

Malawi

Liberia

Kenya

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Burundi

Swaziland

Gabon

DRC

Mali

Botswana

São Tomé and Príncipe

Eritrea

Chad

Lesotho

Cameroon

Togo

Gambia

Mauritius

Sierra Leone

GDP Growth Annual %GDP 2000(USD millions)

9,129

3,909

10,417

531

3,238

4,977

2,611

615

8,180

202

3,878

2,255

45,984

1,254

959

6,607

6,193

10,186

132,878

4,692

1,735

1,798

4,249

1,744

561

12,691

3,112

215

709

1,490

5,068

4,306

2,422

5,632

n/a

634

1.385

746

10,075

1,329

421

3,220

4,583

636

75,493

9,265

23,304

1,549

12,805

26,169

8,141

764

28,526

535

8,590

6,653

173,004

10,413

2,006

5,625

16,043

21,368

285,366

12,822

5,216

5,383

9,790

4,727

876

29,376

4,103

165.26

1,325

3,001

11,062

10,575

8,996

11,823

191

1,873

6,839

1,579

22,186

2,855

733

9,580

8,589

1,942


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The low quality of growth notwithstanding, Africa’s pre-crisis boom and its surprisingly fast and strong

recovery have reiterated the continent’s immense economic potential. While poor policies, conflicts, natural disasters and other seismic events may disrupt growth in individual countries and sub-regions and significant structural barriers remain to be overcome, the fundamental trends and drivers suggest a positive growth outlook for most of the continent.

In the short-to-medium term, most African countries will continue to profit from recovery in the global economy, rising global demand for their resources, growing interest in their markets and further structural improvements in their business and regulatory environments. The IMF expects to see FDI rise further and demand for African bonds increase, which should help governments to address crucial infrastructure deficits.22 UNCTAD expects the dollar value of remittances into Africa to grow by 4.5 and 6.7 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively, which would further support the strengthening of household consumption.23

In the medium term, most countries have enormous potential for gains through targeting the informal sector, easing labour-market rigidities, addressing infrastructure deficits, promoting regional integration, enhancing fiscal systems, boosting administrative capacity and harnessing international cooperation to improve resource mobilization.24 Partnerships between public actors and with the private sector offer enormous opportunities to address some of the structural barriers that have been constraining Africa’s growth for decades.

In the long-term, growth will increasingly reflect interrelated social and demographic trends – particularly the rise of the African urban consumer and the growth of affluent middle classes. McKinsey, for example, estimates that, as a result of strong per capita growth and rapid urbanization, 221 million additional Africans will enter the market for basic consumer goods by 2015.25 While growth trajectories will continue to differ substantially (especially between oil exporters and diversified economies), Africa’s collective GDP is estimated to reach $2.6 trillion in 2020, and consumer spending $1.4 trillion.26 Based on this positive outlook, more and more African countries are now regarded as promising investment destinations, including Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.27

Yet enormous risks remain. In the short-term, sovereign debt defaults in advanced economies could affect banking systems and economies worldwide and threaten the continent’s fragile recovery. In the medium-term, insufficient economic diversification may thwart Africa’s chances to move towards a path of sustainable, inclusive, and ideally green growth. In the long-term, accelerating climate change, environmental degradation and unsustainable pressures on finite resources may reverse economic and social progress.

The overarching message from this brief review of Africa’s economic growth is straight forward. In order to make the most of the continent’s enormous potential, and counter the risks in years ahead, African leaders, with the help of their international partners, need to accelerate economic diversification and structural transformation.28 Without such transformation, growth will remain inequitable jobless, volatile, and largely inadequate for achieving the MDGs by 2015.

Growth Outlook andEconomic Potential

The fundamental trends and drivers suggest a positive growth outlook for most of the continent.


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Partnering around Africa’s infrastructure deficit Africa’s lack of energy, transport and communications infrastructure has given rise to a number of promising partnerships between public actors, including the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the EU–Africa Infrastructure Partnership. Given the identified need for as much as $93 billion a year to close the continent’s infrastructure gap and increasing pressure on public finances, many of these partnerships focus on mobilizing complementary resources. They provide incentives for the private sector through: leveraging public flows; identifying opportunities for public–private partnerships; helping to remove technical, political and knowledge barriers to investment; providing risk-mitigation instruments; reducing inefficiencies in resource allocation; and coordinating the rapidly proliferating initiatives around infrastructure development. Thus, partnerships have helped to refocus much-needed attention on the sector and contributed to the significant increase of commitments from $7 billion in 2005 to nearly $40 billion in 2010.

Sources: World Bank (2009), African Country Infrastructure Diagnostic; PEI and ICA (2011), Infrastructure Investor: Africa – An Intelligence Report.

The fundamental trends and drivers suggest a positive growth outlook for most of the continent.

16

Pre-transitionTransition

Diversi�edOil exporters

USD

Economic diversi�cation

10

100

1000

10,000

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Manufacturing and service sector share of GDP, 2008, %

Clusters (only select countries represented) GDP per capita

$500 - $1,000< $500 $2,000 - $5,000

> $5,000$1,000 - $2,000

Mauritius

South Africa

Morrocco

Namibia

Zambia

SenegalKenya

MozambiqueUgandaTanzania

Rwanda

Madagascar

Ghana

Cameroon

Côte d’Ivoire

Botswana

GabonEquitorial Guinea

Angola

DRCAlgeria

Libya

Nigeria

Egypt

Chad

Sierra Leone

Sudan

Mali

DRC

Ethiopia

Tunisia

Size of bubble proportional to GDPPre-transition

TransitionDiversi�edOil exporters

USD

Ecomomic diversi�cation

10

100

1000

10,000

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Manufacturing and service sector share of GDP, 2008, %

Clusters (only select countries represented) GDP per capita

$500 - $1000< $500 $2000 - $5000

> $5000$1000 - $2000

Mauritius

South Africa

Morrocco

Namibia

Zambia

SenegalKenya

MozambiqueUgandaTanzania

Rwanda

Madagascar

Ghana

Cameroon

Côte d’Ivoire

Botswana

GabonEquitorial Guinea

Angola

DRCAlgeria

Libya

Nigeria

Egypt

Chad

Sierra Leone

Sudan

Mali

DRC

Ethiopia

Tunisia

Size of bubble proportional to GDP

CLUSTERS OF AFRiCAn ECOnOmiES

Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move: The progress and potential of African economies. Radial charts (opposite page) World Bank Development Indicators (2011)

DIVERSIFICATION OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES

Note: Selected countries include those whose 2008 GDP is aproximately USD 10 billion or greater, or whose real GDP growth exceeds 7% over 2000-2008. 22 countries that account for 3% of African GDP in 2008 are excluded.

McKinsey’s framework illustrates four main clusters: diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies and pre-transition economies. The framework highlights that despite important differences between the countries within each category, they have similar economic structures and therefore share growth opportunities and challenges. This framework, however general, provides insight for business and policymakers with a new categorization upon which to make decisions.

17

Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) Estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants

Improved water source (% of population with access) Human Development Index (HDI) Health Expenditure per Capita (Current US$)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad

Congo, Republic Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia

Botswana Madagascar Mauritius Rwanda

Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone Algeria Angola

Chad Congo, Republic

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH

Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0

ACCESS TO MOBILE TELEPHONY

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data

World average (=59.3) World average (=260) OECD average (=24.8) World average (=23) OECD average (=23.9)

World average (=857.1; o� scale) OECD average (=4653.8; o� scale)World average (=86.8%) OECD average (=99.0%) World average (=0.624) OECD average (=0.879; o� scale)

OECD average (=100.0)



0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH


0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0


Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data






0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH


0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0


Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data



OECD average (=100.0)Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) Estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants


0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH


0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0


Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data






0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH


0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0


Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data



OECD average (=100.0)Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) Estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants


0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

ACCESS TO WATER

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

0.0

100.0

200.0

300.0

400.0

500.0

600.0

ACCESS TO HEALTH

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

ACCESS TO INTERNET

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

MATERNAL HEALTH


0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

100.0


Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali



Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

Algeria Angola Chad


Gabon

Libya (117)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Morocco

Namibia

South Africa

Tunisia


Sudan

Cameroon

Ghana

Kenya

Mozambique

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DRC

Ethiopia Mali

Sierra Leone

DRC

no data




ECOnOmiC CLUSTERS AnD SOCiAL inDiCATORS: iS ThE DiVERSiFiCATiOn OF ThE ECOnOmY TRAnSLATinG inTO SOCiAL AnD hUmAn DEVELOPmEnT?

18

INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO FINANCEWith FDI concentrating in the extractive sectors of a limited group of resource-rich countries, high risk ratings driving the cost of credit, and poorly developed financial markets, most Africans have very limited access to finance. The consequences are significant. Low rural access to credit hampers agricultural productivity, inadequate access to finance by SMEs impedes private sector development in industry or high-value added services, and limited access to trade finance constrains the diversification of exports. By remodeling risk-weighted assets, Basel II, the new framework for banking supervision and regulation, may further adversely affect the cost of financing and inhibit cross-border financial flows to countries where public and private borrowers are rated at a higher level of risk such as LDCs.

UNFAVORABLE GLOBAL RULESThe unbalanced global economic system and its out-dated set of rules heavily disadvantage Africa. Bloated subsidy regimes, quotas, as well as high tariff and non-tariff barriers constrain its potential to escape unfavourable trading patterns and diversify its economies.

POOR MARKET QUALITYThe majority of African markets are plagued by their small market sizes, ethnic segmentation, high-percentage of informal activity, significant productivity gaps, skill mismatches, and low competitiveness. Particularly financial markets are still poorly developed.

POOR REGULATORYENVIRONMENTSDespite notable reforms in some countries, Africa remains a difficult place for entrepreneurs which face greater regulatory and administrative burdens, and less protection of property and investor rights than in other regions. Complex tax codes and high compliance burdens imposed by an inefficient tax administration are powerful incentives for small enterprises to remain informal.

WIDESPREAD INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICITDespite the proliferation of programmes to remedy Africa’s infrastructure deficit, the continent remains plagued by a crippling lack of energy, transport and telecommunication infrastructure. Current annual investment needs are estimated at USD 93 billion, with more than one third remaining unfunded and insufficient maintenance creating additional needs for expensive rehabilitation. The World Bank estimates that if Sub-Saharan Africa could improve its infrastructure to the levels comparable with those in Mauritius, its growth of real GDP per capita would increase by 2.3 per cent a year.

STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

This figure shows the worldwide distribution of deposit accounts in institutions per thousand adults. Predicted values are used when data are not available.

ROAD DENSITY

0African

low-incomeOther

low-incomeAfrican

middle-incomeOther

middle-income

100

200

300

500

400

Paved road density

Total road density

Kilo

me

ters

pe

r 100

sq

uare

ki

lom

ete

rs o

f ara

ble

land

ELECTRICITY

0African

low-incomeOther

low-incomeAfrican

middle-incomeOther

middle-income

100

200

300

500

400

600

700 Generation capacityElectricity coverage

Line

s p

er t

hous

and

po

pul

atio

n

WATER AND SANITATION

0African

low-incomeOther

low-incomeAfrican

middle-incomeOther

middle-income

20

40

60

100

80

Improved waterImproved sanitation

Per c

ent

of p

op

ula

tion

co

vere

d

TELEPHONE

0African

low-incomeOther

low-incomeAfrican

middle-incomeOther

middle-income

100

200

300

500

400

600Main line density

Internet densityMobile density

Line

s p

er t

hous

and

po

pul

atio

n

TIME TO EXPORT

Sour

ce: W

orld

Ban

k 20

11, D

oing

Bus

ines

s Re

port

: Mak

ing

a D

iffer

ence

for E

ntre

pren

eurs

. SA

DC

Regi

onal

Pro

file

Zimbabwe 5352

4444

3130

2928

2423

211817

135

41

0 10 20 4030 50 60

Namibia

Malawi

Madagascar

Zambia

Tanzania

Lesotho

Seychelles

Angola

Botswana

SADC Regionalaverage

Swaziland

DRC

Mozambique

South Africa

Mauritius

Denmark

COST TO EXPORT

DRC 3,505

3,280

3,010

2,664

1,850

1,754

1,713

1,686

1,680

1,531

1,262

1,197

1,100

876

737

450

1,856

0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000

Namibia

(SADC) Regionalaverage

Madagascar

Botswana

South Africa

Swaziland

Seychelles

Zimbabwe

Lesotho

Angola

Mozambique

Zambia

Tanzania

Malawi

Mauritius

Malaysia*

Bank loans per 1,000 adults

300 - 799 No data

49 or fewer50 - 299

31.2

This graph compares the number of days required before an entrepreneur can export. Denmark as the country with the least amount of time to export is included as a benchmark.

Number of days

USD per container

This graph compares the cost per container to export. Malaysia as the country with the lowest cost to export is included as a benchmark.

Sour

ce:

Wor

ld

Bank

20

11,

Doi

ng

Busi

ness

Re

port

: M

akin

g a

Diff

eren

ce fo

r Ent

repr

eneu

rs. S

AD

C Re

gion

al P

rofil

e

Source: Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce (2010) Measuring Financial Access around the World

Sour

ce: Y

epes

, Pie

rce

and

Fost

er in

Wor

ld B

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326

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37

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88

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150134

29

284

381

461

106

19

RENEWABLE ENERGY Africa has enormous potential for energy production from renewable sources – solar, hydro, wind and geothermal. Almost all Sub-Saharan African countries have sufficient renewable resources, exploitable with current technologies, to satisfy many times their current energy demand. (See chart on page 45.)

REGIONAL INTEGRATIONDeepening regional integration holds enormous potential for economic growth and social development across the continent. According to UNCTAD, an investment of $32 billion to improve the main intra-African road network alone could generate around $250 billion in additional trade over a period of 15 years. As part of a broader development strategy, regional integration can enhance productive capacity, intensify economic diversification, and improve competitiveness. Pooled resources and economies of scale would also allow African countries to participate more effectively in the global economy.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGEIn contrast to what is happening in much of the rest of the world, Africa’s labour force is continuing to expand. The continent currently has more than 500 million people of working age. By 2040, their number is projected to exceed 1.1 billion. Over the last two decades, three-quarters of the continent’s increase in GDP per capita came from an expanding workforce, the rest from higher labour productivity. While population growth can create intense pressure on resources, public institutions and social stability, it also provides an enormous opportunity for the continent.

RISE IN DOMESTIC CONSUMPTIONBy 2014, the number of households with income of $5,000 or more is expected to reach 106 million. Africa already has more middle-class households (defined as those with incomes of $20,000 or above) than India. Africa’s rising consumption will create more demand for local products, sparking a virtuous cycle through a growth in discretionary income. As a result, consumer-facing sectors such as retailing, banking, and telecom are set to grow fast.

INCREASING URBANIZATIONThe high urbanization rate of the African continent which exceeds that of any other region can be a great asset by boosting productivity, demand, and investment by creating economies of scale. There is a clear need to avoid urban crowding and “slumification”.

SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGYWhether by connecting people with each other, linking rural areas to the world, spreading knowledge, improving healthcare delivery or providing a basis for small businesses through mobile banking, the rapid spread of information and communication technologies has changed how Africa’s people interact and its economies function. But the benefits of new technologies are in other sectors, such as manufacturing, where they are allowing African countries to leap frog development stages.

RISE IN GLOBAL DEMANDAfrica will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural gas, minerals, food, and arable land. Fast growing demand for raw materials has both positive and negative effects. On the negative side, it may discourage or at least slow the build up of other sectors. On the positive side, it will induce FDI not only to explore the resources, but also to develop infrastructure to reach and transport them which are bound to have positive spill-over effects.

EXAMPLES OF GROWING POPULATION (AGES 15-59)

Note: Data through 2050 are based on the United Na-tions medium variant projection series.Source: Ashford (2007) Africa’s Youthful Population: Risk or Opportunity? Population Reference Bureau. USA.

02005 20252015 2035 2045

45

50

55

65

60

70

GhanaNamibia

MadagascarUganda

*Projections

1950 19901970 2010* 2030* 2050*1960 20001980 2020* 2040*0

10

20

30

50

40

60

70

0

200

400

600

1,000

800

1,200

1,400

Urb

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n sh

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of t

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Afri

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(%) Po

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The

2009

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2010

) Th

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.

AFRICAN URBAN POPULATION TREND

Fixed-line operators Mobile operators

North AfricaUSD 24 billion

(slight decrease from 2007)

West AfricaUSD 26 billion

(increased from 2007) East AfricaUSD 6 billion

(increased from 2007)

Central AfricaUSD 4 billion

(increased from 2007)

Southern AfricaUSD 27 billion

(increase from 2007, mainly driven by large inflows to South

Africa and Angola)

Source: Williams (2010), Broadband for Africa: Backbone Networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, USA.

STRUCTURAL DRIVERS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

Per c

ent

of t

ota

l po

pul

atio

n

0

50

100

150

250

350

200

300

400

450

500

Rout

e k

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rs (

tho

usa

nds)

THE GROWTH OF THE MOBILE NETWORK

1990 1995 2000 2005

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI IN AFRICA

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009


20

The last year has seen significant developments on all levels of political and economic governance.

Nationally, democratic recessions and leadership deficits are threatening to overshadow significant improvements in economic governance in several countries. Regionally, African states and their organizations continue to pursue a growing array of cooperative and integrative efforts despite capacity constraints. Globally, the drive for much-needed systemic reforms has stalled despite high hopes and repeated declarations to the contrary.

National Governance

Overall, the quality of national governance as measured by indices like the Ibrahim Index

of African Governance has remained virtually unchanged this year.29 However, as with the continent’s economic growth, the averages hide significant variations and trends across various components. While many countries have seen impressive improvements in economic governance, nearly two-thirds have also seen disconcerting deteriorations in political participation, human rights, physical security and the rule of law.30

The refusal of Laurent Gbagbo to relinquish power to the recognized winner of last year’s presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire and the heavy-handed response of Muammar al-Gaddafi to calls for political change in Libya are cases in point. However, while the attempt of some leaders to cling to power has been the most visible expression of democratic recessions, others, including the “dominance of the incumbent”, are equally worrying. Six of the nine presidential

elections held over the last year were won by the incumbents some of whom have been in power for well over two decades.31 Unfortunately, this trend appears set to continue as only four of the fifteen countries holding elections over the next year (not counting the planned elections in Egypt and Tunisia) will not include the incumbent seeking re-election.32 As the Economist’s Democracy Index indicates, an increased number of elections has not necessarily translated into a greater choice of candidates or more democracy for the majority of Africans.33

This trend compounds the continent’s chronic governance problems, including state fragility, endemic corruption and widespread lack of basic freedoms.34 With several leaders having extended their tenures indefinitely, including by adjusting constitutions and removing term limits, the disconnect between rulers and their citizens as well as between elites and the broader population remains an unfortunate characteristic of many African countries.

But there are also signs of hope. Last year has seen the adoption of new and improved constitutions in Kenya and Niger, a peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the first democratic elections in Guinea, and the fall of autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Together with the popular uprising in Libya, these transitions highlight new dynamics of accountability and increased pressure on governments to deliver tangible results to their citizens. Several countries, including Liberia and Mauritius, have made remarkable progress in improving accountability, and more countries are implementing regional and global good-governance initiatives, including the African Governance Platform. By early 2011, 31 countries had acceded to NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (one more than last year), and 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (two more than last year) and were slowly implementing the review’s recommendations.

GOVERNANCE

South Sudan: Africa’s youngest nation

Following a peaceful referendum in January 2011, in which over 98 per cent of the voters endorsed independence, South Sudan is set to become Africa’s newest nation on 9 July 2011. Governing the largely undeveloped country will not be easy. Despite significant mineral wealth and great agricultural potential, the new state will face challenges of public-service provision, economic governance, and peace and security. It will also need to clarify important issues with North Sudan, particularly concerning demarcation of the border (the longest in Africa), citizenship, and the sharing of oil revenues. While the government led by President Salva Kiir and his successors will bear the main responsibility for tackling these challenges, it will need significant support from within and outside the continent to ensure that South Sudan gets off to a good start without further instability in the region.


21

Most progress was undoubtedly made in the area of economic and resource governance.

Many African countries significantly improved their domestic resource mobilization by deepening the tax base, strengthening tax administration and formalizing the informal sector. While the trend of tax revenues is positive, in some countries, like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau, annual per capita taxes are still as low as $11.35 Many countries still collect only half of what would be expected given their living standards and economic situation.36 Elsewhere, tax revenues are still dominated by taxes related to resource extraction, which can be up to 66 per cent

of total revenues, leaving these nations vulnerable to shocks.37

Many countries have made progress in curbing corruption, particularly in the extractive sector. Twenty-one resource-rich African countries have now joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and adopted its stringent standards on the verification and publication of private-sector payments. The Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and Nigeria are already fully compliant. Nonetheless, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to rank last in the Revenue Watch Index, measuring governments’ willingness to disclose information on their resource revenues.38

Partnering around transparency in extractive industries

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a partnership of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations that supports transparency and good governance through verification and publication of payments and revenues from oil, gas and mining ventures. While the responsible use of reported revenues naturally depends on national governments, EITI has already led to improved investment climates, promoted economic and political stability for host governments, and mitigated political and reputational risks for companies and investors. It shows how a partnership can help define and advocate for sensible standards and then support their implementation. Given the importance of commodity exports to many African economies, there is great scope to expand this type of initiative beyond extractive industries.

Africa’s international partners have continued to make progress in controlling corruptive practices

of their companies operating on the continent. The United States’ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010, for example, requires all oil, mining and gas companies registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their payments to foreign governments by country and by project. Hong Kong has recently introduced similar conditions for companies listed on its exchange, and France and the United Kingdom have recently revised their national anti-bribery laws and are pushing for improved transparency laws at European level. At their November 2010 summit, G20 states agreed an ambitious anti-corruption action plan.39

Another encouraging sign is the growing role of civil society organizations and independent oversight institutions across Africa. While still unduly limited by some governments, such organizations are becoming an increasingly vocal and essential cornerstone of democratization and anti-corruption efforts in many

countries. Empowered by advances in information and communication technology including social media (such as Twitter and Facebook) and crowdsourcing platforms for social activism (such as Ushahidi), they provide a crucial complement to governments and the private sector, and keep both sides accountable to each other and to the people.

However, parliaments, opposition parties and civil society organizations are still too weak in many African countries to provide effective checks and balances to entrenched political elites.40 According to Transparency International, corruption also remains widespread, costing the continent billions of dollars a year.41 In many areas, the fight against “quiet corruption” – the failure of public servants to deliver goods and services paid for by governments – remains an uphill struggle.42 Accelerating population growth, organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade, as well as climate change, are adding new pressures on local and national governance systems, particularly in fast-growing cities and remote rural areas.

Many countries have made progress in curbing corruption, particularly in the extractive sector.

22

Country Name of leader (*incumbent president winner of last election)

Years in power

Year of last Presidential Election (% won by)

Registered voters (1)out of total population (2)(million)

The leader originally came to power through a coup (year)

Constitutional change in the last 10 years that favours the incumbent (3)(years)

Constitutional change in the last 10 years: Qualitative improvement of constitution(4)(year)

Countries holding presidential elections 2011-2012(*incumbent seeking reelection)

Algeria President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA* 12 2009 (90.2%)

18.1 / 35 2008

Angola President Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS* 31 1992 (49.6%)

4.8 / 13.3 2010 2012 (*)

Benin President Thomas YAYI BONI* 5 2011 (53%) 4.3 / 9.3 2011 (*)

Botswana President Seretse Khama Ian KHAMA*

3 0.7 / 2.1

Burkina Faso President Blaise COMPAORE* 23 2010 (80.2%)

3.9 / 16.7 1987 2002

Burundi President Pierre NKURUNZIZA* 5 2010 (91.6%)

3.5 / 10.2 2005

Cameroon President Paul BIYA* 28 2004 (70.9%)

4.7 / 19.7 2008 2011 (*)

Cape Verde President Pedro Verona Rodrigues PIRES*

10 2006 (51.2%)

0.3 / 0.5 2011

Central African Republic President Francois BOZIZE* 8 2011 (64.4%)

1.3 / 4.9 2003 2010 2011 (*)

Chad President Lt. Gen. Idriss DEBY ITNO*

20 2006 (64.7%)

5.7 / 10.8 1990 2005 2011 (*)

Comoros Ikililou DHOININE Will take office May 2011

2010 (61.1%)

0.3 / 0.8 2001

Congo President Denis SASSOU-NGUESSO*

13 2009 (78.6%)

1.7 / 4.2 1997 2002

DRC President Joseph KABILA* 10 2006 (58%) 25.4 / 71.7 2011 2011 (*)

Côte d'Ivoire President Alassane OUATTARA >1 year 2010 (54.1%)

5.5 / 21.5

Djibouti President Ismail Omar GUELLEH* 12 2011 (80%) 0.2 / 0.8 2010 2011 (*)

Egypt Former President Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK*

29 2005 (88.6%)

31.8 / 82.1 2011

Equatorial Guinea President Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Teodoro OBIANG NGUEMA MBASOGO*

31 2009 (95.8%)

0.2 / 0.7 1979

Eritrea President Isaias AFWORKI 18 1993 (95%) n/a / 5.9

Ethiopia President GIRMA WOLDEGIORGIS*

9 2007 (79%) n/a / 90.9

Gabon President Ali Ben BONGO ONDIMBA

1 2009 (41.7%)

0.5 / 1.6

Gambia President Yahya JAMMEH* 14 2006 (67.3%)

0.7 / 1.8 1994

Ghana President John Evans Atta MILLS 2 2008 (50.2%)

12.5 / 24.8

Guinea President Alpha CONDE >1 year 2010 (52.5%)

5 / 10.6 2010

Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai SANHA 1 2009 (63.5%)

0.5 / 1.6

Kenya President Mwai KIBAKI* 8 2007 (46%) 14.3 /41.1 2010

Lesotho King LETSIE III 15

Prime Minister Pakalitha MOSISILI 13 2007 (National Assembly election)

0.9/ 1.9

Liberia President Ellen JOHNSON SIRLEAF 5 2005 (59.6%)

1.3 /3.8 2011 (*)

Libya Revolutionary Leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar AL-QADHAFI

41 n/a / 6.6 1969

Madagascar Andry RAJOELINA 2 n/a /21.9 2009 2010 2011 (*)

Malawi President Bingu wa MUTHARIKA* 7 2009 (66%) 5.9 /15.9

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GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET

23

Mali President Amadou Toumani TOURE*

9 2007 (71.2%)

6.9 /14.2 2012

Mauritania President Mohamed Ould Abdel AZIZ

1 2009 (52.6%)

1.1 /3.3 2008

Mauritius President Sir Anerood JUGNAUTH* 7 2008 n/a / 1.3

Morocco King MOHAMMED VI 11

Prime Minister Abbas EL FASSI 3 n/a / 32

Mozambique President Armando GUEBUZA* 6 2009 (76.3%)

9.9 / 23

Namibia President Hifikepunye POHAMBA* 6 2009 (76.4%)

1 / 2.2

Niger President Mahamadou ISSOUFOU >1 year 2011 (58%) 5.2 / 16.5 2010 2011

Nigeria President Goodluck JONATHAN 1 n/a / 155.2 2011 (*)

Rwanda President Paul KAGAME* 11 2010 (93.1%)

3.9 / 11.4 2003

São Tomé and Príncipe President Fradique Bandiera Melo DE MENEZES*

9 2006 (60%) 0.1 / 0.2 2011

Senegal President Abdoulaye WADE* 11 2007 (55.9%)

4.9 / 12.6 2001 2012 (*)

Seychelles President James Alix MICHEL* 7 2006 (53.7%)

0.1 / 0.1 2011 (*)

Sierra Leone President Ernest Bai KOROMA 3 2007 (54.6%)

2.6 / 5.4 2008 2012 (*)

Somalia Transitional Federal President Sheikh SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED

2 2009 n/a / 9.9

South Africa President Jacob ZUMA 2 2009 (69%) 23.2 / 49

Sudan President Umar Hassan Ahmad AL-BASHIR*

17 2010 (68.2%)

7.6 / 45 1989 2005

Swaziland King MSWATI III 25 2005

Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso DLAMINI

2 n/a / 1.4

Tanzania President Jakaya KIKWETE* 5 2010 (61.2%)

20.1 /42.8

Togo President Faure GNASSINGBE* 6 2010 (60.9%)

3.6 / 6.8

Tunisia Former President Zine El Abidine BEN ALI*

23 2009 (89.6%)

4.9 / 10.6 2002 2011

Uganda President Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI*

25 2011 (68.4%)

10.4 / 34.6 1986 2005 2011 (*)

Zambia President Rupiah BANDA 2 2008 (40.1%)

3.9 / 13.9 2011 (*)

Zimbabwe President Robert Gabriel MUGABE*

23 2008 (85.5%)

5.6 / 12.1 2011 (*)

Notes: Algeria: Constitutional amendment removed the presidential two-term limit in 2008. Angola: In 2010, the parliament approved a new constitution abolishing direct elections of the president. Botswana: Parliamentary election in 2009, President elected by National Assembly. Burkina Faso: In 2002, constitutional amendment reduced the presidential term to five years. This has not been applied to the incumbent president. Burundi: 2005 constitution guarantees representation of main ethnic groups, by setting out the share of posts they will have in parliament, government and in the army. Cameroon: 2008 constitutional amendment enables the incumbent president to run for a third term in 2011. Central African Republic: The 2010 constitutional amendment extended the terms of the President and the National Assembly when it became apparent that, for technical reasons, elections could not be held in time. Chad: 2005 referendum removed constitutional term limits. Comoros: 2001 constitutional referendum granted the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan, Moheli greater autonomy within the federation. Congo: 2002 constitutional referendum approved amendments aimed at consolidating presidential powers. The presidential term was increased from five to seven years and the post of Prime Minister was abolished. DRC: January 2011 constitutional amendment eliminates the second round of presidential elections. Djibouti: 2010 constitutional amendment allows the president to run for a third term. Egypt: Following Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in early 2011, the military caretaker government dissolved the constitution on 13 February 2011. Guinea: The 2008 coup was followed by the country’s first democratic elections and a new constitution in 2010. Kenya: Government of national unity. The new constitution approved through a referendum in 2010 is set to reduce the power of the president, devolve power to the regions and abolish the position of prime minister. Lesotho: Parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The Monarchy is hereditary with no legislative or executive powers. The leader of the majority party in the National Assembly is appointed Prime Minister. Madagascar: In 2009, elected President Marc Ravalomanana was toppled by opposition leader Andry Rajoelina. In November 2010 voters approved a new constitution which lowers the minimum age for the president, allowing Rajoelina to run for president. Mauritius: President was unanimously elected by National Assembly. Morocco: Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch following legislative elections. Niger: Coup in 2010 led to 2011 democratic transition. The 2010 constitution, approved in referendum, designed to restore civilian rule and return democracy after ousted President Mamadou Tandja had changed the constitution to stay in power. Nigeria: President Jonathan assumed the presidency after the death of President Yar’Adua. Elections took place in April 2011, at time of print (18 April 2011) results were yet to be officially confirmed. Rwanda: 2003 constitution adopted through referendum is aimed at reconciliation and bans the incitement of ethnic hatred. It established a presidential system of government with separation of powers between the three branches of government. Senegal: 2001 new constitution approved by referendum, which shortens presidential term, limits holder to two terms (but also gives president power to dissolve parliament). Sierra Leone: 2008 constitutional amendment grants the Anti-Corruption Commission the power to prosecute offenses involving corruption. Somalia: Somalia has a transitional, parliamentary federal government. The Transitional Federal President was elected by the expanded Transitional Federal Assembly in 2009. Sudan: Total population includes population of Sudan and South Sudan. Interim National Constitution of 2005 is part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the conflict in southern Sudan. Swaziland: Swaziland is a monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch from among the elected members of the House of Assembly. Constitution signed by the King in 2005 took effect in 2006 cementing the rule of the King. Tunisia: President Ben Ali stepped down in Jan 2011. Interim President Fouad M’Bazaa was appointed in January 2011. 2002 Constitutional referendum included changes that abolished the three-term limit for incumbent presidents and raised the age limit of a sitting president from 70 to 75, paving the way for the fourth term of former President Ben Ali. Uganda: 2005 constitutional amendments removed presidential term limits and legalized a multiparty political system. Zimbabwe: Government of national unity. Zimbabwe’s 2011 election is set to take place after a constitutional referendum planned for 30 June 2011.

(1) Year of latest available data: Algeria 2004, Angola 1992, Benin 2006, Botswana 2009, Burkina Faso 2005, Burundi 2010, Cameroon 2004, Cape Verde 2006, Central African Republic 2005, Chad 2006, Comoros 2006, Congo 2002, DRC 2006, Cote d’Ivoire 2000, Djibouti 2005, Egypt 2005, Equatorial Guinea 2002, Gabon 2005, Gambia 2006, Ghana 2008, Guinea 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2005, Kenya 2007, Liberia 2005, Madagascar 2006, Malawi 2009, Mali 2007, Mauritania 2007, Mozambique 2009, Namibia 2004, Niger 2004, Rwanda 2003, São Tomé and Príncipe 2006, Senegal 2007, Seyschelles 2006, Sierra Leone 2007, South Africa 2009, Sudan 1996, South Sudan 2011, Tanzania 2010, Togo 2005, Tunisia 2004, Uganda 2006, Zambia 2008, Zimbabwe 2008.

(3) Constitutional change includes the removal or extension of term limits, or the modification of their age limits.

(4) Constitutional change includes the decentralization or devolution of power, shortening or the creation of presidential term limits, the creation of anti-corruption or reconciliation mechanisms, and the restoration of civilian rule.

(2) Total population 2011 estimate.

Country Name of leader (*incumbent president winner of last election)

Years in power

Year of last Presidential Election (% won by)

Registered voters (1)out of total population (2)(million)

The leader originally came to power through a coup (year)

Constitutional change in the last 10 years that favours the incumbent (3)(years)

Constitutional change in the last 10 years: Qualitative improvement of constitution(4)(year)

Countries holding presidential elections 2011-2012(*incumbent seeking reelection)


24

Regional Governance

African states are increasingly acting on the economic and political imperative of greater

regional integration. Over the last year, they have continued to expand their cooperative and integrative efforts in several areas and increasingly rely on the political steering mechanisms of regional organizations for the coordination and pursuit of collective interests. Remarkably, these mechanisms are moving beyond mere geographic compositions in the form of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to encompass functional cooperation on topics ranging from reform of the United Nations (Committee of Ten Heads of State on the UN Reform) to the impact of and responses to the global economic crisis (Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors). Such functional and issue-based cooperation has the potential to increase Africa’s bargaining power on the international stage.

At the 16th African Union Summit in January 2011, the continent’s leaders reaffirmed their commitment to greater unity and integration through shared values, and pledged to accelerate efforts in the seven priority areas of the AU’s Minimum Integration Programme (free movement of persons, goods,

services and capital; peace and security; energy and infrastructure; agriculture; trade; industry; and investment and statistics).43 A growing number of regional and trans-regional initiatives, including the Short Term Action Plan of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, as well as innovative partnerships, are targeting the continent’s serious deficit in connectivity infrastructure to drive increased physical integration through market expansion and trade creation. Even though the East African Community had to postpone its plans to create a common currency by 2014, the creation of regional customs unions, free trade areas and other means of converging macroeconomic policy, as stipulated in the Abuja Treaty, is progressing in many RECs.

At the same time, Africa’s organizations remain plagued by widespread capacity deficits, fragmentation of efforts, lack of harmonization and a tendency to concentrate on the formulation of cooperation agreements rather than their implementation.44 Many African states are struggling with the competing demands and agendas of their various, often overlapping, memberships in regional initiatives. Consequently, many decisions are not being implemented at national level.45

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the economic development programme of the African Union which aims to provide an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. It was set up in 2001 and integrated into the AU structures in 2010. Focusing on six areas (agriculture and food security, climate change and natural resource management, regional integration and infrastructure, human development, economic and corporate governance, and cross-cutting issues such as gender and technology) it has helped to harmonize the policies of African states. Through its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which encourages conformity to an agreed set of governance standards through periodic reviews it has also begun to institutionalize a spirit of self-monitoring. While severe problems remain with regard to the implementation of some of its programme, NEPAD clearly shows the value intergovernmental partnerships can add to individual development efforts.

Functional and issue-based cooperation has the potential to increase Africa’s bargaining power on the international stage.


25

* The number of flights is a rounded average of the total number of departing flights per week for a selected country.The average was computed using a representative week for each month over a whole year.

Source: Innovata LLC, IATA. Source: Innovata LLC, IATA.

0Europe Asia Middle East

5

10

15

35

25

45

20

40

30

50

13,7%

46,2%

33,0%

NUMBER OF FLIGHTS TO/FROM AFRICA PER WEEK AND BY REGION

PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS PER WEEK TO/FROM AFRICA JANUARY 2008 - JANUARY 2011

Europe Middle East Asia North America South America

0Jan 2005 Jan 2008 Jan 2011

1,000

2,000

3,000

7,000

5,000

4,000

6,000

KENYA

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Tanzania (53), Uganda (29), South Africa (24), Sudan (6)Connected to: 25 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Tanzania (102), Uganda (64), Sudan (45), South Africa (30)Connected to: 29 countries

International topdestinations*: United Arab Emirates (24), United Kingdom (18), Netherlands (14), India (10), Qatar (1)Connected to: 12 countries

International topdestinations*: United Arab Emirates (26), United Kingdom (24), Netherlands (15), Qatar (15), India (7)Connected to: 15 countries

SOUTH AFRICABEST CONNECTED WITHIN AFRICA

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Mozambique (109), Botswana (89), Namibia (87),Zimbabwe (55)Connected to: 28 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Zimbabwe (99), Botswana (90), Namibia (89),Mozambique (71)Connected to: 28 countries

International topdestinations*: United Kingdom (55), Germany (25), United Arab Emirates (14), Australia (9)Connected to: 23 countries

International topdestinations*: United Kingdom (55), United Arab Emirates (42), Germany (25), Australia (14)Connected to: 22 countries

NIGERIA

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Ghana (32), Ethiopia (10), Côte d’Ivoire (7), South Africa (4)Connected to: 17 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Ghana (48), South Africa (14), Egypt (14), Ethiopia (13)Connected to: 18 countries

International topdestinations*: United Kingdom (27), France (11), Netherlands (11), United Arab Emirates (6)Connected to: 8 countries

International topdestinations*: United Kingdom (33), United Arab Emirates (16), Germany (14), France (7)Connected to: 11 countries

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: South Africa (7), Kenya (7), Congo (7), Ethiopia (1)Connected to:7 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: South Africa (17), Ethiopia (10),Kenya (9), Congo (3)Connected to:17 countries

International topdestinations*: France (3), Belgium (2)Connected to: 2 countries

International topdestinations*: France (3), Belgium (2)Connected to: 2 countries

GUINEA BISSAULEAST CONNECTED COUNTRY

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Senegal (3)Connected to: 1 country

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Senegal (4)Connected to: 1 country

International topdestinations*: Portugal (2)Connected to: 1 country

International topdestinations*: Portugal (3)Connected to: 1 country

ETHIOPIA

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Kenya (17), Djibouti (14), Nigeria (10), Sudan (5)Connected to: 18 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Kenya (24), Djibouti (19), Sudan (16), Nigeria (13)Connected to: 25 countries

International topdestinations*: United Arab Emirates (10), Italy (9),India (6), Thailand (3)Connected to: 12 countries

International topdestinations*: United Arab Emirates (21), India (15), Thailand (10), Italy (9)Connected to: 16 countries

SENEGAL

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Mali (20),Côte d’Ivoire (14), Morocco (8), Gambia (8)Connected to: 14 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Mali (17),Côte d’Ivoire (14), Morocco (14), Gambia (14)Connected to: 16 countries

International topdestinations*: France (21), Italy (8), Spain (8), USA (7)Connected to: 8 countries

International topdestinations*: USA (15), Spain (10), France (8), Italy (4)Connected to: 9 countries

EGYPTBEST CONNECTED INTERNATIONALLY

2005 2010

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Sudan (22), Libya (17), Morocco (8), Nigeria (4)Connected to: 12 countries

Intra Africa maindestinations*: Libya (40), Sudan (40), Nigeria (13), Morocco (12)Connected to: 15 countries

International topdestinations*: Saudi Arabia (75), Germany (63), United Arab Emirates (55), United Kingdom (29)Connected to: 38 countries

International topdestinations*: Saudi Arabi (214), United Kingdom (113), United Arab Emirates (103), Germany (97)Connected to: 44 countries

Air traffic to and from Africa accounted for 4.1% of the global scheduled air traffic in January 2011.

Comparing January 2005 and January 2011, weekly number of flights has increased by 10.2% globally while weekly number of flights to/from Africa has increased by 84.9%.

The weekly number of intra-Africa flights grewby 49.9% between January 2005 and January 2011.

AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL AND INTRA-REGIONAL FLIGHT CONNECTIONS

Per c

en

t

Functional and issue-based cooperation has the potential to increase Africa’s bargaining power on the international stage.


26

Global Governance

Despite repeated declarations, the public re-examination of global governance triggered by

the recent financial and economic crisis has not led to significant changes to out-dated arrangements for representation and decision-making. Also because of the inadequate diplomatic capacity of many governments, Africa remains heavily marginalized in world affairs, with little control over how these affairs affect its people.

In fact, the recent crisis seems to have complicated Africa’s bid for a louder voice and greater international representation. The inclusion of big emerging economies like Brazil, China and India, with their own (legitimate) concerns and priorities,46 risks further marginalizing less economically powerful players. The G24, the intergovernmental group representing developing countries in the IMF and the World Bank, has calculated that the lion’s share of the promised 6 per cent shift in IMF voting power is actually a shift from developing countries to emerging economies, thus further reducing Africa’s say in these organizations.47 The crisis has added weight to specialized bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board, on which Africa has very little representation even though its countries are directly affected by the decisions taken.

At the same time, the broad-based consensus on the need to adapt global governance to changed political and economic realities has not disappeared. At their summit in Seoul in November 2010, the G20 nations agreed to a series of measures addressing global imbalances and pushing for further changes to governance structures of the IMF and World Bank.48 The French G20 Presidency has vowed to implement these measures as part of its ambitious reform agenda focusing on the modernization of the international monetary system. Also in November 2010, the EU pledged to support Africa in its efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.49

South Africa’s membership in the G20 and the increasingly institutionalized participation of the AU and NEPAD in the group’s meetings are important steps towards ensuring that Africa’s concerns and priorities are taken into account in the proposed reform efforts. They may also encourage greater African representation in other decision-making fora. It is unrealistic to expect individual representation of most African countries in every important organization, and also unrealistic to expect single countries to set aside their own national concerns in order to represent the entire continent. Therefore, continental and regional representation may prove the most effective way to include African perspectives. Crucially, this may also help to improve the legitimacy of organizations like the G20.

Africa remains heavily marginalized in world affairs, with little control over how these affairs affect its people.


27

Pervasive conflict and insecurity continue to slow Africa’s progress. More than one fifth of the

continent’s population remains directly affected by conflicts which continue to destroy socio-economic infrastructure, erode institutional capacity, aggravate poverty and human suffering, and make it even more difficult to achieve the MDGs.50

With at least nine countries experiencing major conflicts within their territories (two more than last year) and the highest number of peacekeeping missions (five UN, three regional and one hybrid),51 Africa continues to rank as the world region least at peace.52 The seemingly intractable conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, Darfur and Somalia continue, while democratic recessions, including the protracted electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, demographic change, increasing food and oil prices, and growing inequalities have raised tensions throughout the continent.53 The revolts in North Africa, and particularly the civil war in Libya and the international cooperation around the no-fly zone, have added yet another dimension to Africa’s complex security situation.

Most security challenges in Africa continue to be a direct result of weak or poor governance, including the absence of effective state institutions. The ongoing spread of terrorism and organized crime includes drug trafficking and illicit trade, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the pervasiveness of piracy around the Horn of Africa. Residual transnational militancy and fluid forms of cross-border violence, such as that perpetrated by

the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, can all be traced to the continuing existence of ungoverned spaces and high state fragility throughout Africa.54

Many of these problems are further exacerbated by increasing external stresses relating to accelerating climate change, global economic dynamics and increasingly volatile food prices. These raise the likelihood of destabilizing large-scale population movements and conflict over scarce natural resources, including water and arable land.55

But the last year has also seen positive developments: the peaceful referendum in South Sudan, strides towards democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, and the great progress Guinea and Niger have made towards restored constitutional order and consolidated peace. At intergovernmental level, operation continues of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In November 2010, the AU began to assess procedures for deploying its African Standby Force, and three of the five regional brigades have now been declared fully operational.56

However, enormous capacity and harmonization problems persist at all levels of inter-African security cooperation, as most states have been reluctant to free resources for the new institutional architecture. As a result, the AU remains dependent on international support to finance, equip and sustain its growing array of security initiatives. It is also subject to internal disagreements on central political issues and principles, including the legitimacy of outside intervention in African affairs.

PEACE AND SECURITY

Most security challenges in Africa continue to be a direct resultof weak or poor governance.

Africa remains heavily marginalized in world affairs, with little control over how these affairs affect its people.


28

A little over a decade after the Millennium Declaration, many African countries remain

off-track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.57 While increasing numbers of success stories highlight the possibility of rapid improvements in all key sectors and some countries are on track to achieve most of their targets, overall progress continues to be slow. It is hampered by exogenous trends such as accelerating climate change and by inadequate policies, unmet commitments, lack of focus and accountability and insufficient dedication to sustainable development by both African states and their international partners.

A particularly worrying development is the increase in inequality – both within and across African societies.58 The UNDP’s new inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (HDI) shows that the human development ratings of African countries are substantially lower if adjusted for inequality in the distribution of wealth. This adjustment reduces ratings of some countries, including the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Namibia, by up to 40 per cent.59

The global financial crisis has also clearly shown the importance for African countries of creating mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable segments of their populations against unexpected shocks. Despite the efforts of some countries to implement the AU’s Social Policy Framework, basic social security remains beyond reach for most Africans, with less than 5 per cent of the working-age population in Sub-Saharan Africa covered by contributory pension schemes, unemployment benefits or other social safety nets.60 As a result, economic contraction and price volatility continue to have a disproportionate effect on the poor.

But it is not all bad news. There is plenty of evidence that with the right policy mix and international support, African countries can still achieve many of their MDG-based targets, particularly in the areas of education and health. At the Review Summit in September 2010, world leaders reaffirmed their commitment to achieve the goals by 2015 and a number of promising initiatives, such as the UNDP’s

MDG Acceleration Framework, are under way to identify, replicate and scale up success stories and accelerate progress across the continent.61

Poverty Alleviation

To the detriment of hundreds of millions of Africans, the continent’s strong economic growth has not

translated into widespread job creation and poverty reduction. While there is still considerable controversy around both the method of computation and the actual level of Africa’s poverty rate,62 it is certain that many African countries will not reach their poverty-reduction goals by 2015 despite strong GDP growth. UNCTAD projects that income per capita will grow at only 2.7 per cent in 2011, and 2.8 per cent in 2012, which is below the threshold of 3 per cent considered as the minimum rate to make a substantial dent in poverty and far below the rate needed to achieve the MDGs in most countries.63

The need for greater progress is urgent. According to the 2011 Rural Poverty Report of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Sub-Saharan Africa is home to nearly one third of the world’s poor. While their share in the continent’s total population is declining, their absolute numbers have increased from 268 million to 306 million over the last decade.64 The UNDP’s Multi-dimensional Poverty Index, which complements money-based measures by considering multiple deprivations and their overlap, even puts the number of poor Africans as high as 458 million.65

While poverty remains a predominantly rural phenomenon throughout Africa, rapid urbanization is adding an increasingly important dimension.66 The continent already has the highest incidence of slums – over 62 per cent of the urban population lives in such informal inner-city settlements – and accelerating rural flight is bound to swell the ranks of the urban poor.67 Increasingly volatile food prices, the uncertainties and effects of climate change and a range of natural-resource constraints will also complicate efforts to reduce poverty.68 At the same time, positive trends include increasing agricultural productivity, growing international interest in bottom-of-the-pyramid business and the spread of mobile and affordable technology. These offer new and exciting opportunities for tackling poverty.

sociAl develoPment

There is evidence that with the right policy mix and international support,African countries can still achieve many of their MDG-based targets.


29

Partnering around mobile technology to tackle poverty The mobile money transfer service M-Pesa (M stands for “mobile”, Pesa means “money” in Swahili) is one of the best examples of the transformative power of partnerships. With the initial support of the UK Department for International Development (DfID) through a matching fund, the Kenyan mobile-phone service provider Safaricom has created a service which allows users to make and receive payments, transfer money to other users and non-users, and deposit and withdraw money without needing to visit a bank. By relying solely on the ubiquitous mobile phone, M-Pesa has significantly expanded financial access among Kenya’s poor. By bringing the unbanked into the market it has also created new markets for goods and services tailored to mobile banking. Already serving more than 14 million users in Kenya, this type of service is being replicated in other African countries including Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. It clearly demonstrates that partnerships for development can mature into self-sustaining and profit-making ventures with transformative effects.

There is evidence that with the right policy mix and international suport,African countries can still achieve many of their MDG-based targets.

30

Millennium Development Goals

Country

Eradicate extreme

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Achieve universal primary

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Promote gen-der equality

and empower women

Reduce child mortality

Improve maternal

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Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria

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Ensure environmental sustainability

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Central African Republic l l l l l l l

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Côte d’Ivoire l l l l l l l

Djibouti l l l l l l l

Egypt l l l l l l l

Equatorial Guinea l l l l l l l

Eritrea l l l l l l l

Ethiopia l l l l l l l

Gabon l l l l l l l

Gambia l l l l l l l

Ghana l l l l l l l

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Morocco l l l l l l l

Mozambique l l l l l l l

Namibia l l l l l l l

Niger l l l l l l l

Nigeria l l l l l l l

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Senegal l l l l l l l

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Tunisia l l l l l l l

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TRACKING MDG PROGRESSTracking progress on MDG achievement is an immense challenge due to a lack of sufficient, reliable, and updated data. There are also inconsistencies between national and global tracking efforts that make it difficult to compare progress across countries and regions but commendable efforts have been made.

This infographic illustrates overall MDG progress as seen in the African Economic Outlook 2010 Report.

2009 and 2010 data from other progress reports highlight the following:

GOAL 1: POVERTY AND HUNGERDespite progress in

many countries, the number of people suffering from hunger on the continent has increased.

Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, DRC, Angola, Mozambique and Malawi made the most progress in GDP growth rate per person employed. Many countries increased labour productivity but Comoros, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Mali, Namibia, Tunisia, Eritrea, Botswana and Lesotho showed a decline between 1992 and 2008.

In Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Libya and Madagascar the prevalence of underweight children increased.1 Undernourished population decreased in Nigeria and Ghana, but increased in Gambia. Liberia,and Sierra Leone.2

According to IFPRI, African countries that achieved the most progress in combatting hunger are: Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana and Mozambique. The largest deterioration between 1990 and 2010 is seen in the DRC and Burundi, which together with Chad and Eritrea have the most alarming 2010 Global Hunger Index scores.3

1 Data not available for Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland Tunisia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde2 FAO 2009 The State of Food Insecurity in the World Economic Crisis3 International Food Policy Research Insti-tute (IFPRI) (2010) Global Hunger Index

MDG SCORECARD…

31

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GOAL 3: WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENTThe gender parity index in primary education

(1991-2007) shows that Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Madagascar, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and have regressed. Mauritius is the only country that has managed to maintain gender parity for the same period. Other countries have only marginally increased gender parity.

Women’s representation in African parliaments has made significant progress. Of 37 countries only six– Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Cameroon – show that parliamentary seats held by women decreased between 1990 and 2009. The most progress was seen in Rwanda followed by Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uganda.1

1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)

GOAL 4: CHILD MORTALITY Overall African under-five mortality rate (U5MR) declined at an

insufficient rate to attain the MDG target between 1990 and 2008.U5MR progress has been most striking in Eritrea and Malawi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and Niger.1

Progress remains slow in Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Central African Republic and Swaziland.

Between 1990-2008, there was no change in DRC or Somalia. while in Chad, Congo, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the U5MR increased.

Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) declined between 1990 and 2008. Mozambique recorded the greatest reduction, followed by Malawi, Niger and Ethiopia. Kenya was the worst performer, followed by Chad, Congo, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

Between 2000 and 2008, 16 countries increased their measles immunization: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea,Madagascar, Niger,

1 UN (2010) The Millennium Development Goals Report

GOAL 5: MATERNAL HEALTHDRC, Ethiopia and Nigeria, account for

50% of all maternal deaths globally. Although the Maternal Mortality Ratio has fallen in both Nigeria and Ethiopia, it needs to fall at a much faster rate for the overall picture to change1.

Most African countries are unlikely to achieve the target as only ten countries have reached an over 50% contraceptive prevalence rate: Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, South Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Swaziland.

Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco report the lowest adolescent birth rates on the continent. It is highest in Chad, Mali, Mozambique and Niger.2

1 The Lancet (Hogan et al., 2010)2 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)

GOAL 6: HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASESAfrica has sustained the

progress made in tackling HIV/AIDS. Namibia and Rwanda made remarkable increase in knowledge about HIV prevention between 2000 and 2008 but most countries will not meet the 95% knowledge target by 2010 set by the UN. Condom use has also gained acceptance in some countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia and Nigeria. As of December 2008, some 3 million Africans were estimated to be receiving antiretroviral therapy (44% of the estimated need).1 1 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update 2009

GOAL 7: ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY1

Many countries are yet to include environmental sustainability in their national development plans. Most are failing to honor commitments made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and NEPAD’s Environment Initiative.

Africa is the lowest emitter of carbon dioxide as a global region. CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2006 decreased in most countries


GOAL 2: EDUCATIONAfrican countries continue to show overall progress in

net enrollment in primary education where Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania and Morocco showed significant improvement as did Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland and Togo. DRC and Equatorial Guinea reversed progress (1991- 2007).

Guinea, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Malawi, Madagascar, Tanzania and Togo have made significant progress in improving primary completion rates while Burundi and Mauritius were the only two countries to register a setback.1

1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010) Assess-ing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals, MDG Report 2010

Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Benin, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Egypt, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe reported a setback over the same period.2


Malaria mortality has dropped in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia and the Zanzibar region of Tanzania. Between 2000 and 2008/2009 there was significant increase in the use of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITN)to protect from malaria. The proportion of children under five sleeping under ITNs rose considerably in Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia.2

The TB prevalence rate has been rising in Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia. It declined

2 UN (2010) The Millennium Development Goals Report

in Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco.3 Nine countries are still classified by WHO as TB high-burden countries: DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.


except Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, and the Seychelles. Libya is the highest emitter of CO2 per capita in Africa.

Many countries showed an improvement in access to safe drinking water. In 2008, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Tunisia reached over 90% coverage. DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone and Somalia had less than 50% coverage.

Progress in sanitation is still slow. Only Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Mauritius have 90% of their population with access to improved sanitation. Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo have less than 20%.


32

Education and Skills Formation

Primary education continues to be one of Africa’s greatest success stories. According to the latest

figures, the majority of African countries are on track to achieve the goal of universal primary education by 2015, with Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania having made notable progress.69 This has been achieved through abolition of school fees, greater public investments and improved donor support, particularly through the World Bank’s Education for All Fast Track Initiative.

There is less success in other areas such as the quality of education, completion rates, enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, basic education reform, and teacher recruitment.70 Meeting the relevant targets will be an enormous challenge. More than 31 million African children, most of them girls, remain out of school and the number of new teachers needed between now and 2015 alone equals the continent’s entire current teaching force.71 With an enrolment rate of merely 6 per cent, low female participation, and over 40 per cent of faculty positions vacant, higher education remains a particularly serious stumbling block in the continent’s quest for strong and sustained growth. This is despite the growing engagement of international donors and collaborative initiatives like the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa or the Association for the Development of Education in Africa.72

There is still a notable lack of strategic planning for and access to skills development as part of the broader education curriculum. The acquisition of skills linked to market-needs plays an essential role in human development, employment generation, poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. While the share of secondary school students enrolled in technical and vocational programmes has increased to 13 per cent in Mali, 16 per cent in Rwanda, and 18 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it remains below 2 per cent in Niger, Chad and Sudan.73

Crisis-induced spending cuts in both African and partner countries, quickly growing youth populations and the prevalence of armed conflict in many parts of the continent complicate efforts to address these

and other serious shortfalls. However, the spread of information and communication technology offers chances to bridge some of the gaps in innovative ways, including through web-based education and testing platforms, e-learning, and long-distance mentoring.

Gender Equality andWomen’s Empowerment

The empowerment of Africa’s women is critical to the achievement of all MDGs, not just the goal of

gender equality. Fortunately, awareness of the link between women’s empowerment and development continues to grow. Although gender-disaggregated data remain patchy, the results of increased efforts are beginning to show.

In October 2010, the AU launched African Women’s Decade, and there are encouraging signs of progress to come.74 Last year showed a continuing upward trend in the political participation of African women, who now hold 18.5 per cent of parliamentary positions (from 15 per cent in the previous year). Women’s representation in parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa is now higher than in South Asia, the Arab states or Eastern Europe.75 Most countries are also on track to achieve gender parity in primary education by 2015. A growing number, including Senegal, Benin and Burkina Faso, have integrated gender concerns into their national development plans and poverty-reduction strategies, also because international partners like the Millennium Challenge Corporation have made gender reform a prerequisite for grant disbursement.76 Lesotho has even achieved the greatest overall improvement of any nation in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index over the last five years.77

Despite these encouraging signs, Africa remains plagued by substantial and debilitating gender gaps in health, employment, and wages.78 For every headline success, thousands of women continue to find their talents and aspirations blocked by formal and informal barriers. If adjusted for gender equality, human development ratings drop substantially across the entire continent.79

The empowerment of Africa’s women is criticalto the achievement of all MDGs.


33

For reasons ranging from labour-market conditions to access to education to social barriers, cultural values and attitudes in the household, the vast majority of women in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to face income and job insecurities.80 The economic crisis has further increased both the informalization of jobs held by women and their share of vulnerable employment.81 Even though women make up the majority of the agricultural workforce, producing as much as 80 per cent of the continent’s food, they still own less than 1 per cent of Africa’s land. They are still the first, along with their children, to suffer under economic contraction, food insecurity and violent conflict.

This is not only a personal tragedy for millions of women and their families, but a major brake on Africa’s development. Failing to use women’s energy and skills slows progress towards achievement of the MDGs, weakens governance and accountability, and hampers the implementation of much-needed reforms. Empowering women, on the other hand, is proven to increase household incomes, nutrition and education levels, and agricultural productivity, and to decrease fertility, population growth and carbon emissions.82 Africa still has a long way to go in realizing the enormous potential of its women.

Health

Increased financing and a strategic scale-up of effective interventions have led to some

remarkable results in health this year. For example, enough insecticide-treated mosquito nets have been distributed to protect more than 578 million people at risk of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of these and similar efforts, 11 African countries have shown reductions of over 50 per cent in the number of confirmed malaria cases, and the majority of African states are now on track to halt the advance of malaria by 2015.83

While Africa as a whole is unlikely to meet the goal of reducing infant mortality by 2015, some countries have achieved outstanding reductions, including Mozambique (over 70 per cent), Malawi (68 per cent) and Niger (64 per cent).84 Although maternal mortality remains unacceptably high across the continent, the limited available evidence indicates that some countries, including Burundi, Cape Verde and Egypt, are achieving substantial reductions. This suggests that current efforts to reduce maternal mortality are working but need to be further scaled up and complemented by increased investments in information systems and accessible and affordable services. Africa’s leaders agreed at the AU Summit in July 2010 to increase financial and political support for female and child health, and to intensify cooperative efforts through partnerships like the Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA).87

While the goals of reducing maternal and infant mortality across all Africa remain distant, there are several important milestones within reach. The elimination of polio, measles, guinea-worm disease and mother-to-child transmission of HIV is possible, but requires a strong final push.88 The expansion of routine immunization across the continent is progressing and the introduction of several new vaccines, including for meningitis and pneumococcal disease, is already yielding substantial benefits.89 A promising malaria vaccine is in the final testing stages and its introduction may be only a couple of years away.90

Many of these recent achievements were made possible by effective partnerships between and among governments, international organizations, the private sector, philanthropic actors and civil society. Particularly innovative funding mechanisms such as the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria have helped to turn international goodwill into results on the ground.

Eleven African countries have shown reductionsof over 50 per cent of confirmed malaria cases.

The empowerment of Africa’s women is criticalto the achievement of all MDGs.

34

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OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN AFRICAFEMALE EDUCATION & LITERACY

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO FINANCE IN AFRICA

Egypt

Countries analysed in the Women’s Economic Opportuniy IndexSelected countries for referenceAfrican countries

Egypt

Sour

ce: E

cono

mis

t Int

ellig

ence

Uni

t (20

10)

Wom

en’s

Econ

omic

Opp

ortu

nity

Inde

x.

35

WOMEN’S OPPORTUNITES IN SELECT AFRICAN COUNTRIES

General BusinessEnvironment

Women’s Legal andSocial Status

Educationand Training

Access toFinance

LabourPractice

Labour Policy

SOUTH AFRICA

On the methodology:

The Women’s Economic Opportunity Index is a dynamic quantitative and qualitative scoring model constructed from 26 indicators that measure specific attributes of the environment for women employees and entrepreneurs in 113 economies.

Five category scores are calculated from the unweighted mean of underlying indicators and scaled from 0-100, where 100=most favourable. These categories are: Labour policy and practice (which comprises two sub-categories: Labour policy and Labour practice); Access to finance; Education and training; Women’s legal and social status; and the General business environment. Each category or sub-category features either four or five underlying indicators.

The overall score is calculated from a simple average of the unweighted category and indicator scores. That is, every indicator contributes equally to its parent category and every category contributes equally to the overall score. This is the baseline score for the Women’s Economic Opportunity Index.

The women’s access to finance programmes indicator assesses whether governments or the formal financial sector have programmes aimed at providing fi nancial accounts to women, improving both access to loans and financial literacy.

BOTSWANA




Access toFinance

LabourPractice

Labour Policy

NIGERIA




Access toFinance

LabourPractice

Labour Policy

TANZANIA




Access toFinance

LabourPractice

Labour Policy

CHAD




Access toFinance

LabourPractice

Labour PolicyWorld average

Best in world

World average

Best in world

World average

Best in world

World average

Best in world

On the radial charts:

Indicator scores are normalised to lie within a consistent range between 0-100, based on source data. Section scores are the weighted sum of the underlying indicator scores. All scores 0-100 where 100=most favourable.

NOTES

World average

Best in world

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Women’s Economic Opportunity Index.


36

Partnering for health I: The global initiatives Global health partnerships have received great public attention, and have transformed the quality and scope of health provision across Africa, saving millions of lives. Successful collaborations include advocacy on a particular disease (UNAIDS), improving coordination between multiple initiatives (the Rollback Malaria Initiative), or delivering much-needed services, financial and medical resources, and technologies to national governments (the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI). GAVI and the Global Fund in particular demonstrate how partnerships across sectors and between organizations can achieve objectives that no single agency or actor could achieve alone.

Partnering for health II: Eliminating river blindness The African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) is one of the longest-running partnerships for health on the continent. Focusing on community-directed treatment, APOC involves a broad range of financial, scientific and operational partners, including a network of 15 NGOs and 19 African countries. Implemented by WHO, with financing managed by the World Bank, the partnership has come close to eliminating river blindness. Besides reducing the number of infections by over 16 million cases and providing regular treatment to over 50 million people, the partnership has helped to reclaim abandoned arable land for settlement and agricultural production.

Source: WHO (2011).

Partnering for health III: SMS for life The SMS for Life initiative is a public–private partnership harnessing standard technology to improve local access to and availability of essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The Roll Back Malaria Partnership, Novartis, Vodafone, IBM and the Ministry of Health in Tanzania jointly used a combination of mobile phones, Short Messaging Service (SMS) technologies and easy-to-use websites to track and manage the supply of malaria drugs. The initiative was built on a generic and highly scalable platform that could be used for other medicines or products and could be replicated across the continent with minimal adaptation and high impact.

Encouragingly, this goodwill has been reconfirmed over the last year. Leaders at the G8 Summit

in June 2010 pledged to mobilize $5 billion to accelerate progress on MDG 4 and 5 as part of the Muskoka Initiative to reduce maternal and new-born deaths in developing countries.91 At the MDG Review Summit in September 2010, world leaders, private-sector actors, philanthropic organizations and civil society pledged a total of $40 billion for health over the next five years. The Global Fund’s replenishment in October 2010 yielded $11.7 billion for the global fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for 2011–2013 (up from $9.7 billion for 2008–2010); several donors, including Australia and Norway, have announced new commitments to GAVI ahead of the forthcoming replenishment meeting.

These generous pledges, provided that they materialize, contrast markedly with the reluctance of African governments to fulfil their own commitments. Many of them fall short of the Abuja target of allocating 15 per cent of their public expenditure to health; 19 countries spend less on health now than they did when they signed the Abuja declaration in 2001.92

Because of insufficient investments by national governments and largely disease-specific efforts of donors, most of Africa’s health systems continue to be seriously understaffed, inefficient and characterized by glaringly inequitable access.93 They remain largely inadequate to deal with many of the continent’s health challenges. These include


37

both the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the extremely poor, and the “silent epidemic” of non-communicable diseases such as cancers, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases expected to increase significantly over the next 20 years. The number of Africans with diabetes, for example, is expected to rise from 12.1 million to 23.9 million.94

Access to Water and Sanitation

In July 2010, the UN General Assembly declared access to clean water and sanitation a human right.

Implementing this right will be a particular challenge in Africa where more than 40 per cent of people live in water-deprived areas. The amount of water available per person in Africa is not only far below the global average already, but is declining even further as groundwater levels fall and precipitation patterns change as a result of accelerating climate change. At present, only 26 countries are on track to attain the water-provision target to halve the proportion of the population without sustainable access to clean drinking water by 2015.95 Only nine African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Rwanda, Botswana, Angola, South Africa and Egypt) are expected to meet the MDG target of halving the proportion of the population without sustainable access to basic sanitation by 2015.96 At current trends, Africa will miss this target by over 300 million people.97

This slow progress is highly problematic because improved access to safe water and sanitation is essential to improve health.98 Currently, only 60 per cent of people in Sub-Saharan Africa have access to improved sources of drinking water and less than half have access to basic sanitation facilities.99 More than a quarter still have to practise open defecation, thus protracting water- and hygiene-related diseases such as diarrhoea and worm infections.100 The slow

progress also compounds and widens existing inequalities, as improvements in sanitation and water access are largely bypassing the poor.101 These inequities are becoming increasingly apparent in Africa’s cities where almost half the poor population suffers from at least one preventable disease caused by lack of safe water and sanitation.102

Increased intergovernmental activism includes the G8 Partnership on Water and Sanitation, the G20 Working Group on Water and Sanitation and the African Ministers’ Council on Water and its African Water Facility. This has not yet translated into national policies and investments necessary to address the lack of progress. By investing only an average 0.2 per cent of GDP in sanitation and hygiene, most African countries have missed the 2010 targets of the eThekwini Declaration which called for the sector-specific allocation of 0.5 per cent of GDP.103 As a result, total investment in Africa’s water sector remains far below the AfDB estimate of $11 billion per year required to meet the continent’s drinking water supply and sanitation needs.104 Other obstacles to progress are poor governance of the water sector, both nationally and with respect to Africa’s 63 shared water basins,105 the growing water needs of African agriculture, a lack of private-sector capacity in manual drilling, and limited capacity of community-based maintenance of water infrastructure.106

At the same time, a number of innovative partnerships, such the AfDB’s Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative, the CEO Water Mandate, the Sanitation and Water for All Partnership and Ecotact’s commercialized provision of affordable sanitation in urban slums, have shown that rapid progress is possible.107 There is also enormous potential for expanding simple water-harvesting techniques and savings from utility reforms.

Partnering around affordable sanitation services With the support of partners like the United Nations Foundation, Ashoka, UNICEF, and the Coca Cola Company, the social enterprise Ecotact provides affordable sanitation services in informal settlements and urban slums in Kenya. By setting up pay-per-use toilet facilities, Ecotact has improved hygiene in targeted communities, reduced pollution from human waste, generated employment opportunities for the urban poor and restored dignity through the provision of sanitation services. It also delivers highly impressive economic returns, especially if lower healthcare costs, reduced disruption to schooling and higher work productivity are considered. Built on commercial viability, Ecotact’s model is highly scalable and, given the rapid growth of urban slums across Africa, should be highly replicable. Sources: UNDP (2011), Growing Inclusive Markets Initiative


38

Even though several African countries are on the verge of meeting their MDG targets for hunger

reduction, the continent as a whole continues to be the world’s most food-insecure region.108 Hunger and malnutrition remain pervasive in many countries, and rising food prices are compounding the situation for millions across the continent, particularly in zones of protracted conflict and in fast-growing urban areas.109

Volatility of Food Prices

Food prices are higher now than at any time since 1984.110 Even though the World Bank’s Food

Price Watch sees Sub-Saharan Africa less exposed to risks related to soaring food prices as domestic food production is increasingly replacing imports and recent harvests have been good,111 the price spikes have deepened existing macro and micro vulnerabilities. On the macro level, countries with a high share of food imports and limited fiscal space like Burundi are driven deeper into current-account deficits and the possibility of social unrest as they become unable to use subsidies and price controls to shield their populations from inflation. On the micro level, higher prices make life even more difficult for Africa’s poorest, who already spend between 60 to 80 per cent of their income on food. Faced with reduced access to food and increased vulnerability to the seasonality of local food prices and markets, households are forced into unavoidable compromises, such as choosing cheaper (often less nutritious) food, selling productive assets, withdrawing children from school, forgoing healthcare, or simply eating less than they need.

The recurrence of food-related crises over the last few years has focused international attention on the tragic state of food security in Africa and given rise to a number of supportive initiatives such as the G8’s L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, and the World Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program. The French G20 Presidency has also prioritized food security, and especially the moderation of speculative trading in food commodities, for the 2011 Summit in Cannes. It is

planning to host the first ever meeting of the Group’s Ministers of Agriculture before the Summit. In addition, there are attempts to create more transparency of food stocks held by large exporters to avoid panic caused by market uncertainty about the availability of essential commodities.112

Structural Barriers to Food Security

At the same time, the fact that the number of Africans suffering from hunger had already been

on the increase well before prices spiked suggests that chronic and structural problems rather than mere price fluctuations continue to underlie much of the continent’s food insecurity. These problems include: disadvantageous international trade rules and subsidy regimes; a debilitating lack of essential infrastructure such as irrigation and storage systems; inadequate agricultural research; a lack of improved seeds, fertilizers, and plant protection material; poor soil and water management systems; poor access to credit and marketing services; as well as inefficient and wasteful agricultural value chains. Agricultural productivity is also affected by social realities such as persistent poverty and insufficient access of women to land and other essential resources.

These structural barriers are increasingly compounded by global trends. In the short-term, the gap between the continent’s domestic food supply and demand will widen as global consumption patterns continue to shift towards meat products, and more profitable bio-fuels supplant food crops. In the mid-to-long-term, the continent’s food system will experience an unprecedented confluence of pressures, including through the reinforcing impacts of population growth, climate change and environmental degradation.113

Agricultural Productivity

Over the last year, African countries and their partners have increased their commitment

to raise agricultural productivity on the continent, including through multi-stakeholder partnerships. For example, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) now has 25 signatory countries (seven more than last year) committed to spending at least 10 per cent of their national budgets on agriculture, to accelerate growth

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY

Food prices are higher now than at any time since 1984.


39

Partnering around the potential of Africa’s smallholder farmers A critical constraint to agricultural growth in Africa is lack of access to financing across the agricultural value chain, particularly among smallholder farmers. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has initiated financial partnerships and risk-sharing instruments with a number of institutions to mitigate the risk of lending by commercial banks and other financial institutions to smallholder farmers and value chains that support them. So far, AGRA and its partners have used $15 million in loan guarantee funds to leverage $160 million from commercial banks in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, benefiting more than 85,000 smallholder farmers and helping to boost regional food security. AGRA is also cooperating with the Central Bank of Nigeria to help leverage a $500 million governmental risk sharing initiative into $3 billion in new lending from commercial banks to support agricultural value chains and farmers in Nigeria.

in the sector to at least 6 per cent a year. Nineteen countries have finalized Agricultural Investment Plans.

Practical efforts to boost agricultural production are beginning to yield results in many countries, including Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania. Focused international assistance and innovative partnerships, like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), have helped governments to intensify production. Methods include: the introduction of high-yielding varieties of crops and improved techniques such as micro-dosing of fertilizers and drip irrigation; increased accessibility of production-enhancing inputs, credit and other financial services such as weather-indexed crop insurance; and improved markets and information. The increasing engagement of the private sector, including through the promotion of agricultural growth corridors and agro-industrialization, will help to increase resources available for agricultural investments.

These successes remain too small to feed the continent. Global food production will have to increase by 70 per cent over the next 40 years to keep

pace with population growth, and a significant part of that increase will have to come from Africa. There is an urgent need to scale up successful interventions, focus on Africa’s army of smallholder farmers and increase emphasis on staple food crops. There is also a need to ensure that the growing foreign investments in Africa’s arable land, sometimes referred to as “land grabs”, are transparent, add to the continent’s food security, benefit local farmers and communities, and avoid undermining social, environmental and governance systems.114

The dire social consequences of the recent food crises have shown that efforts to improve agricultural productivity and connectivity on the supply side need to be complemented by better risk management, efficient social safety nets and targeted nutritional programmes on the demand side. As with the implementation of agricultural development plans, national governments ultimately bear responsibility for this.

Practical efforts to boost agricultural production are beginning to yield results in many countries.Food prices are higher now than at any time since 1984.

40

CountryAfghanistan DR CongoBurundi Eritrea Sudan EthiopiaAngola LiberiaChadZimbabwe

Rank12345678910

Food Security Risk Index

maplecroft© Maplecroft 2011

Afghanistan

DR Congo

Liberia

Angola

Burundi

Zimbabwe

EritreaEthiopia

SudanChad

www.maplecroft.com

Extreme risk High risk

Medium risk Low risk No Data

Food Security Risk

This map is the visual representation of the Maplecroft Food Security Index (FSI). It provides a quantitative assessment of the availability, stability and access to food supplies, as well as the nutritional outcomes that result from food insecurity. Each country is assigned an index score based on its performance across 18 key indicators, classi�ed into four sub-indices: extreme risk, high risk, medium risk and low risk.

FOOD SECURITYAND HUNGER

MAIZE PRICES IN EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND WORLD PRICE 2006-2009

Sour

ce: F

AO (2

009b

) bas

ed o

n na

tiona

l sta

tistic

al d

atab

ases

.Uganda Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia International

PRICE VOLATILITY

Jan 06

USD

pe

r me

tric

ton

0

100

200

300

500

400

600

Jul 0

6

Jul 0

7

Jul 0

8

Apr 09

Apr 06

Apr 07

Apr 08

Jan 09

Oct 0

6

Oct 0

7

Oct 0

8

Jul 0

9

Jan 07

Jan 08

FOOD SECURITY

FOOD PRICE CHANGES Q1 2010 TO Q1 2011

Maize +74%

Wheat +69%

Palm oil +55%

Soybeans +36%

Beef +30%

Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group

41

global Hunger index and Food ProduCTion

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Algeria Angola

Benin Botswana

Burkina Faso Burundi

Cameroon Cape Verde

Central African Republic Chad

Comoros DRC

Congo, Republic Côte d'Ivoire

Djibouti Egypt

Equatorial Guinea Eritrea

Ethiopia Gabon

Gambia Ghana Guinea

Guinea-Bissau Kenya

Lesotho Liberia

LibyaMadagascar

Malawi Mali

Mauritania Mauritius Morocco

Mozambique Namibia

Niger Nigeria Rwanda

São Tomé and PríncipeSenegal

Seychelles Sierra Leone

Somalia South Africa

Sudan Swaziland Tanzania

Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia

Zimbabwe

2000 2007

LowModerate

SeriousAlarm

ing1999-2001 = 100Extre

mely

Alarm

ing

no data

no data

no data

no data

no data

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0

19902010

IFPRI Global Hunger Index 2010 Agricultural and Food Production Index

*

*

*

*

*

* indicates a value of

less than 5

Sou

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s: F

oo

d a

nd

nu

triti

on

se

cu

rity

Sou

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- IF

PR G

lob

al H

un

ge

r In

de

x 20

10 D

ata

un

de

rlyin

g t

he

ca

lcu

latio

n o

f th

e 1

990

an

d 2

010

Glo

ba

l Hu

ng

er I

nd

ice

s.

Sou

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: Afr

ica

n S

tatis

tica

l Ye

arb

oo

k 20

10 (

UN

ECA

, AU

C, A

fDB)

.


42

Climate change is already placing enormous burdens on African societies and economies,

and further complicating their development. At the same time, international efforts to counter its effects offer the continent new chances to profit from its vast carbon sinks, leapfrog dirty technologies, and embark on a path of green growth and clean development.

The Impact of Climate Change

For millions in Africa, the effects of climate change are already manifest in increasingly frequent

storms, droughts and floods, changing weather and precipitation patterns as well rising temperatures.115 In combination with existing environmental degradation,116 this reduces agricultural productivity and threatens food security,117 increases water stress, facilitates the spread of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, and erodes valuable human habitat. Through the acidification of seawater, rising sea levels and the spread of storm-surge zones, climate change also directly threatens the lives and livelihoods of millions of Africans dependant on the oceans for food and income.118

By all indicators, African countries are among the most vulnerable to the effects of sustained climate change.119 According to Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 12 of the 25 countries most at risk are African, with high levels of poverty, population density, and reliance on flood- and drought-prone agricultural land.120 These countries are finding it increasingly difficult to feed their people, protect them from the vagaries of nature, grow their economies and conserve their environments. The risk of resource-based conflict and destabilizing mass migrations only adds to these other multiple insecurities.

Climate Change Politics

Approaching the 16th Conference of Parties (COP 16) on climate change in Cancun in December

2010, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) continued to develop the continent’s common position and provided African

negotiators and Heads of State and Government with an improved communication and negotiation strategy.121 The Cancun Summit did not result in a comprehensive agreement or legally binding treaty. However, it did anchor previous agreements in the formal negotiation process, clarify details in important areas, revitalize the multilateral process led by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and establish a Green Climate Fund to help facilitate financial support to developing countries. With COP 17 poised to take place in Durban in November 2011, African states, supported by the AU, AfDB and NEPAD, have an opportunity to push for clarification and implementation of agreements reached in Copenhagen and Cancun.

Climate Change Finance

African countries require substantial additional resources to help them adapt to the unavoidable

consequences of climate change. For reasons of design, sequencing, coordination, and lack of absorptive capacity, they have been unable to benefit from financing instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Programme. The Copenhagen Accord includes the commitment to support developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation efforts with additional resources. This is in the form of fast-start finance ($30 billion for 2010–2012) and long-term finance ($100 billion a year by 2020), with 40 per cent of each fund earmarked for Africa.

To date, most of the fast-start finance appears to be coming from existing ODA budgets.122 The High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Finance convened by the UN Secretary-General and co-chaired by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi concluded that the long-term finance could be mobilized in addition to existing ODA budgets by auctioning emission rights, establishing a carbon-dioxide tax or emissions-transaction fee for international carbon trades, and relocating funds from fuel subsidies in developed countries to adaptation activities in developing countries.123

Despite persisting uncertainty about the sources and disbursement of proposed financing as well as the

CLIMATE CHANGE

By all indicators, African countries are among the most vulnerableto the effects of sustained climate change.


43

level of political commitment, there are already well over 20 bilateral and multilateral funds dedicated to receiving and managing pledged resources.124 These include the Global Environmental Facility, the World Bank’s Green Climate Fund and the AfDB’s Africa Green Fund. This proliferation of funds runs contrary to the Paris principles for aid effectiveness by complicating the reporting, monitoring and verification of financial commitments and will need addressing at the forthcoming High-Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The proliferation of funds also adds to the already heavy administrative burden placed on recipient states – and to their growing distrust in the willingness of richer countries to go beyond the formulation of elaborate mechanisms.

At the same time, there is growing realization that transfers of public revenue and carbon taxes in developed countries can provide only part of the solution. Reliance on carbon markets is also problematic, given Africa’s insufficient access, the low price of carbon and the uncertainty surrounding international negotiations and market mechanisms. Consequently, there is increasing focus on the potential of the private sector and international capital markets to complement the compensatory activities of developed countries through leveraging public flows, financing large-scale infrastructure projects and promoting market-based adaptation activities.125

Adaptation and Mitigation

Several African states, including Ethiopia and Rwanda, have made notable progress in

implementing their National Adaptation Programmes of Action. They have incorporated adaptation into their development agendas, and are pursuing

green policies such as fostering sustainable land and watershed management, combating deforestation, using taxes and market-based instruments to shift consumer preference, and promoting green investment and innovation. They have also continued to engage in multilateral initiatives like the Congo Basin Forest Fund, the Lake Chad Sustainability Programme and the creation of Regional Climate Centres. The Climate Information for Development in Africa (Clim-Dev) Programme aims to improve the continent’s analytical capacity, knowledge management and access to information on climate change.

Partners are also stepping up their supportive efforts across Africa. The World Bank, for example, has earmarked $7 billion for adaptation initiatives across the continent and is already implementing its climate change strategy for Africa in ten countries. This includes a project to improve a congested public-transport system in Nigeria, and the “Lighting Africa” initiative to provide carbon-free lighting to 250 million Africans by 2030.126

None of this, however, is enough to spark and drive the required transformation towards green growth and environmental sustainability.127 Much more is needed, from both African states and their development and business partners, to ensure that the continent has the resources, mechanisms and technologies necessary to adapt to the effects of climate change. This requires investment in transformative mitigation measures such as increasing renewable-energy generation and transmission capacity, and promoting sustainable land management. Given Africa’s low rate of electrification and deficient power grids, there is great opportunity for the deployment of alternative sources of energy for personal consumption.

Partnering around clean household technology Worldwide, nearly three billion people use polluting, inefficient stoves or open fires for indoor cooking and heating. This causes significant health problems and contributes to climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases. Several partnerships involving public and private actors, including the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, are successfully promoting the use of fuel-efficient stoves. These can save up to three tons of carbon per year (per stove) and have significant economic and health benefits. For Africa, the aim is to convert 100 million homes to clean-cooking technology by 2020, saving as much as three hundred million tons of carbon a year. Progress to date is encouraging, with millions of improved stoves already distributed across the continent and markets for clean household-cooking solutions emerging in many countries.

By all indicators, African countries are among the most vulnerableto the effects of sustained climate change.

44

Low* High Severe AcuteModeratel l l l l

Source: Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis, DARA & Climate Vulnerable Forum. http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/ * No African countries fall under the “Low” category for any of the indicators.

CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY

Health Weather Disasters Habitat Loss Economic

StressOverall

VulnerabilityCountry Year 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030Algeria l l l l l l l l l lAngola l l l l l l l l l lBenin l l l l l l l l l lBotswana l l l l l l l l l lBurkina Faso l l l l l l l l l lBurundi l l l l l l l l l lCameroon l l l l l l l l l lCape Verde l l l l l l l l l lCentral African Republic l l l l l l l l l lChad l l l l l l l l l lComoros l l l l l l l l l lCongo, Republic l l l l l l l l l lDRC l l l l l l l l l lCôte d’Ivoire l l l l l l l l l lDjibouti l l l l l l l l l lEgypt l l l l l l l l l lEquatorial Guinea l l l l l l l l l lEritrea l l l l l l l l l lEthiopia l l l l l l l l l lGabon l l l l l l l l l lGambia l l l l l l l l l lGhana l l l l l l l l l lGuinea l l l l l l l l l lGuinea Bissau l l l l l l l l l lKenya l l l l l l l l l lLesotho l l l l l l l l l lLiberia l l l l l l l l l lLibya l l l l l l l l l lMadagascar l l l l l l l l l lMalawi l l l l l l l l l lMali l l l l l l l l l lMauritania l l l l l l l l l lMauritius l l l l l l l l l lMorocco l l l l l l l l l lMozambique l l l l l l l l l lNamibia l l l l l l l l l lNiger l l l l l l l l l lNigeria l l l l l l l l l lRwanda l l l l l l l l l lSão Tomé and Principe l l l l l l l l l lSenegal l l l l l l l l l lSeychelles l l l l l l l l l lSierra Leone l l l l l l l l l lSomalia l l l l l l l l l lSouth Africa l l l l l l l l l lSudan l l l l l l l l l lSwaziland l l l l l l l l l lTanzania l l l l l l l l l lTogo l l l l l l l l l lTunisia l l l l l l l l l lUganda l l l l l l l l l lZambia l l l l l l l l l lZimbabwe l l l l l l l l l l

45

Source: The Climate Fund Update, http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/

(Source: REN21, Figures from Renewable Energy Potentials 2008.)

North America

OECD Europe

Transition Economies

Middle East

Rest of Asia

OECD Paci�c

Latin America

Africa

Solar PV

Solar CSP

HydropowerWind

Onshore

O�shoreWind

GeothermalElectri

cOcean

Energy

Electricity

Production

Potential Total

Electricity

Consumption0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

AFRICA’S GREEN GROWTH POTENTIALTECHNICAL POTENTIAL FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY POWER GENERATION AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS BY 2050 (EXAjOULES A YEAR)

MAIN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION FUNDS

Fund - name and acronym Type Adminstered by Areas of focus

Date operational

Pledged (USD mn)

Deposits (USD mn)

Approved (USD mn)

Disbursed (USD mn)

Share to Africa

Africa Green Fund Multilateral African Development Bank A 2011* no data no data no data no data 100%Adaptation Fund Multilateral Adaptation Fund Board A 2009 216 202 34 9 36%Amazon Fund (Fundo Amazônia) Multilateral Brazilian Development Bank A, M,

REDD2009 1,027 51 7 7 0%

Clean Technology Fund Multilateral World Bank M 2008 3,792 1,493 1,453 227 42%Congo Basin Forest Fund Multilateral African Development Bank REDD 2008 83 83 17 12 100%Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Multilateral World Bank REDD 2008 221 174 12 10 26%Forest Investment Program Multilateral World Bank REDD 2009 559 102 3 3 no dataGEF Trust Fund - Climate Change focal area 4 + 5

Multilateral Global Environment Facility - completed

A, M 2006 1,032 1,033 934 735 15%

GEF Trust Fund - Climate Change focal area 5

Multilateral Global Environment Facility A, M 2010 1,156 339 7 0 no data

Global Climate Change Alliance Multilateral European Commission A, M, REDD

2008 226 225 187 21 62%

Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund

Multilateral European Commission M 2008 170 60 60 60 no data

Green Climate Fund Multilateral World Bank A 2011* no data no data no data no data no dataHatoyama Initiative - private sources Bilateral Government of Japan A, M 2008 4,000 1,360 1,360 0 no dataHatoyama Initiative - public sources Bilateral Government of Japan A, M 2010 11,000 3,960 3,960 0 no dataInternational Climate Fund, Formerly ETF

Bilateral Government of the United Kingdom

A 2011 4,717 40 no data no data no data

International Climate Initiative Bilateral Government of Germany A, M, REDD

2008 519 516 504 504 14%

International Forest Carbon Initiative Bilateral Government of Australia REDD 2007 216 67 48 48 0%Least Developed Countries Fund Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2002 262 219 144 92 66%MDG Achievement Fund – Environment and Climate Change window

Multilateral UNDP A, M 2007 90 90 90 71 27%

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Multilateral World Bank A 2008 972 306 287 8 40%Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program for Low Income Countries

Multilateral World Bank M 2009 307 24 no data no data no data

Special Climate Change Fund Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2002 149 134 99 74 29%Strategic Climate Fund Multilateral World Bank A, M,

REDD2008 0 0 no data no data no data

Strategic Priority on Adaptation Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2004 50 50 49 49 20%UN-REDD Programme Multilateral UNDP REDD 2008 126 95 76 51 21%

Sour

ce: R

enew

able

Ene

rgy

Pote

ntia

ls (2

008)

A - Adaptation M - Mitigation REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries

* Operationalization envisaged for 2011


46

As African states are improving their domestic resource mobilization, and becoming

increasingly attractive investment destinations, the overall share of assistance from international partners in their development finance continues to decline, having now fallen to an average of about 10 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI).128 The importance of this assistance, however, remains high as predictable, concessional and targeted aid helps to lubricate the ability of governments to respond to the needs of their people, leverage other flows and ensure that they achieve developmental results. This having been said, several states, including Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, remain almost wholly dependent on international aid.129

Domestic Resource Mobilization

In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development highlighted the need for African states

to complement, and ultimately replace, external aid flows with domestic resources for development. Since then, many states have significantly strengthened their capacity to mobilize domestic resources through improving tax administrations, deepening the tax base, segmenting taxpayers and reducing widespread tax exemptions, particularly in the extractive industries. Thirty-one countries have joined the African Tax Administration Forum to promote and facilitate cooperation among revenue services. However, in many states revenue performance remains weak and too little of the mobilized resources are invested in social development.

For many countries, aid continues to represent a significant proportion of development finance. According to the African Economic Outlook 2010, of the 48 African countries with data available, 12 receive more aid than tax revenues, 24 receive aid equal to at least half the tax revenues, and 34 receive aid exceeding 10 per cent of tax revenues.130

Encouragingly, aid already represents less than 10 per cent of tax revenue in 14 countries.

Traditional Bilateral Partners

Aid flows are only one measurement of partners’ commitment to development, but they remain

an important one.131 For both the promises to double Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa made by the G7 at their 2005 Summit in Gleneagles, and the intermediate goal of the EU Roadmap to deliver 0.56 per cent of EU GNI in aid, 2010 was the target year. The most recent figures show that only three G7 countries (Canada, Japan and the US) have met their 2010 spending targets for Africa.132 While all others have fallen short of their promises, there are some important differences between them. The UK has made a more ambitious pledge, and has shown commendable increases in ODA to Africa since Gleneagles, particularly over the last year, and has fallen just short of its target. By contrast, Italy made an ambitious commitment but is delivering less aid now than it did at the time of the Gleneagles Summit, raising further doubts about its credibility at top decision-making tables. Both Germany and France are somewhere in between. While they have made ambitious pledges and have shown notable increases in ODA to Africa, they have fallen far short of their promises. Preliminary figures suggest that OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors overall have met just over half (52 per cent) of the increases in aid promised between 2004 and 2010.133

The consensus on increasing development assistance has undoubtedly been tested by the global economic crisis. Although some traditional donors such as Germany have already returned to strong growth, policies of fiscal austerity will continue to put significant pressure on aid budgets for some time. The last year has already seen a noticeable decrease in new commitments to Africa, and the OECD predicts a further reduction in the growth rate of aid, with the most marked deceleration in aid to Africa.134 The US administration has already agreed significant cuts in its foreign affairs and aid budgets in recent congressional negotiations.

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND COOPERATION

Aid flows are only one measurement of partners’ commitmentto development, but they remain an important one.


47

The G8 Muskoka Summit

In June 2010, the G8 met in Muskoka, Canada. Development issues on the agenda included maternal, newborn and child health, food security and accountability. As in previous years, several African leaders were invited to participate in selected aspects of the Summit, but there were very few noticeable outcomes for Africa beyond a slightly improved accountability framework, and the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health which commits G8 members to spend an additional $5 billion between 2010 and 2015 to accelerate progress towards MDGs 4 and 5 in developing countries.

It is doubtful that most donors will achieve the target of dedicating 0.7 per cent of GNI to development

assistance by 2015. While Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden continue to exceed the target, the most recent DAC figures show that most donors would have to almost double current ODA disbursements to reach it.135 Nonetheless, the announcements by France, Germany and the UK of sticking to the 0.7 per cent target, and in the case of the UK to reach it as early as 2013, leave some space for hope, even though current budget freezes mean that spending will need to increase drastically in a short amount of time.

The financial climate has accelerated several trends in how aid is viewed, managed and delivered. There is renewed interest in ways to increase the developmental impact of aid without necessarily increasing its volume, such as results-based financing, cash-on-delivery aid, the consolidation of engagements to reduce aid fragmentation, and bringing in the private sector.136 Increasing pressures on public finances have also led to renewed attempts to include expenditures for peacekeeping, climate finance and even the schooling of immigrants in ODA budgets. Repackaged and recycled commitments are increasingly opaque and difficult to monitor. The same pressures have sparked a search for complementary, if not alternative, sources of development finance, including market-based instruments. Several states including France, and the European Parliament, are investigating the use of levies on financial

transactions or international transport to cover the increasing need for such resources.

Bilateral Partners fromthe Global South

Although it remains difficult to separate their provision of technical and financial assistance

from trade and investment activities, emerging economies like Brazil, China and India are undoubtedly providing an increasingly important share of Africa’s development finance.137 Their growing willingness and ability to provide grants and concessional finance has increased the resources available to African states. It has also helped African states to reduce their dependence on OECD DAC aid, with its inbuilt policy conditionalities, high administrative costs and underlying Western development models.

Most emerging partners are styling their commercial engagement in Africa as South–South cooperation, complementing it with increasingly comprehensive development initiatives including financial assistance, infrastructure provision, and training and education. More Southern partners are emulating China’s biennial Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has evolved into an important platform for ambitious pledges and commitments to the continent. More of them are also recognizing the political and commercial benefits of sharing their own development experiences with African countries, sometimes in triangular partnerships with traditional donors.

Emerging economies are undoubtedly providing an increasingly importantshare of Africa’s development finance.

Aid flows are only one measurement of partners’ commitmentto development, but they remain an important one.

48

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

Japan*

USD 1.6 Bn USD 1.4 Bn

UK

USD 5.1 Bn USD 5.5 Bn

GermanyUSD 3.4 BnUSD 6.7 Bn

USUSD 9.6 BnUSD 8.8 Bn

CanadaUSD 1.9 Bn deliveredUSD 1.5 Bn target

G7 USD 38.2 Bn 2010 target

USD 28.9 Bn delivered in 2010

Notes: * Japan figures for ODA and targets tracks bilateral ODA net of debt relief only, but G7 totals are based on Japan's total ODA (with 2010 targets incorporating a Japan flatlined multilateral estimate from 2009 onwards.)

At Gleneagles, three G7 countries set 'volume targets' (Canada, Japan and the US). Four G7 countries set ODA targets as a per cent of GNI.

ItalyUSD 1.2 Bn USD 5.0 Bn

FranceUSD 4.4 Bn USD 8.0 Bn

TRACkinG ThE GLEnEAGLES COmmiTmEnTS

GLOBAL G7 ODA AS % OF GNI

UK

France

Germany

Canada

G7

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100%

0.1%

0.2%

0.3%

0.4%

0.5%

0.6%

USJapan

Italy

0.56%

(excluding debt)

Per c

en

t o

f GN

I

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

20

10

20

10

20

10

20

10

USD

BIll

ion

s

20

10

20

10

40

20

TOTAL G7 ODA AND ODA TO SSA

104%

Total ODA SSAChange 2004-2010

43%

25%

81%

71%

92%

36%

UK

France

Germany

Canada

US

Japan

Italy

represents portion of ODA to SSA

(2010 prices, excluding debt)

Not

e: T

hese

cha

rts

are

base

d on

act

ual v

alue

s. Pl

ease

not

e th

at

targ

ets

are

base

d on

sm

ooth

ed m

ultil

ater

al fo

r 200

4 an

d 20

05So

urce

: ON

E/D

ATA

Rep

ort 2

011

Sour

ce fo

r all

data

on

OD

A: O

NE/

DAT

A R

epor

t 201

1

EU target for 2010

TOTAL 2010 ODA AS VOLUME OF TOTAL 2010 ODA COMMITMENT

49

EXTERnAL DEBT, SSA 2005-2010

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

USD

Bill

ions

Perc

ent %

Total debt in $ billion

Total debt service $ billion

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Total % of GDP Total debt service % of GDP

Source: ECA and AU (2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011, Governing development in Africa – the role of the state in economic transformation

DOmESTiC RESOURCE mOBiLiZATiOn

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per c

ent

(%

) G

DP

TAX SHARE, 1990 - 2007, SSA

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

19

95

1996

1997

19

98

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

20

05

2006

2007

Upper Middle IncomeLower Middle IncomeLower Income

Source: African Economic Outlook 2011Note: Based on GNI per capita, economies are classi�ed as lower income, lower middle and upper middle. Classi�cation by the African Economic Outlook.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Net debt �ows (includes o�cial creditors, private creditors, net medium and long-term debt �ows and net short-term debt �ows)

Worker remittances

Net equity in�ows (includes net FDI and net portfolio equity in�ows)

Net private and o�cial in�ows

USD

Bill

ions

Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD

NET CAPITAL INFLOWS, NET PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL INFLOWS TO SSA 2001-2009

TOTAL OFFiCiAL AnD TOTAL PRiVATE FLOWS FROm OECD DOnOR COUnTRiES TO DEVELOPinG COUnTRiES

Source: Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) index includes calculations of numerous other private �ows from corporations, foundations, charities, individuals, universities, and religious organizations.

121

355

USD

Bill

ions

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

19911993

19951997

19992000

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

19921994

19961998

O�cial FlowsMore Complete CGP Total Private Flows

Total Private Flows (philanthropy, remittances and investments)

Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD

Source: African Economic Outlook 2011

Note: Based on GNI per capita, economies are classified as lower income, lower middle and upper middle. Classification by the African Economic Outlook.

Sources: OECD, Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) index includes calculations of numerous other private flows from corporations, foundations, charities, individuals, universities and religious organizations.

Source: ECA and AU (2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011, Governing development in Africa - the role of the state in economic transformation


50

Partnering around development experiences I: South-South cooperation

South–South cooperation (the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between countries of the global South) has become an important form of development partnership. While there is a tendency to style purely commercial deals with this label, the development effects of South–South cooperation are beyond doubt. The sharing of relevant experiences and best practices, in particular, has helped African countries avoid mistakes, leapfrog technologies and practices, and accelerate progress. Examples include Brazil and India sharing experiences in the rural health sector, Malaysia providing assistance in banking and legal issues, Indonesia sharing experience on sustainable rice production, and South Korea providing expertise on access to low-cost technology and education.

Partnering around development experiences II: Triangular partnerships

Triangular partnerships combine the resources of traditional development partners with the development experiences of emerging economies from the global South around specific development objectives in Africa. Encouraging examples include the Feed the Future Programme through which the US cooperates with Brazil to bolster Mozambique’s agricultural productivity. Specifically, the US funds and helps to organize targeted education activities based on Brazil’s agricultural-extension experiences. Some Brazilian seed varieties are well suited to Mozambique’s climate, offering higher yields and better resistance to disease and pests.

Institutional Partners andCountry Groupings

With bilateral aid budgets under increasing pressure, intergovernmental institutions like the

World Bank, the IMF, and the AfDB, as well as country groupings like the EU and OECD, have consolidated their central role in Africa’s development. Given their wealth of expertise and resources, and experience with some of the earliest success stories, they have become crucial champions of partnerships for development, adapting their strategies to reflect their growing support. In February 2011, for example, the World Bank launched its new, partnership-based Africa strategy, to guide the Bank’s work in the region through 2016.138 At the 3rd EU–Africa Summit in Libya in November 2010, the EU presented a Green Paper on Development

and adopted an action plan to 2013, explicitly based around partnerships for development.139

In November 2010, the G20 joined the ranks of intergovernmental groupings engaging in international development by adopting the Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth and its Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. To avoid overlap or competition with the G8, the G20 focus is on growth-related (rather than social or humanitarian) aspects of Africa’s development, including infrastructure development, job creation and financial inclusion. While many of the proposed initiatives and actions are encouraging, it remains to be seen whether the current French presidency can enthuse more sceptical group members.


51

The G20 Multi-Year Action Plan for Development

The Multi-Year Action Plan is part of the Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth agreed at the 2010 G20 Summit in South Korea. It specifies concrete and time-bound actions to be taken up to the end of 2014, including on infrastructure, human resources and development, private investment and job creation, food security, growth resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge sharing. Collective action through partnerships and accountability form the core principles of the Plan, some aspects of which have already been implemented, including the establishment of a High-Level Panel on Infrastructure Investment which is chaired by APP member Tidjane Thiam.

Philanthropy and Private Giving

Private capital flows have become a widely recognized source of development finance.

Even throughout the global economic downturn, such flows have outpaced official development spending. They are also recovering faster than most other flows.140 Reasons for this quick recovery include the arrival of new philanthropic actors, such as philanthropic investment firms that attract socially minded investors and intermediaries as well as the accelerating spread of innovative ways of giving and lending, such as web-based platforms like McC4 or Kiva that allow for the effective accumulation of small-scale contributions. There is a notable increase in “home-grown” philanthropy, with some of Africa’s richest individuals establishing private foundations to help address social and environmental problems in their countries.

By providing catalytic funding, leveraging resources, supporting long-term research and implementing partnerships, philanthropic actors are increasingly important in overcoming crucial obstacles to progress. Whether by driving the development of an effective malaria vaccine (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), increasing smallholder agricultural productivity with better seeds, soils and markets (Rockefeller Foundation) or improving the climate resilience in rural communities (Ford Foundation), they fill important gaps left by insufficient resources,

flexibility and reach of other development actors. They also often prove more willing to take calculated risks.

Debt Relief

Despite the enormous progress made in recent years through bilateral debt relief and

multilateral efforts like the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, massive debt burdens continue to constrain the development prospects of many African countries. On average, they still have to spend 4.8 per cent of GDP on servicing their (collective) external debt of $300 billion.141

The repercussions of the global economic crisis, increasing extension of concessional loans by Southern partners and the efforts of several countries to tap international markets to fund ambitious public-spending programmes have renewed concerns about debt sustainability and the possibility of a new debt crisis. According to the IMF and the World Bank, 28 African low-income countries are now rated as having a high or moderate risk of experiencing debt distress – more than at the time of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) six years ago.142 Moreover, 13 Sub-Saharan African countries that have reached their HIPC completion points and consequently received billions of dollars in debt relief are seeing renewed risks of debt distress.143

Massive debt burdens continue to constrain the development prospects of many African countries.


52

From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness

There is widespread agreement that aid is not the answer to Africa’s problems and that it must

be used not only to save lives in the short-term, but also to strengthen systems and increase countries’ capacity to drive their own development through economic growth and transformation in the long-term. There is also agreement that the available resources must be used effectively and efficiently to maximize their developmental impact. Unfortunately, progress in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action remains slow.

With OECD donors failing to meet their 2010 implementation benchmarks, a significant proportion of aid remains plagued by inefficiencies in delivery, management and disbursement. More than half of OECD DAC aid, for example, is still delivered behind schedule, causing an estimated deadweight loss of as much as 20 per cent of total aid.144 Other problems include unnecessarily high transaction and administrative costs due to a proliferation of initiatives and lack of coordination, burdensome conditionality, medium- and long-term unpredictability, a lack of alignment to country systems, and a fragmented

aid architecture. Many of these problems also hamper the implementation and spread of effective partnerships.

Aid effectiveness, as defined by the Paris Declaration, also places obligations on the recipients of aid, which many African states have yet to fulfil. They have been particularly slow when it comes to increasing the transparency of aid usage and the establishment of joint mechanisms for reviewing progress on their commitments. Recent surveys suggest that only 15 per cent have such a review mechanism in place.145 Even though several studies predict significant efficiency and effectiveness gains from increased transparency, African nations have also been slow in endorsing the International Aid Transparency Initiative, through which 18 donors have agreed common reporting standards.146

Positive developments include the African Platform on Development Effectiveness, created by African states before the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011. The European Union and other institutional donors have made further progress in harmonizing initiatives and increasing coherence of their efforts, including by involving the private sector in aligned and complementary activities.147

Available resources must be used effectively and efficiently to maximize their developmental impact.


53

PART II

LOOKING AHEAD:PARTNERING FOR

PROGRESS The last year has shown that the state of progress in Africa is almost as diverse as the continent itself. While enormous challenges remain in many sectors and countries, there are also encouraging signs of progress. The next few years will be critical as African countries attempt to translate this progress into tangible results and sustained transformation for their people ahead of the 2015 MDG deadline. Given the proven but heavily underutilized potential of partnerships for development, the second part of our report is dedicated to them.

54

MAIN PARTNERSHIP MODELS AND ACTORSAlthough the idea of partnership for development is hardly new, it is currently experiencing a well

deserved renaissance – as development needs continue to multiply, governments increasingly struggle to meet them, and a growing number of exemplary partnerships are showing what is possible. Attention is focused particularly on the potential of such partnerships to catalyse the energy, creativity and resources of nongovernmental actors, such as the private sector and civil society.

Despite the increasing attention, valuable lessons learned and successes in Africa and elsewhere, we do not see nearly enough of these successes replicated or brought to scale across the continent. We do not see effective partnerships in nearly enough sectors. Consequently, many opportunities to tackle problems and drive development are being missed. So, what can we do to realize more of the potential of partnerships for development, and spur more collaboration for progress?

The examples in the first part of this report show the enormous contribution partnerships are already

making to development efforts across the continent. They show that, under the right circumstances and with the right leadership, partnerships can fill crucial gaps in existing development efforts, mobilize additional resources, and extend opportunities, services and access to everything from infrastructure, health and education to income, finance and markets. They can also help to reduce risks and costs, optimize the allocation of scarce resources, create synergies, increase efficiencies, contribute to policy development, and drive research and technological progress by spreading knowledge and expertise.

The examples also show that partnerships can take many forms. As challenges and opportunities multiply, and interests and motivations converge, models have spread from small-scale cooperation between the private sector and civil society at community level, and public–private partnerships around large-scale projects, to a vast array of possible forms. However different, all these partnerships share two characteristics. They allow actors to combine

HOW PARTNERSHIPS ARE ALREADY CONTRIBUTING TO DEVELOPMENT International Organizations:

United Nations (UN) and its Specialized AgenciesInternational Financial Institutions (IFIs)

• International Monetary Fund (IMF)• World Bank Group• Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

• Asian Development Bank (ADB)• European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development• Inter-American Development

Bank (IDB) Group• Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs)

• European Investment Bank (EIB)• International Fund for Agricultural

Development (IFAD)• Islamic Development Bank (IDB)• Nordic Development Fund (NDF)

Country Groupings:Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)Arab LeagueEuropean Union (EU)G8G20North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)Organization of American States (OAS)Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD)Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

MAIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSAND COUNTRY GROUPINGS

National Governments and their AgenciesAfrican Union (AU) and its Programmes (including NEPAD)African Development Bank (AfDB)Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*

• Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU)• East African Community (EAC)• Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS)• Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS)• Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA)• Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD)• Southern African Development

Community (SADC)

*Official partner organizations of the AU

mAin PUBLiC SECTOR ACTORS – AFRiCA

55

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN:

MAIN PARTNERSHIP MODELS AND ACTORS

African Governments

African Governments and Developed Country Governments

African Governments with Developing Country Governments (South-South Cooperation)

African Governments /Developed Country Governments/ Developing Country Governments (Triangular cooperation)

African Governments and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)

African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)

African Governments and African Companies

African Governments and Developed Country Companies

African Governments and Developing Country Companies

African Governments, Developed Country Governments and Developed Country Companies

African Governments, Developing Country Governments, and Developing Country Companies

African Governments, African Companies and African International Organizations (e.g. AU)

African Governments, Developed Country Company and Developed Country International Organizations (e.g. EU)

African Governments, African Companies and Global International Organizations (e.g. UNDP)

African Governments, Developed Country Companies and Global International Organizations

African International Organizations (e.g. AU), Global International Organizations (e.g. World Bank), and Developed Country Companies

African Governments and African CSOs

African Governments, African CSOs, and Developed Country CSOs

African CSOs

African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs

African CSOs and African Companies

African CSOs and Developed Country Companies

African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs and Developed Country Companies

African Governments and Global CSOs

African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and African CSOs

ACTOR

Public sector Multilateral/International Organizations AfricanDeveloping/Global South

Private sector Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Socierty Organizations (CSOs)

Developed CountryGlobal

REGIONAL SCOPE

PUBL

IC S

ECTO

R PA

RTN

ERSH

IPS

PUBL

IC-P

RIV

ATE

SEC

TOR

PART

NER

SHIP

S*C

IVIL

SO

CIE

TY (

CSO

s)PA

RTN

ERSH

IPS

LEGEND

* All combinations can also include CSOs.


56

their capacities, expertise, resources, networks and comparative advantages in a way that adds value for each of them, and they allow them to engage in areas and issues in which they would or could not engage on their own.

Many of the examples underline the central role of the private sector.148 They prove that businesses have much to contribute to development efforts, and that, with the right incentives, information and enabling framework, they can deliver clear win–win outcomes for themselves and wider society. They also show that, built around commercial viability, private-sector approaches to development challenges are often scalable.

Many businesses now consider engaging in development as more than an issue of corporate social responsibility or philanthropy. Increasingly, they regard development activities as essential to their core business and a promising avenue towards growth, greater market share, increased efficiencies and lower risks and costs.149 This convergence between business interests and development objectives is changing the traditional one-dimensional model of government-led development.150 As businesses realize the commercial opportunities and benefits involved, they are increasingly willing to complement the

development efforts of African governments and international donors, and bridge important gaps in a results-oriented (because profit-driven) manner.

Together with philanthropic organizations, businesses have become the newest and arguably some of the most important allies of traditional development actors. Engaging them in partnerships has added much-needed capacity, expertise and resources as well as versatility, creativity and pragmatism to development efforts across the continent and has created manifold opportunities to accelerate progress.

At the same time, partnerships for development are not without their risks and potential pitfalls. If not coordinated with existing initiatives and closely aligned to national development frameworks, partnerships can complicate, dilute and even undermine other development efforts. They can also lead to harmful competition for resources and unnecessary duplication of effort. Partnerships often have high transaction costs, and complex decision-making processes can further burden already overstretched governments and cause problems of accountability and ownership. In combination with the tendency of many partnerships to develop in isolation, these well-known problems make it imperative to integrate partnerships closely into broader development strategies driven by African governments.

Businesses have become the newest and arguably some of the most important allies of traditional development actors.


57

How inclusive business models help to spread development

According to recent studies, people living on less than $8 a day have a combined annual income of roughly $5 trillion. More and more companies invest in understanding this segment of the population, often called the “bottom of the pyramid”. As they redesign or invent products to fit the cash flow of the poor, integrate them into their value chains, offer service rather than ownership models, and leverage existing distribution and payment platforms, development cooperation is undergoing one of its most fundamental transformations yet. Africa is at the centre of this change. Spurred by the success of business models like M-Pesa, more and more companies are extending their business to Africa’s poor, whether as employees, producers, suppliers, distributors, customers or sources of innovation. In the process, they are increasing access and opportunities, creating jobs, raising living standards, developing functional markets, cultivating entrepreneurship and spreading innovation. A number of donors, including Germany and the UK, have already expressed a clear interest in fostering the spread of inclusive business models to complement and expand government-led development efforts.

Sources: International Finance Corporation (2010), Inclusive Business 2010: Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; Business Action for Africa et al. (2010), Accelerating Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through Inclusive Business: Delivering Results: Moving to Scale.

There is no doubt that effective partnerships are already contributing to development

across Africa – but also that the number of people benefiting remains too small to effect systemic change. By whatever count, the number of successful partnerships for development is miniscule compared with both the potential and the need for them. Too often, activities remain small-scale, localized and isolated, as partners lack the capacity, resources or incentives to scale up their operations, replicate them elsewhere, or deliver more than piecemeal change.

Of course, partnerships for development are not, and will never be, a panacea for the continent’s many problems. Even brought to scale, they cannot solve governance deficits or conflicts, at least not in the short term; they cannot prevent refugee flows, droughts or crime. But they can help to improve access to and quality of development in many ways and, if scaled up, they can effect sustained social and economic transformation, particularly in the following key areas.

Basic Service Delivery

Poor access to basic services and public goods such as water, housing, healthcare and energy

is becoming an increasingly serious development challenge for millions of Africans. Conventionally seen as a concern for governments, there is increasing evidence that partnerships for development can help to improve access to basic services by increasing the efficiency and scope of delivery, offering alternative sources and methods of access, significantly reducing operating and unit costs, and pioneering novel methods of payment such as pay-as-you-go which can cater to the cash-flow realities of Africa’s poor.

There is no shortage of encouraging examples from Africa and beyond, including d.light’s production of affordable solar-powered lamps for extremely poor clients, Vestergaard Frandsen’s LifeStraw for easy and cheap filtration of drinking water, and the “Quality Public Services – Action Now” Coalition of Trade Unions.

Partnerships can do more than just increase access to services or improve their quality; they can also help to curb the politics of patronage, corruption and lack of transparency. For example, several service providers have begun to work with mobile-phone companies to develop direct-payment systems enabling users to pay providers without recourse to intermediaries.

HOW PARTNERSHIPS COULD BE DRIVING FURTHER PROGRESS

Businesses have become the newest and arguably some of the most important allies of traditional development actors.


58

Efficient and affordable public services are central to human development and economic activity. There is also increasing demand for services, especially in fast-growing urban areas. Therefore, there is great scope for replicating proven and commercially viable delivery models across places and sectors, and for nurturing micro-economies of agglomeration around these models.151

Access to Opportunities

Partnerships have contributed significantly to poverty reduction and social development

across Africa by extending opportunities to previously marginalized populations. They have contracted smallholder farmers to produce sorghum for beer-making and helped women to establish local distribution businesses for soft drinks. Particularly partnerships built around the power of modern telecommunication technology have created valuable new platforms for development, including through the low-cost provision of banking and other enabling services previously inaccessible to most Africans. Partnerships have also increased opportunities by creating or strengthening markets, integrating local populations into value chains, reducing numbers of intermediaries, and promoting skills formation. There is great scope to stimulate further economic growth, employment and human development by spreading access to affordable connectivity, applications and services, as well as economic opportunities, to more of Africa’s people, particularly women.

Access to Finance

Insufficient access to finance hampers the efforts and ambitions of individuals, companies and countries,

and constrains entrepreneurship, innovation and the expansion of markets. Collaborative initiatives such as the mobile-phone-based money-transfer service M-Pesa, the Partnership for Making Finance Work for Africa or AGRA’s cooperation with Standard Bank of South Africa and the Millennium Challenge Account to increase commercial lending to smallholder farmers, have already shown how to improve access to finance by leveraging existing flows, mitigating risks and facilitating the development of the financial sector. But particularly the all-important small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are so central to job creation and economic growth as well as

the rural economies that are so central to poverty reduction still lack sufficient access to finance. There is thus great scope to expand proven business models such as micro-finance, micro-insurance,152 m-commerce, linkage and community banking, remote distribution, and payroll-based lending.153

Access to Health

Lack of access to healthcare facilities, medical practitioners and medicine is one of the biggest

and most fundamental challenges for Africa’s poor and the continent’s development. It reduces productivity, places enormous costs on society, and prevents progress on every MDG. More than in any other area, partnerships in the health sector have proven their potential to complement and expand on the efforts of the public sector. Successes include raising awareness, developing and distributing vaccines and treatments, reducing costs, and increasing information on the availability of treatments. There remains great scope to expand partnerships further to strengthen health systems, increase the number of skilled healthcare personnel, and leverage the market size for investments in research and development. There is also a need to identify the reasons for the enormous success of healthcare partnerships and replicate them across other sectors.

Infrastructure

Improvements to Africa’s transport, energy and communication infrastructure have particular

impact on economic development and efforts to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals.154 Evidence collected by the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, for example, has shown that improvements in transport, energy and communications infrastructure have contributed substantially more to African per capita growth over the past decade than structural policies, and that an improved infrastructure stock could increase GDP growth rates in Africa by as much as 1 per cent.155 Partnerships for development are already contributing to infrastructure improvements by helping to raise capital, accelerate project delivery, reduce operating costs and improve maintenance, but given the enormity of the challenge there is great potential and need for


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REPLICABLE MODELS OF INCREASING ACCESS TO FINANCE

Approach Example/s Comment

The Equity Bank model Equity Bank The clearest proof that an exceptionally profitable business can be built by providing appropriate and affordable banking services dedicated to economically active low-income consumers in Africa.

Leasing for small businesses

Burkina Bail Small-business demand for alternative forms of finance, including leasing, remains high.

Overdraft finance and cash-flow smoothing for small businesses

Equity Bank, Mbinga, Stanbic Uganda

Unsecured overdrafts for small businesses are a fraught proposition for conservatively inclined banks but Mbinga’s kifuku product shows it can be done. Equity’s biashara imara product and Stanbic Uganda’s warehouse-receipts product are both serious attempts to address business cash-flow fluctuations with alternative forms of collateral.

SME lending Banque Misr Banque Misr proves it is possible to lend money profitably to very small businesses. Other organizations such as Access Holding and ProCredit, both active in Africa, also demonstrate that it is possible to replicate a standardized approach to small-business lending in different jurisdictions.

Bundling insurance through small loans

MLife, MicroEnsure

If consumers start to experience the benefits of insurance by seeing it pay off a microloan or compensate a farmer for weather-damaged crops, this will reinforce perceptions of its value among poorer consumers. Working through the continent’s burgeoning commercial micro-lenders could be a significant growth opportunity for insurers.

Paying social payments through bank accounts

Absa-David Subsidizing banks to open basic bank accounts into which social payments, such as an old-age grant, can be paid extends access while also providing beneficiaries with safe and cost-free means of receiving money.

The Mini ATM FNB As these devices are mobile-enabled, no landlines are required. The small size of the terminals means they can be housed in very small retail outlets and the retailer, not the bank, dispenses the cash.

Mobile payments M-banking The demographics of mobile-phone use, the early success of M-Pesa and other models, and the continuing flux around evolving business models all mean that this continues to be a space that will repay careful monitoring. Although the operational complexities and required investment are significant, the potential for large-scale success is clear.

Source: Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa.


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scaling up financing and operating models that have worked. Also, current partnerships are concentrated in a small number of African countries (such as South Africa and Nigeria) and sectors (such as energy and telecommunications), leaving significant scope for both functional and geographical expansion.

Agriculture

Agriculture is a key driver of economic growth, poverty reduction, human security and

social development. Partnerships have already helped to increase efficiency at all stages of the agricultural value chain from production to storage, trading, processing and retailing. They have increased access to finance, inputs like seeds and fertilizer, and weather information. Partnerships have supported basic and advanced research, and fostered a more holistic approach to rural development by promoting agricultural growth corridors and agro-industries. Nonetheless, Africa requires even greater sustainable increases in agricultural productivity to accommodate population growth and changing consumption patterns, achieve food security for its people, and produce enough surpluses to help meet

growing global demand for food and other agricultural products. There is particularly great scope for partnerships to strengthen agricultural value chains and improve access to rural credit, including weather-indexed crop insurance, and to productive inputs and markets.

Low-Carbon Growth

G iven its abundance of renewable resources and the general absence of high-carbon

legacy industries, Africa is well placed to embark on low-carbon growth. Partnerships have proven their abil ity to enhance energy and resource efficiency. Examples include the distr ibution of more efficient and less polluting cookstoves, increased access to mitigation technology, and support for investment in low-carbon infrastructure and renewable-energy generation.156 International support init iatives, particularly those agreed as part of the UNFCCC process, offer real opportunities to finance, scale-up, and embed such partnerships at the heart of Africa’s development and growth agendas on both the individual and industrial levels.


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Unfortunately, the transformative potential of partnerships remains constrained by several

obstacles. Specific operational and programmatic blockages vary, but many relate to poor enabling environments and governance deficits. These include weak institutions, burdensome bureaucracies, insufficient access to courts and other legal facilities, and budgetary and human-resource limitations of the public sector. Partnerships involving the private sector are not scalable or replicable where governments fail to remove such obstacles and cannot offer the necessary legal guarantees or incentive structure to underwrite a viable growth strategy. Endemic corruption is another major challenge: many good partnerships are impeded or even prevented by corruption, such as when unnecessary intermediaries pocket part of the benefits.157 In addition to such hurdles related to poor regulatory environments and weak governance, there are at least five structural and often crosscutting gaps hampering the initiation and spread of successful partnership models.

The Trust Gap

T raditional suspicions remain one of the most basic obstacles to new or larger partnerships.

Many governments and non-governmental organizations continue to mistrust the private-sector profit motive. They continue to view it mainly as a cause of social, environmental and economic problems, rather than as part of a potential solution. There is widespread suspicion that many companies engage in partnerships merely for reputation management, and that the benefits are offset by companies’ harmful behaviour in other areas. Many also fear increased corruption and reduced control as a result of companies’ growing engagement in delivery of public goods and services. Companies, on the other hand, often mistrust the reliability of government commitments, and may view attempts to address social weaknesses as coming at their expense. This trust gap is caused and compounded by transparency deficits, and the resultant lack of information and clarity about what each partner wants from the relationship.

The Information Gap

The lack of reliable, up-to-date and symmetrical information and data across many parts of Africa

severely hinders the planning and implementation of partnerships, particularly if the private sector is involved. Even the most enterprising companies are reluctant to scale up investment in partnerships without full understanding, or at least a deeper appreciation, of the needs, trends and benefits involved. Partnerships are often also hampered by insufficient information on the motivations, capabilities, resources and comparative advantages of potential partners.

The Imagination Gap

The information gap feeds into a gap in imagination. Without sufficient information, it is difficult for

many actors to escape institutional mindsets and cultures, to envisage new partnership models and pro-poor modifications of sourcing, production and distribution. Even with the necessary information, many actors struggle to see beyond traditional dichotomies and overcome institutional scepticism. Yet, this is often necessary to free the human and financial resources to drive replication or scaling of imaginative solutions – knowing the dots is one thing, connecting them is another.

The Resources and Capacity Gap

Even though new financing methods including hybrid financing that uses a mixture of debt,

equity and other financial instruments, are constantly being developed, there continues to be a notable lack of resources to plan, implement and operate partnerships for development. Given shareholder pressure for short-term profits, many international companies are reluctant to devote the necessary resources and capacities to partnerships with distant prospects of value creation. Many African actors, particularly in civil society and non-governmental organizations, simply do not have resources for up-front investments or capacities to staff and operate scaled-up partnerships. Here, national governments, international donors and multilateral development banks can play a particularly constructive role

OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS


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by providing catalytic investments to meet initial financing needs for scaling up or replication.

The Perceived Benefits Gap

Businesses are primarily interested in partnerships with potential to generate benefits such as

future resource streams. Therefore, low ceilings to perceived benefits, or insufficient scale, may prevent private-sector companies from engaging in a particular partnership. This may explain why small economies like Niger or Mali have difficulty in attracting public–private partnerships or those

built around inclusive business models. By contrast, large and populous countries like Nigeria or South Africa can offer economies of scale, large numbers of potential consumers and consolidated markets. This highlights the enormous potential for regional integration to increase perceived benefits through market expansion. Another obstacle to replication concerns the perceived benefits of intellectual property and trademarks. A partnership around an entrepreneur with a good idea may resist the replication of that idea by others, especially if the replication is perceived to deny business opportunities to the original entrepreneur.


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WHO NEEDSTO DO WHAT

The conditions needed to foster successful partnerships and adapt them to other regions, countries, and sectors are not a mystery. They include: a viable growth strategy based on realistic assessments of demand, receptivity, risks and absorptive capacity; a clear delineation of respective responsibilities and commitments; sufficient resources, capacity and expertise; full transparency; harmonized expectations and a common vision among partners; and the fulfillment of commitments. Naturally, the precise ingredients vary from case to case and are always firmly grounded in the local context, which reduces the usefulness of general prescriptions and recommendations. However, it is clear that all actors can do more to remove blockages, facilitate the spread of successful partnership models across the continent, and increase their developmental impact.


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African governments bear the main responsibility for the continent’s progress. While they depend on supportive global policies and agreements, it is up to them to provide the plans, frameworks and

conditions for their countries’ development and the realization of their peoples’ potential. Similarly, when it comes to fostering partnerships and maximizing their developmental impact, it is up to African governments to create the necessary conditions and incentive structures. They can do much to improve the attractiveness, scalability and sustainability of partnerships, and to contribute constructively at all stages.

AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

African governments can strengthen partnerships for development by...

• Clearly articulating, prioritizing and communicating development needs• Providing an enabling environment, which includes clear policies, sufficient administrative capacities at

all levels of government, and supportive legal and regulatory frameworks • Facilitating access to financial incentives, investment-risk-mitigation instruments and other benefits to

increase the attractiveness of partnerships• Providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing gaps at all stages of partnerships• Driving regional integration to increase market size and improve scalability and sustainability of

partnerships• Coordinating local, national and regional authorities to minimize the administrative burden on potential

partners• Leveraging the skills, resources and expertise of the African Diaspora to fill capacity gaps• Raising awareness through gathering and disseminating information, highlighting best practices and

drawing attention to specific opportunities• Ensuring full transparency of processes and accountability for results • Improving liaison mechanisms with the private sector and civil society, including through dedicated

contact persons and clear responsibilities in the office of the Head of Government and social ministries.

International donors have made a series of commitments to Africa, which they need to keep. They share responsibility for Africa’s progress, particularly when it comes to ensuring a level playing field, correcting

harmful global realities, particularly with respect to trade, climate change, the international financial system and achieving the MDGs. Given their resources, expertise, networks and influence there is much that international donors can contribute to initiating and supporting partnerships for development.

INTERNATIONAL DONORS

International donors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

• Leveraging their power to convene different types of stakeholders to facilitate and catalyze them around specific development challenges

• Mobilizing resources for partnerships and providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing gaps at all stages of partnerships

• Providing risk mitigation and other supportive guarantees, including by assuming some of the risks• Building the capacity of actors to engage constructively in partnership• Helping to collate information and guidelines by supporting the study of effective partnerships and the

dissemination of results• Minimizing overlap of initiatives and ensuring maximal coordination between initiatives• Providing forward-looking data on planned investments to facilitate partnership building around them.


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The private sector is increasingly important in Africa’s development. However, there are still too many companies not adhering to fundamental principles of corporate responsibility, such as those articulated

in the UN Global Compact. While private-sector actors should at least “do no harm”, there is enormous scope for businesses to add social, economic and environmental value. They can do so by modifying their business models to target the poor or integrate local communities and producers into their value chains, but also through cross-sectoral partnerships around specific development challenges. As providers of resources, innovation and expertise, private-sector actors often hold the key to the success of such partnerships.

PRIVATE-SECTOR ACTORS

Private-sector actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

• Showing leadership and building in-company commitment for partnerships• Managing expectations within companies and among partners• Managing shareholder expectations for short- and long-term results• Freeing human and financial resources for the identification, planning and implementation of

partnerships• Mobilizing business networks and sharing knowledge, lessons learned and expertise• Fostering peer learning • Using social-investment budgets to facilitate entry into new places or segments that may not otherwise

meet the financial-viability threshold for core business activities• Examining their entire business model to identify potential contribution to and opportunities for collaboration• Contributing expertise in project design, management and implementation to the solution of large-

scale challenges • Helping shape policy through constructive input, preferably through harmonized business associations• Improving their relations and capacity to engage with governments and civil society• Clearly communicating support needs and requirements for engaging in partnerships.

Civil-society actors, including non-governmental civic and social organizations, citizen groups, trade unions, the media and faith-based organizations, play a crucial function in the system of accountability

that underlies the success of all partnerships. Given the identified problems caused by lack of information and misperception of benefits and risks, there is also great scope for them to mediate and broker partnerships for development as well as draw attention to opportunities and need for such partnerships.

CIVIL-SOCIETY ACTORS

Civil-society actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

• Helping to identify and communicate development needs and partnership opportunities• Playing a crucial intermediary role between companies, governments, local entrepreneurs and

communities, as well as national and international finance institutions and donors • Collecting and sharing information on lessons learned and available supportive initiatives to help practitioners• Providing crucial checks and balances through monitoring partnership implementation, highlighting

shortcomings and reporting mismanagement• Supporting project improvements through collecting and sharing feedback at grassroots level• Supporting the development and utilization of accountability tools• Helping to identify, inform and educate (potential) beneficiaries of partnerships• Harnessing and sharing their experience in cultivating change agents at grassroots and national levels • Identifying synergies between initiatives and formulating a common agenda• Helping to improve coordination between initiatives to minimize unnecessary overlap and inefficiencies.


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Drawing broad conclusions from Africa’s raucously diverse experience over the last year is not

easy, even though some things have not changed. The continent remains marginalized at the top tables of global decision making and vulnerable to global economic trends. It continues battling to achieve social progress against a backdrop of rapid population growth, increasing urbanization and poor management of its human and natural resources.

The most striking developments have been in the political arena. Governance deficits are on display at all points of the African compass, including Libya to the north, Somalia to the east, Zimbabwe to the south, and Côte d’Ivoire to the west, with political progress in many other countries looking distinctly fragile.

And yet... there are strong grounds for hope, even where there has been most conflict and political turmoil. It is too early to say how things will turn out in countries facing difficult transitions. But leaders and people across the continent have not missed the point: the role of the state is to serve its citizens, not its rulers.

As we have argued before, the key ingredient for progress remains good governance – by the global community to ensure that Africa’s place and potential are fully supported, and most importantly by African leaders and people, to ensure that the continent’s vast resources are geared to positive ends.

The lingering effects of the global economic and food crises, as well as accelerating climatic and

demographic changes, complicate the achievement of responsive governance around a shared economic vision. But, as Africa’s growth and development agendas continue to converge, new approaches and solutions are becoming possible, and necessary. As we have argued throughout this report, partnerships for development are among the most promising, and potentially most effective, of these new options. They can complement, expand and improve government-led development efforts and, if scaled up, can effect positive structural change and sustained economic and social transformation.

Against this background, we have assessed how to strengthen, replicate and scale up the many successful examples of partnerships already evident in Africa and how best to create the policy framework and incentives needed to spur further collaboration for progress. We have come to the conclusion that all actors can do more to facilitate the spread of successful partnership models across countries and sectors – and that doing so is in their own self-interest. National governments can do more to ensure the regulatory conditions that allow partnerships to mature beyond small-scale and localized projects. International donors and institutions can do more to initiate and provide seed funding, risk mitigation and other supportive guarantees to innovative models. Private-sector actors can do more to move beyond traditional patterns of sourcing, production, and distribution, and expand their operations to previously marginalized segments of the African population. And civil society organizations can do more to play a constructive intermediary role and provide expertise and access at grassroots and national levels.

CONCLUSION

Partnerships do not shift the responsibility for progress away fromthe shoulders of African leaders and international donors,

even though they can help to spread the burden.


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The success of partnerships depends on clear delineation of respective roles, the availability of reliable information and, above all, the right incentives. For the private sector, profit-seeking is at the heart of the incentive structure, but brand validation and corporate responsibility also matter. National governments want access to networks, expertise and resources. Civil-society organisations want to see their specific issues addressed, and donors want to offset demands and increase the impact of their activities. Fortunately, understanding and acceptance of these different motivations is growing among the various actors. Together with the convergence of development objectives and business interests, rising pressures on international aid, as well as ample proof that partnerships can mature into self-sustaining and profit-making ventures with transformative effects this makes collaboration an increasingly attractive option for all sides.

However, in spite of the enormous value they can add, partnerships for development are certainly not a panacea for all of Africa’s problems. Even brought to scale, there are many challenges they cannot solve. As governments try to harness capacities and resources that are additional and complementary to their own, partnerships for development are only one instrument in their arsenal – albeit an increasingly powerful one. They do not replace good governance, strong institutions and political leadership as the core ingredients of progress. On the contrary, partnerships depend on them to be able to fulfill their potential.

Crucially, partnerships also do not shift the responsibility for progress away from the shoulders of African leaders and international donors, even though they can help to spread the burden. Donors still need to fulfill the extensive financial and political commitments they have made to the African continent and it remains up to African leaders to inspire processes and build practical capacities to translate the continent’s wealth and potential into tangible results for its citizens. It also remains up to them to protect these citizens from the vagaries of nature and the volatilities of the global economy, provide them with adequate public services and afford them the opportunities to feed and educate their children and make a decent living. For this they need to meet the interlinked challenges of growing their economies, conserving their environments, and achieving the MDG-based targets they set themselves a decade ago.

This is possible. We have seen renewed proof that rapid progress is achievable even in the most resource-deprived and insecure circumstances. We have seen that good governance, transparency and accountability bring results, and that economic growth can drive development if it leads to job creation, structural transformation and the spread of opportunities. And we have undoubtedly seen that partnerships for development can help to fill gaps, expand efforts and accelerate progress. We therefore end by calling on African leaders and their partners across regions and sectors to intensify their collaboration for the continent’s progress.

Partnerships do not replace good governance, strong institutionsand political leadership as the core ingredients of progress.

Partnerships do not shift the responsibility for progress away fromthe shoulders of African leaders and international donors,

even though they can help to spread the burden.


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AAP Africa Action PlanAEC African Economic CommunityAEO African Economic OutlookAfDB African Development BankAFMI African Financial Market InitiativeAGF Africa Green FundAGOA African Growth and Opportunity ActAGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in AfricaAICD African Infrastructure Country DiagnosticAMCEN African Ministerial Conference on the EnvironmentAMCOW African Ministers’ Council on WaterAMFm Affordable Medicines Facility – MalariaAPDev African Platform for Development Effectiveness APOC African Programme for Onchocerciasis ControlAPRM African Peer Review MechanismAPSA African Peace and Security Architecture ASEAN Association of South East Asian NationsASF African Standby ForceAU African UnionAUC African Union CommissionAWF African Water FacilityC10 Committee of TenCAADP Comprehensive African Agriculture Development ProgrammeCAHOSCC Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate ChangeCARMMA Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in AfricaCDI Commitment to Development IndexCDM Clean Development MechanismCEWS Continental Early Warning SystemCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCSR Corporate Social ResponsibilityDAC Development Assistance CommitteeEAC East African CommunityECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEDF European Development FundEFA Education for AllEPA Economic Partnership AgreementEU European UnionFAAP Framework for African Agricultural ProductivityFAO Food and Agricultural OrganizationFARA Forum for Agricultural Research in AfricaFOCAC Forum on China–Africa CooperationFSB Financial Stability BoardFTI Fast Track InitiativeFTT Financial Transaction TaxGAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security ProgramGAVI Global Alliance for Vaccination and ImmunizationGEF Global Environment FacilityGDP Gross Domestic ProductGNI Gross National IncomeHDI Human Development Index

HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative/ Programme)IATI International Aid Transparency InitiativeICA Infrastructure Consortium for AfricaICC International Criminal CourtICT Information and Communication TechnologyIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIFFIm International Finance Facility for Immunization IFI International Financial InstitutionIFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentIHP International Health PartnershipIIED International Institute for Environment and DevelopmentILO International Labour OfficeIMF International Monetary FundIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeITUC International Trade Union ConfederationLDC Least Developed CountryMCC Millennium Challenge CorporationMDG Millennium Development GoalMDRI Multilateral Debt Relief InitiativeMIP Minimum Integration ProgrammeMPI Multidimensional Poverty IndexNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentOAU Organization of African UnityODA Official Development AssistanceOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPCD Policy Coherence for DevelopmentPEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (Partnership)PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in AfricaPSC Peace and Security CouncilPSD Private Sector DevelopmentPPP Public–Private PartnershipREC Regional Economic CommunityREDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation SADC Southern Africa Development CommunitySDR Special Drawing RightsSME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNEP UN Environment ProgrammeUNESCO UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural OrganizationUNFPA UN Population FundUNICEF UN International Children’s Emergency FundUNIFEM UN Development Fund for WomenWBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable DevelopmentWEF World Economic ForumWDR World Development ReportWHO World Health OrganizationWTO World Trade Organization

LIST OF ACRONYMS


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All data used in this report are drawn from official and readily available sources, which are referenced below. Every effort has been made to cite the most recent figures, even though occasionally preference has been given to older but more reliable data. As with every report, the reader should be aware of the inherent limitations of the available data and projections as well as the considerable controversies around the prevailing methods of measuring progress. To the best of our knowledge, the information and data presented in this report was accurate and the most up to date available as of 20 April 2011.

Quoted averages may mask significant differences between individual countries and within regions. As far as possible, all amounts are adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Unless stated otherwise, amounts are quoted in United States Dollars.

Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce material from this report for educational, not-for-profit purposes providing that they acknowledge the Africa Progress Report 2011 as the source.

1 The Economist (2000), The Hopeless Continent2 IMF (2010), Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa: Weathering the Storm3 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy4 Boston Consulting Group (2010), The African Challengers: Global Competitors Emerge from the Overlooked Continent5 UNCTAD and Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin (2011), The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008-2009 and Developing Countries6 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy7 UNCTAD (2011), 5th Global Investment Trends Monitor8 AUC and UNECA (2010), Economic Report on Africa9 World Bank (2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments; see also World Bank (2011), Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011; UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update – Regional Annex for SSA10 UNWTO (2011), World Tourism Barometer 201111 IMF (2011), World Economic Outlook Update12 The Economist (2011), Africa’s Impressive Growth; see also Steven Radelet (2010), Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way13 AUC and UNECA (2011), Governing Development in Africa: The Role of the State in Economic Transformation14 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies15 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies16 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy, p. 34; UNTAD and UNIDO (2011), Economic Development in Africa Report 201117 AfDB (2010), Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa, AfDB Policy Brief, Vol. 1, Issue 418 Experts Group convened by Germany, Great Britain, Indonesia and Turkey (2011), The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a Final Deal, Interim Report19 UN-OHRLLS, UNDP and UNECA (2010), Outcome Document of the Africa Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Review of the Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action20 AfDB (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010 21 ODI (2010), Economic Growth and the MDGs, Briefing Paper 60; see also AfDB, AUC, and UNECA (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals22 IMF (2011), Emerging Africa Expected to See Rise in Investment23 UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update – Regional Annex for SSA24 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa25 McKinsey Quarterly (2010), Africa’s Path to Growth: Sector by Sector26 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies 27 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa28 AUC and UNECA (2011), Economic Report on Africa 2011: Governing Development in Africa – The Role of the State in Economic Transformation29 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance30 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance31 Only elections that took place between April 2010 and April 2011 are considered32 Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (2011)33 Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat34 Freedom House (2011), Freedom in the World 201135 AEO (2010), Database on African Fiscal Performance36 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid37 C-10 (2010), Domestic Resource Mobilization across Africa: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options38 Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International (2010), Revenue Watch Index 201039 G20 (2010), Anti-Corruption Action Plan: G20 Agenda for Action on Combating Corruption, Promoting Market Integrity and Supporting a Clean Business Environment, Annex III to G20 Seoul Summit Document

NOTES


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40 UNECA (2010), Opposition Parties in Africa: Fighting for Survival41 Transparency International (2010), Corruption Perceptions Index 201042 World Bank (2010), Quiet Corruption: Undermining Development in Africa43 AU (2011), Decisions and Declarations of the 16th Ordinary AU Summit44 The Economist (2011), The African Union: Short of Cash and Teeth45 Continental Advisory Research Team (2010), State of the Union Continental Report 201046 Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2010), Growth and Responsibility: The Positioning of Emerging Powers in the Global Governance System47 G24 (2010), Communiqué of 7 October 2010; see also Ngaire Woods (2010), The G20 Leaders and Global Governance, GEG Working Paper 2010/5948 G20 (2010), The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration49 EU (2010), Tripoli Declaration50 World Bank (2011), World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development51 Center on International Cooperation (2011), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 201152 Institute for Economics & Peace (2010), The Global Peace Index 201053 See Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen Hendrix (2010), Food Insecurity and Conflict: Applying the WDR Framework, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper; Frances Stewart (2010), Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper 54 Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer (2010), Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper55 Alex Evans (2010), Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper; see also The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2010), Resource Scarcity in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation?56 AU PSC (2011), Report of the Peace & Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa57 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 201058 There are substantial discussions on the effects of inequality. See, for example, The Economist (2011), The rich and the rest: What to do (and not to do) about inequality59 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 201060 ILO (2010), The World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond61 UN General Assembly (2010), Resolution A/65/L.1. For more information on the MDG Acceleration Framework see UNDP (2010), Unlocking Progress: MDG Acceleration on the Road to 2015.62 See, for example, Institute for Economic Affairs (2011), A New Understanding of Poverty63 ILO (2011), Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery; see also UNCTAD (2011), World Economic Situation and Prospects 201164 IFAD (2011), Rural Poverty Report 201165 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 201066 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa 67 UN-HABITAT (2010), State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011: Cities for All – Bridging the Urban Divide. See also Ben Arimah (2010), The Face of Urban Poverty: Explaining the Prevalence of Slums in Developing Countries, United Nations University Working Paper No. 2010/3068 Emmanuel Skoufias et al (2011), The Poverty Impacts of Climate Change, World Bank Economic Premise no. 5169 UNESCO (2011), EFA Global Monitoring Report: The Hidden Crisis – Armed Conflict and Education70 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 201071 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 201072 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010), The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics73 UNESCO (2011), Building Human Capacities in Least Developed Countries to Promote Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development74 AU (2010), Nairobi Declaration on the African Women’s Decade75 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 201076 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 201077 WEF (2010), The Global Gender Gap Report 201078 UN Commission on the Status of Women (2011), To Promote Women’s and Girl’s Access to Education, Training, Science and Technology; UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 2010; 79 UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 201080 Agence Française de Développement and World Bank (2010), Gender Disparities in Africa’s Labor Market81 ITUC (2011), Living with Economic Insecurity: Women in Precarious Work82 FAO (2011), The State of Food and Agriculture; CGD (2010), The Economics of Population Policy for Carbon Emissions Reduction in Developing Countries, Working Paper 229 83 WHO (2010), The World Malaria Report 201084 WHO (2010), World Health Statistics 201085 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; Also see Margaret Hogan et al (2010), Maternal Mortality for 181 Countries, 1980–2008: A Systematic Analysis of Progress towards Millennium Development Goal 5, The Lancet, Vol. 375, Issue 973086 APP (2010), Maternal Health: Investing in the Lifeline of Healthy Societies & Economies87 AU (2010), Summit Declaration on Maternal, Infant and Child Health and Development88 See Global Polio Eradication Campaign (2010), Annual Report 2010; WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Annual Measles Initiative Report 2010; Carter Center (2011), Guinea Worm Disease Campaign Nears Eradication Goal; WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 201089 GAVI (2010), Saving Lives & Protecting Health: Results and Opportunities90 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2011), 91 G8 (2010), Muskoka Declaration92 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing – The Path to Universal Coverage93 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing – The Path to Universal Coverage; WHO and UN Habitat (2010), Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings94 UNSG (2011), Uniting for Universal Access: Towards Zero New Infections, Zero Discrimination, and Zero AIDS-Related Deaths, Report by the Secretary-General; see also WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 2010; Whitaker Group (2011), Africa Health News; World Diabetes Foundation (2010), Annual Review 2010; AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 201095 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas96 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas


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97 WaterAid (2011)98 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 201099 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010100 WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Monitoring Report 2010: Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water 101 UNECA (2010), Equal Access to Basic Services in African LDCs: The Need for Coherent, Inclusive and Coherent Policy Frameworks102 WHO and UN Habitat (2010), Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings103 AICD (2010), Annual Report104 AfDB (2010), Financing Investments in Water for Growth105 AfDB (2010), Water Sector Governance in Africa106 UNDG (2010), MDG Good Practices Report 2010107 The Global Compact (2010), The CEO Water Mandate Guide to Responsible Business Engagement with Water Policy108 International Food Policy Research Institute (2010), Global Hunger Index 2010109 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; FAO (2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises110 The Economist (2011), The Future of Food: What is Causing Food Prices to Soar and What Can Be Done about It?111 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch112 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch113 UK Government Office of Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability114 IIED (2011), Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts? 115 WMO (2010), 2010 Equals Record for World’s Warmest Year, Press Release 96/2010116 FAO (2011), The State of the World’s Forests 2011117 The Economist (2011), Climate Change and Crop Yields: One Degree Over; see also UNDP (2011), Fast Facts: Climate Change and UNDP118 UNEP (2010), Environmental Consequences of Ocean Acidification: A Threat to Food Security119 DARA (2010), Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis; David Wheeler (2011), Quantifying Vulnerability to Climate Change: Implications for Adaptation Assistance, Center for Global Development Working Paper 240120 Maplecroft (2010), Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2010121 UNEP (2010), AMCEN Gets New Tool for Communicating Climate Change and Promoting an Effective Response in Africa122 WRI (2011), Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges123 The Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010), Final Report124 Development Initiatives (2011), Monitoring Climate Financing Architecture125 WEF (2011), Scaling Up Low-Carbon Infrastructure Investments in Developing Countries, The Critical Mass Initiative Working Report 2011126 World Bank (2009), Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa 127 UNEP (2011), Green Economy Report128 OECD (2011), Statextracts129 OECD (2011), Statextracts130 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid131 CGD (2010), Commitment to Development Index 2010132 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011 133 ONE (2011), ONE/DATA Report 2011 (based on the figures released by the OECD DAC on 6 April 2011)134 OECD DAC (2011), Development Aid Reaches an Historic High in 2010, Press Release135 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011136 OECD (2010), The OECD Fragmentation Index 2010137 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), Africa’s Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners: Options for Africa’s Development138 World Bank (2011), Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It139 EU (2010), EU Development Policy in Support of Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, Green Paper140 Hudson Institute (2010), 2010 Index of Philanthropy and Remittances141 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), External Debt in Africa, Policy Brief 3142 IMF and IDA (2010), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) – Status of Implementation143 IMF and World Bank (2010), Preserving Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries in the Wake of the Global Crisis144 OECD (2010), Indicators for Progress on the Implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness145 AfDB, AU and NEPAD (2010), Issue Paper on Ownership, Sustainability and Accountability for Results, 2nd Regional Meeting on Aid Effectiveness, Tunis, 4-5 November 2010146 Development Initiatives (2009), The Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency147 OECD (2011), The Role of the Private Sector in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Consultative Findings Document Final Report148 See, for example, IFC (2010), Inclusive Business 2010 – Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; APP and Concern Universal (2010), Doing Good Business in Africa: How Business Can Support Development; WBCSD (2010), Doing Business with the World: The New Role of Corporate Leadership in Global Development; UN Global Compact et al (2010), Innovating for a Brighter Future: The Role of Business in Achieving the MDGs149 Business Action for Africa et al (2010), Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals Through Inclusive Business: Delivering Results: Moving to Scale150 Accenture Development Partnerships (2011), Cross-Sector Convergence: A New View of Global Development; see also Michael Porter and Mark Kramer (2011), The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value, Harvard Business Review 151 World Bank Institute (2009), A Way to Effective Service Delivery in Fragile States: Public-Private Partnerships152 See Allianz Group (2011), Learning to Insure the Poor: Micro-Insurance Report; Swiss Re (2011), Micro-Insurance: Risk Protection for 4 Billion People153 See Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa154 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa155 AICDS (2009), Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation156 WBCSD (2007), Investing in a Low-Carbon Future in the Developing World157 WBCSD (2005), Business for Development: Business Solutions in Support of the Millennium Development Goals

acKnoWleDgeMenTsThe Africa Progress Panel would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Gill Bates (SIPRI), Christoph Benn (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), Timothy Brewer (WaterAid), Audette Bruce (UNDP), Daniel Coppard (Development Initiatives), Wouter Deelder (Dalberg), Dustin Dehez (Freie Universität Berlin), Shanta Devarajan (World Bank), Nicolas Douillet (UNDP), Hania Farhan (Mo Ibrahim Foundation), Ricardo Fuentes (UNDP), Cosmas Gitta (UNDP), Richard Gowan (NYU Center on International Cooperation), Alan Hinman (The Taskforce for Global Health), Aubrey Hruby (The Whitaker Group), Andreas Hübers (ONE), Michael Keating (UN), Michel Lavollay (Public–Private Partnerships Europe), Franklyn Lisk (Warwick University), Carlos Lopes (UNITAR), Aileen Marshall (World Bank), Jason McGeown (Maplecroft), Jonas Moberg (EITI), Benito Müller (Oxford University), Kate Norgrove (WaterAid International), Warren Nyamugasira (African Monitor), Paatii Ofosu-Amaah (AfDB), Patrick Osakwe (UNCTAD), Judith Randel (Development Initiatives), Alistair Rivers (Innovata LLC), Zahid Torres-Rahman (Business Action for Africa), Elisabeth Sandor (OECD), Guido Schmidt-Traub (CDC Climat AM), Lindiwe Sibanda (FANRPAN), Elisabeth Sköns (SIPRI), Tesfai Tecle (AGRA), Filippo Veglio (World Business Council for Sustainable Development), Alyson Warhurst (Maplecroft), and Sharon Wiharta (SIPRI).

The APP would also like to acknowledge the generous support from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the French Government and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Cover design, infograhics, overall design and layout: Violaine Beix, Thad Mermer, Carolina Rodriguez and Blossom Communications. Copy-edited by Nina Behrman.

Printed by Imprimerie Lenzi, Geneva Switzerland.

africa Progress PanelP.O. Box 157

1211 Geneva 20Switzerland

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Panel MeMbers

Kofi Annan Chair of the Africa Progress Panel, former Secretary-General of the United Nations and Nobel Laureate

Tony blair Patron of the Africa Governance Initiative and former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Michel camdessus Former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund

Peter eigen Founder and Chair of the Advisory Council, Transparency International and Chairman of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

bob geldof Musician, businessman, founder and Chair of Band Aid, Live Aid and Live8, Co-founder of DATA and ONE

graça Machel President of the Foundation for Community Development and founder of New Faces New Voices

linah Kelebogile Mohohlo Governor, Bank of Botswana

olusegun obasanjo Former President of Nigeria

robert rubin Co-Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign Relations and former Secretary of the United States Treasury

Tidjane Thiam Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Plc.

Muhammad Yunus Economist, founder of Grameen Bank and Nobel Laureate

The Africa Progress Panel promotes Africa's development by tracking progress,drawing attention to opportunities and catalyzing action.

The Africa Progress Panel prints on recycled paper

Documents

Africa Progress Report 2011