Synthesis Report onAfrica Local Council Oversight and

Social Accountability (ALCOSA)

February 2010

69406

Executive Summary

This report, based on a cross-country analysis of four East African countries- Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya, analyzes how local government councillors oversee local administration and are in turn held accountable by citizens. The report is primarily based on the findings of a World Bank Project- Africa Local Council Oversight and Social Accountability (ALCOSA).

Council oversight (referring to the mechanisms or sanctions by which councillors hold their executive in check) can only truly function if public officials are held accountable to citizens through the electoral and party systems and social accountability mechanisms. In addition, councils need to have institutional and individual capacities to carry out their mandates. The report examines these aspects of council oversight and finds that decentralization in all four countries has focused little on the lowest level of governance. In terms of legislative structure, except for Ethiopia, in the other three countries there is clear separation of the legislature (elected councils) and the executive (bureaucrats). Furthermore, in all four countries local governments have councils with standing committees to oversee specific aspects of the administration

The political environment in the four countries varies significantly with Kenya on one end with fairly robust multi-party politics and Ethiopia on the other end with a predominantly one party system and the incipient multiparty systems in Uganda and Tanzania. Uganda has the strongest local governance system because it has directly elected mayors and chairpersons and MPs have limited role in local government affairs (though centrally appointed RDCs can sometimes interfere with council functioning). The chairpersons and mayors in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya councils are not elected through universal suffrage. Also in Kenya and Tanzania, MPs have considerable say in local government functioning. Ethiopia does not have MPs at local level but the central party has a strong presence and control over local government functioning. Recall candidate provisions seem to be either non-existent or abused in all four countries. In Kenya there is no recall provision for poor performing councillors. In Tanzania generally citizens cannot recall a councillor before elections if the only reason is poor performance. In Ethiopia and Uganda, the system of recalling councillors exists but does not work effectively. Independent candidates are not allowed to run for local office in Kenya and Tanzania. While they are allowed to run in Ethiopia and Uganda, the provision is generally misused.

Various avenues of social accountability exist in all four countries. Village meetings are the most common mechanisms through which councilors give feedback to citizens in Uganda. However, given the irregularity of village meetings, this mechanism is not always effective. Similarly in Tanzania, village assembly meetings are required to be held every three months but they were rarely or never held. In Kenya, there are no legal requirements for local governments to provide citizens with information on council operations except for a summary of the annual budget (and even that is not obligatory but permissive.) In the absence of formal forums, public “barazas”, that is public meetings are convened by the provincial administration. In Ethiopia, there are periodic public assemblies held in kebeles that are chaired by the kebele or woreda administration or the agenda is provided by the kebele administration. Posting of local government information on notice boards and newspapers seem more common in Uganda and Tanzania compared to Ethiopia and Kenya. The radio is becoming a common mechanism of communicating with citizens in all four countries. User committees are increasingly involved in service planning and operation under sector specific programs. In all four countries local councilors are represented and support and oversee the performance of these committees and account back to the community members.

Strong local informal institutions and forums exist in all four countries. These institutions either function independently of the local government system or their leaders are also leaders in local government. In either case, they are yet to serve as an alternative means of holding local governments accountable to citizens.

To further empower citizens, there is need for strong legislation mandating councils to share information with citizens and requiring citizen participation in planning and budgeting processes. There is also need to intensify civic education focusing on rights and responsibilities; strengthen radio programs to communicate major council decisions; revive village meetings for giving feedback; and clarify the oversight and accountability roles and relationships between user committee, CSOs and local councils. Apart from playing an active role in planning, budgeting and monitoring services, CSOs should also be encouraged to work with citizens in building their capacity to access information and demand accountability.

Councillors in all four countries are poorly facilitated with regards to finances and infrastructure facilities. While Uganda and Kenya have strong local government associations, the association in Tanzania is weak and Ethiopia is yet to set up a similar institution. In terms of individual capacities, in Uganda, while the district chairperson has to fulfil minimum academic qualifications to be eligible for the post, no similar criteria exist for political heads at other levels as well as councillors. In Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya there is no educational requirement to become a councillor.

For local accountability to take root there is need for clear mandate and resources for local councils without which local level participation will be frustrated. Lack of discretionary funds renders citizens' engagement in planning and budgeting a mere theoretical exercise and limited visible investment reduces local citizens’ interest in the process and undermines local accountability. Therefore council oversight and downward accountability in planning and budgeting processes are analyzed within the discretionary space local governments operate in. In all four study countries, central transfers account for about 90% local government revenue. Moreover, own revenues form a miniscule percentage of local government revenues. In fact in Uganda and Tanzania, central government abolition of the main source of local own-revenue (graduated tax in Uganda and development levy in Tanzania) has further made the local governments upwardly accountable. Although central government oversight is important, in all four countries, excessive administrative control and multiple un-coordinated oversight activities have created undue transaction costs and diminished the discretionary space local governments operate in.

A significant constraint to effective local council oversight and accountability arises from limited council control over personnel. The interference from central government in staff matters such as central transfer of local staff due to political and other reasons have led to frustrations and lack of motivation for councillors. Reforms that seek to enhance local council autonomy in human resource management are a prerequisite to effective local council oversight. Reform interventions should ensure that local councils regain the autonomy in determining the size of the establishment, setting terms and conditions of service and incentive schemes and be able to hire and fire their staff. While Uganda has developed the innovative District Service Commission, the other three countries are still struggling to obtain the right balance between central control and local oversight.

Procurement is the most lagging among the studied issues in local council oversight. In Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, procurement functions have been recently taken away from councillors and granted to a separate independent body controlled by the centrally appointed local chief officer. This change in responsibility was a central government response to politicization and corruption of procurement processes by councillors. While in Tanzania, the council still retains control over hiring of procurement unit staff, in Uganda and Kenya, the procurement units are hired independently. In all three countries, council still retains the mandate to go over procurement plans and budgets, but its role seems quite minimal and perfunctory. In Ethiopia, procurement is independently carried out by the local administration and does not seem to require council approval in any region. Thus councillors and citizens have no oversight function in this regard. Under national standards and guidance, local governments should have the discretion to develop procurement strategies, identify associated processes, and issue contracts for goods and services. While removing procurement planning from core council functioning may reduce patronage in the short run, it also takes away the crucial oversight role of councillors required to keep the local governments accountable to citizens. Citizens who are represented by elected leaders are

3

inadvertently disempowered and have almost no role in the procurement process; hence the extent to which they can hold local governments accountable is limited. Legislation, enforcement and local capacity building have to be improved in this regard.

Thus, local council oversight and accountability depends to a large extent on the level of local autonomy and the existence of conducive legal, administrative and institutional framework for local decision-making in areas such as planning, budgeting, priority-setting, human resource management, procurement and implementation. Formal and informal civil society organizations have to take on a stronger role in keeping local governments accountable to citizens.

4

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................32. ALCOSA Background and Methodology............................................................................73. Local Government System in the Study Countries.............................................................8

3.1 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Uganda.............103.2 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Tanzania...........133.3 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Ethiopia.............173.4 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Kenya...............19

4. Institutional Assessment of Councils................................................................................224.1 Electoral System.................................................................................................224.2 Party Politics........................................................................................................244.3 Social Accountability...........................................................................................264.4 Council Capacity.................................................................................................31

5. Council Oversight in Planning and Budgeting..................................................................345.1 Planning and Budgeting in Uganda.....................................................................345.2 Planning and Budgeting in Tanzania...................................................................365.3 Planning and Budgeting in Ethiopia.....................................................................385.4 Planning and Budgeting in Kenya.......................................................................39

6. Council Oversight in Human Resource Management.......................................................407. Council Oversight in Procurement....................................................................................448. Conclusion........................................................................................................................45Reference.............................................................................................................................49

5

1. Introduction

Democratic decentralization ‘brings government closer to the people’ which is expected to

improve service delivery by making governments more responsive to citizen needs (Blair 2000,

Bardhan 2002). Existing literature suggests that management of local government officials’

political incentives and the existence of mechanisms fostering local accountability of

governments are necessary preconditions for effective local government performance—and thus

for the success of democratic decentralization. Nevertheless, most of the existing theoretical and

empirical research has dealt with the impact of intergovernmental administrative and fiscal

relations on the performance of the governance system as a whole and insufficient emphasis has

been paid to local accountability systems in the new institutional environment created by

decentralization policies (Eckardt 2008). The unfinished research agenda in the theory and

practice of decentralization thus demands the exploration of how local accountability systems

function and how they in turn affect local government performance and service delivery (Eckardt

2008). This report conducts an institutional assessment of councils in four countries- Uganda,

Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya- and analyzes how councils oversee local bureaucracy in planning

and budgeting, human resource management and procurement, within the discretionary space

provided to local authorities by central governments.

Local councils are the core units of decentralized governments. They make laws—as

representative bodies for collective decision-making—and they work with the local

government’s executive branch to deliberate on policies and implementation. At the same time,

they are assumed to represent citizens—by giving voice to individual citizens, civil society

organizations, and business groups—and by representing the needs of local constituents in

policy-making. It could be argued that local bureaucrats are also accountable to the citizenry

through the “short route of accountability” (World Bank 2004) wherein citizens as clients hold

service providers directly accountable, but in public sector production the direct link of client

power is frequently missing (World Bank 2004). The lines of accountability usually run from

bureaucrat to elected representative to citizenry wherein the administration is accountable to the

council and not directly to citizens. Though bureaucrats should be responsive to citizens (this

responsiveness is one of the measures of good democratic local governance), they should be

accountable to elected officials.

6

Several institutional factors interfere with the oversight responsibility of local councillors such as

their status. Although executive positions are generally considered to be full time, in many

settings, councillor positions are low paying and part time. In some developing countries, such as

Ethiopia, there are no safeguards against dual structures of accountability; councilors often

occupy roles as full-time executive functionaries dependent on, and accountable to, higher-up

bureaucracies as well as elected local officials. Also in many countries, councillor positions

overlap with key patrimonial, social, or other structures in the locality, thus blurring the lines of

accountability. Council oversight (referring to the mechanisms or sanctions by which councillors

hold their executive in check) can only truly function if public officials are held accountable to

citizens through the electoral and party systems and social accountability mechanisms. In

addition, they need to have institutional and individual capacity to carry out their mandates.

Free, fair, regularly scheduled elections and universal suffrage are the most direct mechanisms

for ensuring that those who govern are accountable to citizens. But elections are crude

instruments of popular control, since they occur at widely spaced intervals and address only the

broadest issues (Blair 2000, Devas and Grant 2003). Also vote buying, as observed in Uganda, is

a common feature of local level electoral practice which excludes those who cannot afford such

political purchases (Devas and Grant 2003). In many systems, opposition political parties make

for a powerful engine for enforcing accountability. The party in power often has strong

incentives to evade accountability, but opposition parties have their own incentives to uncover

wrongdoing and publicly hound incumbents for their misdeeds. They present a constant vision of

a viable alternative for doing public business in a different and perhaps better way (Blair 2000).

Such an alternative helps keep the party in power on a path of rectitude. However, this scenario

requires a strong party system at the local level, which is often not the case.

Social accountability mechanisms can give the poor and marginalized people a more direct voice

in the policies that local governments formulate and implement. Such mechanisms are often part

of broader efforts to deepen democracy and ensure a robust public sphere for citizens to give

feedback and control government action. The practical form of participatory practices and

arrangements include public meetings, citizen juries, forums for various social groups such as the

young or the elderly, neighborhood assemblies, multi-choice referendums accompanied by active

public debate and discussions, and activism by non governmental organizations and other

community groups. In some settings, citizens are excused from work and asked to meet to make

7

recommendations about local issues, drawing even the normally passive and disinterested

citizens into public life and activism (Lankina 2008). The study countries have adopted some

related measures in their decentralization processes as discussed under section 4.3. Examples

include participatory expenditure tracking surveys, village assemblies, as well as other

participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques. Yet, the link between these tools and local

councils are often weak and hindered by capacity constraints such as weak council capacity in

accounting and record-keeping and skill and pay differentials between local administration

officials and councillors. These capacity constraints create tensions and render elected

representatives unable to make the necessary decisions or to monitor and enforce accountability

from officials.

Even if sound social accountability mechanisms and high local capacity were to exist, councils

can only perform their oversight role within the discretionary space provided by central

governments. Inconsistencies in central government functioning such as shortfalls in central fund

transfers, cuts in unconditional grants and approval of unrealistic local budgets often undermine

the potential of local councils (Devas and Grant 2003). Within this space, how is bureaucratic

accountability to local public officials established?

The relationship between elected local councillors and executives pertains to planning and

budgeting, human resource management and procurement. Local councillors are supposed to

oversee the local government’s executive branch during the entire public financial management

process and provide local executives with constant feedback. This requires establishing a link

between planning and budgeting (whether budgets reflect planning) and between planned and

executed budgets (budget execution performance), and producing policy-oriented budgets

(outcome-oriented budgeting responsive to demands and preferences of local citizens). These

links are usually established through standing committees within the local councils similar to

public accounts committees at the national level. Best practices suggest that under these standing

committees there are also specialized committees to oversee specific areas of interest to the local

communities such as education, health or water. These committees –provided that they build

enough capacity to do so- periodically monitor the activities of the local governments based on

the budget cycles – namely, planning and formulation, execution, and reporting cycles- as well

as service delivery performances. Closely related to such a scrutiny mechanism is the oversight

over human resource management of the local government. Finally, local government’s

8

procurement processes affecting local communities and businesses need to be subject to local

legislative oversight.

Local council oversight function is therefore impacted by the robustness of the oversight

mechanisms in place and the capacity to implement oversight function amongst elected officials

as well as the capacity of citizens to exercise influence over their representatives. This report

compares across four African countries the degree and effectiveness of councillors’ involvement

in the formal and informal processes that respond to local needs and the extent to which this

involvement reflects local preferences. Specifically the report presents an overview of the

differences and similarities in the local council oversight processes in the countries as well as

some emerging issues and challenges. Section two provides details on ALCOSA background and

methodology. Section three analyzes the local government system including council oversight

structures in the study countries. Section four examines councils as an institution. This includes

analyzing the electoral and party system, social accountability mechanisms, and council

capacities in all four countries. Section five examines council oversight role in planning and

budgeting processes including auditing and monitoring implementation. Sections six and seven

examine council’s oversight role in human resource management and procurement respectively.

Section eight concludes.

2. ALCOSA Background and Methodology

ALCOSA project’s main objective was to improve knowledge through research and increase

awareness about oversight by local councils and community based organizations on local

governments. The project’s aim was to link good governance strategies to local decision-making

and service delivery mechanisms. In this regard, the project supported in-country and regional

dialogues on developing partnerships among the local councils, executive branch of local

governments, and community based organizations towards building more transparent and

accountable local governance mechanisms in Africa.

The four countries- Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya- were selected because they had

already embarked upon decentralization reforms to varying degrees. This is evidenced by the

move towards multi-party system and recent regulations in all four countries focusing on reforms

9

in local council functioning.1 The willingness to pursue the associated public sector governance

reforms –both at the national and local levels- is reflected in the countries’ PRSP and CAS

reports. Besides, other African countries are also exhibiting signs of implementing local

governance reforms, which are hopeful indications for capitalizing on the policy options

produced by the project. Therefore, the decentralization efforts in these countries, provided that

they are combined with a comprehensive framework including participatory oversight

mechanisms, offer a promising opportunity for sustained governance reforms in the region.

In each study country, we partnered with the local World Bank office and worked with selected

local institutions and individuals to conduct the research. The methodology included conducting

analytical studies in the four African countries to produce policy recommendations for the local

decision makers on ways to improve legislative and social monitoring. A background review was

conducted on local council oversight over local government operations, specifically in planning,

budgeting, human resources management and procurement. In addition, we worked with selected

individuals and institutions to carry out field research to substantiate and deepen the findings

from the background review (see annex I, II, III and IV for results framework for each country

study). The findings and recommendations of country studies were shared in country meeting(s)

and a regional forum held in Kampala which was also used as capacity building opportunities.

The Kampala regional forum at the culmination of the project was organized by the Uganda

Local Governments Association (ULGA), in partnership with the World Bank, Uganda Ministry

of Local Government, and the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability (ANSA-Africa). The

World Bank took on a secondary role at this stage to allow for civil society organizations to take

on the leadership role in organizing the forum and developing policy recommendations based on

country findings. The key objectives of the forum were to enhance regional dialogue, cross-

country learning and co-operation on local council oversight and social accountability; and to

discuss and develop policy options for future actions to enhance local council oversight and

social accountability. Participants represented different stakeholders including policy-makers,

civil society organizations, government officials, donors and researchers from the four study

1 In Uganda, The Local Government Act (1997) and subsequent amendment in 2001 clearly outline council powers and functions. Similarly, in Tanzania, The Local Government Reform Programme (1996-2000) and sector policies focus on reforming councils and committees to improve quality and access to service delivery. Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution provides for a strong federal structure. Within this framework, well endowed regions such as Tigray have established council oversight mechanisms. In Kenya, Local Government Act, Cap 265 details administrative and legal powers as well as functions and responsibilities of councils.

10

countries as well as neighboring countries of Rwanda and Burundi. The forum focused on the

four country reports prepared under the project and explored the applicability in other African

countries as well as lessons learned from other countries. Recommendations discussed at the

forum were further shared with World Bank and ANSA staff and next steps are currently being

finalized (further details including country reports can be accessed here).

3. Local Government System in the Study Countries

Decentralization in the four countries varies considerably in both level and mode, with Uganda

considered most decentralized and Ethiopia the least. Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya share a

similar colonial history of British rule. After undemocratic and indirect rule by the British these

countries saw gradual introduction of elected local governments during independence but there

was eventual recentralization in the 1970s. Local government reforms in 1980s promised

stronger local authorities with devolved powers and functions. Ethiopia’s decentralization is

relatively newer. While local bodies have existed for long, decentralization was established in

1991 when the country progressed from military to civilian regime.

Decentralization in all four countries has focused little on the lowest level of governance. In

Uganda villages are treated as an administrative unit, even though they are the only level where

elected leaders formally interact with citizens. In Tanzania, village assemblies do not have

legislative or executive powers and village local government is dominated by officials from

higher governments. In Ethiopia the lowest level of governance- kebeles do not enjoy the same

constitutional formality as regions, zones, woredas, or municipalities, but are in effect the

primary contact level for most Ethiopian citizens. In Kenya since there is no tiered structure, it is

difficult for citizens to interact with government officials. Thus in all four countries there needs

to be a renewed focus on the lowest tiers of governance.

Let us look into the governance structures and oversight structures in the study countries. All

four countries have robust local governance systems with well delineated council and

administration. Except for Ethiopia, the legislative framework in the other three countries

provide for clear separation of the legislature (elected councils) and the executive (bureaucrats).

Councillors are responsible for setting policies and overseeing technical staff that implement

them, thus setting the foundation for local council oversight and accountability. Ethiopia has a

unique environment in which political/party and administrative structures overlap with some

11

senior officers serving as members of the council as well. Members of administration, who are

council members may review and vote on their own plans and performance reports within the

council meetings. This structure fundamentally undermines local council oversight and

accountability.

In terms of oversight structures, all councils have standing committees to oversee specific

aspects of the administration. The council is the decisive political body of a local government

authority and the committees are supposed to oversee the implementation of council decisions,

i.e. the efficient and cost effective management of local government affairs. The committees are

therefore a crucial oversight organ between the council and the administration. Let us look into

the specific local government systems and oversight structures in each study country.

3.1 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Uganda

The current local government in Uganda is based on a system of hierarchy of councils. It

includes the village/cell (LC 1), parish/ward (LC 2), sub-county/municipal division/town (LC 3),

county/municipal/city division (LC 4) and district/city level (LC 5). There are 45,500 villages,

5,500 parish/wards, 911 sub-counties, 34 divisions, 98 towns, 151 counties, 13 municipal and 5

city division councils. Also there are 81 districts and one city council (see figure 1). Of these,

only the district and sub-county levels in rural areas and city/municipal/town councils as well as

city and municipal division councils in urban areas have both political authority and significant

resources. They are corporate legal entities which can sue and be sued. The other units are called

administrative units and are not corporate bodies and therefore can neither sue nor be sued (LGA

1997, Article 12).

12

District Councils (LC5)

No. in the country: 81 (including Kampala city)

Average pop: 307,025

Town Councils

No. in the country: 98

Average pop: 19,000

Municipal Councils

No. in the country: 13

Average pop: 59,000

Municipal Division Councils

No. in the country: 34

Average pop: 22,500

City Councils

No. in the country: 1

Average pop: (Day) 2.5m

(Night) 1.2 m

County Councils (LC4)

No. in the country: 151

Average pop: 148,344

Parish/Ward (LC2)

No. in the country: 5,500

Average pop: 4,290

Villages/Cells/Zones (LC1)

No. in the country: 45,500

Average pop: 500

Average size(Km2): 4.4

City Division Councils

No. in the country: 5

Average pop: (Day) 0.5m

(Night) 1.2 m

Administrative Unit

Local Government Unit

Figure 1: Local Government System in Uganda

Sub-county Councils (LC3)

No. in the country: 911

Average pop: 27,000

14

Adapted from Steffensen et al 2004

The local government civil service in each district in Uganda is headed by the Chief

Administrative Officer (town clerk in the city) He/she is selected at the central level by the

public service commission and is responsible to, and subject to, the general directions of the

local chairperson and the council.2 In addition, there is a Deputy Chief Administrative Officer

(CAO) and a number of Assistant CAOs and other officers and employees of the district as

council may determine (LG Act section 67). The political authority in all local government units

is the council, led by its chairperson. All council proceedings are presided over by a speaker who

is elected by the council.3 The council comprises of an executive committee consisting of

maximum five members nominated from the council by the chairman and approved by its

members. The local government councils also operate through the statutory organs such as

District Service Commission (DSC), District/City Contracts Committee, District Land Board and

Local Government Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC).

In the administrative units, at the county level, the council is constituted of all members of the

sub-county executive committees in the county. In addition, the district councillors representing

constituents in the county are ex-officio members. There is a chairperson and a vice chairperson

selected by the council from amongst its members.4 At the parish level, there is a council and an

executive committee. The council comprises all members of the village executives and sub-

county county councillors representing constituents in the parish are ex officio members. The

village council comprises all citizens above 18 years residing in the area. The chairperson elected

by the council nominates members of the executive committee. The administrative units do not

have a well established administrative structure but they have technical staff attached to them

responsible for coordinating activities at the respective levels.

In addition to local government units, statutory organs and administrative units there are

president-appointed Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) in each district. The RDC is

responsible for coordinating the administration of government services in a district, advising the

district chairperson on matters of national nature, and carrying out other functions as may be

assigned by the President or prescribed by Parliament (Constitution 1995, article 203, Local

Government Act section 71). Specifically, the RDC is responsible for overseeing proper

2 Similarly there is a Municipal Town Clerk for the municipal council, Sub-county Chief for a sub-county, Town Clerk for a town council and an Assistant Town Clerk for the city and municipal division.

3 City and district councils also elect a deputy speaker

4 The county council does not have an executive committee

implementation within the district of the functions that are not yet decentralized, especially those

related to defence, security and maintenance of law and order, as well as supervision of projects’

implementation.

Standing Committees

The council chairperson in local government units is supported by five sectoral committees5

composed of councillors whose number varies from district to district (Kisembo 2006). These

five committees are finance and planning; health and environment; production, marketing and

industry; works and urban planning; and education and sports and have specific mandates. For

instance, the standing committee on finance is mandated to review all minutes of the contracts

committee and awards made on a quarterly basis to ensure that care is exercised by the contracts

committee to safeguard the interests of council. No council member belongs to more than one

committee.

3.2 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Tanzania

Local government authorities (LGAs) in Tanzania are divided into rural and urban authorities.

Rural authorities are district councils, township authorities, ward development committees,

village councils and vitongoji.6 Urban authorities consist of city, municipal, town councils, ward

development committees (WDCs) and mitaa7 (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Local Government System in Tanzania

5 Usually local government units below the city and district do not have more than one standing committee due to resource constraints.

6 Kitongoji is singular while vitongoji is the plural form.

7 Mtaa (sometimes referred to as ‘neighbourhood’ and literally translated as ‘street’) is singular while mitaa is the plural form.

16

CITY Council (4)

MUNICIPAL Council (18)

TOWN Council (5)

WARD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES (2,555)

DISTRICT Council (106)

Townships

VILLAGE Council(10,397)

MITAA(1,755)

VITONGOJI (50,836)

Source: Dege Consult 2007, PMO-RALG, 2008

In the tiered governance structure in Tanzania, only the highest tiers of district and urban

governments have separate legislature and executive bodies with resources and assigned

functions. Most important decisions, such as planning and budgeting are carried out at this level

as well. Vitongoji- the lowest local government levels do not have any legislative or decision-

making powers and operate as a forum for transmitting orders from higher level governments to

the community. An elected chairperson mobilizes residents for development, payment of taxes,

and keeping records (REPOA 2007).

At the village level, the village assembly composed of all adult members elects a village council

as well as the council chairperson. The assembly does not have legislative or executive powers.

The village council also consists of all vitongoji chairpersons in the village and at least one-

fourth women council members. The village executive officer (VEO) appointed by the District

Executive Director (DED) serves as a non-voting secretary to the council. Similarly the township

does not have a separate executive structure and comprises chairpersons of the vitongoji in its

area, not more than three members appointed by the district council, and women appointed

according to political proportionality to make up at least one-third of the authority.

17

The ward is technically an administrative unit (not a local government unit) and consists of

village chairpersons in the ward, all VEOs, and non-voting members invited from civil society.

The councillor of the ward,8 elected by its residents, chairs the WDC, and the ward executive

officer (WEO) appointed by the DED, is a salaried non-voting secretary. The WDC is

responsible for coordinating development activities, planning at the ward level and linking plans

with the district level.

At the district level, the council consists of the elected ward councillors, members of the

parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the council, woman representatives,9 and

other MPs whose nomination originated from organs of political parties within the district

council jurisdiction. Members of the council elect a chairman and vice chairman from amongst

themselves. The chief executive officer also referred as District Executive Director (DED), is a

civil servant appointed by the Minister of Local Government. DED is the non-voting secretary as

well as the accounting officer to the council.

At the urban level, the mtaa has an institutional structure similar to the village except there is no

assembly deemed by law. Instead of a council the mtaa has a committee of up to six elected

members.10 It has an executive office headed by an executive officer appointed by the higher

urban authority. Similar to the vitongoji, the mitaa operate more as a forum for mobilizing

community participation and support than as organs of local governance (REPOA 2007).

The city, municipal, and town councils consist of members elected from the wards within them,

resident MPs appointed by the President, women members,11 up to three members appointed by

the minister, and the executive director who is the administrative head.12 The legislative head is

the mayor elected by the council members.13

8 Ward councillors are different from village chairpersons although there are a few instances where village chairpersons have been elected ward councillors.

9 Women representatives should be one-third of total members.

10 Residents elect three regular members, two women members and one chairperson.

11 Women representatives should not be less than one third of all the elected ward councillors and the MPs.

12 City council directors are appointed by the president, while directors of town and municipal are appointed by the minister.

13 To select the mayor each party represented in the council proposes one person and all councillors and MPs vote.

18

In the districts and higher urban authorities, the council is the decision-making political body.

The council’s administrative structure is the council management team typically comprising

department heads. In addition, to facilitate the execution of its functions, the councils at the

district and urban levels work through a standing committee system.

Standing Committees

There are two main types of committees at the council level: standing/sectoral committees and ad

hoc committees. With respect to standing committees the members of the committees have to be

members of the council and are elected by the council. Act no. 6 of 1999 section 13 provides for

the formation of three stranding committees in the district council, which are: The Finance,

Administration and Planning Committee; The Education, Health and Water Committee; and The

Economic Affairs, Works and Environment Committee. In urban local authorities, the law

provides for the formation of three standing committees: The Finance, Administration and

Planning Committee; The Economic Affairs, Education and Health Committee; and The Urban

Planning and Environment Committee.

In addition to the three standing committees, both district and urban councils are allowed to

establish up to three more standing committees. Legislation provides that the Minister

responsible for local government should approve such addition. However, there is nothing

against broadening the mandate of the three committees mentioned above, and this is seen as a

much more cost-effective solution than creating additional committees.

Besides these standing committees, councils may decide to appoint ad hoc committees under the

standing committees with a mandate relating to a specific task to be carried out. Councils can

also form service boards within the major sectors comprising members who are not councillors

with delegated powers.

All committees have specific mandates, which reflect council objectives. The finance,

administration and planning committee, for example, plays an active part in preparing the budget

and carrying out regular financial performance control. The committee further looks into the

management of tax registers as well as elaborating carefully designed investment plans, which

incorporate activities of possible donors and non government organizations (NGOs) dealing with

the public service. It also has mandate to review and proposes any changes to the administration

of the council.

19

In conducting council business, departmental plans go through the three standing committees

before being submitted to the full council. Two of the three standing committees have to forward

their business to the finance and administration committee, which in turn forwards to the council.

The fact that standing committees are paid for only one meeting in three months regardless of the

bulk of business they have to deliberate on, limits the scope of their oversight role.

3.3 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s current Constitution, ratified in 1995, establishes a federal structure based on nine

ethnic regional states and gives them the right to secede (Article 39 of the Constitution). Of the

countries studied, Ethiopia is the only one with a federal structure. The regional governments are

responsible for implementing economic and social development policies and for maintaining

public order, including administering a police force, and the federal state is responsible for all

powers not delegated to, or shared, with the regions.

Ethiopia’s nine ethnic regional states14—Afar, Amhara, Benishangul/Gumuz, Gambella, Harari,

Oromiya, Somalia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Tigray—have followed

an asymmetric pace of decentralization with the four most populous regions (Amhara, Oromiya,

SNNP and Tigray) decentralizing more rapidly than the other lagging regions. The government

of these four most populous regions decided in 2001 to move important sector departments (such

as health, education, agriculture extension, water supply and social sectors) from the zonal to the

woreda level.15 Transfer of power to woreda level in the other regions is still ongoing.

Overall, local governance structures exist at the region, zone, woreda and the kebele levels and

follow the same tripartite structure—an elected head of the administration, a council with an

executive committee and a sector bureau.

Each region has at its apex a regional council, with its council members directly elected to

represent woredas. Regions decide the number of representatives their woredas are allowed to

14 In addition, decentralization established two city administrations- Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. These city administrations have different governance structures but are considered equivalent of regions.

15 There is lack of clarity in the exact number of local governments. There is also varied use of terms in describing local governments, even periodically in legislation. Hence, some literature regards all local governments as “woredas”, whereas others distinguish woredas from “urban or city administrations.”

20

send. For example, in Oromiya, each woreda elects three delegates and in Southern region four

delegates to the regional council. Each regional council has a president elected by the council, an

executive committee and a regional sector bureau (which reports to the committee) to implement

the council mandate. The president selects executive committee members from among the

elected councillors who are then approved by the council. The president also appoints heads of

bureaus that are not elected council members.

The governance structures in the zones vary—in Southern Nations, zones (and Special Woredas

such as Konso) elect councils, which also form executive committees; in Amhara and Oromiya

there are no such elected councils and zonal executive committee members are appointed by the

regional council and include those from its own ranks. In all cases, zonal executive committees

are chaired by the zonal administrator and comprise, in addition to elected representatives, civil

servants from the technical bureaus and security officials. The sector bureaus have offices at the

zonal level.

At the woreda level, the woreda councils consist of directly elected representatives from each

kebele in the woreda. The woreda council has dual accountability: upward to its respective zonal

and regional executive committees, and downward to its electorate. The woreda cabinet (also

referred to as the executive committee) consists of around a dozen members of mostly sector

bureau chiefs. Woredas also feature a court, which falls under the authority of the regional

judicial apparatus.

Municipalities have executive committees or teams of 2-7 members usually appointed by a

higher level of government to manage them. At times an elected municipal council supports

these committees. For example, in Bahir Dar municipality, the seven member executive

committee is supported by an elected municipal council of 100 members.

Kebeles, the lowest tier of local government, do not enjoy the same constitutional formality as

regions, zones, woredas, or municipalities as they are not budgetary units and do not receive

financing from woredas. Kebele administrations consist of an elected kebele council, a kebele

cabinet (also referred to as the executive committee), a social court (comprising three judges)

and the development and security staff posted in the kebele. The kebele cabinet16 usually

16 The recently released ‘Good Governance Package’ by the Ministry of Capacity Building states that the kebele leadership will comprise seven cabinet members- four council members, a development agent, a health extension worker, and a chairman of the education board.

21

comprises a manager, chairperson, development agents, school director, representatives from the

women association and youth association. All the kebele cabinet members are members of the

council. About three kebele council members usually represent the kebele in the woreda council.

Below the kebele, formal structures vary. In Oromiya and Afar there are no formal sub-kebele

structures; in Amhara, communities are sub-divided into sub-kebeles (300-400 households), gotts

(villages of about 100 households) and mengistawi buden, or government teams (30-50

households). In Southern Nations, similar sub-kebele units are termed kantas, below which are

found ketenas.

Standing Committees

Woreda councils have standing committees to oversee sector activities. Members of these

committees sometimes lead the discussions in the quarterly meetings of the councils. But their

capacity and effectiveness vary from woreda to woreda. Woredas in Amhara, Oromiya, and

Tigray have four committees (Budget and Finance Committee; Social Affairs Committee;

Security Affairs; and Women Affairs Committee) while woredas in lagging regions such as Afar

are likely to have no committees.

3.4 Local Government System and Council Oversight Structure in Kenya

The system of local government in Kenya does not have a tiered structure, as is the case in the

other three countries, but is made up of autonomous units. These units of local authorities are

city, municipal, county and town councils. Broadly speaking, county councils are rural local

authorities, while city, municipal and town councils are urban local authorities.

Usually, the area of jurisdiction of a county council corresponds to that of a central government

administrative district unit. Municipal and town councils are established for large urban centres

and their areas of jurisdiction are usually excised from that of county councils in which they are

situated. For this reason, the areas of jurisdiction of most municipal and town councils are

surrounded by the area of the county council from which they were derived.17 Available

information indicates that there are a total of 175 local authorities in Kenya, made up of one City

council,18 45 Municipal Councils, 62 Town Councils and 67 County Councils.

17 Nairobi and Mombasa are the only two municipal councils whose areas of jurisdiction are not surrounded by that of any county council.

22

A local authority has both a political and an administrative arm. The political arm is made up of

elected and nominated councillors. Nominated councillors are proposed by political parties, in

proportion of the parties’ representation among the elected councillors, and the law requires that

the number of such nominated councillors shall not exceed a third of the elected councillors.

Once a council has been constituted, there is no distinction between an elected and a nominated

councillor as regards his powers or status.

At the apex of a local authority’s governing structure is the ‘full council’. This is the governing

body. The full council is made up of all the councillors in a local authority. The full council is

headed by a chairman (in the case of a county or town council) or a mayor (in the case of a city

and municipal council). The chairman or mayor and their deputies are elected biannually by all

the councillors from among themselves. The full council meets regularly to receive and consider

reports and proposals from its standing committees.

The administrative arm of the local authority is made of departments, the number of which

depends on the size and the functions and services being undertaken by a local authority. Large

local authorities, especially urban ones, usually have more departments. Typical departments in

a local authority include administration, finance, planning, engineering, housing and social

services, education and health. Departments are headed by technical or professional officers

appointed by the Public Service Commission (PSC) who are transferable from one local

authority to another by the PSC (but the PSC appears to have delegated this function to Minister

for Local Government.)

Standing Committees

The council conducts its business through a committee system. Every councillor, whether elected

or nominated, must be a member of at least one standing committee of the local authority. Each

standing committee is headed by a chairman, who is elected annually by the full council from

among the councillors. Each standing committee is responsible for overseeing specified

functions of the local authority. The standing committees to be found in most local authorities in

Kenya include the following: Finance, Staff and General Purposes Committee; Works

18 Nairobi was conferred the status of a city by a Royal Charter in 1950. Mombasa and Kisumu are known as “cities” but there is no statutory or other instrument conferring the status of a city on any of them

23

Committee; Planning Committee; Social Services Committee; Education Committee; Health

Committee; Environment Committee; and Water and Sewerage Committee

Each committee has a defined mandate. For example, the Finance, Staff and General Purpose

Committee, among other things, supervises revenue and expenditure management, procurements

and human resource management, receives audit reports and co-ordinates the general

administration of a local authority. The Education Committee supervises the education function

and is most prominent in the older and larger urban centres which provide both early childhood

and secondary education.19

Every department in a local authority reports to a particular committee of the council.20 The

general practice is for a departmental head to submit progress reports to the appropriate oversight

committee at its regular meetings.21 For example, the Treasurer, who is the head of the Finance

Department, is required to place before the Finance and General Purposes Committee, at regular

meetings, statements of monthly revenue and expenditures. During committee meetings, the

departmental head normally responds to queries from councillors arising from the reports tabled

before the committee. At these meetings, the departmental head also responds to any substantive

motion brought by a councillor on concerns in relation to service delivery or any other issue.

4. Institutional Assessment of Councils

While de jure, council oversight structures exist in all four countries, the operationalization of

these provisions is poor as elected councillors are in a much weaker position vis-à-vis the

appointed officials due to a number of factors including, low education levels, lack of control

over human resources, lack of information, poor facilitation and political party pressures.

Councillors are therefore likely to have their decisions overruled or manipulated by local

bureaucrats and central government. This seriously undermines their oversight and

accountability role. This section discusses how the political environment including the electoral

and party system, citizen oversight and council capacity impact on local council oversight and

accountability to citizens.

19 These include the City of Nairobi and the Municipal Councils of Mombasa, Kitale, Kisumu, Eldoret and Nakuru.

20 One standing committee may however oversee more than one department.

21 Most urban local authorities have monthly full council and committee meetings. The intervals between meetings for rural local authorities are usually longer.

24

4.1 Electoral System

One of the key prerequisites for successful decentralized governance and service delivery is an

effective political process that provides for popular participation in the election of councillors as

it determines the degree to which electorate can hold the elected representatives accountable.

Political local government structures share common features in the study countries. The highest

decision-making body is the local government council comprising directly elected councillors. In

addition, most councils have nominated members. Uganda council has members elected under

electoral colleges including women councillors, youth, and people with disabilities. Tanzania

also has appointed women members in the council. In Kenya, political parties can nominate

additional members to the council.22 Ethiopia does not have reserved seats for minorities in the

woreda councils though it has certain administrative staff such as head of women association that

are mandated to be women. As discussed earlier, regular operation in all the councils is

conducted through standing committees.

The chairpersons and mayors in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya councils are not elected through

universal suffrage23 whereas Uganda has a stronger system of local governance with directly

elected mayors and chairpersons.24 Moreover Uganda councils are also stronger because MPs

have limited role in local government affairs (though centrally appointed RDCs can sometimes

interfere with council functioning). In Kenya and Tanzania, Members of Parliament have

considerable say in local government functioning. Ethiopia does not have MPs at local level but

the central party has a strong presence and control over local government functioning.

The manner in which the elections are organized and conducted also impact on the extent to

which the councillors can perform their oversight and accountability functions. For instance, in

Uganda, commercialization of elections has now developed strong roots in spite of the party

22 There are numerous documented cases where the Minister nominated more councillors than is permitted by law or where political parties’ nominees were overlooked.

23 In Kenya, a currently evolving popular view is that mayors and chairmen of local councils should be elected directly by citizens for a period of five years rather than being elected by the councillors on a two years’ term, as is presently the case. The arguments in support of this proposal are twofold. One is that a mayor or chairman so elected would be insulated from the obligation to please his fellow councillors so as to retain his position in the council; and the other is, having been elected by popular vote, these leaders would be accountable to the electorate rather than fellow councillors. 24 Wollmann (2004) argues that directly elected mayor system results in strengthened administrative leadership and enhanced political accountability in comparison to the council elected mayor system.

25

discipline associated with multi-partyism. Unfortunately, it has gone as far as “buying” votes by

paying cash or distributing essential goods among voters by candidates or their agents (Golooba-

Mutebi 1999). If this is repeated extensively, it implies that accountability by the elected

representative to the electorate is non existent.

In terms of recall and independent candidate provisions, they seem to be either non-existent or

abused. In Kenya there is no recall provision for poor performing councillors. In Tanzania

generally citizens cannot recall a councillor before elections if the only reason is poor

performance. In Ethiopia, citizens are legally empowered to recall their elected representatives if

their behaviours and actions are contrary to their responsibilities and mandates. But the recall

measure seems to be used by the party to mobilize people to remove opposition party members

or members who fall out of favour with the ruling party. Similarly in Uganda the system of

recalling councillors exists but does not work effectively. Citizens report that procedures are too

complicated, so they wait until the time of elections to express their displeasure towards a

councillor. The system is further rendered faulty by the fact that even those councillors who no

longer perform due to loss of interest or other circumstances often do not step down and if they

do, their positions are often not filled.25 Posts have been filled mainly when the councillor

concerned has died.

Similarly, independent candidates are not allowed to run for local office in Kenya and Tanzania.

While they are allowed to run in Ethiopia and Uganda, cases illustrate that the provision is used

by party renegades and influential elites who usually join a party after being voted to office. In

other words, the provision brings in persons who present themselves as independents in pursuit

of purely personal interests, not as holders of views which diverge from those of political parties.

4.2 Party Politics

Local councils operate in an open political environment, often affected by national and local

dynamics. In a multi-party environment, differences in political affiliations are often played out

at the local level, affecting the relationship between various political factions within the council,

as well as the relationship between the council and the central government. Political interference

from the higher level (central government or the higher level council) can influence decision-

25This is not the case with Members of Parliament (MPs) positions in Uganda which are mandated to be filled within a stipulated time.

26

making at the local council level and constitutes a significant impediment to effective oversight

and accountability.

The political environment in the four countries vary significantly with Kenya on one end with

fairly robust multi-party politics and Ethiopia on the other end with a predominantly one party

system and the incipient multiparty systems in Uganda and Tanzania. In Kenya there seems to be

a fair representation of different parties in the local councils. But political party affiliations do

not seem to significantly influence councillors with respect to local authority operations. Where

factionalism develops, it is not always based on political party affiliations but rather on the

personal agenda of councillors and local community interests. In Uganda, as mentioned earlier,

widespread “buying” of votes by candidates is leading to dwindling demand for accountability

from councillors as citizens have “sold” their right to do so. The predominance of one party in

most councils also leads to party ideologies and preferences taking priority in decisions taken in

the council. In Tanzania local councils with a majority of opposition councillors are constantly

opposed by the government and are only able to implement their decisions when they have

numerical superiority in the council (see Box I), whereas their counterparts in predominantly

ruling party councils have to take directives from the ruling party or government agents. In

Ethiopia senior administrative officers are also party operatives. In addition, a number of local

administration staff members occupy dual roles as councillors. These full-time executive

functionaries are dependent on, and accountable to, higher-up bureaucracies, as well as elected

local officials. This creates a conflict of interest and undermines the councillors’ ability to

oversee. Thus, the oversight functions of the council are seriously compromised as most cabinet

members in all woredas are also members of the council and are thus unable to objectively

oversee the cabinet.

27

4.3 Social Accountability

Studies have observed that appropriate mechanisms or sanctions by which citizens can hold their

local council accountable comprise the weakest link in local council oversight and

accountability. Outside the electoral process discussed earlier, citizens have limited formal

mechanisms through which they can hold councillors accountable. Some of the formal forums of

interaction between councillors and citizens are as follows:

Village meetings

Interviewees in Uganda reported that village meetings are the most common mechanisms

through which councillors gave feedback to citizens. However, given the irregularity of village

meetings, this mechanism is not always effective. Interviewees reported that village meetings

currently concentrate on issues such as security and land dispute settlements rather than

receiving feedback from the councillors. In Tanzania, while the village assembly is cconsidered

the most powerful and decisive organ in the village, its functions as defined by the act are too

broad (e.g. economic and social development) and no mechanisms are in place for the assembly

to remove any council members before the end of the tenure. Village Assembly meetings are

required to be held every three months but researchers observed many villages where they were

rarely or never held. The main reason cited by interviewees was the lack of financial

transparency by the village governments (for example, the income and expenditure statements

28

BOX I: Opposition Members’ Influence in a Council in Tanzania

An example of multi-party system enriching the oversight process can be observed in Karatu district,

Tanzania, where the opposition party controls the council. This helped to bring more educated people into

the council who also had stronger economic power that they used to bring benefits to their wards. Several

interviewees in Karatu agreed that the better education and higher economic power of the councillors

translated into more effective oversight. The staff interviewed noted that these councillors were more

critical and thorough in reading the reports presented to them. As evidence of seriousness and self-

confidence, the opposition councillors in Karatu locked out the DED in 2005 because the DED was absent

and unresponsive when the full council was in session. The interviewees commented that this would not

have been possible in a ruling party- CCM dominated council.

were not presented during such meetings). The non-implementation of agreed projects was cited

as another reason. There have been sporadic instances of village assemblies acting as catalysts

for change. For instance, in a northern village in Tanzania, the assembly managed to have the

chairperson and head teacher removed when financial irregularities were revealed through Public

Expenditure Tracking Surveys (see Box II).26

In Kenya, there are no legal requirements for local governments to provide citizens with

information on council operations except for a summary of the annual budget (and even that is

not obligatory but permissive.) In the absence of formal forums, public “barazas”, that is public

meetings are convened by the provincial administration to discuss development and security

issues and other concerns in the community. This provides the local councillor the opportunity to

interact with constituents and other stakeholders such as NGOs, CBOs and development

partners. In Ethiopia, there are periodic public assemblies held in kebeles. But these do not seem

to represent independent voices as in a number of cases, they are chaired by the kebele or woreda

administration or the agenda is provided by the kebele administration. Cases where the kebele

community tried to hold the kebele or woreda administration accountable for service delivery are

rare (see Box III).

2626 The name of the village is withheld as the case is ongoing.

29

BOX II: Tanzania Village Assembly Acts on PETS Results

The decision to conduct PETS was made at a village assembly following capacity building efforts by

an NGO. The assembly decided to form a committee to track funds in the education sector. The

results of the survey revealed that funds had been misappropriated by the village chairman and the

school head teacher. The councillor and the DED were informed. Initially no action was taken.

However, disappointed by the authorities’ inaction, the villagers decided to boycott public meetings

and refused to contribute to any government-funded project. The DED office was forced to take

action to investigate the matter further and resultantly the village chairman and the head teacher lost

their jobs and were taken to court.

Public Postings and Radio Programmes

Posting of local government information on notice boards and newspapers seem more common

in Uganda and Tanzania compared to Ethiopia and Kenya. Information posted includes budgets,

plans, proposed bylaws and ordinances, annual reports and information of receipt and

disbursement of funds.

Apart from public postings, the radio is becoming a common mechanism of communicating with

citizens. For example in Uganda, the chairperson of Kasese District has airtime on Radio

Messiah to inform people about council plans and achievements as well as to answer any

emerging questions. It was reported that through this mechanism, land disputes between the

Basongola and the Bakonjo were discussed and mitigated. Inspired by this, Masaka Municipal

Council in Uganda also plans to start radio programmes to provide information to the citizens.

Some council sessions were reportedly broadcast live on local radio stations in Tororo District.

Similar use of radio was observed in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya.

User Committees

User committees are increasingly involved in service planning and operation under sector

specific programmes. In Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya local councillors are represented

and support and oversee the performance of these committees and account back to the

community members. In all four countries, user committees seem to function effectively in

influencing certain aspects of education, health and water supply. For example, in Ethiopia,

kebeles commonly form community committees – such as water users’ committees to oversee

spring management and maintenance, health brigades to drain and spray malarial areas, or

special women’s committees to raise consciousness, provide education and mobilize female

30

BOX III: Kebele Assembly’s Attempt to Influence Local Government in Ethiopia

A rare case of kebele members trying to hold the administration to account was in Mudda Sanqalle

kebele in Lome woreda in Oromiya region. The river in the kebele was discharging toxic wastes into

the farms causing health issues in domestic animals and community members. The community came

together and tried to convince woreda officials of the need to divert the river away from the farms but

to no avail. Thus the community mobilization did not result in positive outcomes.

labor. Each kebele also has parents-teacher associations and school boards to deal with school

management issues and complaints.

In addition to the above forums, an important opportunity for councillor and citizen interaction is

through monitoring events and physical inspections such as those carried out jointly with

technical staff on specific programmes. Also citizens in all countries reported meeting

councillors on a one to one basis to discuss specific issues of concern. Councillors usually do not

have office facilities in their constituency like MPs do. Hence such encounters usually took place

at the councilor’s residence or place of work. Another mechanism for interaction and feedback is

the citizen charter. The association of local authorities in Kenya has developed a citizen guide for

use by local authorities. The guide is intended to facilitate effective and faster access to service

delivery by providing basic information on services provided by the local government, eligibility

criteria if applicable, the process to access, documentation required, cost if applicable and the

procedures for channelling complaints. The goal is to improve accountability and transparency in

service delivery and to empower citizens by equipping them with the information necessary for

them to hold their local officials accountable. Under the current Rapid Results Initiatives

programme of the Government of Kenya, most local authorities have developed citizen charters

but it is too early to assess their implementation.

There are other avenues for interaction, which are not directly accessed by any members of the

local community but rather by their ‘representatives’ at different levels. These include citizens

providing feedback to community management entities such as Parish Development Committees

and Area Programme Management Committees like in Masaka Municipal Council in Uganda. In

Tanzania, there is a Local Government Day (in regional centers) to show case the activities

undertaken by local councils where citizens can voice their views.27 In Ethiopia, membership-

based mass organizations such as women and youth associations are adopting a more

independent stance towards government. The EC Non-State Actors study (2004)28 notes, for

example, that the women and youth associations in Tigray and Amhara Regions are engaging

regional governments on issues of policy and are working more collaboratively with sector

bureaus and less under their direction.

27 The Association of Local Government Authorities (ALGAK) in Kenya has proposed that Kenya borrow this practice from Tanzania.

28 Quoted in Silkin et al 2005.

31

Involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in holding local councils accountable in the

four countries vary but in all cases CSOs are acknowledged as legitimate representative

institutions at the local level, whether they be NGOs, customary, faith-based or other form of

membership-based organisation such as service user groups. A number of initiatives have been

undertaken in the auspices of CSOs that have the potential to enhance the capacity of citizens to

hold their local council accountable. For example, a coalition of NGOs in some districts in

Tanzania has undertaken Public Expenditure Tracking Studies (PETS) in its councils.

Preliminary reports have been shared with the relevant Members of Parliament. In Kenya, a

local NGO- Christian Partners Development Agency- has set up community neighbourhood

assemblies in constituencies in Western Kenya to audit the performance of MPs and other local

leaders to ensure improved service delivery. The reports touching on corruption, insecurity and

poor service delivery have been forwarded to the provincial administration officials and the

police for action.

Attempts by civil society organizations to hold local governments accountable have had a

number of challenges interacting with citizens and local officials. For example, in Uganda,

although NGOs stand to represent the interests of the electorates they have no direct linkages to

the elected leaders especially at LC 3 and LC 5 levels. Furthermore, according to the 1997 Local

Government Act, it is generally understood that local governments are supposed to monitor the

NGOs but the framework in which this coordination must take place is not well articulated. In

some cases, this failure to articulate the framework of coordination has led to clashes between

local governments and the NGOs. For example, civil society involvement in monitoring of

poverty eradication expenditures through the formation of Poverty Action Funds (PAFs)

Monitoring Committees now established in several districts, seem to have caused uneasy

relationship between the NGOs and the district technical staff. This inadvertently constrains the

oversight and advocacy role of NGOs.

Strong local informal institutions and forums exist in all four countries. These institutions either

function independently of the local government system or their leaders are also leaders in local

government. In either case, they are yet to serve as an alternative means of holding local

governments accountable to citizens. For instance, in Kasese District in Uganda, interviewees

32

remarked that the previous elections of 2006 were directly tagged to the attitudes of the

candidates towards the re-establishment of the ‘Obusinga’ (king) cultural institution. The

interviewees reported that the king attracts a lot of respect from the people. The power and

institutional relationships through which the religious and ethnic leaders can be involved in the

decentralized context to contribute to the development agenda need to be further studied,

elaborated and formalized as in some cases these religious and cultural leaders are legitimate

representatives of their constituents. In Ethiopia, there are also community-based organizations

in the form of funeral associations (iddirs), rotating credits (iquubs) and various church-related

organizations. Their energy is generally directed towards specific activities (such as group

savings and credit schemes, patrolling clan grazing boundaries and building churches) that fall

outside the official development process. Studies have looked into involving such traditional and

informal institutions in social accountability approaches (see Dercon et al 2004, Clark et al 2004)

and have concluded that in general the process needs to be voluntary and evolutionary and

approached in a cautious manner.

4.4 Council Capacity

Unlike national political leaders, councillors in all four countries are poorly facilitated with

regards to finances and infrastructure facilities. Because of budget constraints in Uganda, local

government units below the city and district do not have more than one standing committee (see

Box IV) and 75% district councils are unable to meet even once a year (Monitor 18th May 2008).

Further, political patronage in Uganda has resulted in creation of 24 new districts by the central

government between 2004 and 2006. This creates additional resource constraints for local

governments. In some regions of Ethiopia there are no woreda standing committees. Kebeles

usually do not have standing committees because of resource constraints. Another example of

resource constraint impacting council oversight is in Tanzania, where under-resourced

committees meet only once every three months thus limiting the scope of their oversight.

Researchers in all four countries observed lack of basic infrastructure, such as well equipped

offices with computers, electricity and information management systems in local governments.

These capacity issues constrain council capacity to effectively exercise their oversight and

accountability mandates.

33

In addition, lack of education is an impediment to councillors’ oversight function. In Uganda,

while the district chairperson has to fulfil minimum academic qualifications to be eligible for the

post, no similar criteria exist for political heads at other levels as well as councillors. 29 A number

of local elected officials do not have the capacity to comprehend accounts and reports submitted

by line departments because of inadequate education. In Tanzania,30 Ethiopia and Kenya there is

no educational requirement to become a councillor. Thus the councillors often have low levels of

literacy compared to the line agency heads who are salaried full-time civil servants.

Functioning local council oversight relies on the assumption that local elected representatives

have an incentive to respond to the needs and preferences of local populations and that citizens

are able to hold their local councillors accountable for their performances. The election of local

government councillors is the most basic precondition for effective council oversight and

accountability. Ideally, it should establish an obligation on the part of the councillor to represent

the interest of the constituents and right on the part of the constituents to demand service and

29 Attempts were made by Parliament to mandate minimum academic qualifications of councillors but the President vetoed it. He argued that it was not possible to 'legislate' people out of governance of their country.30 The Ministry has been trying to rectify the issues related with limited councillor capacity by organizing capacity-building interventions in areas related to councillor roles and responsibilities, meetings and committee work, financial management, and other relevant skill areas.

34

BOX IV: Resource Constraint in Uganda Councils

Field research in Uganda found that lack of resources in districts and lower level councils seriously

impedes committee oversight functions. For example Lyantonde district with ten councillors finds it

difficult to have more than one standing committee after forming the executive with five councillors

and the election of the district speaker and deputy speaker. This scenario is very common in lower

local governments where the councils are far smaller than in districts and cities. Moreover, there are

several vacant positions in the sub-county councils with no time limitation on when they should be

filled. Because of this some sub-counties are forced to have only one committee, the General Purpose

Committee, which compromises their oversight function. The sub-county chief of Kilembe sub-

county, in Kasese District, reported that having one committee is the major cause of role fusion

between the councillors and technical staff. The same issue was observed in Panyango sub-county in

Nebbi district. Thus, lack of resources has a direct negative impact on council oversight role.

accountability. This link is further strengthened by the fact that councillors are paid by revenue

raised locally from the constituents.

But this has not always been a straightforward process. Recently, councillors in Kenya and

Uganda have been agitating to be paid from the consolidated fund other than the locally raised

revenues. This is not surprising; as it is common knowledge that a great number of persons

seeking to be elected as councillors are driven by livelihood motive, where being a councillor is

a source of employment. This is further backed by reports of rampant vote “buying”. In general,

personal motives such as status, access to resources and the ‘corridors of power’ appear to be

stronger motivators for one to vie for the councillor position rather than a genuine desire to

champion the interest of ones constituents.

One of the key factors that maintain the accountability link between the citizens and the

councillors is the capacity of the citizens to meet the costs of council operations including

payment of councillor remuneration. It is assumed that when councillors are paid by the citizens,

citizens would assert their right to demand for accountability and the councillors would be

motivated to support local revenue generation initiatives part of which would meet their

operation expenses but the bulk of which should be used for the provision of prioritised services

to the citizens.

Given the underlying motivation for being a councillor, payment of councillors directly from the

central government would seriously undermine the downward accountability as councillors

would have no incentive to provide feedback to the constituents and the constituents would have

no leverage to demand accountability. This is likely to shift local council accountability from the

constituents to the central government, who are paying the allowances.

Another aspect of local government capacity is the presence of an independent advocacy

organization that works on its behalf. While Uganda and Kenya31 have strong Local Government

Associations, the association in Tanzania is weak and Ethiopia is yet to set up a similar

institution.

31 While the Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya (ALGAK) is strong in Kenya, it is recognized by neither the local Government Act nor the Constitution

35

5. Council Oversight in Planning and Budgeting

For local accountability to take root there is need for clear mandate and resources for local

councils without which local level participation will be frustrated. Lack of discretionary funds

renders citizens' engagement in planning and budgeting a mere theoretical exercise and limited

visible investment reduces local citizens’ interest in the process and undermines local

accountability. Therefore council oversight and downward accountability in planning and

budgeting processes have to be analyzed within the discretionary space local governments

operate in.

In all four study countries, central transfers account for about 90% local government revenue.

Moreover, own revenues form a miniscule percentage of local government revenues. In fact in

Uganda and Tanzania, central government abolition of the main source of local own-revenue

(graduated tax in Uganda and development levy in Tanzania) has further made the local

governments upwardly accountable. Although central government oversight is important, in all

four countries, excessive administrative control and multiple un-coordinated oversight activities

have created undue transaction costs and shifted the attention of council officials from downward

to upward accountability.

Within the existing discretionary space, the ability of councillors to control the budgetary process

is dependent on their ability to use the information contained in the documents. This is a function

of their institutional capacity discussed earlier as well as of the volume of documentation and the

time allocated to councillors in the budgetary cycle for analyses of the documentation (Kluvers

2001). Let us analyze the oversight mechanisms councillors have at their disposal in the planning

and budgeting processes.

5.1 Planning and Budgeting in Uganda

In Uganda, once the administration estimates the costs of a plan, the plan and the budget are

forwarded to the responsible standing committees for review and subsequent presentation to the

council for approval. The plan is finally ratified by the district council. Within the limited

discretionary sphere mentioned above, Uganda local councils have a high degree of oversight in

the budgeting process. The field study revealed that councillors through participation in the

standing committees get the opportunity to discuss the development plans tabled in March,

before they are approved by the full council in June. There were even cases where the

36

councillors refused to approve the development plan because they did not have enough time to

scrutinize it.

Councillors are also allowed to cross-allocate between sectoral budget indicative figures during

the budget process. They can reduce the sector ceiling indicated to them by up to 10% and put

the funding in a pool from which they can reallocate according to their priorities. This is done

with the approval of the full council during the budgeting process.32

At the same time, a major challenge limiting council discretion, apart from lack of own-source

revenues, is the conditional nature of the central government transfers. Councillors interviewed

argued that the bulk of the grants are earmarked compelling the councils to give precedence to

national level priorities over local ones. Notwithstanding the fact that councillors make critical

decisions like determining the location of the project, their power and discretion to decide on

priorities to address constituent needs are constrained.

In terms of auditing, though the councils have no direct role in maintaining accounts, the finance

committee receives and reviews monthly financial statements and the councillors were reported

to be exerting pressure on the technical staff to ensure that the final accounts are submitted on

time. This is especially because timely submission of final accounts is a minimum requirement

for local governments to receive the discretionary local development grants.

During implementation, councillors periodically monitor progress along with sector staff. The

councillors are given information on contracts awarded, location, contractor amount and

schedule of work. This enables them to provide feedback to the citizens and execute physical

inspection and monitoring. Interviewees reported that improved vigilance of staff and councillors

as well as functionality of internal audit, and LGPAC, have led to improvements in

implementation.

In terms of citizen participation, as stipulated in the harmonized participatory planning guides,

the citizens on annual basis are supposed to analyze their problems and prioritize investments to

address them. The councillors taking part in the community planning meetings are supposed to

ensure that some of the community priorities are addressed at the community level and others

incorporated in the respective local government development plans. The citizens are also given

an opportunity to participate in the local government budget conferences. However, the

32Once the budget has been approved local governments cannot reallocate funds between sectors.

37

community members interviewed reported that quite often their priorities are not implemented.

The councillors and technical staff attributed this to the limited resource envelope at the disposal

of the councils. Also interviews revealed that apart from the national publishing of transfers in

newspapers and posting of local government budgets on notice-boards, councillors rarely

account to the citizens regarding the amount of funds received and expended from the central

government.

5.2 Planning and Budgeting in Tanzania

In Tanzania, under the bottom-up process envisaged by the Local Government Reform

Programme (LGRP), a comprehensive district development plan and budget is first tabled at the

committees where it goes through the first round of discussions. The committees discuss and

question staff on the plans and budgets and then recommend them to the planning, finance and

administration committee for further debate and recommendation to the full council. The

planning, finance and administration committee reviews the plans and budgets, questions the

staff if required and finally endorses the plans and budgets before sending them to the full

council.The full council can send the documents back with questions and comments. All plans

and budgets must be approved by full council before they become binding.

During implementation, the full council exercises oversight by reviewing reports and

recommendations forwarded to it by the council committees. Although this review of plans and

implementation reports by full council may be seen as a cursory matter of procedure, it is a

useful process as it provides an opportunity for the entire council to agree on issues and

collectively endorse them. The committees also monitor implementation of projects and service

provision in their areas by meeting quarterly and reviewing reports presented by staff.

Committees accompanied by council staff tour projects and service delivery points to assess

service delivery. Councils can also form sub-committees with specific mandates to monitor

implementation of projects (see box V).

The internal auditors’ reports are considered very critical in budget management as well as

service monitoring. For example, in the case of Morogoro municipal council, the internal auditor

pointed out to the finance, planning and administration committee the anomalies involving funds

paid for ferrying sand. The level of service was found to be low, that is, it did not justify the

funds claimed by the suppliers. The committee ordered revision of the claim to reflect the

38

amount of sand ferried. The engineer involved was also reprimanded and issued with a written

warning.

In terms of citizen participation in planning and budgeting, the Opportunities and Obstacles to

Development (O & OD) planning methodology in Tanzania is intended to be participatory and

inclusive allowing citizens to inform the government about their needs and priorities. However

the process has not been effective because the villages rarely receive the indicative planning

figures from the higher local government to enable them to plan within a known resource

envelope. This means the villages essentially produce what amounts to wish lists, as they cannot

engage in an informed exercise of prioritization when they don’t know the budget ceiling. The

final indicative figures are usually released in May, a month before the budget session, while the

planning and budgeting processes in the councils are completed by March. This leads to plan and

budgets that are approved by the councils to be subjected to further changes by the Ministry of

Finance, thus circumventing the rules and laws governing the functions of the councils. Also, as

mentioned earlier, since a large part of the budget is earmarked, councils give precedence to

national priorities over local ones.

39

BOX V: Council Investigation Committees in Tanzania

Apart from council committees, Tanzania councils also exercise oversight by forming investigation

committees when necessary. Council investigation committees tend to be very effective because

councils act on their recommendations and the mechanism is most feared by council staff. These

committees are formed by the full council on recommendation of council committees and are

disbanded as soon as their mandate is completed. They are usually given specific terms of reference

to guide their investigation. For instance, in Same ward, when the council was dissolved to allow for

elections to take place, a councillor learned that school teaching materials meant for a school in his

ward were not delivered at the school. Council staff claimed they had delivered the materials to

another school within the same ward. The councillor reported the matter to the full council which in

turn formed an investigation sub-committee. The sub-committee found that the councillor’s suspicion

was correct: no teaching materials ever reached the school and in fact staff had diverted the materials

away for personal gain. The implicated staff were transferred to another council.

5.3 Planning and Budgeting in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, there is usually a monthly reporting on finances and physical activities from sectors

to councils, which provides the basis for discussions in quarterly meetings. But the discussion is

said to be cursory. Budget preparation and management are mainly handled by the bureaucracy

and elected representatives focus more on tax collection and labor mobilization. There are

sporadic cases of councils rejecting sector plans or dismissing sector heads based on

observations of councillors and committees overseeing the sectors, but in general councils play

an insignificant role in the planning and budgeting process. There is some variation across

regions on the role of the cabinet members who are also councillors. In some woredas, cabinet

members vote on their own proposals whereas in other woredas, the cabinet members who are

also councillors do not have a voting right. In either case, as mentioned earlier, dual roles of

sector staff as councillors further erodes the oversight process.

In terms of monitoring implementation, there are both physical inspection and financial auditing

units operating under the finance and economic development unit of woredas. Both the

inspection and auditing units submit annual plans and reports to the head of finance and

economic development department. After the clearance of the report, it is transmitted to the

woreda administrator, cabinet and woreda council. If the report presents unsatisfactory

performance, the head of the sector can be questioned by the council. If there is corruption, the

case is referred to the police and justice unit.

In terms of citizen participation, woredas are largely reliant on block grants from the regions and

have limited ability and rights to raise and use additional funds, which constrain their

involvement in participatory development and accountability. This is because most plan

resources (85-90%) available for woredas and kebeles are spoken for by the recurrent budget

needs of the civil service, over which local governments have no say. Thus, the current service

delivery model can be characterised as following a largely top-down, supply-led, government-

organised and standardised approach. Planning and implementation follows flows designed from

the region downwards, often based on regional targets that are set for woredas, with limited

consideration of local conditions, potentials and constraints.

40

5.4 Planning and Budgeting in Kenya

In Kenya, councillors receive progress and performance reports from heads of departments on a

quarterly basis. But the involvement of the local councillors in the budgeting process is only in

the finance and audit33 committee deliberations. In this context, the main role of the members of

the finance committee is to scrutinize and recommend the annual plan and budget to full council

for approval. As committee members, they review reports and make necessary recommendations

for action. Councillors may also ask questions touching on financial matters, and the appointed

officials are under obligation to respond to such questions including providing documentary

evidence to substantiate such response.

The auditing committee within the council is responsible for overseeing matters concerning

external and internal audits. Its oversight responsibilities include monitoring progress in the

implementation of the internal audit annual work plan; considering the objectives and scope of

any work to be undertaken by the internal auditor to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest

and that the independence of the internal auditor is not compromised; and reviewing audit

findings and recommendations of the external auditors, local government inspectors, the

controller and auditor-general and the internal auditor. The committee can recommend to the full

council necessary corrective or preventive action; resolve unsettled and unimplemented audit

queries and recommendations; and initiate special audits and investigations on any allegations,

concerns and complaints regarding corruption, lack of accountability and transparency in any

department or establishment of the council.

With respect to citizen participation in the planning and budgeting processes, there is a lack of

comprehensive, all inclusive and legally binding mechanism for participating in the decision-

making process in the council such that citizens’ concerns influence resource allocation and

service delivery by the local council. Under the provisions in the recent Local Authority Service

Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) Regulations and Guidelines, issued under the Local Authorities

Transfer Fund (LATF) Act, local governments are required to involve the community and other

stakeholders in project identification, prioritization and monitoring of implementation. Citizens

are involved in selecting the projects and activities to address their needs using the available

resource envelope but this arrangement is inadequate because the citizens and other stakeholders

33 Every council is required to establish a separate Audit Committee. If the council has not established the audit committee, then the full council becomes the audit committee.

41

are not involved beyond the selection of projects and activities included in the resource envelope.

Further, the responsibility for identifying and inviting the stakeholders to the consultative forums

remain that of the local council. Thus it is not an open forum where any interested citizen can be

involved. Also the process is not anchored in the law thus making it difficult to enforce

compliance (see box VI).

6. Council Oversight in Human Resource Management

A significant constraint to effective local council oversight and accountability arises from limited

council control over personnel. The interference from central government in staff matters such as

central transfer of local staff due to political and other reasons have led to frustrations and lack of

motivation for councillors.

The Uganda government has come up with an innovative solution wherein the district councils

are able to oversee civil servants through the District Service Commission (DSC), an

independent statutory body responsible for the management of human resource. The secretary to

the DSC provides the political oversight function, while the CAO, with the assistance of a

personnel officer, is responsible for its day to day running. The council has control over DSC as

it determines its staffing. The DSC consists of a chairperson and other members appointed by the

district council on the recommendation of the district executive committee with the approval of

the Public Service Commission (LGA Cap 243 section 54.) In terms of citizen involvement, it is

hard to tell how and when citizens oversee the work done by the appointed officials, apart from

those that have frequent interface with relevant staff such as the agricultural extension staff,

medical staff, teachers and community-based service officers. Citizens also communicate

through unofficial channels such as complaining to their area MPs. Sometimes complaints go as

42

BOX VI: Lack of Citizen Participation in Meru Council, Kenya

In Meru Municipal Council, the council decided without involving the users (in this case butchers), to

construct a slaughterhouse about 5 km from town along a poorly maintained earth road. The butchers

simply decided to take their animals to a more accessible private slaughterhouse, rendering the

council’s investment wasteful. Had the law required user participation, this wasteful expenditure could

have been avoided.

far as the President during his local tours. Nonetheless, such complaints are, in most cases,

limited to teachers’ and nurses’ absenteeism (The Monitor, 23 May 2008).

Apart from Uganda, the other three countries are still struggling to obtain the right balance

between central control and local oversight. In Tanzania, there is discrepancy in the laws

regarding the role of the council in human resource management. The Public Service Act of 2004

(re)established the local government authorities as the appointing and disciplining authority,

whereas the Public Service Regulations 2003 assigns the Council Director with the

responsibility. Also, the district council seems to have no say in the hiring of senior officers such

as the DED and district education officers. Since local governments themselves have limited

discretion over human resource management, there are not many avenues for citizens to be

involved in this process.

Similar to Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia local governments do not have high discretion in

human resource management. In Kenya, processes of appointment, deployment and transfers are

spearheaded by the Ministry and the Public Services Commission. Local governments are

involved in hiring junior staff but even in those cases, the decisions can be overturned by the

PSC. In Ethiopia, in principle, woredas are responsible for hiring, firing and transferring staff,

but their decisions are sometimes overruled by the regional bureaus or zones, without

consultations. For example, there have been cases where zones in SNNP have overruled woreda

decisions to retrench local staff. In some woredas, there have been unplanned transfers of

frontline workers from the zones to the woredas without the woredas’ discretion.

Certain recent trends in personnel management could be interpreted as attempts at

recentralization by the central government. The recent constitutional amendments which

centralized the management of Chief Administrative Officers from local to central level in

Uganda, the District Executive Director in Tanzania and the chief officers and supervisory cadre

of staff from the local authority to Ministry of Local Government in Kenya have removed a key

oversight linkage at the local level. This centralization trend has strong implications on the

ability of local councillors to hold appointed officers accountable for the prudent management of

local resources and efficient service delivery. These chief officers in a council are key to

ensuring proper public financial management, compliance with legal and regulatory

requirements and effective service delivery. To ensure that they properly perform this role, it is

43

imperative that they be held accountable by the council they serve. Thus, de-linking the chief

officer from council by having them recruited centrally and being deployed to councils is likely

to result in accountability lines shifting from the council and the citizenry that they serve to the

central government. One can only hope that this is a temporary response to local politics and lack

of capacity to oversee at the local level and personnel management would soon be a council

responsibility.

Apart from recentralizing key local positions, the central government also impacts local council

oversight of personnel management through financing modalities, party politics and centralized

hiring and transfers. Control over local personnel can only be accomplished if local governments

have discretionary funds to hire staff. In Uganda, in theory local governments are empowered to

establish their own appropriate staffing structures and though the salaries of pensionable staff is

generally determined centrally, local governments exercise autonomy in establishing various

benefits such as staff loan schemes, training, as well as housing. But in reality their autonomy is

curtailed by the financing modalities, whereby a large number of staff is paid through specific

conditional grants (teachers, health staff, water officers, agriculture staff etc.) The few offices not

benefiting from central government funding (e.g. human resource unit/personnel office) are

often understaffed and de-motivated as they lack minimum operational budgets (Steffensen etal

2004). Similarly, in Tanzania, all doctors, secondary school teachers, accountants, nurses and

agriculture extension officers are recruited by the relevant ministry and then deployed to LGAs.

Any other staff that LGAs wish to recruit can only be hired after receiving permission from

central government. There is no council involvement in staff appraisals and cumbersome

procedures for staff discipline ensure that they are rarely used (Dege Consult 2007). Lower level

governments and user committees have virtually no influence over staff and can do little if public

servants such as teachers, extension staff or health service staff do not perform their functions

(Dege Consult 2007). In Ethiopia, local councils’ discretion in employment policies varies across

regions but in general the ruling party seems to play a dominant role in employment decisions.

Even when woredas have the discretion, they are in general, unable to hire sufficient staff

because of either low attractiveness of the location, particularly in remote areas, unattractive

salary, or the lack of candidates who meet the criteria for the jobs with open vacancies. In Kenya,

deployment of senior staff from one local authority to another is undertaken by the Ministry

44

often without consulting the respective councils. Rampant transfers of local government staff by

the Ministry have resulted in a number of adverse impacts.

7. Council Oversight in Procurement

In Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, procurement functions have been recently taken away from

councillors and granted to a separate independent body controlled by the centrally appointed

local chief officer. This change in responsibility was a central government response to

politicization and corruption of procurement processes by councillors. While in Tanzania, the

council still retains control over hiring of procurement unit staff, in Uganda and Kenya, the

procurement units are hired independently. In all three countries, council still retains the mandate

to go over procurement plans and budgets, but its role seems quite minimal and perfunctory.

In Uganda, as a result of outcries of abuses and corruption involving awarding tenders or

influencing their outcomes in favor of political cronies and supporters, local government tender

boards were abolished by the center and replaced with contracts committees which are subjected

to control by the centre. Contracts committees are provided for in the Public Procurement and

Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003. They consist of five members nominated by the CAO from

among public employees in the district and approved by the Secretary to the Treasury at the

national level. This implies that the local councils have no power regarding the constitution of

the contracts committees. Councils also have limited powers regarding the award of tenders and

procurement contracts. This limited power is retained in the council’s standing committee on

finance which is mandated to review all minutes of the contracts committee and awards made on

a quarterly basis. In any case, councils meet to review and discuss the minutes of the contracts

committee after the awards have already been made. This is a great limitation in the council’s

oversight function because as mentioned earlier, three-fourth of district councils are unable to

meet even once a year because of budgetary constraints. What is even more limiting is the fact

that the council has no power to nullify an awarded contract – local councillors can query

decisions of the contract committee but cannot reverse them.

Similar to Uganda, Tender Boards in Tanzania are independent of councillors. But unlike in

Uganda, the planning, finance and administration committee in Tanzania is involved in the

tender board members’ selection process. The committee also reviews implementation of

45

activities and issues related to procurement as presented by the tender board as well as re-

allocation of funds.

In Kenya, a separate tender committee is established to carry out procurement with its staffing

determined centrally. Again councillors review and approve annual procurement plans and

monitor the performance against these plans through the quarterly procurement reports presented

to them in the finance committee.

In Ethiopia, procurement is independently carried out by the local administration and does not

seem to require council approval in any region. Thus councillors and citizens have no oversight

function in this regard.

The involvement of communities in the procurement process in all four countries is limited to

small projects being implemented at lower levels. Most of such procurements are carried out by a

community-based committee, like school or health committee which is also involved in

monitoring service delivery. A school committee, for example, helps to ensure teaching materials

procured are for example in line with the order and a fit for purpose. Citizens do not seem

formally involved in larger procurement decisions.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations

It is likely that the trend towards decentralized governance and service delivery will proceed in

all four study countries (a summary of key findings can be found in table 1.) But in order to

strengthen council oversight over bureaucracy and accountability towards citizens, lower level

local governments such as the village assembly in Tanzania and kebeles in Ethiopia need to be

strengthened and provided active roles and resources. Also further study needs to be conducted

on the implications of introducing multiparty politics at lower local councils. Council systems

need to be strengthened by ensuring participation of women and minorities. Interventions by

MPs and higher level government and party members need to be limited. For instance, in Kerala

state in India, MPs are not allowed to vote in council meetings. Independent candidates should

be allowed to run for elections while policy makers and researchers are cognizant of the fact that

it may take time before independent candidates present a real policy alternative to mainstream

parties. In a similar vein, recall provisions of councillors and chairpersons need to be made easier

for citizens.

46

To empower citizens, there is need for strong legislation mandating councils to share information

with citizens and requiring citizen participation in planning and budgeting processes. There is

also need to intensify civic education focusing on rights and responsibilities; strengthen radio

programmes to communicate major council decisions; revive village meetings for giving

feedback; and clarify the oversight and accountability roles and relationships between user

committee, CSOs and local councils. Apart from playing an active role in planning, budgeting

and monitoring services, CSOs should also be encouraged to work with citizens in building their

capacity to access information and demand accountability.

To enhance council capacity, the technical staff needs to present information to councillors on

time, in simplified formats and local languages where applicable. There is also need to further

empower the accounting officers to ensure that procedures and regulations are followed and to

organize joint capacity building activities for the staff and councilors. A Local Government

Association needs to be created in Ethiopia and strengthened in all four countries to play a strong

advocacy role for local governments and to work with them to improve their capacity. Also

while designing projects and programs, donors need to be aware of the domestic political

economy and how it influences local governance capacity in each country.

Even if institutional capacity were to be increased, council oversight and downward

accountability can only be part of a meaningful dialogue if councils have a viable discretionary

space to carry out their activities. With more than 90% of local government funding through

central transfers and means of own-source revenue dwindling in all four countries, the space to

exercise council oversight becomes quite narrow. Within this space, central government

measures to centralize hiring of local chief officers and separate procurement from council

functions further adversely impact council oversight and downward accountability.

To increase local government discretionary space, central government and donors need to focus

on local revenue generation through among others supporting local economic development

initiatives and efficient and transparent tax assessment, collection and administration. They also

need to invest in increasing discretionary funds and transfers to lower level governments and

supporting local governments to develop and implement client charters. This can enhance

political dialogue on spending priorities and improve involvement of all stakeholders thereby

strengthening local accountability. There should be clarity on the roles, relationships and

47

implications of ministries’, departments’ and agencies’ interventions to local governments as

well as organization of joint support, inspection and review missions.

In order to increase council oversight over administration in general, when a person is affected

by an administrative action or decision by an executive officer, there could be a special

committee of the council that is charged with responsibility of hearing complaints, followed by a

right to further appeal to a court of law if necessary. In planning and budgeting processes, the

full council should meet to consider changes made on plans and budgets by the central

government. Where changes are very significant the council should send the plans and budgets

back to lower level governments for revision and prioritization. Furthermore, at the end of the

half year, the council should carry out a major review of the plans and budgets for purposes of

reallocating idle resources.

Reforms that seek to enhance local council autonomy in human resource management are a

prerequisite to effective local council oversight. Reform interventions should ensure that local

councils regain the autonomy in determining the size of the establishment, setting terms and

conditions of service and incentive schemes and be able to hire and fire their staff. This is a

common area of concern in a number of decentralizing countries as it seems difficult to strike the

right balance between central control and local autonomy. In a study conducted in six developing

countries (Blair 2000), the author observed that bureaucratic accountability to public officials in

human resource management was incomplete mainly because of reluctance of central

governments to truly decentralize and the unwillingness of government employees to be

decentralized as they lose national career opportunities. A possible avenue available to the

councillors to ensure that they can hold officers accountable is the implementation of a system of

performance contracting for these and other officers of the council. The regular performance

appraisals involving setting annual targets and reviewing the extent to which they have been

attained would provide the council with the basis on which the can bring the officers to account.

For example council chairmen, mayors and chairmen of finance committees in Kenya have

signed performance contracts with the Minister, for Local Government committing the council to

deliver on their Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plans (LASDAP). This should provide

a mechanism for councillors to hold the officers accountable through the performance appraisal

system that underpins performance contracting. Another case where some balance has been

achieved between central controls and council oversight is in the state of Karnataka, India where

48

over the several decades of Panchayati Raj, for the most part, central and local governments have

achieved a compromise (Blair 2000). Elected officials direct government civil servants in their

jurisdictions, while the line ministries write annual evaluation reports and determine promotions

and postings. In order to insulate human resource management from undue political interference,

an autonomous body, such as the DSC in Uganda, may be established to handle local

government personnel issues such as recruitment, standardised scheme of service and staff

appeals. DSC, an independent statutory body is responsible for the management of human

resource while the council is responsible for hiring its staff. The bottom line is that central

government’s role in oversight and monitoring role should be limited to general compliance

monitoring mechanisms instead of the larger, central role it currently plays in personnel

management in all four study countries.

Procurement is the most lagging among the studied issues in local council oversight. Councils in

none of the study countries have adequate discretion over procurement planning and citizens do

not have much role in the process either. Under national standards and guidance, local

governments should have the discretion to develop procurement strategies, identify associated

processes, and issue contracts for goods and services. While removing procurement planning

from core council functioning may reduce patronage in the short run, it also takes away the

crucial oversight role of councillors required to keep the local governments accountable to

citizens. Citizens who are represented by elected leaders are inadvertently disempowered and

have almost no role in the procurement process; hence the extent to which they can hold local

governments accountable is limited. Legislation, enforcement and local capacity building have to

be improved in this regard.

Thus, local council oversight and accountability depends to a large extent on the level of local

autonomy and the existence of conducive legal, administrative and institutional framework for

local decision-making in areas such as planning, budgeting, priority-setting, human resource

management, procurement and implementation. Formal and informal civil society organizations

have to take on a stronger role in keeping local governments accountable to citizens.

Further research needs to be conducted on the following issues:

While the purported aim for decentralization is to improve service delivery by governments

being more responsive and thus downwardly accountable (Blair 2000, Bardhan 2002), the aid

49

modalities’ focus on technocratic solutions seem to encourage upward accountability of local

governments (Craig and Porter 2003). The report highlights the different local systems with

council capacities and accountability outcomes. This raises the question as to what are the

conditions under which this assumption can be true. To what extend does the underlying political

economy in a country undermine the outcomes of this assumption? Political economy which

donors have not traditionally focused on has a large impact on the discretionary and

accountability space at the local level. For instance, the creation of new districts and

centralization of CAO by the Uganda government has undermined the decentralization process,

decreased local resources and thus negatively affected council oversight functions. Similarly in

Ethiopia, the influence of ruling party in local politics subverts the local council process. Further

research needs to be carried out to understand the role of political economy in shaping local

governance structures.

Another issue that needs further research is the optimum methods to improve local capacities.

Many African governments have adopted decentralization policy with more service delivery

functions being devolved to local authorities. The functions of council as the supreme body of

local authorities also changed with these devolved mandates. They are now required to review

and approve local development plans and budgets, manage personnel and monitor

implementation of programs. The report notes the mismatch between the tasks to be performed

by council and their capacities. Since councils are increasingly becoming responsible for the use

of public funds, both own revenues and transfers, further research needs to be conducted to

identify areas to focus on for capacity building. For instance, should there be minimum

qualification requirement of councillors?

The report notes a number of participatory methods and tools that have been introduced to give

voice to the needs, opinions and concerns of citizens and to prod governments to better

understand citizen priorities and to better serve their citizens. Although the several layers of

engagement formally provide space for citizens to voice their opinions at the local government

level, the socio-cultural and political environment still restrains the citizens from holding local

governments to account. Important strategies for strengthening citizen voice like creating space

for public debate and platforms for citizen-state dialogue, building citizen confidence and rights

awareness, facilitating the development of coalitions and alliances that can speak with a strong,

50

united voice, are all still in their infancy; How can citizens be made more aware and vested in

what elected and appointed local government officials do? What should be their stake? How can

tax systems be improved to strengthen this linkage?

The above issues need to be further studied to further understand means to improve council

oversight systems and structures and ultimately service delivery in decentralized contexts.

51

Issue Key Findings

Overall Local Government System

Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya share a similar colonial history of British rule while Ethiopia’s decentralization is relatively newer.

Decentralization in all four countries has focused little on the lowest level of governance.

Except for Ethiopia, the legislative framework in the other three countries provide for clear separation of the legislature (elected councils) and the executive (bureaucrats).

All councils have standing committees to oversee specific aspects of the administration. The council is the decisive political body of a local government authority and the committees are supposed to oversee the implementation of council decisions, i.e. the efficient and cost effective management of local government affairs.

Electoral and Party System Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have nominated members in the council. Ethiopia does not have reserved seats for minorities in the woreda councils though it has certain administrative staff such as head of women association that are mandated to be women.

Uganda has the strongest long governance system because

o It has directly elected mayors and chairpersons. The chairpersons and mayors in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya councils are not elected through universal suffrage.

o In Uganda MPs have limited role in local government affairs (though centrally appointed

RDCs can sometimes interfere with council functioning). In Kenya and Tanzania, MPs have

considerable say in local government functioning. Ethiopia does not have MPs at local level

but the central party has a strong presence and control over local government functioning.

Recall candidate provisions seem to be either non-existent or abused in all four countries. In Kenya

there is no recall provision for poor performing councillors. In Tanzania generally citizens cannot

recall a councillor before elections if the only reason is poor performance. In Ethiopia and Uganda,

the system of recalling councillors exists but does not work effectively.

Independent candidates are not allowed to run for local office in Kenya and Tanzania. While they are allowed to run in Ethiopia and Uganda, the provision is generally misused.

The political environment in the four countries varies significantly with Kenya on one end with fairly robust multi-party politics and Ethiopia on the other end with a predominantly one party system and the incipient multiparty systems in Uganda and Tanzania

Social Accountability Village meetings are the most common mechanisms through which councilors give feedback to citizens in Uganda. However, given the irregularity of village meetings, this mechanism is not always effective. Similarly in Tanzania, village assembly meetings are required to be held every three months but they were rarely or never held. In Kenya, there are no legal requirements for local governments to provide citizens with information on council operations except for a summary of the annual budget (and even that is not obligatory but permissive.) In the absence of formal forums, public “barazas”, that is public meetings are convened by the provincial administration. In Ethiopia, there are periodic public assemblies held in kebeles that are chaired by the kebele or woreda administration or the agenda is provided by the kebele administration.

Posting of local government information on notice boards and newspapers seem more common in Uganda and Tanzania compared to Ethiopia and Kenya. The radio is becoming a common mechanism of communicating with citizens in all four countries.

User committees are increasingly involved in service planning and operation under sector specific programs. In all four countries local councilors are represented and support and oversee the performance of these committees and account back to the community members.

Strong local informal institutions and forums exist in all four countries. These institutions either function independently of the local government system or their leaders are also leaders in local government. In either case, they are yet to serve as an alternative means of holding local governments accountable to citizens.

Council Capacity Councillors in all four countries are poorly facilitated with regards to finances and infrastructure

53

facilities.

While Uganda and Kenya have strong Local Government Associations, the association in Tanzania is weak and Ethiopia is yet to set up a similar institution.

In Uganda, while the district chairperson has to fulfil minimum academic qualifications to be eligible for the post, no similar criteria exist for political heads at other levels as well as councillors. In Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya there is no educational requirement to become a councillor.

Council Oversight in Planning and Budgeting, Human Resource Management and Procurement

In all four study countries, central transfers account for about 90% local government revenue.

Own revenues form a miniscule percentage of local government revenues.

In all four countries, excessive administrative control and multiple un-coordinated oversight activities have created undue transaction costs and shifted the attention of council officials from downward to upward accountability.

While Uganda has developed the innovative District Service Commission, the other three countries are still struggling to obtain the right balance between central control and local oversight.

Recent trends in personnel management in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya could be interpreted as attempts at recentralization by the central government.

Personnel management in all four countries is affected through financing modalities, party politics and centralized hiring and transfers.

In Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, procurement functions have been recently taken away from

councillors and granted to a separate independent body controlled by the centrally appointed local

chief officer. This change in responsibility was a central government response to politicization and

corruption of procurement processes by councillors. While in Tanzania, the council still retains

control over hiring of procurement unit staff, in Uganda and Kenya, the procurement units are hired

independently. In all three countries, council still retains the mandate to go over procurement plans

54

and budgets, but its role seems quite minimal and perfunctory. In Ethiopia, procurement is

independently carried out by the local administration and does not seem to require council approval

in any region. Thus councillors and citizens have no oversight function in this regard.

Procurement is the most lagging among the studied issues in local council oversight. Councils in none of the study countries have adequate discretion over procurement and citizens do not have much role in the process either.

55

ReferenceBardhan, Pranab. 2002. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 16, Number 4. Fall 2002. Pages 185–205

Blair, Harry. 2000. Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries. World Development. Vol. 28, No. 1. pp 21-39, U.K.

Clark, Jeffrey, Daniel Bekele, Daniel Schneider, Jalal Abdel-Latif. November 2004. Review of the Environment for Civic Engagement and the Role of Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction and Democratization Efforts. Submitted to the Ministry of Capacity Building, Government of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa

Craig, D. and Porter, D., 2003, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence, World Development 31(1): 53–69.

Dege Consult. 2007. Local Level Service Delivery: Decentralization and Governance- A Comparative Study of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania Education, Health and Agriculture Sectors. Tanzania Case Report. Tanzania.

Dercon, Stefan, Tessa Bold, Joachim De Weerdt and Alula Pankhurst. December 2004. Extending Insurance? Funeral Associations in Ethiopia and Tanzania. OECD Development Centre. Working Paper No. 240. Paris, France.

Devas, Nick and Ursula Grant. 2003. Local Government Decision-Making—Citizen Participation And Local Accountability: Some Evidence From Kenya And Uganda. Public Administration and Development. 23. 307-316

Eckardt, Sebastian. 2008. Political Accountability, Fiscal Conditions and LocalGovernment Performance—Cross-Sectional Evidence From Indonesia. Public Administration and Development.(28). 1-17.

Golooba-Mutebi, F. 1999. Decentralization, Democracy and Development Administration in Uganda, 1986-1996: Limits to popular Participation. Un published Ph.D Thesis

Kisembo, S.W. 2006. A Handbook on Decentralization in Uganda. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Kluvers, Ron. 2001. Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government. Australian Journal of Public Administration. 60(2):35–43, June 2001

Lankina, T. (2008) “Cross-cutting Literature Review on the Drivers of Local Council Accountability and Performance.” Social Development Working Paper No. 112. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Monitor Newspaper. May 18 2008. Districts Run Broke.

http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/sun_news/Districts_run_broke_65351.shtml

PMO-RALG. 2008. The Status of Implementation of Decentralization by Devolution on Mainland Tanzania and the Way Forward. Paper presented by the Permanent Secretary, PMO-RALG in the National Convention on Public Sector Reforms 17th – 18th June, 2008, Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam.

Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). 2007. Framework for Downward Accountability in Local Government Authorities. Submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office- Local Government and Regional Administration.

Silkin, Trish, Mark Sinclair, Akewold Bantirgu, Getinet Assefa. July 2005. Review of Donor Engagement with Civil Society in Ethiopia.

Steffensen, Jesper, Per Tidemand, and Emmanual Ssewankambo. 2004. “A Comparative Analysis of Decentralization in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Country Study Uganda.” Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Wollmann, Hellmutt. 2004. Urban Leadership in German Local Politics: The Rise, Role and Performance of the Directly Elected (Chief Executive) Mayor. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Volume 28 Issue 1, Pages 150 – 165. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

World Bank. 2004. World Development Report: Making Services Work for the Poor.

57

ANNEX I

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR ALCOSA UGANDA

Broad Issues Research Issues/Questions

Information to obtain before going on field

Size of district (population and geographic area) Harmonised participatory planning guide for lower local governments and lower local

councils Policy amendment to have the members of the Executive paid from the consolidated

fund other than local revenues Laws on affirmative action at local level

Oversight in planning Do citizens participate in planning process as provided for under the harmonised participatory planning guide for lower local governments and lower local councils?

How are sector specific planning processes coordinated with the local government wide processes – how does the Planning Unit capture the priorities of the sectors within the comprehensive local government development plans?

How are citizen priorities reflected and/or incorporated within the respective local government development plans

Do councillors participate in the formulation and approval of development plans at the respective local government levels? Are there instances where they rejected or sought amendment in plans? How were their comments incorporated?

What are the recent legislations passed by the council? What was the process of drafting and approving the legislation?

Oversight in budget planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation (public finance management system)

Describe the fiscal year cycle. Provide local government budget breakdown by sector and transfers versus own

revenues raised at district and sub-district levels. What is the process of council participation in budget preparation and approval

processes? What is the linkage between the plans and budgets? Do budgets reflect planning

(financial interpretation of the development plans) Is the budget responsive to the demands of the marginalized? Are there specific

instances? Do councillors participate in the formulation and approval of budgets? Are there

instances where they rejected or sought amendment in plans? How were their comments incorporated?

Oversight in service delivery and procurement

Rate the performance of service providers in terms of timeliness, quantity and quality of services.

Is there adequate provision of technical information to the councillors to facilitate oversight – bills of quantities, construction schedules etc. as agreed with the technical staff?

What is the role of the councillor in the process of contract approval? How can councillors guard against delays and shoddy work?

What is the ceiling on contract amounts that can be approved by the council? What is the role of councillor in the process of complaint mechanism in different

sectors? Do the councillors provide adequate information to the citizens on the process of

prioritizing projects and the progress of service providers? What is the impact of abolition of community contributions and payment of user fees for

service delivery on the interest and functionality of user groups to demand for

58

Broad Issues Research Issues/Questions

accountability and improved service provision?

Oversight in human resources

What is the role of council in hiring sector heads and other civil servants (teachers, health workers etc)?

What is the role of council in dismissal/demotion? What is the role of council in relocation?

Oversight in auditing Are there internal auditing structures? Is there regular auditing and inspections conducted? When was the last one conducted?

Do auditors report to the council? Who decides which sector/project is to be audited? When was the last audit completed? What was the result? In case of misconduct, what

is the protocol followed?

Overall analysis of the functionality including Capacity Issues

How regularly are meetings of LC1, LC2, LC3 and LC5 meetings held? On average (and in the last meeting) how many persons attended and what is their designation?

Is there clear demarcation between council and sector positions and responsibilities? What is the turnover rate of councillors? Why? How are council members paid? How has the recent policy amendment to have the

members of the Executive paid from the consolidated fund other than local revenues affected the performance of the oversight function in Uganda? How do the low local revenues affect the performance of councillors not paid from the consolidated fund?

What is the capacity (in terms of skills, knowledge, attitudes and resources) of local leaders to carryout the oversight role –especially in regard to overseeing civil works

What is the process of dismissal of council members? How many times was this carried out the last year? What were the reasons cited?

Existing Incentives for Councillors

What are the existing incentives for the local councils to perform their functions (salary, party perks, sense of service and pride)?

What is the link between the individual councillor performance and re-election? What is the link between performance of local councillors and resource allocation (does

each council member lobby for services in his sub-district?)

Electoral System and its Impact on Council Oversight Functions

What is the quality of elected officials (especially academic qualifications and experience in public affairs) and how does it affect council oversight - quality of decision-making at those levels and the extent of their involvement in various LG operations.

Are the local elections genuinely competitive? Why/why not? What has been the impact of the introduction of multi-party politics at local government

levels on the oversight function What is the effect of affirmative action- reserved seats for minority groups and women-

on safeguarding the interest of the groups they represent

Role of other government levels and their impact on local council oversight

What is the implication of the recent re-centralisation tendencies to the local council oversight function – for example the recruitment of the Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) by the Public Service Commission instead of the District Service Commission?

How does the role of the Resident District Commissioners facilitate or hamper the local councillors in the performance of the oversight function?

How does the national Parliament (MPs and Sectoral Committees) support or hamper the performance of local councils?

How has creation of new districts affected council oversight function – does it necessarily create more possibilities for participation and political representation?

59

Broad Issues Research Issues/Questions

Role of CSOs/NGOs/informal institutions

Which are the NGOs/CSOs/informal institutions operating at district level and below? What is the role of these NGO/CSOs in council planning/budgeting? What is the role of NGO/CSOs in procurement? What is the role of NGO/CSOs in hiring/firing? What is the role of NGO/CSOs in service delivery (planning, monitoring, delivering

services etc)?

Citizens holding councillors accountable

Is information on council proceedings, plans and budgets, procurement and availability of position readily accessible to the public? (for e.g. minutes of council meetings)

Are there institutionalized provisions for citizens to channel their preferences to councillors – like participation in budget conferences and participation in open council sessions?

What is the mechanism for responding to citizen requests and complaints?

Do the citizens effectively use all the communication channels to demand for accountability?

What are the modalities for the councillors to account in return - the process and effectiveness through which councillors provide feedback to the constituents- for e.g. summarize and disseminate key council decisions to the electorate, provide information and communicate periodically on outcomes of council deliberations etc.

60

ANNEX II

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR ALCOSA TANZANIA

Research Question Operational question/issue Source of Data Methods to collect data1. What are the general features

of a District/Municipal - Location, size of the District/municipal, size of population and

distribution including rough estimates of religious diversity (number of dominant religions), ethnic diversity

- Level of education/literacy (rough estimates)- Number of wards and villages/streets, hamlets (vitongoji)- Level of political competition- number of political parties with offices in

the District/municipal, dominant political party- Dominant economic activities, levels of economic wellness (poverty)

within District/municipal- Untapped Economic opportunities- Presence/absence of strong CSO (NGOs, FBO, CBO etc)- Key issues/problems facing a district

- Official document: strategic plans, MTEF documents,

- Census report (2002)- Council staff, - Councillors - citizens- District Commissioner

(DC)

- Document review, - Interviews

(triangulation necessary)

- Observation

2. What are the characteristics of the elected (and nominated) representatives

Individual councillors:- Party affiliations, - Occupation of the Individual councillors- Age categories, - Number of terms one has been councillor,- Social status (education, wealth, etc??Whether some councillors are

believed to be more influential than others and why)- Motivation for becoming councillor- Place where one was born and grew up?

- Official records - Councillors- DED (District

Executive Director)- Councillor Clerk

Document review,Interviews ,Observation

As an institution (means and incentives):- Does the council have a place and resources to function ( office, access

to transport, dedicated staff etc)- Who decides allowances to be paid to councillors and on what basis!- Gender aspect of the Council- Number of Councillors, how the representation of women is achieved- Political parties representation within the Full Council- Proportion of councillors serving different terms

- Councillor- Council clerk- DED

- Observation (e.g. see the office)

- Interview- Document review

(where available)

61

Council processes: Who sets the Agenda for full council meetings, committee meetings Timely access to information by councillors Announcement of full council meetings to public (and committees) Can the public have access to Full council minutes Opportunities available for citizens to engage with councillors during

council meetings Language used in documents given to councillors Internal rules/ethics for councillors and adherence Who pays the councillors (are they paid from own sources?) Rules of the game: time taken by meetings, minutes (at full council

meetings) review, matters arising etc How often full council meets, how often council committees meet, who

decides the duration of meetings, Atmosphere under which discussions are held: are councillors free to

contribute ideas during the meetings? Raise issues? Do party considerations influence discussions! Relationships between Council chairperson and DED (Do they travel

together, drink together etc), What is the councillors’ involvement in the various processes involved in service delivery?

Planning and Budgeting

Assesses the inclusiveness of the budget process in practice (e.g are marginalized groups’ preferences taken on board? examples)

Assess whether citizens preferences/priorities are reflected in the plans and actual implementation

Inquire into the councillors’ involvement in the process of planning and budgeting : at village level, ward, and District

Council plans (trace citizens priorities through the budget)Councillors and staff (e. g.WEOs)

Documents reviewInterviews

Procurement What steps of the procurement process are councillors required to be involved?

What steps of the procurement process are councillors involved in practice?

o Contract management (supervision of the services being provided)

Laws, and regulations Councillors

Document reviewInterviews

Human resources issues

What is the discretion of the councillors in HR issues provided in law? What is the actual involvement of Councillors in HR issues: firing?

Relocation, etc? How do the councillors interact with staff (via committees?)

Law and regulationsCouncillors, district staff

Document reviewInterviews

Service delivery

Do they carry out physical supervision/assessment of work once done?

Councillors, district staff Interviews

62

Internal Audit Does that IA dept. have a budget Do they actually receive they funds they request Do the IA reports receive adequate attention of the councillors

Councillors, District staff Samples of reports

and actions taken

Document reviewInterview

External Audit

Does the full council take responsibility to address the issues raised by EA

Councillors, district staff Interviews

Throughout the process of collecting data, efforts will be made to ensure that answers are sought to the questions of what, how, why with respect to accountability as shown in the questions below:

How are democratic local actors with discretionary powers being held accountable (i.e. by what mechanism)

By the populations (Downward accountability)

What mechanisms formally exits for citizens Do the citizens know about these mechanisms if yes,

what are the constrains to using the mechanisms What are the means that citizens actually hold councillors

accountable? (Rumours, juju etc?) Citizens, councillors, District staff central government

(PMO-RALG), CSOs

Interviews, focus group discussions (at community level)

By the political administrative hierarchy (Upward accountability)

What are the accountability relationships between Councillors and central GoT, DC, RC etc?

How is accountability in practice executed/discharged?

By other social actors (diagonal accountability)

Do other actors play any role in eliciting accountability from councillors?

What are the motives for holding these actors accountable?

To the populations (Downward accountability)

What motivates citizens to hold councillors accountable

By the political administrative hierarchy in which they are embedded? (Upward accountability)

What motivates central government to hold councillors accountable

By other social actors (diagonal accountability)

What motivates NGOs etc to hold councillors accountable

How the structure of local government as outlined in law shape accountability? – e.g. how does it constrain

To the populations that elected them? (Downward accountability)

Does the structure encourage accountability to citizens?

To the political administrative (Upward accountability)

Does the structure encourage accountability to higher level governments?

63

it? To other social actors (diagonal accountability)

Does the structure encourage accountability to higher level governments?

How does practice shape accountability

To the populations that elected them? (Downward accountability) What are the practices that shape accountability downward,

vertically and diagonally?To the political administrative (Upward accountability)To other social actors (diagonal accountability)

64

ANNEX III

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR ALCOSA ETHIOPIA

ETHIOPIA PBSII PREPARATIONLOCAL COUNCIL OVERSIGHT, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

BROAD RESEARCH QUESTIONS

MAIN QUESTIONS

1. What role do the traditional, informal structures play in mediating relationships between citizens and local governments. In this context, is this role supportive or obstructive of newly emerging social accountability initiatives that PBS envisages to build?

2. What’s the role that elected local officials at kebeles and woredas play mediating relationships between citizens and local governments. In this context, is this role supportive or obstructive of newly emerging social accountability initiatives that PBS envisages to build?

3. In what ways traditional/informal structures, local council oversight systems, and social accountability initiatives intersect and could be bridged to improve transparency, accountability, and participation at Kebele and Woreda decision-making and service delivery?

SUB-QUESTIONS

1. What are the existing local public oversight and accountability mechanisms? Are they adequate? 2. What are the power structures (formal and informal) at the local level and how do they influence and be influenced by the local council system?3. What are the existing social accountability mechanisms? Are they adequate?4. What are the capacity constraints- both physical (such as lack of physical infrastructure) and human resource constraints (such as education level, salaries, number of people employed)

- of the elected councillors in exercising discretion and oversight responsibilities?5. What are the perceptions and expectations of local councils by the local actors?

1) DESCRIBING AVAILABLE FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS AND LOCAL COUNCIL OVERSIGHT Methodology for

65

Data CollectionPUBLIC OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Political

- Is there a clearly established separation of power between the executive (i.e., mayor) and legislative (i.e., council) bodies of local governments? Are there clearly defined roles for legislation and oversight for local councils (Legislative)?

- Are there clearly defined rules regarding electoral system and broader guidelines for local political competition for mayors and councillors? Are there restrictions on local party competition? If yes, what are they?

- Do the elections allow for competitive multi-party systems? Are there instances of different parties represented in the council or council versus legislative body? What is the impact?

- Is there legislation allowing for citizens to demand public hearings on policy decisions and actions? Are there consultation mechanisms such as public hearings and are these integrated into formal decision-making processes?

Administrative

- What are the limitations with respect to decision-making power attributed to local governments (i.e. employment/civil service policy, city planning, environmental regulations, business regulations, and procurement)?

- Is there a mechanism that citizens can participate in/challenge the administrative decisions made by local governments? Is this a formal or informal mechanism? For e.g. Is there a grievance/complaint system as well as a whistleblower protection system? If yes, how have they worked thus far?

- Is there a citizen ombudsman office in local governments? How does it work?

Fiscal/Financial

- Does the local government have meaningful autonomy over local expenditures decisions (typically, capital versus recurrent expenditures; kinds and recipients of

66

services) and meaningful autonomy in local revenue decisions (setting tax bases and rates and fee rates)?

- Is there a transfer system that is flexible and responsive to the local needs and changing conditions? Is there a use of multiple transfer types such as conditional and unconditional transfers to respond to different needs? Are they transparent and predictable?

- Are there clear processes with respect to each budget cycles (budget formulation and planning/execution/internal and external audit/reporting/monitoring and evaluation)

- Is there strict adherence to a fixed budget calendar?

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

- What are the accountability relationships between the elected councils and citizens, identify examples of accountability initiatives affecting governance, policy, and quality of service delivery. Specifically focus on those that aim to increase local council oversight? For e.g., are there public oversight mechanisms to provide citizens a channel to oversee local service delivery and introduce measures for assessing citizen satisfaction with service delivery (scorecards, service delivery surveys)? Can citizens request administrative audits directly?

- What is the role of media, NGOs, organizations affiliated with local governments in developing and promoting accountability initiatives?

- How do power relations (explored in the previous section) impact the initiation and effectiveness of such initiatives

- What are the constraints and promising practices in increasing the number and effectiveness of such mechanisms and initiatives?

2) DESCRIBING LOCAL CONDITIONS, INCLUDING INFORMAL NETWORKS Methodology for Data Collection

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

67

- Who are the critical actors in representation, decision-making, and implementation in the case-study site within the country?

a. Who are the government actors in the local arena—elected, appointed, line ministry,, etc. (also describe characteristics such as educational level, age, gender, ethnicity, profession, social status, religion, etc)

b. Who are the non-government actors in the local arena—citizens, CBOs, NGOs, user groups, elites, religious organizations, customary chiefs, etc.? In the particular location, what is the landscape of communities, NGOs, family networks, and business groups? What interests do they represent? How do they represent those interests? (also describe characteristics such as educational level, age, gender, ethnicity, profession, social status, religion, etc)

- What powers does each of the above actors hold in deciding and influencing the critical issues affecting local development? How have these powers changed over time?

a. What financial and material resources are at their disposal?

b. What capacities and capabilities do they have?

c. Are they able to mobilize people (experts and government agents) and agencies (including their equipment such as tractors) from outside of the local arena? What means do they have for doing so? (E.g. how do power structures impact the initiation and effectiveness of promising practices?)

- How are each of these actors held accountable to external actors, accountable to the elected local council, downwardly accountable to the population (with a focus on the downward accountabilities of these actors vis-à-vis the public powers any of them may hold)?

a. How are elected local councils held accountable to the population?

b. How are the other actors held accountable to citizens (to citizens overall and particular members whom they represent)?

- How are the terms “citizens”, “civil society” and “local community” used/understood? How are the roles and powers of local elected officials and local appointed officials understood by the local population—do they understand their roles and powers, do they see them as working for the people or for the state, to whom do they believe these actors are accountable and through what mechanisms? What do local people expect from different authorities and what do they perceive the different authorities have delivered?

- How do communities, NGOs, family networks, and business groups affect/mediate the relationships between citizens, local governments (both appointed officials and elected councillors), and service providers? What’s the role of these networks and organizations in resolving local conflicts and mobilizing people around issues?

- Which are the marginalized sections of society? i.e., how are women, youth, people with disabilities and people living with AIDS represented?

68

SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- How does the overall level of socioeconomic development in the particular location affect government-citizen relationship? Does this affect the popular perceptions of and participation in the local decision-making and service delivery?

- Which subgroups in the society (based on age, gender, profession, etc) are more likely to engage with governments? To what extent socioeconomic level of these subgroups impact this behavior?

- What’s the level of literacy among population groups?

- What is the relationship between socioeconomic inequalities and elite capture as they affect the design and outcome of decentralization reforms in a particular locality?

- What’s the influence of diaspora in the emergence of new projects?

- What’s the influence of donors in the emergence of new projects?

CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

- What are the norms and values of citizens with regard to role of government leaders in their lives?

- What’s the perception of population towards civic duties and engagement (however they are defined) in public affairs?

- What’s the level of tolerance to corruption, nepotism, patronage, clientelism, etc (ask proxy questions)?

- Are there alternative social networks (i.e. informal and traditional structures) that provide some citizens access to particular types of social and economic benefits. Do these structures and networks support or hinder the emergence of new social accountability initiatives (did any social accountability practice emerge despite or in link with the traditional and informal structures?)

- What role identity (ethnicity, religion, family, kinship, etc) plays in associating with others to form a good practice?

3) STUDYING THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES Methodology for Data Collection

69

- Who were the key actors behind the emergence of the practice? Who initiated it? What was the government’s role?

- How did they decide to exercise this practice? Through public consultation? With support of donors? Who participated in this decision-making process?

- Who contributed in what form in the implementation of the practice?

- How were the beneficiaries selected?

- Are there any local actors/groups/individuals that are not happy with the practice?

PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF LOCAL ACTORS

Local Councillors - As individuals, how do local councillors perceive their own roles in local decision-making and service delivery? This entails their role in planning, budgeting, auditing, and service delivery cycles, including procurement and contracting. - How do they see their new roles under ongoing decentralization reforms? What are their views on constraints in exercising their functions?- How do they see their roles in representing citizens? Do they play any role in resolving local conflicts?- How often do they interact with local administrative staff, service providers, local business owners, service beneficiaries, or ordinary citizens?

Local Administrative Staff, Bureaucrats, and Service Providers

- How do they see the role of councillors in planning, budgeting, and auditing, do they feel accountable and answerable to them? - How do they see the role of councillors in service delivery, do they feel accountable and answerable to them etc)- Do public officials believe that these essential services are readily available, provided without interruption, and without additional “gift payments.”- Do ordinary citizens and the public see the provision of public services in similar ways?

Individual Households/Citizens/ Beneficiaries and User Groups

- Do citizens feel believe that essential services such as water, electricity, education, and health are readily available–provided without interruption and without additional “gift payments.”- Do citizens resort to alternative ways to access to services such as religious groups, ethnic groups, or other social formations? Do citizens see these alternative access options more reliable/less corrupt for service delivery? - How do citizens see the role of councillors, how do they interact with them; why do they vote for a particular councillor?- Do citizens have confidence in the performance of their local and national leaders? Do citizens believe that their local officials are honest or corrupt? Which of these factors–service delivery, economic performance, honesty/corruption, accountability, transparency, consultation–is most important in shaping people’s level of confidence in their leaders? Are people more confident in local leaders, who are closer to them, than in national leaders–and, if so, can we trace this to the greater accessibility of local leaders–or to their role as political patrons and/or representatives of dominant ethnic groups/tribes?

70

- Do ordinary citizens believe that political leaders listen to what they have to say? Do they believe that some people have more influence than others in deciding public policy? Do people believe that local level officials pay more attention to the public than do national level officials?- Have ordinary citizens tried to influence any leaders on questions of public policy? If so, on what area and do citizens believe that they were successful? Do citizens know where to find information on government and do they know whom to contact to resolve a problem they may face? Can they approach someone and expect that person to respond without a bribe?

- Do people regularly vote for national and local office? Do they believe that voting is the best way to affect public policy? What other acts of participation (writing letters, petitioning, protesting, using personal contacts, organizing with other citizens) have citizens used to contact political leaders at both the national and local level? Do political leaders respond to citizen initiatives? Have these initiatives led to successful resolution of the issues raised? Do local leaders respond more satisfactorily to citizen contacts than are national leaders? Are people more likely to get satisfactory answers to requests for personal problems/issues than for matters of public policy?

NGOs and Civil Society representatives/ Local Business Owners

- What is the role of media, NGOs, organizations affiliated with local governments in developing and promoting accountability initiatives?- What are the constraints and promising practices in increasing the number and effectiveness of such mechanisms and initiatives?

Local Elite/Traditional Authorities

- Do elites believe that these essential services are readily available, provided without interruption, and without additional “gift payments.” Do some elites have more favorable views of service delivery and does this suggest that some elites have greater access to decision-makers than do others?- What is the perception of traditional leaders on decentralization reforms? How do they perceive the new role of elected officials? A threat or an opportunity?

71

ANNEX IV

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR ALCOSA KENYA

Based on review of laws and regulations and existing literature as well as interviews with

academics and local government officials, the local researcher drafted a report that took into

account the following issues:

1. Characterization of the discretionary space in which the local governments operate. For

example, what are the discretionary powers held by local governments in the realm of

education (procurement and construction of schools, hiring and firing of education staff etc)

2. Characterization of the current accountability and oversight systems: Are accountability and

oversight arrangements adequate? What are the roles and processes in planning, budgeting,

human resource management, auditing, procurement and service delivery? Key issues

analyzed were:

a. Obligations and roles of local council in oversight

b. Powers (means to carry out obligations and roles)

c. Means of accountability available to citizens to monitor their elected local leaders.

d. How are these understood in discourse, specified in law, and exercised in practice?

72

e. ACRONYMS

ALCOSA Africa Local Council Oversight and Social Accountability

ALGAK The Associating of Local Government Authorities

CAO Chief Administrative Officer

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DED District Executive Director

DSC District Service Commissions

IPF Indicative Planning Figures

JARD Joint Annual Review on Decentralization

LASDAP Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan

LATF Local Authority Transfer Fund

LGA Local Government Act

LGCDG Local Government Capital Development Grant

LGDP Local Government Development Programme

LGs Local Governments

LGA Local Government Authority

LGPAC Local Government Public Accounts Committees

LGRP Local Government Reform Programme

MoLG Ministry of Local Government

MP Member of Parliament

NGOs None Government Organisation

O & OD Opportunities and Obstacles to Development

PBS Protecting Basic Services

73

PETS Public Expenditure Studies

PSC Public Service Commission

RDC Resident District Commissioners

TC Town Clerk

ULGA Uganda Local Government Association

VEO Village Executive Officer

WDC Ward Development Committee

WEO Ward Executive Officer

74