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Africa and the worldMaxi Schoeman aa Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies , Rand Afrikaans University(RAU) ,Published online: 11 Nov 2009.

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73

Africa and the World

Maxi Schoeman1

Introduction

i n examining Africa and the world one could look back over this century1 and chart a list of failures, disappointments and crises, or one could bewailand bemoan Africa's enduring and ever increasing marginalisation. Anotherapproach would be to put a bright face on it and list a number ofachievements for Africa during this century. At the very least we end thiscentury free of colonialism — it is quite a different situation from the one thiscontinent faced at the end of the previous century — but this, too wouldperhaps be too contrived. As we exit the 20th century, we are beingpresented with new challenges. There are windows of opportunity openingup to Africa and the challenge is to recognise these opportunities and to usethem in such a way that the continent gains maximum benefit from them.2

Africa and international politics

No matter how much we talk about globalisation and the retreat of the state,the political division of the world into sovereign independent states seemsto be as enduring a characteristic of the way in which world order isestablished and maintained as it was at the end of the previous century. Infact, we exit the 20th century with a vastly increased number of states thanwere in existence a mere 50 years ago. The international state system andthe way in which power is distributed in this system is therefore one towhich we should pay attention. This interstate system is built on theprinciple of sovereignty, and hence non-intervention. States exist in ananarchic system and have to secure themselves against infringement of theirsovereignty and threats to their independence, autonomy and survival.National interest, a marvellously ambiguous term covering many sins,

1 MAXI SCHOEMAN is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies,Rand Afrikaans University (RAU). This article is a revised version of a paper presentedat a workshop arranged by ACCORD and the Department of Political Sciences, UN ISA,on 18 May 1999, commemorating Africa Day (25 May).

2 These are not necessarily the only opportunities open to Africa.

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therefore becomes the yardstick in terms of which governments makedecisions, formulate policy and justify their actions.

The founding of the United Nations (UN) at the end of the Second WorldWar made it possible to move from balance of power politics, with itsemphasis on order and stability, to collective security, with its emphasis onpeace and security. Collective security brings with it a softening of theprinciple of sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention. Members of sucha system are expected to deter any form of aggression against any othermember, and Chapter VII of the Charter sets out the powers of the UN tomaintain or restore peace and security in the case of aggression or a threatto the peace. African states, during the long struggle against apartheid, madegood use of Chapter VII, among other mechanisms, to implement acomprehensive sanctions regime against South Africa. The end of the ColdWar briefly kindled hopes of an even bigger role for the UN collectivesecurity system in promoting international peace and security. The role ofUN peacekeeping in Namibia and later in Mozambique served to strengthenthese expectations.

But events since the mid-1990s dashed these dreams: the failure of the UNin Somalia and more recently in Angola, and the half-hearted attempt by theorganisation to intervene in central Africa, particularly during the Rwandancivil war, resulted in a call from Africa, and the world at large, for theopportunity and even the right of Africa to solve its own problems andmanage its own conflicts. In Africa the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)has spent much of the past decade evolving mechanisms to enable thecontinent to do exactly this: to prevent or manage conflict and to developearly warning systems — in short, to establish an African peacekeepingcapacity and capabilities. These attempts are being supported and to someextent sponsored by the international community — from material andlogistical donations to intellectual arguments in favour of the principle ofAfricans being responsible for their own security and well-being.

This issue of Africa being responsible for itself is one that offers a majoropportunity for the continent. Decisions taken now may in the long runhave a huge impact on the continent's position internationally and on itsdegree of integration within the international system. The first question wehave to ask ourselves is: What do we mean by 'taking responsibility for ourown security'? Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with the relationshipbetween regional organisations and in Article 53 the UN forbids the takingof enforcement action by regional agencies without the authorisation of the

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Security Council, confirming, in its general spirit, the precedence ofuniversalism over regionalism.3

If we mean to go it alone, in other words to delink in practice (if not onpaper) from the UN collective security system, we run the risk of evengreater marginalisation than we experience at the moment. In 1995 OlaraOttunu, president of the International Peace Academy in New York, warnedagainst an over-emphasis on regional organisations as agents of security.This could lead, he said, to 'a sort of tribalisation of peacekeepingactivities'.4 Two aspects of such a delinking were particularly dangerous toOtunnu. The first one is the limited capability and capacity of Africa fortaking such responsibility. These constraints not only refer to a lack ofmaterial and financial resources and other skills and abilities, but also to thedangers inherent in a too parochial approach where historical links,divisions, tensions and mistrust may hamper efficient conflict managementor even exacerbate conflict. The current upheaval in the DRC and broadercentral African region and the patterns of intervention by other African statesillustrate this point well. Related to this is the possibility that regionalresponsibility may also lack legitimacy and again, in the long run,undermine the development of 'softer sovereignty'. Countries involved inconflicts where regional responses or interventions were applied may cometo distrust neighbours and to totally reject any form of external intervention,hardening borders and making the application of peacekeeping effortsimpossible. Capacity and legitimacy are perhaps the key requirements forsuccessful peacekeeping -*- Africa should be careful not to debate anddevelop itself out of these 'resources'. Of course, one can also say that oneof the reasons why Africa is insisting on the right to take care of its ownsecurity problems is exactly because of the failure and lack of legitimacy ofinternational (UN) peacekeeping missions on the continent. Angola and itsrefusal to continue co-operating with the UN is a case in point.

Otunnu's second warning is that a delinking strategy or 'tribalisation' ofpeacekeeping goes against the grain of the UN — it undermines the veryphilosophy of collective security, joint responsibility and internationalsolidarity. If peace is indivisible, then everyone has to contribute to the

3 See Bennett A, International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th edition. EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp.232-235.

4 Ottunu O, 'Peacekeeping: from a cross-roads to the future' in Cilliers J & C Mills (eds),Peacekeeping in Africa. Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy and Braamfontein:South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.52.

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maintenance of peace and the building of security. Therefore, although interms of the Charter regional organisations should spearhead internationalresponses to conflict situations, they should not detract from the importanceof, and necessity for, wider international involvement. The demand thatAfrica should solve its own security problems (and the support it receives inthis instance from the international community) becomes ironic when oneconsiders that an African leader such as Nelson Mandela on his recent visitto Russia called on NATO to end its strikes against Yugoslavia and to allowthe UN to search for a solution to the crisis. Why does east-central Europewarrant UN attention and action, but not African conflicts?

UN involvement in African conflicts has lost legitimacy in some instancesand resulted in suspicion and enmity on the part of actors involved inconflicts on the continent. This is where the challenge lies for Africa: to playa role in strengthening the UN's peacekeeping ability and efficiency. Thecontinent has to inculcate a sense of responsibility for, and loyalty to, Africain the UN so that the organisation treats conflict there with the samemeasure of urgency and sincerity, dedication and application of resources,time and attention as it bestows on other conflicts such as Yugoslavia or Iraq.

The role of continental and subregional organisations should, as remarkedearlier, be to 'spearhead international involvement'. This means that Africashould develop its peacekeeping capacity in two main ways. The first is toestablish, maintain and encourage the growth of early warning capacity; thesecond is to refine and hone its skills in the realm of preventive diplomacy.A third role or function of African regional organisations should be that oftraining personnel, both in the security forces and services and in civilsociety, for peacekeeping duties that will be undertaken as part ofworldwide peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the UN. Developinga peacekeeping capacity for deployment in intra-regional conflicts on thecontinent should not be the objective.

It is for this reason that the debate about the restructuring of the SecurityCouncil becomes so important.5 Two aspects of restructuring are ofparticular significance to Africa. The first concerns the issue of permanentmembership of the Council and also the actual size of membership. TheOAU has adopted the position that Africa would demand two seats on the

5 For a detailed discussion, see Field S & C Murphy, United Nations Reform: Perspectivesfrom the South and the North. Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue,Occasional Paper 14, July 1998.

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Council on a rotational basis, and that the Council should have at least 26members, a number that would include five non-permanent seats for thecontinent. So far there has been very little debate about the viability of thisproposal. For instance, would enlargement hamper the efficiency of theCouncil. What would be the result of the (possible) trade-off betweenrepresentivity and efficiency?

In his budget speech in Parliament earlier in 1999, then-Foreign MinisterAlfred Nzo made specific reference to this issue: 'The restructuring andreform of the UN Security Council is probably the single most importantstep to more equitable international relations. In 1997 I raised the questionoí South Africa having to consider whether it is prepared to serve as apermanent member of the Security Council and called for a national debate.It is imperative that we have that debate.'6 Have we started this debate inSouth Africa yet? What are the perceptions and opinions of other Africanstates on this issue? And of other UN members? Do we know? The OAUview may have serious implications not only for Africa's position in theworld and the possibility of its becoming politically more integrated andinfluential, but for African unity as well. Is the decision in favour of rotationone made to preserve African unity, and if so, would it be the best possibleway of improving the continent's international standing and influence?

A second aspect of the restructuring of the Security Council is one thatreceives hardly any attention in public debates on the continent. This is theissue of the scope of the Council's duties and powers, and improvement inits working methods. The Council's mandate is one that is still based on aworld characterised by international conflict and the increasingly outdatedprinciple of non-intervention. International conflict is all but a thing of thepast, and non-intervention is regularly used as an argument to prevent theinvolvement of the international community in the internal affairs ofcountries.7 But there is an obvious and urgent need for the Security Councilto be officially empowered to deal with intra-state conflict, and for the

6 Nzo A, 'Foreign Affairs budget vote: Address by Minister Alfred Nzo', Cape Town:House of Assembly', 4 March 1999.

7 Examples abound: Milosevic claiming that NATO action against Yugoslavia in Kosovoprovince is an abuse of his country's sovereignty; Iraqi charges against US action in theface of what the latter insists are measures to implement Security Council resolutions onsanctions; President Mandela justifying his failure to discuss human rights abuses withhis Chinese hosts during his May 1999 visit to the PRC because, the President explained,South Africa does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

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broadening of Article 39 to allow for Security Council intervention underconditions other than a threat to international peace and stability. Such anempowerment of the Council would strengthen its mandate. It would alsoforce the Council to deal with intra-state conflicts without abrogating suchresponsibility in the name of Article 2 (7). For Africa these aspects of SecurityCouncil restructuring are of particular importance and should be at theforefront when making recommendations and lobbying support if it wantsto strengthen its position internationally whilst at the same time addressingthe needs and problems of the continent.

Africa and the world economy

The second area in which an opportunity has arisen for Africa to improve itsposition is in the world economy. In this domain a number of trends andchanges are now making it possible for the continent to assert itself and toensure that it deals effectively with its socio-economic crises, many of whichare at least partly due to the inequality that characterises internationaleconomic relations. In the domain of international economics, there are fourissues to which Africa, as a continent, should pay serious attention. Theseare the upcoming Millennium Round of the World Trade Organisation(WTO), the post-Lomé Convention negotiations, the possibility of designingand implementing an international — note not global — framework to allowfor capital control and third world debt, particularly debt relief for highlyindebted poor countries (HIPC). But before I discuss each of these, a fewcomments on current trends in the global economy must be made.

The so-called Washington consensus, based on the principle of 'rationalityof the market' is increasingly being criticised and questioned because of thetrade liberalisation measures it enforces, often through structural adjustmentprogrammes.8 The attack on rampant 'free marketism' is, in the North, beingspearheaded by Japan, which points to the fact that the struggle betweendifferent versions of, and approaches to, capitalism is not geographical orsimply part of the North-South debate but rather an issue of philosophy.This divide is perhaps best illustrated by the conflict over the successor toretired WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero. The US, France, Germany,Britain, Canada and most of Latin America supported New Zealand's Mike

8 The discussion of changing trends in the global economy is indebted to Marais H,'Davos: what hope for developing countries?', Global Dialogue, 4, 1, April 1999,pp.15-16.

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Moore. Japan, Australia, the rest of Asia and the Middle East stronglysupported Thailand's Supachai Panitchpakdi. According to the press, bothcandidates had support from Africa.5 There was no clear-cut victory for theUS-led group. A compromise was reached and the six-year term will bedivided between the two candidates with Moore serving as director-generalfor the first three years.

The US promotes the liberalisation of markets, emphasising the need for thestate to stay out oí the economy. Japan, in turn, advocates state interventionand circumspection when it comes to freeing markets. What Japanacknowledges, implicitly, is the fact that 'the economy is political' and thereis no getting around this fact.

When old orthodoxies are under attack, it means that space is being createdfor new ideas and new strategies, in this case ideas and strategies aboutrestructuring the global economy. There is the possibility, though, perhapsstill slight, of re-ordering power away from markets and towardsgovernments, meaning that the international economy mayassert itself overthe global economy. But such an outcome will very much depend on theway in which multilateralism is utilised and what alliances and coalitions areformed around issues pertaining to the structure of the internationaleconomy.

Often participation in multilateral forums is broadly viewed as one in whichthe South is pitted against the North, while some need is found for bridge-builders who can build consensus between the two blocs. An example isSouth Africa's role during the Nucear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) reviewconference of 1995.10 The reality is of course much more complicated.Nevertheless, from a Southern perspective, a united front and a broad 'Southcoalition' is often seen to be the best, if not the only viable strategy withwhich to enter into negotiations with the North to win concessions orimprove conditions in the developing world. Regular calls are "thereforemade on South or Southern solidarity and South Africa, in its current foreignpolicy, is careful to present a unified front to the world through its chairingof the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations Conference

9 See Sakebeeld, 11 May 1999, p.5.

10 Masiza Z & C Landsberg, Fission for Compliments? South Africa and the 1995 Extensionof Nuclear Non-proliferation. Doomfontein: Centre for Policy Studies, 1996. Thisprovides a detailed analysis of South Africa's role.

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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and, one can expect, through theCommonwealth. The fact of the matter is, though, that in some casesconditions, needs and ¡ntra-South political, ideological and economicdifferences mean that there is a need for 'small is beautiful', rather than 'bigis better'. Certain issues cannot be addressed, let alone solved, through alarge coalition of Southern states. What is needed is smaller, strategicalliances. In some instances it may benefit Africa to develop distinctlyAfrican coalitions or alliances, if only because broader, bigger alliances orcoalitions may not be the best way in which.to utilise opportunities for thecontinent to exert influence and improve its position internationally. In otherwords, the very condition of interdependence provides an opportunity forlinking or delinking specific issue areas to or from each other to suitparticular needs at a specific point in time.1'

The complexity of many international and global economic issues, and thedegree of diversity within the countries making up 'the South', means thatsuccess does not depend so much on size, but on the degree to which analliance is focused and geared at very specific targets. And although Africais a conglomeration of diverse countries, conditions and needs, there is stillmore homogeneity within this group than within the South as such. It mayalso be necessary for African countries to form alliances not with neighboursor other African countries, but with countries who share similar concerns oncertain issues. Problems such as international debt, or even the differencebetween Africa's position in the international division of labour vis-à-vis thatof Asia or Latin America, point to the way in which a broad Southern frontfor the sake of numbers and solidarity might actually obscure, ignore or evenexacerbate specific African problems and issues.

Big unwieldy South coalitions tend to be hampered to the point ofbecoming ineffectual and meaningless by the need to find common ground.Instead, distinctly African coalitions of specific interests are needed in thefour areas of economic improvement, prudential capital regulation,involvement in economic policy-making and relief of developing countrydebt.

The first opportunity for Africa to attempt an improvement in its economicposition is in the area of the upcoming Millennium Round of tradenegotiations in the WTO. Within a common South position, it should be

11 See Nye J, Understanding International Conflicts. New York: Harper Collins, 1993,pp. 166-168.

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possible to identify areas of particular importance to African countries orsubgroups of countries. These areas should then be treated not so much asseparate from the broad approach, but as detailed, well-researchedparticulars, with decisions on which countries to target for support and howto prevent possible damaging linkages or delinking. Such areas include thebroad principle regarding 'unfinished business' resulting from the UruguayRound, and the new issues to be put on the WTO agenda —the MultilateralAgreement on Investment (MIA), the proposed Competition Policy and theGovernment Procurement Strategy. Another aspect that needs seriousconsideration is the relationship between regional integration for thepurpose of trade liberalisation vis-à-vis the external environment andregional integration as a predominantly development strategy.12 These twoobjectives differ significantly and the latter demands various concessions interms of the rules regarding the opening of markets to the extra-regionalenvironment.

A second opportunity arises in the domain of the development of aframework within which global capital flows might be regulated. These areso-called prudential capital regulations, sometimes referred to as the MAI.Again, not all African countries need such regulations, at least at this stage.Some aspects of the proposed MAI may even be detrimental to thesecountries.13 Too big an alliance can therefore be an unnecessary andunproductive, albeit politically correct, approach. The regulation of globalcapital flows is of particular importance to emerging markets such as SouthAfrica and, to an extent, the countries most closely linked to it economicallythrough the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the CommonMonetary Area (CMA). In the slow move towards such a regulatoryframework, it is important that these southern African countries develop aclear and common position on those areas of financial or capital flows thatare of relevance to them. This will enable them to lobby like-minded groupsin other parts of the South, or to link up with them or with similar groups inthe North.

12 See Keet D, 'The World Trade Organisation, its impact on the global South and newissues on the agenda', Preparatory Workshop on South Africa and the Non-alignedMovement in an Era of Regionalisation and Globalisation, Braamfontein: Foundation forGlobal Dialogue, August 1998, pp.69-76.

13 See interview with Mr Alec Erwin, minister of trade and industry, Global Dialogue, 4,1, April 1999, p.20.

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The broad political support of a Southern alliance is of course still needed,but the point is that on the specifics of certain issues, it is knowledge aboutthe subject, negotiating skills and a clear picture of preferred outcomes thatare needed to promote and secure interests. Mere acceptance that'something is being done' about prudential capital regulations is notenough, as there are clear differences between various countries on thisissue. These range from support for strict control among free marketagnostics, to those who want such regulations to actually support andencourage freer markets for financial investments. Where does Africa stand?Does it have a position? Is it participating in the debate about prudentialcapital regulation?

The debate about, and negotiations on, a 'post-Lomé dispensation' isanother opportunity being offered Africa to become actively involved inpolicy-making that could influence its economic future and the pace anddirection of development.14 The trade preferences granted to theAfrican-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries did not achieve the expectedgoals of encouraging and improving economic growth. ACP share of EUmarkets actually dropped between 1976 and 1996.15 Post-Lomé options aremany and varied, but many of them originate in the EU, with the ACPreacting to these rather than being proactive. Again, a broad ACP coalitionmay be useful to build solidarity and to provide the impetus for negotiations,co-ordinating different aspects of the overall agreement that has to beworked out.

Africa can develop issue-specific positions and identify baseline positionsand preconditions for negotiations on particular aspects of a futureagreement, for instance agriculture, but then very specific sectors ofagriculture. The 'older' manufacturing industries in Europe, such as textilesand clothing, are of particular relevance to a number of southern Africancountries. For some other ACP countries other sectors of agriculture ormanufacturing may be more relevant. Areas of 'specialised' negotiationsbased on the particular needs of groups of countries within the ACP shouldbe identified and worked on. Africa should focus attention on these areas

14 The post-Lomé negotiations are also to some extent linked to the WTO as the EU usesthe decisions of the Uruguay Round as one of its justifications for favouring a morereciprocal agreement with the ACP.

15 The ACP share was 6.7% in 1976, dropping to 3.8% in 1996, whilst Asian countriesincreased their share in the same period, from 4.2% to 13.1%. See Lambrechts K,'Losing the soul of Lomé?', Global Dialogue, 4, 1, 1999, pp.1-3.

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and develop common positions and clear-cut objectives. The loss of marketshare in the EU is at least partly due to the inability of many of these statesto industrialise, coupled with continued protection of European agriculturethrough the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).16 On the one hand,various conditions militate against industrialisation in many of thesecountries, whilst on the other, their comparative advantage in agriculturalproduce is curtailed owing to protection of EU agriculture. For Africa there¡s a need to identify the particular problems of its member states and to buildstrategic and tactical coalitions around these areas, with a view tonegotiating with the EU.

The last opportunity is thatof developing world debt and particularly HIPCdebt, as the majority of these countries are situated in Africa. South Africa,as chair of NAM and UNCTAD, has taken this issue on in a very public andconcerted effort to find a solution to the problem. The HIPC debt reliefscheme has so far produced very few results, allowing the 'victims' to sinkinto ever greater economic obscurity and poverty. At the same time, though,there are many indications that the issue of debt relief is relatively high onthe international agenda. While it is there, Africa should see it as anopportunity to improve internal conditions

It would seem that one of the problems behind reaching a commitment todebt relief for the HIPC countries is the argument, perhaps correctly made,that debt relief would not solve the structural problems underlying theeconomies of the HIPC. What guarantee exists, it is asked, that the 'reliefdividend' that would come with debt forgiveness would be used in aresponsible and efficient way to build these economies? Northern cynicismon this issue cannot be brushed aside. Rather, it should be addressed head-on. Instead of, or rather attached to requests, pleas, demands andrecommendations for debt relief, Africa can provide this guarantee. Throughan agency such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA) African countries in the HIPC category (as well as their neighboursand 'sponsors', such as South Africa) can develop an agreed frameworksetting out the exact ways in which the debt relief dividend will beintegrated into economic and social development policy in these countries.Such an agreement can then be negotiated with international financial

16 Lambrechts, op. cit., relates the case of CAP support schemes for the EU canningindustry that have driven SA not only out of the EU market, but also cost it market sharein Japan and the US. Langeberg Foods' Paarl factory closed down in 1997 as a result,shedding 120 permanent and 3,000 temporary workers at the factory, and a further 800permanent and about 4,000 seasonal jobs on the farms that supplied the factory.

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institutions from a position of strength, and debt relief can provide impetusfor growth rather than become an act of charity. A negotiated debt reliefpackage with clear principles considering the way in which the benefit ofsuch relief will be utilised would result in a form of structural adjustment,with conditionalities attached, but on the terms of Africa, not the IMF.

Conclusion

Although there is cause for pessimism when one views Africa, there are alsoindications of a range of opportunities that are open to the continent. Thechallenge is to recognise these, and to ensure that the specifics of theseopportunities, not the broad themes, are put on the international agenda.And once it has this agenda, Africa has to negotiate from a position ofstrength, based on strategic coalitions and alliances founded on a thoroughknowledge of the subject matter and a clear understanding of what is to beachieved to promote an African Renaissance.

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