American Foreign Policy2

From the EditorDear AFP Readers,

The last few weeks have seen some interesting developments in American Foreign Policy, including President Obama’s deci-sion concerning troop levels in Afghanistan and the opening of the United Nations climate change summit. Although last month’s issue was largely devoted to the arguments surrounding Afghanistan, this month’s issue is a bit more holistic in its coverage of international affairs and foreign policy, and we hope that you appreciate the diver-sity of these articles.

Our cover story, written by Lucas Issacharoff, details and exam-ines the issue of rising food prices, particularly in less developed countries. Issacharoff argues that the United States could invigo-rate food security through steps to open and normalize the market, such as the elimination of biofuel and agricultural subsidies, and to alter trade restrictions through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. In addition, this issue features John Cappel’s forceful argument against President Obama’s decision to discontinue long-term plans for long-range missile defenses. As mentioned above, the UN Climate Change summit in Copenhagen also finds a place in this issue, as David Chen describes why America needs to take a leading role in combating climate change, and why such action may improve Sino-American relations.

Finally, it is worth noting that this issue of AFP will be the last with both myself and our Editor-in-Chief, Dan May, at the helm. Dan and I are both confident that AFP will continue along its current upward trajectory toward nothing but the highest levels of analysis, sophistication, and aesthetic design. Dan and I would also like to take this time to thank the lifeblood of this publication, and that is the members of our devoted and utterly professional staff, who put in numerous hours every semester to ensure that each issue of this magazine is an unprecedented success. In addition, we would like to thank our advisory board and the Woodrow Wilson School, the James Madison Program, and the Princeton Institute for Interna-tional and Regional Studies for their continued support of our maga-zine.

We hope that you all have enjoyed AFP during this past year and that you continue to read the publication in the months ahead.

In Deepest Gratitude,

Steve Lindsay ‘12Publisher

StaffEditor-in-ChiefDan May ‘11

PublisherSteve Lindsay ‘12

Managing EditorsVishal Chanani ‘11

Tara Lewis ‘11Jamie LaMontagne ‘11

Ben Cogan ‘12

Editors

LayoutYanran Chen ‘12, Production Manager

Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10Kelly Lack ‘10

May Li ‘12Emily Myerson ‘12

Emily VanderLinden ‘13

Business StaffEmma Cunningham ‘11 Samuel Roeca ‘12

Editor-in-Chief EmeritusRush Doshi ‘11

AFP Advisory BoardChristina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies

Robert P. George: Director, James Madison ProgramG. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of

Politics and International Affairs

Ahson AzmatJon BradshawHeejin ChoMatthew DrecunJon ExteinJonathan GiuffridaLucas IssacharoffCatalina ValenciaAaron AbelsonBrendan CarrollKatherine GaudynRachel JacksonAddie LernerElias Sánchez-EpplerZayn SiddiqueEric Stern

‘10‘10‘10‘10‘10‘10‘10‘10‘11‘11‘11‘11‘11‘11‘11‘11

Kit Thayer Oliver BloomYun ChungSweta HaldarJim HaoNatalie KimCharlie MetzgerJay ParikhPeter WangMatt AronsDon ButterworthJonathan LinTaman NarayanJake NebelEmily VanderLindenAudrye Wong

‘11‘12‘12‘12‘12‘12‘12‘12‘12‘13‘13‘13‘13‘13‘13‘13

AmericAn Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. AmericAn Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for of-fice. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or AmericAn Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.

All correspondence may be directed to:AmericAn Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544

afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp

December 2009 3

AmericAn Foreign PolicyDecember 2009 Volume IX, Issue IIIt a b l e o f c o n t e n t s

Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr and Wikimedia Commons Cover Design: Yanran Chen ‘12

cover Story

AFPGlobal Food CrisisRising Prices and ProtectionismLucas Issacharoff ‘10

Strengthening KimberleyHow to Clean Up the Diamond TradeLauren Zumbach ‘13

AFP Quiz Dan May ‘11

Missile Defense RealignmentA Strategic BlunderJohn Cappel ‘11

Global UpdateVishal Chanani ‘11

Beyond CelebrityHow Obama Can Remake America’s ImageSam Norton ‘12

A Leadership OpportunityHow the U.S. Should Approach Climate ChangeDavid Chen ‘13

In Context Tara Lewis ‘11

Cold War GhostsHow the U.S. Should Handle HondurasEvan Larson ‘13

After LisbonThe Future of the European UnionLucas Briger ‘12

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101214151618

American Foreign Policy4

globAl Food criSiS

Rising Prices and Protectionism

Lucas Issacharoff ‘10

has caused extreme food shortages and political conflict. When food prices spike, the poor and those who feed them cannot afford as much food. The UN’s World Food Program and the U.S. Agency for International Development have announced cutbacks in food aid in response to rising prices, while un-dernourishment has increased globally by roughly 20 percent since 2006. Ris-ing food prices have also caused politi-cal instability in the developing world. In 2009 riots against food and fuel prices left nearly 40 dead in Cameroon, and food-related instability led to the Haiti’s prime minister and Madagas-car’s president.

The food market faces two obsta-cles: long-term structural distortions stemming from Western policy, and short-term instability caused by ex-porting nations. A properly function-ing global food market could allow di-rect investment in the most productive land and let net-importing countries focus on their comparative advantages. While the rise in food prices is partly

With the price of grain increasing by 154 per-cent between 2006 and 2008, food prices have

become a pressing issue in the develop-ing world. Despite the global recession, prices rose again in 2009, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization predicts that prices will remain well above the long-term average through-out the decade. The increases in food prices exposed serious deficiencies in the world food market; exporters have abandoned trade and importers are desperately searching for alterna-tives. Food insecurity in the develop-ing world induces inefficient responses by both exporters and importers, caus-

ing enormous human suffering due to price spikes and food shortages in im-porting countries.

Importing countries in the devel-oping world and the U.S. should en-hance the food security of the devel-oping world by creating an open and predictable market. Such efforts should advance on two fronts. First, the devel-oped world should recognize its distor-tionary role in world food markets and eliminate biofuel and agricultural sub-sidies. Second, the U.S. should work through international institutions and with exporting countries to mitigate the price increases in ways that do not hamper trade.

The dysfunctional food market

cover Story

Photo from Wikimedia CommonsAn Afghanistan national police officer helps an American soldier while crossing a stream during a patrol of Balik in Afghanistan on June 14, 2007.

December 2009 5

due to growth in demand from devel-oping nations, the recent drastic price increases owe much to misguided poli-cies.

The West’s agricultural policies play a large part in the troubles of the global food market. The primary cul-prits are agricultural subsidies and bio-fuel subsidies. While subsidies are sup-posed to increase output and decrease global food prices, they divert private investment toward Western agricul-ture and away from underdeveloped countries, where the potential gains in productivity are greater. This counter-productive diversion of resources dis-torts investment patterns and reduces spare production capacity when prices are high. Biofuel subsidies encourage farmers to shift production away from food and toward ethanol, decreasing the supply of food and driving up pric-es. The U.S., by far the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn, may soon use half of its crop for ethanol.

These subsidies are also wasteful for Western countries. Subsidies are a blatantly inefficient case of special in-terest favoritism; the government will spend over $21 billion next year on “farm income stabilization.” Biofuel subsidies and regulations have become a boondoggle—estimated to cost the U.S. between $5 billion and $9 billion—that fails to reduce CO2 emissions.

The heart of the problem is the enormous political importance of food prices in developing countries. In countries where food makes up a large part of household expenditures, price increases can be devastating for voters and treacherous for govern-ments. While facing political pressure to reduce food prices, several major food producers, including Argentina, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, restricted exports to ensure adequate domestic supplies. These restrictions further increased the price of food traded on the international market, causing additional pain to importing nations.

The trade restrictions have impor-tant disadvantages. First, they reduce income to farmers while their prod-ucts’ prices are high, thus stifling in-vestment and production when greater supply is most needed. Second and more damaging is that importing na-

tions begin to fear that the market will no longer suffice to meet their needs. They rush toward panicked and inef-ficient responses, particularly those that increase production on their own land. Saudi Arabia, an extreme exam-ple, spent billions to achieve self-suffi-ciency in wheat production by turning desert into farmland; the drain on the country’s aquifers and its pocketbook forced Saudi Arabia to abandon the ex-periments.

Both of these trends steer invest-ment toward unproductive land in im-porting countries and away from fer-tile land in exporting countries. Saudi Arabia, with enormous oil reserves and

virtually no water, could export oil and import food rather than try to grow wheat in the desert. Its newest strategy for food security, along with countries such as China, the United Arab Emir-ates, and South Korea, has been to buy huge tracts of land in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to assure long-term food security in fertile lands. While this may be an efficient investment in certain cases, the opacity and size of the deals has led to complaints of neocolonialism and corruption. Fur-thermore, this trend demonstrates the strategic disadvantages of global food insecurity for the United States.

The developed world must take the first steps to bolster the global food

market, by eliminating agricultural and biofuel subsidies to enhance the food security of developing countries. More importantly, the United States must prevent nervous exporters from di-verting food supplies inward. The first step is to alter the terms of the World Trade Organization compact to explic-itly declare export bans (or extremely high export taxes) to be contrary to the principles of free trade and subject to penalty. While many exporting coun-tries would oppose such a move, they might make this concession if the U.S. eliminates its agricultural subsidies—a long-sought goal that would make their own exports more competitive in return. Removing the subsidies could advance trade talks, since these sub-sidies were largely responsible for the breakdown in 2008 of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round of negotiations to lower trade barriers.

It will be difficult to design inter-national rules sufficiently compelling to overcome the political pressures at-tendant with rising food prices. Equal-ly important will be policy advice to developing exporter nations to miti-gate the effects of price increases as an alternative to market manipulation. As food prices rise, exporting nations gain income overall. The downside for such countries lies in the transfer of income from consumers to farmers. Govern-ments, during times of high-prices, should assess farmers a lump-sum tax and distribute the revenue to the poor. Carefully calibrated redistributive measures could keep countries satis-fied. A push for global regulation and policy changes would give less devel-oped countries and their citizens the stability they need for security and economic growth and development. Afp

Lucas may be reached at lissacha@Princeton.edu

20 percent increase in

undernourishment since 2006

40 people dead in Cameroon riots

$21 billion spent yearly on U.S.

farm subsidies

Cover Story

American Foreign Policy6

porting nations to evade the rules. Govern-ments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the pro-cess.

When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented coun-tries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging com-pliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated.

Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The sys-tem calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Dia-mond Council, the industry’s representa-tive, also cannot be held at fault. The Kim-berley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.

This flaw also means that the Kimber-ley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ oppor-tunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kim-berley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds.

The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an inde-pendent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regu-latory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more

On November 5th, the world’s conflict diamond monitoring group announced the con-troversial decision not to sus-

pend Zimbabwe following allegations of human rights abuses, diamond smuggling, and corruption. Although Zimbabwe is responsible for a relatively small portion of the world’s diamond trade, this was an important test of the global effort to moni-tor the diamond trade — a test that many would argue the international community failed.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process re-lies on self-regulation by the member na-tions’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kim-berley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Hu-man Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems ex-acerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership.

These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and im-porting firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation.

In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allega-tions of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military su-pervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compli-ance with the Kimberley Process’s mini-

mum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries

such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real.

Obtaining Kimberley Process cer-tificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a power-ful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and ex-

Strengthening Kimberley

How to Clean Up the Diamond Trade

Lauren Zumbach ‘13

“The Kimberley Process

has few tools to deal

with corruption among

diamond importers beyond

asking governments to

implement stricter industry

regulations.”

AFricA

December 2009 7

difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for im-porters to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less ex-acting importers and enter the illegal dia-mond trade.

Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consum-ers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade.

The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regula-tor will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by show-ing its commitment to stricter regulations.

Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, par-ticularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted au-thority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both govern-ments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization.

Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater rev-enues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.” Afp

Africa

Lauren may be reached at lzumbach@princeton.edu

AFP QuizMultiple Choice Monthly

Dan May ’11

1. Which country recently required im-porters to distinguish between West Bank produce that comes from Israeli settle-ments and produce made by Palestinians?

a. United Statesb. United Kingdomc. Franced. Saudi Arabiae. Monaco

2. How many Americans did Pakistani police catch on their way to a terrorist training camp?

a. Twob. Threec. Four d. Fivee. Sixty-four

3. What European country recently passed a ban on minarets by popular referendum?

a. Switzerlandb. Germanyc. Canadad. Austriae. United Kingdom

4. President Obama announced in a ma-jor policy address that he would commit how many additional troops to the fight in Afghanistan?

a. 20,000b. 30,000c. 40,000d. 50,000d. 500,000

5. Based on current planning, how many U.S. troops will remain in Iraq as of Au-gust 2010?

a. 50,000b. 75,000c. 90,000d. 100,000e. 500,000

Answers on page 19

A diamond miner in Sierra Leone / Photo from flickr

American Foreign Policy8

tive, and neither Iran nor North Ko-rea appears to be close to developing the long-range missiles the cancelled system would have been designed to intercept. Iran instead possesses short- and medium-range missiles that could pose a threat to Israel and parts of Europe, while North Korea’s current technology poses no threat to Europe. To protect Europe and Israel from any potential strikes by short- and medium-range Iranian missiles, the Obama administration’s new plan will use ship-based missile inter-ceptors and an installation of small ground-to-air missiles in Poland.

If the diplomatic ramifications of abandoning the Bush-era missile de-fense plans are ignored, the admin-istration’s new strategy is logically sound. New installations in Europe are not necessary for improving and testing the currently unreliable tech-nology for intercepting long-range missiles. In addition, constructing,

fense plan has weakened the Ameri-can diplomatic position in Europe and provided a political victory for Russia.

In announcing the cancellation of the Eastern European missile de-fense installations, the Obama ad-ministration emphasized that it was not abandoning European missile defense entirely, but was instead pur-suing an alternative strategy to more effectively address current threats. Long-range missile interceptors are unreliable and frequently ineffec-

I n mid-September, the Obama administration announced that it would abandon plans devel-oped under former President

Bush to place a radar system in the Czech Republic and missile intercep-tors in Poland. As an alternative, the administration announced new mis-sile defense measures designed to be implemented quickly and counter threats in the immediate future. The introduction of these new measures is commendable. But Obama’s aban-donment of the original missile de-

miSSile deFenSe reAlignment

A Strategic Blunder

John Cappel ‘11

U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. Navy Aegis-class destroyers will replace land-based missile defense installations in Eastern Europe. Photo from flickr.

December 2009 9

agreement between America and Russia on abandoning missile de-fense in exchange for Russian con-cessions would have carried high diplomatic penalties for both states. Alternatively, it would have been na-ïve of the administration to change its missile defense strategy and sim-ply hope for a future Russian con-cession in return. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did say, “if our partners hear some of our concerns, we will, of course, be more attentive to theirs.” This supposed attention to American concerns is unlikely to produce actual policy results, how-ever, given Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance. Simply put, there is no evidence that realigning missile de-fense policy has motivated Russia to change its positions on issues impor-tant to the United States.

From a purely military stand-point, the decision to immediately implement missile defenses against short and medium-range missiles is a good strategic outcome. Unfor-tunately, the decision to simultane-ously abandon slower-developing plans for long-range missile defenses was a diplomatic misstep. Abandon-ing the originally planned sites in Poland and the Czech Republic has not only harmed relations with these NATO allies, but may also make other nations skeptical of American commitments and hesitant to reach agreements with the United States. Moreover, the realignment may re-duce the number of complaints from the Kremlin, but is unlikely to help secure any real diplomatic conces-sions from Russia. Ultimately, the Obama administration’s decision to discontinue the Bush administra-tion’s missile defense program dam-aged American diplomatic credibility without producing any benefits for the United States. Afp

no indication that Russian leaders will be content with some particular amount of regional influence.

More broadly, the Obama admin-istration’s new missile defense strat-egy raises questions about the cred-ibility of American commitments in Europe and around the globe. It signals to other nations the United States’ willingness to change policy in pursuit of its own interests, and indicates that American commit-ments may weaken with changes in administration. While the Obama plan to include smaller interceptors in Poland may assuage Polish con-cerns to some degree, it remains to

be seen if the shift in missile defense policy will make other nations more skeptical of American commitments and less likely to enter into defense agreements.

One could argue that revising missile defense policy presented an opportunity for the United States to improve diplomatic relations with Russia and increase the odds of Rus-sian cooperation on other issues, such as sanctions against Iran or sup-ply lines into Afghanistan. But the Obama administration has repeat-edly insisted that its missile defense decision was completely unrelated to U.S.-Russian relations, and there is no evidence that the United States has received any concessions from Russia in return. Clearly, an open

maintaining, and manning the mis-sile defense sites in Europe would impose a financial burden on the United States for the sake of provid-ing unreliable protection against a threat that does not currently exist. Building missile defense sites now would ensure that the United States would be ready if and when North Korea and Iran develop long-range missiles, but intelligence reports should give the United States enough advance warning to prepare for such an occurrence. The cancelled long-range interceptor sites also failed to address the danger of the technology that Iran currently possesses, so the addition of new capabilities to the missile defense system is commend-able.

In spite of these pragmatic argu-ments for an adjustment in European missile defense strategy, the United States’ new strategy is short-sight-ed and ignores the broader diplo-matic implications of cancelling the planned installations. Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO allies of the U.S., hoped that American mili-tary installations in their nations would deter Russian aggression in the region. Their desire to secure a material American commitment be-yond a treaty obligation is reason-able, particularly in light of the Rus-sian military occupation of territory in Georgia little more than a year ago. Although a Russian attack on a NATO member seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future, Poland and the Czech Republic are rightly con-cerned with checking the expansion of Russian influence in the region.

Conversely, one might argue that cancelling the missile defense sites reduces the need for Russia to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, thereby giving Poland and the Czech Repub-lic less reason to fear Russian en-croachment in Eastern Europe. This analysis assumes that Russia is seek-ing a fixed amount of influence with which it will be satisfied attaining—a thesis with little supporting evi-dence. Russia’s recent foreign policy has been characterized by an aggres-sive pursuit of power; actions such as gas shutoffs to Ukraine and the armed incursion into Georgia give

John may be reached at jcappel@princeton.edu

“The Obama administration’s

new missile defense strategy raises questions

about the credibility of American commitments

in Europe and around the globe.”

U.S. Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy10

G L O B A L U P D A T E

A

A: In HONDURAS, after Rober-to Michelleti steps aside, Porfirio Lobo wins the general presidential election, defeating liberal candidate Elvin Santos by double-digit mar-gins.

B: Over 50 people are killed, and over 20 others go missing, in vio-lence in the PHILLIPINES related to the upcoming general election next year.

C: In the UNITED STATES, Attorney General Eric Holder an-nounces that 9/11 mastermind Kha-lid Sheikh Mohammed will stand trial for his crimes in Manhattan, where the attacks took place. Prosecutors will reportedly seek the death penalty.

G: Mahmoud Abbas, President of PALESTINE, announces that he will not seek re-election in January. Abbas has served as president since 2005 and was originally scheduled to step down this past January, but had his term extended for one year.

H: Following condemnation from the International Atomic En-ergy Agency for pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program, IRAN announces its intentions to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants.

I: In ROMANIA, no clear win-ner emerges from the first round of presidential elections, leading to a runoff between Traian Basescu and Mircea Geoana. However, voters approve a referendum replacing the bicameral legislative system with a unicameral Parliament.

December 2009 11

G L O B A L U P D A T E

A

D: Jose Mujica defeats Luis La-calle in the runoff for presidential elections in URUGUAY. Mujica belongs to the left wing coalition Broad Front, to which current president Tabare Vazquez belongs.

E: Herman Von Rompuy, Prime Minister of BELGIUM is selected by European Union leaders to be the first permanent President of the European Council following the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon.

F: In RUSSIA, a suspected terror-ist bombing of the Nevsky Express train, leaves over 25 dead and more than 100 others injured. Early responsibility for the attack, though unknown, has been claimed by the “Caucasian Mujahadeen” group.

J: Voters in SWITZERLAND approve a controversial referen-dum banning the construction of new minarets in the country, with supporters calling the architectural features signs of “Islamization.” Officials have noted concerns about the message this vote sends to the Muslim world.

K: A massive suicide bombing in SOMALIA kills 20 people and injures over 60 others. Three min-isters of the Transitional Federal Government are among those killed in the attack.

L: President Barack Obama of the UNITED STATES announces that he will send an additional 30,000 troops into AFGHANISTAN and will begin withdrawal within 19 months.

American Foreign Policy12

During the 2008 presidential cam-paign, Barack Obama vowed to “restore America’s standing in the world.” With this pledge, he sought to distinguish himself from George W. Bush, who many believed had alienated the United States from the rest of the world during his two terms in office.

Thus far, Obama can claim only limited success in turning the tide of international opinion. In part, this is because the alleged damage to the American image done by Bush was not as great as Obama and other Demo-crats claimed. But in spite of significant efforts to reach out to global audiences, he has yet to make substantial progress in improving ties with America’s allies. His failure suggests that international popularity is a difficult objective to achieve, and one that is not likely to be worth the costs it entails. Rather than seeking this chimerical goal, Obama ought to shift the focus of his foreign policy toward the advancement of America’s security and economic inter-ests.

Examining the history of America’s interaction with the rest of the world provides context for the actions of the Obama administration. Hand wring-ing about America’s image abroad dates back to at least the 1960s, and has intensified in recent decades. Cold War era conflicts, such as the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race, drew massive protests in Europe. In the af-termath of the downfall of the Soviet Union, observers derided the U.S. as a “hyperpower,” a critique that encom-passed not only America’s political moves, but also its economic and cul-tural might in an increasingly global-ized, unipolar world.

Tensions between the U.S. and its traditional allies mounted in 2002 when Bush announced his intention

to invade Iraq, a campaign he planned to launch unilaterally once the UN re-fused to endorse it. European leaders, most prominently Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroeder of Ger-many, denounced America’s behavior as aggressive, echoing a sentiment ex-pressed by an overwhelming majority of European citizens.

Yet, as in the past, America’s part-

ners maintained a schizophrenic at-titude toward their benefactor. For all its faults, America offered protection for European countries that had largely demilitarized in the years since World War II. Hence, whenever an outside threat appeared on the horizon, all talk of a post-American world suddenly vanished, and the transatlantic alliance appeared to be just as strong as ever. This was the case in the summer of

2008, when Russia’s invasion of Geor-gia inspired fear in the hearts of Euro-pean publics. In response, their leaders quickly modified their stance to ref lect closer alignment with the U.S. on is-sues such as missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Even as America saw its ratings de-cline under Bush in what Defense Sec-retary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “old Europe,” the story was different else-where. The U.S. continued to enjoy fa-vorable relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, who still remain thankful to the U.S. for defeating their former communist oppressors. Several Eastern European nations, most prom-inently Poland, contributed troops to the U.S. mission in Iraq. Ties with ris-ing powers in Asia, such as India and Japan, improved on Bush’s watch, as demonstrated by a series of joint mili-tary exercises as well as a landmark nu-clear treaty with India. These bonds ap-pear likely to remain strong even with the recent election of the Democratic Party of Japan, which has occasionally indulged in anti-American rhetoric, but has also announced a commitment of $5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a critical U.S. priority. Humanitarian aid to areas aff licted by poverty, disease, and natural disaster won plaudits among the President’s harshest critics. In Latin America, where populist politicians like Hugo Chavez gained ground throughout the past decade, local issues such as in-come disparity far outweighed the role of anti-American grandstanding in de-termining their success.

As has been established, America was by no means universally unpopu-lar on the eve of President Obama’s in-auguration. Nevertheless, during the campaign, Obama frequently sounded the theme of America’s deteriorating reputation abroad. To indicate that re-versing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, he sought to portray himself as a global citizen in a way that is perhaps unprecedented in American history: by emphasizing his multicultural background. He ad-dressed an enormous, cheering crowd in Berlin during a tour of Europe and the Middle East in July 2008, and met with foreign leaders who demonstrated their eagerness to work with him.

U.S. Foreign Policy

beyond celebrity

How Obama Can Remake America’s Image

Sam Norton ‘12

“To indicate that reversing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, [Obama]

sought to portray himself as a global citizen in

a way that is perhaps unprecedented in

American history.”

December 2009 13

The contrast between Obama and Bush became immediately apparently in the first few months of Obama’s pres-idency, as he began to overturn policies that, in the past, have incited denuncia-tion of the U.S. Fulfilling a campaign promise, he issued an executive order mandating that the Guantanamo Bay prison be closed within a year, a direc-tive that later ran into logistical prob-lems. He renounced the use of torture against terrorist suspects. In speeches to foreign nations, he extended his crit-icisms of America to include unsavory elements of its history, such as mis-treatment of immigrants and minority groups, and heavy-handed interven-tionism during the Cold War.

All of these measures represented an attempt to “reset” America’s rela-tions with the rest of the world. Vari-ous missteps, however, have tarnished that campaign. Obama was criticized for being deliberately rude to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, one of America’s closest allies, during Brown’s visit to Washington. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Obama’s goal of achiev-ing peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been set back by his frosty relations with hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has refused Obama’s demand to halt settlements in the West Bank.

Discontent with Obama’s foreign agenda has grown in recent months. An article in the German publication Der Spiegel noted that his new approach to international relations has not worked. European powers remain reluctant to provide significant military support for the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. French President Nicholas Sarkozy has been particularly adamant in criticiz-ing Obama’s perceived weakness in ne-gotiations with Iran, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the entire world. China and Russia both continue to exercise their inf luence as regional powers, and have largely ignored the outreach undertaken by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

How can Obama reverse course in his quest to revitalize America’s image? To begin, he should seize every possible opportunity to find common ground with America’s allies on issues such as human rights. When he decided against

Sam may be reached at snorton@princeton.edu

U.S. Foreign Policy

“Obama must acknowledge that

America’s image is a compilation of so many

factors, most of them out of his control, that

changing it within a short span of time would be an

impossible task.”

only contributes to long-term econom-ic growth, but it also ensures closer ties between nations, and thus reduces the possibility of conflict. If Obama were to repudiate his previous positions and commit to reviving the Doha Round, he would remind the world that Ameri-ca is capable of providing global leader-ship on these sorts of seemingly intrac-table problems.

But ultimately, Obama must ac-knowledge that America’s image is a compilation of so many factors, most of them out of his control, that chang-ing it within a short span of time would be an impossible task. Indeed, on some issues, seeking international approval could be detrimental to America’s best interests. Anti-terrorism policy is one example. Measures that have drawn the ire of foreign leaders, including harsh interrogation techniques, extraordi-nary rendition, and detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, are also an important line of defense against fu-ture attacks.

The best route to follow lies be-tween the extremes of the Bush era and the early months of the Obama presidency. America’s allies have a lot to offer in the way of diplomatic sup-port and international prestige, and can lend legitimacy to its military ven-tures. They should not be ignored or marginalized. At the same time, their true concern is security, and if America can no longer ensure their safety, Eu-ropeans and others will look elsewhere for protection. Obama needs to balance conciliation with displays of toughness, while employing his personal appeal to rally support for shared causes such as human rights and nuclear non-prolif-eration. If he takes these steps, he will be able to cultivate increased respect for America abroad without sacrificing its interests. Afp

meeting with the Dalai Llama in Octo-ber, the President aroused suspicions that he would not be as sympathetic to human rights concerns as his predeces-sors, all of who met with the exiled Ti-betan leader during their administra-tions. His endorsement of the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran, in which citizens took to the streets to protest the fraudulent re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was seen as less than enthusiastic. In this matter, he should take the advice offered by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel—“never let a crisis go to waste”—and apply this doc-trine to international affairs. Renewing Bush’s emphasis on development and democracy promotion could also help to reinforce the notion that America is a benevolent hegemon.

Trade is another area in which Obama could positively impact both America’s image and interests. Here, he has backpedaled from Bush’s pro-free-trade stance, imposing tariffs on Chi-nese tires, inserting “Buy American” provisions into the stimulus bill and the “Cash For Clunkers” program, and allowing agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama to languish in the Senate. Such actions hurt the odds of resurrecting the Doha Round of in-ternational trade negotiations, which broke down last year. Ever since the end of World War II, removing barriers to global commerce has been a key goal of the U.S. and its allies. Free trade not

American Foreign Policy14

Though few are optimistic that the community of nations will reach a substantive international agreement at the United Nations

Climate Change Conference in Copen-hagen this December, a renewed sense of urgency has prompted much discussion about the future of climate change control. An overwhelming majority of scientists agree that human-emitted greenhouse gases have caused the Earth to warm throughout the past half-century and will continue to raise global temperatures to dangerously high levels if emission rates do not slow. These warnings have created a general agreement among the internation-al community that something needs to be done, but few countries have actually com-mitted to substantive measures. The U.S. is no exception; it, too, has been, choosing to wait for others rather than bear the bur-den of leadership. As a nation with both the resources and responsibility to reduce carbon output, the US should, instead, lead by example, clearing existing domes-tic hurdles to fighting climate change. Do-ing so will motivate the rest of the world to follow suit.

Any movement toward reduced emissions cannot ignore the two largest emitters in the world: China and the US. Both industrial powerhouses produce a combined 40% of all greenhouse gases. If neither country is at the heart of climate change efforts from the beginning, global attempts to reduce emissions will be use-less. By taking the lead, however, tangible US and Chinese carbon reduction policies will provide the international community with a workable goal. Of the two nations, the US, rather than China, is best posi-tioned to take the lead on climate change. China, then, will do its best to follow the United States. Underdeveloped nations similarly turn towards the US for tangible greenhouse gas emissions reductions, real-izing that, without the US, any emission

reductions on their part will be a drop in the bucket. Without US leadership, an in-ternational climate change movement is impossible.

If the U.S. leads by example, the rest of the world will follow. The EU has already pushed Washington to set clear emissions reduction targets for the next few years and has pressured President Obama to take a more hard-line approach to climate change; they are on board. More impor-tantly, China, surprisingly to some, has

also shown its willingness to cooperate. Just a day after Obama announced concrete targets on emissions reductions, President Hu Jintao followed up with China’s own pledge. In the coming years, China will have to walk a fine line between environ-mental protection and economic growth. China has realized, however, that the two are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, intertwined; without limiting the effects of

climate change now, China stands, as all countries stand, to limit long term growth. As the world’s single largest emitter of car-bon, China recognizes that it will shoulder much of the blame for—as well as the neg-ative natural effects of—climate change if it does tangibly limit greenhouse gas emis-sions. The U.S. can expect an increasingly cooperative partner in Europe and China on the issue of climate change.

In particular, U.S. leadership on cli-mate change has the potential to capitalize on China’s increasing willingness to coop-erate on this particular issue by creating a precedent for further opportunities for more extensive bilateral cooperation in the future. The President’s recent tour of Asia produced little progress in Sino-American relations, as both countires failed to agree on issues ranging from human rights to China’s consistent devaluation of its cur-rency. Obama, however, did make small breakthroughs on climate change. The series of practical measures announced during Obama’s meeting with Hu Jintao —including an electric-vehicles initiative and energy efficiency plan—suggest that emissions regulation may be a bridge to-wards stronger alliances with China. Lead-ership, however, must come first from the U.S., as Hu Jintao will likely be unwilling to act without assistance and promises from developed countries. There is strong public sentiment in China that the U.S. is urging its economic rival to embrace clean energy only as a means to undermine the Chinese economy. If Washington takes the first step in this regard, however, it can reassure the Chinese by debunking any suspicions that the U.S. is trying to gain an economic advantage over their country. Strong U.S. leadership on climate change will likely result in better relations between the U.S. and China.

Another concern that other nations have expressed is that unlike China, a rela-tively young and still developing industrial power, the U.S. has historically emitted more total climate-altering gasses than any other nation in the world. Therefore, the U.S. has the heavier obligation to take the lead on climate regulation especially since underdeveloped nations, which emit the least carbon, would receive the brunt of climate change’s devastating effects. If the worst offender of climate change is unwill-ing to step up as the leader, it would be dif-ficult to justify the participation of anyone else.

A leAderShiP oPPortUnity

How the U.S. Should Approach Climate Change

David Chen ‘13

U.S. Foreign Policy

“Congress should not make legislation

contingent upon the actions of other

countries, but instead push the cap-and-trade

system through, knowing that other nations will then jump on board.”

December 2009 15

Obama, as well as the Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, agreed in November that no binding follow-up to Kyoto would be reached in Copenhagen. In reality, what is to be the upcoming fail-ure to act in Copenhagen is just another symptom of general inaction by all coun-tries involved, none of which is willing to make the first move. The U.S. Senate has bound Obama’s hands, refusing to pass the cap-and-trade program unless China and other developing nations make a commit-ment, too. China and India, on the other hand, will only institute broader and more drastic measures if the U.S. promises sub-stantive emissions reductions. Mutual hes-itancy has certainly delayed any prospect of a binding international agreement.

For the U.S. to take leadership, Con-gress should not make legislation contin-gent upon the actions of other countries, but instead push the cap-and-trade system through, knowing that other nations will then jump on board. Doing so would dem-onstrate to the world that the U.S. is seri-ous and committed to combating climate change. The Senate, however, has been particularly resistant to addressing climate change. Obama, already entrenched in dif-ficult battles on health care and Afghani-stan, may lack sufficient political capital to persuade reluctant senators. As a result, liberals run the risk of having to water down the current bill even farther than it already has been watered down in order to pass something.

Any reasonable carbon emissions bill that emerges from Congress will provide the U.S. with momentum that will then lead to a global emissions reduction agree-ment. Copenhagen will test how receptive the world is to American leadership and a global initiative against greenhouse gas emissions, but environmentalists should not expect much. At best, as former vice president Al Gore notes, “a very signifi-cant framework … can still be completed.” Instead, policymakers should place their hopes on the US and push for American leadership in a warming world. Afp

David may be reached at dcthree@princeton.edu

U.S. Foreign Policy

In ContextCompiled by Tara Lewis ‘11

“A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms.”

-President Obama, accepting the Nobel Peace Prize and explaining the U.S.’s place in the war in Afghanistan.

“He stole my technique.”-Iraqi journalist Muntazer al-Zaidi, who in 2008 threw his shoes at former President George

W. Bush, commenting jokingly about a journalist who threw a shoe at al-Zaidi.

“The first obligation of a country ... is to save the lives of its countrymen.”-SpanishPrime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero explaining Spain’s choice to pay Somali

pirates a $3.3-million ransom to free a Spanish fishing boat that the pirates held captive for over six weeks.

“The peoples of Europe are welcoming and tolerant: it’s in their nature and in their culture. But they don’t want their way of life, their mode of thinking, and their social relations distorted.”

-French President Sarkozy, defending Switzerland’s recent ban on minarets.

“I believe he is an iconic figure at this point, whose survival emboldens al-Qaeda as a franchising organization across the world.”

-General McChrystal, to a Senate committee earlier this month, about Osama bin Laden.

“I haven’t requested asylum, I don’t want asylum and I won’t accept asylum.”

-Honduras’ ousted president, Manuel Zelaya, declining to leave Honduras for Mexico as a political refugee, after recently returning from exile.

“How much more culturally specific can you get than Jewish music of Latin America?”

-Director of L.A. Skirball Cultural Center, criticizing the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for denying a performer a visa to an Argentine band that plays Jewish Klezmer tango

music because it did not meet the requirement of being “culturally unique.”

American Foreign Policy16

Former Mexican President Porfiro Díaz once lamented “Poor Mex-ico, so far from God, so close to the United States.” Although Díaz

spoke these words around the turn of the last century, they reflect many Central Americans’ feelings about the U.S. today. Despite the recent upswing in internation-al approval for the U.S. following President Obama’s election, there is still significant skepticism about America’s intentions in Latin America. Many Latin Americans, accustomed to Washington’s imperialistic tendencies in the region, hold the United States responsible for the region’s political instability and lack of development. The United States needs to prove through its actions that the excesses of the Cold War will never resurface, and that it can begin to fully collaborate and engage with Latin America.

Today, the United States has an oppor-tunity to take action and redefine its Cen-tral and South American policy through its response to the ousting of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. By conditionally acknowledging the new Honduran elec-tion and punishing the Honduran military for its actions, the United States can de-fuse a dangerous situation without evok-ing the legacy of American imperialism.

Although Honduras has had a peace-ful democracy for years, it remains haunt-ed by the ghost of the Cold War. During the 1980’s, the United States used Hon-duras as a staging ground in its efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Washington’s footprint re-mained even after the Cold War ended. Up until the Zelaya coup, the United States was still providing hefty military assistance to Honduras, the most recent package totaling $16.5 million. Despite Washington’s support, Honduras has re-mained one of Central America’s poorest countries. Out of an estimated 8 million Hondurans, more than a third live on less than $2 a day.

Many commentators saw President

Zelaya’s election in 2005 as a revolt against the oligarchy that still controls much of the country. Zelaya represented the in-terests of unions and the working class and developed ties to other leftist lead-ers, including Hugo Chavez and Raúl Castro. He made Honduras a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a purported alternative to free trade deals which has been promoted by Venezuela

and Cuba. Predictably, many Hondurans, especially members of the armed forces, felt that the President went too far in his left-leaning tendencies. Zelaya’s attempt to modify the constitution so that he could run for an additional term, a page lifted from Chavez’s book, was the final straw for the conservative establishment. Before long, Zelaya was ousted from power by the military under accusations of an unconsti-tutional power grab.

If anything was undemocratic, though, it was the expulsion of the Zelaya administration. In the early hours of June 28th, soldiers stormed the presidential

palace, kidnapped the President, took his cell phone, and flew him out of the coun-try. He eventually arrived in Costa Rica, where, still in his pajamas, he angrily pro-tested the coup. After a failed attempt to fly back into Honduras, President Zelaya managed to secretly re-enter the country and is currently residing in the Brazilian embassy.

An international coalition swiftly emerged to oppose the coup, making old enemies into bedfellows. The United States and Cuba were in agreement that Mr. Zelaya was wrongfully removed from power. The UN and the Organization of American States issued warnings to the new Honduran administration. The Obama administration vocally supported a power-sharing agreement, the San Jose Accords, which would have returned Pres-ident Zelaya to power before the Novem-ber election. A deal was eventually made, but it fell through shortly after being final-ized. Unsurprisingly, this unity of opin-ion was short lived. The Honduran elec-tion that took place on November 29th exposed rifts in the international coalition that insisted on Zelaya’s reinstatement. The United States recognized the results of the election of conservative candidate Porfiro Lobo, but only Colombia and a few smaller states have followed suit. Other powers with significant regional influence, namely Spain and Brazil, refuse to recog-nize the results and demand that Zelaya be returned to his post.

The decision to recognize the Novem-ber election could compromise the United State’s legitimacy if not handled correctly. As recently as September, the Obama ad-ministration was threatening to reject any vote held without first returning Zelaya to power. Now that the U.S. has reversed course, Obama must maintain his calls for a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk looking the fool. If the administration unconditionally recognizes the vote and fails to punish the people responsible for the coup, it could look like Washington is offering tacit approval for the Honduran military’s actions. This would smack of American imperialism and remind many of past U.S. support for the ousting of left-ist leaders. Therefore, President Obama should go through with recognizing the election, but only if necessary conditions are met.

First, the election must prove to have been free and fair. If strong evidence of

cold WAr ghoStS How the U.S. Should Handle Honduras

Evan Larson ‘13

“Many Latin Americans, accustomed

to Washington’s imperialistic tendencies

in the region, hold the United States responsible

for the region’s political instability and lack of

development.”

South America

December 2009 17

the Cold War mentality that prioritized American interests over foreign lives. The people that have already suffered the most from the coup, the working poor, are those most likely to be affected by a reduc-tion in aid. This could turn people against the United States and would punish the victims of the coup more than its perpe-trators.

The United States needs to keep in mind the legacy of foreign intervention in Central America as it continues to address the aftermath of the Zelaya coup. Any significant misstep will undoubtedly re-invigorate anti-American sentiments that have been waning in recent months as a result of President Obama’s diplomatic en-deavors. By handling Latin America’s first post-Cold War coup in a way that affirms that the war against communism is indeed over, the United States can take further legitimacy away from its critics and fos-ter stable and prosperous ties across Latin America. Then, perhaps, Porfiro Díaz’s words can finally be laid to rest. Afp

electoral fraud emerges, the Obama ad-ministration should not hesitate to deem the elections illegitimate and withdraw its tentative backing. Second, Lobo should only be recognized as the new head of state if the intimidation of dissident groups ceases. Amnesty International has reported that factions affiliated with the government have unlawfully suppressed Zelaya supporters in preparation for the election. If the Honduran government did indeed hold a clean election and success-fully ends the thuggish behavior of some government-affiliated groups, it will merit the recognition of the vote, and the United States should provide it. By making this recognition conditional, the United States can make clear that it only approves of the restoration of the democratic election process, not of the coup.

Washington must also hold the perpe-trators of the coup responsible. The stream of military aid flowing into Honduras from the U.S. before the coup made the army extremely powerful, and its actions during the coup prove that it has wielded that power irresponsibly. As a punishment for the coup, the United States should cut off all military aid and restore it only once the events of the coup have been thor-oughly investigated, as was promised in

the power-sharing deal. Continuing to provide military aid would be a slap in the face of the Hondurans who saw their democratically-elected president whisked away by well-armed soldiers.

Washington also provides more than $180 million in miscellaneous aid to Hon-duras each year. Some have suggested that this aid should be withheld along with military aid, as punishment for the coup. Honduras is extremely reliant on Ameri-

can dollars, the argument goes, so shut-ting off aid could send a powerful mes-sage. Withholding the aid, however, would be ill-advised, and would only reflect

Evan may be reached at eklarson@princeton.edu

Hondurans for Democracy Protest outside the State Department calling for the return of Zelaya, Washington, DC, July 28, 2009 / flickr

South America

“Obama must maintain his calls for

a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk

looking the fool.”

American Foreign Policy18

President and high representative of foreign policy.

In one view, this “capacity to act” was strengthened by the treaty’s “streamlining” and “simplification” of EU decision-making.

O n November 3, 2009, the Euro-pean Union’s Lisbon treaty was at last ratified when the Czech president Vaclav Klaus ended his

solitary opposition and signed the pivotal — if contentious—document, eight years in the making. Despite its roots in the 2001 Laeken Declaration’s pledge of a “more democratic, transparent, and effective” Europe, the Lisbon treaty’s passage is marked by some noticeably undemocratic qualities. Dating to its former incarnation as the more federalist “constitu-tional treaty,” which contained such proto-nationalistic elements as an EU anthem and a European “bill of rights,” the much-maligned Lisbon treaty was “agreed upon,” despite be-ing rejected by three out of six referendums. Moreover, 10 governments backed down from their own promises of public votes. For the most part, this contention can be dissect-ed as the struggle between the maximalist and minimalist factions of the EU: between those who argue for a more integrated Europe and those who are content with the current su-premacy of certain member-states.

In light of the relatively small fanfare generated by the treaty’s final adoption, ques-tions remain as to whether Lisbon will effect any palpable change and what it means for Europe’s future on the world stage. The Lis-bon treaty aims at further European integra-tion and can be taken as a political statement in support of a more interconnected Europe. For all the substantial political capital used to ensure the treaty’s passage, however, the maxi-malists have nevertheless won an empty victo-ry. Consider current European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s statement about the opportunity presented by the treaty: “Don’t expect miracles. Lisbon reinforces our capacity to act, but at least as important is our willingness to act.” Nothing better illustrates how politicized and inertial the current state of affairs has become than the highly conser-vative picks of Herman Van Rompuy, then Belgian Prime Minister, and Catherine Ash-ton, previously European Commissioner for Trade, to the new posts of European Council

AFter liSbon

The Future of the European Union

Lucas Briger ‘12

In the past, one of the European Union’s main challenges had been its chronic inability to produce a foreign policy consensus among its 27 member states. In the vacuum of any over-arching focus, its foreign policy conformed to the whims of specific members. The treaty’s creation of an EU president and foreign policy representative purports to address this prob-lem. Furthermore, the use of frequently para-lyzing unanimous votes has been abandoned in favor of majority rule in many policy areas, including migration, criminal justice, and judicial-police joint action. Additionally, Lis-bon changes the voting mechanism in some zones to assign votes to member states based on their populations.

In contrast, some critics rightfully ques-tion the potentially troublesome sweeping powers of “co-decision” awarded to the still-unfamiliar European Parliament. These in-clude approval of European Commission president and ministers along with partial oversight of the EU budget. The European Parliament now wields influence that is, theoretically, almost equal to the European Council. Many see this as a disaster, point-ing to the fact that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are out of touch with their constituencies. Relatively few Europeans vote for MEPs, and, as a recent article in The Econ-omist noted, many Europeans do not even know who represents them. From farm sub-sidies to immigration, some fear that the Par-liament will initiate an ill-advised legislative voting spree on narrow democratic mandates. An already prickly co-existence between the

eUroPe

Czech President Vaclav Klaus/ flickr

“This contention can be dissected as the struggle between the maximalist and minimalist factions

of the EU: between those who argue for a more

integrated Europe and those who are content with

the current supremacy of certain member-states.”

December 2009 19

European Council and the Brussels-based Eu-ropean Commission will now be tested by the accommodation of another, even more unac-countable body.

Despite supposed policy improvements, no guiding European foreign policy exists. With the lackluster appointments of Belgium’s Van Rompuy and Britain’s Lady Ashton, EU leaders have confirmed that they are content to exert influence only within Europe, rather than on the world stage. The EU has missed a unique opportunity to utilize the Lisbon trea-ty to redefine a global Europe, which was—in theory—its most significant aim. Business continues as usual, with balance-of-power concerns and the prioritization of national interests leaving the EU with only a second-ary role in world affairs. Granted, Mr. Van Rompuy is an avid Atlanticist, but as he has been prime minister of Belgium for less than a year, it is doubtful that he will “turn heads” in Washington, Beijing, or Moscow the way that a more prominent figure like Tony Blair could have. As British Tory leader David Cameron has observed, Van Rompuy is not “president of Europe.” He is a narrower, “chairmanic” figure rather than a promising sign of unified European diplomacy. It was Van Rompuy’s modest stature that garnered him the outsized support of Germany and France.

Lady Ashton was chosen for similarly dull reasons. When asked why she was se-lected, French president Nicolas Sarkozy re-plied, “It was felt a woman should hold a big EU job, because a center-left politician was needed to ‘balance’ Mr. Van Rompuy and be-

cause ‘our British friends’ wanted the post.” In fact, Lady Ashton was, at best, only the third choice of her own government. To be fair, Mr. Van Rompuy and Lady Ashton had both performed admirably in their previous roles. But this was neither the time nor the place to pick two relatively inexperienced political un-knowns for the most public of EU positions, a weak start for a “new” Europe.

Some Euro-conservatives argue that a minimalist interpretation of the Lisbon treaty will actually benefit Europe. They would also argue against appointing a celbrity figure as either president or foreign minister because neither position is directly elected. As Fi-nancial Times columnist Gideon Rachman notes, “Ordinary Europeans would be justi-fied in asking by what right the unelected Mr. Blair [for instance] speaks for them.” Yet Mr. Rachman also observes that European unity tends to crumble at moments of international crisis, indicating the necessity of Lisbon’s in-tegrative measures. In principle, the treaty’s main objective was to endow Europe with the political heft to match its status as the world’s largest economy. In all likelihood, it is hard to envision America and China, or even India and Brazil, really respecting Mr. Van Rom-puy and Lady Ashton. It is even less likely to imagine Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin doing so. During the South Ossetian War, Mr. Putin reserved no respect for even the European Union itself; its lack of a collec-tive security or defense policy made it impos-sible for Europe to enforce its demands that Russian troops withdraw. In an international

political landscape shaped by power interests, Europe needs the fullest potential of the Lis-bon treaty to avoid becoming an international afterthought. Instead, this missed opportu-nity will cement the status quo of EU foreign policy being diluted by national governments. As Henry Kissinger once famously—if anec-dotally—observed, “Whom do you call when you want to talk to Europe?”

While Europe searches for its voice, it will remain a spectator in a G2 world molded by America and China, as enunciated by British foreign secretary David Miliband. Admitted-ly, the European Union has been considered a triumph of diplomacy, having stabilized the Continent and made war unimaginable. In one sense, though, the European project’s suc-cess has led to the present difficulty of decid-ing how to project its considerable political-economic weight abroad. Europe, with the exhaustion following the Lisbon treaty and the lack of future direction it provided, will only gain international respect if it can har-ness the treaty’s potential and work toward a more maximalist EU. Afp

Answers to the quiz on page 7:1. B2. D3. A4. B5. A

Lucas may be reached at lbriger@princeton.edu

Europe

President Obama at a joint bilateral meeting with President Vaclav Klaus and Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek at Prague Castle/ flickr

oUt oF A Job?

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