Afghanistan Weekly War Update Losing Influence in the Taliban Core

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Afghanistan Weekly War Update: Losing Influence in the Taliban Core?July 19, 2011 | 1155 GMT

Two Prominent Southern Officials Killed

Jan Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan¶s senior presidential adviser on tribal affairs, wasassassinated July 17 at his home in Kabul at around 8 p.m. Khan, the former governor of Uruzgan province, was killed along with lawmaker Hashim Atanwal and three other peoplewhen a suicide bomber and three gunmen attacked Khan¶s home in the Karte Char area of thecity. Though the Taliban claimed responsibility, Afghan lawmaker Mohammad Daud

Kalakani blamed Pakistan¶s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate for the killings. Khan¶sassassination comes less than a week after the death of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and head of the Kandahar provincial council, who wasassassinated July 12 at his home in Kandahar city by Sardar Mohammad. Mohammad, whowas a close associate of the Karzai family for the last seven to eight years in his capacity asthe commander of all security posts in and around the town of Karz, the home city of theKarzai family, shot Karzai several times before being killed by his bodyguards.

The deaths of two government officials with strong influence in the southern provinces ² theTaliban¶s core territory ² could have serious implications for the Afghan government and itsability to conduct business in the south.

Being closely affiliated with the Karzai family and the head of security, Mohammad was afrequent visitor at Ahmed Wali Karzai¶s house, making it possible for him to bypass securitywhile carrying a weapon. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting thatMohammad was a Taliban agent (a routine and expected Taliban response, whether they wereresponsible or not), but it is far from clear whether this was the case. Mohammad and Karzaihad a long-standing association and there were myriad licit and illicit activities in whichKarzai was involved that could have provoked personal, criminal or other motivations for thekilling.

Given that Karzai was a high-profile government official, he would have had tight securityaround him that would have been difficult for the Taliban to penetrate. Additionally, it seemsunlikely that Mohammad would choose to work with the Taliban after being loyal to theKarzai family for several years. Mohammad likely would have known that Karzai had

protection and that he would be killed in the process of assassinating him, making the act morelikely motivated for personal rather than ideological reasons. Acting Kandahar police chief Gen. Abdul Raziq stated that the involvement of foreign circles could not be ruled out. Severalsuspects were detained and interrogated in relation to the assassination. Later reports fromSTRATFOR sources indicate that the assassination might be the result of a feud over finances



arising from coalition contracts.

Later, during the funeral service for Karzai held at Red Mosque in Kandahar city on July 14, asuicide bomber staged an attack. The explosive device, hidden in the turban of the suicide

bomber, killed Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, the head of the religious council in Kandahar,along with four other people. It remains unclear if Hekmat was the intended target. There areconflicting reports about the presence of Hamid Karzai at the funeral service, and if theAfghan president did attend he may have been the intended target. It is also possible that theattack may not have been aimed at any particular official at all, but instead may have targetedthe large crowd of mourners gathered at the service.

This is a critical time for Hamid Karzai¶s government, which is currently trying to hold talkswith the Taliban in an effort to move toward a political accommodation and a negotiatedsettlement as foreign troops begin pulling out of the country. This does not necessarily meanthat the Taliban will immediately have more room to operate in the absence of the AhmedWali Karzai and Khan. Much will depend on the ability of Karzai¶s replacement to step intothe role and wield power through the relationships and networks Karzai built for himself aswell as the replacement¶s ability to take the government¶s relationship with the Taliban in anew direction. What is clear, however, is that the process of political transition is being forcedupon Hamid Karzai¶s regime through assassination in a key area of the country at a decisivetime, and Kabul has work to do in reconsolidating what position it did have in the south under the president¶s half-brother.

Transfer of Power

The targeted killings of three Afghan political figures ² Khan, Ahmed Wali Karzai and thenHekmat at Karzai¶s funeral ² in a week¶s time comes as NATO is preparing to hand power tolocal Afghan forces in the northern province of Bamiyan. Additionally, 1,000 soldiers fromtwo National Guard regiments at the Bagram Air Base in Parwan are scheduled to startwithdrawing this month. Bamiyan is the first of seven locations that will make up the first

phase transferring security responsibility to Afghan forces. The first phase of withdrawal willinvolve the transfer of power in the provinces of Panjshir, Kabul (aside from the restive Surobidistrict) and the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam.



All of these locations are relatively calm and have been largely secured by Afghan securityforces for some time now. The transfer is a slow and measured process, but it will beimportant to watch the evolution of the standard for transfers and any potential shortening of timetables associated with the process as well as how sustainable security gains prove asInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops begin to pull back from key areas.

Meanwhile, Gen. David Petraeus, who will be the next director of the CIA, handed over command of the ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to Marine Lt. Gen. John Allen on July 18.STRATFOR believes and has argued that this is more than a personnel change ² it is theretirement of a key architect and principal proponent of the counterinsurgency-focusedstrategy currently being pursued. His replacement by a commander no doubt carefully vetted

by the White House is beginning to show signs of how the appointment is intended to reshapeand redefine the strategy for the war. The war in Afghanistan appears to be moving away froma focus on counterinsurgency and toward a counterterrorism approach, and Petraeus¶ militaryexperience in Iraq and Afghanistan and his newly-appointed position are likely to help withthat transition.

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Afghanistan Weekly War Update Losing Influence in the Taliban Core