Afghanistan Paper 4

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A Pa t Staz AfgastaShahmahmood Miakhel

T Afgasta Paps | No. 4, May 2010

Addressing International Governance Challenges


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The CenTrefor InTernaTIonal GovernanCe InnovaTIon

The Afghanistan Papers, produced by The Cefor International Governance Innovation (CIare a signature product of CIGIs major reseprogram on Afghanistan. CIGI is an independnonpartisan think tank that addresses internatigovernance challenges. Led by a group of eperienpractitioners and distinguished academics, Csupports research, forms networks, advances podebate, builds capacity and generates ideas multilateral governance improvements. Conducan active agenda of research, events and publicatiCIGIs interdisciplinary work includes collaborawith policy, business and academic communaround the world.

The Afghanistan Papers are essays authored prominent academics, policy makers, practitionersinformed observers that seek to challenge eisideas, contribute to ongoing debates and influinternational policy on issues related to Afghanisttransition. A forward-looking series, the papcombine analysis of current problems and challenwith eplorations of future issues and threats.

We encourage your commentary on these papers welcome your suggestions for the series. Please vus online at www.cigionline.org to learn more abthe Afghanistan project and all of CIGIs reseprograms, events and publications.

At T Afgasta Paps

AbSTrAcT

Afghanistans problems are well known: rampantnsecurity, endemic corruption, deep-seated povertynd weak governance. Unfortunately most of the

trategies advanced to address these issues have lackedlear, effective and culturally-adapted implementationrameworks, making them more like wish lists thanoncrete roadmaps. Based on wide eperience andngagement in Afghanistans state-building project since

2001 in the United Nations, Afghan government, andivil society the author provides a broad outline for a

new strategy to stabilize Afghanistan. At the core of thisnew strategy is a focus on priority areas, or centres ofgravity, and an emphasis on local-level participation inprogram design and implementation. While the window

of opportunity to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan islosing, there are straight forward steps that can be takeno turn the tide of Afghanistans current crisis. This

new approach will not require massive new infusionsof resources, but rather robust political will and resolvemong both Afghans and international actors, somethinghat is increasingly in short supply.

SSN 1921-2119

he opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not

ecessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance

nnovation or its Board of Directors and/or Board of Governors.

opyright 2010 The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

his work was carried out with the support of The Centre for International

overnance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.

rg). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-

ommercial No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (http://

reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution,

lease include this copyright notice.

he author wishes to express thanks to Donna Singmaster of Fallbrook, CA

or her assistance in editing the paper.


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Samam Mak is the Chief of Party in Afghanistan for the US Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to thawas a Governance Advisor for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and, from 2003-2

Deputy Minister of the Interior in the Government of Afghanistan. In 1994-1995 he worked for the United NatDevelopment Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in South and SoutheasAfghanistan, helping to establish District Rehabilitation shuras. He also worked as a reporter for the Pashto serviche Voice of Americafrom 1985-1990.

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AcronyMS & AbreviATionS

ASCI Afghan Civil Service Institute

ADB Asian Development Bank

AMF Afghan Military Forces

ANBP Afghan New Beginnings Programme

ANDS Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program

DDR Disarmament, demobilization andreintegration

ECC Electoral Complaints Commission

ECO Economic Cooperation Organization

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

DLG Independent Directorate of LocalGovernance

EC Independent Election Commission

IED Improvised Eplosive Device

ISAF International Security Assistance F

JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Bo

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSP National Solidarity Programme

NWFP North-West Frontier Province

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

SAARC South Asian Association for RegiCooperation

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UNAMA United Nations Assistance MissioAfghanistan

UNDP United Nations Development Program

USCENTCOM US Central Command

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command


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inTroducTion

For the past seven years, I have occupied senior positionswithin the Government of Afghanistan and in UnitedNations structures in the country. I am familiar with most

of the programs and strategies implemented by both thegovernment and the international community. Most ofhose strategies are supported by bulky documents replete

with sophisticated language describing lofty goals, buteldom contain a succinct implementation plan clear to theverage Afghan government employee or citizen.

n February 2009 I attended a Provincial ReconstructionTeam (PRT) conference at the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul attended byoughly 250 high-level representatives from international

organizations and institutions along with officials fromhe Afghan government. Various programs and strategiesuch as the Afghanistan National Development StrategyANDS), Afghanistan Compact, Afghanistan Sub-National

Governance Policy,1 and a new Anti-Corruption Strategyo be implemented by the nascent High Office of OversightHOO)2 were presented and discussed. I was surprised byhe lack of substance during the discussions, a sentiment Iound was shared by other participants. This compelled me toompile a set of ideas on how to address Afghanistans many

problems in a straight forward, understandable manner that

ould be implemented in the short and medium terms. Thispaper lays out those ideas in the form of a strategic planor Afghanistan, in the hope that it can spur new thinkingmong Afghan and international policy makers on how toddress Afghanistans myriad of problems.

Among the seemingly self-evident but rarely achievedbenchmarks for success in Afghanistan is close cooperationnd coordination between the international community andhe Afghan government. It is equally important that thehree pillars of power in Afghanistan the government,

eligious establishment3 and local/traditional leaders work together and trust each other. These three pillars

The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), in consultation witheveral government departments, has drafted a sub-national governance policy but itas yet to receive government approval.

The HOO was established by the Government of Afghanistan in 2008 to combatorruption.

There are roughly 166,000 mosques in Afghanistan along with 100,000 religioustudents studying in 322 official madrassas. Si thousand leaders of prayers and 7,500eligious scholars are currently on the government payroll (Samem, 2009).

can act in unison only if there is transparency indecision-making process and local engagement in secugovernance and development programming. Howethis does not obviate the need for the government to pa lead role in the reconstruction and stabilization procno plan, program or strategy in Afghanistan can succwithout government leadership at all levels.

Afghanistan has a unique geographic position, standinthe crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and SoAsia, , but with a culture, values and history that divefrom them. In this light, it is important to appreciate reconstruction programs that may have worked in opost-conflict countries, even in adjacent regions, mayhave traction in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been at for 30 years eperiencing occupation, civil war and prwars but, in contrast with many other troubled stsurrounding it, no secessionist movement has ever tahold. For this reason Afghanistan is often considered strong nation with a perpetually weak state.

The FAilure oF PreviouS SecuriTy,GovernAnce And develoPMenTProGrAMMinG

Afghanistans numerous stabilization strategies

programs have suffered flaws. First, they have larbeen supply-driven, designed on the basis of docapabilities rather than the needs of the Afghan peoSecond, most have been designed to achieve short-tstability rather than long-term sustainable peace development. For instance, the Afghan National Po(ANP) have largely been developed as a paramiliforce to support counter-insurgency operations rathan as a service able to uphold the rule of law provide security for Afghans at the community leWhile this militaristic approach may advance immed

counter-insurgency objectives, it will likely inhibit ability of the state to establish community-level secuand win public trust over the long-term.

Stabilization strategies and programs in Afghanifeature a set of common characteristics:

Most could be described as wish lists withimplementation frameworks. Even when aspof an implementation framework are discus


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the goals and mechanisms identified tend to beunrealistic. For instance, the Afghanistan Compactset the goal of establishing

a more effective, accountable andtransparent administration at all levelsof Government; and implement[ing]

measurable improvements in fightingcorruption, upholding justice and therule of law and promoting respect for thehuman rights of all Afghans.

These objectives, to be achieved over a five-yeartime horizon, while valid and admirable, could takedecades to achieve.

Most programs and strategies are devised by

foreign consultants rather than local eperts,and often borrow liberally from strategies andprograms from other countries without adequatelyadapting them to Afghanistans unique socio-cultural and political milieu. Many of these epertsand consultants hold the belief that there has neverbeen a functional government in Afghanistan,necessitating the building of state structures fromthe ground up. Quite to the contrary, Afghanistanhad a functional government for nearly four decadesprior to the 1978 coup. Governance structures and

traditions eisted in Afghanistan prior to 2001;what is needed is renewal, modification and reform,not wholly new structures and practices.

Persistent personnel changes have undercut theirmomentum. When one donor official or consultantleaves, the replacement often re-starts programsor processes without reviewing or building uponprevious work. This problem is compounded by thelimited capacity of Afghan government officials tomonitor foreign advisors, mentors and consultants

and properly eploit their epertise. Too often,donors form relationships with individual ministersor high-ranking government officials, tying theiraid and assistance to them rather than institutions.Accordingly, when a favoured government actorshifts to a new ministry, agency or department,they often take key donor resources with them.The power accumulated by these individualtechnocrats has prompted some to refer to them ascivil society warlords.

Most strategy and program documents are ovtechnical, lack contet and are poorly translated,all, into Pashto and Dari. They are incomprehento the average Afghan or government emplwho is epected to implement them.

Over the past eight years, Afghanistans eis

administrative system has been dismantled, and government and international community are havdifficulty putting the pieces back together. Contto popular belief, in 2001 Afghanistan did haveadministrative system in place that had developed several decades. Afghan officials were familiar wthe system and its machinery, but unfortunately international community arrived with the mentality Afghanistan was a governmental blank slate. Insteadimplementing gradual reform, they tore down the administrative, judicial and security systems, repla

them with Western-oriented structures alien to the aveAfghan. Many of those imposed systems and structuresout of place and unworkable in the Afghan contet.

The reAliTy on The Ground

In my conversations during the past few months acAfghanistan, in Kunduz, Takhar, Paktia, Khost, KunarNangahar provinces, most citizens complained aboutlack of security and competent governance in their arWhen asked, however, about progress in developmentchanges to their standard of living, there was unanimagreement that since 2001 there has been unprecedenimprovement despite problems with governmmismanagement, corruption and insecurity. Most admithat life is better today than it was under Taliban rule,cited the need for more security, accelerated developmand better governance.

The Government of Afghanistan and the internaticommunity must undertake a comprehensive reviewthe performance of the government, assessing eministry, department and agency to identify problems eplore solutions. In some cases the problem may be pleadership or inadequate human capacity, while in othecould be irrational organizational structures or deficitresources. None of these issues can be resolved solely fKabul. They must be addressed through local initiatdecisions and actions. Authority must be delegated tolocal level to identify problems and make quick decision


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urrent governance bottlenecks are to be addressed. This isnot to say that the central government should have no rolen local reforms, only that it should be led and implementedt the local level. Afghanistan will not achieve stability until

both the national and sub-national tiers of government areunctional and able to work together.

PrinciPleS oF A new STrATeGic PlAn

T Gmt a t itata cmmtMst ut

Together, they must agree on a common agenda with bothides fully dedicated to delivering on their commitments.

The people of Afghanistan do not distinguish between

he government and the international community; theyonsider them two sides of the same coin. Therefore, theuccess of one depends on the other. They must worklosely as partners, showing good faith.

Tak At n

The people of Afghanistan do not have high epectationsof their government and the international community. Inact, their epectations are very basic to be safe in their

houses, to have food on their tables, and to be able to travelwithin the country without fear. The government andnternational community must rapidly demonstrate thathey can deliver basic services to the Afghan population,

otherwise they risks losing their trust and support.

utz capa c Sats

t is often suggested that there is no capacity in the Afghangovernment to implement projects, improve securitynd provide good governance. That is untrue. There are

many qualified officials within the governments variousministries and departments. These people can move thehip in the right direction if their epertise is properly

utilized and if they are engaged in the planning andmplementation of all programs. At present, in most

ministries and departments, there is huge communicationgap between top, middle and low-level leadership.Although overlooked due to their lack of English skills,middle and low-level officials tend to be the engine of theAfghan government. They may not know how to charmdonors, but they do know how to get things done.

Appt impata offas

Eisting social and leadership structures in many partAfghanistan allow for local decision making. It is throthese structuresjirgas and shuras (councils)that peaddress day-to-day issues and resolve grievances. Edistrict is divided into sections, villages (qarya) or tr(Miakhel, 2009). If representatives of the Governmof Afghanistanwhether a governor, district governopolice chiefare seen to be playing an impartial role willing to respect local norms and structures, they receive the trust of the people. Unfortunately, in mcases government offices are not occupied by impaactors, especially at the local level. In many areas, powelocal elites have asserted control over government pand use their authority to support their kinship groand political allies at the epense of their rivals. Thas had the effect of ecluding and disenfranchisegments of the population, breeding distrust in state. If local government officials are perceived as bialocal communities, particularly in Pashtun areas, willonly refrain from supporting the state but may seekundermine its authority. The state should take measto avoid becoming embroiled in comple local rivaland feuds among families and tribal groups.

rgz tat A Pts s la

As former Speaker of the US House of RepresentatThomas Tip ONeill once famously stated, all polis local. Nowhere is this more apt than in AfghanisThe people of Afghanistan believe it is more importo know what is happening locally than to know whhappening in Kabul. The eclusion of local communfrom governance and planning, and the impositionlengthy technocratic strategies incomprehensible to lactors, have alienated communities and fuelled insecuThis provides a fertile ground for insurgents to infiltcommunities and secure their allegiance against the s

The government must give local communities a stakthe reconstruction process.

Ass cpt

The Government of Afghanistan must removeindividuals openly engaged in corrupt practices. If government and international community continueappease corrupt individuals, they will further lose support of the Afghan people.


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Ten STePS To Achieve PeAce And STAbiliTy

cat cts f Gat

Afghanistan has been in a downward spiral since 2005.

The security crisis has escalated and is no longer confinedo the south and east of the country. While the stubbornnsurgency presents a major challenge to Afghanistanstate building project, it is often said in Afghanistan thatt accounts for only 20 percent of the countrys problems.

The remaining 80 percent can be attributed to poorgovernance, drugs, warlords and communal disputesUNAMA, 2008). The starting point for any effort toddress Afghanistans diverse array of challenges is todentify priority districts or centres of gravity wheressistance can be concentrated. With resources limited and

he problems immense, the Afghan government and thenternational community cannot be everywhere at once.

These centers of gravity should anchor the stabilizationnd state-building project, providing a launching pado spread stability and development across the country.

Natural centres are Kabul and other major urban areas, aswell as strategically vital rural districts along the bordernd in key trade and drug trafficking corridors. Counter-nsurgency operations should be led and coordinated fromhese centres of gravity to isolate and eventually defeathe insurgency.

Fm cmptt a rpstat rga Tams

A regional team comprised of police, military and civiliansrom Kabul should be assigned to each centre of gravityo consult with the local authorities. The team leader

must be an adequately vetted and trusted professionalppointed by the President in consultation with thenternational community. An observer group, comprisingepresentatives from UNAMA, the PRTs, key donors andivil society actors, should also be formed to monitor the

process. The regional team should be based in the centreof gravity with full authority to make decisions, includinghe hiring and firing of personnel, the direction of police

operations and the distribution of resources.

Ptz ua dstts

After selecting a regional team for each centre of gravity,urban districts (naheyas) should be prioritized forssistance. If the centre of the province is not secured, it

will not be easy to operate in rural areas. The clear, h

and build formula for counter-insurgency operations sh

be adhered to.4 Once the urban centres are stabilizedapproach should be expanded to rural districts.

Fm Sas ea ua a ra dstt

The regional team should establish a shura (local counin each naheya (urban district) and rural district to seas a conduit to engage the local community in dialoon security, governance and development issues. locals know best how to find solutions to their probleVarious actors should be included in each shura to enadequate representation from all three pillars of poin Afghanistan: government, religious authorities community leaders. The government and internaticommunity should support the recommendations mad

the shura;it cannot merely be perceived as a deliberabody with no real power.

Every naheya consists of several guzars(sections), ware led by chiefs or wakeel-e-guzar.5 All guzarchiefsshbe part of the urban district shuras. Similarly, the prleaders of each Jami mosque (those mosques which perfFriday prayers) should be included in the shura. Lastlypolice chief and administrative head of the district shalso be members of the shura. The formation of the shuthe urban districts should not take more than a week, w

in rural districts two weeks may be necessary. Participain the shura should be framed as a public service, thuremuneration will be required.

The selection of the shuras should be based on guidelines: First, it is critical that each of the sectisub-tribes or qaryas (villages) are consulted in establishment of the shura. Second, each section shobe able to select and appoint their representatives, rathan having them chosen by government offici

4 Kabul City has 22 naheyas and only 17 police districts (hawza). There be 22 police hawzas in Kabul City to correspond with the number of naheyaunsettled issues between the Municipality and Province of Kabul has preventsynchronization of administrative structures.

5 It is important to understand the role of wakeel guzar or maliks in local societwakeel guzar or maliks are always appointed by a majority of the people in their(section of a district). They are registered with the naheya or wuleswali and eagiven their own stamp to notarization purposes. They form the link between vand district administration. One cannot get proof of residency, ID cards, macertificate, and so forth, without the attestation of a wakeel guzar or malik.

6 In 1994-1995, I worked for UNDP/UNOPS in eastern Afghanistan to estDistrict Rehabilitation Shuras (DRS). In one instance, I dispatched a team to province to establish a shura in the provincial capital. The shura that the team se


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Government officials must play an impartial role in theelection of the shurain order for it to be representativend legitimate. It is up to the local population to decide

who will represent them in the council. They may choosen educated person, tribal elder, mullahor even in someases an anti-government actor. If the latter is the case, it

will provide an opportunity for those actors to reconcile

with the government and reintegrate into society.

After establishing the shura, all competing shuras in thedistrict should be abolished. Numerous types of shurashavebeen established since the fall of the Taliban by differentgovernment and non-government institutions such as theDLG the Ministry of Education, and the Community

Development Councils (CDCs) under the auspices of theNational Solidarity Programme (NSP). The proposed newdistrict-level shurasshould function until the governments able to hold district council elections as envisioned inhe constitution of Afghanistan.

ct St Ss ea dstt

nvestment in the police force is a necessity ratherhan a choice; a functional state requires an efficientnd effective police service. As part of their first steps,he regional team should conduct a two-week securityurvey with the provincial and district police chiefs. Theurvey would determine how many police officers are

needed to protect each district and to implement the ruleof law. Currently, there are wide variations in estimatesof police personnel requirements.

At present, police officers are assigned to each districtbased on whether it is a category one, two or threedistrict.7 The regional team should have the authorityo approve the recruitment of new police officersn each district on the basis of the survey and localonsultations through the shura.

was disbanded within a year by the local population, who complained that it had beenhosen without adequate local consultation. After agreeing to accept local input in theelection of shura members, the public selected the same individuals from the previouslyisbanded shura. When queried as to why they insisted upon a local process to appointn identical shura, community members eplained that individuals selected by eternalctors would not ehibit the same level of accountability to the community as they

would when directly selected by the community. This was an instructive eperienceemonstrating both the democratic nature of governance structures at the village level

n Afghanistan and the dangers of imposing eternal solutions.

All provinces and districts in Afghanistan are divided into one of three gradesased on population and geography. At the provincial level there are seven grade onerovinces, ten provinces at the grade two level, and 17 grade three provinces. At theistrict level, there are 66, 177 and 121 grade one, two, and three districts respectively.

New police officers could be recruited very quickly wthe consultation of the police chief and the inhabitanteach district shura. The new recruits should be absorinto the regular police, not informal militia structsuch as the Community Defence Initiative (CDI) currebeing proposed by ISAF. In Afghanistan, militias or focreated outside of regular police structures do not h

a good record or reputation and are widely perceby Afghans as a potential source of insecurity.8

new recruits should receive accelerated training byMinistry of Interior (MoI) at one of the countrys regitraining centres. There is no shortage of qualified traiin the MoI to epedite the training. This training caprovided at the district level by eisting commissiopolice officers as was the case in Afghanistan prior to 1There is no need to contract foreign firms to provideweeks of training to rank-and-file officers.

Ass la cfts ea dstt

The first item on the agenda of the shura should bresolve communal conflicts. The shura canact as a mediin eisting conflicts and launch a process of reconciliaamong aggrieved groups. There may be long-standunresolved disputes between tribes or villages that mbe addressed through the shura in conjunction withregional team. It is important to address these confat the outset of the process, as insurgents often use l

disputes as a means to influence and even coopt lpopulations.

estas bmaks

Clear benchmarks to assess trends and developmentsecurity and governance should be established by the shin conjunction with the regional team. Key indicators cinclude the number of security incidents, crime statistrends in communal disputes, and levels of domeviolence. It is important for benchmarks to consider b

formal and informal security structures, as more t80 percent of local disputes in Afghanistan are resothrough traditional security and justice structures.9

8 In 2008, I wrote a White Paper on the role of the Arbacki in Afghanistans sesystem. It can be accessed at: http://www.dawatfreemedia.org/english/inde.php=article&cat=Articles&article=22.

9 The 80 percent figure was derived by The Centre for Policy and Human Develoin its Afghanistan Human Development Report(2007). Given the rise of insecurithe resultant breakdown of formal state institutions in many parts of the countprevalence of the informal system has probably increased.


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monitoring of the benchmarks could be overseen by theegional team in conjunction with the police.

eag rsps dstt Ga

A important role of the regional teams will be to ensure

hat the district administration is responsible and reliable.The chief of the naheya (raes-e-naheya) who is equivalento a woleswal (district governor) and is the head of all

government units in a naheya (district) should be providedwith the tools to monitor civil servant activities and ensurehat all public grievances regarding service deliveryre heard and addressed. Monitoring the performance

of government officials is very important due to thendemic problems of corruption and absenteeism. Theegional team should therefore be given the authorityo remove incompetent officials. Any new staff should

be appointed in consultation with the shura, the linedepartments, the governor and the police chief of theprovince. Addressing incompetence and poor performancen the local administration will demonstrate the resolve

of the government to improve service delivery and itsoverarching commitment to good governance.

mpmt cmmt-l dpmt Pjts

Communities supportive of reform and stabilizationprocesses should be rewarded with block grants of US$2-

million to facilitate development. The disbursement ofhe grants should be directed by the shura. Only the local

population can legitimately determine which projectsre most pressing in their community. Projects could benything from the building of roads, water supply systemsnd recreational facilities to improving garbage collectionnd sanitation systems. There would be no need to createn institution to implement these projects since the NSP

of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and DevelopmentMRRD) already has a good system in place. Money forhese initiatives could be channelled through the NSP.

Mz egg capat

Currently there are thousands of engineers in differentdepartments of the government who are idle or notpending their time efficiently. Creating one department withesponsibility for managing this important resource, a Corps

of Engineers based on the US model, would be a positive step.This body could assemble units on an ad hoc basis to survey,design and eecute projects requested by district shuras.

The inability of the government to mobilize engineecapacity quickly has had disastrous results in the past. instance in 2007, the Afghan government in cooperawith the international community called for the buildinga mosque in the insurgency-ridden district of Musa QaHelmand province. Even though money was made availabimplement the building project, the relevant line ministries w

not able to prepare the design of the mosque and commconstruction. It was setbacks like this that paved the waythe Taliban to twice take Musa Qala from the governmenis critical that the government and international commufulfill their reconstruction promises lest they squander sctrust and goodwill on the ground.

reSourcinG The PlAn

The strategy outlined above could be appsimultaneously in several areas. For instance, in stareas in northern Afghanistan, the process couldimplemented rapidly. Where representative and effecshuras eist in a district, there is no need to crnew councils. Since the shura is a familiar governastructure for most Afghans, the time period requireform them will not be ecessive. None of the elemof this strategy require major infusions of funding. Tdo, however, require the investment of etensive poli

capital on the part of national and international actorkey to the success of the strategy is the prompt delivof resources and support. Bureaucratic roadblocks toprovision of assistance will only undermine public tin the government and the wider reconstruction procMoreover, perceived manipulation of the processfactional actors, inside or outside of the government, undercut public support, raising the importance of stransparency and accountability mechanisms.

coMMunicATionS STrATeGy

The various aspects of this strategythe security survthe establishment of the shuras, the delivery of bgrantsshould be well publicized through media and puoutreach activities. All government and internaticommunity actors should agree upon the message sing the same song to the media. Conflicting statemcreate confusion, mistrust and a lack of confidence ingovernment and international community.


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The dissemination of information as a means to raisewareness and counter misinformation should be vieweds a critical part of the strategy. The media shouldeceive regular updates about the implementation ofhe strategy; otherwise they will glean details from lesseliable sources. The Taliban has been very effective in its

propaganda efforts. The government and international

ommunity must do a better job of ensuring that themedia covers the many positive developments occurringn Afghanistan on a daily basis.

Key iMPleMenTATion PrinciPleS

dp F ya Pas

Afghanistan cannot be developed in the same manners Europe or the United States due to scarce resources,

geography and a history of dependence on foreignssistance. Developing a viable and vibrant economy takeslong time. Therefore, it is imperative to have realistic

nd implementable strategies to improve the livingtandards of ordinary Afghans. Strategic planning shouldocus on five-year increments rather than one- or two-yearycles. Short-term planning tends to focus on immediatetabilization objectives rather than the long-term goals

of sustainable peace and prosperity. It is impossible to see

progress in large-scale development programming in one-o two-year time horizons.

dstt rss e

f resources are distributed evenly to everyone, thenno one will be able to criticize the government or thenternational community. This is not currently the case.On the one hand, people in peaceful provinces, primarilyhe north, often complain that they are ignored becausehere is no fighting in their region. On the other hand,

people in insecure areas, particularly the south andast, argue that the government and the internationalommunity have intentionally imposed the war on themo keep them underdeveloped. Equitable and transparentid delivery will help to allay these concerns and reducenter-communal friction.

r wast

In the long term, there will be a need to restruclarge segments of the current government machinRedundant departments or ministries created for polipurposes must be abolished. A review of each miniwith the goal of streamlining administrative procedand improving service delivery would be a fruitful eer

Pt off-bgt Fg

The budget of the central government should reall current costs and ependitures. Many donors government agencies implement off-budget progrto circumvent bureaucratic procedures and oversand, in some cases, to avoid corruption. However, spractices inhibit the development of sound public fin

management procedures, a key element of the ggovernance and poverty reduction agenda.10

The chAllenGe oF chAnGinG courSe

The strategy outlined here should be piloted in onmore regions before being rolled out across the counThe results of the pilot phase should inform changethe strategic framework prior to a countrywide lauThese ideas could be easily implemented in Afghaniright now. They would not be time- or cost- intensThere is no need to create new institutions, write mcomple strategies and pass more laws to implementabove principles. It primarily requires human resouand political will. The people of Afghanistan do not high epectations. They only wish to be safe in their homto have food on their table and to be able to move arotheir country without fear. There is no more timelong, drawn out deliberations. It is time for action. Tunfortunately, is not on the side of Afghan governmand international community.

10 See World Bank (2005).


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worKS ciTed

Author interview with Dr. Mohammad Shafeq Samem, DeputyMinister of Haji and Awqaf in Kabul on March 15, 2009.

Miakhel, Shahmahmood (2009). Understanding Afghanistan: TheImportance of Tribal Culture and Structure in Security and Governance..Originally published as The Importance of Tribal Structures andPakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their role in security and governance.Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute Center for South Asian Studies.

(2008).Advantages and Disadvantages of Supporting a CommunityForce: The History of the Arbaki System and Its Use in the PresentContext of Afghanistan. UNAMA White Paper.

The Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD) (2007). Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernityand Tradition, Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. Available at:http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)(2008). Unpublished internal survey of JMAC (Joint MissionAnalysis Center) of UNAMA.

World Bank (2005). Report No. 34582-AF (Afghanistan ManagingPublic Finances for Development) Main Report. Vol. 1.December 22.

dAri/PAShTo TerMS

Guzar: Section of a District

Hawza: Police District

Jami Mosque: Mosque that performs Friday pra

Malik: Tribal Leader or Chieftain

Naheya: Urban District

Qarya: Big Villages

Raes-e-Naheya: Chief of a Naheya, equivalent Woleswal

Shura: Council

Wakeel-e-Guzar: Chief of a Guzar

Woleswal: District Governor

Wuleswali: Local Districts


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AbouT ciGi

The Centre for International Governance Innovation isn independent, nonpartisan think tank that addressesnternational governance challenges. Led by a group of

perienced practitioners and distinguished academics,CIGI supports research, forms networks, advancespolicy debate, builds capacity, and generates ideas formultilateral governance improvements. Conducting anctive agenda of research, events, and publications, CIGIsnterdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy,business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI conducts in-depth research and engages epertsnd partners worldwide from its etensive networks toraft policy proposals and recommendations that promote

hange in international public policy. Current researchnterests focus on international economic and financial

governance both for the long-term and in the wake ofhe 2008-2009 financial crisis; the role of the G20 andhe newly emerging powers in the evolution of global

diplomacy; Africa and climate change, and other issueselated to food and human security.

CIGI was founded in 2002 by Jim Balsillie, co-CEO ofRIM (Research In Motion), and collaborates with andgratefully acknowledges support from a number of

trategic partners, in particular the Government ofCanada and the Government of Ontario. CIGI gratefullycknowledges the contribution of the Government of

Canada to its endowment Fund.

Le CIGI a t fond en 2002 par Jim Balsillie, co-chef dea direction de RIM (Research In Motion). Il collaborevec de nombreu partenaires stratgiques et eprimea reconnaissance du soutien reu de ceu-ci, notamment

de lappui reu du gouvernement du Canada et de celuidu gouvernement de lOntario. Le CIGI eprime saeconnaissance envers le gouvern-ment du Canada poura contribution son Fonds de dotation.


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57 ERB STREET WEST, WATERLOO, ONTARIO N2L 6C2, CANADA

Documents

Afghanistan Paper 4