Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) - Quarterly Report Q4 2008

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ANSO and our donors accept no liability for

the results of any activity conducted or

omitted on the basis of this report.

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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Off ice

Throughout the year NGO’s were involved in more than 170 security incidents (up 20% from 2007) withinwhich 31 people were killed, 78 abducted and a further 27 seriously wounded. A growing percentage of incidents were caused by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) and a growing percentage resulted in death or injury. In short, attacks on NGO’s became more frequent and more deadly.

The primary explanation for this is the notably expanded conflict, up >50% from 2007, which caught moreNGO’s in its wake as it spread.

With a few exceptions, NGO’s were generally attacked for being perceived as intrinsic to the military andpolitical objectives of the International Military Forces (IMF) and related foreign Governments.

The ability of NGO’s to address this perception, by demonstrating neutrality, has been severely con-strained by both the dangers of establishing reliable contact with an inconsistent and hostile Armed Oppo-sition and the prohibition of such contact (explicit or implied) by Government, foreign donors and militaryforces who generally perceive it as an act of collaboration with their enemy.

The uncomfortable reality is that throughout 2008 NGO’s have been caught between two obstinate parties

neither of whom respect their right to work with the other in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and this

has directly contributed to the perception of NGO’s as “partial” and the resulting attacks and fatalities.

It is a very unfortunate situation which looks set to escalate in 2009 as AOG continue their rural campaign,

still suspicious of NGO’s intents, and IMF intensify offensive combat operations in accordance with the new

USFOR-A mandate.

The recent IMF articulation of an Iraq style “Clear, Hold, Build ” strategy for Afghanistan bears the potential

to further politicize the delivery of aid, by integrating it as the third element of the combat plan, and is likely

to generate pressure for NGO’s to associate even more closely with one side. The manner in which NGO’s

respond to this pressure will be pivotal in determining their safety throughout the year. Most courses of ac-

tion carry further risks but wholesale avoidance of association would seem the ‘least worst’ option.

Looking ahead, and absent some broad collective action from NGO’s to demand respect, from all parties,

for their right to impartial action, the most likely scenario is that NGO will continue to be at risk of attack in

rural conflict areas and so forced in to ever shrinking enclaves of humanitarian space.

In the short term this may save NGO lives by withdrawing staff from the danger zones, but it will do nothingto address the root cause of insecurity (lack of impartiality) while further deteriorating the ability of NGO to

mange perceptions of themselves in the field and leaving vulnerable Afghan communities underserved.

NGO should anticipate a 2009 fraught with painful and complex decisions.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director,

Kabul, January 2009

SUMMARY & STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

JAN 1st -Dec 31st 2008

ANS O QU ART ERLY DATA REPOR TQ.4 2008



Page 2ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

1.

THE IMPACT OFCONFLICT &CRIMINALITY ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)




1 . 1 G E N E R A L N G O T R E N D S

Incidents involving NGO escalated dramatically this year as conflict spread across the country. They in-

cluded a wide range of attack types from simple threats and intimidations through to armed robberies,

kidnappings and fatal ambushes. They occurred in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces demonstrating a

wide threat area and impacted National and International NGOs comparatively.

Incidents were caused by various actors however the volume assessed to be caused by criminal groups fell

from 61% of the total for 2007 to just 35% for 2008 while there was a corresponding increase in the

share allocated to AOG from 39% in 2007 to a full 65% this year.

This supports the assessments that the increase is being driven by expanding conflict, rather than deterio-

rating social conditions and related criminality, and

that NGO mitigation measures have seen some

success in off-setting vulnerability to crime.

The ongoing phenomenon of criminal involvement in

AOG operations also accounts for more incidents

being allocated to AOG. In many areas it has be-

come analytically irrelevant to distinguish betweenthe two.

Although not directly matching AOG attack trends

(compare chart above with 2.1) it is reasonable to

assume an escalation of AOG/NGO contact mov-

ing in to 2009 and an associated likelihood of death

and injury as a result.

3

5

2

11 11

1415

1112

8 8

6

10 1 0 1 0

13

10

13 1312

16

1112

7

9

12

10

13

8

23

27

2322

11

8

5

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

2006 2007 2008

ANSO reported total NGO security incidents 2006‐2008

AOG

65%

ACG

35%

Assessed Cause of NGO Security

Incidents, 2008 only




1 . 2 A O G AT T A C K S A G A I N S T N G O

NGO contact with AOG was notably higher

throughout 2008 and dramatically so for the

four summer months when conflict usuallypeaks. Organizations with a substantial ru-

ral footprint, which often coincides with

those implementing the National Solidarity

Program and other Government priority pro-

jects, were most exposed.

While verbal and written threats continued to

dominate the incident profile the real

growth was seen in serious, life threat-

ening incidents with armed attacks up

from 12 in 2007 to 21 in 2008, use of IED up from 3 to 9 and abduction up from 14 cases to 22 thisyear.

In a handful of cases AOG appeared to be addressing a specific grievance (actual or perceived) with

some aspect of the NGO’s operations but more commonly serious attacks were launched without any

effort at, or interest in, understanding the agencies activities or intents. AOG often justified these

as targeting “supporters of the international military or Government” without ever offering evidence.

Given the difficulties of advocating towards AOG noted at the outset it seems likely that NGO will remain

at serious risk of AOG attack going in to 2009.

The default strategy of suspension/relocation will mitigate this risk in the short term but will not address

the long term need to develop a strategy for communicating NGO intents to those that would do harm.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Armed Attacks

IED/Explosives

Arson

Missile/Mortar

Abduction

Threats

Searches

Beatings

Armed Attacks IED/Explosives Arson Missi le/Mortar Abduction Threats Searches Beatings

Series1 21 9 7 4 22 34 3 3

Categorization of AOG attacks on NGO, 2008

6

1 1

6

3 3

10

4

7

2

64

6

3

87

3

12

20

17 17

86

4

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

AOG attacks on NGO: 2007 Vs 2008

2007

2008




1 . 3 N A T U R E O F C R I M E S ( A C G ) A G A I N S T N G O

Trends in criminal activity against

NGO are almost opposite to the

AOG trends and have shown adramatic downturn throughout

2008.

As expected, armed robbery re-

mains the #1 crime accounting

for 68% of the total although the

actual volume has dropped from

more than 50 cases last year to

just 39 this.

Approximately 42% of robberies occur

on the road, 40% at home/office

and the remaining 18% fail or are aborted. In most cases there is little evidence that the target is

known to be an NGO. This is especially applicable to those robberies which occur on remote roads

where NGO are caught simply because they have the only vehicles on the road. There is a growing

concern regarding the ability of ACG to recognize NGO workers as potentially valuable abduction

targets and many road robbers have made extensive searches of people and vehicles. Identity

“sterilization” remains the most effective means of addressing this.

Armed attacks (basically what would be classified as Assault or Attempted Murder elsewhere) is thank-

fully down from 19% in 2007 to just 2% this year and has been caused by personal circumstances in

all cases.

4

9 9

7 7

10

3

89 9

6

33

9

2

65

11

76

5

32

1


Criminal attacks on NGO: 2007 Vs 2008

2007

2008

9%

68%

19%

2% 2%

Categorization of criminal attacks against NGO, 2008

Armed Attacks Armed Robbery Abduction Threats Beatings




1 . 4 N G O A B D U C T I O N S

Although the annual figures aremoderately down (78/2008 vs.

88/2007) it is important to note thefact that NGO were much better trained and prepared for kidnap in2008.

This would imply that training & policy are not having an impact on exposure or are just not beingapplied adequately. Staff demo-graphics will also factor here.

Kidnap has remained predomi-nantly Afghan likely due to avail-

ability of targets as Afghans travelmore frequently than Internationals.

AOGs account for more than 90%of abductions and deaths in cap-tivity, up from less than 70% in2007, to indicate a growing involvement of combatants in thisactivity.

Interestingly, with the exceptionof Kabul, not one of the 18 crimi-nally associated abductions oc-

curred in a province where therehad been an AOG NGO abduc-tion possibly reinforcing the ACG/AOG collusion assessment.

Abduction occurred in 14 prov-inces to show a wide threat areawith AOG abduction predictablyconcentrated in South & East andcriminal concentrated in Centre,North and West.

More than 65% of abductions oc-curred while the victim was intransit and mostly between thehours of 8 and 12 AM.

The death of an American womanand Japanese man in captivitywere tragic but exceptional anddo not indicate a major move to-wards execution of captives.95% are released unharmed. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Daykondi

Farah

Farayab

Ghazni

Kabul

Kandahar

Kunar

Logar

Nangahar

Nimroz

Nuristan

Paktika

Paktya

Wardak

Balkh

Helmand

Herat

Kapisa

Khost

Kunduz

Parwan

Zabul

NGO abductions by province, 2008

ACG

AOG

National Staff International Staff Total Killed InCaptivity (K.I.C)

71

7 6

NGO staff abducted, 2008




1 . 5 N G O F ATA L I T I E S

Gross annual figures (right) do not showmuch more than a moderate growth indeaths amongst international staff. Na-tional staff deaths have grown steeplyfrom 2007 but are comparable to 2006and even closer to 2005 (28) so present no clear trend other than the fact that Afghan nationals remainmore exposed than their international counterparts. Factors such as demographics and organizationalpolicies are not known but weigh heavily in these numbers.

The data disaggregated by cause however (above left) provides further evidence of the escalating seri-ousness of AOG attacks on NGO with AOG now responsible for more than 80% of NGO deaths upfrom 53% in 2007. IMF have entered this chart for the first time, killing three NGO staff in an air strike. Atrend which is likely to grow in 2009 with more IMF offensive operations.

Closer analysis (presented below for the first time) reveals that NGO workers are most vulnerable onthe road with the majority of deaths occurring during ambushes or abductions. Targeted killings anddeaths during office/home invasions remain rare.

The number of deaths in roadside ambushes (12) exposes a particular vulnerability to this sort of attackand suggests that the use of vehicle or body armor might be a reasonable mitigating strategy but proba-bly not more so than a simple suspension of road travel in known AOG areas.

There have been few ob-servable patterns in NGOdeaths other than that allinternational deaths oc-curred between 8-11AMand that most were female.

The former is likely due to

the predictable accessibil-ity of NGO workers duringthe morning commutewhile the latter is likely co-incidental.

In 2007 most fatalitieswere male with no indica-tion that this was deliberatetargeting of males.

2006 2007 2008

24

11

25

04

6

24

15

31

NGO Staff Killed, 2006‐2008

National International Total

Roadside Ambush (Small Arms Fire)

Roadside IED Strike

Office/Compound Invasion

During/After Abduction

In IMF Airstrike

Targeted Murder

12

3

4

6

3

3

Circumstances of NGO Death, 2008

AOG

83%

ACG

7% IMF

10%

Perpatrator of NGO staff death, 2008




1 . 6 L O C AT I O N O F N G O AT TA C K S / I N C I D E N T S

Similarly to 2007 attacks on NGO occurred in33 of Afghanistan 34 provinces (only Panjshir is excluded) indicating the wide and systemic

nature of NGO vulnerability.

The regional distribution of attacks (right) hasremained quite stable (2007 Central was26%, West 18%, North 21% etc) but thewhole pie has grown larger (c.20%) with Cen-tral and Northern Regions seeing the largestincrease in actual incident rates.

Kabul and Kunduz have seen the greatestannual growth rates (Kabul36/2007 to 48/2008 and Kun-duz 1/2007 to 14/2008).

For Kabul this reflects the con-centration of NGO facilities andstaff in the capitol, as well asthe inevitable “inkblot” deterio-ration of the province caused bylarge numbers of AOG in Logar & Wardak.

The movement of AOG forcesin to these two provinces, andits impact on the outlying dis-

tricts of Kabul, has been one of the defining aspects of 2008and will be fundamental to themanner in which conflict willunfold in 2009.

Kunduz presents a similar pic-ture reflecting both the concen-tration of NGO (as preferredcapitol of the North East) andthe growth of formal AOGforces in the area.

The Northern regions still havea lead in the more serious inci-dents (5 killed in Kunduz alone)mostly likely as a result of NGOdensity, lower security postureand weaker extension of secu-rity forces.

CENTRAL

28%

EAST

17%SOUTH

15%

WEST

14%

NORTH

26%

Regional Distribution of NGO Incidents, 2008

Kabul/Logar/Wardak

Ghazni/Paktya/Paktika

Heart/Badghis/Ghor

Farah/Nimroz

Helmand/Kandahar/Zabul

Uruzgan/Daykondi/Bamiyan

Nangahar/Kunar/Khost

Nuristan/Laghman/Kapisa

Parwan/Baghlan/Panjshir

Faryab/Jawzjan/Sar‐i‐Pul

Balkh/Samangan

Kunduz/Takhar/Badakshan

36

7

20

6

17

5

21

9

6

11

9

24

NGO Incidents by Provincial

Cluster, 2008




2.

CONFLICTTRENDS & ANALYSIS




2 . 1 A O G I N I T I A T E D AT TA C K S

In December 2007 ANSO Q.4 report noted that “we are at the beginning of a war, not the end of one”. This

proved prescient as we went on to record eight straight months of conflict escalation peaking in the

worst four months of summer fighting since ANSO (and others) records began. It is now commonly ac-

cepted that AOG are in the ascendency and have improved their capabilities and reach to exert effective

’influence’ over close to 45% of the country.

Also notable in the data is the speed and consistency with which the escalation unfolded (compare the erraticJan-Jul 2006 to the same for 2008). This would indicate that weapons, ammunition and personnel are

readily available and that reliable re-supply lines have been established.

This is further evidenced by the annual “winter lull” which has so far failed to drop even as far as the peak of

conflict last year. Such continuity in tempo indicates a well resourced operation with fighters staying in

place during the period in which they normally de-camp.

Further disaggregation of data in to types of attack

(left) again indicates that conventional close range

(small arms & RPG) and indirect fire attacks

(missiles & mortars) have formed the backbone of the AOG strategy. Most commonly these have

been ground attacks on IMF/ANSF fixed positions

or convoy’s.

There have been fewer suicide attacks finding their

target this year but this is due to improvements in

ANP/ANA ability to prevent them rather than any let

up in deployment which remains about even.

81111121

160

213173

279

335

235261

206

159145129160

255

329344

405376

344353332

276

189218

300

372

463

569602

634

508511487

420

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

J A N

F E B

M A R

A P R

M A Y

J U N

J U L

A U G

S E P

O C T

N O V

D E C

2006 2007 2008

AOG Initiated Attacks 2006‐2008(Includes only AOG Close Range, Indirect Fire and Suicide Attacks.

Does NOT include any criminal event or activity)

SUICIDE IDF CR

113

966

1255

151

1267

2030

121

1899

3198

AOG attack composition, 2006‐2008

2006 2007 2008




2 . 2 C O N F L I C T A R E A S

Conflict expanded geographically as

well as in terms of overall number

of attacks.

ANSO data indicates that AOG attacks

occurred in 33 of 34 provinces, indi-

cating a wide operational area, with

notable AOG activity (on average

>20 attacks per month) emerging in

seven new provinces throughout

the course of 2008.

It is important to note however that

classifying provinces in this manner

presents a more positive picturethan may be the case as often when an area really deteriorates incident reports dry up as sources

move out. Many of the provinces reporting <10 incidents per month are known to be much worse.

Expectedly the Southern area accounted for 42% of all AOG attacks (up from 36% for 2007) while the

Eastern region saw some drop off with 31% of attacks (down from 38% of 2007)

The Central, North, West and North East regions maintained an annually proportional share despite in-

creases in actual incident numbers.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100


Kandahar Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008

0‐10 Monthly

Attacks

11‐20 Monthly

Attacks

21‐30 Monthly

Attacks

Over 30 Monthly

Attacks

22

9

02

20

45

4

Number of Provinces Experiencing AOG Attacks, 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100


Kunar Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70


Helmand Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80


Ghazni Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008

THE FOUR PROVINCES WITH OVER 30 ATTACKS PER MONTH




2 . 3 C I V I L I A N C A S U A LT I E S

Civilian casualties continue to climb

with ANSO recording an estimate of

2,366 non-combatant civilians killed

throughout 2008 up from 1,176 in

2006.

This figure includes Afghan civilians only (men, women and children) and does not include ANP, ANA or

AOG figures. The data shows a moderate decrease in the number killed by IMF (also down as a per-

centage of the whole) and an ongoing escalation of civilian deaths caused by AOG.

Majority of deaths are caused in AOG ground offensives (SAF, RPG, IED etc) and targeted killings of civil-

ians suspected of being IMF informants/associates. Murder for criminal causes remains a significant

threat as does being killed for driving too close to an IMF convoy (escalation of force) or being caught

in the area of an AOG suicide attack.

0 200 400 600 800 1000

IMF Escalation of Force

Suicide Attacks

IMF Operation

Criminal Murder

AOG Ground Attack

45

373

411

600

917

# of civilians killed

Most Common Causes of Civilian Death, 2008

557

996

1290

161

541459

2006 2007 2008

Civilians Casualties by Cause, 2006‐2008

AOG IMF

20062007

2008

1176

20262366

Gross Civilian Casualties, 2006‐2008




REPORT END

For further [email protected]

© ANSO, January 2009

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Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) - Quarterly Report Q4 2008