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Defence Journal Pakistan (May 2014) http://www.defencejournal.com 1 Afghan National Army - A Truly National Army for A Country’s Defence or A Militia on SteroidsHaris Khan AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY - “A TRULY NATIONAL ARMY FOR A COUNTRY’S DEFENSE OR A MILITIA ON STEROIDS” Haris Khan With the US/ISAF- Afghanistan retrograde on track there are some apparently intractable issues that remain when looking at the military-political strategy for Afghanistan and its surrounding areas. A new American intelligence assessment on the Afghan war predicts that the gains the United States and its allies have made during the past three years are likely to have been significantly eroded by 2017, even if Washington leaves behind a few thousand troops and continues bankrolling the impoverished nation, according to officials familiar with the report.* This article is geared to shed light on the Afghanistan National Army’s (ANA) and Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capacity to deal with the security of the country post- 2014 withdrawal of the ISAF apparatus. It will shed light on the structure of ANA, the manpower it consists of and its training, order of battle (Orbat), and military balance equipment. I’ll leave the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for some other time to be explained in depth about its modes operandi. For the record the ANSF constitute the following; Afghan National Police (ANP) Afghan Border Police (ABP) Afghan Local Police (ALP) Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) The effectiveness of the ANA is only one element of securing peace and stability in Afghanistan. But the composition of the ANA is of critical importance in providing lasting security and stability and denying Afghanistan as a future base for international terrorism and extremism, since Afghanistan is still at war and will probably be at war long after 2014. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan security forces. There are few signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in neighbouring countries. Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and judgments about its progress have been mixed. In November 2009 the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established as a multinational military organization. After being activated the NTM-A was tasked with providing a higher-level training for the ANA and AAFC.

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  • Defence Journal Pakistan (May 2014)

    http://www.defencejournal.com

    1

    Afghan National Army - A Truly National Army for A Countrys Defence or A Militia

    on Steroids

    Haris Khan

    AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY - A TRULY NATIONAL ARMY FOR A

    COUNTRYS DEFENSE OR A MILITIA ON STEROIDS

    Haris Khan

    With the US/ISAF- Afghanistan retrograde on track there are some apparently intractable

    issues that remain when looking at the military-political strategy for Afghanistan and its

    surrounding areas.

    A new American intelligence assessment on the Afghan war predicts that the gains the United

    States and its allies have made during the past three years are likely to have been significantly

    eroded by 2017, even if Washington leaves behind a few thousand troops and continues

    bankrolling the impoverished nation, according to officials familiar with the report.*

    This article is geared to shed light on the Afghanistan National Armys (ANA) and Afghan

    National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capacity to deal with the security of the country post-

    2014 withdrawal of the ISAF apparatus. It will shed light on the structure of ANA, the

    manpower it consists of and its training, order of battle (Orbat), and military balance

    equipment.

    Ill leave the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for some other time to be explained in

    depth about its modes operandi. For the record the ANSF constitute the following;

    Afghan National Police (ANP)

    Afghan Border Police (ABP)

    Afghan Local Police (ALP)

    Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

    Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

    Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)

    The effectiveness of the ANA is only one element of securing peace and stability in

    Afghanistan. But the composition of the ANA is of critical importance in providing lasting

    security and stability and denying Afghanistan as a future base for international terrorism and

    extremism, since Afghanistan is still at war and will probably be at war long after 2014.

    More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central

    government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan

    security forces. There are few signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will

    lose their sanctuaries in neighbouring countries.

    Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and judgments about its

    progress have been mixed. In November 2009 the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

    (NTM-A) was established as a multinational military organization. After being activated the

    NTM-A was tasked with providing a higher-level training for the ANA and AAFC.

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    Being that Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country, this posed the first and

    foremost hurdle that the trainers were faced with. Uncertainty as to which language the

    instructional training should occur in was a problem. It was decided it should be in English.

    The main focus for NTM-A was that security means that the Afghans handle the violence, not

    the ISAF. The Afghans themselves have to manage their districts and cities while the on-

    going insurgency is occurring.

    The known weaknesses of recent efforts in Afghanistan in creating the ANA are (1) lack of

    modern-style professionalism, greatly caused by illiteracy and lack of education, (2) high

    desertion rates/poor retention rate of soldiers, and (3) lack of equally-distributed proportional

    representation by all the major communities, with some of the predominantly Pathan

    (Pushtoon or Pakhtoon) areas such as Kandahar and Helmand contributing less than the Farsi

    (Dari) speaking Tajiks and Hazaras.

    After a somewhat rocky start, institutional training appears to have progressed well. The

    programs of instruction appear sound and attuned to the needs of the Afghan army. More

    problematic is the unit-level training, which depends in large part on the efforts of embedded

    training teams. It was relatively easier for the officer corps to be instructed in English;

    however, at the lower ranks enlistments this caused significant problems. It was observed by

    some NATO trainers that after the class was dismissed the enlisted men gravitated towards

    their own lingual comrades and stayed with them most of the time and conversed in their

    ethnic languages.

    In 2003, the collation (ISAF) had set a quota of 40 per cent Pashtoons and 25 per cent Tajiks

    for the ANA. Instead, the Tajiks, along with Uzbeks and Hazare, filled the ranks, with very

    few southern Pashtoons signing up. The attitude amongst the ANA troops we should not go

    out on patrol and stay at respected units base. It appeared to imply units, which have non-

    Pushtoons in them, were unwilling to patrol Pushtoon areas and vice versa regarding

    Pushtoon units in non-Pushtoon areas.

    The latest report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

    states: In ANA Tajiks, which represent 25% of the population, now account for 41% of all

    troops who have been trained, and that only 30% of the troops are now Pushtoon, 12 per cent

    Hazari and 10 per cent Uzbek, with the rest made up of smaller ethnic groups, which is

    approximately the percentages of these communities in the Afghan population.

    Now at its biggest size yet, 214,000 soldiers, the ANA is so plagued with desertions and low

    re-enlistment rates that it has to replace a third of its entire force every year, according to

    SIGAR. The desertion rate amongst the Pashtoon is the highest. The attrition strikes at the

    core of Americas exit strategy in Afghanistan: to ensure that the ANA that can take over the

    war and allow the United States and NATO forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.

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    According to USCENTCOM, on the day the retrograde is completed the total combined

    forces of ANA and ANSF should reach its planned strength of 394,000 troops, assuming that

    there is no large scale Pashtoon desertion.

    On the line is also the critical status of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the

    USA and Afghanistan. With the effect (BSA) at least ANA & ANSF would not be left

    themselves to deal with the inevitable and impending frontal onslaught by the insurgents

    (Taliban and other groups).

    BSA will assure the region that the United States will remain engaged and will not abandon

    Afghanistan as the US once did in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal. The BSA is also the

    keystone of a much wider international commitment of several countries involving over years

    of ready to provide economic and security assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2015.

    Afghanistans regional neighbours, with the exception of Iran and India, also understand the

    importance of the BSA. President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, and Prime

    Minister/Foreign Minister Sharif of Pakistan has all personally urged President Karzai to

    conclude the bilateral security agreement.

    According to some estimates the insurgencies are running at less than 50% of its capacity. It

    took the US and its NATO partners eight years to realize that Afghanistan is not large-scale

    combat; instead its a war of intimidation - brief fights and heavy field and aerial bombing

    intended to instil fear, causing the insurgence to pull back and go into hiding. General John

    N. Abrams son of famous Gen Creighton W Abrams Jr (Chief of Staff of the United States

    Army during Vietnam War) said in 2003, that dont let war in Afghanistan become

    Afghanization war of attrition; alas this is what this war has become. To build and maintain

    the spirit of ANA has become the central theme of US-Afghan war policy since 2009. The

    Americans have put all their chips on the ANA so at least they [ANA] can control and keep

    open the cities and highways, otherwise, if there are superficial cracks in ANA while fighting

    the insurgences the Americans can always provide heavy air support to breach the attack and

    spirit of the Taliban (Pashtoons) for the time being. Some months ago Gen. (R) Stanley

    MacCrystal said that if there are problems in Afghanistan they flow into Pakistan like

    river Kabul.

    For Pakistan the BSA is something which ought to happen for its security in Afghanistan. As

    long as the US has a visible footprint in Afghanistan, which entails giving air support to ANA

    and training ANA troops, Pakistans security parameters are more or less guaranteed.

    Pakistan is currently fighting a major internal insurgency (with one of its hands and legs tied)

    with the so-called Pakistani Pashtoon aka almost 55 groups who call themselves Tehreek-e-

    Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Presently there is a hodgepodge effort to deal with this insurgency

    that is bent on destroying the Constitution of the country and wish to impose its own brand of

    perverted understanding of Islam, which is of Khawarij mind-set. For some odd reason if any

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    faction of the Pushtoon Taliban return to Kabul post 2014 things likely will become difficult

    for the elected government in Islamabad and other provisional capitals, hence, the possibility

    of popular military take over becomes very imminent with mass approval of the populace.

    However if there is no BSA the situation in Pakistans FATA and more or less most of

    Afghanistan will be open and hostile to Pakistans sovereignty and national security. What if

    there is an attack on the mainland USA and the postage stamps points straight to FATA or

    any area in Afghanistan? The USA will not ask the Pakistanis to do more or try to talk some

    sense in Kabuls regimes but rather theyll use air assets to bomb the area mercilessly for its

    attack at the mainland USA. Even the talk of US pull-out has started having its impact.

    Pakistan has started to receive more Afghan refugees than before, said Pakistans

    Ambassador to the US Jalil Abbas Jilani. This shows that the people of Afghanistan too

    have fears, Said Jalil Abbas Jilani Pakistans new ambassador to the United States. In case

    the bulk of the troops withdraw, the major responsibility would lie on our shoulders. Security

    responsibilities, previously being shared by others, then exclusively become Pakistans

    responsibility. It is certainly going to be a big challenge, he said. It should also be noted here

    that if for some reasons the backflow of Afghan civil war into Pakistan the country will be

    very susceptible for a military take over because of the securities concerns of Pakistan

    nuclear weapons and its program.

    Below is the chart of the military equipment that the US and its allies have given to ANA and

    ANSF. This chart doesnt include small arms (assault rifles, rocket launchers, pistols, motor

    rockets and its launchers, communication equipment etc)

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    Command echelons include Corps (15,000 - 20,000 troops), a Division (approx. 10,000

    troops), Brigade (3,000 - 4,000 troops), kandak (battalion - about 600 troops) of four toli (a

    company-sized unit of rather more than 100 troops, toli being the Urdu word for troop). Most

    of these units are numbered sequentially, as in the 4th Toli, of the 3rd Kandak, of the 1st

    Brigade, of the 201st Corps [4th Toli, 3rd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 201st Corps], and cannot be

    uniquely identified without reference to their upper echelons. But others have identifiers such

    as Weapons Toli or 201st Combat Logistics Kandak.

    The US will have three CV (Nuclear powered aircraft carriers) groups at the northern Arabian

    sea, plus tactical air wings at Al Udeid Air Base Doha, Al Dharfa, UAE, plus a strategic base

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    at Diego Garcia. This entails close to 350+ fighter aircrafts plus bombers and hundreds of

    stand-off missiles. This leaves the USA enough airpower to dominate Pakistani airspace in 40

    minutes and Indian Air space in 70 minutes according to recent estimates. As I have written,

    it will not take them [US] long to start bombing without any repercussions if needed in

    Afghanistan. The main concern is what has Pakistan planned for this scenarios occurrence. If

    things go wrong in Afghanistan they will flow into Pakistan just as they did during Nov-Dec

    2001 and Jan-Feb 02. These notions of do more will turn into you are the culprits and well

    take care of our problem inside your country. Pakistans armed forces neither have the

    capability nor the capacity to sustain this type of assault.

    On the other hand, the Indians planners wish that the Afghans would refrain from signing the

    BSA. If the BSA is not signed the Indians will try to establish themselves as the main power

    provider for the Kabul regime. This will cause a lot of problems for Islamabad, Beijing and

    Washington DC. Recently, when President Karzai visited New Delhi his Defence Minister

    tabled a long weapons wish list to their counterpart. This wish list shows a dramatic shift

    from the type of weaponry that the USA and NATO have assigned to ANA and ANSF. This

    wish list included 120 pieces of 105mm medium artillery, 150 T-72 heavy tanks, 24 Mi-17

    Hip assault Helicopter, 24 Mi-35 Hind gunship helicopters. If for some reason India is able to

    provide these weapons the face of the ANA will change from being mainly a counter

    insurgency and defensive force into an offensive force which will definitely threatened

    Pakistan.

    Indian hawks, in their army and Ministry of external affairs, have a mind-set which

    encourages taking a robust and possibly even a military role in Afghanistan. They wish to fill

    the security vacuum left by the US withdrawal, force Karzai not to sign BSA, advance its

    regional interest, and compete with China rivals for a permanent influence in Afghanistan.

    They wish to thwart their Pakistani enemies at the same time.

    Historically the trust deficits between the majority Pashtoon and Tajik plus Uzbek have never

    been reconciled. Since the majority of ANA and ANSF is of Tajik and Uzbek groups it is

    inevitable that after some time these two groups will turn their guns towards the Pashtoon. If

    this happens more than likely the Pashtoon will fall back towards the east and the fighting

    will be eventually be at Pakistans border. With the ANA weaponry and added arms from

    India, there is a good possibility that Pakistan will be dragged directly in Afghanistans ethnic

    civil war.

    The choices for Pakistan are very well defined. Pakistan should make sure that Afghanistan

    signs BSA with USA, hence, making sure that the USA is engaged for 10 more years and the

    funding to sustain ANA and ANSF continues unabated. Pakistan needs to make sure that

    Afghan refugees return to their homeland plus at some critical points the border needs to be

    secured with birded wire fence and landmines, even if this security measure requires Pakistan

    erect this fence within its own border. There ought to be fool proof flight cargo manifesto for

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    all the Indian flights, which use Pakistani air space to and from India to Afghanistan to

    determine if illegal arms are being moved without Pakistans permission.

    President Karzai has views about Pakistan which do not sit well with the defence managers of

    Pakistan and USA. He informed one of the US Army officers of the following Everyday

    ANA are getting stronger. No government in Kabul can have a good relationship with

    Islamabad unless there are no hostile material and slogans from Pakistan. He blames

    everyone from Pakistans ISI, religious scholars, traders/businessmen for any problems in

    Afghanistan. On the other hand, he often refuses to acknowledge that the drug problem is one

    of the main incubators of insurgency in his country. If we come to know that Pakistan is

    being used against us we will make sure we take out these camps with our ANA, we are very

    strong and can teach Pakistanis a lesson in a very short time, said President Karzai.

    Intelligence estimates give various figures as to what type of weaponry that was in possession

    with Taliban till October 2001. These weapons are still not being accounted for or have been

    destroyed by the ISAF. Since estimates say that the insurgencies are working at 50% of their

    capacity and presently are only fighting the ISAF and ANA with small to medium arms plus

    IED. When the US completes its withdrawal their heavy weaponry might reappear in

    insurgencies hands and this would change the battlefield equation dramatically. Some of the

    heavy artillery like ex-Soviet M-46 130 mm and multi rocket launchers BM-21 122 mm plus

    the famous Brazilian SS-30 ASTROS (Artillery Saturation Rocket System) with a maximum

    range of 30 km which were purchased by Saudi Arabia and passed on to Afghan Mujahedeen

    forces in 1986 are unaccounted for. The same rockets were confiscated by Pakistans FC

    from Baloch Liberation Army arms cache in 2011.

    Afghan President Karzai has complained to Secy. of Defence Hagel about Pakistans Haft IX

    Nasr SRBFBM because he feels after post 2014 Pakistan might use these missiles against

    ANA. Also, one of the reasons that Karzai is refusing to sign BSA with the USA is to insert

    provisions that the ANA could enter into Pakistan territory and attack suspected militant

    camps. The US refused his request completely and said they will not be party of anything of

    this nature. If Afghanistan deteriorates into a chaotic civil war after the US leaves, it would

    be bad for Afghanistan but a royal disaster for Pakistan.

    Afghanistan has been in a perpetual state of Buzkashi game. What is earnestly needed is that

    the Afghans sort out their own affairs without any outside advice or mediation. The only two

    countries, which have permanent, interest in what happens in Afghanistan, are Iran and

    Pakistan. However, they should honestly keep their hands off when the Afghans are sorting

    out their affairs. Other countries have interest in Afghanistan (USA, Russia, China, India,

    Japan, and Saudi Arabia) but have no permanent interest in Afghanistan and they should be

    told to keep their hands off. Yes, if the situation takes a turn for the worst these

    aforementioned countries will eventually feel the repercussions.

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    However, it would be very difficult to keep the above-mentioned countries out of

    Afghanistans affairs because Afghanistan as a country cant stand on its own but requires

    massive amount of external aid to run its affairs. At this junction it would be very prudent for

    these later countries to help Afghanistan but keep a very strict check into how and where their

    aid money has been spent.

    For Pakistan, a stable and normal Afghanistan is critical for its prosperity and development.

    Since 2002, more than 70,000 Pakistanis have died because of the overflow of violence from

    Afghanistan and it has caused economic losses estimating close to $100 billion.

    The safe havens in North Waziristan Agency ought to be destroyed and cleared from the

    militants (both locals and foreign) who are fighting the State of Pakistan. This is also the

    areas in which are several individuals who are kidnapped and held by their kidnappers, who

    the US intelligence agencies have described as high value sensitive liabilities (HVSL). The

    elected members need to make sure that the hub of insurgency in FATA becomes an integral

    part of Constitutional Pakistan. The main threat to Pakistan territorial integrity, survival, and

    sovereignty is clearly from India, which should not be given any leverage to establish a

    permanent base in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan.

    Works Cited

    Askarson, Katterina. Prospect for a Crisis in Post-2014 Afghanistan, Civil-Military Fusion

    Centre, 2013.

    Author. Informal Conversation with retired US Army Major-General Stanley McChrystal.

    Washington. DC, 2013.

    Dalrymple, William. A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India,. A Deadly

    Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. June 2013.

    Defence, U.S. Department of. Report on Progress towards Security and Stability in

    Afghanistan. 2012. U.S. Department of Defence, n.d.

    Jilani, Jalil Abbas. Pakistans Ambassador to USA Anwar Iqbal. Dawn Newspaper, 2 January

    2014.

    National Intelligence Council, 2030.

    About the Author

    Haris Khan is a native of Karachi, Pakistan and has been living in the USA for almost 29

    years. He owns and operates couple of businesses in the USA. Beside his business he works

    in matters of Homeland Security and is a Defence analyst with acumen on South Asia,

    Nuclear and Missile Weaponization, and the Arabia Gulf countries. He tweets at

    haris_n_Khan plus is an administrator at PakDef Military Consortium website which has

    more than 4,500 members. He can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected]