Advancing accountability theory and practice: Introduction to the human resource management review special edition

www.socscinet.com/bam/humres

Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

Editorial

Advancing accountability theory and practice: Introduction to the

human resource management review special edition

Dwight D. Frinka,*, Richard J. Klimoskib,1

aDepartment of Management, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677, USAbDepartment of Psychology, George Mason University, 3074 David J. King Hall, Mail Stop 3F5, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA

Abstract

Over the past several years, scholars have increased their attention to the phenomenon of accountability. These

efforts come largely from social psychology, where accountability is viewed as a description of a category of causal

factors of behavior in social settings. Indeed, the developments have been substantial, and studies have been fruitful.

Undergirding these efforts are various conceptualizations of accountability which have elements in common,

although they also have some points of difference and others of unclear connectedness. In an effort to provide a

broad framework as a step toward a cogent theory of accountability, Frink and Klimoski [Frink, D. D., & Klimoski,

R. J. (1998). Toward a theory of accountability in organizations and human resources management. In G. R. Ferris,

(Ed.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 16, pp. 1–51). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press]

advanced a role theory framework describing the accountability phenomenon. As a next step, this special edition of

Human Resource Management Review (HRMR) brings together several authors with expertise in varied theoretical

domains, and presents their views of how that framework may or may not be useful in examining their topic of

expertise. As may be expected, the result is a creative and refreshing series of papers incorporating multiple levels of

analysis and covering a spectrum of topics that are both novel for accountability perspectives as well as interesting

and important for organizational scholarship and practice. This edition begins with this introduction piece which sets

forth a synopsis of the Frink and Klimoski platform and then introduces the papers that comprise this edition.

D 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.

1. Introduction

The drive to survive can consume organizational motivations, and strewn across the landscape of

organizational history are the wreckages of accountability failures. The list can be extensive, and we do

not need to look far for examples. Events from the Barings Bank failure to the flawed Hubble telescope

1053-4822/$ - see front matter D 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.

doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2004.02.001

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-601-232-5834; fax: +1-601-232-5821.

E-mail address: [email protected] (D.D. Frink).1 Tel.: +1-703-993-1369; fax: +1-703-993-1367.

D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–172

mirror (Frink & Ferris, 1996) can be explained cogently as accountability failures. Indeed, the ravaging

of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm in the Enron and WorldCom debacles can be described as a

failure of accountability for the accountability watchdog (not to mention the accountability failures in

those two firms).

From the most primitive tribal systems to loosely structured alliances to the most sophisticated

production systems, social systems of any sort demand, at some level, general agreement about

expectations and rules guiding behavior. Indeed, such agreement is not only demanded, it exists by

definition, and is inherent in the very concept of ‘‘social systems.’’ That is, social systems can be defined

in terms of shared expectations. This implies that there are means to elicit conformity through

observation, evaluation, and sanction according to how people respond to those shared expectations.

Thus, accountability is at the root of viable social systems, and all the more so in formal organizations. It

is a great curiosity to us, however, that a concept so fundamental to organizations has received so little

attention from academe. Our interest is in contributing to the resolving of that quandary.

Two basic reasons drive this effort. First, without understanding accountability, organizations are likely

to fail, and we would suggest that the better we understand accountability, the better the chances of longer

term viability. Second, as this special issue bears out, accountability provides an extremely rich and

interesting body of thought for investigation and application. As we set forth in this issue, this body of

thought embraces concepts ranging from the micro domain of cognitive processing to the macro domain of

cross-cultural studies. Indeed, some might suggest that our analysis of our accountabilities and our efforts

to cope with those accountabilities is the most pervasive element underlying our decisions and actions.

This edition of Human Resource Management Review (HRMR) presents a series of papers focused on

accountability in organizations. The approach used for assembling this package was to set forth a

platform built from our views of the accountability phenomenon, and ask a sample of subject matter

experts to view their own domain of expertise from that platform. We also asked them to take a critical

view of our perspective as they deemed appropriate. The platform we propose is derived from our 1998

chapter in Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management (RPHRM; Frink & Klimoski,

1998). One aspect of that framework included a claim that it could accommodate multiple levels of

analysis. In light of that claim, the contributors were solicited to reflect different levels from the

individual through the organizational levels, and on to cultural effects.

Therefore, this edition begins with a synopsis of the platform we set forth. The succeeding papers

offer the various authors’ applications of this accountability platform to their specific domains of

expertise, beginning with the micro level of cognitive processing, moving to successively higher levels

of analysis to organizational and cross-cultural levels. Topics and authors include leadership (Erdogan,

Sparrowe, Liden, & Dunegan), trust building (Ammeter, Douglas, Ferris, & Goka), ethics (Beu &

Buckley), workplace violence (O’Leary-Kelly, Theidt, & Bowes-Sperry), organizational justice (Cro-

panzano, Chrobot-Mason, Rupp, & Prehar), and social controls across cultures (Gelfand, Lim, & Raver).

Before further description of those contributions, we turn to the platform that provides thematic

integration of those papers. This discussion is drawn directly from Frink and Klimoski (1998), and a

more complete discussion can be found there.

1.1. Nature of accountability

Social systems in general can be defined in terms of common sets of shared expectations for behavior.

Accountability, then, might be thought of as the adhesive that binds social systems together. Without the

D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 3

capacity to call individual agents to answer for their actions, there is no basis for social order, for shared

expectations, or indeed, for the maintenance of any type of social system (Tetlock, 1992).

Organizational responses to the need for accountability from its members include the creation of such

mechanisms as formal reporting relationships, performance evaluations, employment contracts, perfor-

mance monitoring, reward systems (including compensation), disciplinary procedures, supervisory

leadership training, personnel manuals, etc. In addition to these formal mechanisms, organizations

promote several informal sources of accountability. These include group norms, corporate cultural

norms, loyalty to an individual’s superior and colleagues, even an emphasis on and respect for the

customers of one’s outputs. What becomes quickly obvious is the potential complexity of the web of

accountabilities in which an employee is embedded. To this myriad can be added the notion of self-

accountability (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Thus, we can readily see that people are constantly

influenced by the potential for scrutiny and evaluation, and indeed, they likely expect to be held

accountable.

1.2. Conceptualizing accountability

Definitions of accountability tend to revolve around two specific themes. One theme concerns the

context, that is, who and what is involved in a given situation, and the second theme involves the notion

of an evaluation and feedback activity in some form.

The first theme concerns the interpersonal context and focuses on persons in two distinct roles. One is

sometimes referred to as the ‘‘agent’’ (Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Cummings & Anton, 1990), and is the

focal person whose behavior is subject to evaluation by another. The other is often referred to as the

‘‘audience’’ or ‘‘principle,’’ and is some person or persons having opportunity and reason to observe and

evaluate the agent. Schlenker and Weigold (1989) add that people can evaluate their own behavior and

therefore self-accountability is a viable concept. Other issues of the interpersonal context include such

notions as the structural, social, and interpersonal contingencies which embed the accountability

phenomenon.

The second theme concerns the activities that are seen as elements of the accountability phenomenon.

In essence, these are activities associated with the observation and evaluation of agents, the determi-

nation of the behaviors that the agent may be compelled to defend, justify, or otherwise answer for, and

the creation of expectations for such an obligation. Finally, in order for accountability to have an

influence on behavior, there needs to be an associated reward or punishment system which makes the

evaluations meaningful to the agent (Mitchell, 1993). Accountability therefore can be explicit in

organizational policies and practices in addition to being implicit in social normative expectations.

Thus, a broad conceptualization of accountability includes both formal and informal systems,

objective and subjective evaluations and rewards, and internal and external audiences. An important

point to note here is that the presence of evaluation mechanisms is not necessarily what directly

influences behaviors. Rather, it is the expectations surrounding potential evaluations which are at the

root of our responses. The evaluative mechanisms and relationships that exist are used for the basis of

perceptions and expectations about future evaluations. Put another way, rather than seeing accountability

primarily as a state of affairs, we tend to view it as a state of mind which is derived, in part, from a state

of affairs.

Thus, accountability involves an actor or agent in a social context who potentially is subject to

observation and evaluation by some audience(s), including one’s self. There also are standards, or


expectations against which the agent’s behaviors are compared, and the belief on the part of the agent of

some likelihood that he or she may need to answer for, justify, or defend the decisions or behaviors. In

addition, it is important that there are outcomes for the agent (i.e., sanctions, rewards, or punishments

that can be explicit or implicit, and also objective or subjective). Finally, the focus is the conduct of

behaviors or decisions by the agent (arguably under his or her own control). It is the control of the latter,

after all, that is the purpose of accountability mechanisms put in place in organizations.

2. Role theory as a framework for accountability

2.1. Role theory and accountability

Role systems theory was originally seen as a way to describe how organizations, as ‘‘contrived social

systems,’’ manage to inculcate or produce reliable behavior on the part of their members (Katz & Kahn,

1978). Accountability theory is also rooted in explanations for predictable behavior. Moreover, role theory

and accountability both place a great deal of emphasis on interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, they

both postulate a central role for interpersonal expectations, emphasize the importance of the consequence

of compliance, and link tasks and activities to individuals (e.g., Cummings & Anton, 1990; Ferris,

Mitchell, Canavan, Frink, & Hopper, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994).

Besides these striking similarities regarding the structure and functioning of role systems and

accountability systems in organizations, the former perspective provides what we feel are important

new insights regarding when and where accountability is produced and the organizational systems that

are relevant. This seems to be a deficiency in current views of accountability theory. Thus, we feel that a

role systems theory perspective adds value to any treatment of accountability in work settings.

Before we get in to the details of integrating accountability and role theory, we briefly review some of

the thinking underlying the nature of roles in work settings.

2.2. Organizations as ‘‘contrived’’

Modern work organizations are created by people in order to attain valued outcomes, outcomes that

require the coordinated activities of many people. But the very nature of the goals and objectives of

organizations usually results in large and complex arrangements of work and of people at work. Thus,

managers and practitioners have long sought how to insure the rational coordination necessary for

organizational effectiveness.

To make matters worse, there are several parties who have a stake in the organization, each having

their own perspectives and interests. Within the organization are various roles and functions, and the

required coordination implies that there may be substantial overlap in the persons or constituencies to

whom one feels accountable. Furthermore, the internal activities are embedded in the context of several

external stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and society) who also have a vested interest in producing

accountability. Because of the need to satisfy (or satisfice) each of these constituencies, there is a regular

and consistent search for means of ensuring proper representation of the stakeholders’ interests in the

agents’ activities.

Because organizations are viewed as systems and because systems tend to evolve, current theories

(e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Weick, 1969) have identified several


mechanisms that seem to have come about for this purpose. These mechanisms involve the articulation

of organizational goals and hierarchical differentiation. They also include the development of

organizational roles.

2.3. The existence of organizational interdependencies

The coordination of activities within an organization requires individuals to interact with and depend

on others to accomplish their own assignments. Indeed, it is incumbent on the organization to create and

maintain these interdependencies. Sometimes, there might be no technical imperative for linking the fate

of one person to another, but, there might be a pragmatic or philosophical reason for doing so (e.g., as in

the creation of group bonus compensation schemes). Workplace interdependencies, regardless of how

they come about, have important consequences for both the worker, the designer of work systems, and

the management of the workers and systems. These revolve around the need for predictability and

control. These also give rise to organizational roles.

2.4. Organizational roles

When people are interdependent at work and must interact with each other on a regular basis, certain

patterns develop. To use Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) term, they create and become mutually aware of a

norm for such behavior. In this context, a norm is a set of expectations about what someone ought to do

under a particular set of circumstances (McGrath, 1984). They are, in effect, rules for appropriate

behavior rooted in expectations (McGrath, 1984). We have norms for particular situations, as well as

norms for the allocation of rewards or resources. There also are norms for defining what McGrath (1984)

calls ‘‘social reality.’’ That is, we have expectations regarding beliefs, attitudes, and values about such

things as what is true, what is right, and what is valuable. As such, normative expectations can focus as

much on desired ways of thinking as ways of behaving. In fact, research on social cognition (e.g., Wyer

& Srull, 1986) informs us that we process information and then act according to scripts, including many

with a normative component.

Of particular relevance to the present discussion is that, in most work settings, norms develop around

the appropriate division of labor and activities. They prescribe what is expected, who should do it, and

when. Such norms or expectations for functionally differentiated sets of behaviors among members of a

work unit are usually referred to as roles (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Thus, role expectations are norms that specify not only what should be done, but who should do what,

when and how (McGrath 1984, p. 201). As such, they add structure to interpersonal relations at work. A

special feature of role expectations is that they develop or come about (and are modified) as a result of

both a priori and ad hoc processes. The interactions and interdependencies that are actually occurring

there serve as the basis for mutual expectations. Moreover, although organizational expectations for key

behaviors (e.g., honesty) may be well articulated, it will be the norms for behavior, as developed and

enforced in routine work interactions, that are likely to have the greatest impact on behavior.

2.5. The content of expectations

In general, only those things that are socially valued and/or seen as useful (instrumental) become

codified in relationships. Thus, not all matters get formulated into mutual expectations. On the other


hand, many things, such as contextual performance, do make a difference in the quality of working

together.

Role theory is eclectic in its approach to just what constitutes the content of sent expectations. Clearly,

however, there is an emphasis on workflow and related behavior. But many aspects of the social–

interpersonal environment are also implied. That is to say, norms are frequently developed and

maintained primarily because they make working together a lot easier and more pleasurable. Such

things as the level of honesty or integrity to be demonstrated, the proper responses to rule violations, or

the level of trustworthiness to exhibit are often among the first things to be clarified in work settings

(Gabarro, 1987). Critical for this process are means of encouraging, maintaining, or enforcing

compliance with the norms.

3. A platform for viewing accountability

3.1. The development and crystallization of shared role expectations

Katz and Kahn (1978) have offered a framework of the development of shared role expectations and

for the taking of organizational roles. Based on this, we offer a schematic for the processes involved in

Fig. 1. Such processes are briefly reviewed. The dynamics involved are seen by us as extremely relevant

to making the case for using a role systems perspective for modeling accountability in work settings.

Our premise for modeling predictable behavior in the workplace is that it takes place in a social

context, and involves the expectations of at least two people. Behavior is also postulated to be the result

of mutual influence processes. That is, expectations get translated into attempts at mutual influence. The

result is mutual understanding and predictable behavior.

Fig. 1. A framework of role theory and accountability.


Because role processes are dynamic in nature, Katz and Kahn (1978) chose to capture important

features in terms of role taking. Basically, this represents a model of social exchange and influence that

results in an increment of understanding (and predictability) in a relationship. Katz and Kahn refer to this

slice of life as a role episode.

The expectations that are held out for a worker are held by someone referred to generically by Katz

and Kahn as a role sender. In one form or another, they are also thought to be held by the target of

these expectations, the person in whose behavior and attitudes we are interested. The term role sender

includes those members of the organization with whom the individual is interdependent and must

interact with on a regular basis. Two other sources of interpersonal expectations are identified in the

figure, that is, the personal traits or attributes of both the sender and target. Simply stated, our

expectations for other people are strongly influenced by our knowledge, skills, abilities, and

personality. They are also affected by the history of our relationship with someone, and with the

organization.

The role-taking perspective of role systems theory assumes that the expectations of senders (the boss,

coworker, etc.) serve as the stimulus for the target’s behavior. Such expectations are communicated to

an individual worker through a variety of means, some are direct, while others are subtle. As noted,

relevant to both the perceptual process and reactions to sent expectations are the target person’s own

expectations.

Relationships also matter. The same communicated expectations (e.g., for hard work, for honesty, and

for good service) will be perceived differently by someone, depending on the history of the relationship

between the sender and the worker. Where there has been a pleasant relationship, such expectations will

likely result in different reactions from where there has been animosity. This implies that those more

adept or skilled at reading and responding to these relationships are more likely to be successful. Thus,

social skill/intelligence should support navigating the social context of the organization.

According to theory, mutual expectations set the stage, and sent expectations are the precipitating

event. But once expectations are understood, the crux of the process is the reactions on the part of the

target (i.e., the ‘‘role episode’’).

Writers, such as Katz and Kahn (1978), Schein (1980), McGrath (1984), and others have

characterized the potential reactions of the target on a continuum of conformity relative to the sender’s

desires or wishes. The importance for our discussion is that the reactions to sent expectations in a

particular role episode will also have consequences. These are schematized in the figure as well. Theory

predicts consequences for the individual (especially his or her self-concept), the relationship of the

individual with the sender, the sender (perhaps revising his or her self-concept as well), and the system in

which the relationship is embedded.

3.2. Role taking vs. role making

Current thinking and empirical data (Morrison, 1993) support the notion that most workers are in fact

proactive in shaping their job duties, and in creating satisfying conditions in the workplace. They are, in

fact, role makers rather than passive role takers. Certainly, the level of initiation will vary somewhat,

depending on such things as the nature of the task to be performed (e.g., professional work) or

hierarchical level (i.e., amount of personal and position power of the focal person). But, by and large,

workers attempt to control their workplace destiny, and this means shaping the expectations and the

course of future interactions. This is the essence of role making. To put it another way, contemporary


views of role theory state quite clearly that what is going on is mutual influence in relationship

management. These comments paint a picture of a focal person who is often not waiting for ‘‘sent

expectations.’’ In this regard, the focal person may be as much the catalyst for others’ expectations as a

recipient.

3.3. Role dynamics and behavior regulation

If the goal is to model behavior in work settings, role systems theory and our version of it would seem

to have merit. It recognizes that individual behavior is determined by a complex of forces operating at

several levels of analysis: the individual (target person), the dyad (role sender/target person duo), the

social (e.g., both the target and sender are embedded in multiple relationships), and the system (e.g.,

organizational policies and practices) level. Neither the ‘‘regular performance of work’’ that is of high

quality nor an ‘‘unethical act’’ can be explained simply.

Another implication of this view of the embedded nature of things is the recognition that organizational

designers, consultants, or managers can only set the stage for particular patterns of behaviors. Their plans

and wishes notwithstanding, much of the variance in behavior is driven by forces rooted in interpersonal

relationships, subject to the realities of work interdependencies and the norms that develop. To put it

another way, it reminds us to think of the prediction of behavior in probabilistic terms.

A third point worth emphasizing is that work relationships are a result of both personal and

institutional factors. The expectations held for individuals in a work relationship can indeed be affected

by policies, practices, and rules. But, it is ultimately the interpretation and application of such rules by

people in a relationship that will account for behavior.

A fourth aspect of this perspective is that it recognizes that the development of work patterns takes

time and can change. It tries to come to grips with the fact that people entering into new relationships

with work and with work colleagues are, at the outset, trying to make sense of just who they are and

what they are to do (Gabarro, 1987; Louis, 1980; Morrison, 1993). Thus, individual expectations,

reactions to expectations, and resulting mutual expectations take time to stabilize. On the other hand, our

model implies that ‘‘nothing is forever.’’ When it comes to mutual expectations, there is reason to believe

in continuous change or development. While experiencing relative equilibrium is possible (and thus,

behavior can be predictable), this equilibrium can and will be ‘‘punctuated’’ (McGrath, 1984) by events,

such as personal insight, interpersonal conflict, change in the composition of the role set, new

technology, or new incentive systems.

Finally, the dynamics of role theory highlight the notion of alignment. In this context, alignment (or

consistency) is relative to the expectations held out for the focal person. This alignment can be with

regard to self-held expectations and those of a role sender, the set of expectations being communicated

by a particular role sender (e.g., the boss), and/or sets of expectations directed to the focal person by

various members of the role set. But importantly, the concept of alignment can be used to characterize

the level of consistency that exists between expectations set up by organizational policies, and those

enacted in the workplace at the level of interpersonal communication.

Alignment implies the potential for successful influence and conformity to expectations. To put it

simply, expectancies that diverge across senders, for example, present a weaker case for conforming on

the part of the focal person. Lack of alignment usually confounds influences (expectations) from the role

set. At a minimum, it allows for increased discretion (or, in the parlance of politicians, ‘‘wiggle room’’)

in responding to any one set of expectations. Occasionally, inconsistency leads to work stress, in the


form of role ambiguity. Over time, it may breed cynicism. In all cases, it results in behavior that is less

predictable, and which, in the eyes of the organization, may be undesirable.

3.4. Integration of role theory and accountability

At its essence, accountability in organizations can be viewed as involving elements of role taking and

role making as these unfold in the context of a history of role episodes.

While accountability theory refers to the building of self-actions–standards perceptions (Schlenker et

al., 1994), role theory also deals with such linkages, but in the form of role expectations. Both

perspectives deal with social control. Accountability theory has tended to focus on opinions, decisions or

behaviors related to moral or ethical issues (e.g., Dose & Klimoski, 1995) as noted, and role theory also

has included these (often as a discussion of the bases of role conflict), as well as issues of a more

mundane sort (work attendance and job performance generally). Moreover, at its base, accountability

implies the anticipation of an ‘‘accounting,’’ having to report or explain oneself to others in the future. In

role theory, the focal worker also anticipates facing an accounting as well, in this case, having to respond

in the future to the expectations of role senders, albeit, perhaps on shorter (e.g., even hourly) and

recurring cycles. In many ways, we argue, role theory explicates the essential components and

relationships central to accountability.

There are other useful comparisons. Accountability theory has largely been one of explaining

reactions to anticipated reviews. Thus, Ferris et al. (1995), Frink and Ferris (1998, 1999), Klimoski

and Ash (1974), Schlenker et al. (1994), Tetlock (1985, 1992), and others describe examples of both the

cognitive and behavioral consequences of having to face the expectations of (or a review by) another

party. This is almost the essence of role theory.

4. Advantages of a role perspective on accountability

There are several advantages of adopting a role theory perspective of accountability in organizations.

To further advance these notions, several specific advantages are discussed below.

4.1. A different unit of analysis

Accountability researchers have tended to focus on what might be called an ‘‘event’’—usually a

decision to be made or defended. In contrast, a major advantage of role theory is that it gives us the

notion of a ‘‘relationship’’ as a preferred unit of analysis. This implies attention to accountability

expectations as these have developed and/or are maintained between people. Such things as the duration,

quality, and predictability of the relationship between an agent and his or her principals will make a

difference in accountability outcomes.

4.2. Temporal considerations

Accountability theory has been examined largely in contrived settings. That is, agent and principal

relationships are created in a simulation and exist for a limited time period. In contrast, role theory

stresses continuity. Its logic implies the building up of expectations and the opportunity to learn the


consequences for meeting or rejecting such expectations. It also stresses the changes that occur to both

the principal and the agent (and indeed, their relationship) as a result of this learning. While temporal

considerations include relationships, there are other important dimensions related to past events and

history that affect responses to accountability requirements.

4.3. Wide range of responses

For the most part, investigators interested in the effects of accountability have tended to focus on a

limited range of phenomena, usually its effects on cognitive processing (Tetlock et al., 1989), opinion

change (Brief, Dukerich, & Doran, 1991), and occasionally behavioral conformity (Klimoski & Ash,

1974). But expectations in a relationship will usually produce a wide range of effects. Role theory allows

for (even encourages) the prediction of a variety of potential agent behaviors in response to a principal’s

expectations, including conformity, avoidance, negotiation, rejection, and selective attention. It also

allows for attempts on the part of the agent at persuasion and, failing that, coalition building (e.g., with

other ‘‘agents’’ reporting to a common principal). Role theory predicts that, while agents will indeed

respond to accountabilities in general, these responses may be different from what was intended when

the accountability conditions were developed.

4.4. Mutual influence

Accountability theory has emphasized the consequence of facing an accounting, usually presuming

that the conditions to be faced by the agent are dictated by the principal. While this can occur in some

settings, according to role theory, it is far more likely that the terms of accountability are negotiated.

Given what we know about the dynamics of empowerment (Conger & Kaningo, 1988), we would

predict that the reactions to any accountability will be strongly colored by the extent and nature of such

negotiation processes. What is not evident in most theory about accountability is the influence that

agents are likely to have.

4.5. Individual differences

Most research on accountability has treated individual differences in agents lightly if at all. For the

most part, accountability researchers have sought to model the general case. On the other hand, role

theory emphasizes the importance of agent attributes. As diagrammed in Fig. 1, these agent differences

are seen to affect the initial expectations of both the role senders (principals) and the agent, and are

thought to operate to filter expectations communicated by the principal. Role theory also stresses the

individual differences among principals (role senders) as well. Individual differences are indeed

influential in accountability relationships, and likely are increasingly so over time.

4.6. Multiple sets of expectations

In contrast to accountability theory, treatments of role theory usually assume that expectations from

multiple principals (constituencies) are operative in most work settings. This is articulated in the concept

of the role set. More importantly, it is also assumed that there are no guarantees that there will be

consistencies across principals regarding expectations. Thus, the agent must be modeled as having to


define, negotiate, or otherwise balance these often conflicting expectations. Multiple expectations can

originate from a single principal, and multiple principals are likely to be a confound in an agent’s

developing of expectations.

4.7. The alignment of expectations

While the number and nature of constituencies implies the degree of consistency or alignment in

expectations that will occur (more constituents = less alignment likely), this factor in itself is worthy of

emphasis. Generally, as noted, lack of alignment brings with it the potential for conflict and stress. But

lack of alignment (consensus) also can produce liberating forces as well. Perhaps it goes without saying,

but we would generally expect more conformity and feel less discomfort facing a principal who has

expectations that are wholly consistent (aligned) with our own.

4.8. The importance of the primary group

The two previous sections highlight the importance of what sociologists might call the primary group

for predicting when and where accountability forces are likely to form and to be strongest. In general, the

members of the role set are implicated as the major source of such forces. The nature and clarity of their

expectations (including how they have come about), the degree of consensus in these expectations, and

the role set’s habits relative to responding to the agent’s deviance from these expectations will be critical

to predicting or modeling agent behavior. A special case of this is the frequent discovery that acts of

unethical or illegal behavior often occur in clusters, in certain locations in organizations. This is as if a

‘‘microclimate’’ (Patterson, Payne, & West, 1996) exists relative to just what expectations are operative

and/or will be enforced. Thus, organizational policies (at the system level) will not be anywhere near as

salient as work group pressures.

4.9. The dark side of accountability

Clearly, as noted at the outset of this chapter, popular treatments of the concept of accountability have

usually assumed that more accountability is better because it produces organizationally desired

outcomes. But as Frink et al. (1995) have pointed out, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, as

suggested earlier, there is a dark side to accountability where there are often undesirable effects. The

advantage of a role theory perspective is that it more completely specifies when and where these dark

side consequences are likely to occur. In essence, then, the result of accountabilities placed on an

individual will be the result of an interaction of internal and external characteristics, and this interaction

may easily lead to outcomes that are undesirable either organizationally or socially, such as in the

increased use of age stereotypes in the study by Gordon, Rozelle, and Baxter (1988).

4.10. Interpersonal vs. organizational processes

The position taken by this paper is that a role theory perspective is a superior vehicle for

understanding accountability forces in work organizations. The bulk of this section has explained

why we think that this is the case. One last argument to be put forth in this regard remains, however.

Specifically, role theory serves to bridge the several levels of analysis that must be attended to in order


for the construct of accountability to have much in the way of explanatory or predictive power in work

settings. Perhaps not so obvious is that macro factors at the level of the organization (e.g., organizational

culture), even at the level of the industry, must be considered as well. For better or worse, these often set

the context for the expectations of members’ role set (i.e., principals).

4.11. The dynamics of accountability contexts

Role theory has proven useful for the explanation of organizations because of its consideration of

several factors and dimensions in a unified framework. As noted, these factors and dimensions have

specific applications to accountability which warrant discussion. One is that a role theory approach

incorporates a multitude of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and person–organization dynamics which helps

guide our approach to several issues. The framework developed herein suggests that variables, such as

general cognitive ability, social skill/intelligence, conscientiousness, Type A personality, generalized

efficacy, trait stress, and self-monitoring, among others, may be of particular interest. These variables

have specific implications for how individuals approach their environments, which may set the stage for

receiving and interpreting environmental cues. Other variables have specific implications for the

interpersonal and person–organization aspects of the proposed framework. Variables, such as agree-

ableness, locus of control, and personal and work values, among others, are related to how one interprets

and responds to environmental cues, and might help explain and predict behavior related to

accountability perceptions.

Another issue is related to the salience or strength of the signals from the role senders. We would

expect that responses to accountability will be related to the number and consistency of sources

promoting accountability in some form. This framework might suggest that we focus on role sender

characteristics related to signal strength of sent expectations, which in turn influences perceptions and

responses to accountability episodes. These may include size of audience, strength of organizational

culture, level of hierarchy of both principal and agent, relative position of principal(s), etc.

A related issue is the question of principal identification—just who is it we feel accountable towards?

Although formal reporting relationships and responsibilities can be quite explicit at times, there are

usually several constituencies that have a stake in what we do. There are customers, clients, coworkers,

subordinates, supervisors, suppliers, etc., who have an interest in our choices. A more refined set of

questions might then be to ask such things as what is the makeup of our role set, how stable or dynamic

is our role set, and what expectations and conditions embed those relationships? That is, how do we

determine which role senders are most influential, for what individuals, and in what circumstances?

Thus, we have offered a vehicle for developing our understanding of numerous events which can be

described in terms of the accountability phenomenon. It is definitive enough to support prediction, yet

flexible enough to permit a broad range of applications. As a test of the viability of our framework, we

move to the topical papers mentioned earlier.

4.12. This issue of human resource management review

As noted earlier, the approach used for structuring this issue is to first set for the platform that serves

as a common foundation for all the contributions. The individual papers, then, take a particular

criterion of interest to the organizational and behavioral sciences, and view that criterion from an

accountability platform. This approach offers a unifying theme, or thread while offering the individual


contributors enough latitude to explore that criterion fully using an explanatory mechanism that we

believe to be useful.

The results are outstanding, in our opinion. The approach of integrating heretofore distinct bodies has

the effect of inducing refreshing creativity into the papers. Fresh approaches that were mandated by this

process created novel applications and concepts that have substantial potential to inform and support

theory, research, and practice.

Erdogan et al. engaged an effort to expand our thinking about the realities of social contexts. This

includes notions like uncertainty, perceptual differences, and psychological contracts, as catalysts for

accountability perceptions (internal vs. external and general vs. specific), and offer a framework for

analyses of these relationships.

They draw from theories of LMX, accountability, contextual performance, expectancy, social

exchange, TMX, and POS to construct their framework and arguments. With the greater emphasis on

LMX and accountability in particular, they build on the common foundations these literatures have in role

theory (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). This results in collapsing LMX dimensions into affect and contribution-

based exchanges. As will be seen, variations on this theme are found throughout these papers.

In developing their thesis, they also differentiate internal vs. external and general vs. specific

accountability perceptions, proposing that behaviors result from accountabilities which emerge from the

LMX relationship, including the affective component. Further informing their analysis is expectancy

theory. Substituting the notion of legitimacy of accountabilities and expectations for valence, they

propose that expectancy, instrumentally, and legitimacy are influenced by the relationships and

accountabilities which embed them. They also integrate self-efficacy as a mediating variable for

expectations proposing a positive correlation between LMX and self-efficacy.

In folding these concepts, theories, and variables together, they produce a number of meaningful

testable propositions about the nature of accountability and leadership. Examples of proposed relation-

ships include affect-based exchanges and lower punishment perceptions, contribution-based exchanges

and reward instrumentally, LMX and the range of reward/punish expectations, and LMX and lower

explicit process and outcome accountabilities. They further propose that self-accountability moderates

LMX, TMX, POS, and felt accountability. Underlying of much of their discussion is the influence of

affect vs. contribution-based exchanges, which affect reward vs. punishment instrumentalities. As will

be seen, this resonates with one of the themes that runs through these papers.

The purpose of the second paper, by Ammeter et al., is to integrate literatures with similar foundations

in relationship development and perceptions. They focus on the interplay of accountability, as a

constraint, and trust, as belief in the efficacy of accountability or motives. They further underscore the

role of political skill in how those relationships, perceptions, and roles develop. From the basis of a role

theory platform for accountability, they explore commonalities between these perspectives. Noting that

accountability is a social adhesive, and that trust is an essential exchange requirement, they emphasize

the positive aspect of trust and the monitoring aspects of accountability. This perspective leads to a

suggestion that trust (i.e., positive expectancies about target behavior) and accountability (as monitoring

for the constraint of behavior) may be thought of as substitutes. Emerging in this discussion is that

accountability can focus on abilities or values, which strongly resonates with Erdogan et al.’s discussion

of affect and contribution-based LMX exchanges. Given those two bases for accountability perceptions,

it then follows that some roles may employ the affective use of trust (e.g., a supervisor delegating a client

account to a subordinate) and monitoring of accountability (e.g., an accountant checking expense

records) in the same role episode.


Ammeter et al. also point out that navigating the complexities of these dynamic and multifarious

relationships can be facilitated by political skill. Defined in terms of knowledge, skills, and abilities

(both innate and learned) in navigating social waters, political skill includes social intelligence and the

astute use of impression management and influence tactics. An example of a straightforward prediction

is that political skill can increase trust, which can reduce monitoring. In a more clearly delineated

proposition that builds further ties with the previous paper, they post that values (affective)-based trust,

political skill, and affective-based LMX are related, while behavioral trust, monitoring, and contribution-

based LMX are related. Further exploring these constructs suggests that accountability evokes a need to

appear competent, and the choice and use of impression management for identity protection or

enhancement is moderated by political skill. From a role sender’s perspective, this might suggest that

soft influence tactics may produce a sense of obligation, which in turn insures accountability where the

relationship is value-based.

Ammeter et al.’s final exclamation point is a reminder to readers that traditional, formal accountability

systems are fading in many quarters as power- and authority-based relationships decline.

As we have discussed earlier, accountability theory, particularly our version of it, readily accom-

modates multiple levels of analysis, and this volume was designed to do so. Most accountability studies

use decision-making methodologies, as do the literatures of many of our other conceptual frameworks.

We do, however, attempt to inch upward in levels of analysis, at least in potential. Beginning with dyadic

approaches, we have moved to broaden social context issues in Beu and Buckley’s discussion of ethics

and accountability. Their purpose is to better understand the moral dimension of relationships, and how

accountability supports that dimension in a range of audiences from a single individual to multiple

stakeholders. They build their discussion primarily on the exchange perspectives of agency theory

(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), economic exchange theory, the stakeholder (vs. shareholder) model, and

social learning theory (Bandura, 1986). Particularly salient aspects of these frameworks include the firm

as a nexus of contracts (agency theory), the necessity of ethical behaviors (economic exchange theory),

and vicarious learning about social sanctions (social learning theory). The trust element resonates with

the previous paper, and the need for positive relationships carries the theories from both previous papers

forward.

After setting forth the basis of social acceptable behavior, Beu and Buckley explore predictors of ethical

choices. Their basic model describes ethical choices as determined by dispositional factors and contextual

factors. The latter include organizational norms and expectations, and their effects are moderated by

accountabilities. In addition to commonly found accountability mechanisms, we are reminded that ethical

codes produce accountability, as does a values-based climate. Such a climate requires individual

accountability with a community vs. a self-interest focus. Employing social learning theory, Beu and

Buckley posit that the values of top managers are reflected downward as vicarious learning informs

employees what behaviors are sanctioned. They further describe how the shift from a shareholder view of

the organization to the stakeholder perspective evokes a new multiplicity of accountabilities.

O’Leary-Kelly et al. follow, using accountability theory to explain the persistence of sexual

harassment despite a legal structure and strong social norms that oppose it. They focus on three key

questions: Why do harassers continue to do so? Why are their targets generally passive? Why are

observers generally silent? Their discussions are generally based on Schlenker et al., Tetlock, and our

own presentations of accountability theory. The authors also set forth the legal groundwork underlying

sexual harassment, especially hostile environment.


Beginning with the notion that behavioral questions give rise to accountability questions, they

delineate two factors in responses to sexual harassment. The first is the focus of the response (i.e., self

vs. initiator) and the second is the mode of the response (i.e., from one’s self vs. using means supported

by others). The resulting 2� 2 demonstrates that likely target choices misalign with typical organiza-

tional preferences. From the premise that perpetrators are accountable for the act, targets are accountable

for their response, and observers are accountable for their reaction, O’Leary-Kelly et al. develop ‘‘zones

of accountability,’’ including domains where the accountabilities overlap.

Continuing to build on those foundations, O’Leary-Kelly et al. explore how the uncertainties and

conflicts in roles seem to often allow ‘‘permission’’ to harass. This may be perceived because of

ambiguous role expectations, changing role expectations, competing prescriptions for behavior, the

influence of group norms, and diffusion of responsibility. Similarly, they develop conceptual bases for

victim passivity, including ambiguities embedding the event, ambiguities in prescriptions for sexual

harassment events, and ambiguities surrounding various identities associated with the event. In addressing

their third question, regarding observer nonresponse, they include, but move beyond, the traditional

bystander effects. O’Leary-Kelly et al. note that sexual harassment is clouded by a serious of ambiguities

that may tend to break down the lineages in Schlenker et al.’s (1994) accountability pyramid. In sexual

harassment, prescriptions are often unclear, the event evokes negative affective and identity responses,

observers are uncertain about the nature of the event, observers identity with the event is weak, and

pluralistic ignorance may further distance observers. Altogether, they have done an intriguing job of

developing conceptual explanations for behaviors that previously have been difficult to understand.

The next paper marks a substantive move from individuals and context to an organizational level of

analysis. Cropanzano et al. have produced a very innovative paper intended to inform perspectives of

holding corporations accountable within an individual-focused society. To support their effort, the build

from fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), the legal theory of juristic persons, and Argyris and

Schon’s (1978) organizational learning theory, with its concept of single and double loop learning. They

work from the notion that a ‘‘person’’ is a social construction, and events are socially constructed, thus

the same basic ideas that we collectively apply to individuals can be extended to apply to corporations.

This notion also is at the heart of our perspective of accountability, and our belief in its efficacy for

multiple levels of analysis.

The variable on which Cropanzano et al. focus is corporate behavior, offering a robust framework.

They first establish that the corporation is a juristic person and therefore accountable. Next, they describe

the psychological processes for attributing responsibility, using the would, could, and should questions

from fairness theory. The third component is a discussion of organizational tactics for coping with

accountabilities they face. Applying the notions of single- and double-loop learning, the authors describe

the focus of single-loop responses, which is on remedying what occurred, and the higher level double-

loop responses which extend the analysis to why things occurred, with an eye toward correcting the

causes. The concept of double-loop learning aligns with the role-making notion of our conceptualization

of accountability, wherein entities both learn the nature of their social roles, while attempting to

influence these role perceptions.

Cropanzano et al. explicitly build on the premises that it is the social construction of reality and the

interpretations thereof that drive organizational actions and responses, describing how these social

constructions have changed over time. From that perspective, we move another step upward in levels of

analysis to Gelfand et al.’s analysis of accountability at the cultural level.


Gelfand et al. begin by underscoring that cultural forces are found at all levels, and are therefore a

critical element for understanding accountability. Indeed, they suggest that the nature of accountability

systems can be an indicator of cultural variables and they offer well-developed descriptions of how key

cultural variables, in combination, can play out in typical accountability systems in specific cultures. Thus,

their purpose is to advance a cultural perspective of accountability, demonstrating that what they refer to as

an accountability is the result of cultural influences at individual, integroup, and organizational levels.

These authors primarily rely on theories of culture, describing the etics and emics of accountability,

moving from universal accountability features to specifics according to specific cultural characteristics.

They employ specific cultural variables that appear to have particular relevance for accountabilities.

These include individualism/collectivism, which concerns the culture’s emphasis on individuals vs.

family or social units (i.e., the nature of people’s identity in a given social system), cultural tightness/

looseness, which concerns the clarity, strength, and perhaps formality of the norms or rules in a social

system (i.e., the nature of the prescriptions), and power distance, which concerns the nature of vertical

relationships (i.e., another dimension of one’s identity in addition to its implications for interpreting

events and the nature of prescriptions about events).

As a vehicle to describe these relationships and influences, they use the concept of an accountability

web, which is a cognitive map of social accountability norms, and which are the result of sociocultural

enculturation. Drawing from theories of culture, roles, and accountability, they note that important

features of accountabilities include the direction (who is accountable to whom), strength of account-

ability norms, number of accountability connections, and alignment of expectations among actors.

They posit that the number of connections is related to individualism/collectivism, direction is related

to power distance and strength and alignment are related to cultural tightness/looseness.

The three cultural variables together produce eight combinations that can generally describe cultures.

Selecting four specific combinations that describe a substantial number of cultures, Gelfand et al.

provide detailed descriptions of how those combinations might play out in the features of typical

accountability systems within certain cultural contexts. Examples of key features include whether the

focus is self-accountability vs. accountability to a collective, how explicit the standards are, the level of

alignment among standards and audiences, the prevalence of role sending vs. role making, and the

impact of those particular accountability webs on creativity and innovation.

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Advancing accountability theory and practice: Introduction to the human resource management review special edition