Administrative Law Case Compilation (Chapter 5-7)

7/27/2019 Administrative Law Case Compilation (Chapter 5-7)

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Chapter 5 (Rules of Procedure), Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 | Admin Law Cases | Dean Roy 2D 2012

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CHAPTER 5

RULES OF PROCEDURE

1. MENDOZA v CSC

FACTS

Petitioner Orlando Mendoza was a Senior Revenue Inspector in the Office of the Treasurer of Tarlac. In a letter dated March10, 1989, respondent Jose Macapinlac, the then incumbent mayor of Tarlac, ordered petitioner to explain why noadministrative and criminal charges should be filed against him for falsification of realty tax receipts and unauthorizedcollections of real estate taxes. The return card showed the letter-complaint was received on March 17.

Respondent Mayor, not having received any answer, rendered a letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, dismissing petitionerfrom service. The return card showed that this was received on April 11.

According to petitioner, he only found out about all this around the 3rd

week of April. He then asked for a reconsideration.According to the mayor, he didnt act on the reconsideration because, while it was dated April 18, 1989, it was filed only on July 4, 1989.

MSPB set aside the letter-decision and reinstated the petitioner to his former position, CSC reversed, holding that petitionersappeal to the MSPB was filed out of time and that at any rate, petitioner was accorded due process

ISSUEW/N petitioner was deprived of due process of law

HELDNO. It was shown by evidence that the letter-complaint was addressed to the Office of the Mun. Treasurer (petitioners office)and that it was received by someone in that office. It is a common practice that letters addressed to an official or employee ina government office are received by an employee assigned to handle mail matters.

It is true that appeals to the CSC shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision, such party being therespondent in the admin case. However, in this case, when the respondent mayor appealed the decision of the MSPB to theCSC, petitioner never questioned its propriety and preferred to defend the correctness of the decision, Likewise, petitionerfailed to raise this question before the SC.

These inactions are considered waiver on petitioners part to question the authority of the CSC to review the decision of theMSPB.

A law limiting the right to appeal to the respondent in the administrative case is a rule of procedure, not of substantive law.Failure to invoke timely a rule of procedure in favor of a party constitutes a waiver thereof.

2. MANGUBAT v DE CASTRO

FACTSMayor Carlos Quizon of Cebu City instituted a case against the petitioner Florencio Mangubat before the Municipal Boardpursuant to RA 557 (empowers the city boards of councils to investigate misconducts or incompetency of members of the citypolice, which could lead to the latters removal)

Hearings were conducted. Petitioner was required to submit his memorandum which was never filed. However, before thecase could be decided, the Charter of Cebu City was approved, and the name of the Mun Board was changed to City Councilof City of Cebu. Sec 30 provided that it would now be the city fiscal who has authority to investigate such cases.

Meanwhile no decision was rendered by the City council. The city mayor then forwarded the said admin case to the city fiscalfor reinvestigation. A reinvestigation was conducted, mostly on the basis of the records and testimonies before the MunBoard and finding no prima facie evidence, it recommended the dismissal of the admin case. However, no resolution wasissued by the City Fiscal to this effect, neither was there an order to the same effect issued by the Mayor. Subsequently, theCity Atty of Cebu again transmitted the records of the case to the City mayor, invoking Sec 26 of RA 4864, andrecommended that final action thereon be made by the city board of investigators. The chairman of the latter board withoutfurther investigation, forwarded the records to the Police Commission. The latter rendered its decision finding petitionerMangubat guilty of grave misconduct and violation of law and ordered his dismissal.

ISSUEW/N petitioner was deprived of due process when the police commission took over the case rendering judgement withoutconducting its own investigation


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HELDNO.Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties in

obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. Otherwise stated, where dueprocess is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.

The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both in Mun Board and in the Fiscals office, with both partiesafforded ample opportunity to adduce their evidence and argue their causes.

The respondent commission cannot be bound by the findings of the city fiscal, much less was it prohibited from makingfindings of its own on the basis of the records which both the Commission and the Board of Investigators consideredsufficient for purposes of rendering a decision. Neither was the Boards discretion not to conduct a new investigationforeclosed by such findings.

There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at leastcontained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

1. RABAGO v NLRC

FACTS

Ace Bldg Care and the Phil. Tuberculosis Society entered into a K under which the former would provide the latter withjanitorial and allied services for a stipulated consideration. Subsequently, however, a new K was awarded to anothercompany which then took over from ABC.The 41 janitors ABC had earlier detailed to PTS f iled a complaint with the NLRC against both ABC and PTS for unpaid wagedifferentials.Moreover, in this case, the complainants were awarded with service incentive leave with pay on the basis of their affidavitsestablishing the length of their stay.

ISSUEW/N the affidavits are hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross examination

HELDUntenable. The rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC, wheredecisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It is also worth noting that ABC has not presented anyevidence of its own to disprove the complainants claim.

2. MACEDA v ERB

FACTSOn the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Conflict, private respondent oil companies (shell, petron and Caltex) filed with the ERVtheir respective application on oil price increases. This was granted.

Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional increase for lack of prior hearing. This wasdismissed pursuant to sec 8 of EO no 172 which gives the ERB authority to increase provisionally without need of a hearing,subject to the final outcome of the proceedings. It was also stated that the ERB was not prevented from conducting a hearingon the grant of provisional authority, however it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

In the same order authorizing the provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to allinterested parties. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the 2

ndhearing. The next hearing was

postponed on written notice of petitioner.

Subsequently, the oil companies filed another application to further increase the prices of petroleum products. Hearing for thepresentation of evidence-in-chief commenced with the ERB ruling that the testimonies of witnesses would be in the form ofaffidavits, and the procedure for taking them would be to present all the evidence of all the applicants first before theopposing parties would be given the opportunity to cross examine said pieces of evidence.

ISSUEW/N the order of proof deprived petitioner his right to finish his cross-examination each of the witnesses of the big 3 oilcompanies and hence denied him due process

HELDNO. The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the


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trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced our of the orderprescribed by the rules is not improper. Such a relaxed procedure us especially true such as the ERB which in matters of rateor price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative not quasi-judicial function. As such admin agency, it is notbound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.Moreover, while the government is able to justify a provisional increase, these findings are not final and it is up to petitionersto demonstrate that the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase

PARAS; dissenting:The ERB has absolutely no power to tax which is solely the prerogative of the Congress. This is what the ERB is preciselydoing by getting money from the people to ultimately subsidize the ravenous oil companies.

PADILLA, dissenting:Any increase, provisional or otherwise should be allowed onlky after the ERB shall have fully, determined, thru bona fide andfull-dress hearings, that is absolutely necessary and by how much it shall be effected.2 proposals to Congress:

A. to do away with the present scheme of allowing provisional increases of oil products because usually if not alwaysthese provisional increases are permanent when fixed.B. All decisions and orders of the ERB should be expressly made by Statute to the President

SARMIENTO, Separate opinion:Phil oil prices today have nothing to do with the law on supply and demand, if they had anything to do with in recent years.Now, oil pricing is a question best judged by the political leadership and oil prices are political, rather than economic

decisions.

FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

1. DADUBO v CSC

FACTSPetitioner Lolita Dadubo, Senior Accts Analyst and Rosario Cidro, Cash Supervisor of the DBP were administratively chargedwith conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In the morning of August 13, 1987 Erlinda Veloso authorized representative of the Tius, presented an undated withdrawal slipfor 60K. This was encahsed.

After banking hours, a 2nd

withdrawal slip, also for 60 K, was presented by a Feliciano Bugtas Jr. also an employee of theTius. Veloso did not know about this. No posting of this amount was actually made because the passbook was not

presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated 8/13, all other supporting docs were dated 8/14 this being a withdrawal afterbanking hours.

The ff day, prior to the payment of the 2nd

withdrawal, Veloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for 60 K, which washanded to Dadubo. Cidro paid Veloso the amount corresponding to the 2

nd 60K, on the thought that it was such 2

nd

withdrawal that Velosos was trying to collect.

It turned out that the 3rd

60K, that was handed to Dadubo was not paid by the bank to Veloso.

Dadubo and Cidro were then found guilty by the DBP of dishonesty and embezzlement of bank funds, due to the unpostedwithdrawal of 60K. Dadubo was dismissed from service. This was because of petitioners action in changing the entry date inthe ledger in the course of her reconciliation which she was advised not to do. MSPB affirmed

CSC reversed and reduced Dadubos penalty to merely 6 mo suspension. However, upon MR of the DBP, the CSC reversedits own decision and affirmed the earlier findings of the DBP as to Dadubos guilt. However, such resolution did not state

clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it was based.

ISSUEW/N the petitioner was deprived of due process when she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her.

HELDNO. While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible their strict observance is notindispensable in administrative cases. The standard of due process that must be met in admin tribunals allows a certainlatitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.

The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present evidence that she was not guilty of embezzlement butonly of failure to comply with the tellering procedure.


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Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was the prerogative of the admin body, subject to reversal only upon aclear showing of arbitrariness. It is true that petitioner was charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bankand not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved herguilt of embezzlement.

The constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law upon which the decision is based appliesonly to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the CSC.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW

1. CORONA v CA

FACTSPresident Aquino issued AO No. 25 creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, which, mandatedthe Department Secretary to be directly responsible to the President in eradicating graft and corruption in his Department andthe agencies attached to it. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is an agency attached to the DOTC. Pursuant to said AO,DOTC Secretary Reyes issued an Office Order creating the Administrative Action Board (AAB), which was to act, decide andrecommend to the Secretary appropriate measures in administrative cases in the department.

An administrative charge against District Manager of the Manila Port Bungubung was filed in the AAB for dishonesty andconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Another was filed by Secretary Reyes with the AAB against Dinopol,

then Manager of the Davao Port. Both Bungubung and Dinopol question the jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrativecases filed against them. They claim that it was the General Manager of the PPA who has proper jurisdiction.

ISSUEW/N the AAB and/or the DOTC Secretary have jurisdiction over the administrative cases filed against Bungubung andDinopol whose ranks are below that of the Assistant General Manager.

HELDYES, however, the AABs and/or DOTC Secretarys jurisdiction are only appellate jurisdiction.The CA is correct in ruling that the PPA Charter (PD No. 857) which provides that the General Manager shall appoint andremove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Managaer, a special law, prevails over the Civil Service Law whichvests upon Department heads jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters on disciplinary action against officers andemployees under their jurisdiction, a general law. The former is also a more recent enactment than the latter, and musttherefore take precedence. Also, the power of review by the Office of the President has been repealed by PD 1409. As aconsequence, the DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, can no longer exercise jurisdiction over PPA

personnel, due to the creation of the Merit Systems Board in the CSC.

The DOTC Secretarys jurisdiction is circumscribed by the PPA Charter and Civil Service Law which give him only appellatejurisdiction. Verily, it is the PPA General Manager who has the power to investigate its personnel below the indicated rank.Thereafter and in case of an adverse decision, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the DepartmentSecretary, else, he may appeal directly to the CSC. Therefore in this case, the submission of the complaints to the AAB waspremature. It was discretionary on the part of the employees to elevate the case to Secretary Reyes; only then could AABtake jurisdiction.

The DOTC Secretary has no power to initiate proceedings against subordinate officials of the PPA; otherwise, the result isan absurd spectacle where he acts as complainant-initiator of a case which later he will review. What the law aims is that theaggrieved party should not be one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint may eventually fall on appeal. No mancan be litigant and judge at one.

2. DEL CASTILLO v CSC

FACTSPetitioner, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was assigned as a watcher in the OptometryLicensure Examination. Two other watchers wrote the CSC saying that theyve seen petitioner answering the test paperssubmitted by an examinee.

He was correspondingly charged by the PRC Commissioner for grave misconduct. The Commission found him guilty, anddismissed him from the service. On appeal to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), the PRC resolution was set asideand he was exonerated of the charge. The PRC appealed to the CSC, which granted. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.Petitioner, in particular, alleges that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction inentertaining PRCs appeal from MSPBs decision. He reasons that the decision of the MSPB exonerating him became


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immediately final and executory. According to him, this was violative of Sec 17(a) of PD 807 which provides that the CSC hasno appellate jurisdiction over the MSPBs decisions exoneratingofficers and employees from administrative charges.

ISSUEW/N petitioners contention is correct.

HELDYES. Section 37 (a) of PD 807, or the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides that the Commission shall decide upon appeal

all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days, or fine in anamount exceeding 30 days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismis sal from office. None of theseinstances are attendant in this case. As a matter of fact, petitioner was exonerated by the MSPB of the charge against him.

Moreover, interpreting the above provision, it was held in Mendez v. CSC, that the right to appeal is merely a statutoryprivilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of the law.

Said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

The conclusion is that in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is not one of those covered by or is less thanthose enumerated above, the decision of the disciplining authority (MSPB) shall be final and appealable.

RES JUDICATA AND REOPENING OF CASES

1. VDA FISH BROKER v NLRC

FACTSPetitioner VDA Fish Broker (VDA), a duly licensed fish broker, is engaged in the business of selling fish. It engaged theservices of private respondents, among others, as batilyos to arrange the fish in the baera, including emptying or filling thesame or pulling or dragging them in or out of the designated area. In 1984, a complaint for non-payment of service incentivepay, emergency cost of living allowance, 13

thmonth pay, legal holiday and premium pay for rest day and holiday was filed

against petitioner by the Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Batilyo-NFL. The latter was represented by its President Bula; thecomplaint was also signed by Salac; both are private respondents here. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack ofmerit, saying theres no employer-employee relationship between VDA and the batilyos. Another complaint, in 1984, was filedby Salac and Bula against VDA for illegal dismissal and for recovery of damages Labor Arbiter again dismissed on the samebasis. He explained that they were independent contractors, and as such, are not employees. In fact, they offer their servicesto other fish brokers. On appeal to the NLRC, this was reversed. An order for reinstatement was issued. Petitioner nowassails this in certiorari claiming that the previous case ruling that no employee relationship existed constituted a bar tothe present suit. The OSG likewise adhered to this res judicata theory.

ISSUEW/N the Labor Arbiters ruling constituted res judicata on the present suit.

HELDYES. The SC has several times applied the concept of res judicata to administrative decisions. It is well-established that thedecisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality,the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.As to the NLRCs claim thatsuch cannot apply here because the causes of action and issues in the two cases are different, this, too is untenable. Theissue of employer-employee relationship is crucial in the determination of the rights of the parties in both cases. Moreover,there are, in fact two different concepts embraced by the principle: (1) bar by former judgement where theres identity ofparties, subject matter and cause of action, and (2) conclusiveness of judgmentwhile theres no identity of cause of action,

judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to the matters actually and directly controverted and determined in thefirst. It is undisputed that the factual issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship had been determined withfinality in the earlier case. Private respondents have allowed this so by not appealing from it. Hence, this should be deemed

conclusive on the subsequent case. To ignore this principle would result in a situation where the same administrative agencywould have diametrically opposed conclusions based on apparently similar circumstances. Else said, this would mean thatrespondents would have dual or conditional status: that of employees for the purpose of reinstatement, but of independentcontractors for purposes of entitlement to service incentive leave pay, etc.

2. SY HONG v COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTSAppellants seek to set aside the warrants of deportation issued against them by the Commissioner of Immigration. The lowercourt, applying Ong Se Lun v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, held that they should first abandon the Philippinesbefore seeking permanent admission thereto because they have previously accepted the status of temporary visitors inentering the same.


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ISSUEW/N appellants acceptance of the status of temporary visitors constituted a bar to their application for permanent admissionhere.

HELDYES. Its undisputed that prior to February 1940, they were admittedly permanent residents of the Philippines. However, its

also true that they were unable to return here within the period of validity of their special return certificates, and gainedadmiision on May 1948 only as temporary visitors. They have, thus, lost their right to reentry as permanent residents. Duealso to the circumstances that theyve been admitted as temporary visitors or non -immigrants, and the period for theirtemporary sojourn has expired, they are the proper subjects of deportation. Corrections made in the status of aliens fromtemporary to permanent residents, by the subsequent Commissioner, are illegal and against public policy.

CHAPTER 6

1. MASANGKAY v COMELEC

FACTSPetitioner was charged with contempt before the COMELEC for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballotsfor the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of COMELECs resolutions which mandated that said act should bedone in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorizedrepresentatives of various parties. He was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan, tasked to take charge of the receipt and

custody of official ballots, etc. as well as of their distribution to the municipalities. The Commission found him guilty ascharged and sentenced him to 3 months imprisonment and a P500 fine. He assails the constitutionality of Section 5 of theRevised Election Code which grants the COMELEC the power to punish acts of contempt against said body, on the groundthat it infringes on the principle of separation of powers. In other words, he contends that even if he can be held guilty of theact of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of COMELEC to impose suchdisciplinary penalty.

ISSUEW/N COMELEC has the power to punish for contempt in the exercise of ministerial functions.

HELDNO. While the COMELEC has the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connectionwith the elections, is not a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution. It is merely an administrative body whichcan exercise quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of its ministerial functions, the Commission cannot exercise the power topunish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The exercise of this power has always been

regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited tomaking effective the power to elicit testimony. The exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of itsadministrative/ministerial function is invalid.

Here, the resolutions of COMELEC merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merelyconcern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia.

CHAPTER 7

JUDICIAL REVIEW OR RELIEF AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

1. FIRST LEPANTO v CA (231 SCRA 30)

FACTSBOI granted petitioners application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product

from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petitioner for review with the CA. CA granted thepreliminary injunction. Petitioner says that the CA has no jurisdiction as it is vested exclusively with the SC within 30 daysfrom receipt of the decision pursuant to the Omnibus Investments Code and therefore, Mariwasa has lost its right to appeal.Mariwasa counters that whatever inconsistencies that the Omnibus Investment Code and the Judiciary Reorganization Acthave been resolved by SC Circular 1-91.

ISSUESW/N Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.


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HELD1

YES. B.P. 129s objective is providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi -judicial agencies for thebenefit of the bench and the bar. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain thedeviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. Although a circular isnot strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantiveright which is prohibited under the Constitution. These simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power toregulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals fromdecisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days fromnotice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing theright to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

2. FIRST LEPANTO v CA (237 SCRA 519)

FACTSThis is a MR of the previous case. Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have supersededart. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated inthe exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courtspursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the Constitution.

ISSUES

Same issue as in the first FIRST LEPANTO case.

HELDYES(as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg.

129,3

by granting in 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicialagencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisionsand final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had takeneffect.

4The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give theSupreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment oflegislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential functionof expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from thedecisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without theadvice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed tohave amended BPBlg. 129, 9.

3. LIBORO v CA

FACTS

Petitioner is a practicing lawyer who was assessed with P14,009.84 deficiency tax in 1980. His protest was denied by theCIR, which he filed a NOTICE of appeal (instead of a petition for review) with the CA then two days later filed for a motion forextension of time to file a petition for review which was denied

2.

In G.R. No. 105368: Petitioner CIR rejected the argument of private respondents3that they were not liable for donors tax of

P263,032.66 each for their contributions to the campaign chest of Sen. Edgardo J. Angara when the latter ran for the Senatein the 1987 elections, on the ground that a political or electoral contribution is not a gift within the contemplation of the

National Internal Revenue Code. The CTA affirmed the decision to which the CIR filed a motion for extension to file apetition for review for 15 days. It was granted but its subsequent motions for extension were denied as the first motiongranted was non-extendible.

1The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular doesnot apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from finalorders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute.Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered bythe Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein.

2The court said that there is nothign in the SC circular permitting an extension of time to file a petition for review3Manuel G. Abello, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz


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ISSUESW/N a party can file a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on decisions from the CTA and other quasi-

judicial agencies under Circular 1-91.

HELDYES.From the rules mentioned in a previous ruling

4, it is clear that the prohibition against granting an extension of time

applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The reason is that only the filing of thenotice of appeal is required to perfect an appeal and nothing more. However, it is different in a petition for review where thepleading is required to be verified. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal, requires careful preparation and operoseresearch in order to put up a persuasive and formidable position.

Circular 1-91 now provides that an appeal from the CTA or other quasi-judicial agencies to the CA is only by petition forreview and not mere notice of appeal a corresponding motion for extension of time to file a petition for review should likewisebe granted. There is indeed no reason why a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review pursuant to Circular No.1-91 may not be filed. Generally then, a non-extendible period of 15 days may be granted unless there are compellingreasons which may warrant the allowance of a longer period. Thus, ubi eadem ratio, ibi eadem legis dispositio.

Considering however that the procedure enunciated herein may work injustice to petitioners or those similarly situated ifgiven retroactive application, as procedural statutes are accorded, in view of the absence in Circular No. 1-91 of an expressprovision regulating motions for extension of time to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals from decisions of theCourt of Tax Appeals and other quasi-judicial agencies, this Court resolves to give prospective application to the rule hereinadopted.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

WHERE REVIEW IS NOT GRANTED BY STATUTE1. MACAILING v ANDRADA

FACTSPetitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales application over a bigger parcel of land including the 4 parcelsof land occupied by the former. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs favor but the Dir. of Landsreversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of Agri. & natural resources reversed the DoLs decision. An MR was denied saying that ithas become final and executory by the SANR and was appealed to the Office of the Pres. The Office of the Pres. Reversedthe decision granting it again to the defendants. The petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action to have the decision of theSANR declared final & executory.

ISSUES

W/N the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the decision of the SANR.

HELD

In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such judicial review; othersare silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review v aryaccording to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the variousadministrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules ofCourt are still available.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.

Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board, Officer or person whoseacts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-

jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legallycorrect or not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial reviewshould be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to theexclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are

being enforced."

The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:

4Lacsamana v. CA states that The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days . If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, themovant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessaryto file a motionwith the Court of Appealsfor extension of time tofile such petition for review.

xxx xxx xxx6) Period of Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen daysfor filing a petitionfor review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases . . . .


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12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (nowAgriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwisespecifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt by the interested parties.

Section 13 following reads:13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.After a decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and [NaturalResources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for reconsideration ofsuch decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources]the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.

And Section 14 is to this effect:"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretaryor the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding takenagainst him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application thereforbe made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding wastaken."

Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956 within 30 days fromtheir receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their appeal wasbut 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denyingtheir second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary'sdecision "had long become final and executory."By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had

no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."

5

2. DABUET v ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS

FACTSA meeting was held between petitioners (laborers) and the respondent company where Mr. Eric Mentha, the company'sgeneral manager, allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter and called the letter and the person who prepared itas "stupid." The counsel for the labor union filed a case (via affidavit) for grave slander against Mr. Mentha. The companyfiled a complaint for perjury against petitioners alleging that their affidavit contained false statements.

The respondent company suspended the petitioners based on breach of trust and filed with the NLRC a petition for clearanceto terminate their employment. The arbitrator found that the petitioners' dismissal was without justifiable cause, but that therewas no unfair labor practice committed and directed that petitioners be paid separation pay. NLRC affirmed but ordered thereinstatement of the petitioners with two (2) months salary as back wages. Both parties appealed to the Secretary of Laborwho set aside the decision of the NLRC and entered another one ordering the payment of severance pay only. The

petitioners appealed to the Office of the President and found the company guilty of unfair labor practice and directing thereinstatement of the petitioners with back wages but reversed its decision after an MR. It ruled that, while the petitioners'dismissal was not for just and valid cause, no unfair labor practice had been committed. Consequently, it directed thatpetitioners be paid only separation pay in an amount double those awarded by the compulsory arbitrator and Secretary ofLabor.

ISSUESW/N the SC has jurisdiction to hear the case

HELDYES. Although Art. 223 of the Labor Code. expressly provides that decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed tothe Office of the president, does not provide for review of the decisions Of the Office of the President by the Supreme Court .The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, may review decisions of the Office of the President on questions oflaw and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This does not mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but theperformance by this Court of a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution, 12as part of a system of checks and

balances.

3. LUPANGCO v CA

5In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quietamovereprescribes that what was

already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). 10We do not doubt that even the Office of the President subscribes to the above

rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527:

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object forwhich courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spuron the slothful. ...


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FACTS

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as

parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in

accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive

any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or thelike or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similarsinstitutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examinationday.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of theRules and Regulations of the Commission.

Examinees preparing for the board exam filed before the RTC of Manila an injunction to prevent PRC from enforcing saidResolution.

ISSUEW/N the RTC may pass upon the validity of a regulation or rule promulgated by PRC?

HELDYES. PRC and RTC are not co-equal bodies. PRC is not like the SEC, whose orders (SEC) may be questioned directly to theSupreme Court. there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order ofthe Professional Regulation Commission. there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the ProfessionalRegulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or totheSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolutionof the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general

jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office ofthe President for general direction and coordination.

8Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office

of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).

4. BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION v ALFONSO

FACTSPHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC. (College), a private educational

institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens fromage-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in

Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where theschool was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to theRizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized theCommission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commissionshowed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. Thereafter 4 other surveyswere conducted by different groups, albeit the same findings. DECS therefore ordered the closure of the College.

Unable to obtain relief from the administrative agencies, the College filed before the RTC an injunction to prevent the

enforcement of the decision. The RTC granted the Petition.

ISSUE

W/N the RTC may prevent the closure order by DECS.

HELDNO. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture andSports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions andorders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required forpermission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative tosubstitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competenceto do so.


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The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education,Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears thathe has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.

Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power toenjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds thatviolations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned

injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without therequisite government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in thecircumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities,operations, etc.

5. ALMINE v CA

FACTSOn December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from theOperation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. Afterdue hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for thecancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over herRiceland. The Minister of Agrarian Relation denied petitioners application.

Aggrieved, Almine appealed to the CA.

ISSUEW/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case?

HELDYES. A perusal of the law reveals that questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain hislandholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may beappealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from thosecognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However,the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as thecase may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of cert ioraribrought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and inholding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent

jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,prohibition or mandamus.

The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not aviolation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF REVIEW

1. AGUINALDO v SEC

EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE OF FINALITY

1. PT&T v COA

FACTSPetitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT & T, for short) was granted on June 20, 1964, under Republic

Act No. 4161. Under the said franchise, the petitioner is required to pay a franchise tax of one and one-half per cent (1-1/2%) on all gross receipts from business transacted thereunder.

Under the provisions of a subsequent law, Republic Act No. 5048, in the event of "any competing individual, partnership orcorporation, receiving a similar permit or franchise with terms and/or provisions more favorable than those granted underRepublic Act No. 4161, or tending to place PT & T at any disadvantage, then such term or terms and/or provisions shall ipsofacto become part of the terms and/or provisions of Republic Act No. 4161, and shall operate equally in favor of petitioner PT& T as in the case of said competing individual, partnership or corporation. "


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On June 17, 1976, Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT for short) was granted by Presidential Decree No. 947 afranchise to operate "as a carrier's carrier. DOMSAT paid a franchise tax of % on all gross receipts.

COA upon examination of its books found that petitioner had a franchise tax deficiency. PT&T on the other hand argued thatsince DOMSAT was paying only % then it too must pay only at the same rate. In a letter dated August 26, 1980, theCommission found petitioner's contention without merit and reiterated its previous stand that petitioner's franchise tax shou ldbe computed at the rate of 1-1/2 %.

Petitioner then appealed directly to the SC to review the letters set by COA.

ISSUEW/N the SC has jurisdiction to review the letters by COA to PT&T.

HELDNO. The letters issued by COA are not final rewards, order or decisions that can be the subject of an appeal. COA merelyexpressed an opinion. Section 1 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides:SECTION 1. How appeal taken. An appeal from a final award, order or decision of the Public Service Commission, theCourt of Tax Appeals, and the General Auditing Office, shall be perfected by filing with said bodies a notice of appeal andwith the Supreme Court twelve (12) copies of a petition for review of the award, order or ruling complained of, within a peri odof thirty (30) days from notice of such award, order or decision.

Then too, respondent Commission cannot render a "final order, decision or award" on the question of whether petitioner

should pay 1-1/2% or 1/2% of franchise tax. This is not a matter falling under its jurisdiction. Rather, it is a matter forresolution by the Bureau of Internal Revenue whose decision may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.

DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT/PRIMARY JURISDICTION

1. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v CA

FACTSPetitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau ofEnergy Development (BED) for the exploration of five coal blocks (collectively called Giporlos Area).

With the objective of rationalizing the countrys over-all coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the areashould be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp (MMIC). The Giporlos and Bagacay area should be awarded to MMIC.Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned to MMIC all its rights in the two coalblocks.

Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the MoA with damages against MMIC before the RTC of Makati,alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the MoA was finalized.

RTC ordered the rescission of the MoA. CA held that BED has the power to decide controversies in the exploration of coalblocks. Hence, this petition

ISSUEW/N the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the MoA concerning a coal operating contract.HELDNO, because of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.It applies where claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requiresthe resolution of issues which have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case, the

judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Said doctrine applies to the case at bar, since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and which entity should begranted coal operating contracts involves technical determination by the BED. The RTC does not have the competence todecide matters concerning exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. It behovesthe courts to stand aside even when apparently, they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary

jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

2. RCPI v NTC

FACTSPrivate respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital TransmissionService Facilities. The respondent NTC provisionally approved the case and set it for hearing. Later, NTC issued a notice of


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hearing; however, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (PT&T) and other companies were not included in the list ofaffected parties.

This prompted PT&T along with other petitioners to move for time to file an opposition or reply to said application, allegingthat neither PLDT nor the NTC informed them of the existence of this provisional authority.

ISSUE

W/N NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing a provisional authority in favour of PLDT, without prior notice to petitioners.

HELDNO, besides the facts that: (1) the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public servicesprovisionally... (Sec 16 of the Public Service Act); and (2) the impossibility for the respondent Commission to give persona lnotice to all parties affected.

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines an administrative office the power to determine particular questionsor matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. Hence, findings ofadministrative officials who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generallyaccorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar,there is no reason to disturb the findings of the NTC.

3. VIDAD v RTC

FACTSA group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held a strike to demand the release of their salaries by the Departmentof Budget. A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo Gomez warning that failure toresume classes would result to administrative charges. The order was not heeded, thus administrative complaints were filed.

Another group of school teachers, who were administratively charged, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete a complaint forinjunction, prohibition, and damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction against afornamed DECS officials, which wasgranted by the court.

DECS moved for a motion to dismiss while the school teachers moved to strike out the appearance of the Sol. Gen. Bothmotions were denied. Both parties filed with the SC petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. Four other cases,raising like issues, were consolidated.

ISSUE

W/N the RTC should have dismissed outright the said cases.

HELDYES. The court cases and the administrative matters are closely interrelated. While no prejudicial question arises where on is

a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, it behoves the court to suspend its action on the case before itpending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court toarrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with administrative bodyof special competence. In this case, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the rule.

4. SAAVEDRA v DOJ

FACTSOwners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI) and respondent Gregorio Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Saavedra. AMemorandum of Agreement, which contained an automatic rescission clause, was executed to evidence the transaction.Petitioner withheld payment for the reason that sellers failed to comply with their warranties, however the balance wasdeposited in escrow to be released once the warranties were complied with.

Petitioners filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages against private respondent alleging that he (petitionerwas the President and principal stockholder of the company. Respondent questioned petitioners capacity to sue in behalf ofPPI claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president when the sale of PPI stocks was automatically rescinded.

After executing a document entitled Rescission of MoA, Ramos filed a case with theSEC praying that the rescission bedeclared valid and legal. During the pendency of the case in SEC, private respondent filed a criminal case for perjury againstpetitioner alleging that petitioner perjured himself when he declared in the verification of the complaint that he was thePresident of PPI.

In his answer, petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending unresolvedin the SEC, there was no basis to charge that he asserted a falsehood in claiming to be President. Despite this, Provincial


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fiscal found a prima facie case for perjury against him. Petitioner sought a review with the DOJ, which also upheld the findingof probable cause for perjury.

ISSUEW/N DOJ should have deferred the proceedings since the issue was still pending with the SEC.

HELDYES. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which

is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal having been placed within its special competence. In such cases thejudicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the dispute.Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior toresolution of that question by that administrative tribunal, much less can the Provincial Prosecutor arrogate to himself the

jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC. That the issues of ownership and auto rescission are intracorporate, the ProvincialProsecutor clearly has no authority to rule on the same.

5. FREEMAN v SEC

FACTSFreeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corp. (EQUITABLE). When FREEMAN failed to pay,EQUITABLE instituted a collection suit which included Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman Inc., who signed as co-maker.Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, and the other respondents (pls refer to the original for complete list of names), filed an answer inintervention which was denied all the way up until the SC. The collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a

compromise agreement which was approved by the court; however, FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian, failed to comply withthe judgment.

A writ of execution was issued. 2 parcels of land belonging to FREEMAN were sold at public auction where the highestbidder was one of the petitioners, Freeman Management and Development Corp (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT). BeforeFREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties, private respondents (Mui, Saw, and the otherChinese people), filed a petition a petition with the SEC seeking dissolution of FREEMAN, and reconveyance of theproperties.

On motion of private respondents, the SEC Hearing Officer issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent consolidation ofownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties.

ISSUEW/N SEC, being a coordinate body with the RTC, could not interfere in the proceedings held therein and neither could itreview the issues passed upon by the said court.

HELDNO, SEC could not interfere.

The doctrine of non-interference dictates that the judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,modified, or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. The SEC is the co-equal of the RTC. As such, onewould have no power to control the other.

In this case, judgement was already rendered by the trial court approving the compromise agreement. A writ of executionwas issued against the defendants to enforce the judgement and 2 properties of FREEMAN were sold to FREEMANMANAGEMENT as the highest bidder. After a judgement has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once andfor all. Hence, the properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now considered excluded from the assets of FREEMANand can no longer be the subject of the SEC proceedings. SEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of injunctionenjoining FREEMAN MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

1. FERNANDO v STO TOMAS

FACTSPetitioners were Mediator Arbiters in NCR. In a Memorandum Order, issued by Labor Secretary Confessor, 7 Med-Arbiterswere reassigned to different departments, like the Bureau of Labor Relations, and Appeals and Reviews Unit. 3 of themcomplied immediately. However, the rest asked for a reconsideration stating that there reassignment was made without theirconsent and was tantamount to removal without just cause. Respondent Secretary clarified that it was merely an assignment,and not a transfer, as they erroneously alleged. Petitioners still refused to comply, so the Labor Secretary asked them toexplain why they shouldnt be administratively sanctioned for gross insubordination.


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Petitioners filed an appeal with the Merit Systems and Protection Board of the CSC. Petitioners averred that theirreassignment was unconstitutional, and that as quasi-judicial officers, they cannot be transferred or reassigned except forgrounds provided by law; and the law provides that pending their appeal to the CSC, their transfer or reassignment should beheld in abeyance. The CSC found their reassignment valid and legal, thus dismissing their appeal for lack of merit. LaborSecretary then issued another order preventively suspending the petitioners for 1 year for gross insubordination.

ISSUE

W/N the CSC (and not the MSPB) has jurisdiction to review on appeal the Memorandum Order of the Labor Secretary?W/N the Petitioners have a right to file a Petition for Certiorari to their dismissal by the Labor Secretary?

HELDNO. A Resolution was issued on July 1, 1993, directing the abolition of the MSPB to streamline the operations of the CSC.

decisions in administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service appealable to the Commission,including personnel actions, shall be appealed directly to the Commission and not to the MSPB, and those cases which havebeen appealed or brought directly to the MSPB shall be elevated to the Commission for final resolution. Petitioners appealwas only perfected last July12, 1993 when the resolution was already in effect, hence their appeal was considered filedbefore the CSC.

The SC did not deem it appropriate to rule on the merits of the order issued on July 26, 1993 by respondent Secretarypreventively suspending petitioners for ninety (90) days, as well as her subsequent order dated October 25, 1993 findingpetitioners guilty of insubordination and imposing on them the penalty of suspension of one (1) year. Evidently, petitioners, inasking the SC to resolve the issues thereon in their present recourse, have overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that

the same are clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

On the first aspect, petitioners allowed the 90-day period of preventive suspension to lapse without appealing from the Orderof July 26, 1993. In fact, the investigation which necessitated such suspension has long since been concluded and thereafterresulted in the condemnatory Order of October 25, 1993. Hence, they are now clearly estopped from invoking the certiorari

jurisdiction of this Court in a belated attempt to seek redress from the first Order.

Secondly, as stated earlier, the Order dated October 25, 1993 imposing a punitive suspension of one year on hereinpetitioners cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.Presidential Decree No. 807 and Executive Order No. 292 explicitly provide that administrative disciplinary cases involvingthe imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days are appealable to the Civil Service Commission. Nothaving fully exhausted the remedy available to them, petitioners cannot resort to their present judicial action which is bothpremature at this juncture and proscribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Further, there was no finding of any of theexceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which could be applicable to the instant case, nor havepetitioners essayed any submission on that score.

2. BAGUIORO v BASA

FACTSPetitioner Pacita Baguioro was the Elementary Head Teacher and Respondent Romeo Espinosa was the Elementary SchoolPrincipal in a school in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. They were both considered for promotion to the position ofGeneral Education Supervisor I in the said Division when the same became vacant.

The Division Promotion Board decided in favor of the petitioner and recommended appointment to said vacancy. Hence, theRegional Director decreed petitioners appointment to the contested position. Respondent moved for its reconsideration. TheRegional Director reversed himself and declared respondent better qualified; consequently, the latter was appointed to thecontested position.

Petitioner appealed to then Minster of MECS. Because of the delay in the disposition of her appeal, petitioner filed a petitionfor Quo Warranto with Mandamus and Damages against the MECS Director with the RTC. This was dismissed on the ground

of prescription. The Minister of MECS affirmed the decision favoring petitioner. The MECS Regional Director then appointedher to said position.

In the meantime, respondent filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The SCdismissed it for lack of merit. After the finality of the SC decision, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for quo warranto.Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the issue is already barred by res judicata. The RTC denied themotion. Petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE

W/N the the Petition for Certiorari should be dismissed due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELD


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YES. First, the SC found that such action was already barred by res judicata. Second, the respondent did not exhaust hisadministrative remedies provided by law to set aside the promotion extended to petitioner. In this regard, the complaint failsto state a cause of action. A dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to adismissal based on lack of cause of action. What respondent should have done was to appeal the decision of the MECSMinister to the MSPB, then if the decision was still not in his favor, he should appeal to the CSC.

3. ROSARIO v CA

FACTSPursuant to the Land for the Landless Program the City of Manila undertook to subdivide and award lands of the formerTeresita Estate in Sampaloc, Manila. Lot 3 was further subdivided into 3-A, 3-B and 3-C. Private Respondent Cruz was theoriginal lessee or 3-A and 3-C, which he constructed residential houses on. He then sublet the house on 3-A to petitioner.

Availing the citys Land for the Landless Program, both parties filed with the City Tenants Security Commission for theaward of the lands they live in. 3-A was then awarded to petitioner, and 3-C was awarded to Cruz. Cruz, however, assailedthe award to petitioner, stating that petitioner merely has a secondary preference, as he was only a lessee of Cruz. Petitionercounters that based on social justice and his uninterrupted possession of the land for 32 years, he has a preferential right topurchase said land. After Investigation by the City Tenants Security Commission, they revoked the award to petitioner andgave it to Cruz instead.

4 years after, petitioner filed an action for Quieting of Title with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint stating thatpetitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies, as he was required to appeal the decision of the City TenantsSecurity Commission to the Office of the President before seeking judicial review. Having filed the appeal late, the decision

became final and executory. 15 days after petitioner received the decision of the RTC, he filed a Motion for Extension of Timeto file a Petitioner for Review with the SC. However, apparently changing his mind, he filed a Motiion for Reconsiderationinstead, which the Respondent Judge denied for having been filed late. Petitioner appealed with the CA, and was likewisedenied.

ISSUE

W/N the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies shall deny the petitioner the right to question the award of the land toCruz?

HELDNO. The lower courts dismissed the complaint of the petitioner for not being able to first exhaust all administrative remedies.However, the only effect of non-exhaustion of remedies is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which canbe a ground for a motion to dismiss. Although, if a motion to dismiss on this ground is not invoked in time, it shall be deemedwaived; and based on equity the court shall take cognizance of the case.

It appears that Cruz failed to file a motion to dismiss on this ground. Thus, where the equities warrant in an extraordinarysituation, the court shall entertain petitioners Petition for Certiorari.

With regard to the award of the land, the Program was intended to give preferential right to first, the bona fide tenants,second, the occupants, third, to private individuals. As proven by petitioner, he has been living on said land for anuninterrupted period in good faith of at least 32 years. Thus, to dismiss petitioners appeal is to deny him justice and equity.Therefore, the SC awarded 3-A to Rosario (petitioner).

4. ROSALES v CA

FACTSThe Don Bosco Technical Institute posted the list of honor students for the graduation of its elementary department. RommelRosales, a student of Grade 6, candidate for graduation and likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents thathe was not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name of Conrado Valerio. The parents ofRommel demanded a re-computation of the grades of their son and filed a formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of

Private Schools against the school claiming anomalous ranking of pupils for the grade school with a request for a review ofthe computations made by the school. The rector of the school dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had lost itsvalidity since the same was filed on the eve of the commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the Manual ofRegulation for Private Schools. Subsequently, the Director of Private Schools rendered a decision holding that RommelRosales was the rightful valedictorian.

Rosales then filed a complaint for damages in view of the failure of the school to graduate him as valedictorian of his class.Respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that their MR was granted and the Director ofPrivate Schools had reconsidered and set aside his decision declaring Rommel Rosales as valedictorian. Petitioner averredthat said MR was mysteriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of the Director of Private Schoolswhich would show the date of filing thereof. It appears that there was indeed an MR filed by respondents and that theDirector had indeed set aside his former decision. It also appears that petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Education


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which appeal was still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint in court. The TC granted the Motion To Dismiss onthe ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA affirmed.

ISSUEW/N the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case.

HELDYES. The civil action for damages was premature as it was shown that an appeal to the Secretary of Education was still

pending. The finality of the administrative case which gives life to petitioners cause of action has not yet been reached. Thiswas still pending as evidenced in the certificate issued by the agency trying the same. The court a quo was thus correct inacting upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondents on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrativeremedies. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, as a general rule,cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.When an adequate remedy may be had at the Executive Department of the government but nevertheless, a litigant fails orrefuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based notonly on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in thegovernment . If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can bemade to the court. A MR or appeal is curative in character on the issue of alleged denial of due process.

APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT1. FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v INCIONG

FACTS

The herein petitioner Federation of Free workers is a labor organization registered with the DOLE. It is the certifiedcollective bargaining agent of the Allied Sugar Centrals Co. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the privatesector to pay their employees an across the board increase of P60 in their existing monthly emergency allowance. Thedecree also authorized the Secretary of Labor to issue the appropriate rules necessary for its implementation. Sec. 6 of theimplementing rules promulgated by the Secretary provided for an application for exemption from the payment of the aboveincrease, provided that the application be made within 30 days from the effectivity of such rules. This entitles privatecorporations to be exempt if they are in financial difficulty. Subsequently, after the effectivity of the rules on May 1, 1977, theprivate respondent, Allied Sugar, was about to pay the increase, but attempt to do so was short-lived. It decided against thepayment and the plan was therefore aborted. However, it applied for the exemption only on September 22, 1977, or 100days after the effectivity of the rules. Its reason was that it had suffered substantial losses during FY 1974-75 and 1975-76.The application was approved effective for one year. The approval stated that it was final and unappealable. The petitionerfiled with the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the approval of the exemption, someof the grounds of which was that the respondent was not in unsound financial condition, and that the application was made

beyond the prescribed period.

Subsequently, respondent filed another application for exemption for the next year. This was granted, the approval alsoreciting that the same is final and unappealable. The petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari. The respondents arguethat the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available before it. It stated that the rulings of the respondent

Acting Secretary of Labor can still be elevated to the President for review.

ISSUE

W/N the case should have been appealed first to the OP

HELDNO. First, this view is traversed by the fact that, as stated by the respondent Acting Secretary in approving both applications,such approval is final and unappealable. Second, in the absence of constitutional provision or statute to the contrary, theofficial acts of department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself, then it would be absurd for the presidentto review his own act. Under the presidential type of government, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts

of the executive department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the ChiefExectuive are performed by and through the executive departments and the acts of the secretaries of such departmentsperformed and promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. EXCEPT:

1. In cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person;2. The exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally; or3. The Chief Executive disapproves or reprobates the act of the alter ego.

The court affirmed the approval of respondents exemption even though the application was made beyond the prescribedperiod. It gave such period a liberal construction and stated that, an employer who is distressed immediately before thelapse of the 30 day period is no different from one who becomes distressed immediately after the said period, as in the caseof private respondent.


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2. TESORERO v MATHAY

FACTS

Petitioners, who were consumers of Davao Light and Company(DALIGHT), opposed the inclusion of some of properties ofDALIGHT for reappraisals by Board of Energy(BOE). Such opposition stems from the effect that a higher appraisalcorresponds to higher rates which the consumers have to pay.

As culled from the records, DALIGHT filed with BOE the application for the approval of sound value appraisal of its propertiesin December 1979 in the amount of P339M. The appraisal report was made by TAMSPHIL but upon inspection of BOE of thephysical existence of the properties, the appraisal was disqualified because of the discrepancies found.

In June 1982, Dalight again filed another application for appraisal of its properties in the amount of 302M which wasconducted by Asian Appraisal Co.. The appraisal was opposed by the petitioners but eventually was approved by BOE butonly in the amount of P 282M as the fair and reasonable value of properties. 17 days after receipt of order of approval ofappraisal report, an MR was made by the petitioners but was denied by BOE. Apparently, the order of denial of MR was notreceived by petitioners and the latter prayed for hearing to be conducted and a resolution be rendered on the MR.Subsequently, BOE issued an order informing them that the motion had long been denied and furnished the petitioners withcopies.

Hence the petition for certiorari.

ISSUES

1. W/N certiorari is the proper remedy.2. W/N administrative remedies should have been exhausted first before resort to judicial bodies.

HELDCertiorari is not the proper remedy since PD 1206 creating the BOE provides for an appeal to the Office of the President(OP) within seven (7) days from receipt of notice of its decision or orders. Thereafter, under Judiciary Reorganization Act,final decisions, orders are reviewable by the IAC.

It must be noted that after the receipt of the questioned decision (approval), 17 days have lapsed before an MR was madethus, the decision had already become final and executory. Be that as it may, The Court in the broader interest of justice togive due course to the petition for certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant suchrecourse and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval. In this case 70,000 consumers will beaffected and it is appropriate to consider the petition on merits rather on technicalities.

With regard to the second issue, in this case no. The exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is

not an absolute rule. It admits of exception among which is that where the question is purely legal. In the case at bar, thebone of contention is not the factual determination of the appraisal of properties but the legal determination of the propertiescovered by the reappraisal. Among the objected covered properties are those not related to the production of power such asthe administration of bldg and an airplane, properties not owned by DALIGht, nad motor vehicles falling under the EmployeesCar Plan.

Hence, the court adjusted the BOEs decision and reduced the appraisal of covered properties to 122M.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION

1. AQUINO-SARMIENTO v MORATO

FACTS

Petitioner requested the records officer of MTRCB to be allowed to examine the boards records pertaining to the voting slipsaccomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. The voting slips are

the basis for banning or cutting the films accordingly. The records officer advised petitioner to secure a prior clearance fromMorato(MTRCB chairman) to gain access to the records.

Morato, denied the request arguing that the voting slips were private and personal in nature. This stance was opposed bypetitioner arguing that the records are public in character. A board meeting was held to address such issue andboardresolution 10-89 was issued declaring the voting slips to be private and personal. Subsequently, Morato ordered somedeletions on the movie Mahirap ang Magmahal despite the initial classification of the Review Committee that it is R-18 withno cuts. Morato cited MTRCB resolution 88-1-25 which allegedly gave the MTRCB Chairman the power to downgrade acontroversial film already reviewed by the committee. The matter was brought to the attention of the Executive Secretary andthe Office of the President. Sec. of Justice opined that Morato was not vested with that powers but did not opine on theconstitutionality of resolution 10-89. Hence, this petition. Respondent moved to dismiss the case for failing to comply with thedoctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.


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ISSUE1. W/N the case should be dismissed for failing to exhaust all possible administrative remedies.2. W/N the two resolutions are valid (sub issue to admin topic)

HELDNO.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed to resort to

the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law.The rationale is to give theproper authorities the ample opportunity to act and correct its errors committed in the administrative level. If the error isrectified, judicial intervention is not necessary. Nonetheless, it is not absolute for it admits of exceptions such as 1) when noadministrative review is provided by law, 2) when the only question involved is one of law, 3 where the party invoking thedoctrine is guilty of estoppels, 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitraty and oppressive, 5)where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant, 6) where to exhaustadministrative review is impracticaland unreasonable; and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies.

In this case, the issue raised is one of law hence the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable. The records show that petitioneradhered to the administrative processes by referring the issue first to the Executive Secretary and to the Office of thePresident.

Resolution 10-89 is invalid because it is against the constitutional right to information. W/n the purpose of the examination ofthe public records are unlawful is not the biz of the recording officer but of the legislature to devise of ways to prevent i t.

In the second resolution, a reading of PD 1986 does not vest to Morato as chairman the authority to reverse or overrule adecision rendered by the Review Committee.

2. MADRIGAL v LECAROZ

FACTS

Public respondents, Gov. Lecaroz et. Al., abolished Petitioner Madrigals position as a permanent construction capataz in t

Documents

Administrative Law Case Compilation (Chapter 5-7)