ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES

Universal Robina Corp. vs Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011Facts:Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be discharging pollutive waste water. Petitioner moved to reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.Issue:Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.Ruling:No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011

Facts:Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees, and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days.Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of certain employee privileges but were denied because of their pending administrative case.Petitioner promulgated Resolutions 372 and 197 disqualifying employees with pending administrative case from step increment and other benefits and privileges. Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing.In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents petition for prohibition, restraining petitioners from implementing the above resolutions.Issue:Whether or not the resolutions need to be filed with the UP Law Center to be valid.Ruling:Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) v.La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), G.R. No. 166741, March 22, 2011Facts:TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility created under PD 198 which authorized to LTWD supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposedTMPCs application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is exclusive. In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.Issue:Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive.Ruling:The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions (the latter in Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., and other cases,the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive."

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency xxxunless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto xxx subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

Sterling Selections Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA,G.R. No. 171427, March 30, 2011Facts:Petitioner Sterling Selections Corporation is assailing the decision of Pasig City RTC and resolution of Court of Appeals. Sterling Selections Corporation is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewellery with the products manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann, located in Barangay Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. On January 16, 1998, Alicia Maceda, a neighbour of the petitioner, wrote a letter to the Brgy. Chairman to complain the loud noise and offensive toxic fumes coming from the petitioners manufacturing plant. Maceda has likewise filed a formal complaint with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - NCR office, with the latter endorsing the complaint to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) which had territorial and functional jurisdiction over the matter. On November 19, 1998, a notice of violation and a cease and desist order (CDO) was served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by RA 4850. Petitioner contended that, as a cottage, its jewellery business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. Under RA 6977, the law prevailing at the time of its registration with the SEC in December 1996, cottage industry was defined as one with assets worth Php 50,001.00 to Php 500,000.00, and, based on its Articles of Incorporation and CPAs Balance Sheet, it claims that its total assets, when it was incorporated, amounted only to Php312,500.00.Issue:Whether or not petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from the LLDA to operate its business because it is a cottage industry.Ruling:The term "cottage industry" as used in this Act shall mean an economic activity carried on in the homes or in other places for profit, with a capitalization of not exceeding P100,000 at the time of registration.Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets. The law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.Thus, the conclusion is that petitioner is not a cottage industry and, hence, is not exempted from the requirement to secure an LLDA clearance.Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry. Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant.69 Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts.

Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011Facts:Private respondents Barien, et al are stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. which took over the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corp. They allege that upon orders of UWTCs general manager, the buses regularly driven by them were confiscated by a task force composed 0of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination after due hearing. He was sentenced the penalty of 3 mos. suspension from service without pay. Petitioner appealed his case with the DILG but Sec. Alfredo Lim denied it and affirmed the suspension. He then appealed to the CSC claiming that he was denied due process but was again denied and modified the decision to dismissal from service.Issue:Whether the petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service of the PNPRuling:The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process.

Imperial vs GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011Facts:Petitioner, then Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office was administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for approving salary loan requests of 8 employees who lacked contribution requirements. He was preventively suspended for 90 days. The counsel of the petitioner explained that his client granted the loan applications under an existing board resolution, with the approval of the GSIS Vice President; the loans were fully paid, without causing any prejudice to the service. The GSIS President found him guilty of the said charges. This being petitioners second administrative offense, the penalty of dismissal was imposed upon him with accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner was denied due processRuling:Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. In the case at bar, what negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case. Again, the GSIS President duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he denied the same. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.

Office of the Ombudsman vs Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011Facts:Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave abuse of misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and testimonies of several witnesses (Penaloza, Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the flunkers of the drivers license examination the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-taking the same. It is alleged that he illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor. On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.Issue:Whether or not Reyes was denied due processRuling:In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.Department of Health v. Camposano restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.Reyes was denied due process because the 5th requirement (the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected) on the cardinal principles on due process in administrative proceedings as laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v CIR was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner's decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the petitioner issued its Decision.

Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009Facts:On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.Issue:Whether or not the MTRCB is entitled to issue preventive suspensionRuling:YES. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. The mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986 would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. It is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the aforequotedSec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010Facts:Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The preceding italicized provision contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails. Issue:Whether or not the IRR of R.A. No. 9355 went beyond the criteria prescribe by law.Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled that the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.The Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and void.

City Engineer of Baguio Vs. Baniqued G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008Facts:Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, City Mayor of Baguio City, Domogan, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. It states that the building was constructed without any building permit in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279, qualifying it as illegal thus, subject to demolition. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued. The CA sustained Baniqued. Hence this petition.Issue:Whether or not the City Mayor's act of issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function.Ruling:The Supreme Court explains that under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities.There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial function as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.

Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. Advertising Board of the Philippines,G.R. No. 164242, November 28, 2008Facts:Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)."AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement but was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.Issue:Whether or not the writ of prohibition will lie on this caseRuling:No. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 1inisterial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.

Gov. Orlando Fua v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009Facts:The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. On the same date, corresponding Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed.Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus who wrote a marginal note, NO OBJECTION.The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was and thereafter limiting the grant of the bonus.AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, Commission on Audit Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance.Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the petition should not be given due course because of petitioners failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.4 Moreover, respondents emphasized that the marginal note allegedly written by the President stating No Objection had never been authenticated and was effectively revoked by Budget Circular No. 2003-7 and Administrative Circular No. 88, limiting extra cash-gift to all government and local government personnel to P5,000.00 only.Petitioner counters that the present case should be deemed an exception to the above-mentioned general rule, because the issue raised here is a purely legal one.Issue:Whether or not there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Ruling:No. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as ruled by the LAO-C has now become final and executory. There is nothing in this case to convince us that it should be considered as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. The issue presented is not a purely legal one. The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit, would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required approval.

Municipality of Pateros v. CA, G.R. No. 157714, June 16, 2009Facts:The subject property in this case consists of portions of Fort Bonifacio. The subject property is allegedly situated within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent as per Proclamation No. 247 issued on January 7, 1986(Proclamation No. 2475) by former President Marcos. Subsequently, on January 31, 1990, former President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 518,[5] amending Proclamation No. 2475. Pateros, in 1991, led against Makati before the RTC of Pasig. It was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.It was later re-led with the RTC of Makati. Pateros claimed that, based on historical and ocial records, it had an original area of 1,038 hectares, more or less. However, when a cadastral mapping was conducted in 1978, Pateros learned that its territorial boundaries had been substantially reduced to merely 166 hectares.Makati led a MTD and later on a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, arguing that the bill converting Makati into a city was pending approval before the Senate and portions of the subject property are included in the proposed charter. Makati was later converted into a highly urbanized city.RTC dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. CA denied the appeal of Pateros. Issue:Whether or not there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled that when Pateros filed its complaint with the RTC of Makati, Makati was still a municipality. We take judicial notice of the fact that there was no Sangguniang Panlalawigan that could take cognizance of the boundary dispute, as provided in Section 118(b) of the LGC. Neither was it feasible to apply Section 118(c) or Section 118(d), because these two provisions clearly refer to situations different from that obtaining in this case. Also, contrary to Makati's postulation, the former MMA did not also have the authority to take the place of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because the MMA's power was limited to the delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila. The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services, and exercise of its rule-making power.Therefore, there is no merit in Makatis argument that Pateros failed to exhaust administrative remedies inasmuch as the LGC is silent as to the governing body in charge of boundary disputes involving municipalities located in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009Facts:This is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the August 5, 2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint against the respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence of the respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative, cannot, by their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.Issue:Whether or not the respondent are administratively liableRuling:An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability.Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own negligence. While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.