#Admin Perez, Toledo, PITC

8/8/2019 #Admin Perez, Toledo, PITC

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PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERSG.R. No. 159149June 26, 2006

FACTS:BP. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,

adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as

possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefiedpetroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violatorsto a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P

50,000.4

On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE toimplement B.P. Blg. 33, thus enumerating the penalties for different acts in relation tothe BP.

Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked theDOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied therequest for lack of merit.

Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayerfor temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trialcourt.

After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the groundthat it introduced new offenses not included in the law.6 The court intimated that theCircular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed

the maximum penalty under the law.The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence this petition, raising the following issues:

ISSUES:

WON the provisions of the Circular is null and void

HELD/RATIO: YESFor an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have

the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made acrime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must beprovided by the statute itself.16

The Circular satisfies the firstrequirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of

petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal actsinvolving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which thesaid criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighingscale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, notrade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, noembossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPGcylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts andomissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb thepernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.

As for the secondrequirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with thelaw. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person whocommits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and amaximum of P

50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail

outlets is P20,000,17 an amount within the range allowed by law. However, forthe refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximummonetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of theaforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular providespenalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all thatB.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts

involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for thecorresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silenton the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in theCircular contravenes the law.

Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based werespecifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penalmeasures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, aswell as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest.To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts toprotect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of someunscrupulous LPG traders.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of

DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of PasigCity, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting itsimplementation are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE.No pronouncement as to costs.

TOLEDO v Civil Service Commission, COMELEC

G.R. No. 92646-47

OCTOBER 4, 1991

FACTS:

Atty, Toledo was appointed by Comelec as Manager of the Education and Information

Department of the Comelec. He was already more than (57) years old at that time and

first time in government service as he was then engaged in active private practice

prior to said appointment.

Petitioner's appointment papers (Civil Service) and oath of office were endorsed by

the Comelec to the CSC for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for

exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on

Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured - prohibiting the appointment of

persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by

the CSC (CSC Memo). Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the

functions of his office.

Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required of the CSRPAP, and CSC

Memo, declared void from the beginning the appointment of Atty. Toledo as Manager

of the Education and Information Department of this Commission.

Petitioner appealed the Comelec Resolution to public respondent CSC which declared
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the appointment merely voidable and not void ab initio. Hence, Atty. Toledo is

considered a de facto officer from the time he assumed office on June 16, 1986, until

and up to the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution on January 29, 1989.

ISSUES:

W/N the CSC Resolution is without legal basis because the CSRPAP is invalid and

unenforceable for not having been published in the Official Gazette or in anynewspaper of general circulation as required under P.D. 807.

RATIO:

No. The Civil Service Act(RA226): "with the approval by the President, to prescribe,

amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the

provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after

publication in the Official Gazette". It subsequently adopted and promulgated rules

intended to carry the law into effect: SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or

reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of the

Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he

possesses special qualifications and his services are needed; though the Act

contained no provision prohibiting such appointment or reinstatement.

Like RA226, PD 807 empowered the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce

suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree," and

also provided that said "rules and regulations shall become effective thirty (30) days

after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.

The provision regarding persons 57 years of age was purely a creation of the

Commission, having no reference to any provision in the decree intended to be

implemented.

It was this provision of the CSRPAP which was applied to Toledo. According to the

CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's appointment had never been obtained

indeed, it would appear that the appointment papers were not transmitted by the

COMELEC to the CSC until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment was

"approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSCthe appointment

had to be struck down.

These rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official

Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation, at least as of the time that it was

applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. The Chairman stated in a letter that CSC

had "no record of the publication of said Rules in newspapers of general circulation"

although "published and distributed by the National Media Production Center in 1975,"

and the Director of the National Printing Office stated that said Rules was not

submitted to th is office for publi ca tion .

The Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be

considered valid and effective after RA 2260 was repealed and superseded by

PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended to take the place of RA 2260. In all

matters dealt with by both laws, the provisions of PD 807 were obviously

intended to be controlling. So, also, the rules promulgated by the CSC to carry

the provisions of PD 807 into effect were meant to supersede or take the place

of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP

were intended to make RA 2260 and its implementing rules functus officio,render them without force and effect except only as regards any provision, if at

all , not dealt with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.

The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said

RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity-it is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no

basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or

connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect,

such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the

employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a

determination of some point in a person's life at which he becomes unemployable, or

employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore an unauthorized act of

legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid

exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, torepeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of

the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of

57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in

employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on

the matter.

The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying

it into effect.

Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the

application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never

published. The argument that the CSRPAP need not be published, because they were

"a mere reiteration of existing law" and had been "circularized," flies in the teeth of the

explicit and categorical requirement of PD 807 that rules and regulations for carrying

into effect the provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty (30) days afterpublication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. CSRPAP

cannot properly be considered a mere reiteration of existing law-the implementing rule

governing 57-year old persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be considered

"existing law."

OTHER DOCTRINES:

The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or

put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to

supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course,

the law itself can not be extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of

Congress.'


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WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED.

PITC vs COA

G.R. No. 152688.

November 19, 2003

FACTS:

The DTI Secretary issued a Department Order No. 79 (DO #79):- it granted a Staple Food Incentive (SFI)- in the maximum amount of P7,200.00- to each to the officials and employees of DTI bureaus, attached agencies andgovernment owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).

- subject to the availability of savings of those attached agencies/GOCCs

Pursuant to DO #79, Phil. Int'l Trading Corp (PITC):- a GOCC attached to the DTI,- issued a resolution- approving the grant of SFI to its officers and employees.- Thus, it released the total amount of 1M as SFI for the year 1998.

Later, the Resident Auditor of PITC issued a Notice of Suspension:- disallowing the grant of the SFI and- requiring the PITC to submit the approval of such grant by the Department of Budgetand Management (DBM)- in accordance with Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, or the SalaryStandardization Law (SSL)

12 of the SSL provides that:- (1st Sentence) allowances, subject to certain exceptions, shall be deemed includedin the standardized salary rates as prescribed by the act- (2nd sentence) but other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being

received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salaryrates shall continue to be authorized.

Those exceptions to allowances, which are not included in the standardized salaryrates include:- representation and transportation allowances;- clothing and laundry allowances;- subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels andhospital personnel;- hazard pay;- allowances of foreign services personnel stationed abroad; and- such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may bedetermined by the DBM

When PITC elevated the matter to the Commission on Audit (COA):- COA affirmed the questioned disallowance.- It ruled that the grant of SFI by PITC was an illegal disbursement of public funds- under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 (SSL)- because the DBM did not approve the grant of the SFI

PITC asserts that 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is void because:- DBM-Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10,- its implementing rules,- was nullified in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit- for lack of publication.

Thus, PITC claims that COA committed abuse of discretion when:- it based its ruling on a void DBM Circular

ISSUES:

1. WON COA committed abuse of discretion in disallowing thedisbursement of funds for the SFI of PITC?

2. WON the nullification of the DBM Circular also nullified 12 of the SSL?

RATIO:

1. No, the COA did not commit abuse of discretion in disallowing the disbursement of

funds for the SFI.

The Staple Food Incentives was granted under D.O. No. 79:

- to help the DTI employees

- cope with the present economic difficulties,

- boost their morale and

- deepen their commitment and dedication to public service.

Thus, SFI is a financial assistance or a bonus:- falling under the second sentence of Section 12 and

- not a payment in consideration of the performance of an official duty.

It is not a benefit within the ambit of the first sentence:

- because it was not granted to defray or reimburse the expenses

- incurred in the performance of their official functions,

- like representation and transportation allowances, and other benefits of similar

nature.

Accordingly, in order that the SFI may be allowed:

- the requisites for the entitlement of benefits


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- falling under the second sentence of Section 12 must be established.

- Unfortunately, there is no evidence on record

- that the recipients of the SFI were incumbents when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on

July 1, 1989 and

- that they were in fact receiving the same at the time.

- Hence, no abuse of discretion was committed by COA

- in disallowing the disbursement of funds for the SFI of PITC.

2. No, the basis of COA in disallowing the grant of SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No.

6758 and not DBM-CCC No. 10.

The nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10 will not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758.

It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that:

- statutory provisions control the rules and regulations

- which may be issued pursuant thereto.

Such rules and regulations:

- must be consistent with and

- must not defeat the purpose of the statute.- The validity of R.A. No. 6758 should not be made to depend

- on the validity of its implementing rules.

OTHER DOCTRINES:

PITC need not refund the questioned SFI received by them in 1998. This is sobecause National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit which made adefinitive interpretation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 was promulgated only onAugust 5, 1999. Prior thereto, PITC is presumed to be without knowledge that, absentthe requisites under the second sentence of R.A. No. 6758, the disbursement of fundsfor the SFI is without legal basis.


WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the March 5, 2002 decision of theCommission on Audit in COA Decision No. 2002-044, which disallowed the grant of

Staple Food Incentive in 1998 to the officers and employees of the Philippine

International Trading Corporation, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The officers

and employees of the Philippine International Trading Corporation need not refund the

Staple Food Incentive they received per Resolution No. 98-12-07 dated December 9,

1998.

SO ORDERED.

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#Admin Perez, Toledo, PITC