ADMIN CHAPTER 4 CASES

Manila Jockey Club vs. CA

Cruz vs. Youngberg

FACTS:

Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of

mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg,

requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter

thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from

foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent

the introduction of cattle diseases in the country.

The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer

was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not

be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit

the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioner’s failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to

the Supreme Court.

Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in

his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act

No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.

ISSUES:

1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional

2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General

to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the

legislative powers

3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law

RULING:

1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication.

The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from the

provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle

industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is

now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the

resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands

has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public

interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be

said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.

2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves

discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under

and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no

unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.

3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the

importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely

supplemental to Tariff Law

Olsen vs. Aldanese

FACTS:

Walter E. Olsen and Co., Inc. is a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of

cigars made of tobacco. Defendant Aldanese is the Insular Collector of Customs, and defendant Trinidad is the

Collector of Internal Revenue. Plaintiff alleges that under the Tariff Act, it had the legal right to export from the

Philippines into the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown in the Philippines. Subsequently, Act No.

2613 entitled ―An Act to Improve the Methods of Production and the Quality of Tobacco in the Philippines and to

Develop the Export Trade Therein‖ was enacted. Following this, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated

Admin. Order No. 35 or the ―Tobacco Inspection Regulations‖. Act No. 2613 makes it a duty of the Internal

Revenue Collector to certify to the Insular Collector that any tobacco offered for expert to the US, which comply

with the act of Congress will be issued a certificate of origin which will ensure the speedy admission of such cigars

to the US. Plaintiff applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for such a certificate for a consignment of 10,000

cigars. That the consignment was packed and stamped as required, and that all the requirements of the Act of

Congress was complied with. The Collector of Internal Revenue, however, refused to issue the certificate on the

ground that said cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of

Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:

WON the Collector of Internal Revenue Acted within the scope of their authority as conferred upon them under Act

No. 2613.

.

HELD:

Yes. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated

Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been

promulgated by that officer, the court has a right to assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when

he refused to issue the certificate of origin. It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler

cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. By the express terms

and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to

refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified

kind, and the court have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal

and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to

his examined or inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned,

it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.

Araneta vs. Gatmaitan

Facts:

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines

Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and

resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the

same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In

response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was

amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending

the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.

Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the

same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned

from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80

2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the

President

HELD:

1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all

Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control

of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive

orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66

and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.

2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the

promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could

endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic

resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur

issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay,

he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of

issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

Public Schools District Supervisors Association vs. Hon. Edilberto de Jesus

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the ―Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,‖ became a law on

August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the

DepEd Secretary is mandated to ―promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after

the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2)

years‖ after such approval.

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the

DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:

I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS’ ADMINISTRATIVE

SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN

HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF

PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES

OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 – THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC

EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED

UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS

WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.

III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT

SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF

PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT

OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS

IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION – IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

Issues:

1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative supervision over the Elementary School

Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).

2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI,

Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003 are constitutional.

Rulings:

1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over

the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:

(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of

schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;

(2) Curricula supervision; and

(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence

excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a

statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended

to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a

statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid.

The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division

superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district

supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school

heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or

cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private

elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.

Romulo Mabanta vs. Home Development Mutual Fund

Facts:

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted

for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of

a superior retirement plan.

The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,

Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended,

Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it

must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the

Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In that the

amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The

repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF.

HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a

provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase ―and/or,‖ and that the Rules

Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law.

The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the

option to use ―and‖ only instead of ―or‖ in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund

Law. By choosing ―and,‖ the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of ―and/or‖ in Section 19 of

P.D. No. 1752, as amended.

PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.

Held:

YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words ―and/or.‖

It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an

employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from

coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing

plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words ―and‖ instead of ―and/or.‖

Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the

plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of

either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both

plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent

condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word ―or‖ in

the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and

Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a

delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope

of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation

be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the

standards prescribed by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both

provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it

effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption

through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of

Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the

exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed,

administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they

intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut Authority

Facts:

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 232 as an independent public

corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all

its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development

and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. In March 1993, however, PCA

issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply

for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise

unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition

among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based

commodities. The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to

compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD:

Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.

Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the

power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the

removal of ―protective regulations‖ for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6

and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the

general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

Facts:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter

of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act

No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to

lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION

AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE

ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.

7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that

it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'

obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful

exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the

Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death

Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual

punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is

constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply

(than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly

or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to

respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the

Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae

with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s

arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for:

(a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our

international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:

No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment

considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the

dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A.

No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court

which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and

(3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently

cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the

punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there

something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in

particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or

inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters

which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of

execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the

"court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that

the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to

the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the

date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules

must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death

sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the

judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President

of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months

from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive

clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous

injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of

lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is

unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of

phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner

simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and

agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel

involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume

that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel

punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty

and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a

limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or

suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean

that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man

is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to

extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes

enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most

serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the

provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.

The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its

boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the

legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be

executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate

the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to

the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection

to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that

"all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such

task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised

is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed

by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the

administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be

overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which

provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice

has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the

Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the

Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur

of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such

apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well

as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17

amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection

shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is

pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be

commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised

Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid

exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances

when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while

she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the

implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of

the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is

suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal

Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,

tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible

contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in

harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

Lupangco vs. CA

Facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No.

105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure

examinations in accountancy

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-

out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any

reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the

three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules

and Regulations of the Commission

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy

schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated

like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ

of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned

resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no

jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the

respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be

unconstitutional

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:

It is not Constitutional.

the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of

the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill

motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty

guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should

prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed

to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their

faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful

knowledge that will promote their personal growth

Taxicab Operators of Manila vs. Board of Transportation

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the

nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order

provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and

earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52

instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital

Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted

for registration as public conveyances.

ISSUES:

W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power

HELD:

NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable

standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and

followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding

consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The

State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health…,safety and general

welfare of the people

It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of

choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not

mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from

operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide

discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due

process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry

prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the

data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.

As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):

Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or

vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or

quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It

is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or

persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

De Jesus vs. COA

Facts:

Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No.

6758 "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For

Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional

compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from

consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat

and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without

qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the

payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and

enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that the Circular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act

6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not

published in the Official Gazette.

COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being

inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the

honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions

under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette

RULING:

No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), publication in the Official Gazette or

in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an

administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be

effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in

a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. Before the said circular under

attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned

should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of

general circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever

opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with

democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular makes

resolution of the other issues at bar unnecessary.

Petition is granted.

People vs. Maceren

Facts:

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario

were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated

Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of

March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or

equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to

the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such

dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law

creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.

Held:

No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of

Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders

are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned

under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless

to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of

any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily

embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular

department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into

effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand

the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

CIR vs. CA

FACTS:

On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income

taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985.

Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and

November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-

00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed

the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982

in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.

ISSUES:

WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty

RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application

of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-

1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986,the law could have simply so

provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has

been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by

it. It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately

preceding the 1986revolution during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten,

for civil Disobedience, most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be

understandable then that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government following the successful

revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.

Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. Sec. Of Education

Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized

and existing under the laws of the Philippines

Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

FACTS:

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled

"Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended

to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for

the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in

school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases

were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%.

Petitioner still opposed the increases.

Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for

prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The

thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also

maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution

in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school

fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should

be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the

questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees

HELD:

Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other

government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be

considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function.

If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of

due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function,

prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an

administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake

of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a

finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The

assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the

country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its

issuance.

Misamis Oriental Assoc. Of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. DOF Secretary

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner questions Revenue

Memorandum Circular 47-91 issued by the respondent, in which copra was classified as agricultural non-food

product effectively removing copra as one of the exemptions under Section 103 of the NIRC.

Section 103a of the NIRC states that the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from

VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced and

not by any other person or entity. Section 103b states the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is

exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is - which the petitioner

enjoys. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner this exemption when copra was classified as

an agricultural food product.

Petitioner filed a motion for prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Circular is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The Court first stated that the CIR gave the circular a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax

exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.

The Court also stated that the Circular is not discriminatory and in violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioner

likened copra farmers / producers, who are exempted from VAT and copra traders, which the Court disagreed.

Lastly, petitioners argued that the Circular was counterproductive which the Court answers that it is a question of

wisdom or policy which should be addressed to respondent officials and to Congress.