De la Llana vs Alba

Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129

In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other

Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the

judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would

contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He

averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP

129).

HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of

inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the

competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such

power.  Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of

removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that

from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its

effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of

significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,

therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as

incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the

fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic

principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were

the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two

departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put

in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the

reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no

departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved

by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the

conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents

vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any

unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.

Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of

alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to

be preferred.”

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

e Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill  Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected

by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers

to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal

Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for

playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or

imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to

the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as

the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any

motion picture or audiovisual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty

percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in

Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the

Metropolitan Manila Commission.”

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of

videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or

variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated

circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a

tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby

resulting in substantial lossesestimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and

disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the

Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie

industry.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. 

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a

public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly

because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the

proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the

movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree

No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the

moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,

considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the

viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing

pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to

the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are

virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to

engage in business." 

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN  Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of thelaw, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot beextended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS:The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in freshwater fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

 ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD: NO.The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power

People vs. Maceren

G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977

Aquino J.

Facts:

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.

Held:

No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS

If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, prior notice and hearing is not essential tothe validity of its issuance. FACTS:The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report recommending an increase in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing a 15% to 20%increase as recommended. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%.Petitioner still protested the increases and filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to declare the questioned Department Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis and for violation of the due process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before issuance.

ISSUE:Whether the Department Order is valid?

HELD:YES. The power of the DECS, as granted by law, to regulate school fees includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. As to the issue of due process, there is no such violation. The

function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. In this case, the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Hence, it applies to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department order is in the exercise of DEC’s quasi-legislative power. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of anadministrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended  pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called Giporlos Area. IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.

US VS. ANG TANG HO

Delegation of Power – Admin Bodies  On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest

RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos

Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents

Type of petition filed: petition FOR CERTIORARI

ISSUE:

Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.

Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:

1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright

2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court.

3. Measure should have not been presumed

4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

HELD:

Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:

1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as there’s no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require theirinstant destrcution3. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immedeiately condemned and punish

YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one

province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-

A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality

of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the

exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.

Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.

Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably

necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting

the transferof carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the

carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after

the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. 

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989Marcos, petitioner

VS.Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)

Facts:Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms

dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar4. Honasan’s failed coup5. Communist insurgency movements6. secessionist movements in Mindanao7. devastated economy because of1. accumulated foreign debt2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:No to both issues. Petition dismissed.Ratio:Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect

the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),  inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.Fernan, Concurring

1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.

2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.

3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right

guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national

security. Fears were mere conjectures.3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the

Philippines. .2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried

w/in 10 days.3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it.

It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.

4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.

Padilla, DissentingSarmiento, Dissenting

1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989Marcos, petitioner

VS.Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)

Facts:

In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:

1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.

2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.

3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.Issue:Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.Decision:No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to

the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.

3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.

4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order

respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation

of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of

the powers granted in her by the Constitution.

Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers

of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive

power”. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated

in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has

to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the

power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.

Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.

Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.

Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of

office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of

the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present

circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had

acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not

enjoin the implementation of this decision.

204 SCRA 546

Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less

take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of theteachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

Carino vs CHR

Adjudicatory Power of the CHR  On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari

regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Rizal Empire Insurance Group v NLRCChester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! 

LABOR CODE, ARTICLE 5: RULES AND REGULATIONS 

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents. 

G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987

Facts:

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits. 

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality. 

Held:

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: 

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. 

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. 

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). 

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. 

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. 

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Araneta vs. Gatmaitan

GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957

Felix, J.

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer

to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.

Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 802. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated

to the President

HELD:

1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.

2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990

Sarmiento, J.

The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron

Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.

ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation

GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power

HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health…,safety and general welfare of the people.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned

PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.

ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner

HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava

Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.

On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training.

ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law

HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles.

Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.

GUEVARA vs. COMELEC

Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others,

that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings

HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

G.R. No. L-34674             October 26, 1931MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERGOstrand, J

Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)

FACTS:This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent as cause of action

HELD:Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.

The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

GSIS vs. CSC

According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the CSCS, she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide.

Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.

Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC.

In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988. the Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit Systems Board has the function to “Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system.”

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:

j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems

Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.

Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation

GR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975

Fernando, J.

FACTS:

Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan Interantional Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line applied for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination

HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.

GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962

De Leon, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man committee to investigate him. After conducting hearings, the committee recommended petitioner’s reinstatement. The Monetary Board, however, adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. Subsequently, respondent Mariano Marcos was appointed to replace petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto. After several hearings, the court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedies

HELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislative intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted.

KBMBPM vs. Dominguez

GR No. 91927, January 13,1992

Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos’ successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.

On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available

HELD:

1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA G.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs

and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious,

educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises

to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes

on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the

assessment.

Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking

fees is exempt from taxation

Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the

payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded.

The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their

intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, stressed during the Concom

debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,

buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational

purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the

Concom, adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to

property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption

covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI,

Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution.

YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit

educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for

educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court reiterates that

YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property.

The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its

exemption from the payment of income tax. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.

Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove

with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational

institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and

exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was

submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.

YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The

term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a school, seminary,

college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational

institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not

submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively

used for educational purposes.

Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Issue: Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.

 F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner''''s allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. 

HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face.

It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires.

Bautista vs. JuinioGR L-50908, 31 January 1984En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part

FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.

HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up

the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "

In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "

Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).

Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law. 

Ople vs Torres

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.   

     A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

     A.    THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.     B.    THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.     C.    THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."  

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:      It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. 

     Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:

(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and (2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YES

Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters

insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

1. US VS. PANLILIO

The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks74 SCRA 212

FACTS:

Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.

In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD:

Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

SYQUIA V BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (RUIZ, ENRIQUEZ, MOSES) 74 SCRA 212

TEEHANKEE; Nov 29, 1976

NATUREPetition for special civil action for certiorari

FACTS- December 1974 > Ruiz, Enriquez, Moses (respondents) filed 3 complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia (petitioner) as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate,

Manila, for selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by the board, in that Syquia billed Ruiz et al various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by the board. - Syquia’s motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual obligations of Ruiz et al as apartment tenants and were beyond the board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. - Syquia filed her answer, wherein she questioned the complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of the board as a regulatory body, since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature. She added that the tenants including Ruiz et al had no complaint under the contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco billings include all consumption in the entire compound, including the common areas, servants' quarters and elevators, the payment for which was advanced by Syquia and later collected by way of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that Ruiz et al alone complained later when on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by Syquia to all the tenants pro rata. - August 28, 1975 > Syquia further manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as the board may determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against Ruiz et al for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. The board in said order however came up with its computation which would allow Syquia to charge Ruiz et al only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by Syquia for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas. - Syquia pointed out in her MFR that the board's computation would not reimburse her for the cost of the electric consumption in the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a month or P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the tenants over which the regulatory board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting through its Acting Chairman de Guzman denied reconsideration and ruled that since the tenants are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their electricity within their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants' quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants

ISSUEWON the Board of Power and Waterworks has jurisdiction over the said case

HELDNORatio The board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by Ruiz et al against Syquia. The board acquired no jurisdiction over Syquia’s contractual relations with Ruiz et al as her tenants, since Syquia is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Ruiz et al’s complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Reasoning- Comment of Acting Solicitor: the regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints, since Syquia does not operate, manage or control the power plant and furthermore, since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the end-user, it cannot be correctly claimed that Syquia is selling electricity nor can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business. - The dispute between Syquia the landlord and her tenants as to how much each tenant should be correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity consumed and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common facilities used in the apartments, if such amounts should be borne by the

tenants at all, is an issue affecting mathematical computations and conditions of lease between landlord and tenant. - Under the reorganization plan effected by PD No. 1 as amended by PD No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act were transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks. Disposition The orders of the board are annulled and the complaints of Ruiz et al are ordered dismissed

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion GR 139465

Facts: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

Issue: 1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto

2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are

given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion 343 SCRA 377 (2000)

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC

Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign

Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand

Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition

were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical

evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be

addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the

extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. 

The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that

point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements

under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty)

have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents

is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed

rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the

documents. 

3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force

is binding upon the parties. 

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled

in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested

papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

Issues:

1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with

the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or

government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in

connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty

imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although

the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the

DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition

process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite.

This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite

pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during

the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a

prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such

consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an

investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical

assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a

prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a

criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in

criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an

administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative

proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In

the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition

proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly

lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due

process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the

people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official

records & documents

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation,

having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A

favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign

country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a

preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and

imprisonment of the respondent.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings.

Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be

notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear

therein & present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:

a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative

charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).

b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isn’t prevented from

enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a

delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)

c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the

Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of

crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their

respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the

due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions

of RP-US Extradition treaty

No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that

rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative

acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted

during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Secretary of Justice vs.   Lantion Posted on June 29, 2008 by asteroids08

FACTS:Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.  The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.  Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request  for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US  Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE:Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING:Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)     The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7)     The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU

alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted

to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be

proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native

dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer

union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided

the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the

Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court

whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103).

It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not

intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially

passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the

parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,

affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of

disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.

It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,

matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,

and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in

accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not

narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case,

without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal

evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements

does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the

fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative

character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support

thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the

record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and

facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the

parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely

affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,

and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case

receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the

requirements set forth. So ordered.

ANG TIBAY vs. CIR

FACTS:

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. avers that: (1) Toribio Teodoro, who is the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, was falsely claiming that there is a shortage of leather soles for him to temporarily lay off the Members of the National Labor Union, Inc. as it was unsupported by records; (2) the alleged lack of materials was a scheme to discharge systematically the Members of the NLU, Inc. from work; (3) The National Workers’ Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is an illegal union which is dominated by Toribio Teodoro; and that (4) The employer, Toribio Teodoro, was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU, Inc, and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood.

The case enumerated the specific powers of the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR, as the Court observed is not constrained by technical rules of procedure in hearing the matters before it, but it does not mean that it can ignore entirely the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

ISSUE:

What are the cardinal rights or the requisites of procedural due process which must be respected in administrative proceedings?

HELD:

The Court provided the ff. as the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings:

1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.3. Decision must have something to support it.4. Evidence must be substantial (more than a mere “scintilla”, relevant evidence a reasonable mind

accepts to support a conclusion)5. Decision must be rendered on the evident presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the

record or disclosed to the parties affected.6. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the

law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.