0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1993, 108 Cowlty Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, M A 02142, USA The Howard Journal Vol32 No 3. Aug 93 ISSN 02655527

Adjudications in Prison: Custody, Care and a Little

Less Justice?'

P E T E R M . QUINN Governor, Prison Service Headquarters, London and Visiting Fellow,

Faculty o f L a w , University of the West of England, Bristol

Abstract: The writer considers the Home Office responses to Lord Justice Woolf s report on the 1990 prison disturbances insofar as they affect one aspect of prison lift, nameb, the adjudication. He fears that, with the removal from boards of visitors of their adjudicatosy function, elements o f natural justice have been placed in jeopardy. I t may not be possible for a governor to come to a hearing without bias or without hints that the governor is a judge in his or her own cause not being suffientl,, independent. Lord Bridge's dictum in ex parte Leech (1988) to the effect that the governor adjudicates as something other than a servant of the Secretary of State is diyficult to sustain in practice. The adjudicating governor may be in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The writer offers a way forward whereby discipline may be maintained in prisons through the application of a redrafted Prison Rule 47 and a revision of the present procedure.

One of the many consequences of Lord Justice Woolf's (1991) monumental inquiry into the 1990 prison riots was that the Home Secretary was required to address the question of justice in prison with greater urgency than hitherto. Whatever the causes of the riots, the Home Ofice had, according to the report, simply failed to convince a significant number of prisoners that they were being treated with fairness during their sentence. Dialogue took place during Woolf's public seminars which indicated a shift in thinking within the highest level of Prison Service management about justice, internal discipline and the punitive sanctions available to help maintain discipline. This thinking became crystallised in the 1991 white paper Custody, Care andJustice (Home Ofice 1991a), which, whilst paying tribute to the dedicated work of boards of visitors in the past proposed to remove from them the power to adjudicate and to punish prisoners. That should have come as no surprise. Whilst influential voices had previously been raised against a splitting of their functions (Weiler Report (Home Ofice 1975); May Report (Home Ofice 1979)) others (Jellicoe Report (Martin 1975); McKenna 1983; Prior Report (Home Ofice 1985)) had argued cogently for the removal of the adjudicatory role. Home Ofice had vacillated. Douglas Hurd announced to the 1986

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annual conference of boards of visitors that they were to lose their adjudicatory function but his Minister of State for prisons, Lord Caithness, told the same conference, the following year that they would not. Lord Justice Woolfs voice was simply too powerful to be ignored and his recommendation, adopted in the white paper, was that boards of visitors should drop out of the process completely. All future infractions of internal prison discipline should be disposed of by the governor within existing powers of punishment or, if serious enough, should be referred to the police who would be invited to mount a criminal investigation. The changes were implemented by an amendment to Prison Rules which came into force on 1 April 1992.

Gains and Losses

What has been gained as a result of this change? In the first place boards of visitors are no longer faced with the contradiction of being the body which both safeguards the rights and privileges of prisoners through their watchdog role whilst at the same time taking them away through their adjudicatory role. Secondly, being freed from responsibility for adjudicating boards have more time to develop and to devote to their statutory duties under Part IV of the Prison Rules. They may thus become more effective as the Secretary of State’s eyes and ears inside establishments. Thirdly, as was pointed out to the Woolf inquiry team at one of their public seminars, between April and December 1989 boards of visitors had ordered 1,723 punishments of unsuspended forfeiture of remission of over 28 days. Now that the maximum number of days that can be added by a governor is 28 in respect of any one offence there will be some inroad into the figure of 600-700 people remaining in prison beyond their originally calculated release data. This, Woolf described as ‘an astonishing extra burden on the Prison Service (which) needs to be controlled and relieved’.

The more intriguing question however remains whether anything has been lost as a result of change. The loss, it is contended, is that degree of independence vested in the adjudicator which ensures the application of the principles of natural justice. I t had been long argued that boards of visitors were seldom truly independent. They were often seen by critics and certainly by a large number of prisoners as being in cahoots with management. Until recently they had a management role in that under Prison Rule 94(4), as formerly drafted, they could suspend members of staff from duty. However much boards might have been suspected of sacrificing their independence there remained the authority of the European Court of Human Rights which, in Campbell and Fell v. UK (1982) declared them, as adjudicators, to be ‘an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. They thus fulfilled one of the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Council of Europe 1950).

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The Independent and Impartial Governor

Boards of visitors are appointed by the Secretary of State and not by the Director General of the Prison Service. Governors, on the other hand, whilst ultimately working to the Home Secretary’s command, do so through the management line of area manager, operational director and Director General. This has not been fundamentally affected by the Prison Service’s change to agency status on 1 April 1993. Until the decision of the House of Lords in ex parte Leech (1988), the domestic courts, in accord with the apparent policy of ‘hands off in prison matters, firmly rejected the notion of an ‘independent governor’

Analogies drawn were between the governor and the commanding officer or sea captain (Fraser v. Mudge (1975) the schoolmaster (exparte St. Gennain (1979)) or the manager (ex parte King (1 984)). Waller LJ in exparte St. Germain in the Court of Appeal perceived ‘the importance of the Officer charged with maintaining discipline not being interfered with by the court’. Governors had readily agreed with the view of the adjudication as being part of the managerial role in keeping a smooth running prison. Their then trade union (Home Office Prison Department 1987) saw it as essential for the governor to be ‘involved in day to day management eg. adjudications’ and Jenkins (1987), then a serving governor, wrote of adjudications being ‘regulatory or managing rather than a simple pursuit of justice’. Governors’ training to take adjudications remains fairly rudimentary and sits within management modules at the Prison Service College.

In ex parte Leech (1988) however, the House of Lords decided that governors’ adjudications are directly reviewable by the divisional court by way of certiorari in exactly the same way as those of boards of visitors. Governors are required to apply the rules of natural justice and to reason in a judicial manner when hearing charges against inmates. The managerial element of the adjudication was tossed aside. Adjudicating governors owed their vires not to any management line to higher authority but to the statutory instrument under which were performed their duties. Lord Bridge stated it thus:

A prison governor may, in general terms, be described as a servant of the secretary of state but he is not acting as such when adjudicating on a charge of a disciplinary offence. He is then exercising the independent power conferred upon him by the Rules. The secretary of state has no authority to direct the governor . . . as to how to adjudicate on a particular charge or what punishment should be awarded. If a Home Ofice official sought to stand behind a governor at a disciplinary hearing and tell him what to do the governor would properly send him packing. (at

During 1990, the last year for which figures are presently available, over 81,500 offences against prison discipline were punished (Home Office 1991b). Apart from the 600 or so cases which the Prison Service Directorate of Inmate Administration project will be dealt with by the courts it is clear that adjudicating will remain a substantial part of the

p. 497)

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governor’s role. Speaking as governor of Durham Prison in 1992 Martin Mogg told a seminar of governors at Low Newton Remand Centre that he found it ‘hard to give proper consideration to the rules of natural justice when you have 19 or 20 adjudications to get through in a morning’. Mogg’s expression of concern goes to the core of this paper. Just how possible is i t for the governor to be independent and impartial in adjudicating and if it is not possible, what does that say for natural justice at such hearings?

Compromised Independence

Lord Bridge’s view of the adjudicating governor acting outside the role of state servant may be to enunciate the domestic law correctly but it is to misunderstand the realities of prison life and to pay little regard to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Classically the governor has been seen as: responsible to the Commissioners (broadly predecessors of the Prisons Board) for everything that goes on in his establishment. (Among) the principal aspects of his work are the maintenance ofsecurity and good order and discipline. (Home Ofice and Scottish Home Department 1958, p. 44)

Further, despite the governor’s role as general manager of the prison, the casework-cum-counselling ethos of old implies that many still have an interest in, concern for or relationship with their charges. Williams (1990) has it that:

It is untrue that helpful, caring approaches - even friendship and counselling in some cases never occur between, governors and prisoners . . . With long term prisoners the governor of the institution can become similarly involved not least because of intractable discipline problems with some inmates. (p. 59)

So management issues, personal relationships and discipline problems may become seamless parts of a whole often implying that, at adjudication the de novo principle may be in jeopardy. The governor is the manager of the organisation within which the alleged offence has taken place and is the employer of the reporting officer. Certainly, in adjudicating, the governor’s mind will be on maintaining the good order of the prison and the delicate balance that exists between the staff disciplinary function and the preservation of the tolerable life for inmates. The governor will attempt to come to a hearing with an open mind. Yet the experience of managing the prison day in day out will make it hard to avoid bias. Morris (1975) noted the argument that a governor may well be seen as a judge in his own cause. The governor may well know the strengths and weaknesses of the principal characters at the hearing. If, for example, the charge is one of assault, the governor may already have seen papers indicating difficulties that a particular officer has had with a particular inmate. The governor, faced with a simple conflict of evidence, may be inclined to accept the staff version of events since, in the absence of other clarifying factors, there is a knowledge of what staff expect. Prison officers tend to classify governors as representing one or other extreme of a

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continuum. They may be ‘the prisoners’ friend’or a ‘staff man’. Thus the inter-personal and inter-professional relationships between staff and staff, and staff and governor may all have their influence on the hearing. Governors may find themselves subject to formal protest raised by the Prison Officers’ Association over the manner in which they have adjudicated. A governor may be swayed by the exigencies of the regime to order a particular punishment in the hope that it may have some general deterrent effect or because of some more mundane institutional reason such as that the segregation unit is full. Indeed the governor may have had to decide whether or not the prisoner who faces the charges will have had to be segregated prior to the adjudication and thus, in performing a managerial function, will have had to weigh in the balance the prisoner’s dangerousness, previous behaviour or chances of having done that which has been alleged.

What have the courts made of this conundrum? For as long as adjudications could be seen as part of the management function prior knowledge was seen as a positive advantage serving to enhance adjudicatory skills. In ex parte King for example Griffiths LJ had it that:

With the governor’s knowledge of the personalities with whom he is dealing, I suspect that he will usually be left in no doubt as to the truth of the matter . . . The board of visitors are entirely independent and in all probability they do not know the prisoner or if they do, not nearly as well as the governor.

It was, of course, ex parte King that was overturned by the decision in ex parte Leech (supra). But that ex parte King has been overturned does not affect institutional dynamics. I t does not affect what is expected of a governor by subordinates and superiors. The requirement to adjudicate will be part of the governor’s job description and the need to keep good order and discipline now forms a part of the Prison Service’s (1993) new business and corporate plans to which every governor is committed.

A novel twist to the argument is presented in that provision is made in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 for prisons to be contracted out to the private sector. I t is enacted that custody officers, the equivalent of prison officers in the contracted out prisons, should assume a broad range of the duties of the latter group but the director of such a prison is statutorily excluded from adjudicating (s.85 (3)a). Adjudications are conducted by a controller who is La crown servant appointed by the secretary of state’ (ss.85( 1)b; 85(4)) partly for that purpose. Paradoxically then, the adjudicator is independent of the contracted out prison but not of the Secretary of State as Lord Bridge would have it. With the publication of the job specification of the controller of Wolds remand prison (Prison Governors’ Association 1992) we learn that she is a member of the prison governor grade who is tasked inter alia ‘to deal with all prison disciplinary cases and authorise confinement and restraint’. The judicial and the managerial functions thus appear fused into one. The controller of the contracted out prison has a similar management line to that of a conventional governor though in place of an area manager she is accountable to the head of the Custodial Contract Unit with the Home

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Office and ultimately to the permanent under secretary rather than to the Director General. Being independent of the management of Group Four, who run the establishment, she will come to her adjudications de novo, without bias and without being judge in her own cause. Her statutory position, reinforced by her job specification written by crown servants, implies that she adjudicates because that is required of her by the Secretary of State.

A Note on Article Six: A Note on American Practice

Neither the European Commission nor the Court of Human Rights has yet been required to address the question of the adjudicating governor’s role. An indication as to how they might recommend or decide may he gleaned from Engtl and others v. Netherlands ( 1 976) and Sramek v. Austria (1984). Engel arose out of infractions of a military disciplinary code some of which were criminal in character and others purely disciplinary (cf Prison Kule 47 infia). As to whether or not the hearing of such charges attracted the protection of Article 6( 1 ) of the Convention, that is, were disciplinary charges tantamount to criminal charges, the Court held inter alia that one of the factors to be taken into account must be the severity of the punishment risked. Since the soldiers risked such penalties as ‘strict arrest’ or ‘service in a disciplinary unit’ the charges fell within ‘the+ criminal sphere’. Thus the Article applied. ‘The susceptibility of up to 28 extra days detention however it is styled would place governors’ adjudications clearly within the Engel test. In Sramek a member of a tribunal was a civil servant under the authority of the state official bringing the action. The government agreed that the superior offcer was precluded from giving instructions to the subordinate nor was there evidence that there had been any such attempt. The Court found a violation of the Article since ‘the parties could maintain legitimate doubts about that person’s independence’. The prisoner at adjudication might reasonably harbour legitimate doubts about the governor’s independence, not because the Secretary of State had given instructions but that, given the hierarchical relationship, it appeared that he was in a position to do so. Similarly, the prisoner could question the governor’s objective impartiality hecause of the kind of managerial concerns that have been examined.

Robertson (1991) addressed the question of impartiality a t internal hearings within prisons in the United States. Due process does not prohibit internal hearings as long as no adjudicator has been ‘involved in the investigation or prosecution of a particular case or has had any other personal involvement in the case’. Personal involvement may be direct (for example, the investigation of an incident or the decision to charge) or indirect (for example, personal knowledge of material facts or manifest command influence (cf. Sramek)).

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Bias and the Absence of Bias It is not impossible for the adjudicator in a conventional prison to avoid bias. The governor may genuinely come to a hearing with no prior knowledge of the inmate and no institutional pressures conspiring to affect judgment. Most infractions of internal discipline tend not to be particularly serious nor committed by notorious desperados. Akester, in her evidence to Lord Justice Woolf (1990, paper El , p. 32) noted that they tended to be about little things - ‘scraps over the hot plate 3nd goodness knows what’.

In other cases the governor may address the question of bias and apply the test in ex parte Topping. Here magistrates had seen court papers that revealed seven further pending charges against the accused yet they proceeded. The divisional court quashed the conviction since they had failed to exercise their discretion as to whether or not they should discontinue the hearing. The test to be applied is whether there would be an appearance of bias to a reasonable person observing the proceedings with a complete knowledge of the relevant facts. A governor would on many occasions be in a position akin to that of the justices in ex parte Topping yet custom and practice would generally be to continue with the adjudication. Governors would doubtless argue that operational necessities mean that they must adjudicate and must do so speedily, after all detailed instructions as to how they are to act are laid down by the Secretary of State (Home Ofice Prison Service 1992) despite Lord Bridge’s view that they are not his servants when they do so.

There is, of course, a difference between hearings in the magistrates’ court and disciplinary proceedings in prison yet the importance of preserving natural justice by the avoidance of bias is common to both. Clapham (1992) stated the position thus:

the law relating to bias seems to be reasonably clear. I t is not what the adjudicator feels about possible bias, nor indeed what the accused feels, but what the man on the Clapham omnibus, sitting in court with full knowledge of the relevant facts, considers fair and reasonable. If he feels that the accused is unlikely to receive a fair trial, because of ostensible bias, then an appearance of bias will lead to his convictions being quashed and/or a new trial being ordered. (p. 394)

The foregoing presupposes that governors know of the test in ex parte Topping. The writer has argued elsewhere (Quinn 1992) that whereas many governors are graduates, only a handful have read law or have much acquaintance with it and the case put forward by Evans and Le Jeune (1987) for an increase in legal awareness training for civil servants has gone unheeded insofar as governors are concerned.

The Rightings of Wrongs

A prisoner who is aggrieved at the outcome of an adjudication has one of two courses of action in seeking a remedy. One way, as has been seen since

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exparte Leech, is to seek judicial review. The other way is to seek an internal remedy by way of the established requests and complaints procedure. In the latter case the record of the disputed hearing is lifted to area manager level. In practice the matter is reviewed by a member of that person’s support staff who will pass comments on to one of a team of three senior executive officers who make a recommendation to the area manager concerned. One of the three present post holders has a law degree but that is not seen as a requirement of the job. The Directorate of Inmate Administration informed the writer that during 1992, 470 findings at adfidications were quashed or punishment mitigated by the Secretary of State under Prison Rule 56( 1). Yet it will be appreciated that to whatever degree an adjudicating governor strives to be impartial or independent of the Secretary of State, the review process rests firmly with his servants.

A Way Forward

It has been argued in this paper that whereas Lord Bridge would have a governor cast aside the hat of servant of the Secretary of State when adjudicating it is well nigh impossible to do that. Conversely, the ‘noise’ surrounding an adjudication will be wrapped up so closely with the management of the prison that it will be similarly impossible for a governor to come to the hearing with an open mind. There is a solution, but it is one that is likely to be unpopular both within the Home Office and amongst governors themselves since it smacks of administrative inconvenience and a diminution of governors’ powers. Inconvenience is not a reason to deny something which is correct in principle as we know from the dicta of Lane 1.J in ex parte St. Germain (No. 2). ‘Mere administrative difficulties simpliciter’ he said ‘are not in our view enough. Convenience and justice are not often on speaking terms’. A starting point might be to develop the notion put forward by Fitzgerald giving evidence to the Woolf public seminar on behalf of the National Council for Civil Liberties. He said, in part:

The government should have no power to take away liberty whatever form that liberty is cast in - be it the forfeiture of remission, the postponement of parole or as I see the white paper itself says that additional days in prison could be ordered. If additional days spent in prison are to be ordered for misconduct then it is absolutely fundamental that governors who are not independent and impartial should not have the power to make those orders. In fact i t would be a clear breach of Article 6( 1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. (Evidence to Lord Justice Woolf 1990, paper E l , p. 106)

Prison Rule 47 lays down offences against discipline. As presently drafted it includes some which are patently criminal in character (for example, fighting (Rule 47(4)) or fire raising (Rule 47(13))) and those which are essentially disciplinary in character (for example, non compliance with the terms of a temporary release licence (Rule 47(8)b) or being disrespectful (Rule 47(16))). Others are a form of hybrid (for example, having in possession an unauthorised article (Rule 47(9)a) which may or

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may not be criminal in character depending upon the nature of the article. A final catch-all (in any way offending against good order and discipline (Rule 47(21))) is of dubious legality for want of legal certainty. I t is possible to envisage a redrafting of the Rule which might separate out those charges which have the colour of criminal acts from those which do not. Under a revised system a governor would have uires only in respect of those which do not and would lose the statutory authority given under s.42 of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act to add days within the term of a sentence following a finding of guilt. A model for this presently exists in the system of so called ‘minor reports’ prevailing in young offender institutions. Here trivial offences are dealt with the minimum of formality, usually by the wing governor or uniformed principal officer, the sanction being strictly limited. I t would accord both with evidence given to the Woolf seminar (1990, paper E 1, p. 63) by Caffarey on behalf of the Prison Service and with the recommendation of Lord Justice Woolf himself that there should be a progressive move towards less reliance upon added days in prison and more reliance upon deprivation of privileges as a sanction.

Who should adjudicate in cases that are criminal in character but which, for whatever reason, do not reach the courts? Essentially it must be a person who stands aside from the day to day management of the prison. According to the Fitzgerald model it should not be a governor but according to Lord Bridge it can be. One solution might be to look to each area manager and that person’s support team. Perhaps each of the Prison Service’s 15 administrative areas should have assigned to it a peripatetic adjudicator who might visit each prison in the area as occasion demanded. Ideally such a person should be independent of the Home Office - maybe a retired lawyer or magistrate. This would satisfy not only Fitzgerald’s concern that the adjudicator should not be a governor but also Lord Bridge’s ‘independence’ requirement. Most important it would place prison practice in harmony with Article 6(1) of the Convention. Such ideas would need refining but may offer some way forward both in terms of the very necessary maintaining of internal discipline and of ensuring adherence to the rules of natural justice. Could discipline be maintained if governors’ power to adjudicate were to be reduced? That, of course, is untested yet Alpert (1978) found that the implanting of greater legal normality into a prison system (in that case the provision of legal services) was a step which reduced tension, anxiety, hostility and also infractions of discipline among inmates. Under the present model, a governor in awarding 28 added days can, in effect, order the equivalent of a two month prison sentence without the safeguards available to a defendant in open court. In the light of the foregoing arguments it is posited that such a power should no longer be vested in the governor, and indeed the Prison Governor’s Association (1993), in its recent discussion document (March 1993) urged that consideration should indeed be given to the use of (an) ‘independent adjudicator for offences which attract additional days’.

Whilst it is clear that there is no short-term prospect of the review of disputed hearing being taken out of the hands of civil servants a new

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factor is about to enter the equation. The implementation of another of Lord Justice Woolf s proposals means that, at the time of writing, the appointment of an independent prison ombudsman is imminent. Whereas the locus for the review of disputed adjudications will remain with the area manager, once that process has been completed the prisoner will have access to the prison ombudsman, That office will have the power to recommend an alternative decision to the Secretary of State if it is seen that the area manager was at fault.

Conclusion

Palley warned the British Institute of Human Rights (1980) conference on judicial review of prison discipline that we should guard against an ‘over judicialised procedure’ at adjudication but saw manifest fairness as the overriding factor. During the time that has elapsed since that conference the climate has changed with the emergence of ‘the active judiciary’ (Gearty 1991). The need to be fair permeates all the recent caselaw and it has become apparent that prison authorities can no longer depend upon judicial abstention to guard their activities from scrutiny in the courts. That Mr Leech and Mr Prevot, with whom his case was joined, are the only prisoners ever successfully to have had governors’ adjudications overturned at judicial review cannot be seen as a reason for complacency. It can only be a matter of time before further litigation calls into question the fairness of governors’ adjudications as presently constituted, The cost of litigation and the inevitable adverse publicity accruing to the Prison Service should prisoners once again be successful should not be the reason for change. That should come about partly since manifest fairness will itself help towards the maintenance of peaceful prisons. The kind of change outlined will also place the adjudication process on all fours with Lord Justice Woolfs aspirations that the prison regime as a whole should be informed by considerations of justice.

Note

’ The views expressed are those of a writer and not necessarily those of the Prison Service or Home Office. The writer is grateful to Colin Warbrick of the Department of Law, University of Durham for his helpful comments on this paper.

References

Alpert, G. P. (1978) Legal Rights of Prisoners: An Analysis of Legal Aid, Lexington: Heath.

British Institute of Human Rights (1980) ‘Judicial review of prison discipline’ (report of a meeting held at Queen Mary College, University of London, 5 June), London: BIHK.

Clapham, B. (1992) ‘Should judges and JPs always declare an interest’, Justice of the Peace, 156, 3 7 6 7 , 3 9 3 4 .

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Council of Europe ( 1950) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with Subsequent Protocols, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Evans, S. and Le Juene, M. (1987) Report on Training in Legal Awareness, London: Cabinet Office.

Evidence to Lord Justice WoolPs public seminar (1990) ‘Justice in prison’, City University, 30, 31 October 1990; public seminar papers EI/E2.

Gearty, C. (1991) ‘The prisons and the courts’, in: J. Muncie and R. Sparks (Eds.), Imprisonment: European Perspectives, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf with The Open University.

Home Office (1975) The Report of the Working Par0 on Adjudication Procedures in Prison (The Weiler Report), London: HMSO.

Home Office (1979) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the United Kingdom Prison Services (The May Report), Cmnd. 7673.

Home Office (1 985) Report of the Committee of the Prison Disciplinary System (The Prior Report), Cmnd. 9641-1, 9641-2.

Home Office (1991a) Custody, Care and Justice, Cm. 1647. Home Office (1991b) Statistics of Offences Against Prison Discipline and Punishments:

England and Wales, 1990. Cm. 1651. Home Office Prison Department (1987) ‘Note of a meeting held on 12 February

1987 with the Society of Civil and Public Servants (Governors’ Branch), London, HOPD (P8 Division), (internal circulation).

Home Office Prison Service (1992) Standing Order 3 0 : Offences, Adjudications and Punishments, London: Home Office Prison Service.

Home Office and Scottish Home Department (1958) Report of the Committee on Remuneration and Conditions of Service of Certain Grades in the Prison Services (The Wynn-Parry Report), London: HMSO.

Jenkins, M. J. (1987) ‘Control problems in dispersals’, in: A. E. Bottoms and R. Light (Eds.), Problems of Long Term Imprisonment, London: Gower.

McKenna, B. (1983) Justice in Prison, London: Justice. Martin, J. P. (1975) Boards of Visitors of Penal Institutions: Report of a Committee set up

by Justice, the Howard League and NACRO (The Jellicoe Report), Chichester and London: Barry Rose.

Morris, T. (1975), in: BIHR, Detention: Minimum Standards, Chichester and London: Barry Rose.

Prison Governors’ Association (1992) PGA Magazine, March, No. 16. Prison Governors’ Association ( 1993) ‘Discussion document’ considered at the

PGA Annual Conference, Newbold Revel, March 10-1 1. Prison Service (1993) Business Plan 199S94, 5; Corporate Plan 1993-96, 16-17,

London: Prison Service. Quinn, P. M. (1992) ‘Prison discipline, justice and Woolf: the demise of the

adjudicating board’, Cambrian Law Review, 23, 7-29. Robertson, J. E. (1991) ‘Impartiality and prison disciplinary tribunals’, New

England Journal on Criminal and Civil ConJinement, 17, 301-35. Williams, B. ( 1990) Working with Prisoners, Birmingham Venture. Woolf, Sir H . (1991) Prison Disturbances: April 1990. Report of an Inquiry by the Rt.

Hon. Lord Justice WooEf (parts 1 and 2) and His Honour Judge Stephen Tumim [Part 2), Cm. 1456.

Table of Cases

Campbell and Fell v. UK (1982) 5 EHRR 207. Engel and others v. Netherlands (1976) Eur.Ct.H.R. Series A, No. 22.

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Fraser v. Mudge (1975) 3 All E R 78. R v. Board of Visitors of Hull Prison ex parte St. Gennain (1978) 2 All ER 198, QBD;

(1979) 1 All ER 701, CA; R v. Board of Visitors of Hull Prison ex parte St. Gennain (No. 2) (1979) 3 All ER 545.

R. v. Debug Governor of Camp Hill Prison ex parte King (1984) 3 All ER 897. R. v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison and another ex parte Leech and another, The

Times, 5 February 1988; reported sub.nom. Leech v. Parkhurst Prison Deputy Governor (1988) 1 All ER 485.

R. v. Liverpool Justices ex parte Topping (1983) 1 WLR 119. Sramek v. Austria (1984) Eur.Ct. H.R. Series A, No.84.

Date submitted: October 92 Date accepted: January 93

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