Adequacy, accountability, autonomy and equity in a Middle Eastern school reform: The case of Qatar

Adequacy, accountability, autonomy and equityin a Middle Eastern school reform: The case of Qatar

Cassandra M. Guarino • Jeffery C. Tanner

Published online: 1 April 2012

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract This study examines Qatar’s recent and ambitious school reform in the

early stages of its implementation against a set of four criteria for successful edu-

cation systems drawn from guidelines developed by the international community:

adequacy, accountability, autonomy and gender equity. We investigate both the

initial structure of the reform and its sustainability in light of concerns that

movements in these directions might be politically unfeasible. To some degree,

these concerns are substantiated by the developments we trace. However, it is

important to note that the reform has changed the landscape of primary and sec-

ondary education in Qatar and that many reform principles, though diluted, have

been retained. This paper highlights lessons learned – both hopeful and cautionary –

in the first few years of reform and presents a methodology for evaluating progress

along key dimensions that can be applied to school systems in many nations.

Keywords International education � K-12 reform � Primary and secondary

education � Qatar

Resume Pertinence, responsabilite, autonomie et equite au cœur d’une reforme

scolaire du Moyen-Orient : le cas du Qatar – La presente etude examine les premieres

etapes de l’application de la recente et ambitieuse reforme scolaire du Qatar, en

fonction d’une serie de quatre criteres etablie pour la reussite des systemes educatifs et

Disclaimer The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ own and do not represent those of their

affiliated institutions, the World Bank Group, or the Independent Evaluation Group.

C. M. Guarino (&)

Indiana University Bloomington, Bloomington, IN, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

J. C. Tanner

The World Bank Group, Washington, DC, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

123

Int Rev Educ (2012) 58:221–245

DOI 10.1007/s11159-012-9286-4

tiree de recommandations elaborees par la communaute internationale : pertinence,

responsabilite, autonomie et equite entre les sexes. Nous avons etudie la structure

initiale de la reforme ainsi que sa viabilite a la lumiere de reserves emises quant a la

faisabilite politique des mouvements qui vont dans ce sens. Ces reticences sont dans

une certaine mesure confirmees par les processus que nous retracons. Il importe

cependant de relever que cette reforme a transforme le paysage de l’enseignement

primaire et secondaire du Qatar, et que de nombreux principes bien qu’edulcores ont

ete retenus. Les auteurs relevent les enseignements – qu’ils soient prometteurs ou

incitent a la prudence - tires des premieres annees d’application de la reforme, et

presentent une methodologie pour evaluer les progres en fonction de criteres standard,

susceptibles d’etre appliques aux systemes educatifs de nombreuses nations.

Zusammenfassung Eignung, Rechenschaftspflicht, Autonomie und Gleichstel-

lung in einer Schulreform des Vorderen Orients: der Fall Katar – In dieser Studie

wird die jungste ambitionierte Schulreform Katars in den ersten Phasen ihrer

Umsetzung untersucht, und zwar anhand von vier Kriterien fur erfolgreiche Bil-

dungssysteme, die aus Richtlinien der internationalen Gemeinschaft abgeleitet

wurden: Eignung, Rechenschaftspflicht, Autonomie und Gleichstellung der

Geschlechter. Vor dem Hintergrund der Bedenken, dass man politisch in diesen

Richtungen moglicherweise nicht weiterkommen wird, untersuchen wir sowohl die

ursprungliche Struktur der Reform als auch deren Nachhaltigkeit. Bis zu einem

gewissen Grad werden diese Bedenken durch die von uns verfolgten Entwicklungen

belegt. Es ist jedoch anzumerken, dass sich die Landschaft der Primar- und Se-

kundarschulen in Katar durch die Reform verandert hat und dass viele Grundsatze

der Reform erhalten geblieben sind, auch wenn sie verwassert wurden. In diesem

Aufsatz werden die Lehren aufgezeigt, die – mit vorsichtigem Optimismus – aus

den ersten Jahren der Reform gezogen werden konnen, und es wird eine Methodik

zur Bewertung der Fortschritte in grundlegenden Dimensionen dargestellt, die auf

Schulsysteme in vielen Landern anwendbar ist.

Resumen Adecuacion, responsabilidad, autonomıa y equidad en una reforma

escolar de Oriente Medio: el caso de Qatar – Con el presente estudio se analiza la

reciente y ambiciosa reforma escolar de Qatar en las fases tempranas de su im-

plementacion, con respecto a un conjunto de criterios para sistemas de educacion

exitosos que se delinearon a partir de pautas desarrolladas por la comunidad in-

ternacional: adecuacion, responsabilidad, autonomıa y equidad de genero. Inves-

tigamos tanto la estructura inicial como la sostenibilidad de la reforma, a la luz de

las preocupaciones de que los movimientos emprendidos en esta direccion puedan

resultar polıticamente impracticables. Hasta cierto grado, estas preocupaciones se

ven justificadas por los desarrollos que registramos. Sin embargo, es importante

tomar nota de que la reforma ha cambiado el panorama de la educacion primaria y

secundaria en Qatar y que muchos de los principios de la reforma, aunque esten

diluidos, se han conservado. Este trabajo realza las lecciones – tan esperanzadoras

como aleccionadoras – aprendidas en los primeros pocos anos de la reforma y

presenta una metodologıa para evaluar el progreso a lo largo de dimensiones clave

que pueden aplicarse para sistemas escolares en muchas naciones.

222 C. M. Guarino, J. C. Tanner

123

Introduction

Education is a critical component of any nation’s effort to prepare its youth for civic

participation and a global economy. Recently, thinking among international

development agencies has begun to coalesce around what may be regarded as

necessary conditions for a successful educational system. The World Bank’s WorldDevelopment Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People emphasised that

successful education systems must incorporate elements of adequacy, accountability

and equity, stating:

An institutional arrangement for basic education should be judged by its

production of high-quality learning, equitably distributed. This requires that

children be in school and that they learn. This in turn rests on education

systems that create relationships of accountability between citizens, politi-

cians, policymakers, and providers, with clear objectives, adequate resources,

capable and motivated providers, progress assessments, and performance-

oriented managements. (World Bank 2003)

Coming near in timing and tone to the World Bank’s position, the Copenhagen

Consensus 2004,1 which assessed the relative benefits of aid across 10 major policy

areas in the developing world, published its Challenge Paper on Education that

established four broad requirements for education reform: clear objectives,

1 The Copenhagen Consensus 2004 was a conference which brought together eight of the world’s leading

economists, including 4 Nobel Laureates and 30 of the world’s top specialists, to discuss proposals for

tackling 10 global problem areas (one of which was education) on the basis of factual evidence.

Adequacy, accountability, autonomy and equity 223

123

sustained adequate financing, autonomy to manage for results, and accountability

(Pritchett 2004).

The broader scholarly literature on educational reform and finance highlights

many of these same principles in characterising a highly functioning school system.

Efforts to determine and provide resource levels adequate to support educational

quality have intensified in recent decades and have ushered in a series of challenges

for school finance systems in the 21st century (Fowler and Chaikind 2001; Guthrie

and Rothstein 2001; Berne and Stiefel 2001). The importance of autonomy on the

part of school leaders to produce high quality educational programmes has been

sustained by many (e.g. Fink and Brayman 2006), and the movement towards

increased school choice and a business model both in the U.S. and internationally

has been based on combined principles of autonomy and accountability through

market mechanisms (Zimmer et al. 2010).

The position documents produced by the World Bank and other international

institutions have undoubtedly drawn upon prior efforts of the scholarly community

and are reflective of these recent trends in school organisation and reform. Both the

World Bank (2003) and the Copenhagen Consensus (Pritchett 2004) documents

agree that a school system should provide funding that is adequate to support

educational excellence. The Copenhagen Consensus elaborates further by adding

that adequacy in funding must be sustained over time. Similarly, accountability is a

tenet of both documents. A school finance system should ensure that recipients of

public funds produce a quality of education commensurate with the funding

received. The World Bank asserts the need for capable and motivated education

providers and the Copenhagen Consensus the need for autonomy on the part of

providers to manage for results. A school finance system must allow providers to

make decisions regarding how to use finances to meet established objectives. Here,

a balance must be struck between the autonomy that allows for high quality

innovation and regulatory provisions that render the reform effort sustainable and

replicable over time.

The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations (UN 2000), to which all

Member States were signatories, determined eight Millennium Development Goals.

The third Millennium Development Goal establishes gender equity in education as a

desirable criterion for successful reform. The education of girls contributes to

societal development in several fundamental ways: it improves the skill of the

labour force, it reduces fertility rates, it helps safeguard the well-being of children,

and it improves health outcomes (see, for example, Herz and Sperling 2004). As

mentioned above, equitable distribution of financing is also a tenet of the World

Bank framework.

Taken together, these documents suggest a degree of international consensus

around the need for reform centring on principles of adequacy in funding,

accountability, autonomy and equity. One criticism levelled at these prescriptions,

however, is that they can be politically impractical (e.g. Schultz 2004). That is, the

political costs of moving to a reform exhibiting these characteristics would be so

high that the reform would either be unfeasible or unsustainable. Moreover, even if

such reform were to occur, critics regard it as highly unlikely that the reforming

nation would make available the testing systems and financial and contextual data


123

required to assess the reform against this internationally recognised framework.

Establishing and evaluating an educational system in accord with this framework

would require political and financial capital and considerable amounts of data on a

variety of indicators. Furthermore, research on school reform suggests that strong

tensions exist between change and continuity and between quality and equity and

that moving forward on all dimensions of effectiveness involves striking a balance

between competing forces (Stoll and Fink 1996).

This study focuses on an evaluation of the early stages of a recent large-scale

education reform in Qatar that was based on many of the principles advocated by

the international community. The Qatar case provides a unique opportunity to assess

the feasibility of meeting the proposed criteria. Although planning for the Qatari

reform slightly predates the World Development Report 2004 and the 2004

Copenhagen Consensus report, the main pieces of the reform follow the suggested

framework remarkably closely.

Because Qatar has grown extremely wealthy very quickly and because its regime

is largely (benevolently) autocratic, the country does not have the degree of fiscal or

political constraints common to many countries throughout the world. Thus Qatar

represents a compelling case for examining whether a reform incorporating many

principles espoused by the international community can succeed in changing an

education system and its outcomes. Failure to succeed in such a context would

suggest the international community may need to re-evaluate its models or provide

more guidance on how to implement them.

A feature of Qatar’s reform that further underscores its suitability as a subject of

study was the immediate establishment of fiscal data systems and a standardised

testing programme, making it possible to evaluate the reform’s progress with respect

to key aspects of the international standards. Applying the four major principles

from the international literature – adequacy of funding, accountability and

autonomy for education providers, and gender equity – this paper evaluates the

reform during its first two years of operation – the academic years 2004–2005 and

2005–2006 – a period when the reform was most vulnerable to resistance and many

changes were introduced. We evaluate both the degree to which these principles

were embodied in the initial reform and the degree to which they were sustained

over time. For each principle, we employ a methodology suited to its evaluation,

illustrating an analytic approach that can be employed for ongoing assessment of the

reform’s progress and adapted for use in other international education contexts.

The next section discusses the Qatari context and the initial introduction of the

reform, and the subsequent section investigates the early reform with respect to the

four key principles outlined above – adequacy, accountability, autonomy and gender

equity. This is followed by a conclusion.

The Qatar context and the introduction of the reform

Though small in size – only 11,427 km2 – Qatar’s significant oil and natural gas

reserves have secured membership in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) and a per capita gross domestic product of US$75,426 in 2007


123

(OPEC 2008).2 This wealth is redistributed to nationals through the civil service:

77 per cent of Qataris are employed in government administration; only 4 per cent

work in the private sector (Berrebi et al. 2009). As a result, Qatar imports much of

the labour needed for its economy. Of the 1.04 million people living in Qatar in

2006, in-country sources estimate only about 18 per cent are nationals (Qatar

General Secretariat 2008, Tables 5 and 20), with the balance comprising expatriate

workers and, rarely, their families.

The nation’s leadership views education as the key to economic and social

progress and has taken steps to build a world-class educational system consistent

with other Qatari initiatives for social and political change. To ensure that Qatari

citizens maintain a strong role in their own economy and are able to compete in the

international market, Qatar instituted an ambitious educational reform. In 2002, the

Emir of Qatar issued Decree No. 37, which established a Supreme Education

Council (SEC) as the highest authority in Qatar’s education sector, charged with

leading a reform entitled Education for a New Era. Much of the reform focused on

primary and secondary (K-12) education and was designed to decentralise authority

and increase autonomy, accountability, variety and choice within the system.

The K-12 reform was a radical departure from the previous educational structure.

‘‘Independent Schools’’ were established in the form of charter schools that were

operated independently from the existing Ministry of Education (hereafter referred

to as the Ministry). School operators were allowed to exercise a degree of autonomy

over both academic and financial matters within a moderately regulated framework.

This autonomy was intended to lead to a variety of curricular offerings and

pedagogical approaches that would in turn lead to quality improvements in

schooling options, and parents were permitted to exercise a limited degree of choice

over their children’s enrolment.

Curriculum standards and a national testing regime were introduced to provide

information on school performance. In parallel to the establishment of the new

schools, Qatar developed curriculum standards in four subjects – Arabic, English,

mathematics and science. The SEC also commissioned the development of the

Qatar Comprehensive Educational Assessment (QCEA) exam: a paper-and-pencil

standardised national assessment battery consisting of multiple-choice and

constructed-response questions, based on the Arabic, English, maths and science

curriculum standards. The tests are ‘‘scale scored’’ so that year-to-year progress in

student learning can be tracked. Ministry and private Arabic schools were assessed

along with independent schools in 2005 and 2006, but only independent schools

were assessed in 2007. Concurrently, the government developed the Qatar National

Educational Database System (QNEDS) – a broad series of surveys for students’

parents and teachers. Accountability for improving outcomes was thus intended to

be fostered through choice, standards and information.

The reform was introduced in stages but experienced rapid growth. Twelve

independent schools (termed Generation I schools) opened in the 2004–2005

academic year, and 21 more (termed Generation II schools) in 2005–2006. In

2006–2007, there were a total of 46 independent schools operating alongside

2 This figure is likely be much higher if it were to include only Qatari nationals.


123

approximately 164 Ministry schools and 292 private schools. Independent school

students represented approximately 18 per cent of all K-12 students in Qatar, both

private and public, in that year. The growth in the independent schools has

continued, and full conversion of all Ministry schools to independent schools was

recently completed in April 2010.

A profile of the first two generations of independent schools, broken down to

grade level, gender, size and year is provided in Table 1.3 The majority of the

independent schools were primary schools. The largest independent schools, called

‘‘complexes’’, are schools that span a number of grades from kindergarten to grade

12. The Generation I schools – with an average enrolment of 760 students in

2004–2005 and 852 students in 2005–2006 – tended to be larger than those in

Generation II – with an average enrolment of 563 students in 2005–2006, driven

largely by the presence of the complexes.

Alongside educational reform and to ensure that Qataris maintain a vital share in

the governance of both the public and private sectors, the country’s leadership has

given high priority to a national policy termed ‘‘Qatarisation,’’ which promotes the

participation of Qatari citizens in the labour force, predominantly through skills

training and quotas, to induce employers to hire nationals. Semi-private or parastatal

corporations, such as Qatar Petroleum, as well as private companies have been

primary targets of the quota system, but the school system has also been charged

with promoting the employment of Qataris (Berrebi et al. 2009). Target quotas have

not been rigorously enforced, however, and many schools have fallen short (Stasz

et al. 2007). Despite this, the continued push toward Qatarisation has important

implications for school staffing and finance, which we discuss later in our

evaluation.

Along with Qatarisation, gender-related features of the Qatari labour market

have played an important role in school staffing. Schools are segregated by gender

for both students and staff. Female teachers may teach girls at all levels and boys

at the primary school level (grades 1–6). Primary schools, termed ‘‘model’’

schools, may use female staff to teach male students.4 Male teachers may teach

only boys. Men and women do not generally work together in the same institution,

so, for example, a boys’ primary school with female teachers is likely to have an

all-female staff. Again these features of the labour market have implications that

we later discuss.

3 In the majority of our tables and analyses, we use data provided by the Finance Office in the form of

audited statements, cash flow statements, staffing reports, and student enrolment figures from the years

2004–2006 and information we received during that period regarding changes slated for 2007–2008. A

detailed report relating to the evaluation can be found in Guarino et al. (2009). The earliest phases of the

K-12 school reform effort – i.e. those prior to 2004–2005 – are documented in Brewer et al. (2007). More

information about the reform can be found at Qatar’s Supreme Education Council website:

www.education.gov.qa (Arabic version, with a link to the English version). Further information about

the Research and Development (RAND) project supporting the reform initiative can be found at

www.rand.org/education/.4 Model schools were developed in the 1970s to ease the transition from home to school for young boys

(Brewer et al. 2007, p. 23).


123

http://www.education.gov.qa

http://www.rand.org/education/

Tab

le1

Gen

erat

ion

Ian

dII

indep

enden

tsc

hools

Gen

erat

ion

I

20

04–

20

05

Gen

erat

ion

I

20

05–

20

06

Gen

erat

ion

II

20

05–

20

06

Sch

oo

lsS

tud

ents

Av

erag

e

studen

ts/s

chool

Sch

oo

lsS

tud

ents

Av

erag

e

studen

ts/s

chool

Sch

oo

lsS

tud

ents

Av

erag

e

studen

ts/s

chool

Pri

mar

ym

od

elb

oy

s0

0N

/A0

0N

/A3

1,5

73

52

4.3

Pri

mar

yb

oy

s3

1,6

66

55

5.3

31

,866

62

21

62

56

25

Pri

mar

yg

irls

42

,691

67

2.8

42

,717

67

9.3

73

,971

56

7.3

Pre

par

atory

boys

21,2

01

600.5

21,2

71

635.5

21,2

40

620

Pre

par

atory

gir

ls0

0N

/A0

0N

/A4

2,2

32

558

Sec

ond

ary

bo

ys

12

45

24

51

34

83

48

21

,224

61

2

Sec

ond

ary

gir

ls0

0N

/A0

0N

/A2

94

84

74

Co

mple

xes

bo

ys

11

,790

1,7

90

.00

11

,860

1,8

60

.00

00

N/A

Co

mple

xes

gir

ls1

1,5

24

1,5

24

.00

12

,163

2,1

63

.00

00

N/A

To

tal

12

9,1

17

75

9.8

12

10

,22

58

52

.12

11

1,8

13

56

2.5

So

urc

eQ

atar

Su

pre

me

Ed

uca

tio

nC

ou

nci

lF

inan

ceO

ffice


123

Evaluation of the Qatar reform

Sustained adequate financing

Qatar has earmarked a significant amount of funding for educational reform and has

expanded its commitment over time. Average per-pupil funding in the Generation I

independent schools in the first year of operation (2004–2005) was approximately

QR 18,913,5 and remained roughly constant at QR 18,321 in 2005–2006. By

2005–2006, total funding for these schools amounted to QR 226 million (Ministry

of Education 2005).6

Evidence indicates that the financial support accorded to the independent schools

in their early years of operation exceeded expenditures. Figure 1 shows that, on

average, the independent schools carried surpluses in both 2004–2005 and

2005–2006. Surpluses as a proportion of operating revenues were, on average, 15

per cent for Generation I schools in the first year of operation and 10 per cent in the

second year. Generation II schools had surpluses comparable to Generation I (16 per

cent) in their first year of operation. Surpluses varied widely across schools,

however, ranging up to 29 per cent while one school in one year carried a slight

deficit (of -0.4).7

Although it is possible that schools may simply have been overfunded, we can

speculate on several alternative explanations for the accumulation of surpluses.

QR 16,023 QR 16,543 QR 15,186

QR 2,961QR 1,778QR 2,890

2004-2005 Generation I 2005-2006 Generation I 2005-2006 Generation II

Per-Pupil Operating Expenditures Per-Pupil Operating Surplus

QR 18,913 QR 18,321 QR 18,147

QR 25,000

QR 20,000

QR 15,000

QR 10,000

QR 5,000

QR 0

Fig. 1 Per-pupil operating revenues, expenditures and surpluses for Generation I and Generation IIschools for 2004–2005 and 2005–2006. Source Finance Office: KPMG-audited statements

5 The monetary values reported in this paper are in Qatari Riyals (QR). Readers may wish to translate

these into more familiar currencies, such as US dollars, British pounds or Euro. Generally, over the time

period covered in the study, the exchange rates were 3.64 QR per US dollar, 7.0 QR per British pound and

4.5 QR per Euro.6 Funding flows to the independent schools initially comprised three broad categories of support – start-

up funds designed to cover pre-operational expenses, per-pupil allotments based on school level and

enrolment, and grants to fund special projects or cover unusual needs. As the reform progressed, grants

were virtually eliminated in 2005–2006, and start-up funds were eliminated in 2006–2007.7 The school carrying a -0.4 per cent deficit in its first year of operation had a technology-intensive

curriculum. Without this school, the range in surpluses was from 3 per cent to 29 per cent.


123

First, a climate of uncertainty surrounding fiscal policies may have led operators to

maintain high balances for contingency funds. Second, operators may have lacked

experience in school spending. New independent schools may have lacked the time

or expertise to address spending decisions in a timely manner. If so, surpluses

should decrease over time as schools settle into operation. Third, the system

provided an incentive for operators to produce surpluses: independent schools were

originally set up as for-profit entities.8 Fourth, the system lacked direct incentives to

increase quality, since accountability mechanisms were not tied to academic

performance. Fifth, the requirement that all expenses needed to be approved by the

Finance Office may have led to under-spending.

Thus, the mere existence of surpluses does not indicate that funding levels were

‘‘adequate’’ to support educational excellence. First, standards of excellence must be

defined, and, second, the connection between funding and outcomes must be

established. Debate exists over how to establish this connection and measure the

impact of funding increases (Augenblick et al. 1997; Picus 2000; Guthrie and Springer

2007). Three main approaches have been developed to determine funding levels that

are adequate to achieve particular goals – the professional judgment approach, the

econometric approach and the successful schools approach – but each is subject to

limitations (Augenblick et al. 1997; Guthrie and Springer 2007; Hanushek 2006).

The professional judgment approach relies upon a panel of experts to decide upon

the resource levels needed to achieve a high targeted quality of learning environment.

Once the type and amount of resources are decided upon, they are assigned costs. The

costs are then summed to produce a total spending amount. While sensible, the

professional judgment approach has at least three drawbacks. First, no clear selection

criteria for the expert panel exist. Second, whether the panel is composed of educators

or financial officers, conflicts of interest are likely. Third, the judgments made are

likely to be subjective and devoid of efficiency considerations.

The econometric or ‘‘cost-function’’ approach uses econometric modelling to

examine the relationship between costs and education outcomes – generally student

achievement. The convenience and growing availability of test scores has led to

their popularity as a measure of excellence, although it is important to keep in mind

that other measures are important, such as graduation rates, student or parent

satisfaction or delayed effects (e.g. college attendance or employment rates). To

implement the econometric approach, costs are related in a statistical model to

achievement and school characteristics and predicted costs are then calculated for a

desired level of achievement. This approach is problematic for several reasons.

First, the data are based upon the existing use of resources, which may or may not

be efficient. Second, and more importantly, the results are highly sensitive to the

way in which the model is specified (Guthrie and Springer 2007). Third, if desired

achievement levels are much higher than those currently achieved in the sample of

schools in the data, the equation must predict costs based upon scanty evidence,

which may lead to out-of-sample prediction bias. Last and most importantly, the

model can be highly misleading if resources and achievement are only weakly

8 The original legal status of independent schools and the subsequent transformation from for-profit to

non-profit entities is discussed in greater detail in a later section.


123

related. If this relationship is not strong, then the model will produce very high and

most likely inflated estimates of the amount of funding needed to produce small

desired increases in student achievement (Hanushek 2006).

The successful schools approach examines actual expenditures in schools that are

viewed as being successful in achieving desired outcome levels, adjusting for

factors that lead to bias, such as having students from high-income families. In this

approach, high-performing schools are first identified, and average costs in these

schools are then calculated and used as evidence of adequate spending levels.9 One

advantage of this method is that it can examine the use of several types of resources

in high-performing schools and compare it with the use of these same resources in

lower-performing schools. For example, per-pupil expenditures, pupil-teacher

ratios, the ratio between administrative and instructional expenditures, etc., can

all be examined. A disadvantage is that it requires that the most successful schools

do indeed reach desired performance levels – if not, there will be no truly successful

schools from which to gather cost data.

Despite its limitations, we deemed the successful schools approach to be the most

appropriate methodology to apply to the Qatari context, given that it relies on actual

rather than hypothetical spending patterns and is not subject to the issues that

undermine the credibility of the econometric approach. As a first step, we created

value-added school performance measures using QCEA test scores.10 We

constructed performance measures for the independent schools by calculating

school-level effects on 2005–2006 test scores after adjusting for 2004–2005 test

performance and available child characteristics in student-level regressions – one

for each school level. Since the complexes had students in each of these levels, their

students appear in the three separate analyses. After estimating these regressions,11

9 In the U.S., the first study to employ a successful schools methodology was by John Augenblick and

John Myers (Augenblick et al. 1997) in response to the education adequacy order of the Ohio Supreme

Court in DeRolph v. State (1997).10 A simple measure such as average school performance may be biased if more able students tend to

select or be selected by particular schools. To correct for selection, some measure of a school’s ‘‘value

added’’ is constructed by adjusting in some fashion for the prior achievement of students, requiring a

minimum of two years of test scores for each student.11 The statistical model can be written as follows:

yist ¼ qyit�1 þ Xistbþ ast þ cLOSSist þ eist ð1Þ

where yist is the achievement of child i in school s at time t, yit-1 is the achievement of child i in the prior

period t - 1 (independent of school s as we allow for the possibility that a pupil changed schools), and

X is a vector of child characteristics obtained from QNEDS data (gender, special needs, Qatari

citizenship, age in months, grade level, mother’s and father’s education, parent involvement with the

school and homework, hours spent on homework, Arabic language primacy in the home, residency in the

capital city of Doha). The parameter q represents the relationship between current and prior achievement.

The vector of parameters b represents the relationships between student achievement and each of the

variables contained in X. The parameters ast, which differ for each school, represent the deviation from

average achievement for each school, after adjusting for all the other factors in the model. Thus, these

estimates serve as our school performance measures.

In addition, we included an indicator for a student’s having the lowest obtainable scale score (LOSS)

for their grade because the tests contained strong floor effects and a number of children appeared not to

have answered any questions, thus introducing measurement error. The inclusion of the LOSS indicator

variable was the most parsimonious correction for the measurement problems.


123

we saved the adjusted school performance measures for use in subsequent

analyses. We then compared the schools ranked in the top half of the distribution of

adjusted performance measures with those ranked in the bottom half to see if

there was a difference in per-pupil expenditures (PPE) and pupil-teacher ratio

(PTR). Table 2 shows these differences for the four testing subjects over the three

school levels.

Table 2 Resource use in independent schools ranked in the top and bottom halves of the school per-

formance distribution in 2005–2006

Type of test Type of school Number of schools PPE PTR

Arabic Top primary 8 (2) 14968.4* 11.5*

Bottom primary 10 13555.6 14.1

Top preparatory 4 (1) 16087.5 13.3

Bottom preparatory 4 (1) 16373.4 14.2

Top secondary 1 (2) 18100.3 10.2

Bottom secondary 3 25147.1� 11.5

English Top primary 8 (2) 14856.0* 11.7*

Bottom primary 10 13645.5 14


Bottom preparatory 5 16132.4 13.4

Top secondary 1 (2) 18100.3 10.2


Maths Top primary 8 (2) 14999.6* 12




Top secondary 1 (2) 18100.3 10.2


Science Top primary 8 (2) 14174.6 13




Top secondary 1 (2) 18641.8 10.2


Note The top/bottom rankings were created using the adjusted school performance measure including the

two complexes. ‘‘Number of schools’’ is the number of schools used in calculating the average per-pupil

expenditure (PPE) and does not include the two complexes because their financial information was not

broken out by level; the number of complexes is indicated in parentheses

* Indicates a significant difference between the top and bottom halves at the 10 per cent level� Note that the Per-Pupil Operating Expenditure numbers for the bottom half of the secondary schools

include a vocational school with a technology-intensive curriculum, which has significantly higher per-

pupil expenditure as a result of its curriculum focus. Excluding this school gives PPE values for the

bottom half secondary schools of QR 19,787 for the Arabic, English and Maths test and QR 19,444 for the

Science test. Pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) numbers change only slightly


123

From Table 2, we see that the top half of primary schools in Arabic, English and

mathematics spent more per pupil, on average, than those in the bottom half of these

tests. The difference is statistically significant, even with the small number of

schools in each grouping. There were some apparent differences in spending at the

preparatory and secondary levels, but these were not statistically significant –

possibly due to a lack of power given the smaller number of schools in these groups.

Similar results were found for the pupil-teacher ratios: better test results for the

Arabic and English exams in primary schools were associated with smaller class

sizes. It is worth noting that the average pupil-teacher ratio for the top half of

schools is consistently better than the average pupil-teacher ratio for the bottom half

for every test at every level but one (preparatory English), although not always

statistically significant. The above analyses should be interpreted as merely

suggestive, however, given the limited number of schools in the system. In addition,

it is important to note that the school performance measures we have created are not

exact measures of ‘‘true’’ school quality but are instead approximations. Further-

more, a school performance achievement objective has yet to be established in

Qatar. To fully assess whether schools have attained excellence, excellence must be

defined through the establishment of national proficiency targets based on these

types of performance measures.

The analysis suggests, however, that spending slightly more than QR 15,000 per

pupil in primary schools (at 2005–2006 prices) is associated with relatively high

performance levels in Arabic, English and mathematics. Given that per-pupil

revenue allocations at the primary level were set at QR 16,000, they may be have

been adequate to produce educational excellence, and it is possible that low-

spending schools should be encouraged to spend more rather than accumulate

surpluses.

To explore the relationship between resources and achievement further, we

estimated a similar regression model treating school effects as random and

dependent upon funding and pupil-teacher ratios.12 We found that both higher per-

pupil expenditures and lower pupil-teacher ratios were significantly related to

higher achievement on test scores. Our estimates indicated that for an additional

QR 5,000 spent per pupil on education, one could expect to see an increase in

Maths test scores of 1 point, on a base of a 17-point average year-to-year increase.

Similarly, an increase of one pupil per teacher was associated with a reduction in

average test scores by nearly 1.5 points in Maths. Full estimation results are found

in Table 3.

With the small number of schools available for analysis in the first years of the

reform, we do not claim to have presented definitive findings regarding adequate

funding levels but rather to have illustrated a methodology for determining school

performance and tracking the spending levels of high-performing schools. As the

reform expands, the power of such analyses to detect potential significant

relationships will increase.

12 A Hausman test of the random versus fixed effect specifications indicated that the move to the more

efficient random effects estimator was justifiable.


123

Table 3 Achievement regressions for Arabic, English, Maths and Science tests for independent schools

at the primary level

2006 Subject test scale score

Arabic English Maths Science

Per-pupil operating expenditure (QR) 0.002

(1.91)

0

(0.28)

0.005

(4.53)**

0.007

(4.69)**

Pupil-teacher ratio -1.509

(4.75)**

-0.911

(5.19)**

-1.46

(4.05)**

0.377

(0.75)

2005 Subject test scale score 0.629

(39.42)**

0.352

(22.68)**

0.386

(22.84)**

0.527

(22.31)**

Received lowest obtainable scale

score in 2005 (dummy)

132.282

(22.28)**

27.961

(13.80)**

35.345

(10.29)**

65.378

(12.65)**

Received lowest obtainable scale

score in 2006 (dummy)

-227.477

(40.81)**

-103.31

(97.05)**

-114.322

(54.00)**

-121.072

(27.13)**

Generation II (dummy) 7.333

(2.49)*

-3.454

(2.03)*

14.252

(4.20)**

23.841

(4.55)**

Scale of parent involvement in school events, 0:6,

6 high

-0.54

(1.27)

-0.137

(0.58)

0.203

(0.42)

-0.362

(0.56)

Scale of parent involvement in homework; 0:2,

2 high

-6.696

(3.82)**

-2.53

(2.59)**

-5.8

(2.89)**

-8.391

(3.43)**

Scale of parent discussion of plans & academics

with child; 0:3, 3 high

1.168

(1.34)

-0.171

(0.35)

0.53

(0.53)

-1.512

(1.14)

Homework time dummy: 1 if spent more than

1 h/wk on homework

-0.144

(0.09)

0.147

(0.16)

0.698

(0.38)

2.537

(1.02)

0 if child is not a special needs child;

1 if child is a special needs child

-5.636

(1.02)

-6.063

(2.04)*

-3.176

(0.53)

-5.08

(0.62)

0 if Arabic is main language spoken at home;

1 if some other language

-16.398

(4.09)**

0.001

0.00

-5.846

(1.30)

-5.415

(0.98)

Parents spent more than 2,000 QR on

child’s education (dummy)

2.216

(1.05)

-1.95

(1.68)

-0.53

(0.22)

-3.81

(1.19)

Parents spend 501–2,000 QR

on child’s education

2.642

(1.36)

-1.063

(0.99)

1.209

(0.54)

-1.642

(0.56)

Father completed secondary (dummy) -0.225

(0.12)

0.001

0.00

-1.792

(0.87)

5.739

(2.08)*

Father has Bachelor’s (dummy) 5.467

(3.04)**

2.834

(2.86)**

5.843

(2.87)**

5.097

(1.87)

Father has Master’s or higher (dummy) 3.705

(1.31)

0.454

(0.29)

1.143

(0.35)

7.519

(1.78)

Mother completed secondary (dummy) 4.924

(2.75)**

0.471

(0.48)

3.932

(1.93)

6.445

(2.38)*

Mother has Bachelor’s (dummy) 4.249

(2.38)*

2.278

(2.31)*

6.023

(2.99)**

12.083

(4.39)**


123

Accountability

The World Bank and Copenhagen Consensus reports emphasise accountability to

stakeholders as an essential element of an education reform. In accord with this

notion, a key element of Qatar’s reform was to hold independent schools

accountable for fiscal responsibility and student learning. Accountability relied

primarily on two mechanisms: school choice and fiscal monitoring.

The first involves allowing parents to select the school that their children attend –

essentially ‘‘voting with their feet’’ and signalling their satisfaction with schools.

Schools that failed to attract parents and students would not survive in the

educational marketplace. Schools that survived, on the other hand, would be those

whose academic and extracurricular offerings have sufficiently captured the interest

Table 3 continued

2006 Subject test scale score

Arabic English Maths Science

Mother has Master’s or higher (dummy) 11.653

(2.31)*

4.934

(1.77)

12.331

(2.10)*

23.008

(3.17)**

Grade 5 (dummy) 23.996

(11.49)**

10.862

(9.44)**

-28.911

(7.47)**

71.042

(1.77)

Grade 6 (dummy) 38.586

(12.41)**

16.274

(9.48)**

-19.139

(3.89)**

78.722

(1.91)

Share of teachers at the school who are Qatari -4.408

(0.85)

-5.815

(2.01)*

7.41

(1.26)

0.322

(0.04)

Average teacher salary at the school (QR) 0.003

(2.10)*

0.006

(6.34)**

0.004

(2.38)*

0.03

(10.46)**

School size (number of students) 0.023

(1.82)

0.005

(0.69)

0.044

(3.15)**

-0.19

(8.79)**

Student is Qatari (dummy) -9.705

(6.07)**

-2.934

(3.37)**

-8.929

(4.92)**

-12.182

(5.03)**

Female school (dummy) 8.28

(3.88)**

8.142

(6.73)**

-3.779

(1.57)

3.646

(0.96)

School is in Doha (dummy) 5.526

(2.36)*

1.634

(1.28)

3.512

(1.34)

10.818

(2.94)**

Age in months -0.409

(3.76)**

-0.063

(1.05)

0.021

(0.17)

-0.403

(2.58)**

Constant 171.918

(6.98)**

311.723

(20.37)**

241.592

(8.85)**

0

(.)

Observations 2906 2864 2854 1906

Number of groups (schools) 17 17 17 16

Note Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 5%

** Significant at 1%


123

of parents and students. Parents could use assessment results and other information

disseminated to the public to understand how well schools perform relative to each

other and make informed choices regarding where their children will attend school.

To aid parental decision-making, school report cards were disseminated to

inform parents of the academic performance and features of every independent,

Ministry and private Arabic school in Qatar. However, the choice mechanism itself

was overall fairly weak. All independent schools were converted from Ministry

schools rather than arising as ‘‘start-up’’ schools. Space in the independent schools

was thus constrained by limited facilities and, in addition, by requirements to limit

class sizes to 25 students. Many independent schools were oversubscribed, and

preference was given to students who attended the school before conversion and

students within the school’s catchment area (Supreme Education Council 2007a).

Thus there was little incentive for independent schools to achieve higher

performance levels to attract enrolments. However, the fact that many independent

schools had waiting lists may have encouraged Ministry schools to raise their

standards – i.e. potentially producing desirable ‘‘spillover’’ effects.13

In addition to using market-based choice mechanisms, the Finance Office held

schools fiscally accountable through a monitoring process that tracked school costs

and operators’ resource allocation decisions. It did so through three practices:

external audits,14 internal monitoring at each school and regulation. The internal

monitoring system at each school included a set of policies and procedures

regarding financial matters, a budget development calendar, a computer-based

accounting system, a system for payroll services and banking arrangements.

Regulations covered surpluses, financial operations, and salary floors for Qatari

staff. For example, restrictions were placed on the percentage of the overall budget

that could be used for administrative expenses, and there was a minimum amount

that must be used for instructional staff and expenses. Minimum salaries for Qataris

were established on the basis of education level and prior service in the Ministry of

Education. Schools submitted a number of reports throughout the year directly to

the Finance Office so that it could assess compliance with regulations.15 Based on

these data, we found that the majority of schools adhered to most guidelines.

Unfortunately, staffing reports provided the monthly salaries and nationality of staff

members but did not note education levels. Thus, compliance with salary floors

could not be monitored without relying upon individuals to report departures from

the minimum levels.

The Finance Office adjusted fiscal accountability standards with regard to

budgetary surpluses and operator compensation after observing the surpluses in the

first year of school operations. In 2004–2005, the Finance Office recommended that

‘‘During the initial years of opening, reinvestments into the schools is the preferred

use of any surplus funds; however, operator annual benefits (including stipends and

13 We had no information on the incentive structures for Ministry schools, however, and could not assess

whether spillover effects had occurred.14 Audits were performed by KPMG and Deloitte & Touche in 2004–2006.15 These included periodic budget projections, cash-flow statements, and staffing and enrolment reports

in addition to the external audits and annual reports.


123

other compensation) should not exceed 10 per cent of the revenue’’ (Education

Institute 2004, p. 17). Later, in early 2006, however, the Executive Committee of

the SEC decided to place school budget surpluses in a holding account. Funds were

available from this account for school-related expenses upon request and subject to

the approval by the Education Institute. It is unclear why these restrictions were

imposed, although fears of profit-taking by operators appear to have played a role.

We found no evidence that the operators themselves received any portion of profits

in 2004–2005, however, and thus assume that the restrictions were preemptive. In

sum, we found that accountability for the proper use of resources within the system

relied more on regulation than parental choice, and regulations grew more stringent

with the passage of time.

Autonomy

According to the internationally accepted framework, a sound education system

must give producers sufficient autonomy to manage for results. Once adequate

financing has been secured, producers must be given the ability to determine the mix

of inputs to best reach those objectives. Accountability without autonomy will be

unlikely to attract capable and motivated providers. Autonomy was considered a

fundamental principle upon which Qatar’s education reform was founded.

Compared with those in the traditional Ministry system, independent school

operators were initially afforded unprecedented freedom in staff selection,

pedagogical practice and resource allocation and, as previously mentioned, parents

were offered a degree of school choice.

As we have seen, however, the de facto choice mechanism was weak from the start,

and the Finance Office stepped in to increase regulations on the use of funds. We

found that in the early years of the K-12 reform in Qatar, each aspect of autonomy that

the incentive structure provided was undermined; not only were surpluses frozen,

but real funding levels were cut and other regulations were intensified as well.

Changes to finance-related policies were frequently instituted as financial and

administrative information on the independent schools flowed in, and measures were

taken to address perceived problems in the system. Thus, the initial reform structure

was altered, curtailing autonomy and possibly innovation along with it.

The existence of substantial surpluses had formed much of the impetus for

cutbacks in funding and changes in regulations guiding the reform. A further

impetus was the desire to promote Qatari nationals in leadership positions. In

addition to the added restrictions on surplus accumulation and operator compen-

sation (described in the previous section), grants were eliminated as an added source

of funding and a change in the legal status and leadership requirements for the

schools was instituted, including requirements that operators be Qatari nationals and

serve as principals of the schools. To promote a variety of schooling options for

students, the original reform design had allowed any individuals or groups from the

community to apply for the position of school operator, subject to the approval of

the SEC. For example, a group of parents could unite to start an independent school

or Qatar Petroleum could open a school that emphasised science and mathematics to

act as a potential source of student talent for the company. Initially, the independent


123

schools were privately incorporated as limited liability corporations (LLCs). A

minimum of two people is needed to form an LLC in Qatar, and one member must

be Qatari. Therefore, teams of operators formed. By virtue of their status as LLCs,

schools became for-profit entities, a strong departure from the traditional public

school culture in Qatar. By March 2006, however, regulations regarding operators

and legal entities had changed: independent schools were changed to non-profits and

operators were required to be Qatari nationals and serve as their school’s principal

(Supreme Education Council 2006). As a result of these changes, the operator teams

in approximately one-half of Generation I and II independent schools no longer fit

the requirements, which engendered significant turnover in school leadership

(Zellman et al. 2009).

In addition to these policy shifts, the SEC made changes affecting staffing and

resources in independent schools. In the first year of operation of Generation I

independent schools, operators had the freedom to recruit teachers from any country

they wished to fulfil teaching and staffing needs. After the first year of operation,

however, the Qatarisation policy to promote the employment of Qatari nationals

was put in place by setting quotas. The quotas differed by level and type of school in

recognition of the different balances of Qataris and expatriate teachers needed for

boys and girls at different ages. They ranged from 20 per cent in boys’ secondary

schools to 70 per cent in girls’ secondary schools (Supreme Education Council

2005). Minimum salaries for Qatari educators were set in May 2005 (ibid.), and in

October 2005, the SEC specified that the surplus funds be directed toward meeting

Qatarisation goals (ibid.). In addition, a 40 per cent increase in the base salary of

Qatari nationals in the Civil Service was instituted in September 2007 in response to

nationwide increases in the cost of living, driven largely by increases in the price of

real estate. To furnish the funds for the mandated salary increases, the SEC

increased per-pupil allotments by QR 2,000 for all primary schools and QR 1,000

for preparatory girls’ and secondary girls’ schools, beginning in 2007–2008

(Supreme Education Council 2007c). These increases were meant to ‘‘encourage

more Qatari involvement in the reform initiative’’ and ‘‘to ensure that Qatari staff in

independent schools enjoy the same living standards as their partners in other

official sectors’’ (Supreme Education Council 2007b). These changes, in addition to

the elimination of grants in 2005–2006 and the elimination of start-up funds for new

schools in 2007–2008 represented significant modifications to revenue policies.

These governmental alterations to staffing policies and the market wage of

Qataris reduced the autonomy of providers to choose their own optimal mix of

teachers. In addition, they exerted potentially substantial constraints on resource

allocation decisions within schools. The degree to which operators experienced

these constraints varied, given the different characteristics of staff at various school

levels and types.

Gender equity

With the establishment of the third of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000,

the international community charged nations with the clear objective of achieving

gender equity in education. Equity concerns arise in education and education


123

finance when particular groups are short-changed in the allocation of resources

within a system. Given possible gender-based differences in the sensitivity of school

operations to system-wide policies noted above, we investigated gender differences

in both educational outcomes and education finance in the Qatari reform.

With respect to academic outcomes, girls appeared to fare well in the initial years

of operation of the independent schools. Female enrolment rates in the schools

tended to be equal to or higher than that of boys at various levels. In fact, Qatari

girls were more likely to have a secondary degree and to have received advanced

training as of 2004, reversing older trends in which men were more educated than

women (Berrebi et al. 2009). Our regression analysis in the adequacy section

indicated that girls’ schools tended to do as well or better than boys’ schools on

nearly every achievement test at every level. This result was independently

corroborated by Zellman et al. (2009) who used a different model and also found

statistically significant differences favouring girls on the QCEA examinations.

Because clear differences exist in the staffing characteristics of girls’ and boys’

schools, we also examined the fiscal balance between the two types of schools. We

expected that gender segregation might have an impact on school finances given

that wages account for the majority of school expenditures and female teachers

typically earn substantially less than their male counterparts. Since primary,

preparatory and secondary schools received different amounts of funding, we

investigated potential gender-related fiscal disparities by school level.

Inspection of the 2005–2006 finance data16 indicated that average per-pupil

revenues were not very different for boys’ schools and girls’ schools. Similarly,

there appeared to be little evidence of differences between boys’ and girls’ schools

at each level when comparing operating revenues, expenditures and surpluses (see

Fig. 2), except for an apparent difference in surpluses at the secondary level in

QR 12,967 QR 15,684 QR 19,444

QR 2,715

QR 3,874

QR 2,210

QR 13,840 QR 15,924 QR 18,371

QR 2,429

QR 3,689

QR 3,760

QR 0Boys

Elementary (N=4)

GirlsElementary

(N=7)

Boys Middle(N=2)

Girls Middle(N=4)

BoysSecondary

(N=2)

GirlsSecondary

(N=2)

Per-pupil Operating Surplus Per-Pupil Operating Expenditure

QR 25,000

QR 20,000

QR 15,000

QR 10,000

QR 5,000

Fig. 2 Per-pupil operating expenditures and surpluses for generation II schools from 1 September 2005to 30 June 2006, by school level and gender. Source Finance Office: KPMG audited statements

16 Given the limited number of schools in certain levels of Generation I and the fact that the Generation I

complexes did not provide financial breakdowns by level, we focused only on the 21 Generation II

schools in 2005–2006 in our analysis of gender by level.


123

favour of girls’ schools where one of the two girls’ secondary schools had higher

than average miscellaneous income per pupil. Thus, it appeared that the finance

system achieved a certain amount of gender parity overall.

However, upon further inspection, these apparent similarities masked underlying

differences in compensation. The financial balance was, in fact, tenuous and

dependent upon the offsetting effects of male/female and Qatari/non-Qatari salary

differences. Traditionally, in the Qatari labour force, men earn higher salaries than

women, largely because of a different benefit structure.17 As a result, employees

generally do not expect gender parity in compensation. Furthermore, as in many

other countries, teachers are far more likely to be women than men. In 2006–2007,

females represented approximately 70 per cent of all staff and 68 per cent of all

teachers in the independent schools. Female teachers comprised 50 per cent of all

employees in the independent schools, followed by female non-teachers (25 per

cent), male teachers (18 per cent), and male non-teachers (8 per cent).

Given that boys’ preparatory (grades 7–9) and secondary (grades 10–12) schools

employ only male teachers, many male teachers must be recruited abroad to teach in

boys’ schools. Thus, the proportion of expatriate male teachers is greater than that of

expatriate female teachers. The pressures posed by these types of compensation and

employment differentials are seen in markets and education systems across the

globe.

The move toward increased participation of Qataris in the workforce, if realised,

has important implications for financing the reform since Qataris earn higher

salaries than expatriate workers of similar education and experience. Changes in the

salaries of Qataris relative to those of non-Qataris might shift the balance in staff

spending between the boys’ and girls’ schools because girls’ schools employ higher

proportions of Qataris. For the same reason, stronger enforcement of the

Qatarisation quotas designed to increase the proportion of Qataris in the workforce

might upset the balance in staff spending between the boys’ and girls’ schools. To

investigate possible effects, we performed a forecasting simulation.18

Figure 3 shows average monthly salary differences for teachers by gender and

nationality in all independent schools in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006 that we used as

baseline data. Qatari men are by far the highest paid staff members in the

independent schools. In 2004–2005, they earned around 52 per cent more (QR

4,805), on average, than the next highest earning category, Qatari women. This

difference grew even more in 2005–2006, when Qatari men earned almost 60 per

cent more than Qatari women (a premium of QR 5,585) in the independent schools.

Non-Qatari teachers of either gender received lower average salaries than their

Qatari counterparts. Of particular interest in Fig. 3 is the 20 per cent increase over

the two-year period in the average monthly salaries of non-Qatari male teachers to

the point where they were similar to the salaries of Qatari female teachers. It is

likely, then, that the observed parity in boys’ and girls’ schools’ instructional

17 Several traditional types of ‘‘allowances’’ are attached to salaries in Qatar, which may include separate

payments for social needs, housing and transportation, for example. Men and women differ in their

eligibility for these allowances (Berrebi et al. 2009).18 A detailed description of the forecasting simulation and procedures can be found in Guarino et al.

(2009).


123

expenses was an outcome of the salary parity between Qatari females and non-

Qatari males. The lowest earning category by far was female non-Qataris, who in

2005–2006 earned some 45 per cent less than those in the female Qatari and male

non-Qatari categories and earned less than half of a male Qatari’s average salary.

Given these underlying differences in salary structure, we used the forecasting

model to predict the effect on girls’ versus boys’ schools of the mandated wage

increase for Qataris coupled with the possible enforcement of Qatarisation policies.

We found the potential impact to be highly heterogeneous, with some schools

gaining a windfall and other schools running into large deficits.

Since schools staffed by female teachers have higher percentages of Qatari

nationals than those staffed by male teachers, these schools could expect increases

in operating expenditures between 5 per cent and 8 per cent due to the wage

increase, compared with increases of between 0 per cent and 1.5 per cent for male-

staffed schools. Thus the overall impact of the wage increase would be far more

harmful to female-taught schools – i.e. all the girls’ schools and the boys’ model

schools – than male-taught schools.

The potential impact of Qatarisation goals – if they were to be fulfilled – was

more complex because the goals differed by school level. The forecast impact of

fulfilling Qatarisation goals along with the 40 per cent base salary increase for

Qatari staff was to increase expenditure by more than 8 per cent for all types of

primary schools and secondary girls’ schools, but by 5 per cent or less for

preparatory schools and boys’ secondary schools. The slated increase in per-pupil

allotments would be insufficient to cover the increased expenditures in some schools

and more than sufficient in others. Girls’ schools at primary and secondary levels,

along with primary boys’ schools, would be the most likely to suffer the net effects

of all the policies.

5,9776,430

9,213 9,389

7,687

9,324

14,01814,974

02004 2005

Category

Female Non-Qatari Female Qatari Male Non-Qatari Male Qatari

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Ave

rage

Sal

ary

in Q

R

Fig. 3 Average monthly teacher salaries in the independent schools, by gender and nationality2004–2005 and 2005–2006. Source Office of Finance Staffing Reports. Note. In 2004, Female Non-Qatarin = 296; Female Qatari n = 213; Male Non-Qatari n = 177; Male Qatari n = 35. In 2005, Female Non-Qatari n = 687; Female Qatari n = 585; Male Non-Qatari n = 344; Male Qatari n = 42


123

Thus, although Qatar met or exceeded the Millennium Development Goal of

gender parity in scholastic outcomes and resources in the first years of its reform,

the apparent equity in school finances was the result of a tenuous balance between

gender and nationality wage premiums, and proposed Qatarisation and wage

policies could easily upset this balance. If salary differentials remained static while

the staffing mix changed, the funding balance between boys’ and girls’ schools

could be greatly altered.

Conclusion

This study evaluated Qatar’s recent and ambitious Education for a New Era reform

in the early stages of its implementation against a set of four criteria for successful

education systems drawn from guidelines advanced by the international community:

adequacy, accountability, autonomy and gender equity. We investigated both the

initial structure of the reform and its sustainability in light of concerns that

movements in these directions might be politically unfeasible in many contexts.

With regard to adequacy, we found that initial funding appeared adequate to

secure performance levels that were high relative to implicit standards within the

system. Our methods could not discern whether funding was adequate to sustain

educational excellence, however, because standards of excellence had not been

defined. At the time of our data collection, levels of funding appeared adequate to

maintain the performance levels of the higher achieving schools, but more rigorous

performance levels might be desired. Furthermore, although funding in the early

years was generous enough to result in budgetary surpluses on the part of most

schools, later changes to funding policies had the potential to cause fiscal strain and

possible reductions in school quality. Our findings provided suggestive evidence

that a positive relationship between school quality and funding existed within the

system. We found that schools appeared hesitant or unable to spend all their allotted

funding in the first year of operation – thus it is possible that spending may need to

be facilitated or encouraged in order to reach levels that enhance student

performance. Unless a more comprehensive determination of ‘‘successful’’ school

outcomes is made, however, adequate funding levels remain uncertain. In any case,

funding levels were reduced rather than maintained or increased by the SEC in

response to the initial surpluses, reflecting a judgment on their part that levels were

too high.

We found that accountability to stakeholders within the system was enforced

primarily via spending restrictions. The parental choice mechanism – one of the

principles underlying the reform – was relatively weak because of capacity

constraints and thus unlikely to have provided a strong incentive to raise quality.

Spending restrictions, on the other hand, appear to have been effective in achieving

desired ratios for instructional and administrative expenditures and averting

potential profit-taking among school operators. Reducing access to surpluses may

have curbed the flexibility of operators to make investments in high-quality

education, however, and it is unclear whether the accountability provisions


123

established through the finance system would have had a positive, negative, or

neutral effect on school quality going forward.

We found that autonomy to manage for results with incentives for capable and

motivated providers appeared to have been strong in the reform design and in the

initial years of the reform but was increasingly eroded in subsequent years. Over

time, successive constraints imposed on providers rendered the leadership structure

more similar to that of the pre-existing Ministry of Education system.

With regard to gender equity, we found that the participation of girls in the

independent school system was as high as that of boys and that girls scholastically

outperformed boys in the system. Thus the gender gap appeared to be the reverse of

that in many parts of the world. We also observed gender parity in school finance in

the first two years of the reform. However, this parity was maintained through a

tenuous balance that depended upon offsetting wage premiums for gender and

nationality. A combination of newer workforce policies, if fully implemented, could

severely threaten the balance and potentially have a negative impact on the

academic achievement of girls.

The Qatar K-12 educational reform has expanded quickly as the conversion of

existing schools to independent schools has continued at a rapid pace to complete

conversion in 2010. However, as we have seen, many of the reform principles that

reflected international recommendations were almost immediately transformed –

largely in the direction of mimicking the pre-existing system. Initially generous

funding levels were reduced, calling into question the long-term adequacy of

funding for educational excellence. Provider autonomy was curbed and the

population from which providers could be drawn – initially unrestricted – was

limited to individuals within the system. Gender parity with respect to achievement

and funding promised to be an ongoing issue as competing labour market reforms

altered the mix of nationalities in the teacher workforce.

To some degree, these developments substantiate criticisms that reform along the

lines promoted by international agencies may be politically unfeasible and difficult

to sustain – even in a system of political hegemony like the emirate of Qatar.

However, it is important to note that the K-12 reform has changed the landscape of

education in Qatar and that many reform principles, though diluted, have been

retained. As it stands, Education for a New Era has introduced school choice and

streamlined many administrative functions.

In addition, it put in place comprehensive data systems, including both fiscal

records and standardised testing regimes. These systems, if maintained, would

facilitate ongoing evaluations of progress along the lines outlined in this paper.

Because of the extensive data collection, we were able to evaluate the reform in its

early years, providing information and designing analyses that highlight the

strengths and weaknesses of the system and serve as an example for other nations. A

later follow-up to this analysis would be an important subject for future research, as

it would reveal the trajectory of these initial trends.

This paper has highlighted lessons learned in the first few years of independent

school operation and has presented and applied a methodology for evaluating

progress along key dimensions of reform. The Qatar experience has struck both

hopeful and cautionary notes and provides useful lessons for other countries – not


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only those in the Gulf region but also those embarking upon ambitious educational

restructuring – and our analytic strategy for assessing the performance of a school

finance system can be applied to school systems in many nations.

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The authors

Cassandra M. Guarino is an education economist at Indiana University Bloomington specialising in

policy. She obtained her PhD in the economics of education from Stanford University in 1999. Her work

explores factors leading to education production and includes both US and international research.

Jeffery C. Tanner is an economist at the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group specialising in

Impact Evaluations. He is completing his PhD in policy analysis (applied economics) at the RAND

Graduate School. His work focuses on development economics, specifically the design and evaluation of

public sector programs, and international migration.


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http://www.english.education.gov.qa/section/sec/education_institute/admission

http://www.english.education.gov.qa/section/sec/education_institute/admission



http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf

http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf

Documents

Adequacy, accountability, autonomy and equity in a Middle Eastern school reform: The case of Qatar