Addressing Challenges in Climate Change Adaptation...2 Also known more widely in the Pacific as ‘kava’, and scientifically as Piper methysticum, it is a plant that is indigenous

Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND 1

AddressingChallengesinClimateChangeAdaptation:LearningfromtheNarikosoCommunityRelocationinFiji1

AnnaAnisi

Abstract

Climatechangeadaptationremainsacomplexchallengebothinpolicyandinpractice.Yet,comprehensiveand interdisciplinaryresearchonadaptationbarriersandchallengesarelimited, particularly in the context of small island developing states at the forefront ofclimate change. This paper draws from the experiences of amulti-stakeholder plannedrelocationmeasureinNarikosovillage,Fiji,toenhanceunderstandingsaroundthenatureandscopeof challenges in relocationprocesses foradaptation.Key learningsaredrawnfromtheNarikosocasestudywith implicationsforpolicyandpractice.Thisbriefmakesstrategicandoperationalrecommendationsinareasof:promotingparticipatoryprocesses;buildingonexistingcapacitiesandimprovingcoordination;strengtheningtheinclusionofsocio-culturaldynamics;improvingmonitoring,evaluationandlearning;andsecuringandmanagingfinance.

1 This paper is based on research conducted by the author for the purpose of a Master’s thesis entitled‘Explaining thepresenceandemergenceof climatechangeadaptationbarriers:Acasestudyof theplannedrelocationofNarikosovillageintheFijiIslands’(2019).Albert-LudwigsUniversity,Freiburg.Theauthoracknowledgesthevaluablecontributionsofthekeyinformantsinvolvedinthisstudyincluding:governmentministries;non-governmentstakeholders;andthecommunityofNarikosovillageinKadavu,Fiji-allwithoutwhomthisstudywouldnothavebeenpossible.

PolicyBriefNo.84

July2020

Policy Brief No. 84 Toda Peace Institute 2

Introduction

Adaptation to climate change poses a complex governance challenge for policymakers,developmentplanners, practitioners and communities.While adaptation goals generallyaimatreducingvulnerabilitiesand increasingresilience inhuman-environmentsystems(SmitandWandel2006),definingwhatthisactuallymeansforpolicyandinpracticeinlocalcontextsposesacontentiousissue.Forone,adaptationprocessesinherentlyraiseissuesofprioritisation, trade-offs and just distributions in decision-making around ‘who shouldadapt’, ‘what needs adapting’, and ‘how to adapt’.Moreover, understanding anddealingwith global climate system dynamics and related inherent uncertainties and feedbackeffects is premised on reliable data and an effective integration of climate science intodevelopmentplansandclimatepolicy (Dessai et al.2009;Termeeretal.2013).Climatechange adaptation is therefore a complex process where numerous gaps have becomeapparentasreflectedinalackofstreamlinedandeffectivestrategies,plansandpublicpol-icies(Kleinetal.2005),alsowithlimitedsuccessesinachievingthedesiredoutcomesontheground(Berrang-Fordetal.2011;Biesbroeketal.2010;Biesbroeketal.2011;Swartetal.2014).Consequently,theseobservationshaveraisedtheneedfordifferentapproachesincomprehensiveanalysisofadaptationchallenges,aswellasfindingwaysforaddressingtheseinadaptationprocesses(Biesbroeketal.2013;MoserandEkstrom2010).

Inrecentyears, therehasbeengrowingpoliticalattentionaroundtheemerging issueofclimate-inducedrelocationasanadaptationmeasuresinceitwasofficiallybroughtintotheCancunAdaptationFrameworkin2010(McAdamandFerris2015;UNFCCC2010).Plannedrelocationshavebeendescribedasastate-ledapproachtomovepeoplefromhigh-risktolower-riskareaswithinnationalboundaries,developed inresponsetoclimaticandnon-climaticvulnerabilities,andconductedwiththepriorinformedconsentandparticipationof the affected persons or communities (UNHCR 2014). Moreover, planned relocationinvolvesaprocessofresettlementthataimstoimprovelivelihoodsandtoenhancepossi-bilitiesforsocialandeconomicdevelopmentinanewlocality(McAdamandFerris2015;McNamaraetal.2016).Plannedrelocationsthereforedifferfromforcedrelocationswherepersonsorcommunitiesareresettledinvoluntaryandbecomedisplacedwithinoracrossnationalborders (Warneretal.2013).Plannedrelocation isalsodifferent fromclimate-inducedmigrationwhichusuallyreferstomovementofpeopleacrossnationalbordersonamorepermanentscale(Burkett2011).

Theincreasinglyrelevantissueofclimate-inducedrelocationhasalreadytranslatedintoclimatepolicyinsomePacificSmallIslandDevelopingStates(PSIDS).TheGovernmentofFiji(GoF)isseenasaglobalforerunnerinadvancingnational-levelclimatechangepoli-cies,plansandguidelinesforinstitutionalisingplannedrelocationsasaclimatechangead-aptationmeasure.Inthislocalcontext,communityrelocationsareconsidered“anoptionoflastresort”assuchprocessesareconsideredbothcomplexandcostly(GoF2018b).Nevertheless,giventheincreasingvulnerabilityofcoastalcommunities,duetoamyriadoffactorsbutinparticularlinkedtotheissueofsealevelriseandcoastalinundation,40communitieshavealreadybeenidentifiedasbeinginneedofrelocating(GoF2018b).Onechallengeforstrategicplanninginthisregardisthatthereislimitedresearchonthelong-termenvironmental,economicandpoliticalimplicationsofpastrelocationsinthePacificregionthatcanbeusedtofeedintocurrentpolicyandpractice(Campbell2008).

Anna Anisi Addressing Challenges in Climate Change Adaptation: Narikoso Case Study 3

Moreover,recentresearchinmorerecentcaseshighlightsthatsocialandculturaldimensionsremain“undervaluedandunderstudied”(Bertana2019:6).Assuch,unpackingthescopeandnatureofchallengesthatemergeinrelocationprocessespro-videsanessentialfirststepforaddressing,transforming,andatbestovercomingthechal-lengesinpolicyandpractice.Thispaperpresentsstrategicandoperationalrecommenda-tionsforimprovingcommunity-basedmulti-actorrelocationprocessesinFijibasedonthelearningsgarneredfromanin-depthcasestudyoftheNarikosocommunityrelocationprocessinKadavuprovince,withpossiblewiderrelevanceforPSIDS.

Inthisresearchprocess,bothprimaryandsecondarydatawasgatheredandtriangulatedinfieldworkconductedbetweenAugustandSeptember2019.Severalmethodswereusedwhich included conducting semi-structured interviews with key government and non-government actors, and with men and women from Narikoso village. Additionally, oneseparatefocusgroupdiscussionwasconductedwiththeyouthfromNarikosovillage.Fieldobservationsandaprojectprogressassessmentwerecarriedoutinthevillageandatthenewrelocationsite.Moreover,availableprojectassessmentreports,relatedpolicydocu-ments,andonlinemediaarticleswereconsulted.Thedatawasanalysedqualitativelyandcoded,andinvolvedelucidatinginteractionsbetweentheactors,theformalandinformalinstitutional context through the exploration of process accounts to develop a processnarrative. This process narrative was constantly amended throughout the fieldworkthroughcheckingandverifyingwithkeyinterviewrespondentsandidentifyingemergingpatterns,drawingfromthewideradaptationliterature.

TheNarikosoVillageRelocationProcess:ACaseStudy

TheContext

Narikosovillageislocatedonthesouth-easternsideontheislandofOno,inthemaritimeprovinceofKadavu,Fiji.OnoIslandliesapproximately80kmsouthofthecapitalcity,Suva,andisaccessiblebyregularseatransport.Thevillageislocatedonanarrowstripofaflatcoastalareathatisfringedbyasteeprockinclinetothewestandamangrovestripthatextendsfromtheeasttothesouth.NarikosoisaniTaukei(indigenous)communityof27householdswithapopulationofapproximately100people(McMichaeletal.2019).Villag-ersregularlymovebetweenlocalitieswithintheprovinceandthemainlandforeducationalandworkpurposes.Mostvillagersengageinsemi-subsistenceagricultureandsmall-scalefishingactivities,whilesomeareeitherfullyorpartlyemployedinnearbytouristresorts(BarnettandMcMichael2018).Themainagriculturalcashcropisyaqona2,alongsideotherstaplefoodcropsandavarietyofseasonalvegetablesandfruitsthatgrowabundantlyonthe island’s naturally fertile soils. In 2019, the GoF provided solar electrification to thevillage, enabling households to run basic electrical appliances which were previouslylimitedbytheuseofexpensivedieselgenerators.AlthoughNarikosoisremote,thevillagers

2AlsoknownmorewidelyinthePacificas‘kava’,andscientificallyasPipermethysticum,itisaplantthatisindigenoustothePacificregionandholdshighculturalsignificanceinFiji,Vanuatu,TongaandSamoa.KadavuisrenownedinFijiforproducingveryhigh-qualitykava,whichissoldatahighmarketpricemakingitalucra-tivebusiness.


arenotisolatedfrominternationalmediaandglobaleventsastheyareabletoaccessmediachannelsthroughsatellitetelevision,radioandamobilenetwork.

Narikosovillage first started to faceproblemswithcoastalerosion in themid-1960s. Inresponse,villagersbuiltaseawallasaprotectivemeasure;however,overtheyearsthesea-wallhasbeenseverelydamagedandhasnotbeenabletopreventongoingerosion.Recenttechnicalassessmentsrevealaproximate15-metrerecessionoftheshorelineontheeast-ernsidecausingregular inundationofseveralhouses in thevillageduringextremehightidesandstormsurges(EU-GIZ2016).Sea-levelrisehasbeenidentifiedasonecontributingfactorastheaveragerateofsea-levelriseinFijiliesattwiceabovetheglobalaveragerate(AustralianBureauofMeteorologyetal.2015;EU-GIZ2016).Despitethis,othermaladap-tive factors have also contributed to the problem in Narikoso including the inadequatedesignoftheseawallandtheblockageofapassagebetweenthevillageandanearbyisletinthe1990s,whichhavealteredthewaveandsedimentflowdynamics(EU-GIZ2016).

AFailedFirstAttempt

Inresponsetotheincrementalandincreasinglyproblematicissueofmoreregularcoastalinundation,Narikoso villagers requested assistance from the government in 2011 to berelocatedwithintheircustomarylandboundaries.Theprojectwasconsequentlyinitiatedin2012throughthedirectsupportofthePrimeMinisterwhopersonallyvisitedNarikosoon a rural outreach tour. Shortly after the visit, the FijiMilitary Forceswere tasked toundertaketheinitialexcavationgroundworksinordertopreparethenewvillagesiteabout200metresawayfromthecurrentvillagesite.Boththevillagersaswellassomegovern-mentandnon-governmentactorsadmitinhindsightthatpropertechnicalassessmentsandthoroughconsultationswerenotcarriedoutduringtheinitialprojectdevelopmentstage.Asaresult,extensiveenvironmentaldamagewascausedbythegroundworkactivitiesduetotheclear-cutremovalofaportionofcoastalmangrovesandlittoralforestadjacenttothevillage. The new areawas excavated and flattened by cutting terraces and levelling thehilltop,withtheuseofdynamiteintheprocess,causingsurfaceerosionandsiltationofthenearshoreecosystemandcoralreef.TheinitialgroundworkshavecosttheGoF200,000FJDyettheprojectwasterminatedattheendof2012duetopoorplanningandalackoffunds.

ASecondAttempt

Therelocationprojectwaspickedupagainin2013whenthelocaldistrictrepresentativeapproached theDeutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)3 and theClimateChangeDivision(CCD)oftheGoFtoaddresstheenvironmentaldegradationthathadbeencausedduringthefirstinterventionphase,andwithsightssetonasecondattempttofurtherdeveloptherelocationprocessforNarikoso.Thisprocesssignifiedashiftfrombeing a joint government-community project to a multi-stakeholder and multi-levelplannedrelocationwithfinancialsupportcomingfromthetheEuropeanUnionchannelledthrough theGIZ, technical supportcoming fromtheGIZ,SPCaswellaskeygovernmentministriessuchastheMinistryof iTaukeiAffairs,MinistryofForeignAffairs,MinistryofEconomy,Ministry of Rural andMaritime Development, Ministry of Lands andMineral

3GermanCorporationforInternationalCooperationGmbH.


Resources,MinistryofCommerce,TradeandTourism,MinistryofWaterwaysandEnviron-ment,MinistryofHousingandCommunityDevelopment,MinistryofDisasterManagement,MinistryofForestry,andtheMinistryofAgriculture..TheNarikosorelocationprojectwasbroughtundertheumbrellaofthebroaderEU-GIZ‘AdaptingtoClimateChangeandSus-tainableEnergy’(ACSE)Programmein2014.Itwasapprovedinlate2015asajointprojectwiththerelocationofWaciwacidistrictschool,intheprovinceofLau,withcombinedpro-jectfundsof700,000Euroandaplannedprojectperiodof3years(EU-GIZ2016).Atthisstage,nationalrelocationguidelineswerelacking.Inresponse,agovernment-ledNationalRelocationTaskforce4wasestablishedwiththemandatetomeetregularlyandexchangeinformationontheprojectprogress,toconsolidateandcoordinateresourcesbetweenthedifferentstakeholders,aswellasdocumentinglessonslearnedtoinformaparallelprocessofdeveloping theNationalPlannedRelocationGuidelineswhichwere laterpublished in2018(GoF2018a).

Importantly, the relocation taskforcewas able to establish the need for comprehensivevulnerability and adaptation needs assessments to be carried out. The stakeholdersinvolvedalsoestablished,bymeansofaconsultativeprocess,thatresettlementwouldneedtobesupportedbyalivelihoodcomponenttoincreaseself-sufficiencyanddiversifyincomegeneratingopportunities(EU-GIZ2016).Asaresult,projectactivitiesinvolvedtheplantingofmoreclimate-resilientcrops,provisionoftreeseedlings,coastalrehabilitationandexten-sionofagroforestryservices,andestablishingacommunityvegetableandpineapplefarminitiative(SPC2014).Theseactivitieswerealsoaccompaniedbytheconstructionofacom-munitygreenhousenurseryandtrainingonthepropagationandmanagementofnurseryplants(SPC2014).Moreover,villagerswerealsoengagedinfloriculturetraining,organicfarmingtechniques,restorationofthevillagepineplantation,andotheragroforestryinclud-ingthepropagationandsowingofnativeseedsandestablishingavanillaplot(Daveta2018).Under the ACSE project timeline, additional support for the livelihood component inNarikosocameundertheIntegratedHumanResourceDevelopmentProgramme(IHRDP)of theMinistryofCommerce,Trade,Tourism including theplanningandsettingupofavillagecooperativeandfinancialliteracytraining;forthemaintenanceandextensionofthepreviouslyestablishedpoultryfarm;andtheprovisionofassistancefortheestablishmentofbeefarming.Theprogrammealsofundedthepurchaseofagenerator,coolerandfreezerforthecooperativestorethathasbeingconstructedbythevillagers.Additionally,a40HPoutboardmotorwasalsoprovidedtoassistwithtransportationandfishing.

Despitetheimpressiverangeofsupportingactivitiescarriedoutincooperationwiththecommunitytoenhanceresilienceandlivelihoods,manychallengeshavebeenobserved.Forone,villagersbecameincreasinglyfrustratedwithfrequentdelaysintheprocess;thetimingofactivities;thedesignandqualityofthenewlyconstructedhouses;andadhoccommuni-cation flows between the Suva-based stakeholders, the district administration and thecommunity.Initial‘promises’bythegovernmenttorelocatethewholevillagewerereduced

4ThenationalrelocationtaskforcecommitteecomprisingtheCommissionerEasternOffice,NationalDisasterManagementOffice(NDMO),MinistryofEconomy(MoE)andtheGIZ.TheNarikosocommunityrelocationcommitteerepresentativewasalsopartofthetaskforceintheinitialstage,butwasremovedlaterandreplacedbyaSuva-basedrepresentative.Thetaskforceconsults withtheCCDoftheMoE,andtheCCDthenreportstotheNationalClimateChangeCoordinationCommittee(NCCCC).TheNCCCCismandatedtomakesubmissionsforendorsementinCabinetonclimatepolicy-relatedissues.


toonlysevenhouseholdsunderthenewEU-GIZprojectprocess.Untiltoday,villagersques-tionwhyaproximaterelocationontheirownlandwouldtakesolongtoberealised.Ontheother hand, implementing and supporting agencies point towards the complexity of theproject;thelackofpolicyguidelinesresultinginadhocplanningatthetimei.e.adoptinga‘learningbydoing’ approach;overstretched staff capacities and frequent turnovers; andunexpected events such as natural disasters hampering implementation plans. Somegovernmentofficials also refer to the lackof commitment andownership shownby thevillagersinthelivelihoodcomponentoftheprojectasreasonswhytheprojecthasfailedtoachievethedesiredresults.

However, in consolidating the views of the different stakeholders involved, it becameevident that therewasa lackofunderstandingof the linkagesbetweendifferent factorsleadingtobarriersintherelocationprocesssincetheinceptionoftheinitialideatorelocate.InordertobetterunderstandtheproblemsthatbecameevidentintheNarikosorelocation,asystematiccausalprocesstracingmethodwasusedtoidentifyandexplaintheunderlyingfactorsandmechanismsleadingtotheobservedbarriers(seeCollier2011;GeorgeandBen-nett2004;KayandBaker2015).Thisapproachsuggeststhatwhileidentifyingindividualfactorscanexplainwhyadaptationprovesdifficult,adeeperanalysismustalsoincludehowthese factors are related by identifying themechanisms at play (Biesbroek et al. 2011;Biesbroeketal.2014).Thisapproachhasbeenappliedinotherstudiesexplainingadapta-tionbarriersinvariouscontextswithconvincingresults(seeBiesbroeketal.2014;Sieberetal.2018).Moreover,thisinnovativeapproachprovidesanopportunitytobetterunder-standtheemergingissuesintheircontext;todeliverstrategicadaptationresponses;andtomoveclosertoreachingtheplannedadaptationoutcomes.Thefindingsofthecasestudyaresynthesisedbelow.

UnderstandingSocio-CulturalDimensions

Adaptationresearchinrecentyearshasdrawnattentiontowardssocio-culturaldimensionsas abasis forunderstandinghowactorsperceivewhat is legitimate action (Adger et al.2012), for enhanced engagement and building relationships (Evans et al. 2016), and toestablishthesymbolicandculturalmeaningspeopleattachtoplaces(Adgeretal.2011b).Assuch,itisarguedthataproperunderstandingofsocio-culturaldynamicscouldsupportmoreeffectiveplanningtomeetcommunityvalues,needsandpriorities.

The experience of the Narikoso relocation sheds insights into understanding theimportance of community decision-making and legitimation processes. The case ofNarikoso seemed tobe straightforwardas therewerenopreexisting landdisputes.Thedecisiontotransferaportionoflandbelongingtotwovillageclanstoaccommodatethenewvillagesitefollowedaconsolidated,consensualandlegitimateprocess.Initialdiscussionswith the government and the villagers over the project revealed plans to relocate thecommunity as a whole. Along the process, on the basis of technical and economicassessments,decisionswere takenby theexternal implementingagencies to reduce thenumber of households to be relocated. These assessments point towards the estimatedcostsandbenefitsandsetoutaneconomicrationaleforrelocation(Jolliffe2016).Moreover,otherconsiderationsincludedlimitedprojectfundingandthelimitedspaceattheclearedsitetoaccommodatetheentirevillage.


Theimplementingagencieswereadamantthatthevillagerswereawareofthereasonsforthedownscaling,andthatitwasjustifiedintermsofvulnerabilityassessmentscarriedout.Despite this, thedecision to relocate only a sectionof the village challenged the ideaofcommunity, failed to acknowledge the villager’s own processes of decision-making, andfailed to move up the ladder from consultation to participation in decision-making.Deviating from the original plan to relocate as a community also caused anxieties andconcernsthatmovingonlyonesectionofthevillagewouldaffectcommunitycohesionandstructureandcouldbeasourceofconflictinthefutureasrevealedinsomeresponses:“WeFijianpeopleworktogether,thatisonlyonemataqalimovingsothevillagewillbreakdown[…]alsoit’snotfairifsomestaybehind[…]maybeonetimewewillfight”(Malevillager,personalcommunication,29.08.2019).

Moreover,theNarikosocaserevealsalowlevelofsocialacceptabilityofthegovernmentstandardisedruralhousingunitsatthenewsite.Thehousingunitsaretoosmalltoaccom-modatetheexistingfamilystructuresandthedesignandqualityofthenewhouseshavebeencalledintoquestion,withlittleresponsetotheseconcerns.Also,culturalconsidera-tionswerenotadequatelytakenintoaccountwithregardstothelayoutofthenewsiteandthedesignofthehouses.Forexample,thevillagersmentionedthatinitialplanstoconstructacommunityhallasanimportantsocialamenitywerenottakenintoconsideration,whileothersfeltthatthenewsitewasincompletewithoutachurch.Moreover,thenewsitedoesnotresemblethetypicalset-upofaniTaukeivillage.Ingagingtheresponsesofthevillagers,thesenseof‘place’amongvillagerswasstronglylinkedtoasenseofcommunityascapturedinthewordsofonecommunitymember:“whenwemove,wemovetogether[…]thisisavillage,wearefamily[…]wehavebeenworkingtogetheruntilnow”(Malevillager,personalcommunication,29.08.2019).Notably,manyoftheissuesoutlinedaboveechoexperiencesmadeinthepreviouscommunityrelocationofVunidogoloavillageinFiji(c.fCharanetal.2017), yet the transfer of learnings from one project to another has been low. Whilecomprehensive and thorough assessments became indispensable for planning, theassessments did not fully capture socio-cultural dimensions by taking stock of actordynamics,comparingindividualversuscommunityperceptions,mappingpossibleareasofconflict,andestablishingotherrelevantsocialindicatorsasabaselineforvulnerabilityandactionplanning.

ParticipationinPlanning,Decision-MakingandMonitoring

TheNarikosoprocessreflectsalackofparticipationinprojectdesignanddefiningtherulesofengagementwhichtranslatedintothedesignandimplementationoftheproject.Thiswasalsolinkedtoalackofasharedunderstandingaroundtheprojectobjectives,projectactivitiesandthetimeplan.Asaresult,thelackofparticipatoryplanningmarksthebeginningofdivergingissueframesinprioritisingandassessingcommunityneedsbetweenthedifferentactorsinvolved.Concurrently,thereisalackofunderstandingamongsomevillagersaroundfutureclimate-relatedrisksandpossiblesolutionstoaddresstheserisks,despitenumerousawarenesstrainingsessionsthathavebeencarriedout.Thiscallsforarevisionofawarenessraisingstrategiesandeffectivenessinengagingcommunitiesintheidentificationoflong-termvulnerabilitiesandadaptation.Taking‘headnodding’incommunityconsultationsasabasisforawarenessraisingisnotasatisfactoryapproachto


ensurethatthecommunityhasunderstoodthescopeoftheissuesdiscussed.Whatisrequiredisamorenuanced,carefullyplanned,contextappropriateformofdialogueandengagementtocaptureandbringtogetherthedifferentsourcesoftraditionalandtechnicalknowledge.

Additionally, theNarikoso experience also showed that community engagement is timeconsumingand ideally involvesmonitoringbythecommunity.However,communicationflowsbetweenthegovernmentandtechnicalagenciesbasedinthecapitalcity,thedistrictadministrationandthecommunityofNarikosowereneitherfluidnorregular.Monitoringwascarriedout‘whenpossible’andwithalackofproperengagementofvillagers.Toensureeffectiveengagement,ataminimumlevel,thereneedstobefluidcommunicationwithkeyknowledge brokers. Knowledge brokers are individuals who facilitate the flow of ideasbetweenactorsandenablecollaborationandaction(Agoguéetal.2013).Forexample,thesecouldincludekeygovernmentofficialsandnon-governmentpractitionerswhocarryinfor-mationbetweendecision-makingspaces,butalsoincludethevillageadministrator,villagecommitteememberrepresentatives,youthandwomenrepresentatives,thechurchpastorandotheractiveandinfluentialindividualsinthecommunity.Whenkeyknowledgebrokersarenotidentifiedandutilised,informationandcommunicationflowswithintheprojectasawholeareweakened,resulting inverticalandhorizontalcoordinationdisconnectsandambiguityaroundprojectactivities.Byextension, thiscanalsoagain leadto frustrationsandmistrusttowardsimplementingagencies,runningtheriskofanegativefeedbackeffectthatcomplicatesmonitoringefforts,makinginformationlessreliableandimplementationlesseffective.

Moreover,while research around community based adaptation (CBA) projects in PSIDSshowthatadoptingalivelihoodsapproachcanenhancetheoveralladaptivecapacitiesofcommunitiestofosterresilience(McNamara2013),theNarikosoexperiencerevealedthatlivelihoodsactivitiescanberatedandrankeddifferently in termsof theirrelevanceandsuccesswith implications for planning anddecision-making by the actors involved. TheNarikosocasealsorevealsthatwhenthesearenotresolvedatanearlystage,itcanleadtodivergingorpolarisingissueframes.Forexample,governmentalandnon-governmentoffi-cialsframedtheproblemrelatedtothelowsuccessofthelivelihoodcomponentasaprob-lem caused by the villagerswho did not investmuch commitment and initiative in theproject.Whenthehoneybeeinitiativefailedtotakeoff,theviewwasthat“[theyouth]justdothingswhentheyfeellikeit”(Governmentofficial,personalcommunication,20.08.2019).Anotherviewwasthatthecommunitywasnotfullyengagedbecause“theywerelookingmore for financial support, rather than seeing what they could do themselves” (Non-governmentstakeholder,personalcommunication,20.08.2019).Also,anotherviewrelatestothewillingnessofthecommunitytounderstandthecomplexitythattheimplementingagencieshavetodealwith:“[…]theyaretiredofallthesegovernmentpeoplegoingdowntodoalltheseassessmentssotheymustseethecomplexitiesofthis–buttheyjustdon’tcare” (Non-government technical advisor, personal communication, 14.08.2019). Theresponsesfrommostofthevillagersontheotherhand, indicatetheissueofthe ‘unkeptpromise’bythegovernmenttorelocatethewholevillageasthedominantissueframeandreflectmixedfeelingsoffrustrationandsadness:“it’sshamefulthattheydidnotkeeptheirpromises[…]weareconcernedthatsomewillstaybehindandhalfthevillagewillmove[…this]makesussad”(Femalevillager,personalcommunication,30.08.2019).


Divergingorpolarisingissueframesreflectaninteractionalprocesswherebyissuesheldbyactorsbecomefixedandincreasinglydisconnected(DewulfandBouwen2012)andwhichin turn can become increasingly polarised when actors face ambiguities, for examplebecauseofalackofcommunication(Biesbroeketal.2014).Inmulti-stakeholdersettingswhere actors with different backgrounds, priorities, positions and value systems cometogether,ambiguityandmisunderstandingsareboundtooccurwhenactorsfailtorecog-nise,andthenalsodealwith,theunderlyingissuesinordertobeabletofacilitatedialoguesandactionbetweentheseactors(Dewulfetal.2005).

PowerfulActorsandDonorDependency

Enablingresource-intensiverelocationsoftenrestsonestablishingapartnershipbetweenfundingagencies, governmental andnon-governmental agencies, and local communities.However, such partnerships also hinge on differentiated levels of power, influence, anddependencyandcanrevealthepresenceofvetoplayers.Vetoplayersareinfluentialandpowerfulactorswiththeauthorityandresourcestomakedecisionsthatcandelay,blockandderaildecision-makingprocesses(Sieberetal.2018).ThecaseofNarikosorevealsthatgovernmentsandfinancingagenciesact,oftenunintentionally,asvetoplayersindecidingonwhat, how, andwhenactivities are carriedout, as reflected in theexperienceof onevillager:“whyarewestillgoingtotheplacewhichhasbeenexcavated,whynotshiftabitfurther to thebackwhichhasnotbeen touchedby anymachines and the soil hasbeenstabilizedverywell?Butthe[governmentofficial]said–No,becausethegovernmenthasusedthemoneyforthissite”(Malevillager,personalcommunication,29.08.2019).

Theauthorityofthevetoplayersisunderpinnedbyunequalpowerrelationshipsthroughcommunities’dependencyontheseactors,especiallyintermsoffinancingtheproject.Asaresult, Narikoso villagers have been reluctant to voice discontent openly towards theimplementingpartners,worriedthatprojectfundscouldbewithdrawn:“[onething]thatkeepsourmouth shut is thatwedidnot give anymoney, because everything theypro-vided…sothosearethedifficultieswecameacross”(Malevillager01,personalcommuni-cation,29.08.2019).Moreover,thepresenceofactorsthatwieldpowerthroughthecontrolofinformationcanalsochallengeparticipatorylearninganddecision-makingprocessesandincreasestheriskofimproperplanningthatcanleadtomaladaptation.

Therefore,whilethereisopportunityindrawingondifferentsourcesofknowledge,therealso needs to be “awillingness to devolve influence and authority for decision-making”(Adgeretal.2011a:765)inaprocessthatshouldinvolve“considerationoftheroleofpowerandmarginalityamonggroupsparticipatinginthelearningprocess”(Armitage2008:86).Theseconsiderationsalsoformimportantelementsinmonitoringandevaluations,whichtoalargepartalsodependontheability,timing,capacityandskillsofactorstoidentifyandrespondtotheemergingchallenges(DewulfandBouwen2012)aswelltheabilitytofostertrustbetweenactors(Klijnetal.2010).


GuidelinesandOperationalProcedures

In adaptation processes, roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined to reduceambiguities and toenable the flowof communications for the coordinationof activities.Importantly,itshouldbepointedoutthatrolesandresponsibilitiesarenotmerelydefinedin policy, but are also shaped by informal norms, beliefs and practices in communities(AgrawalaandvanAalst2008;Reidetal.2009).

In the Narikoso case, the lack of clear guidelines to guide the process and interactionsbetween actors was repeatedly highlighted by both government and non-governmentactors.Althoughthenationalrelocationtaskforcepresentedaforumtocircumventsomeofthelimitationsgiventheabsenceofrelocationguidelines,alackofeffectiveengagementofsub-nationallevelactorswasevident,bothonthecommunityandprovincialadministrativelevel,particularlyinrelationtothedevelopmentofoperationalproceduresintherelocationprocess.Eventhoughtheimplementingagenciesconsciouslyadopteda‘learningbydoing’approach, the implementation process clearly lacked community participation inidentifying,reflectingandactingupontheemergingchallengesintheprojectprocess.

ProjectCoordinationandManagement

Oneof themain factors identifiedasa challenge in the relocationprocess relates to theability of the implementing agencies to manage expectations beyond what could bedelivered.Whenmany agencies are involved, differentmessagesmay flow through thedifferentchannelsunlessinformationiswellcoordinated.Intheabsenceofguidingframe-worksatthetime,somestakeholderssawtheprocessas“topdownandadhocwithtoomanypeoplewhoalwaysfeelabitinthelead”(Non-governmenttechnicaladvisor,personalcommunication,14.08.2019).Otherinstitutionalfactorssuchasthereshufflingandshiftingof government ministries and departments around the implementation phase incurredadjustmentperiods,staffturnovers,andfurtherdelayedtheintegrationofactivitiesintotheexistingministerialworkplans.

Somegovernmentofficialsnotedthattheamountofworkthatwasrequiredoftenexceededtheircapacitiestodelivertheseactivitiesinatimelymanner.Furthermore,differentpacesofworkwithingovernmentagenciesalsocontributedtoconsiderabletimelagsthroughouttheimplementationprocessastherewerecertainactivitiesthatneededtobecompleted,beforemovingontoothers.Particularlyprocessesdealingwithlandissuesweredescribedascomplex,requiringverificationandlengthyadministrativeprocedureswhenredefininglandboundaries,includingforthepurposeofextendingvillageboundaries.

In terms ofmanaging finance, therewere considerable difficulties in synchronising theperiodictransferoffundsbetweenagenciesinatimelymanner.Oneargumentforthedelayofactivitieswasthattheexternalfundershaveadifferentfinancialcalendarthanthatofthegovernmentwhichcausesdelaysinreceivingprojectfunds.Also,itwasevidentthatfundsbecamesignificantlydelayedwhenfundersrefusedtoreleasethenexttrancheofprojectfundsdue tomissing vouchers and receipts fromaprevious reportingperiod.Althoughthesewererecoveredlater,itcausedconsiderabledelaysthatwerenotcommunicatedwellatthecommunitylevel.


In terms of coordinating activities with the community, it became evident that projectactivitieswerenotstreamlinedwelltotheexistingvillagetimeplan.Thereseemedtobeamisconceptionamongsomeactorsthatvillagershaveabundanttimeorthattheyworkinanunorganisedway.Inretrospect,villagersareorganisedbutoftenoverwhelmedwiththerequirementsofhostingnumerousassessmentteams,researchersandthemedia,attendingthenumerousad-hoctrainingactivities,beinginvolvedintheconstructionofthehouses,while also carrying on with their lives in attending to daily livelihoods and culturalobligations.

Altogether,itwasnotexpectedthattheprocesswouldstretchoversuchalongperiodoftime.Withthevisibledelaysandincreasingambiguitiesaroundthereasonsforthese,themotivation levels of the villagers dropped for some project activities, such as for thecommunityvegetablefarm,seenascausingunnecessarydelaystoreachingtheirprimegoalof building the new houses. Additionally, villagers have voiced their disappointmentsaroundtheunclear timeframefor theplannedactivities: “Therewasnotimeline for thisprojectthatisthebigissuesthere[…]sowecannotmonitor”(Malevillager,personalcom-munication,29.08.2019).

Tomakesenseofthenatureofinteractionsbetweentheimplementingagenciesandvillage,manyissuesaresimilartothosefoundinothercasesthatpointtowards“discrepancies[…]inwaysgovernmentsandprivateactorsinteractandcollaborate”(Sieberetal.2018:2385).The differences between how private actors, including communities, and public actorsoperate are linked to different “functional rationalities” or sense-makingprocesses, forexampledecidingwhatshouldbedone,andhowitshouldbedone,thatcreate“inherenttensionsbetween theconsiderations […]” (Meesetal.2012:310)andwhichcanhaveahamperingeffectforcollaboration.Togetherwithalackofverticalinformationflows,thiseffectalsocontributedtounaddressedconflictemergingoverthecourseoftheproject.

Unaddressed Conflict

TheNarikosorelocationshowsthatunaddressedconflictwastransferredfromonephasetotheother.Inthiscase,thesourcesoftensionsbetweentheactorsrelatedto:theabsenceof clear relocation policy and/or implementation guidelines; the lack of participatoryplanninginputfromthecommunity;alackofaccountabilitytowardsthecommunityfromthesideoftheimplementingagenciesandfunders;andalackofmonitoringtoidentifyearlywarningsigns.Wherecriticalissueshaveremainedunattendedandconcealedinsilence,this has allowed frustrations, mistrust and rumours to pervade beneath the surface ofinteractionsbetweentheactorsinvolved.Asaresult,thesetensionsaffectedrelationsandcollaborationbetweentheactorsandledtoissueframesbecomingincreasinglypolarisedintheprocess.

Whenproblemsbecameincreasinglyvisibleinthedelayoftheproject,theimplementingagenciestendedtoreactaversivelytotheproblemsbyevokingablameavoidanceattitudeinsteadof engaging indialogue andanalysis of the emerging issues. For example,whengovernment officials were confronted with discontent about the project process, thewasthat“[p]eoplearealwayslookingforsomeonetoblame,eveniftheythemselvesareatfault” (Government official, personal communication, 12.08.2019). In turn, this closed


spacesforopencommunicationandreflection,reinforcingtherelationalriftbetweenthevillageand the implementingagenciesalong theprocess.Theabsenceof consistent andeffective monitoring further hampered open communication around conflicting issuesacrosstheprojectphases.

UnexpectedandUnplannedEvents

Finally,theNarikosocaseshowsthatadaptationprocessescanbesignificantlyhamperedbyexternal,unplannedandunanticipatedfactors.Forexample,shortlybeforetheprojectfundsfortheNarikosoprojectwerereceived,FijiexperiencedTropicalCycloneWinston,thestrongestcyclonetomakelandfallinthecountry’srecordedhistory,causingdamagesamounting toF$2billion,equivalent to20percentofgrossdomesticproduct(GoFetal.2017). Although the cyclone did not pass directly over Kadavu province, governmentalagencieshadtochanneltheircapacitiestonationalrecoveryeffortsasittookalmosttwoyears tonormalise thingsagainwithin the country.Thishas contributed to thedelay inprojectactivitiesbetween2016-2017sincetheresponsibleagenciestaskedwithcoordinat-ingtheimplementationwerefullyoccupiedwithlarge-scalenationaldisasterresponseandrecoveryefforts.5

Whileuncertaintycannotbeeliminatedinadaptationprocesses,itcanatbestbemanagedeffectively by the actors involved through effective coordination (Klijn and Koopenjan2015).Ontheotherhand,theNarikosoexperiencealsoshowsthatwhenactivities,rolesandresponsibilitiesarecoordinatedinadelegatedformacrossseveralagencies,thiscanalso slow down implementation due to different work paces, capacities, and annualworkplan schedules between the different agencies. Therefore, implementationplans inmulti-level governance settings need to be supported by clearly defined roles andresponsibilities,andbackedbyadequatefinances,staffandactorcapacitiestonegotiateandmanageunexpectedchangesinprojectimplementation.

Recommendations

The ability of policy-makers, development practitioners and communities to be able toeffectivelyadapttotheimpactsofclimatechangeiscriticalforsustainingandenhancinglivelihoods and development opportunities in the medium to long-term. Governmentscontinue to play a central role in developing and coordinating the implementation ofadaptationpolicies,plansandguidelinesatlocallevelsthroughharnessingthesupportofvariousexternalandlocalagenciesandactorsacrosslevels.Nevertheless,lessonsdrawnfromadaptationapproaches,includingtheplannedrelocationofNarikosovillage,revealtheneedtolookbeyondtechnocraticandpolicyfixes.Theseexperiencesshowtheneedtouseadaptiveco-managementapproachesforbetterplanning,implementationandmonitoringinordertofacilitateeffectiveadaptationoutcomes(Armitageetal.2009;FabriciusandCur-rie2015;Folkeetal.2005).Assuch,theNarikosocasealsohighlightsthatprogressshould

5Atthetimeofwritingthispaper,NarikosovillagehasbeendirectlyaffectedbyTropicalCycloneHarold,mak-inglandfallinApril2020.Atotalof15homeswereeitherbadlydamagedordestroyed,withtheaffectedvillag-ersseekingrefugeinthecommunityhall.


notonlybedefinedbytheabilitytoimplementactivitiesaccordingtoprojecttimeplansandbudgets,butratheralsobytheabilitytocontinuouslyreflectandrespondtotheunder-lyingsocial,economic,environmental,culturalandpoliticalfactorsthatinfluencetheadap-tationprocess.Therecommendationsputforwardheresuggestaneedtolookatbothstra-tegicandoperationallevelresponsestoenhanceadaptationoutcomes.

PromotingParticipatoryProcesses

On a strategic level, there is a need for effective involvement of local actors, especiallyaffectedcommunities,intheplanningandimplementationofadaptationpolicies(DoversandHezri 2010), because “adaptationwill only succeed if it is acceptable to the peopleconcerned and congruent with their values and way of life” (Spires et al. 2014).Communitiesconcernedshouldbeplacedatthecentreofdecision-making,planning,design,implementationofprojects,andaccompaniedthroughanenhancedunderstandingoftheircapabilities,knowledgesystemsandneeds.LearningfromthecaseofNarikoso,thiscouldinpracticeinclude:

• Prioritisingcapacitybuildinginareasidentifiedbythecommunity.• Enhancingengagementofsub-nationallevelactorssuchasdistrictadministrations,

non-governmentalandfaith-basedorganisations.• Improvedwillingnessandability toharnessandtransfer learningsbetweensub-

nationalandnationallevels.• Clearroles,responsibilitiesandaccountabilitymechanismsbetweenthedifferent

actorsinvolved.Oftenaccountabilityflowstowardsgovernmentsanddonorsandlittle attention is given to accountability mechanisms which flow towards thereceiversofassistanceintermsoftheresultingadaptationoutcomesandimpacts.

BuildingonExistingCapacitiesandImprovingCoordination

Governmentiswellplacedtoidentifykeyareaswherecapacitiesareneededforharnessingjointactiontowardsadaptationgoals.Nevertheless, tensionsoftenarisebetweenhavingclearandrobustpolicieswhilealsoallowingforflexibilityandchange.Onastrategiclevel,thesetensionsneedtobeunderstoodandclarifiedcollectivelybythestakeholdersinvolvedinanyadaptationprocess,andatbestmanagedandfacilitatedbyadesignatedentity,suchastheclimatechangedivision/department,toensurethatframeconditionsandguidelinesforimplementationareclearattheoutset.LearningfromthecaseofNarikosothiscouldinpracticeinclude:

• EquippingGovernmentministriesordepartmentswithadequatestaffandfinancialresourcesbeforeengaginginambitiousplanningandimplementationofprojects.Conversely,theseactorsrequireregularcapacitybuildinginareasofparticipatoryaction planning (PAP) and participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning(PME&L).

• Buildingcapacitiesacrosslevelsinareasofsocialandconflictanalysis,aswellasmediation techniques, to enhance trust and healthy relations. This type ofspecialised knowledge and skills often lie beyond the scope of government and


couldbeharnessedthroughmorecollaborativeapproacheswithnon-governmententities.

• Gaps and delays in the project should be well communicated in an open andtransparentmanner.Mistakesneedtobeacknowledged.

• Documentingallaspectsoftheprocesstoavoidknowledge‘gettinglost’overtime.Thiscouldbeenhancedthroughbringingtogetherthecapacitieswhichalreadyexist,utilisingkeyknowledgebrokersatvariouslevelsforeffectivecommunicationflowsbetweennationalandsubnationallevels.

• Assigning climate change point persons across government departmentsresponsible forstreamliningandmonitoringclimatechangeactivities.Thesekeypointpersonsactaskeyknowledgebrokers,andareresponsibletofeedinformationintoreports to the central coordinating unit and for supporting the integration andalignmentofadaptionplanswithministerialbudgetsandannualworkplans.

• Assigning key point persons within the climate change unit to support theimplementation of the different strategic policy areas 6 and to facilitate theestablishmentofproject-specifictaskforcesonacaseandneedsbasisincludingawider representation from communities, national and district administrations,nongovernmentactors, researchers and development practitioners. Drawing on the differentexpertise of these actors could ensure that communities receive the neededaccompanimentnotonlyintechnicalbutalsoinsocialterms.

StrengtheningtheInclusionofSocio-CulturalDimensions

There is a need to consider how to better integrate complex socio-cultural dimensionsrelatedtothelocalvalueandbeliefsystems,needsandpracticesoflocalcommunitiesbothin policy and in actual project planning and implementation. Learning from the case ofNarikosothiscouldinpracticeinclude:

• Enhancingtheweighting,relevanceandabilitytoidentifysocio-culturaldimensionsinvulnerabilityandadaptationassessments.

• Utilisingimprovedmethodsofapproachingandengagingcommunitiesintermsofthetiminganddesignofactivities.

• Developingstrategiestoinclude‘silent’ormarginalisedvoiceswhilebeingawareofpowerrelationsandinequalitiesthataffectcommunicationanddecision-making.

• Ensuringguidelinesareinplaceforanalysingandaddressingconflicts.

ImprovingMonitoring,EvaluationandLearning

Monitoringisoftenhighlightedinpolicyyetinpracticeoftenneglected,especiallybeyondthescopeofprojecttimeframesandforthepurposeoflearning.Amonitoringframeworkshould be developed closely aligned to existing adaptation plans and policies tosystematicallyharness learnings–this iscurrentlybeingdevelopedinFiji.Nevertheless,

6Fiji’s2018-2030NationalAdaptationPlanidentifiesthefollowingkeystrategicsectoralareas:Foodandnu-tritionsecurity,Health,Humansettlements,Infrastructure,BiodiversityandtheNaturalEnvironment.


thereisariskthatproject-specificmonitoringrequirementsandstandardssetbyexternalfundingagenciesmaylackalignmenttothenational-levelmonitoringframeworkleadingtoexcessivereportingworkloads-animportantfactortobeconsideredinstrategicplanning.LearningfromthecaseofNarikosoimprovingPME&Linpracticecouldinclude:

• Monitoringandevaluationtechniqueswhichnotonlydeterminetheextenttowhichprojectgoalsandobjectiveshavebeenmet,butcouldalsoreflecthowlearninggoalsandoutcomeshavebeennegotiatedbytheactorsinvolved(seeBoursetal.2013).

• Consideringnotonlytheimplementationlevel,butalsoanalysingtheprocessasawhole.Participatoryactionresearchmethodscouldbebetterintegratedinsuchanapproach.

• DocumentingandsharingPME&Loutcomes inanopen-accessonlineportalwithregularlyupdatesasaneffectiveandtransparentknowledgesharingplatform.

SecuringandManagingFinance

TheNarikoso case study reconfirms the importance of planning andmatching financialresourcestoadaptationpoliciesandplansbeforecommencingimplementationactivities.FormostPSIDS,includingFiji,climatefinanceishandledoutsidegovernmentbudgetsandremainsproject-based(SamuwaiandHills2018)whichlowerstheabilitytocontrolsuchfinance, making long-term adaptation planning difficult. On a strategic level, new andinnovativeapproachesarenecessaryinordertomovetowardsmoresustainableformsoffinance. For example, Fiji has recently established a national relocation trust fund forrelocation purposes including relocation-related research; assessments; infrastructuredevelopment; andother related activities and initiatives (GoF2019a).Whilepart of thecontributions to the fundare sourced from taxes, such as theEnvironment andClimateAdaptationLevy(ECAL)7,furthersupporttowardsthelocallyadministeredfundcouldbesoughtintermsofbilateralandmultilateralgrantsandprivatesectordonationsintothefund,therebyconsolidatingfundingbeyondthelevelofprojectsandenablingmoreflexibleuseofadaptationfinanceinthelongrun.UtilisingtherecentlylaunchedFijisovereigngreenbond (GoF 2019c) to support community relocations could also be further explored.Learning from the case of Narikoso for better management of project finance could inpracticeinclude:

• Runningariskanalysisandclosemonitoringofparallelprojects.Forexample,theNarikosocaseshowedthatunexpectedeventsanddelaysintheparallelprojectofWaciwacialsoledtoimplementationdelaysandriskmaladaptation.

• Clarityaroundproceduresforfinancialreportingrequirementsbyalllocalstakeholdersinvolvedpriortodevelopingprojects.

7TheECALtaxwasfirstintroducedinFijiasanenvironmentlevyin2015andlateramendedin2017.Itiscal-culatedatataxrateof10%onserviceprovidersregisteredandoperatinginFijiwhoseannualgrossturnoverexceeds$1.5millionFJD[~600,000Euro],10%taxonimportationofluxuryvehicles,10%chargeonsuperyachtchartersanddockingfees;10%incometaxonindividualannualearningsexceeding$270,000FJD[~100,000Euro];anda20centslevyonplasticbags(GoF2019d).Sofar,therevenuesgeneratedfromthetaxhavebeenlargelyspentonmoreresilientinfrastructuredevelopments(GoF2019b).


• The presence of robust financialmonitoring guidelines, togetherwith enhancedfinancialstaffcapacitiespriortodevelopingprojects.

Conclusion

Amulti-levelgovernanceperspectiveonthespecificcaseoftheNarikosorelocationrevealsthemanychallengesthatcanplayoutatlocallevels.Thesechallengesareinterrelatedandshouldnotbeseeninisolationfromoneanother.Thechallengesoftenextendbeyondthelimitedscopeoftheprojectitselfandmayresultfromunexpectedexternalevents;fromthelackof policy andoperational guidelines; and the inadequacies to include,measure andplace a value on important aspects of the socio-cultural context in actual planning andimplementationprocesses.Moreover,improperplanningcanhavelong-lastingimplications,evenwhenplansareamendedlaterintheprocess.ThiswasrevealedintheNarikosocasewhenthefirstphaseoftheprojectresultedinsevereenvironmentaldegradationandinad-equateplanninguseoffinancialresources.Whenplansmadeinaconsolidatedcommunityprocess are changed by donors and coordinating agencies, this not only highlights thefrequentlackofaccountabilityexternalactorshavetowardscommunities,butalsothepres-enceofpowerdynamicsanddependencyrelationshipswhichtendtofavourthedonors,thetechnicalexpertiseandgovernmentratherthancommunities.TheNarikosocaserevealsthatdecisionsnotonlylackedcommunityparticipation,butalsocontributedtoincreasingconcernsovercommunitycohesionwhichdidnotregisterwiththeexternalagencies,lead-ingtounaddressedconflict. Buildingonthesefindings,thereisscopeformorepractice-orientedresearchinthefieldofadaptationgovernanceandcommunity-basedrelocations,for example, looking into integration of process-based research methodologies andmonitoring, evaluation and learning frameworks. Furthermore, there is scope formorecomparativeanalysisofmanymorecasestudiestoconsolidatecausalprocesspatternsandtodevelopbetterplanningandinterventionstrategies.Onafinalnote,thisbriefsuggeststhat adaptive co-management should strive towardsbetter integrationof adaptation re-search,practice,andpolicyinformingeachother.


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TheAuthor

AnnaAnisiisagraduateoftheUniversityoftheSouthPacific(Suva,Fiji)andAlbertLud-wigsUniversity(Freiburg,Germany).SheholdsaBAinEnvironmentalStudies,Postgradu-ateDip. inDevelopmentStudiesandMSc inEnvironmentalGovernance.Herspecific re-searchinterestsincludeadaptationgovernanceandglobalenvironmentalanddevelopmentpolitics.Beyondherresearchinterestssheisanadamantsupporterofenvironmentalandsocial justicemovementsandadvocacycampaigns.Mrs.AnisiwaspreviouslyengagedasProgrammeManager,ProjectOfficer,andResearcherAssistantattheInstituteforMissionandResearchofthePacificTheologicalCollegebasedinSuva,Fiji,andhascontributedtoresearch projects looking into the development of Christianity in the Pacific region andstrengtheningecumenicalrelations.Shewasalsoinvolvedinthedeliveryofcapacitybuild-ingtrainingsinthePacificregioninareasofleadershipandmanagementandsocialanalysis.Mrs.Anisiiscurrentlydoinganinternshipinthefieldofinternationalhumanitarianassis-tanceatCaritasinternationalbasedinFreiburg,Germany.

TodaPeaceInstitute

TheTodaPeaceInstituteisanindependent,nonpartisaninstitutecommittedtoadvancingamorejustandpeacefulworldthroughpolicy-orientedpeaceresearchandpractice.TheInstitute commissions evidence-based research, convenesmulti-track andmulti-discipli-naryproblem-solvingworkshopsandseminars,andpromotesdialogueacrossethnic,cul-tural,religiousandpoliticaldivides.Itcatalysespractical,policy-orientedconversationsbe-tweentheoreticalexperts,practitioners,policymakersandcivilsocietyleadersinordertodiscerninnovativeandcreativesolutionstothemajorproblemsconfrontingtheworldinthetwenty-firstcentury(seewww.toda.orgformoreinformation).ContactUsTodaPeaceInstituteSamonElevenBldg.5thFloor3-1Samon-cho,Shinjuku-ku,Tokyo160-0017,JapanEmail:[email protected]

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Addressing Challenges in Climate Change Adaptation...2 Also known more widely in the Pacific as ‘kava’, and scientifically as Piper methysticum, it is a plant that is indigenous