Adams Richard Brokers and Career Mobility Systems

Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of Complex SocietiesAuthor(s): Richard N. AdamsSource: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter, 1970), pp. 315-327Published by: University of New MexicoStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3629363 .

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SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

VOLUME 26 e NUMBER 4 e WINTER e 1970

Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of Complex Societies'

RICHARD N. ADAMS

Two means of gaining access to power in complex societies are through the mobility of individuals or groups and through the use of power brokers. Based on a study of the national social structure of Guatemala, this paper presents the argument that the two forms tend to appear under different circumstances. Power brokers are in evidence where power domains are strong and levels of articulation are rigid; brokers disappear and mobility systems come into play where power domains become weak and levels become flexible.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to relate career mobility systems and power brokers with two analytical notions that concern the structure of complex societies, power domains and levels of articulation. Three generally familiar concepts are first reviewed; some modifications are then suggested; finally, interrelations are proposed among them. The proposals are speculative and stem from analyses of the national social structure of Guatemala (Adams 1970).

LEVELS OF INTEGRATION, BROKERS, AND CAREER MOBILITY SYSTEMS

The concept of levels in human society has been used in many contexts and for many centuries. In contemporary anthropology, however, it is especially associated with the work of Steward (1955), and Wolf (1967) has added further thoughts on the subject. While Steward used the concept to refer specifically to "national" and "local" levels, Wolf expanded this to seven "levels and sublevels" for Middle America. But neither author, so far as I

1 This is a revised version of a paper read at the 1968 American Anthropological Association Annual Meetings. The Guatemalan work on which it was based was supported by the Ford Foundation and the Institute of Latin American Studies, The University of Texas at Austin.

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316 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

know, has directed his attention to a rather central problem: What is a level of integration? That is, how do we know when we are dealing with one? How do we know that one may exist, be coming into existence, or possibly be changing? How do we then account for the possible fact that there may be different numbers of such levels in different societies, or in different parts of a single complex society? If these questions cannot be answered, then the concept can never be a satisfactory analytical tool.

"Brokers" has been used to refer to individuals who occupy linkage roles between sectors of a society. "Marriage brokers," as well as "stock brokers," serve to articulate two clients in order to effect an exchange of approximate equivalence. Until a few years ago, this exchange of equivalencies seemed to imply that brokers worked between social equals. Wolf (1956) suggested that this kind of articulatory role could be seen operating in individuals who related social elements which were clearly not equals, where the things being linked were on different levels of the society and, therefore, stood in relatively different positions of power. This extension of the concept has facilitated the conceptualization of the connections and linkages between local levels of a society and the larger system. A problem in the use of the concept, however, is that we have little notion why these "cultural brokers" seem less congenial in some societies than in others and what conditions lead to their appearance or disappearance. A further question is whether the cultural contact between two different levels afforded by a broker is of relevance structurally and, if so, under what circumstances.

"Career mobility systems" refers to a phenomenon that has received little elaboration beyond the case that was presented by Leeds (1965) in Brazil, and the model of spiralism proposed by Watson (1964) for Great Britain. Obviously, in dealing with levels we are also interested in the process of mobility, the devices whereby an individual or party succeeds in moving from one level to another. Societies clearly differ in the degree to which mobility during one's career is possible; and in those societies where mobility is feasible, it usually can be described rather systematically. It is possible, therefore, to speak of career mobility systems as those patterned processes within a given society whereby one moves up or down.

What is sometimes overlooked about these systems is that they are more than merely ways for individuals to move up or down; they also establish linkages between the different levels. Whereas brokers translate the interests of one level into responses at another, in mobility systems those with interests at one level can attempt to move to the next level and to assess their own interests there. In one respect, therefore, career mobility systems parallel the activities of brokers, and the problem posed concerning brokers is equally applicable to them: i.e., under what conditions do these systems



BROKERS AND CAREER MOBILITY SYSTEMS 317

come into operation or fall into disuse? Further, do they specifically have some relation to the presence or absence of brokers?

POWER DOMAINS, LEVELS OF ARTICULATION, AND CONFRONTATIONS

The conceptual relations I wish to explore here are derived from trying to understand a series of events covering a twenty-five year period in Guate- mala and include matters such as relationships between rural community dwellers, changing national governments, associations of national scope, and the role of foreign powers, specifically Germany, the United States, and Cuba.

Of the concepts central to this discussion, that of the power domain has been discussed elsewhere (Adams 1966). It should be kept in mind that the concept of power used here is not derived from Weber (1964:152-153); i.e., it does not include the totality of influences that make people obey the wills of others. It refers to control over the environment; the environment en- compasses any set of events external and relevant to the persons doing the controlling. We are concerned, however, with a particular phase of control, that which one individual may have over the environment of another. Thus, the concept of power being used here diverges from the Weberian in that power is only one of the totality of influences that may exist between two individuals or players. Moreover, we also use a generalized concept of player, one that can include any kind of social operating unit that is coping with the environment. (Adams 1970:39-53 contains an extended treatment of these concepts.) Thus, a family, a community, a political party, a military establishment, a government may all be operating units, and hence players. A power domain, then, is a relationship wherein one player has greater control over the environment of a second than the second does over that of the first. The domain concept is useful in organizing and examining the dynamics of inequalities in systems of power.

To this, I want to add a remodelling of the notion of levels. To avoid confusion with earlier usages, I am referring to this as "levels of articulation" (see Adams 1970:53-70 for a detailed treatment). A level of articulation comes into being when two players meet in a confrontation. A confrontation takes place when two players find that successfully coping with the environment brings them into a situation where either may stand as an obstacle to the further exercise of power by the other. Confrontations may occur ran- domly, but they are more commonly foreseen and often actually planned by at least one of the parties. In terms of power, success in a confrontation means that one so uses his power tactically that he eliminates the other or superimposes himself in a domain over the other. This then places them at different levels. Confrontations may, however, be continuing and fairly stabilized, without either party winning. In this case, the parties remain in




articulation, to some degree intentionally keeping each other under stress. It is the condition of the continuing presence of balanced confrontations, and the repetition of similar confrontations, that serves to provide some permanence to levels.

It is probably worth noting that the term "confrontation" here is not being used in quite the same manner as in international and local U.S. politics in recent years. This latter usage suggests that a face-to-face meeting necessarily implies a potential conflict and a necessarily violent resolution; e.g., to say that two nations wish to "avoid a confrontation" has become almost synonymous with saying that they wish to avoid a war. In the context of this essay, "confrontation" refers to the fact that two parties are in articulation because one or both are obstacles to the other; it does not imply that they will choose to fight over the issue nor, indeed, that these issues will necessarily ever be resolved.

Levels of articulation become increasingly explicit and important as confrontations become more durable, as more of them occur between parties of equivalent power, and, therefore, as the perception of relative power becomes institutionalized within the society. As such, levels are more than merely loci of confrontations; they also provide a place for many kinds of relationships between parties, ranging from confrontation and competition to cooperation and assimilation. Individuals may find themselves operating at different levels, depending upon which of their various roles they occupy at the moment. Consequently, a consistency tends to emerge among levels of articulation. Instead of ranging over a broad undifferentiated continuum, players tend to bunch where those of roughly equivalent power are maintaining their positions and, consequently, where those who wish to confront them must also congregate. To this should be added the recognition that real players operate in real space. This means that topography and other external features will influence the possibility of confrontations taking place. Because of this, levels in one locale or region need not precisely correspond to those elsewhere. Anything which promotes isolation, be it cultural or physical, may differentiate systems of levels.

In spite of this, however, most complex societies have sets of levels that approximate the following: (1) sub-communal (possibly identified around kin, households, etc.); (2) local (possibly neighborhoods, communities, or sets of small communities); (3) regional (possibly large towns or cities and hinterland, sets of communities, etc.); (4) national (sets of regions or a collec- tivity of small national scenes); and (5) clearly supranational, the maximal level at which the more powerful nations operate.

The concepts can be illustrated in the Guatemalan cases as follows. Gua- temala itself is in a power domain of the United States; its economy is




heavily dependent upon actions taken by the United States government, and its political system is explicitly aligned with the policy decisions of the United States and against those of socialist countries. The government of Guatemala, in turn, exercises domain over all Guatemalans in various aspects. And within Guatemala, there are lesser domains of businesses, the church, agrarian enterprises, industries, corporate communities, etc. Levels of articulation can be identified within Guatemala by taking note of the confrontation articulations between individual family heads, of town officials dealing with like officials elsewhere, of ministers of government nego- tiating with leaders in business and industry or with political figures of dis- tinction, and so forth. They are also evident in the dealings between the Guatemalan government and other governments and in the fact that the United States clearly exercises more power over Guatemalan decisions than the reverse. In this paper, however, we are concerned with the lower levels of articulation, those that operate within the nation.

It is important to recognize that domains and levels are two different ways of conceptualizing the consequences of power operations within a single society. The presence of domains can be examined to see how players with roughly equivalent access to power are aligned horizontally; and the manifestation of levels indicates that the relationship between domains has become somewhat institutionalized. However, the two concepts need dif- ferentiation because confrontations may produce domains which are not clearly aligned within a set of levels. The notion to be explored in this paper is that societies, or subsegments of societies, will from time to time place special emphasis on either domains or levels, and that this differential emphasis has consequences for our understanding of brokers and career mobility systems.

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTS

Let us now return to the concepts mentioned at the outset. "Levels of articulation" obviously refers to much that is contained in Steward's (1955) and Wolf's (1967) "levels of integration." The new notion, however, is more precise in its referent, allows for cross-cultural correlation of varying forms, indicates the dynamics of the levels, how they come into being, and how they may change. Since they are products of potential conflicts, their locus and systematization must reflect the adaptation to the total environment. Because of these advantages, however, there are some cautions which must also be observed. Since one cannot, a priori, assume that levels found in one locale will necessarily be present or operative in another, they must be sought out empirically. The study of different regional power structures in Guatemala made this quite clear (Adams 1970:219-237). Just as kinship,




locality, and political and economic organizations may be assumed to exist in some form, so may levels. But their specific forms must be discovered and described; they cannot be assumed.

The concept of brokers, as a linkage or articulation between levels, has principally been applied in the literature on Latin America to relations between local and national levels. The material from the Guatemalan study suggests that the concept of broker should be modified in two ways. First, it is a term that refers to two quite different kinds of linkages; second, it is a form which seems to be important principally when domain structures are emphasized over levels.

As linkages between local and national levels, various authors have cited instances such as caciques, school teachers, political agents, military recruiting agents, tax collectors, lawyers, labor recruiters, etc. Emphasis generally has been laid on such matters as whether the individual had his origins at the local rather than the national level or whether he represented the interests of one over the other. If it is asked whether brokers act as channels through which power is exercised, however, then we find we must differentiate between two quite different kinds of intermediaries.

Classically in Guatemala, and in many other Latin American countries, the school teacher is a cultural representative of the national system working in a culture different from that within which he is used to operating. While the teacher may serve to make national traits available, he usually has no power himself. He cannot expect firm support from his own Ministry of Education and consequently has little to offer or deny the members of the local group beyond whatever may be inherent in his role. The teacher's weakness at the national level means that he is of little interest to them in any except his specialized capacity. The same may be said for the public health doctor and the agricultural extension agent.

This situation of essential weakness is quite different from that of the cacique, an individual who classically plays the role of intermediary through utilizing his controls at each level to the advantage of the other. He can offer support by the local population to regional or national political figures only if he can then be sure that they will respond to his calls for support. His actual control over either sphere depends upon his success in dealing with the other; his controls in one level of articulation provide a basis for controls in another. In addition to the classic cacique, brokers in this sense include political party agents, mass organization leaders, labor union leaders and agents, industrial foremen, local and regional marketeers and credit agents, labor recruiters, lawyers, etc.

It is clear that these "power brokers" differ from those of the first cat- egory, for whom we may retain the label "cultural broker." The cultural




broker is an individual from one level who lives or operates among individuals of another level. Whatever influence he may have on the other level depends basically not on the power that he can wield but on his own skill and personal influence. Even flamboyant success at one level may have absolutely no effect on his role at the other. The school teacher who is a favorite in a rural school is not necessarily going to be the favorite in the Ministry; and he who "politicks" around the Ministry may fail to gain a following in his own school.

The power broker, on the other hand, specifically wields power at each of two levels, and his power in one level depends upon the success of his operations at the other level. He controls one domain only by virtue of hav- ing access to derivative power from a larger domain. It is interesting that so many Latin American governments have, from time to time, attempted to use cultural broker roles in a context where they really needed power brokers. Few governments, however, allow their school teachers or agricultural agents access to power.

The conditions under which each of these brokers appears within a complex society necessarily differ. Cultural brokers are usually sponsored through upper level decisions and are destined to act at lower levels. Their tasks, however, are seldom of first priority, since a failure to realize them is not felt to be a threat to the relative position of power of the parties spon- soring them. Classically, a Minister of Education does not lose his job because he fails to improve national education but because he becomes a political liability. The increase of teachers, public health agents, and agricultural agents varies with changes in national government policy about the importance of these particular areas of life for the government or for the nation. The increase of traveling agents of breweries, shoe salesmen, and wholesale agents depends upon how and when commercial houses decide to improve business operations. In general, I would assume that the importance of cultural brokers varies with the state of the national economy and the particular efforts being made to promote the spread of a national culture.

The incidence of power brokers answers to a different structure. Power brokers link units or actors at different levels, where the difference in power is such that the inferior has no real chance to confront the superior. The 19th century Guatemalan Indian dealt through the elders or cacique because little could be gained by going directly to officials at the national level. Political party agents operate at the local level to gain voting support for their candidates because it is impossible for the candidate himself to do all the organizing, traveling, and convincing necessary for his election. The military establishment keeps local agents to undertake recruiting because it cannot afford to take up the time of colonels and generals in such a menial




task. In all, the power broker holds an important place in the power structure of the country and particularly in the region within which he works.

Since a major feature of the role of power brokers is to mediate where confrontations do not occur, it follows that they should be especially important where domains are dominant. If someone low in a domain wishes to obtain something that is available only to superiors in the domain, he may attempt a confrontation, or he may try to do it through a broker. If he attempts a confrontation, he makes the levels more flexible; if he operates through a broker, he strengthens the domain. Power brokers are important, then, where domains are strong and, correlatively, where levels tend to be rigid. In pre-revolutionary Guatemala (prior to 1944) dictator Ubico allowed no confrontation; similarly, no coffee farmer would allow a show of orga- nized power on the part of his laborers. The major means of handling prob- lems were through elders, caciques, town intendentes (government-appointed town mayors), farm administrators, and others who stood in power brokerage positions. At the same time, there was no question as to what levels existed, and each person knew where he stood. Domains were strong and levels were rigid.

During the 1944-1954 revolutionary period, new sources of power opened up, and multiple access to power was made possible by organizing political parties, mass organizations, labor unions, and the like; concomitant with these changes, the incidence of confrontations between organizations and domain superiors increased. As a result, the system of levels became much more flexible, and domains weakened. By the same token, the role of the power broker became ambiguous. As it became increasingly possible for the lower sector to get what it wanted through various new channels, the broker was by-passed if he was not effective. The outstanding case was the manner in which young, politically oriented individuals began to take over control of local governments through the elective process and thereby ignored the traditional channels of local political authority. Indian elders, local ladino (mestizo) upper strata, and large farm operators could all be confronted or by-passed completely by virtue of the new access to power of the political party and labor union. (See Adams 1957 for case histories.)

The change bringing about the new emphasis on levels, and the concomitant de-emphasis on domains, did not stop with the end of the revolutionary period in 1954. The increase in confrontations was reduced in important ways, but the new power sources and new channels opened by the revolution began to be used in different ways. Labor courts continued in operation, and, although under severe practical constraints, they were more effective in dealing directly with a farm administrator in extreme instances.




Labor unions, while weakened, nevertheless continued to operate, particularly in the capital city.

A contrary case, which tends to demonstrate the proposition here suggested, is that of the labor recruiter. Seasonal migrant labor, which probably numbers as high as 400,000, did not have effective access to new power under the revolution. The labor laws and unions could do little to influence their situation. The means of contracting labor had traditionally been through individuals who would act as brokers between the farm administrations and the laborers of particular towns or villages. These habilitadores and engan- chadores, perfect examples of power brokers, continue to operate up to the present. They serve a purpose for which no readily devisable means of confrontations have been invented. It may be predicted, however, that if and when the labor needs of farms outstrip the availability of the rural population for seasonal labor, then confrontations will begin to take place and the broker will disappear.

Just as rigidity of levels is an aspect of a strong domain system, so flexibility of levels is a concomitant of the weakening of domains. And whereas brokers have a real role in the former situation, this role is replaced by mobility in the latter. In systems where brokers operate, upward mobility is very difficult. Individuals at the lower levels, in the absence of access to derived power, depend upon brokers to provide what little they may get. The weakening of domains and disappearance of brokers is simultaneous with an increase in mobility. Aggressive lower sector individuals reach directly for power themselves; intrasocietal patterns develop whereby confrontations may be made, and the cleverer and luckier individuals and groups will gain more power for themselves and thereby move to higher levels. As was in- dicated earlier, we are faced with a painful shortage of studies of the mobility processes that have evolved in different societies. Leeds' (1965) description of the career system in Brazil was an important innovative study because here it was made perfectly clear that mobility is considerably more than a set of sociological statistics and that it probably manifests the same diver- sities that are to be found elsewhere in socio-cultural systems.

The replacement of brokerage by mobility suggests that the latter is more than a means of bettering the lot of individuals within the society, that it is also a structural linkage within the system as a whole. Both mobility and brokers enable a social system to continue on its course with only gradual structural change. The difference, quite obviously, is that one keeps people in their appointed roles, whereas the other allows them to change. In both, the role system remains much the same. The increase of confrontations, however, means that individuals and groupings accomplish this mediation by




moving out of the lower levels and by obtaining direct access to power (whether derivative or independent).

Another way to look at the contrast between the two situations is to see the broker system as static and the mobility system as dynamic. A broker does not change his position within the total structure by virtue of his activities as broker. Since his power in each level depends upon maintaining his control over resources in both areas, he generally cannot move without losing control over one or both sources. (I say "generally," because there are occasional individuals who are successful in moving out of the brokerage position into higher levels through confrontations. The classic case of the provincial caudillo who takes over the central government, as Rafael Carrera did in Guatemala in 1838, does occur. But they are relatively few when compared with the number of brokers in operation.) Consequently, the broker accomplishes linkage within the society by not moving. In a career mobility system, on the other hand, the linkage is accomplished by the individual occupying one position in one part of the society at one point in his career and another position later. He may retain relations at the different levels, but his roles change as he moves up. Time does not change the broker's position, but it extends the roles of the mobile person across various levels of society, and it is the very movement over time that provides the linkage.

THE PROCESS OF WEAKENING AND STRENGTHENING OF DOMAINS

There remains a question as to the reasons that domains vary from weakness to strength and levels of articulation from flexibility to rigidity. Basical- ly a domain may be said to be strong when it has sufficient power within its control to keep subordinates in an inferior position. The circumstances which may affect the relative control of domain superiors are too varied to permit even a cursory review here. They may be illustrated, however, in terms of recent Guatemalan history.

Since levels are defined by the presence of confrontations, it follows that an increased flexibility in levels depends upon an increase in confrontations. Some of the more obvious conditions that produce this include population increase, economic development, and political expansion. Population growth brings about competition over land and other resources, and it results in confrontations which may appear at any level, from the family to the international. Economic development, entailing as it does an increased extraction of resources and production, is inherently a competitive process, both in- ternally and internationally. It, too, may breed confrontations at any level, although they are perhaps better known at higher levels. Political expansion refers mainly to the expansion of nation states or to political movements




within nations. These, also, are apparent at higher levels, but they occasion- ally occur in the form of urban demonstrations and of peasant or Indian movements. Even within the community, the expansion of a family or kin group may be seen in this light.

Because we live in an age where both national growth and economic development, as well as population growth, seem to be in evidence almost everywhere, it may seem harder to find cases where there is a shift from flexible to rigid levels. Indeed, the three processes just described constitute three phases of the major course of contemporary social evolution. Their conjunction is not a convergence of independent variables but a complex whereby each affects the other, and feedback from one increases activities within another.

Given this picture, and assuming reasonably that the course of evolution is unidirectional, it would be easy to assume that flexibility of levels regular- ly increases. This, however, is erroneous. The changing flexibility of levels and strength of domains is a mechanism within the evolutionary process, not an outcome of it. A major unidirectional change is to increase the number of domains, to increase the amount of power at the top, and, therefore, to increase the importance of larger domains. This inevitably leads to more confrontations and, consequently, to a more complex structure of levels. The specificity of real situations, however, will inevitably lead to a periodic or fluctuating relative isolation of domains; and this relative isolation leads inevitably to fewer confrontations at those points and to a concomitant strengthening of the domain.

To return to the recent history of Guatemala, under the pre-1944 government, the country was a somewhat isolated domain, characteristically a unitary domain, under the general external power of Germany and the United States. Germany was eliminated by World War II, and the United States remained the sole external power of any importance. During the revolutionary period of 1945 to 1954, the internal structure of the country began a drastic reorganization such that internal multiple domains became common and, with this, a sharp increase in confrontations. Levels became flexible, and the internal domains weakened. As the United States became frightened of activity in Guatemala that it considered to be "communistic," it began to provide support to encourage a confrontation between the government and the elements working against the government, a process which culminated in a counter-revolution in 1954. This, in turn, coupled with a steady process of economic development and population increase, led to a severe strengthening of the upper sector, with a concomitant strengthening of and reemphasis on domains and rigidity of levels. In this the United States provided important derivative power crucial to the process. The grad-




ual regeneration of a more virile revolutionary movement in the 1960s, following the Cuban Revolution, led the conservative elements of Guatemala to align themselves (not by any means always to their taste) with United States demands, so that confrontations became parallel at various levels. Not only was the United States in confrontation with Cuba and the socialist world, but the government of Guatemala was in confrontation with some fairly agile guerrilla groups, and in both rural and urban populations there were frequent politically related assassinations. In this way, the increasing activity at various levels initiated a new series of specifically political confrontations. Over the past thirty years, then, Guatemala has shifted from a period of strong domains (pre-1944), to a weakening (1945-1954), back again to strength (1954-ca. 1961), and now again to signs of weakening (ca. 1961 to the present).

Nation states essentially attempt to strengthen their own domain structures. But the fact that they are undergoing economic development and that their populations are usually growing means that inherently the fre- quency of confrontations increases. Concurrently, levels reassert themselves and become more flexible through confrontations, promoting the appearance of career mobility systems and putting power brokers out of business.

FINAL COMMENT

The intent of this essay has been to relate the process of brokerage and mobility to more inclusive conditions of the total society. It has done this through relating the modes of handling power within a society to the shape and emphasis of the larger social system; it has further suggested that the condition of the larger system sets constraints on the kind of linkages that will emerge within it. As stated at the outset, it has been speculative, and, as such, I hope it will serve to stimulate further inquiry into the relations of the unit activity within a complex society to the world society and to the social evolution of which it is a part.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADAMS, RICHARD N. 1957 Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian Communities: a Symposium.

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1966 Power and Power Domains. Amdrica Latina, ano 9, no. 2, pp. 3-21. 1970 Crucifixion by Power: Essays in the National Social Structure of Guate-

mala, 1944-1966. Austin: University of Texas Press.

LEEDS, ANTHONY

1965 "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: a Case History and Model," in




Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America (ed. by D. B. Heath and R. N. Adams), pp. 379-404. New York: Random House.

STEWARD, JULIAN 1955 The Theory of Culture Change: Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

WATSON, WILLIAM

1964 "Social Mobility and Social Class in Industrial Communities," in Closed Systems and Open Minds (ed. by Max Gluckman), pp. 129-157. Chicago: Aldine.

WEBER, MAX

1964 The Theory of Economic and Social Organization (trans. by A. M. Hen- derson and Talcott Parsons. Ed. with an introduction by Talcott Par- sons). Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

WOLF, ERIC 1956 Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico. American

Anthropologist 58:1065-1078. 1967 "Levels of Communal Relations," in Handbook of Middle American In-

dians (R. Wauchope, general ed., and M. Nash, vol. ed.), vol. 6, pp. 299-316. Austin: University of Texas Press.

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