AD-A274 043I I iili 11 I nvasionuiof

The German Invasion of Yugoslavia:Insights For Crisis Action PlanningAnd Operational Art in A Combined

Environment

A Monographby

Major Daniel L. Zajac

Armor

, ELECTE

-NEC22 1993.

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term Ay 92-93THIS MONOGRAPH CONTAINS COPYRIGHT MATERIAL

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4. TITLE ANO SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERSTHE GERMAN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA: INSIGHTS FOR CRISIS

ACTION PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL ART IN A COMBINEDENVIRONMENT. (U)

6. AUTHOR(S)

MAJ DANIEL L. ZAJAC

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND AUDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONSCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES REPORT NUMBER

ATTN: ATZL-SWVFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900COM: (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON: 552-3437

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

14. S BJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGESCRISIS ACTION PLANNING THE GERMAN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA 1941 67

OPERATIONAL ART OPERATION 25 16. PRICE CODE

COMBINED OPERATIONS THE BALKANS 1941

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSII-ICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTOF REPORT OF TIllS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

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SOOOL OF ADVANCED MIUXTY STUDIES

MOOPP AMMAL

a-oz Dwniel L. Zalac

Title of I& mgr 1;': The Ginn Inyasla of Yugoslavia: Insigts for CrisisAtion Plaminig And zaa Art In A Combied

_ofraDiet

•uoxb -1-lenal Patric teum, t8C, mm

L A-N ý %A Direcotr,School of AvneMI7cml James R.Moorug4, M6 6' d~ yStdo

P4_Directo, Q&mdute Degreehilip J. Rodm, Rh.D.

NTIS rR,, • ...

Ampted this 14th day of May 1993.

0- --- ---1•--IDTIC j••.

DlstIMf•¢ii . ....

TEGERMAN InVASI04 OF YUGOSLAVIA: INSIGHTS TPC CRISIS AC1!ICt PLANNING ANDOPRAICtIAL AIRP IN A CCBIMSNDD)hD? By WJ Daniel L. Zajac, USA, 67

This u~g, 1- seeks to determine i~diat ipcaaufor crisis actionplanning and - _eratimnal art in combined mwvirauit can be derived from theGerman exprience in the invasion of Yugoslavia (April. 1941). This studly hastw olael functions. First, from an historical standpoint, it

h~gitsthe state of Garmn cpamraticzial art between camqxetgr. in Franceand Iamaia. Second, it provides a convcise summay of the German invasion formilitary plofeinsig~ls currently suploring the history of warfare inYugoslvi.

On 27 Harda 1941, Adof HiLtler informe )my political and militaryleaedrs of Nazi Germny that he hod decidind to invads Yugoslavia at theearliest possible "Inn. Prior to that meting, the w-**sis preparingfor the invasicni of Gkmoce and F~msia, and had no plans for an attack onYugoslavia. However, by 5 April they had developed a caqmpign plan--<!RATIQI 25--and staged 21 divisions in Austria and three allied nationfor the invasion. F~nalrtkoie, they coordinated their operation with faorallisi natiCiw, two of wh~m join in the attack. aPEPATIQI 25 began on 6April and on the 18th Yugoslavia captuated. 7he campaign moved from

cu ttotLuito in 23 days. Aite %mk Yugoelav" sii theCamein feat of arm e a -romer 1 I ,, ~oxxxnful example of crisis responseand * ir itional art in a combined IrcIui. An analysis of CPEATICN 25offers valuable isigIfts for the U.S. military today.

12u focus of this maograph is linited to crisis action proeI resinvolving the coaziain w of military frcea. It is further Ltmitmi tooturaticnal art in a combined M irnit. Specifically, the mc~roAmphcompares the German reaction to the Yugoslav crisis in 1941 with the six"Tma Sinsitive Planning Phases" desoribed in Joi4Iicto 5-02.4, Jo~nOpeation Pl~.annigct", Volume IV, crss(-CJOPS volume

IV.It iduwitifies signiicanfdiff-es nd aties that haveiWpicaticmi for U.S. doctrira The wonoraph applies the smen approach to

the Ia--acteristic-M of qieraticnal art found in Field Hanal 100-5,SHore the sxtwy examines the reaia~p. betwmn military -en

and political ends; the -Inerto of tactics, opeaticne and strategy toachiiev political ads; centers of gravity; and the sequence of thecinuaign. Comiud cparaticm are reI~ I he they? iugwt on crisisaction planning and -liprational art.

The ,u g P gh concluds that teGeman reaction to teYugoslav crisiswssizilar to curnnt U.S. doctrine for crisis action. 7e some is tru fox.

the U.S. Army's concept of moparaticne1 art. Iqflicatimw drawn from thestudy indicate a need to inlu~lde guidelines fcor cinsd n~puation, conflictte rmninagtion and posttxuflkt, cparaticx. in Crisis action ]proom raihres.Likafis, current doctrine for combined operattiau iwuld addess tin.sensitive planning in a combined nwirwu1ni. Finally, this analysis ofCFURATIQI 25, supports currenrt doctrine by providing an historical precedentidure similar 1thodologies were sucesfully employed.

Table of Cmt Page

I. .......n ............................................................ 1

II. Crisis Acticn. P1anning, operatioal Art and CCObined Operation ........ 2Crisis Action Pr"OdLM (CAP).

mrsational Art.The Codlned Eniralmen.Criteria for Analysis.

in. P , dz of the Yugs2lav Crisis ..................................... 9him Crisis.Me Military Baimc.

IV. An.lysis of The Gszn Inmion of Yugoslavia .......... ............. .21

Sitatimn Dave]* and Crisis Ain,.1 1Cmm= of Action Dsvelc int, and Selection.Emcutian Plannin.Emcution.

The a Debm Military Means and Political Bids.ntegZa olii TaCtic. and opaat•onS with Stratg to Aieae

Political Ed.CO*As of Gravity.

V. Conca musv and .......................... 4gnt 1. Map of Yugoslavia ........ o e~e............... ..................... 45

-is It 2. Yugoslavian Military i: April 1941.................46

Appnix 3. Ygoslavian Army and Air Force Equipm.nt: April 1941.......... 47

AR Wix 4. Yugolavian Naval Equiiont: April .1941 .............. ... ...... 48

-;1Iix 5. German Military n tiar For COPRTIQC 25: April 1941 ..... 49

Si i . Gam Military Data: k-Apil 1941......... ........ .. ... .. 50

Appenix 7. V3p of Gsmw -ulyi~ an Iialjsiw.............. 51

Au Ix 8. Xhp of CP WICQ 25 in Yugslavia ............... ...... .e ...... 52

A-9dix 9. Ybp of OPEATIQI 25 in Smthrn Yugolavia ................. ooo53

iv

On 27 Much 1941, Adolf Hitler informed key political and military

leders of Nazi Gemany that he had decided to invade Yugoslavia at the

* earliest possible I*. Prior to that =winstg, the wa ~s preparing

for the invasiaw of Greme and Rinsia, and had no plan far an attack on

Yuoslavia. Hower, by 5 April tky had duwmlq a caumpaig plan--

0CU1LAIM 25--aM stad 21 divisio in Austria and thre allied nations

fort e invasi. iwtt-m-O, they irditmedmI their oeratin• with four

alled ratiorm, to of whmu join in the attack. CP1,•A.•IC 25 began on

6 April, and on the 18th, Yugoslavia pilated. 7 campaign moved fron

q: kt to tezmination in 23 days. Despite weak Yugoslavian €goition, the

German feat of arm ams a rnkably scesful exauple of crisis response

and *wsaticoal art in a cminmd u•wirment. An analysis of OPEATIN 25

offers valuble insights for the U.S. military today. 1

Dupite the ad of te Cold Iar a myriad of wriedictable threats still

g re the vital interests of United States. 7his situation is ccmqlicated

by a stategic awirawat whwe U.S. involvament in coalition wmrfare

Lysars likely. In this setting the pr bMty of U.S. military respne

to crises in combined awit Its has incraued. Uhfortuznaly, current

U.S. doctrine for crisis action pr•mdures, ebodied in Joint Publication

5-02.4, i•o • Rkluazni tJ., Volmmt IV, Crisis

(MPS Volmm IV), mikw no referec to ombined operatios. Similarly,

Field Mrumal 100-8, .a-in .hM ynrtigm (PM 100-8) fails to address

crisis action in cmzbneIenu irvrts.

This mra ap explores the invasion of Yuslavia to determine what

insights for crisis action r (CAP) and ceratioal art in ombined

uwfrinntws can be derived frum the German experience. The breadth of this1

subject require limits. lw-refo, the focus is limited to crisis action

prccvuaes-inwolvirM the cw•uitment of military force-and operati-na. art

in a obind envirorzunnt. This study contributes to the body of evidence

that supports cwr~r±t doctrine and provides insights for that doctrine's

reevaluaticn. This paper has two collateral fumicne. First, it highlights

the state of Gimm cuIer ticnial art between campaigns in France and Russia.

Secrd, it provide a cise analyWsi of oPERATMI 25 for military

fmricaszas eploring the hiutory of 'm in Yugauenda.

secifically, the ;ra1pic arepe the Germn reaction to the Yugoslav

crisis in 1941 with the six "Tim Suuitivw Plarming Rases" described in

JOPS Volume IV. It identifies significant differencs and similarities that

have i plicaticre for U.S. doctrine. On ograph applies the sam approach

to the I -- -- rIstico * or paticnl art found in PM 100-5. Hart, the study

exmmin. the r'atia I p betwmen zilitary -as and political ads; the

int gy:ion of tactics, cperation and strategy to acieve political ends;

the centers of gravity; and the seqen. of the qn. 2 czhined

cperaticu are adressed n they impact on crisis action planning and

cperatcma art.

32. CRSSA C3M~ fPa NN .WEITCLA, N ac__, ,o•m en cam qmo

Crisis Action Plarming (CMPI

Pta the p2proe of this per a crisis is a famt-trewkiq event that

occtua with little or no warning and threaten a vital interest of the united

States and (or) its allies. Mare•ver, a crisis requires rapid decisions that

te ate the emplayumt of U.S. military forces to attain national

objectives. 3 Relevant military reaptm:es to a crisis include ongoing

presence, sham of force, J, - aratucns, special perations, quarantines,

blodmde, and forced entry cpratiau. 4

2

Sir=e 1960 the United States has faced over 200 events thra4wt the

world that fit the definition of a crisis. 5 In the aftermath of a series

of crises in the early '70s the President and the Secretary of Deferme

(SEMM) determirnd that the ountry's military organization for crisis

ralotinit and p e Was inradquate. Fblladx this oc~lusion the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) dwmvlcpad rw doctrine for crisis action planing and

in 1976 the r, raI m we irwtituted. Qirrent doctrine, refined by

atIpeim, is mkdied in JtPS Vohme 7. 6

As u•iAniaud pruviously, JOPS Volum IV makis no refere= to crisis

Wro dre in ccdined enicuwt. brthemwore, it ignores; the ocixxts of

conflict temination and p nlict erationr. hee cmissicns are

sigrifint since the final resolution of a crisis my occtr after the end of

in a crisis leading to a military reqmci-e the President, Naticr• l

Security Ckxnil (NSPC, and JC nnrmly eaplcy a c-orclinated process to

prodc a suitable plan to deal with the problen. This process is described

in JOPS Volum IV and cnists of the following six phases: I. Situation

Dvevloi•t; II. Crisis Asenmit; III. Cmnse of Action Dewlopwnt; IV.

Corse of Action Selection; V. Mmwtio Planning; and VI. Maec,±in.

7e pases facilitate planminz as wll as the deploynment and employmwit of

force. sinc evry crisis is wdqm, the CRP pro-1z n designed for

flexibility. Phames or portia. of phases my be .xeiedy,

rx w-rently or caitted based on the situation and time available. 7

Situation Dvl~ent, the first pbase of crisis action prcedre,

begins with the occrece of an inident that my effect or threaten

national security. Every day a myriad of Coranizatic.n mcnitor wcrld events

and, if any of them detect an event having possible national secuwity3 I

implicaticrm, they aimit reports to the National Military Comand Center

(MOC). Phase I eads %be the National OQznud Authority (NOL),-the

President or Sm-the Chairnan of the JCS (CJCS) and JCS are informed of

the event. 8

After receiving such a report, the NCK and JCS e te Phase II or

Crisis Am e In . In this phase the political, eccnomic and military

iuplications of the crisis are evaluated. The NM determin the national

interests at risk, the objectives; zrr n; iU to tose interests and the

political, eo~mic and military optiors available to achieve those

objectives. In the meantime, updated situation reports fro- the Cmuarder in

de (Cnlm) roespansble for the crisis area-the crisis occurs within that

C=',s Area of Eupcmxiblity (AM)---and national intelligene assets keep

the NM, C7C and JS infomrid of the situation. 9 Thraqhout this phase,

the CJC and JCS advise the President on potential military resposes and

review any exsting plans for .xmh an occuwrn. he r-n mov to phase

III if, after weighing the option available, the NCA decides that military

courses of action should be d•rloped.10

Course of Action Develpiet or phase III of CAP c s when the CWCS

traimits a Waning order (1MW) to the CIN ard any -a-oriri CfICs.

Ideally, the tC will provide clearly defined missions anl guidan -

-- to include the strategic objectives to be attained--o the .pted and

.-- or ing mcs. 3 rwa phase III on, the aeratiaial design of the

respons takes shape. Normally the CINC will be tasked to prepare a

cmmnder's Estimate that inc-lucis viable courses of action (Co) and his

recWInded ODA. However, if time is short, the NCh and the JCS may develop

their amn c)A. Phase III ends when the CINC seni his estimate and

rlad cDA to the CJCS and NCL.124

After receiving the CN•C's estimate and r im ed CDA, the CJCS starts

phase IV, Couse of Action Selection. As the principal military advisor to

the NCA, the CJCS evaluates the estimate. Mis evaluation may result in the

c1eatiCn of entirely new COA, the refieit-• revision-of the CINC's ODA

or a wt of his re""im-ationu. Based on the situation and the ODA

available, the CJCS my Issue a Planming Order to speed exmcution planning;

homver, this does not ccnwtitute a decision. Finally, the CJCS presents the

wm-died CDA to the NCR for a dicisimn. Phase IV is complete xd= the

CJC ism an Alert Order that identifies the selected ODA and authorizes

the initiation of Em otion Planning.1 3

Once the Alert Order is issaed, the Emcution Planning Phase begins and

the supported cutuander transforms the selected CDA into an Operations Order

( )cc Ca•aign Plan. In this phase the detailed plarmirg required to

emxcute the approved .O is cmpleted. The suported and supporting CI"•s

identify the forcms, aistalIu packages, and strategic trarao-rtatio'n

required. The level of detail will be ropo=tAonal to the time available for

planning. Phase V = Aon- the required forces are on hand, a viable plan

is complete and the CInc is ready to mxcute his plan. 14

Phase VI or E~mcution, starts with the NCA decision to employ a military

optio. 'Th SE authorizes the CJ3 to isaue an Execute Order that

directs theC IC to carry a*t the . e CInC then ism an Execute

Order to his aibordinate and awpc'ting cdemrs. At this point the CINC

is e wting his operational plan.15

In each pase the servies, o&tr Cnx and aobmmande mwxiers

monitor the situation and-if required to support the respcnible CINC-my

create crisis action teaxs, estimates and supporting plans of their own.

Mos often same mgorti CINCs will provide resa•r and (or) forces of5

som type. MNe United Stat8e --a rti nard (UMRM4ANSC plays a key

role in situatiors reqtring the movemnt of large forces. In these

situations TRANSCC4 will review the CINC's cm, serd him deployment estimates

for eac hOA and assist him in refining reUrinmmnts both before and after a

ODA has been selected. . A rteru1re, orne in th Execution Planning and

IMiti #=ases, TPANS=4 bijds transportation scdwiles and ezures that

adequate assets are available to ne and sustain forces. 16

- oalAt.

FM 100-5 defines cLeratiorl art as *the employmnt of military forces to

attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of urationsth

the design, Lianzation, and couct of ca. aigr and major operations." 17

Setting the condition for tactical succes is not part of the formal

definition, but is an important m wiftration in the dein of camqigns and

=jajr m.oer atica..

Operatioal art requires the aC and his staff to link tactical actions

to the strategic ends he must attain. He mst disown %hat military

corditicns will achieve the desired erds. Imreo•r, he nut determine what

sequence of actions will create those conditiors. Finally, he must decide

how he will aeploy his available military resorces to cowplete the required

seqine of actions. his ;os normlly results in the design of a

cpaign plan?.1 Eln=i s of apmratiowl design izclude ctwr(s) of

gravity, ueuI IrIg, Lines of operatia.s, decisive points, azbuinating

points, Iz-arws and squels.

•e aanined •' 'm•

Joint Publication 1-02 Departmnt of Defemse Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms defines the combined as containing "two or more forces or

I-jcies of two or nore allied nations."19 Wen these forces or agencies6

act "together for the ax ul ut of a single mission" they execute

ombined operaticu. 20 ccAned operations nrmally oca in the framwrk

of an alliance or coalition. An allianc is created through "formal

a t, for broad l=,q tem cbjemtives."21 Th is-or Tripartite

Pact--cf World War II is an example of an alliance. A coalition is less

frao l than an alliance and often forms as a repnw to unfores- crises.

FM 100-8 defines a coalition as an "ad hoc acgeemot for ommn acticn."22

critata Ftr Analysis.

Military profeusiiciaJs searchin the past for evidence to suport or

refute theories must take care to avoid the misapplication of history and

paradigms. Specifically, they not be weary of drwwir teix= parallels

betw the past and present. Ccoparizu U.S. doctrine for crisis action

planmizq and !q:er ational art with Ginn= actionw in 1941. is no exception.

America's all volunteer military, wile armed better than any force in

history, is =h smaller than the • of 1941. Today the U.S. military

maintains a high state of peacetime prorPrelyIss but its state of readiness

carTxt match that of wartime Germany. Finally, while the Germans faced

problems in projectirM forces into Yugoslavia, their difficulties pale in

comparison to the globel r for force projection facing America

today. geu differences have beow cnaidered in this analysis.

U.S. doctri for crisis action plaming and -Merationl art, provide

criteria for a comparative analysis with German acticas in CPERATICK 25.

Diffe in political and military leadership structures will be amnts1

for by ttirq German pcsitiaou of similar respcnsibility with their

modern U.S. •iteparts. Hitler was Gerzany's NCA. While the co--anders of

the (air force), j ~(army) , Mr(navy) and the

Orkouand desW (a --Armed Farces Hig Command-approxi-ate the7

JCS. Germany had no positions equal to the CJCS or SKDEF. Figure 1. lists

those elements of CAP and operational art employed as criteria for analysis.

Figure1. C. EM oO 23Phase 1: Situation een'.

E : An event occurs with possible implications for nationalsecurity.

•h: Te event is monitored and re•ognized. 7he MCf subuits hisatof the situation.

Cz=on: Ihe --- it agency determies that the event may havenational security picatior and reprts it to the NCA/JCS

wies 11: Crisis sesetT he nitrir ageny's repoit and (or) CINC's a arerecmive.

A he JCS assess the situation and advise the NCA on possiblemilitary responses. NCA/CJCS evaluate the situation.N: NCA/JCS decide to develop military C0A.

Phase III: Course Of Action Deeln.m: CJCS publishes a warning order.Acio:Cn: are developed and evaluated. 7e JCS review the CINC's

estinate. Sujodimate and &Wortti commands evaluate thesituation; , prepares deploymnt estimates.: rwpublishes his estimate with a rceinr d CDA.

Pase IV: cirse Of Action Selec .y: CJCS presets refined and prioritized CoAs to the NM.tio: C co ntinuies to advise the NCA, he may issue a Planning

Order to start emcution plarming before the NCA cooses (C0A.outcom: NCM selects C0A. CUCS publishes selected ODA in Alert Order.

Phase V: Execution Pl .E: CINC receives an Alert or Plannin Order.

.i: equired tasks are identified and assigned to units. TheCnC, subordirnte and mnporting cnmands convert the C0Ainto CPI~ and mi~orM WM . Moverent -tsaxe identified. Shortfalls and limitations are resolved.M VC issues his or Cmpaign plan.

Phase VI: Emamxtion.tNC decid to execute the O or Cmauaign plan.

•-i: CJcs issues iM zte Order by authrity and direction of theSBDEF. he CINC executes his O or Caqnign plan.S~Crisis is resolved.

ratinal Art: How uere military means related to political ends?Were tactics, operaticns and strategy integrated to ahieve

political erds?Were centers of gravity identified? Was the camraign logicallys,,uencd?How did the exigencies of Combined Cperatiors affect planning?

8

III. BAOC3R0tD OF MfE YUWOSLAV CRISIS

Located on the west side of the Balkan peninsula, Yugoslavia ws bordered

by 1,300 miles of Ariatic coast and 1,850 miles of land frcntier with Italy,

Aurtria, HKnjary, Iaauinia, Eiqgaria, Greece and Albania. The country's six

mjcr g- ;raphic regions inlded the Panwnian Basin, the Saa and Drava

river valleys, the Morva and Vardar river valleys, the Dinaric Alps, the

Adriatic coast, and the rugd cetral plateau. 2 4

The Pannonian Basin posmsssd most of the nation's inix ztry and Belgrade

the Yugoslav capital. Belgrade s Yuoslavia's largest city with 400,000

t-abitants and constituted the political and military heart of the country.

Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, possessed 200,000 residents and was the ne~os

of the most inqortant rail lime in the Balkans. Other major cities included

klje in Wacecia, Sarajevo in Bosnia and the Ariatic ports at Split and

Dbvnik. The u-t iqxztant line of mc nications in Ygslavia--ad the

Balkans-folloed the Worava-Vardar river line and ncted Budapest,

Hmxjary with Salonika, Greece on the Aegean Sea. 2 5

Rrxged terrain slowd the graft of Yugoslavia's transportation netwjrk.

Croatia and Slovenia possessed most of Yugoslavia's few paved roads and its

best rail lines. Howmver, uest of then followed twistirn paths through

easily blodced passes. Along the northern border the Drava and Sava rivers

omti1bted obstacles to &=tea %&at. Similarly, the Tima, Danube,

rmava and Vardar rives haxparud east-•mt nxblity. 26

Yugoslavia's clinate is similar to central SaxqIe's, Chracterized by

warm, rainy sumars and cold winters. The Ariatic coast, hmjeer, has a

Mdliterranean climate with warm, dry, siuners and mild west winters. 2 7

After the Firpt World War peace makers tried to revise national

bondaries in the Balkans acoordiM to the principle of national self-9

ain. Dpit good intention, it was iJosible to reach a

settlst ac l to all. Yugoslavia wa a prim exaple of the

problem. 13-A 'Kingdom of Sezs, Croats and Slowves" was created in 1919 by

fusing parts of the defunt Habsburg Dpire-Slovenia, Croatia, aid

Bosnia-Herzegovina--with Serbia, Montero and nrthen ia. 2 8

In the ra Kingdom the Serbs tended to exploit the rest. Of 16 million

irimitrisSerbs r Utib ted 45% of the p~ia~othe Croats repeeted-

about 35% and the Sloawus 112%. 7hs last 9% Consisted of Albwm , Eilgars,

Macedoiam, Bzq.iz , aawimw, and Germiw. In 1919 the Kingdom was

founded on the principle of equal status for the nation's three Slavic

minrities. Serbs, howver, dominated the government from 1919 to 1941. The

nrn-Serbian minorities bitterly resented their secd class status and longed

for the irdj--d, of their ow regi".29

Religion differenc es arbated h ounty's problem. Yugoslavia's

religions divided the popula into three grup that arcId~ provincial

bo••daries. The first included the Serbs, YJbkodnians and 3Mctergrins vho

ebaced the Eastern Orthodox: religion. 7he second grop was pr:d ninantly

Rcman Catholic and csisted of the Croats and Slovenes. Juxtaposed betwen

these two were the Islamic or "Muslim-Slavs" of Dosnia and Herz.gova 30

Betwen 1919 and 1929 the fledgling state avoided the forces of

dieolution with a wek c al govrruw* holding loom control ovr the

country. In 1929 Prince Plegent Alexade took the reins of powe, changed

the kingdom's name to Yugoslavia (land of the South Slavs) and created the

oc•-try's first onuitution. King Alexardew wrked progressively toward a

united Yugoslavia QVde all peoples wold receive equality. 1owever, in 1934

during a visit to France, Croatian radicals assassinated the King. 3 1

After Alexander, the legal sovereign was Peter II, but at 10 years of age10

he could not legally take his throne. For that privilege he would have to

wait until his 18th birthday in November 1941. In the mantime leadership

rested in the hands of the Regent Prince Paul. Paul sympathized with the

Allies but he faced oosition in the form of Intellectuals i leaned toaard

Marxism and n1 era of the military leadaer p who favored the Axis. 3 2

In 1940 Paul's cabinet-in order of -ot- - c. uJisted of Dr. Vladko

Macek, a Croat and the Deputy Premier; Dragisa Cvet)wa~c the Prim Minister

and Ci1.rMai the* freign Minister. MIck, while dedicated

to the Croatian cause, was a peaceful and devoted Catholic. Cvetwkovic, a

Serb %ho contributed little to the government, held his position because he

was willing to work with the Croats. Finally, there was C"n'r-Marivc, a

Serb and career diplomat who served in Berlin u.tn Hitler rose to power. 3 3

Internally, Ygslava was, wraced by bitter ethnic feids. In August of

1939, Mmuek's Croat Peasant Party dvraded greater autmrxxy for Croatia.

They received m co sions but their succens angered the Serbs i felt

their dcminance sliping away. Meanwhile, in a, a Croatian extremist

named Ante Pavelic-leader of the radical "Ustasa Movement"--courted

Mmssolini'ss suport for an Iz-mp-rd-it Croatia. With Italian patronage the

Croats were a powerful threat to the stability of Yugolavia. 34

Internal dissent and rugged terrain ware not the only probleam facing

Yugslavia. A aon of theo contrim created after World Ibr 1, Yugslavia

was mwrmaudedl by neighbor. desiring the recovey of lost torritory. 7flm

ri onged to recov territory lost to Yugoslavia (Umnst) and Rumnia

(Transylvania). Similarly, Bulgaria eyed the Yugoslavian province of

c i a and the Iaum-ian province of Doizuja. Besides Hungry and

Bulgaria, Yugoslavia had to contend with Mussolini, who had designr on the

Dalatian coast. Meanwhile, Risia, a traditiona fried to Serbia, longed11

to absorb the Rmnian provinces of Bessarabia and &avina. In the '30s the

Balkan aers as volatile as they were in the period before World War 135

Yugoslavia's national strategy in the interwar period hinged upon

maintaining the country's integrity %hile attacking its internal problems.

In 1924--to dater Hmxjarian expasioi--the Yugoslavs joined the Czech and

Aminiane to form the Little Entme. hi Ente natiol -ap•cn -•ed by

ftMnce-patciPated in arwml military oron-,on from 1929 to 1937.

laUtr, the Balkan ftuite of 1934--deigned to maintain the status

cia-gh~t Yugolavia, Greece, Ramnia and Mzkoy together. Moo of these

cumtries accepted Frenc military missions, adopted the Frenc military

system and purchased Frenc equipmyt. Yugoslavia bnefited frEm the

aliane until the late '30s. 7hen, faced by a rgent Germany and a

hostile Italy, the Yugmlav. attmed to remain rmftral. 36

T gain favor wiLth. an increasingly pwrful Germmny, many Balkan nations

cpted for increased c erce with the Paich. Amenia traded oil for carmi.

Similarly, Yugoslavia, traded metals for frontlinm aircraft and artillery

pieces. By the sumer of 1939, Germny was the dzminant trading partner with

uirm of the Balkan states and received mumt of the resources it needed from

them. Hitler's interests in the region included its peace and stability. 37

7he r nPu-ssrieion pact of 1939 and the wift German

oq o Is in Scandinavia, the ,,w Comtries and France b4xt m Balkan

naticnu close to Hitler. Yugoslavia, however, tried to rnmain neutral by

seeking a prec arics balanm betwmen bar Balkan nighbors, GerQmy, Italy,

the Soviet Llion.38

By the fall of 1940 Hitler controlled &zqm from the Vistula River to

the PArmes Marntains. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Britain and the

postp!i I of OPEATION SEA LION, the futwe aqeared bright for the Reich.12

Calm ml¥, before the lUfZef ducck at the hands of the Royal Air Force,

the Ftn'er's attwiticn was turning to the East. on 31 July 1940 he gave the

army Vddance for OPIPATIQI BAMMCW6SA: the invasion of imsia. 39

Gmrmny's Oeall strategy for 1941 molved around the tmxtiucti of

the Soviet uniia and periphral attada in the ibditerrarman to force EglaMd

cut of the region. The .It1r-m1umn portion of this strategy, Qdle clearly

playinq I flidle to UM, Involved seizure of Gibraltar and

o~ixnd cqratirs with the Italians In Nt Africa. 7he onoing bettle of

the Atlantic and the limited air mar England were ioztLg efforts in

the overall strategy. followin Russia's defeat, the could focus

on elmimtnain Eland from the wr. Events in the Balkans, hwver,

¢ominerd to distract Hitler from the Im 0i of his plarm for ARssia. 4 0

Bewe June and Septer of 1940 Rmsia, Hzunay and lgaria is•du

eands for the return of tr4rito-ies lost -to Rumnia after" WWI. Hitler

inter'wd and fum-nia suffered. Rusia w Be•marabia and nthern

ajoovina, Wrgary recovered Trarnylvania and Blgaria abmorbed suthern

Dcbuja. In Septemer, a Fascist am* toppled Rumnia's King Carol Ir anid

established a dic that joined the Axis. la.mnia's fate provided an

abject lesson to Yuoslavia: Hitler was the now arbiter of the Balkans. 4 1

On 28 Octcbr 1940--withoutt advising Germ.ny--Italy invaded Greece.

After six days m- LWMing and Min= Italian gaiLn, the Q-ed 1mxnied a

countmoffaruiva. MW~ drove the Italians aft of Greece and by Janu~ary 1941

they had p rtrated 150 miIs into Albania. By No•wr 1940 the British had

establishad their ; r, a in the Bakans by providing naval, air and

logistics supprt to the Greeks. In D the frustrated Italians

formlly requested Gervan i ivention. 42

Having decided to ir• m "ssia, Hitler ould nort tolerate hostile forces13.

threataning his flank in the Balkm. FBrthe!•e, British airpowimr based in

Gream could range the Ruanian oil fields at Plosti, a major source of

petrolaeu for Garumny. ly, on 13 Decmbr Hitler ismsd Directive

20 for OPERATION MRRM1T: the invasion of Grece. Thm plan for the seizre of

Gibraltar wa cnceed and Hitler's pari ml strategy wasietracd0.43

To mexute MWRM the N.u first task wa to got an invsion fore

to the Greek c mrIr. While the 1t direct rots ran throh Yugoslavia, an

altermntivw datd fr Murspzy thtrugh m Ania to ft~iria. Homamr, if

the Gamrun deployed on the seeond rate, Yugoslavia still posed a problm.

With an army of one million men, the Yugoslavs were no smIll threat to German

1ine of caunmication. Russian intervention coMld exactrbete the problem.

Hitlar nIdId a nIme-essiom pact with Yugoslavia, if rot an alliance."

Fterful of Amuian mpmtim, Ruinia accepted Crmn to:n to guard her

oilfields. lbs ag rians--who joined the Tripaztite Pact on 20 Novadw in

watitd for Hitlr's belp In reainin Trauylvenia--cooprated by grantiM

tranuit rights to Gezrn fores on the wy to Rumnia. ry, one th

later they signed a "Pact of otant Peace ad Eternal Frieniahip with

Yugoslavia." In reurn for Hitler's assistance in recouveri southern

Dozuja, King Beris of Bulgaria 1agzee to Garmny's covert use of his contry

as a stagging are. for ITMk. Mlw King, hever, stayed o•t of the Axis,

until 1 11d=i 1941, to a•id pmvddn the msians or Turks.45

Hitler new had the froedoo to amoute the minim= *erational movemnts

1rAuired for MRKaM , b•t Y slavia wa still a problem and the

pnmad for the easie rout. Yugslavian occration uld them six to ten

wmdis in the deployms for MRrM and the rslployuents for BR SSA.46

h rdingly, the FP-rer applied diplcoatic pressure on the Yugoslav

gvmW Int. In a imeting with C IMhoc at Ber"htngaden on 2714

Novemer, Hitler offered Yugoslavia the Greek port of Salanika and a

guarantee of her frontiers in return for signing the Tripartite Pact.

Circar- riwvic was r ittal. with its intelligence service predictirn a

German attac Rn 1musia, the Yugsavian goverr••nt held out in the hope that

a campaign in lpumsia %ld distract Germwny. Naw*&.le, they courted aid

frCe Britain and Auwim, but all they received wasverbal ,couagwm• mt. 47

By Ptbrury 1941 Hitler's patianm was wearing thin whiile the Nd n

w c lmwing about the difficulties that Yugoslav rmitrality inxned on

WATIQI TaRrJA. on the 14th, Hitler again received Ciwur-horkavic, .h

continud to stall. In early March, Prince Paul mat with Hitler at

DWzr%=k.gadu as the German =AtW massed in Bulgaria. The dictator

exlairad that if Yugoslavia refused to cooperate, he wolA do nothing to

save fr= Italian aid Bulgia n expaion following MMRI. Paul

remPued to 1c1 to Ga n I T prince, hmovr, returned how

oivizud that Yugoslavia wald be crumhd if it did not join the Axis,

epite his feelirg, Paul hwitated and conidered resisting Hitler. 7he

Yugoslaws hurriedly di-_t-hd liaison officers to Imet with the British and

Greeks. y ih Britih assuraniis of direct intervention with gromd

and air forces, but the Yugoslavs left empty handed. The British, however,

advised m to i•• m, AidAlbania to capture Italian equipmmt. Bravely, the

Yugoslavs begna noving thekir ThIrd Army toward the Albanian border to have

the option available at --,rt natioe.48

Hitler calld exute no furthe delay and on the 22nd he gave the

Yugoslav one last chanc to sign the pact. As rumors of Yugoslavia's

joining the Axis spread, pressure mounted inside the country for defiance in

the face of the dictator's ultimatum. Over the next few days the Yugoslavian

Royal Cuncil debated their options. While sme advocated resistance, the15

majority agreed that for Yugoslavia's survival they must accqe Hitler's

demands. Cn 25 r, Cevtkvic and Ci' "r-Markavic signed the Tripartite

Pact on bhalf of Yugoslavia. However, they signed with the stiulaton that

no foreign troos wld be allowed to transit throug Yujoslavia. 4 9

Hitler'Is partial diplCtic .c.. ww short-lived. On the day after

the pact wasigid Ge al Bora Mirkovic, a patriotic Serbian and Duty

o~m r of the Yugoslav Air Pkz , hatdcd a - spiracy to overthro the

gOa•vrh . Nirkovic had cxmt~1ated such a oaup since 1937 and Paul's

latest mays provided a spark for action. GatherinM m*prt from his fellow

officers and with the tacit aupport of the GW.ral Simovic-the Air Farc

Cemider in C2ief--e rapidly planned to seize cotrol of Belgrade.

irkovic would lead the forces involved and S1mvic mild head the nwgover.ui..0

At 0220 hours on the 27th, Mirkovic's hastily assmbled forces ported

by tanks and artillery seized key locatiorn in Belgrade. With the city

effectively cut off from the rest of the country, General Sinovic presented

his emand to the gorrznt. Cvmtkovic resigned while Paul rrxxzed his

powrs and fled to exile in Greee. A radio proclamation at dawn annomcd

the overthrow of the princ and throughot the 27th, Belgrade rejoiced in a

m of anti-Germn Iu=m-Iat io. an the 28th the rebels installed the

yozhful Peter a King. Sinovic wodld act as Prim Minister %ihile Vladko

!aock ws persuaded to stay on as Deputy Premier. lor a brief Ii

Serbian, advocates of the Yugoslavian idea, and comumists were united in

the belief that history had been .e51

7he Military Balance

In the '30s and '40s Yugoslavia's military leadership often overshadowed16

the country's politcia. Serbs duirated. the force: 163 of the 165

* ~Yugoslav gurwrals wae Serbianis. Moms of the military leadiership had Ien

blood ed in the First World War, 4wre they fought with great bravery and

eduran T. hey were a poud grup steeped in the rich lore of their

military heitage. Howhwe, they we slaved to tradition and slow to accept

row tra~ in warfare. 1ViDe Yugolav generals presideud ove wargame; ndm

muvers that refoxa t the battles of the past wr, Gemany ws ov!rrurminz

1t of Europe. Th Yugmlava largely iged the le. prwide by the

-m w I z mta tiu of drn warfare. Furthermore, themlt

prrizatin -gin that they started proceeded at a smail's pace. 52

In 1940 the heed of Yuoslavia's armed forces was Gensral Milan Nedic the

Miný r of War. Nedic leaned tard the Axis and when Italy invaded Greece,

he advcated an attack to seize the Greek port of Salanika. Paul overruled

Nedic and repla him with a 73 year old General named Petar Pesic. Paul

Aw 0 him becaumehe was- easier to control. Pesic, however, was rot up to

the renot:sawibilities of his post and his - itmen t angered the country's

military leadrship.53

7hw Yugoslav military in 1941 was urqmred for a German invasion. At

full moilization the Army could muster 1,000,000 trained man in 35

divisions, an aseorbint of Igp I.It bra and 23 frontier guard

1bmtt Ia'licr. Um the N~CI attadcad, 700, 000 ama in 28 infantry and

thre cavalry divisic.. were in the field. However, only the regular army

divisions of the Thir a Fourth Armies readid full mobilization.5

Indiv y the Yugoslavian soldir was a wll trained an wrthy

cmRwtnt. Secial units called "Cetnici, "--trained in guerrilla operations

of up to battalion size-deployed nsar the border to harass the rear the

invaders at the onset of wr. ¶lum troqn, howver, would not prove their17

value until after Yuoslavia capitulated. 5 5

Mny of Yugoslavia's 6,700 artillery pieces and all of its 200 tanks were

of foreign design and obsolete. urMhenmre, the Army lacked mobility

bec=ime motor traiortatican was scarce. Finally, the Yugoslav's failed to

practice large unit marmrxs that integrated air, artillery and tank

forces.56

The Yugoslav Air Ptc posessed 505 aircraft, 300 of 4uid were modern

deiegns. 'n total included 73 Jngmeru•hitt Bf-109s and 70 lornier Do-17s

bougt from Germany. fw• mtwatly for Yugoslavia, training was poo and

nost of the country's airfields were inadequate for comat cperation. 57

The Yugoslav Navy was a relatively modern force stationed in the Adriatic

ports of Sibenik and Kotor. HorWuw, with only four modern destroers, 18

t=:pedo boats and four subarims, Yuoslavia's maritime service was in no

position to affect the coming caMaign•A

Terrain limited the options open to the Yugoslav Army. Against one

frm, the Yugoslavs could exploit their tough terrain in the defense and

protect the nation's vital areas. Howmver, if faced with multiple threats on

the country's lorn borders, the weak transportation net negated the advantage

of interior lines of operation. In this case falling back to t1Pe central and

southern parts of the country or linkin up with the British and Greeks to

the mouth could prolong the fitg and provide the o tt for an allied

citerofensive. This concept was embodied in War Plane S of 1938 and R-40

of 1940.59

Had they adopted Plan S or R-40 the Yugoslavs could have severely mauled

the invaders in terrain inhospitable to panzers. Instead they developed a

raw wr plan--R-41, issued on 31 March 1941-that called for the defense of

every crossing along the frontier and an invasion of Albania by the Third18

Army. Perhaps there w little choice as the first two war plane required

the early abandoruint of the cotry's most vital areas. In March 1941 the

army spread out in a cordon defefse along 1,859 miles of land frontier. 7he

Yugslavs planned to form a trategic reserve, hwer, they ver created

it. Defanive positions in depth er neglectd and irdividal frontier

fortificatiom, while skillfully located, ladced n tion and heavy

artilery. In Aril 1941 the w&M** idmetified and eqloited the

of Plan R-41,60

At the outset of the invasion the Yugoslavian Army deployed three army

groups, an --dqi1wd t army and the oastal Defemse Casmrd. Air support for

each army group w supplied by an air brigade while naval aircraft flew in

sprt of the Coastal coma. 7he First Army Group dployed with the

Ssvnth Army on the left and Furth Army on the right. 7ey wold defend the

northern Iordr J from the Adiatic to Slatina on the 8mgarian frantier. Nexct

c-o the Second Army Grup co ed of the Second and First Armies. The

Second Army deployed on the H•ngarian border while the First Army defended

the Banat region cpposite the Iingarian and Amnian borders. Te Sixth Army

-- an i e nt Ipositioned in the Banat to the rrxtheast of

Belgrade along the Ruanian frontier. In the south the Third Army Group was

repnible for the defnme of Maceonia and the invasion of Albania. To

acooplish these mlasirm , Thizd Armjy marched to the Albanian frontier while

the Fifth and Third Tw-it-rial Armies defeded posite the knuznian and

augarian border.. Finally, the Coastal Defenme Cumand guarded the Adriatic

coast, Sebinek and Kotor with an infantry division and t fcrtress brigades.

Simovic took overall c•mrd and set up his Ueauuariers in Belgrade. 61

In the spring of 1941 the German military macine was a Large and

powerful force. Seasoned in the ma sful igr of 1939 and 1940, the19

Wehacht was con~rieaw, aonfident and highly proficient in the art of

war. Since it was still in a state of war with England, the German military

was in a high state of readines. By Mnrdi 1941, the German Army possessed

190 divisions: 51 of hich were statined in Germany; 56 in France, Holland

and Belgium; 30 deployed along the Rmssian boder; 17 in Bulgaria and

Rumania; 10 in Norway and Denmark; and oan in Africa. With the exeption of

the T1lfth Army staqinq in Bulgaria aUl of Gmeriny's divisions ware employed

in o=4ztion duties or wae earmrke for BNAPMFDR . 62

The German Army of 1941 posssed a well-oiled tactical tedmique

ccommonly kno~wn today as bltjgW This techinique permeated the air

armored, umechanized andi motorized portionu of the force. In kbjlj tanks

and air pomr provided mass, speed, and fCrce to the! attack. Initiative,

uanifested in d1-osi0 the time, place and diticau for the attack as wal

as the ability to exploit oportunities, was an easntial ingredient in the

German tactics. Esetially, bj.trgdW was a form of tactical maniver

dsigned to create a breakthcMugh in enemy defenses to facilitate

eiwelopments. Thse mvelopments alloed the Germas to encircle and destroy

enemy forces. Once they diutured the enmuy army the vital portions of the

c ponint's nation were Iefernseleus to German attacks. A variant of this

. a. v by Gerurmny's armor p =Its--relied more on the shock

and paralysis of deup thrusts rather than battles. By strik-irg

dep and fast into the enemy'1 vital areas and their inomrui and

control capability this version left the enamy unable to react. 63

Despite its defeat in the Battle of Britain, the L of March 1941

was the mst powerful air force in the world. on the verge of the coup in

Belgrsle, the IMeZ~f possessed over 4,000 frontlim aircraft, 490 of which

were deployed or enrote to Bulgaria and Rumnia for MARIA. Seasoned pilots20

and I. wo-well versed in bl --Wfilled the laftwaffel. ranks.64

While b wes a well-practiced technique by the spring of 1941,

the Germars never codified it in written doctrine. Similarly, while same of

the Wdmahl, campaigns manifest the characteristics of operational art,

the essence of the conct was aben•t from their doctrinal literature.

Finally, like b and 1pratiouil art, no mention of crisis action

pr ams- some eqUivalnt--can e found in their doctrine. 65

IV. &K= OF M•¶I N INVASICO OF YL0SLAVTA

Situation Duvelaan and Crisis Asesment

Within homrs of the 0ou in Y1ugoslavia-between 1000 and 1100 hours on 27

a c. diplatic sources in Belgra reported the event to Hitler in

Berlin. When the dictator learned of the coup he thouht the news was a

joke. Any Joviality was drt-lived and the h quidcly decided that

Yugoslavia was imntlable and would inevitably join the allies. Despite

messages of r a~ranc from Yugqslavia-that the new gvrut wuld stand

by its treaty obligations-Kitler was urswved.66

At 1200 hairs Hitler amcned the Army and L cOaMrders in chief

and their chiefs of staff to his head ters. From the CIW he called for

Generals Keitel (Chief of the (1Gw) and Jodl (Chief of the CK (OraticzS

Staff) .67 Joadhim Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, received the arder to

attd as wll. At 1300 hours Hitler conveed a Joint plarming session

r9xdix the Yugoslav crisis and informed those attmndirq that he had

decided to "destroy Yugoslavia as a military power and savereign state."68

He size the importance of speed and that Italy, Hwiary, Rmania and

Bulgaria would participate with Germany in a cromined cmnpaign. By 1430

hours, Hitler and his military leaders had developed planning guidance for

the invasion. This guidanc was included in DIRPlTIVE 25--a bequently21

referred to as OPIPATIQC 25--ord•rin the invasion and was issued to the

services that evening. The Army and lat g recieved orders to submit

detailed plans as soon as possible. 6 9

Hitler's guidance called for a phased operation distributed between t

major lines of operation originating in Bulgaria and Austria. Initially, the

LIff waold attack Belgrade, and seize contrzo of the air. In sukuquent

phases it would suport the ground forces. The secod pzase was a ground

invasion by forces ammmling in Bulgaria. 2Tis force would attack in two

.irectins. Tm nrthern wing would attack on the Sofia-Nis-Belgrade axis

while the southern element would attack from the vicinity of Sofia into

southern Yugolavia and then join the attack on Greece. Together these

attacks would secure the vital line of cmmications between Belgrade and

Salonika. Limited objective attacks to seize ke)y terrain features would

coincide with the initial air strikes on Belgrade. Froa Austria an attack

to the southeast would be launchd as soon as sufficient forces were

asombled. MaWnhile, Gerann agents would contact Croatian dissidents and

suport them in an attempt to break any from the Yu_=lav state. If

possible, OP!RATICK !'RT would be launched simultaneously with the

airstrikes on Belgrade.7 0

on the sam day, Hitler disaned the operation with the Hungarian,

Rumnian and Bulgarian ministers, and ragpeeted support frau their

goverrnmits. For active p -rtici n Hitler offered H-gary the Banat

rsian and to Bulgaria he prouised hcedenia. Both •o•cntries balked but the

Hungarians agreed to allow a German corps to assemble in their country or

the invasion. MmarRiile, the Rumnians sealed the Yugoslav border and

prs;are- to defend against Soviet intervention. To Mussolini, Hitler sent a

II.r•u atlinirg what the Germans needed in terms of support. This22

message virtually dictated a course of action for the Italians. Their

missiona were to guard the flank of the German attack fran Austria with a

thrust dam the Dalmation coast to the port of Split and the neutralization

of the Yuioslav Fleet. In addition, they would defend in Albania until

ordered to attack east and -t the German thrust to klje. Mussolini

aRo the plan and ordred his military to prepare for its emeuticn.71

Th initial Germn reaction to the coup bears close r m marms to

current U.S. crisis action prookkes. 71e W reoporme started with

a repor fra diplaic soacs in Belgrade who quickly decided the event

had national security implications for the Reich. As Germany's NCA, Hitler

quickly assessed the situation. With the start dates of mARmIA and

BARBARSSA fast ahproaddri he had to solve the problem quickly. In his view

Genrrly faced a crisis that required a military course of action.

Whether the coup nonatituted a threat to Germmn's national security or

if there were viable nan-dmitary means to resolve the problem are

debatable. zrer e, there is little indication that Hitler sought the

advice of his political or military advisors prior to deciding on a military

option. Nonetheless, Hitler as the NCA decided that Yugoslavia was a threat

that had to be eliminated by force of arms.

7hS leades present in Hitler's Chancellery on 27 March 1941 were roughly

equivalent to the JCS and together they produced a OD. U.S. doctrine

provides far similar flexibility in tilarly tim-senitive situations.

7he NtA and the Joint Chiefs my produce a COA if they feel the situation

will not allow enugh time for the suported CINC to produce his own

estimate. Given the fact that NARinT was scheduled to start in early April

and with BARBAROSSA slated for mid-May, reaction time was in short supply.

Since only One CA 'was develqped, by issuing Directive 25, Hitler had23

essentially given each of his services an Alert order to start detailed

planning. Like current U.S. doctrine the German proc"ss aws flexible and

actions similar to the Situation Develpmt and Crisis t phases ran

Sto the Couse of Action Developmet pase. For the purposes of

this analysis the German Situation Development and Crisis Assess t phases

Wee Similar to those that might be employed by the Uniited States military.

7 German acted as if they were following U.S. pru chwes for a NCA/JCS

dftwsculad CIA. Sinc all of Genwm's key military leaders were present when

the CA as dwm~pevd,--du-irn the euiivalent of the Situation

and Crisis Assessment phases-a R was not require.

Of interest is the fact that on the same day Hitler contacted the

Ru•uian anr Bulgarian foreign ministers to inform them of his intent.

Later, he drafted and traritted a sage to Mussolini dictatirg a course

of action for the Italian army. T important point here is that Hitler

gras ped the iortant role that comined operations would play in the

invasion and that he inmdiately moved to marshal his allies' coqeration.

Cturse of Action Develccmnt. Selection and Emction Plarni

The German Army High immnd (CICH) warked feverishly t the night

of 27-28 Mardi to create an outlin plan that ws incorporated in Directive

25. nTs effort expanded the gudance already received from Hitler. 72 At

1230 hours on the 28th Genral Fmanz Hal dr--C'ief of the Army General Staff

(CO)--briefed the dictator on the outline plan. 73

The entire Balkan theater would be commaned by Field Marshall Walter von

aCt t omander in Chief of the Army-from a cmand post at

Wiener-Neustadt, Austria. Without a declaration of war, the would

initiate the attack on 1 April, followed by a the ground offensive betwn

the 8th and the 15th. Meanwhile, NNRI1A was rescheduled for the 2nd or 3rd.24

Frce Austria and Hungary, Gnmeal vii n Weich's Second Army would

crush resistance in Croatia and then drive southeast bemwen the Sava and

Drava rivers toward Belgrade. General Ewald van Kleist's First Panzer Group

would assemble mar Sofia, drive north up the Morava river valley and seize

Belgrade. Both of these thrusts would link up in the vicinity of Belgrade

and r ipt any attet by the Yugoslav's to fall back an the interior. 7he

ta4u aent to the t force, Field Marshall Wilib3A

von Lint's Twelfth Aroy which had already asumbled in cmatt Bulgaria for

Metro. Van List woald strike into Mcdmia with his right wln, heading

first for Skcplje and then into northern Greece, in effect cutting Yugoslavia

off from the British and Greeks. Mmmr3&aile, the Army's center would thrust

into southern Macedonia and then move south to outflank the Greek

fortifications on the Metaxms Line. Simultanaously, the left wing of the

Twelfth Army would invade eastern Grea.e74

On 29 March Geual Friedrich von Paulus-the KH Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operatitau-p ided over a corfer=e of army cimnl rs and staffs

participating in PERMTI• 25. Oollectively they assigned -rps

tmdkjuart.' to the armies, allocated forces and adjusted the proposed

timing of the plan. mhe • and Twelfth Arm would attack

sinuzltancxusly on 6 April. Von Kleist's was sdheled to attack on the 8th.

Vbn List would attack last, on the 12th, because of the time required to -ass

his forces in Huanzy and Austria. em Italians would not be ready until the

22nd, but Hungary now aeed to omit a sali or;s under O control.

Halder sent Von Paulus to Budapest the u day to work cut the details. 7 5

In addition to va Paulus' trip to Huznary, the Wnt!. liaison

officers and their anterparts from Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria

rapidly nn=Ainated the actions of their countries. Major General Erich von25

Rntele ws instrtzuunta1 in syncronizing Italy's participation. Memanhile

ven List workced closely with the 1Fumenians and Bulgarians. Thsemetn and

others ware vital in setting the conditions for the y sucxess.76

Hitler aproved detailed plans for the invasion when he reived Halder

on the afternoon of 30 March. Operating on exteicr lines, the Axis front

stretd over 1,000 mile fro the Adriatic to suthwest Bularia. In final

form, the plan called for distrituted =vuwr along five Lines of

qpera*L=t. The XL Panzr Corps would form von List's main effort toward

Splje on 6 April. Simultane-m ly, the xvnI ltzntAin corps would attack

from Petrich to Strtmica and the lower Vardar with five divisions. To days

later (8 April) von Kleist's First Panzer Group wou) srike toward Nis and

eventually Belgrade with the XIV Panzer and XI Corps. On 12 April, vn

Weicd's Secon Army would attack from Austria, Hunaay and 1muna into

Sloania, Cratia and Serbia. In the wet, his XL= Moutain Corps would

cross the Drava and advarmx to Ljubljana and Zagreb. In the center, the LI

Corp would cross the Nira and Drava rivers rmr Mribor and proceed to

Zagreb. From Hmrjary, the XLVI Panzer Corps woud strike from Barcs to

1elgrade and Zagreb. Mmamnwile, Genral Rirt'ardtIs XLI Panzer Corps would

head smthwest, frm the Rumnian city of Tweevar and join the attack on

Belgrade.77

Gwnral Alea r Larw took mmnd of all Lu&CMtM forces in the

Balkas. He wvs tasked to destroy the Yugoslavian i and and o~ntrol

zaratu in aiiadef seize ocntrol of the air and suport Germn ground

forces. Besides attacks on Yugoslav airfields his primary target on 6 April

ws Belgrade. This oeration entitled "bto&W (Punishmant) ws a 48

hour airblitz on the Yugoslav Capital. To accoa lish these missions, Idhr

received General van Riditofen's Fli g = (Flyirn Corps 8) already26

stationed in Bulgaria with 414 aircraft. In addition, he oculd call for

murt from 168 aircraft of Fli M X based in Sicily. Hmwver, after

corting his estimte, Ldhr determiid that his mission required additional

warplanes. Accordingly, the 1&=a= assuuled amther 576 aircraft- from

Gemny, France and Africa-tf create 3:V (Airflest 4). Since

Swas -r e familiar with the region, Ufw tasked va

Richtofen to cantml the operation. MwMdile, the Italian

(gyal Airforce) nmed 66 aircaft for their qMuatjow. 78

While the Germa and their aIes raced ahead with planm for wmr, the

Yugoslavs tried in vain to forestall the inavitable. In a futile attoet to

stave off the inmasion they sent a maber of massge to Hitler desigrmd to

reammse the dictator they would h,,ar the Tripartite Pact. Their nemmges,

howevr, fell an deaf ears. Given the I - -1aixoes, Siwvic cc1m red the

Yugoslav Army to nublize on 29 Mach. Tt C r•ats fanully joined Simuric's

gover, , t1c o 3 April. Thesue day a Yugoslav degtaiarri ved in Mosecow

hoirn to seal a nM=a assistance pact. Howver, all they cold wrangle

from their Slavic brothes wms a treaty of friendhip and nK-zggression that

was signed on the Sth. Any hope of deterring Hitler we fading fast. In

the meantime, hacek was in cntact with German agents hoping to seure

mpecial -- ideIraticon for Cratia.79

Aided by =tkWS re1-1 vaiunam fli••ts, Coloel Kizel of CI

i en a•ey teplated the Yugoslav dployments. Fztird ,on

3 April, a defecting croatian Air Pbtc officer supplied the German with the

locations of Yugslavia's primary and alternate airbase.. Kinzel believed

that the ladc of a strategic reserve would prevent the Yugoslavs from

stc 'ing a bresWthrough and he predited a swift enemy collapse if the army

beahd the borde defemes. Once German forces penstrated the initial27

def he balieved the Parner would swiftly drive through the comtry. On

the Albanian front he predicted a Yuoslav advance and problems for the

Italia m. As the invasion draw near Kinzel reported that the Yugoslavs had

strawngthund their force south of Nis. Thi indicated that the army may

have divined the location of the TwIifth Army's attack; owJever, no

awet e me to tha German plan. 80

Ds ir• a plan in a t period of time is a far easier task than

asi~lz~the required semto amoute it. For (IaTI=CR 25 the assembly

of farces turond out to be the grate dalleme faced by the Germmn. At

the start of the cisis the Twelfth Army was already marshalling in south-

wet Bulgaria and without diffliculty rapomitioned forces for the new

mission. Hmnvwr, because the trareportation rwhrk in ampgry, Rumannia and

Bulgaria wa already stratchdu thin, vmList ca3i' cqpat no reinforcements

bsyad a larger staff for • n Kleiut's panzer gro=. Mmarahile, ad hoc mtor

transpot units from force in Amnia assisted in the redeplaymots. 8 1

T mass w h 1,9 o at pair for the Second Army, the Germra gathered

nine divisions and five corps I from France, Germany and forces

mving to asusmbly areas-for BLAFRSA-in Poland. MA hea&juarters of the

Second Ary melf-deployed. HIm r, a coplex ccabination of road, rail and

wter moves had to be mm, aa-wd emrgency dititicu--to assweble the

rst of the S�d Ary. Througot ths m;ratioal ms the Germa

w heqxerd by the Alps, powr "ow1, the lack of airlift caability and the

limited rail capacity of Andria, Hurxpay and Rummnia. In Aumtria the German

Chief of Tram mrtal-ion instituted a "mmximum acc•leration aduile" that

effectively cancelled all nn-military traffic. German trazportation

control centers were set up in Hunqary, Rumania and Bulgaria while German

lo•ties and rolling sto• wre sent to asWlt the rail systems of her28

allies. 7hae moe and the wmperlative cooperation of the Hungaian

Iraniotaia Chief alleviated iny problem. By 5 April yomt of SecondI

Army's lead elmw*s wee in position and ready to execuate Iimaited attacks

into Yugmolavia. By the 9th they had wxxh- il cm- I powr to attack in

sfrainth.8 2 Since Germn logisticiars started planning on the n~igt of the

27th, thesdeply in 15 days, owutitut. an Imprsive achievin*t.

Supplying the irwmsimr force wa nte problem requiring a , I, r of

isprovlsaticim. First, the Guum rsrtamd temir force in Anaunia with

heavy trudc IWniQ5. rM~ISOile, they assemled a flotilla of smpply barges

for use on the Damnbe. Similarly, in constanta Bulgaria,, they loaded four

freiiyiterE and readied thi for a lirk-up with advancing forces in Greece.

Finally, they diverted a stodipile of mzmrgw a~liein-,cllected in Viera=

for DaTIOI= BMh1D6WkO0f. M.. iitain th SM=nd ry8

1tw the pzpasu of this analysis the Ginmn plarr~mprq ~omn RNcloMely

remoled the Course of Actim Deval-g , Cmua of Action Selection and

zoacutioin Plaminin ptmu of U.S. cap. An =itiond previan.ly, Hitler

rapidly decided on a nilitary r i a;,, , and developed a CID with his

gmrlst. 7hime actkra cbviated the need to isamu warning or Alert: orders.

After Hitler's decision the German Army and Air Pb High Comwds reated

swiftly and moved to Qirue of Action Dwelpw and Mmminoi Planning.

Hilder and his staff took the lead in refining Directive 25 and produced

an outline plan ovexniigit. when Haider briefed Hitler on the cutline plan

(28 b1dA ) and later when h im =u delivered the final cmpaign plan (30

March), tim COH Chief of Staff was performing a role similar to that of tim

Cics. in this case, Halder presnited his NCR with a refined OD. Since the

CIKH, led by vnBrawzhitsctl, would command tim operation, Haider briefed tie

tim Cn~ camaeign plan as well. If IKeitel,, the Chief of thm (lKW had29

briefed Hitler, the siuilarity to U.S. docrine would be greater. While on

paper the function of C5f awear to have bee1 roghly equivalent to those of

our JCS, the CIJ never held a position of similar importance nor did it have

an equivalent to the CJCS. Norathles, Hitler apoved the plarn. nce

they issued the plan and assbled the allocated force, an Exeocte Order

could start the caoiaign.On the 29th, G rl vn Pmalus biefed General von Brxitsdt (CIMC)

and the omr ws of the mujr t unit-- xIc t in the operaticn. With

the o eratioral ca 15 preset they resolved the timing, force allocation

and cond st ure for the invasion as part of Emsaution Plarning.

Moreover, they identif ied the required tasks and assigned than to the

aodinate comn. Simultaneously, the Germxn Chief of -rarwcztation and

his staff ancted parallel plarMi to nmo and sutain the allocated ground

and air forces. Like UTB19MU, they identified movemnt r.uira=Ymts,

stmxfalIs and limiti atic . An thern. e, through a series of improvisations,

they d loed plans and provided rources to reolve tranportation and

=4*Krt prblm.

Vyn Paulus' trip to Bdapest on the 29th dmonstrated the importance that

the German hiih command placed on combined operations. Similarly the Chief

of Transportatin coordinated his efforts with Germany's Rumnian and

o 'ria allie.

With the Gimn Army taking the lead in planing, l1JtJgogt fell into

the role of a subordinate ommd. After corIuc-tir his own estimate L4hr

quickly decided that reinfOrcents were necessary and received then fr the

XaIM, a supporting inmmnd. YMarwhile, Riditofen and the staff of

Fli k VIII initiated parallel planning to build Luftflotte IV'

egporting plan for air operations in the campaidgn.30

On 3 April Hitler issued the Ecmuat Order: (P!RATICO 25 would start on

the 6th. 84 The invasion began in the usual W fashion. At 0700

hours on 6 April 1941, 234 Germrn b1-1rs esorted by 120 fighters attadcad

Belrade. To protect their capital, the Yugoslavs scrambled 20 Bf-109s, 18

awUricaru and 6 IK-3s. As Stukas hit the lyal. Palace, War Ministry, rail

station and the umjor aird.e at Zinus with deadly precision, Yugoslav

ints r - tangled with Gervmn fightrs. tfortatmely for the defendrs,

stom f o the Hurricamn pilots en g d friemnly Bf-109s as wall as the

lafZfe.s. Th first strikes resulted in the destruction of 50 Yugoslav

warplanes. Thre additional wves, each consisting of apprcdmately 100

aircraft, hit the capital on the 6th. The Germn air-strikes contirnud

t~w 9ai -rat the 7th. Bad weeth curtailed cparatix= on the 8th bat not

before the Lats killed 17,000 p le of Belgrade and rubled the cnter

of the CiLty. Against averiblmbing odd~ the Yugolavs put up a spirited fight

and down 40 German aircraft in the two day air battle. 85

The Luftwafes attadcs on Belgrade ad key facilities Ithrghzt the

coutry achievd their objectives. They severely disrupted the nerve center

of the Yugoslav Army, destroyed oe 60% of their air force, and won air

.4.rioit. Desite the beating, the Yugoslav Air Force managed to mount

"imited stikes on advancing Gemn colu= and targets in 11xmazy and

.gmaria. The Yugoslav High Ccm x - in fact paralyzed by the shdc an

ferocity of the ezrmin air-strikes. Simovic reacted by moving his gvrmt

to Uzim in the Serbian hills, wile the Army High C ud moved to

Sarajevo. Thee displawisen further disrupted their ability to control

events.86

As the Luffme ravaged the country, von Rbds launched s mail elements31

of the Se Army into Croatia and Slovmnia to seize key bidges and

momtain pa . Sa of these formces m special assault trocs--code

namd Iimwmnau r (Yaicfire) -that infiltrated Yugoslavia in the first days

of April. Agairnt nrligible oR ition ds1tadu±nts of the XLVI Panzer Corps

seized key ride ovr the Dava river at tatmiye, Zakany, andl arcs. In

similar I o raitiaM the LI Corps Cptured the Mira arid Drava river bridges at

Maribor, Gzek-iamdxk= zq and MwaJo Sradimce. bgthr the ti

hed taken key te•ain wdhle aining vital infE for CI: the Pburth

Yugoslavian AM minly of Croats-ladcied the will to resist. 87

In contrast to von Weidi's liUitd objective attacks, van List attacked

in force. At 0530 hours on the 6th the XL Panzer Corps darged across the

border on two axs. Both prot of the attack met determined resistance in

dificflt terrain ad at -nt -- t of day overoming the defeun s. However,

by eveni•g they penetrated to Rnnuvuo and had seized Kcane. At this point

the Yugoslavian 'Third Territorial A&W wms ornurblirq and an 7 April Skcplje

fell while German infantry c-r-aed the Vardar River at Vales. On the 8th,

the 9th Panzer Division of the XL Panzer Corps pivoted south and raced into

Prilep. 7he next day they took kMmstir while recxmnaissance elemns ts

contact with the Italians in Albmnia.88

To the south of the XL Panzer Corps, the XVIII Mourtain Corps euployed

the 2nd Panzer Divisiaon in a driw on Strumica. Meeting wek rinistance the

biggest Impedimnt to the division Consisted of -,d aMd einfilds. Strumica

fell on the afternoon of the 6th. The 2nd Panzer defeated a comteratta k

aqairmt its nrth wing an the 7th and proceeded south into Greece. Von List

had acxxplished his initial objectives: isolating Yugoslavia fran the Allies

in Greece and turnin the Ibtaxas line. 89

lwi vn Kleist's XIV Panzer Corps crossed the frontier on 8 April, the32

YUgoslav High Commnd ws unable to coordinate the actions of its armies.

Sp1arhe1 by the 12th Panzer Division-vith the 5th Panzer, 294th Infantry

and 4th ?muntain Divisions in support-the Corps attacked through Pirot

toard Nis. In difficult terrain the Yuolav Fifth Army put up tGul

resistanc but the 11th Panzer brke the defense on the first day assisted by

strong artilley and clam air sLW t. 5th Army attemte to with-aw

behind the Moava to reeutabliuh the defense, but the 11th Panzer preempted

them oni the 9th by seizing Ni. and cossuing the rivw. At this point the 1st

Panzer Grop is In the Morava Valley and terrain better sumid for panzers.

After heavy fighting in the Paracin-Kragujevic area, van Kleist's foroes

rcuted the Fifth Army and "pei11 the wy to Belgrade. 7he 5th Panzer turned

souith at Nis, cut off Yugoslav troops around Lescovac and, then went under XL

Panzer Ops' control for the invasion of Greece.90

Th XLt Panzer Corm attacked out of Tizosoara on the •th of April and

met week -- sisa- in a wift advance thwoxj the Banat region. 7he "•gM

Dautschand* jgztoized Infantry Plegimennt took Par~x ani the 11th, w~hile the

2nd SS Motorized Infantry Division moyd to a point 45 miles north of

Belrae.91

- 0r - --tthe 10th a Kleist. pursued his •opnents up the Morava Valley

and on the 11th his panzers slasd into the flank of the Yugoslavian Sixth

Amy. Alreay reelig fm the attack of the ,XL Panzer cCps, the Sixth

Army dis#Inteate on the 12th. Von Kleift's nazroI lines of cominmication

utrtl uyr 125 mile from B&lgaria, b•t there were no Yugoslav units

available for a -. terattadc. A noose ws tio *tn aroud Belgrade. 9 2

Given the success achieved by the Twmlfth Army and the limited attacks of

the Second, yon BrauLtsch advanced the latter's start date from the 12th to

the 10th. Despite the fact that the assembly of his force was inoimplete,33

vcn Wbidun was egrto attack. His first objective was Zagreb, the second

capital of Yugoslavia and the center of Croatian dissidenc. Oposirn the

Second Army was the Yugoslav Fburth Army, a force largely composed of

Croatian, utio we ready to welm the Germns as liberators. 9 3

On 10 April the 14th Panzer Division of the XLVI Panzer Corps alog with

the LI Infantry and X= Mountain Corps empted from their bridgeheads. The

Fourth Army disnt -rate and the 14th Panzer took Zagreb on the eveing of

the 10th after a single day'.s adyva of nmrly 100 mile.n4. FtlarAi the

fall of Zagreb, vm Waidu asnt the 14th Panzer toward Vrtovsk to make

cotact with the Italians uhile he regrouped the XLIX mountain and LI Corps

on the Saw river for an advarme an Sarajevo. The mays on Sarajevo was an

umplantied branch to his plan that was inspired by unxpceduccess. The

city was the location of the Yuoslav Hihi C~mm and was a key

ioni icatiow link in the rugge terrain of Bosnia. Its capture would

disrupt any Yugoslav plans to evacuate large units to the interior. 9 5

Against feeble goeition the 8th Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions of

the XLVI Panzer Corp. draom utheast through the Yugoslav Sec•nd Army and

across the plain betwmen the Sava and Drava rivers. Middy roads provided the

tough resistan. C the 12th they rea Mitrovica and then advaced

t~amrd Belgrade in the rwr of the Yliqoslav Second Army Group. At this

point, vcn List divrted the 8th Panzer toard Valjwm and Uzice %hile the

16th Motorized turned towrd Zvnik to aid the rest of the Secod Army in

slzrourI~ Sarajevo.96

Mmairile, on 12 April, elemnts of XLI, XLVI and XIV Panzer Corps'

closed the ring on the Yugoslav capital from three directions. That evening

a motorcycle cupwany of the 2nd SS Division, XLI Panzer Corps crossed the

Danube in captured boats and drove into the center of the city. At 1900 they34

met the Mayor of Belgrade who promptly st-rerzered the city. Within a few

hours advanced parties of the XLVI and XIV Panzer Corps arrived to find a

mer ceRV holding the capital. 9 7

The Italians joined the invasion on the 11th and the next day they made

contact with the 14th Panzer Division at Vbovsk. Now encircled, the

Yugoslavian Seventh Army -- rwidmed. Te Italians proceeded dom the

Dal .tion ost and upn entering Kotor and Sibenik found u-st of the

Yugoslav fleet intact. Although c destroyer w ncuttled by hr crew, the

other units were taken in by the Italian Navy. Mewstale a mall contingent

of the Hunarian Third Army crossed the Yugoslav frontier on 11 April and

pursued the retreating First Army, wtich offered no resistance.9s

The final days of the cmqpaign m anti-climactic. By the 11th Slovenia

and Croatia had broen with Belgrade and smwrwxired to the Germarn. So=

Coatian units in Dalmatia and the vicinity of Sarajevo began fighting the

Serbs. he 14th Panzer sped thrcugh Bihac and Jajcs tord Sarajevo frou the

west while the 8th Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions advanced on the city

from Uzice and Zvornik. All three divisions entered Sarajevo on the 15th and

any Yugoslavian hopes of establishing a untain redobt collapsed. 9 9

The King, Simovic, and Mirkovic fled the country on the 14th and left

Ge-ral Kalafatovic, the Chief of the Gemeral Staff, to end the war. On the

sues day Kalafatavic mnt -two staff officers to ask vn Kleist for term.

Hoever, they could rit find a Yugcoslav civil authority a ae to the

Gerims until the 17th. On that day the Germans flew Aleksanwmr

Cinczar-arkovic to Belgrcad where he signed an azmistice to take effect on

the 18th at 1200 hours. By the time the fighting ended the German had

captured 254,000 Yugoslavian soldiers. OPRACN 25 lasted 13 days and had

cmet Gern 151 killed, 392 wanIded and 15 missing. 1 00

35

The German canpaign was scsful in what it was immediately designed to

avoomplish. However, the major German units that blitzed throuig Yugoslavia

departed quickly, first to Greece and then to Russia. The precipitate Axis

sweep allowed many Yugoslav soldiers to escape to the hills with their

weapons, shocked and dsoganized but still capable of fighting. Twenty-two

imenthusiastic Italian and four week German divisions remained to occupy the

cotry. his force was aided by the Coation "Ustasa" and ad hoc units of

Serb and Woslim Slav collaborators. gho rapid German victory was merely a

prelude to a vicious Guerrilla war that would eventually tie up 700,000

German tr and last until the invaders we evicted in 1945.101

_he Execution phase of U.S. CAP includes the NCA's decision to euploy a

military ODA and the transmissic of an Exmmcte Order through the CJCS to the

CINC. This phase is cmplete when the crisis is resolve. Once mmrr, the

German proceduretmirrored U.S. doctrine. exception, however, was the

abserne of a position similar to that played by the CJCS. Hitler issued the

Ewmute order on 3 April and the CIW-v%= BLxhitsdl-executed his campaign

plan. 7w izmediate crisis was resolved in rapid fashion and Germany's

strategic objective was secre, at least for the mumant.

7he RelationrhiD Between Military Means And Political End•

Germany's overall strategy for 1941 foamed on the destruction of the

Soviet Ukion and peripheral attacks to eliminate British power in the

diterranean. ce they crzuin Russia, the Wacould focus on

Eland. However, the inept Italian invasion of Greece created a chain

reaction of events that disrupted Hitler's stategy. With British

forces-albeit weak forces-deploying to Greece, the Balkan b was

born frE" the perceived necessity to protect the southern flank of OPERATION

BARBAROSSA and the dmnian oilfields.36

To secure the exposed flank of OPElTI(K IRML Hitler required m form

of accommdation from Yugoslavia. Preferably, the Yugoslavs would jobi the

Axis without reservations. However, Yuocslavia's brave resistance to

Hitler's political initiatives frutrated the German dictator frEl Novemer

1940 through Narch 1941. Mm Yugoslavia finally buckled under German

pressure, the result was a cq-romise that secured a new ally that refumed to

grant passag rights for Gerven trops. At that point Hitler had achieved

his political objective despte the fact thet the optimal solation would have

inclxlW fred for qwerational mvement throug the coui•try. After the

coup, the situation as essentially unchanged as the no goverrumint declared

its int•ton to hoor= the Tripartite Pact. RecallirM Clausewitz' dictum

that wmr is an extension of politics by other smum, the invasion of

Y•uoslavia was -osary. 7his would be true unless Hitler's hanged his

political objective.

Hitler, however, dcided that he Ineded the militar'y extu.sion of

politics to better secure his initial objectives and gain another: the

mouveit of Geman foces throuh Ygoslavia. Besides enhancin the hances

of sccess in !NRM, transit rights through Yugoslavia would save tirn in

the redeployment of forces for DARBSS&. EATICK !IT probably would

hav bean su mfu ul-albait mre difficult and timn omifwir--without

G,:man inrnt throuh Ygoslavia. Perhaps the F adde om r1

political objective: a Imtration of the fate that awaited those %ho

wavered in suort of the gdxd Reich. In the end them objectives

trarislated to the military and political uion of Yugoslavia. 1 02

In - -- danc with Hitler's directive the mh t narshaled the

required means-in the form of two armies and an airfleet-frou all carners

of the German Reich to accouplish his bidniM. Wtile the Yugoslav's37

ourmbmered the Germans by ajarodnitely 2 to 1 in m r, the a

held 4 to 1 and 3 to 1 advantage in aMzr and aircaft Ithese forces

cfrtituted a vast overmatch in terms of combat power. Hitler could not

afford to risk a setback. What he needed ws a quick, decisive victory and

the dslivered it. 10 3

Int -ratim Tactics And _Qratcm With Btratm-v To Achieve Political End

7 a ee of eati••i l art is the creative employment of tactical

forcrs to achieve strategic aim. hme strategic objective-or strategic ued

state-issued to the w wws simple, "destroy Yugoslavia as a military

power and sovereign state."104 The cMiUtiOms that would adcieve that end

state inclued the d r n of Yuslavia' s armed forces and political

1earhi, and the occupation of the nation's vital areas.

In terms of tactics the queticn was what to do m r the army bke the

defense along the Yugoslav frontier. Th German answr involved a

ccrbinatian that maximized the benefits of both variants of b

tactics. Rapid weeakthrrgh re follomwd by four deep thrusts aimed at the

seams and rear of the kuroulav armies. Mmse attacks disrupted the

Yagslays' ability to cotrol their forces, deprivirv tham of initiative and

freeo of action. German forces penetratinr into the rear of Yugoslav army

group prevented an orderly retreat to the south or the more defensible

terrain of the omuty's rug hintrland. Me not effect ws a paralysis

of the Yugoslav High Ommad, the swift capture of Belgrade and the

fftatticn of the defedirg armies.

As Belgrade and Sarajevo fell, the remnants of the battered Yugoslav Army

collased for lack of effective command and cntrol. he captured-

-or forced out of the country-most of the political leadership when they

seized Belgrade and Uzice. Finally, they rapidly occupied Yugoslavia's few38

remainirq cities and lines of coammicatius against negligible resistance.

Hwver, when viewed holistically the canpaign was flawed. e Germans

failed to look beyond their immediate strategic objective to long term

conflict teminatio and postcoflict operations. hile the GeCrimm and

their col tors planned for both rfe* -, they did not adquately

prere for the resistance vmnt that started a few mmfts after the

invasion. 7h German failure to aoozt for the proud and caebative

darwcI r of the Yugoslav peoples and the lack of -nliyhtud 1 o I ation

policies resulted in a conf•lict that was neve effectively teminated on

German terr. he long term cost to the German Reicht ar•uably otatweighed the

success of OPERATICU 25.

Esta lishing the conditioms for tactical success represent anther

lim•rtant .linit of operaýtinal art. The German plan did this by Xoiding

the attadd q farcm with enough camt power to achieve overWhilming force

ratios at the point of attac:k on each line of operation. FIu he1:e,

trmoeoperatn u t the German force groupings were positioned to

attack waknese in the Yugoslav defemes. However, providing cmbat units

and arraying them is not enough to e e tactical success. 7he Germans

provided the necessary logistics to sustain their force through a myriad of

91=0u1 inprovisaticnu. To facilitate the success of the ground atta•cs,

the luftwaffe'll strikes on Belgrade disrupted Yugoslav coman and control to

a degree that severely limited a chrent enany respons. Finally, the

portion of the plan that provided for limited objective attacks to seize key

terrain-river crossings and muztain passes-in the Second Army's zone set

the coditicm for success on the lines of operation emNating from Austria

and ungary.

Another ingredient contribotirv to tactical suocess was the effort to39

support Croatian disid=*A in frp gi ntir the Yugoslav state. Or=e

attacked, Coatian units treated the Germ=u as liberators and actually

uaegod other Yugoslav forces. Since the Croats needed little a -xour-eq nt

to revive old feuds, the role played by Gemn agents in this regard remains

ambiguou. Nam:thelels, the effort dmstirates a clear attmqpt to

facilitate tactical sums. b their cooperation the Coats received a

sg ica d of at y after the invasin. 1 05

Stactical ucmems and the •mrational mvnits me uted in

(R•ATICH 25 woud have ben inpoxsible without the comperatiom of Germny 's

four partners. Despite the Tripartite Pact, the ad hoc participation of Axis

nations took on the characeristic- of a coalition without a unified comand

structure. While Hitler laid the foundation for successful ombined

i:opraFtioru through his diplcostic raswws; a largje degree of credit gpoes to

the I liaison off icers. Von Paulus' travels to Fumnia and

Hmrqsxy; v Rintlen's efforts in Italy, and von List's coordination with

the Bulgarians proved critical in i the onrditiors for tactical

and operational coe. . .rh ? F, the coordinatJion conducted by the

German Chief of Traonortatim with his cc PyterparIs in Bulgaria and Amnia

solved the problý irherent in staging and sutaining the invasion forces.

arters Of Graity

Mfm German plan clearly reyeals the great bioRmtauu they attached to

Belgrm . Of the five mjor groupings of Gersxn ground coat forces, three

ware directed on the capital. In asddition, the Laftwaffe first objective

ws an attack on the city, designed to disrupt aomnd and control. As the

capital city and the center of political and military leadership, Belgrade

was an iqportant objective. Furthrsre, its capture provided for the

lirk-up of Gea forces in the rear of two ary groups. Hawever, oncethe40

political and military leadership f1ed to Uzice and Sarajevo, the capture of

Melgrade lost m=3 of its importance apart from sybolisim.

For Yugoslavia the center of gravity rested in its str1nest field force:

the Third Army Group. This ws the only orgnization positicned to establish

contact with the British and Greeks or delay von List and van Kleist long

enough to give the res of the armd forces the dcance to reach the

hinterland. 1Yreo, it had the potential to attack Italian forces in

Albania. ore they defeated the Third Army Grou the rapid advarne of the

German 12th Army and 1st Panzer Grmp wade plan R-41 useless. Mther the

German High Comm.nd identified the Third Army Group as a "center of gravity"

is unknow. u. of their accunts refer to it as auch-but they obviously

grasped the iqportau of the force and initially employed von Kleist's and

von List's forces to dies" it.

Scrutiny of OPERA-'ICH 25 reveals a sequence coprised of three distirct

phases. T first phiase included the ceratioal movements to position the

invasion forces in Austria, Humgjary, iAzmnia and Bulgaria. Phase two

cosisted of the L initial attacks, executed simuiltaneomly with

the Twelfth Army's strike through Macedonia to cut Yugoslav links with Greece

and to establish cntact with the Italians, von Kleist's thrust toward the

rava valley to rupture the defens and gain accew to a route to Belgrade,

and the limited objective attacks of the Secon Army. css in them

c•eraticau •~1 defeat m-at of the Yugoslav Army and set the preco:xnitiors

for attaining oerational objectives. In the final phase, the Gernans seized

BelOgrad, Zagreb and Sarajevo wahile Italian and Hrxqarian forces entered the

conflict. This phase was designed to eliminate the last centers of

Yugolavian political and military leadership while the Yugoslav Army was41

dstroyed and the rest of the =vxy us oveunm.

The of qcraticn follmmd wh Garmn design to a degree seldcm

emaled in military history-. n plan and its execution constitute a fine

excauple of centralized planning and 1, me traliJzed exection. This was

nnifested by the fact that van Bwuditsch's only major decision's of the

cmqaign wmee advaxdM the start date for the Sacml Arm's attack and

athA Secod Azys rnnb to maiz Sarajevo.

Viemd holy, C MU 25 Wa- m phase of a tw cmqpign

strategy to eject the British ftrm the Balkans. It w timed to cc===

with cPERATICM MRI and mmt of the Tuelfth Army units eployed in

Yugoslavia ewmwtually attaciced south into Greem. Yqreovr, the rapid thrust

of van List's army throuh Yugoslavia mt the conitiau for tactical and

nierntilzal success in Greece.

V. CM=M AND 20J2T==N

The t• olusi of this a, V ins that the German conut of

crisis acticn planning w rmarkably simil to the JProR s I mployed in

the U.S. military today. Mhe mam holds true for the U.S. Army's dtrine

for oeraticnal art.

In respone to the Yugoslav crisis Hitler and the W senior

lee.p aplayed a mcodinated ;'os that led to a mxumful military

vqwia . Their a Im. wr Wila to the six pes described in JOPS

Volum IV. 7he only major diffence that can be derived from this analysis

wwe the lack of a German e*quivalent to the C7S and the qphams they placed

on the coordimtiai of cami zi cperatis. The first differee is

insignificant but the seomnd is iiqartant. We cannot escape from fact that

our military will probably respond to future crises in a combined

envirmm11,. The Germfns placed great effort on conrlination missions and42

- significant rosnft. While the 1a foce of their alle did

little fighting, CPERATIQI 25 would have been infinitely more difficult

without the solid coit'raticn of Italy, Sxxpary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

German political and military actionswre m uchrinized to produce and

position the required forma with a~g -iiate objectives to cmrpm

Yugoslavia. 7hwj emloyed that military forma to attain strategic gjoals in a

theater of qlpratiimu through the deign, ogiation, and corluct of

aDMMIQI 25. Nweow,, their plan met the ,,-ditioa, for tctical sue.

Von kmBixttsi and his staff Liiced tactical actions to strategic As.

Ma disened what military conditions wold achieve desired nds and

leiuirad a Ui''c of tactical acticsa to create those conditions.

Finally, the V le!Aldership decided how to emplo available military

reincim; to complete the required sequenc of actions. Nmr of this shold

be non to military rofmionals in tha Udited States Army since mW of the

m;rational onepts emplyed by the N are found in PM 100-5.

FroM this " •gr Pgh we can dra forw meful iuplicaticra for doctrine.

Too aj:ply to crisis action plannin, cra relates to ombinedqratiora and

the cm is applicable to crisis action planning and cm ratAnal art.

U.S. military professionals preparinr for contingancIes involving crisis

action planning huld look to JCS Volume IV as a point of demartue. As

Wittn• , the p tblication provides a thorou gh m'tin of the six phams

crisis action pr o and the myriad of rribilitie, r rts and

Ef-mctions involved in the system. The howeaton Iver, fails to addess

the role that combined operations play in my crises. This cmi iin should

be corrected with s-m referenc to coordination with coalition or alliance

pertrars. This is ptilrly relevant given the increasing likelihood that

Amimc will rempot-d to global and regional threats in combined virauets.43

Cmwerely, Army doctrina for ccoihned operations etablished in PH 100-8

offers no guidance on the pecuiliar require ts of tin-semitive plrii,.

In the past, the U.S. MW solved the problw inhrent in omined

q-:w ati throug a Ixp rm, of trial and errr. -This inevitably ws an

inrfficiunt and timu- nmiq aur . Tim unsitive or crisis situations

will only 9 Aate the problems of comine wrfare. We simply canniot

wte preciom resauzzc in u 1nt during the early stages of a crisis.

Thi too shold be omycctad with gidnmcm alignd with aS Volum IV.

Finally, am Vbihn IV fails to address the imperative to plan for

conflict temination and p;stnonflict cerations. 7m German experience in

Y xsl•avia trates the dangers inrlved 4= military laders fail to

take a long term view of a crisis. S will arg that this r x nsibility

rests in the hadm of political leaders. Hmwer, we do rnt have the

prergtie to dhose o xuissions in a crisis. Therefore, we omt plan for

long term solutions if the situation calls for tihm. Given a tim sensitive

situation, a nzrra focus on the inedia results of crisis response is a

trap to be avoided. JCPS Volum IV shoul be revised to include som

referenc to planming for conflict temnaton and po-toonflict oerap.tio.

Another implication for crisis action plarning involves the validity of

the U.S. military's crisis action proc res. Whlle acoo-int for the

vnvic•uintal diffemims priciumly noted, the Gaem•n reaction to the

Yuwa lav crisis provides evidenc that the conpts seud today wre va in

a conflict of the past. Similarly, the essential elements of operational art

d in PH 100-5, we operative in Gerumny's plarming and execution of

OFDATIQ 25. •sm, the analysis of the Yuoslav campign siports current

doctrine by providing an historical precedent where similar methodologies

wermefully employed.44

(90ET~Ave~obn ;o deWi I xjpueddy

A x 2 (Yugosavian Military Ormnizatin: Apil 1941107)

CinC: Armed Fre

Yugmo.av IFiyal Airforce Yugoslav IPiyal Army YWqolav Payal Navy(JUV) 4 Air Rmqinwts High Cooad NQ ard is Potts:

Sibenik. suxrted bylat Nwava~lecmc Wing

14th BM

I I I I ! I

X X X 2CAfV IN3-I- 12IN 33IN

3 I 22 nI 2x FT(B) 4 IN49 IN 47 IN4x nq(B) 2x TK(C)2x M(R)

1 CAV 27 IN iO IN 3 CAV 8 IN 13 IN TRA32 IN 40 IN 17 IN 7 IN 9 IN 1.5 IN38 IN 42 IN 30 IN 4xjN(B) 34 IN 25 IN 5 IUx In(B) 1x In(B) Ix Pr.(BK 6x FG(EM 50 IN 31 IN 20 IN9x rG (]BN) lx T•01B) 3x IN (B) 1x CAV(B) 46 IN

1x M(R) 1x IN (B)1.x ChV(R)2x TK(c)

M•: Division sized units are lite below each army. A mue followed by x

•Tawrf; WV-Cavalry; PG-frenter Gur; FT-Put,0; •Mk*trized Axrtillery(R)=Peimn (B)-Brigd; (BN)-Batalicn; and (C)-C=VwW.

NO=: This rd'c~o depict.s the Yugoslav Army at ful.l mobi Iizalticn. On6 April 1941 only the Third and Fifth armies reached full mobilization. 7hestrategic reserve was never cons Ituted.

46

A Jdx 3 (Yugoslavian AMW arnd Airfoce B~ipinit: April 1941)

a :1081900 Moirtars800 Anti-Tank Guns of Light Calibers823 75m Field Gums180 105m Field Howitzera

3000 Wb-1d War I Vintage Howitzers of Various Calbers250 66/75/78= Anti-aircr-aft Gun

50 ,Arult R 35 Ligh Tanks, 10.8 t.r, 37mm mn gun (1940 French).50 Soda S--D Ligh Tanks, 4.5 trm, 47mm main gun (1938 Czech)).50 PLriault NC-27 Ligh Tankm, 7.9 tcm, 37mm ma gun (1927 French)50 Pilmult M-17 Lighta Tniks, 6.7 tirns, 1 chin gun (1921 Freuxt)

Of Yugoslavia's 200 tanks only thi R35s could mete with German afar.The Skodas and Ranu1lt NC-27s could be uefu1y employe in defensivipositions. 7he P~nault *-17s we cbsolete WWI deigns.

109

73 Nm aedrhmitt Bf-109E-3 (1938 Germun)44 bw ,zr-icarm 1 (1935 British)31 laidkc Fury (1933 Britiuh/okolete monoplarns)12 -- IK-2 (1936 YWoslav//obolete biplnm)6 PtiRamrmuki 3X-3 (1938 Y/mlov/n)

166 Total Fighters (217 Pro Line)

58 Dnier Do 17Ka Madimu D (1937 Genmn)45 Savoia-Mordmtti SK 79-I M.dium D (1934 Italian)36 rint€o1 Blhati I Light Bober (1935 British)

139 Tbtal Bmaes (103 Frat Line)

12 Capccni Ca 310 (1936 Italian)15 Caproni Ca 311 (1936 Italian)12 Westland Lysander (1936 British)75 mt 19A2 (19?? ]r"ench

114 Total Z ý-•' -mm Aircraft (39 Fr• Limn)

12 Dnier Do 17Ka Mem D u isuance (1937 Cierman)12 Emraei SIN*-XV-H Seaplan, (1938 Yu•oslav)50 lbrriot H-41/Hmirkel la-S ~cermaimmmaum (19".? German)12 wnier Do 22Zi Seaolane (1934 Genman)86 Total Naval Aircraft (24 Frr* Line)

T1tal: 405 Aircraft including 117 Modern Figters and 103 Modern Bombers.

47

Apmdix 4 (Yugoslavian Naval B*Lipment: April 19411)

1 D&rCtk Class, 1880 trns, 37 kts, 4x5.5" and 2x3.4" QMrs, 6 torpedos(YUxjosA 1932)

3 Deograd Clas, 1210 tone, 38 kcts, 4x4.7" Gum, 6 tzrpedos (Yugoslav

4 Destroyrs Total

TgIcMdo Boats:

4 T-1 Class, 262 tal, 28 kts, 2x2.6" gwur, 4 tzpedcs (Austrian 1915)4 T-5 Clau,. 266 tgna. 28 kta. 2x2.6" -az. 4 t-=Mc (Austz:i• 191518 TmCes Boats Total

•Nr.• Thor Mg Boats:8 Crjen Clau, 60 tons, 34 kts, 2 trpsdn (Wgoslav 1937)2 Uskok Claw. 20 tons. 37 kts. 2 taRgedo (yixslav 192I71

10 Motor Urpsd Boats Total

awmarm:;i2 Smli Clas3 600 taos, 14/9 kts, lx3.9" gun, 6 torpedos (Yugoslav 1929)2 Hrakri Class 975 tam. 15/10 kts. 2x4" g=n. 6 =K2MdM (XYWilav 192714 SuTcnrlmsmotal

48

Apenrx 5 (German Military Oranzticn fo OPr UATM- 25: April 1941111

Hitler (NCACinC: ArmedFoce

Armed Forces High CcZwand (01Chief of CKW: KeitelChief of operations Staff: Jodl

K i rir Hmee.IjftwaffeNwaalHigh Cmmmd Amy Hih lm* Air PFcr High Cmnd

Chief of Gen Staff: Haldr7 Dep Chief of Staff: van PaulusNaval Cumixi l1Iaftflotte IV

Ad. Schuster_ _ _ _

v Riditofen_____ ___ [1Fi •ro~ V"ITI

I II 2 I IIII. !

Second~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Ary¶L ane CrsfWUth Armyvc Wi ih erad List

2 SS I r, ID I II

First Panzer

11X 101Z= 79f I 8PZ 5P X92P 0

538 IN 132 IN 125 IN 14 PZ 11 PZ 73 IN 5 M 164 IN*183 IN 16 MT 294 IN 1 SS z r 6 K'*

4 MT (R) 72 IN*125 IN(R)*

M: Division sized units are listed below eadc corps. MIlmnmtain;IN-Infantry; PZ-Panzer; ?KYIObtorized Infantry; GD->Gross Deutschland"otaorized Infantry Regiment HG="Hman WGring" Panzer Regiment; SS=Waffean SS;(R)-tjinit and *=Did not participate in Operation 25.

49

Appendix 6 (German Military Data: March-April 1941)

Distribution of the Germany Army: March 1941112TYPE OF DIVISICN

LLOJATICtN PAN=ORWEST (France, 56 4 2 62Belai • & Holland) _ _4

EAST (Stgini for 30 1 - 3 34

NM_ 51 9- 6 W 6DALigkS (Bulgaria 9 - 2 6 17

NMUR (Dumirk & 10 - 10

AFRIC• -- . • - - L707AL 156 1 12 21 190

German Army and Air Force OPR. O ATICK 25: April 1941

Am*:113_ _ _ DI xN DIVDZY DIV 4QI4M DIV -S52.224141.872 78,00000 0037.096

50 Light Mortars 28 - 109281r= Mad~ium Mortars 44 42 150 144 8701

120= Heavy Ng•= 96 - - -1Arti-rank Rocket- 720 225 252 9737•,•50=/75n Anti-Tank * 96 576 360 536 1.16875=n Field Gurn - - -75= Field Howitzers 744 144 9 72 45C1O5am Field Horitzers 48 192 120 96 456150am Field Howitzers 18 2401 120 1201SDr-TraIsort Vehicles 8,4 .0721 14.500 i.200 70AMV 3 410 328 741Tanks of various types - - 875 - 875

Air Foe (1uftflotte 4): 114

365 'goueshmitt. Bf-109E 120 Dornier Do 17Z Ymdiun Dm er85 NMasersbmhtt Bf-11oc 85 Heinkel He 1.lH Mmdiiu BcDbwe

450 Total Fighters (All Front Lirm) 45 Junkes JU 88A Nedium Dauber120 JuMkers JU 87B Dive Bombe370 Total Bombers (All Front Line)

50 Srt Range, Nausersnmitt Bf-109, Hensidml HA-126 and Fieseler Fi-156.120 LQW RaErMe. Dornier Do 17170 Total 1 naissaie Aircraft (All Front Line)

Total: 990 Aircraft including 450 Modern Fighters and 370 Modern Bombers.

Flieggro X provided on call support to Luftflotte IV with 168 aircraft.7he Italian Bgia Aermnautica, massed 666 aircraft for OPERATICt 25.Total: 1,824 aircraft available to the Axis in OPERATICt 25

50

Ts('

a GF

II0,

1 4Ix

CC

0rX'

IL217

x)

Ge /-

(g 1 AQ6q w~UIli ~~ioda E1Z~j u)L xpc!y

4;-z

LIP'

li -

) U- 'DIIJ;;.~2id0o

z '

*~c Z1 'v1

(TT ,L~t TszuonYxao o A)S'LJ.ecl

App.rwjii 9 (Map of opmrticn 25 in S~uthern yiigo~aviall 7 )

YUGOSLAVIA

BULG ARIA

SESEA

IOI pIeNI U

053

1Alan Palmer, "Operation Puaishment," in History of the Secord World

!&r, ed. Sir Basil Liddl Hart and Barrie Pitt (Lczdon: BPC Publishing Ltd.,1966), 378-379 and 390-391. German plans for Yugoslavia prior to 27 March1941 are a point of contweion. Mo sources deecribe the Germans asur!rqared, howarv, two state that Halder nowidler the t inOctober 1940. Correlli Barnett, Hitler's Generals, (New York: Weidenfeld andNiclson Ltd., 1989), 118; and Martin L. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategv.1940-1941: The Balkan Clue (Camtridg: Unie University Press, 1973),145.

%Us paradigm for the analysis of .eational art ws derived fromJme R. !~om 4, "War in the Falklanri: fTh Use and Disue of Mwory"(Sckwol of vai Military Studiw Nonogaji1, U.S. Army Oid arid GenralStaff College, 1987), 1-3.

3 U.S. Dparbmwnt of Defense, Joint Publication 5-02.4. JointPlanning • , Vol. IV, Crisis Action P~roec7mdr (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Govcrumnt Printing Office, May 1991), I-1.

4 National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1.7e Joint Staff Officer's Gui (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gover t PrintingOffice, 1991), 7-3.

7IbiM.6nbid.

7 mbid.

8National Defense Uhiversity, 7-3, 7-7 and 7-9-7-12; and U.S.Departamt of Defemse, Joint Publication 5-02.4, I-1, 11-2-11-3 and A-1.

9 The repor ible CINC is designated as the "supported CINC." Thearders of other d•fied or specified comuanmds are called "suForting

CINCh."

lOiational Deferme University, 7-3, 7-7, and 7-12-7-16; and U.S.

DwarrA't of Daferme, Joint Publication 5-02.4, I-1, 11-3-32-4 and B-1-5-3.

11fl 5 , h~#, canrot be taken for granted and the CInX may have todistil viable strategic objectives frw the political goals.

1 2National Defemse University, 7-3, 7-7 and 7-16-7-21; and U.S.Depararmn of Defemse, Joint Publication 5-02.4, 1-2, II-4-II-6 and C-1-C-5.

13National Defense University, 7-3, 7-7 and 7-21-7-23; and U.S.Depart• mlt of Defense, Joint Publication 5-02.4, 1-2, 11-6-11-7 and D-1-D-2.

"1 4National Defense University, 7-3, 7-7 and 7-23-7-26; and U.S.Departnwnt of Defense, Joint Publication 5-02.4, 1-2, 11-7-11-9 and E-1-E-4.

15National Defense University, 7-3, 7-7 and 7-26-7-29; and U.S.r nof Defense, Joint Publication 5-02.4, 1-2, 11-9-11-10 and F-1-F-4.

54

1 SNaticiial. Defame University, 7-3, 7-7 and! 7-9-7-29; aix! U. S.DeparbMIn of Defamem, Joint Publicatican 5-02.4, 1-2, 11-1-11-10 and! A-1-A-2.

17 U. S. Dqpartment of the Army, Field Namjal. 100-5. Opration (Finalftmft) (Wadiiiwjtan, D.C.: U.S. Gaverimrit Printing office, 19 January 1993),5-2.

%odd.~c ,5-3.

19 U. S. Daprbmitz of Defame, Joint PublIcatim~ 1-02. OQmI&M Dicticzir f iiary aOf AInoit Thrm (lboiiiritcn, D.C.: U.S.G"rovrnut Printing Office,, May 1991) 76; and U.S. noarbi 1t of the Armoy,

D.C.: U.S. Gomr Ini Printing Office, Janmry 1992), GQ-2.

2 1U.S. Deparburt of the Army, Field Menuza1 100_8. bid

23lsdiat WISderived f rc pag 3-8 of this grWaph and NatioaulDefense Uhiversity, 7-3.

2 4 U.S t.ment of the Army, iAN1 Ibrfar h=~e Harkbook forXrp~isxIa, vol. 1-, (Wbaiirqtai, D.C.: Aimaican University, 1959), 74-79; and

VitrW. nmfjf ad., German C9,MraiMu in the Ba~kmn (2iixi 1941-19441(Now Minrtinville, WV: GMa~rketing Co., 1979), 2-3 and 34.

25UrS. Dqarbunt of the Army, ARmdIa1 Warfare Area Haidb~od forX3La~da 78-80; and Jadej, 2-3 and 34.

26Metj,2-3 and 34-35.

2 7HO Du.r II nt of the Army, MWecIWa1lrfare Area HrBWAcklsaxý a 80-62; and Madej, 4.

28%icaimr 1Amtin, '"Tito and His pertisan Army: y~1axvia, 1941_45,"Stratvw and Tactics 81 (July/Augusnt 1980): 5; and Peluar, 374.

2 9 pa'meir, 374; and Rmtin, 5.

ijxMal e W. Grata, "murtitzticuia1 Develqu -wot 1914-1941," inxLam , ad. by R~het J. Kerne (Berkley: University of Calif'ornia Pres,1949), 118-131.

3JcbB. Haptner, YX.1avia-in Crisis. 1934-1941 (New York: ColiumbiaUniversity Press, 1962), 25-26; and Palmier, 375-376.

33paimr, 376.55

3 4Soptnmr, 23-25, 174-175 and 180; and Palmer, 375.

3 5olivia Harncin, "Rmanian coup D'etat," in History of the Sec2Worl M, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and B•arie Pitt (London: BPC PublishinqLtd., 1966), 253-255; and Palmer, 374-375.

3%%nser, 10-14; and Palmr, 375.

37Hptanr, 103-108; and Palmr, 375.

38 cpn@mr, 175-180; and Pal , 375.

39 U.s. D r I t of te Army, PMq*dlt No. 20-260. =aairm~n,• in te B,,lk•a (figIM 1941) (MmbIirngto, D.C.: U.S. Govuniw€

Printing Office, Aqmt 1954), 4-8."40U.S. Deparb=&%!. of the Army, Paiikilt, No. 20-260, 2-6; and Van

Creveld, 52-55.

41TAG j. Ready, n gtwtme Axis: Germfny's Partners and FLrianVolntTxeers in World Wr II (Jefferson, N. C.: MNFarland and CQzany, 1987),76-77; Manning, 255; and Palmer, 375.

4 2 gkwhj Packer, "Italian Fiasuo: Iw Attack on Greece," in History ofthe Semd World WMr, ed. Sir BaDil Liddo I Hart and Barrie Pitt (Landon: BPCP--- ihirg Ltd., 1966), 263-268; and Hmann Burkhart Rialler-Hillekwand. MS# P-030. f Grmn C'g.Min in t B an. 1941: A Modlel of risis PLaMnir(Weahingtr, D.C.: U.S. Army O2ief Of Military History, Augut 1950), 4.

43U.S. D1iPkmhamt of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 86-87.

44Ready, 73-77.

45,bid., 402-403.

46nphn Hylup, Jn N ewto, and Henry Woociad, eds., oIbjmkJm (Alexamdria, VA: Timw-Life Books Inc., 1990), 16 and 23.

47p , 376.

4 8 Frank C. Liefield, g.Mnv and YsC.•lavia. 1933-1941: 7rm- GermanQmgM of Ywamnavga (Now York: Colurbia University Pre-s, 1988), 95-100;Ekpbwr, 209-211 and 216-219; Palmer, 376; and Van Creveld 126-128.

49Hnr , 239-241; Littlefield, 105 and 109; and Palmer, 376-377.

5 %optner, 250-257; Littlefield, 113-120; and Palmer, 377.

5Hqptner, 256-259; Littlefield, 113-120; and Palmer, 377-378.

52 Hopner, 41, 157-159 and 160-161; and Palmer, 376.

5 3 jozo Tomasevicd, The Cwbuka: War and Revolution in Yuooslavia.1941-145 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 31.

56

5U.S. IW rt of the Ar&W, Pampilet No. 20-260, 33-38; and PRnaldL. Tarzur, nazHdbodS of Armd FCCIS: T Balkans. part II (Lirndaorg, KSTrouen Books, 1981), 128.

5u. S. n Vmw * of tkA Army, P=Vile No. 20-260, 35; and Tuinuevich,58.

56Hoptr, 160-161; Tarnstrom, 100-101 and 128-129; and 1nsevidi,58-59.

5 7 C 1 Shie and Brian 01l1, Air War far M olavia. amr e andS(IurdGr: Gub Street, 1987), 173-175; and Tarnra, 112-116.

5 -arntzu0, 107-108; and Tmsvidch, 59-60.

5 9 TInmevicd, 57.6 0 Ibid., 55-57.

61U.S. Darbtzmit of the Army, Pmaet No. 20-260, 36-37; Shires, and

Cill, 187-192; and Tornstram, 128-129.6 2HInilled-H e nid, HS # P-030, 14-20.

(63Carlas K. Pickar, "Blit0tig: a Art or Tactical Craft?"(Schoo of Mvarie Mi1litary Sties Ir- 1, U.S. Army Clmmrd and GuualStaff College, 1992), 2-6.

6 4Matth r, The Cwmin Airfcm 1933-1945: An AnrtmA of FailrMe(Nw York: Jan.'s Publishin[ Cmpw Irn., 1981), 196-197.

6 5 Obertmrdo des Is1rI, M=, Tiel 1., 1933, traus. (FortLaavemmtth: TheOl m d and Gurwral Staff School Press, 1936); and Pickar, 6and 18-20.

"6Palmer, 378; and Van Creveld, 144-145.

671tital wsm the Chief of the Armed Forces High Comanda-- •or CGf) Jo=1 wa the C5q Chief of the 0pratirs Staff.

6 8Aolf Hitle as qwted in mddj, 22.6 9 Frtr Haldmr, M Privata War Jamal of Gn lgW=s Franz alder.

Chief of a of t•h n &M (CN, vol. VI, 'fu CaqaM inthe Dag kw and A m.. Part I: 21 F•ZMa- 1941 - 31 1J=lv 1941 (Ho U.S.Army, Durcps: Historical Division, ameign Military Studies Branch, March1950), 23.

70u.s. Dqmrbmnt of the Nay, PRer Directives and Other = LevelDirectives of the German Armed Forc 1939-1941, vol. I, Washirgton, D.C.:U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operatiors, 1948), 161-163; and Halder, 37.

7•U.s. Da�a�rzi of the Army, Pauphlet No. 20-260, 22-23 aid 27.57

7 2 Ibid., 29-30.

73Haldgr, 38.

74ftaellrHi1 wd, 1 # P-030, 55; arnl Ha Dq=rbont of ths Army,P tNo. 20-260, 30 and 38.

7 5 Ibid.

7%MMOn M t 1M,.1gr-iUbrd M # P-lo8. GeMM and

Alum- in .rd-•1, r 37: A •d of Axis Collabmatimn Prad-m-, part II,fin11I..mwtin Withb T']v.,1 _=&,M-,, (H U.S. Army, Dmqtn: Historical

Divisicn, Pftmi Military Sbylin mich, 1955), 12-13, 154-157, 182-183 and206-209; and Van Ceumold, 145-147 and 116-119.

77Halder, 43; U.S. Demprbiont of the Army Pampnt No. 20-260, 29-41;Madej, 37-47; and Palmur, 379.

78:m rn Arf'rci, 196-197; Shre, and Qi., 171-172 and

184; Van Cuvo•ud, 153; and Wmw tilidi, Dautache Dsdmc a ZcliesIatki (Bhrg An Sse: Awt Vowirx~a. Ver1M, 1987), 46.

79Li.t.1.ieMd, 121-1L2s.

B0Haldor, 49-50 an 52; Hoapwo, 288; and Shctvs, and Ull, 173-177.

Slg 1wgH.5yu4, 16 f P-030, 36.

82mbid., 35-49.

8 3 MZid., 49-52.

8 4Haldlr, 45.

85QiCper, Mlw Genm Airfcrce, 197-198; and Shcres, and Cull, 195-199.

8%.S. n5i* 1 1- of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 49-50; 1 mr, e

Gman Aifc~rZ, 197-198; P r, 379; and Shcres, and QMll, 195-199.87 U.S. gmr It of tie Ar•y, Pooiet No. 2U-260, 52-53 and 55-57;

Hylap, Nmweta, and W oxI-aJ, 48; aMn Uhlich, 81.

"8u.S. CDirlunt of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 86-87.

8 9 Ibid.

9U.S. Dor.mmit of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 50-52; andTar.Bt~rcm, 131.

9 1U.s. Departmnt of the &my, Pamhlet No. 20-260, 52; and Tarnstzi,

131.9 2 1bid.

58

93ftuxth, MGrinr, ml Balkarm, 1941," in World War 1I GerunMilitary S-iiie: A Collection of 213 s.pcia1 R.ggon the Second World WaPrer by formor Officers of the Wahzat for the United States Army, vol.7, part IV, 1-A CKf War Diar Serie, ed. Donald S. Detailer (Now York:Garland 1bihr, Inc., 1979), 41; and U.S. Dpartmt of the Army,Pampilet No. 20-260, 53.

9 4 U.S. Depum a of tie Army, Paphet No. 20-260, 58-61; andTarzwtau, 132.

9 5 nhtd.

9 6naid.

9"Hylsup, Nmetxn, and Wo11 tm1e1, 55-5.

9 8 U.S. Dqitmrti of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 60-61.

99Ibid., 61-63.

1°SU.S. Dpqe.-M-t of the Army, Pamphet No. 20-260, 63--64; and Palmr,

391.

lIfttinb-, 5-6. Hitler isud three directive• g post•o• flictparation. in Yuoslavia: Directive 26 of 3 April 41; Directive 27; of 14

Aril 41 and an wbered directive dated 18 April 41. Thine docu tsa ersed the division of the country a the Axis, co 1araticn withallies, CPlRMC' IERr anda the soils of war. None of ttmE provided a planfor the Pacification of Yugoslavia or for bringing the pciaeinto the axisfold. RD Dqatmmnt of the Navy, 164-171.

1 02Adolf Hitler as quoted in idj, 22.

d03Pbr details on the data used to detwers times force ratios seeAR~xlcies 3 and 6 on pages 47 and 50. Italian and Hxzjarian forces are notincluded in the M==1 figures. Howver, when they are included, theAxis Verses Yugo•lav force ratios are a•oqadulmfy 1 to 1 in m zowsr, 5 to1 in armo and 4.5 to 1 in airoraft.

104 TMod.

1 1OU*r-Hill6b.nI, Mi # P-108, 216-218.

lO6 Infrj ump was coied from U.S. Dueprtmen of the A&W, %Wjalwarf~ars MM•g f¢E ZuMla~v', 14a.

1077his d wms derived frnm U.S. [eartmet of the Army, PamphletNo. 20-260, 36-37; an Tarnstroua, 100-101, 107, 112-113 and 128-129.

1 0 8 Tarzutrm, 99-101 and 128-129.

1 0 9 Tbid., 112-116.

1 0 Thid., 107-108.59

1 2 *hbs diara ws darived from U.S. Deparbt of the Army, PanriletNo. 20-260, 39-41, 81 and Appendix I; and Tarnstraum, 129-131.

112MU chArt was copied from Nuell1-Hillbard, HS # P-030, 14.

S3 reciss figures for GeAman mw• r and equipent employed inPRATICO 25 were difficult to determine. The figures in this chart are an

estiuate-they do ot include army or cops tz -- ased on typical unitstruig t, and inc=Wplete data found in Jdm A. nglish, On (NowYork: PraeWrPblses 1984), 69-71; Bryan I. Fugate,Bmr ua: Sntw, and Tactics on- n bs arn Front (Navato, Ch: PresidioProms, 1984), 346-348; and Jm I , &lni= Elite: German Hmtinof W1rl War II (Now York: Jarm's PublidLing Inc., 1980), 192-196.

1 1 4yPscise figume for Geman jair M--W typer-wer difficult todetermine. Them figures are an estimte besed on standard f unitstreta and inomp1ete data from U.S. Department of the Army, Paiphlet No.20-260, 29; ,oTher, German Air Ftor, 196-197; %=wres, and QMl1, 171-172and 184; and Tarnrtuwb, 131.

1 1'This map was copied era U.S. Depmrtment of the Army, Pasphlet No.20-260, 42.

1 1 •ds mp was copied frms U.S. Deartmant of the Army, Panphaet No.

20-260, 49.

11721 nap wes copied from U.S. Departmnt of the Army,, Paqphlet No.20-260, 70.

60

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