A *'i

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

SDTFC ^ ELECTE f> MAY121993J I

©

c AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (U)

by

Janes E Hazuka

Major, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in Partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of » Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are • not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Departments of the Navy or the Air Force.

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17 June 1993

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Chairman, Department of Operations

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AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (U)

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HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT OF A FLEET-TO-SHORE OPERATION

it. ABSTRACT TYiin paper is an analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack from a operational level of war perspective. Its purpose is to provide the reader with a Japanese viewpoint of the Pearl Harbor operation, and to determine if there were weaknesses with the plan and its execution. The study is limited in scope in that it will focus primarily en a single operation of the Pacific campaign initiated by the Japanese.

Much has been written about the devastation inflicted upon U.S. forces by Japan on 7 December 1941. Research initiated for this paper concludes that although the execution of the Pearl Harbor operation was successful, the operation did not achieve

con't its strategic aia. A mismatch existed between operational and rtv strategic objectives which was partially attributed to flaws in sld« target selection, priority, and tactical level decision making iO^DiyiteuTlON'AVAILABILITY OP ABSTRACT

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during execution. Japan's narrow objective of destroying primarily capital ships, spared important logistical facilities from destruction. These support facilities proved to be the key to a quick restoration of U.S. naval presence in the region. Likewise, Japan's emphasis on placing a higher target priority for battleships versus carriers, allowed a more.potent weapon system to essentially escape unscathed. This mistake had strategic implications in that aircraft carriers were the key weapon's platform used to destroy the Japanese Navy in later battles in the Pacific. Finally, the tactical commander's failure to exploit America's vulnerability when given the opportunity, minimized further damaged which could have been inflicted upon the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor. These operational and tactical errors allowed America to quickly recover from the attack and pursue offensive actions in the Pacific within a few months. The net result of the Pearl Harbor attack along with subsequent operations, solidified Japan's position in the Southwest Pacific. However, flaws in operational planning and conservative military leadership during the plan's execution, guaranteed this dominance only in the short term.

Abstract of

OPERATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

This paper is an analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack from a

operational level of war perspective. Its purpose is to provide

the reader with a Japanese viewpoint of the Pearl Harbor

operation, and to determine if there were weaknesses with the

plan and its execution. The study is limited in scope in that

it will focus primarily on a single operation of the Pacific

campaign initiated by the Japanese.

Much has been written about the devastation inflicted upon

U.S. forces by Japan on 7 December 1941. Research initiated for

this paper concludes that although the execution of the Pearl

Harbor operation was successful, the operation did not achieve

its strategic aim. A mismatch existed between operational and

strategic objectives which was partially attributed to flaws in

target selection, priority, and tactical level decision making

during execution. Japan's narrow objective of destroying

primarily capital ships, spared important logistical facilities

from destruction. These support facilities proved to be the key

to a quick restoration of U.S. naval presence in the region.

Likewise, Japan's emphasis on placing a higher target priority

for battleships versus carriers, allowed a more potent weapon

system to essentially escape unscathed. This mistake had

strategic implications in that aircraft carriers were the key

weapon's platform used to destroy the Japanese Navy in later

ii

battles in the Pacific. Finally, the tactical commander's

failure to exploit America's military forces at its most

vulnerable point, minimized further damaged which could have

been inflicted upon the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl

Harbor. These operational and tactical errors allowed America

to quickly recover from the attack and pursue offensive actions

in the Pacific within a few months. The net result of the Pearl

Harbor attack along with subsequent operations, solidified

Japan's position in the Southwest Pacific. However, flaws in

operational planning and conservative military leadership during

the plan's execution, guaranteed this dominance only in the

short term.

iii

OTIC QUALITY INOFSCTZD I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

ABSTRACT ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

I INTRODUCTION 1

II THE PLAN 6

Operational Deception to Achieve Surprise 10

Operational Reconnaissance and Intelligence .... 12

Execution 13

III OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 16

IV CONCLUSIONS 22

MAP 24

NOTES 25

BIBLIOGRAPHY 27

iv

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a carefully planned fleet-

to-shore operation. It was initiated as a result of growing

tensions between Japan and the United States over an embargo of

oil and other materials. This deliberate action by the United

States was designed to penalize Japan for its aggressive

military intervention in Indochina. Given the lack of natural

resources in their own country, the embargo had the affect of

"drawing a line in the sand" for the Japanese. The attack was

the initial operation of a multi-phased campaign to make Japan

self-sufficient by occupying the mineral rich area's to the

south, and to establish a defense line around Japan and her

possessions. Subsequent operations in this campaign include

invasion of the Philippines, British Malaya, Burma, and the

Dutch East Indies. For the purposes of this paper, we will only

concentrate on the Pearl Harbor portion of the plan.

From the Japanese perspective, war with the United States

seemed inevitable. During the early 1900's, the Japanese

government spent a considerable amount of their national budget

building a formidable navy. Her contributions to the allied

side during World War I was rewarded by receiving Germany's

island possessions in the Pacific, north of the equator.1

Therefore, Japan emerged from the war as a naval power with

enhanced prestige and an appetite for "primary influence" in the

western Pacific region. The Japanese island possessions were

strategically located close to U.S. controlled islands in the

Pacific thus, a rivalry with America quickly ensued.

In 1918, the Imperial Defense Policy adopted by Japan

identified the United States as their number one potential

enemy.2 This belief influenced all aspects of Japanese naval

policy. A naval arms race resulted from increased tensions

between the two nations. The Washington Agreement in 1922

deterred further escalation by limiting the number of ships each

side could possess. The agreement and subsequent disarmament

conferences, kept the size of the Japanese Navy inferior to

United States naval forces. By 1936, Japan had withdrawn from

the agreement, giving herself freedom to expand her navy. By

1941, the Japanese Navy "was more powerful than the combined

British and United States fleets in the Pacific area."3 This

new arms race led to President Roosevelt's decision to redeploy

a significant part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet from San Diego to

Hawaii in May 1940. It brought the total number of American

warships operating out of the Hawaiian port to well over 100.

This forward basing decision by President Roosevelt was seen by

the Japanese as a provocative action.

Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, the Commander and Chief of

Japan's Combined Fleet, was highly respected within the Japanese

Navy. He had spent considerable time in the United States and

understood that Japan could not compete with America's great

industrial capacity. Yet Yamamoto recognized, given the

objectives of each nation, war was inevitable. His task

therefore, was to develop a plan with a winning strategy against

a superior foe.

The primary concern of Japanese war planners in 1941 was to

secure a source of oil soon after hostilities were initiated.4

Many members of the Naval General Staff wanted to develop a bold

plan employing a massive naval force to capture the southern

mineral rich area's during the initial phase of the campaign.

Admiral Yamamoto did not share this opinion. He was concerned

about the large United States naval presence in Hawaii and its

potential threat to disrupt these operations. Admiral Yamamoto

opted for a multi-phased attack where the Japanese Navy would

strike "a crippling blow at the U.S. Pacific Fleet

simultaneously with the launching of the southern operations."3

His argument focused on the assumption that America's Pacific

Fleet was its center of gravity in the region. Its destruction

was essential before initiating military operations in the south

to achieve Japan's ultimate objectives. A simultaneous strike

would maximize the element of surprise, giving the Japanese the

upper hand in future battles if they occurred.

Admiral Yamamoto was a firm believer in the destructive

capability that could be achieved through projecting air power

fron the sea. He spent much of his military career developing

air tactics for aircraft carriers. Yamamoto was therefore well

equipped to initiate and direct planning efforts for a surprise

attack on Pearl Harbor. The strategic objective of the plan was

"to cripple the American fleet with one blow as a preliminary to

operations designed to capture the oil areas of Southeast

Asia."' The operational objective was to destroy the U.S.

Pacific Fleet in harbor and as many aircraft as possible.

Successful execution of the plan was expected to create an end

state of Japanese naval dominance in the Pacific theater.

Yamamoto reasoned that the shock of a decisive attack might

drive the Americans to a negotiated peace with Japan in light of

the deteriorating war situation in Europe. If he were wrong,

Yamamoto felt it would take years for the United States to

replace what it had lost in the attack. By that time, Japan

could solidify the South Pacific region and retain it

indefinitely.

The plan for the Pearl Harbor surprise attack was

influenced by three events in history.7 The first was Admiral

Togo's operation at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese war.

This surprise attack on Russian ships in harbor by Japanese

destroyers was highly successful because it neutralized Port

Arthur throughout the remainder of the war. Additionally,

Japan's victory in this limited conflict against a superior foe,

gave them confidence that they could replicate this success in

a war with the United States. The second was American Admiral

Prank A. Schofield's mock attack of Hawaii with aircraft

carriers in 1932. It exposed vulnerabilities with Hawaiian

defenses which were never resolved and quickly forgotten by

virtually all except Admiral Yamamoto. The Third was the 1940

attack on the Italian Fleet by the British. In this operation,

two waves of carrier based aircraft attacked the Italian Fleet

anchored at Tarantö Harbor in the Mediterranean. The operation

lasted approximately an hour and was extremely successful in

that three battleships were sunk by 24 planes. Japan's military

leaders learned much from this operation because Taranto, like

Pearl, had a very shallow harbor. Changes to aircrew bombing

tactics and modifications to torpedoes, allowed the British to

overcome this environmental constraint and achieve operational

success. The attack decisively altered the balance of naval

power in the Mediterranean Sea.

CHAPTER II

THE PLAN

Under Admiral Yamamoto's direction, the Hawaiian attack

plan was set into motion. The plan called for an independent

naval operation involving six aircraft carriers, two

battleships, nine destroyers, three cruisers, three submarines

and eight tankers. The battleships, destroyers, and cruisers

would accompany the carrier strike task force and serve the

carriers primarily as escorts and protection screens. Three

submarines would serve as scouts, patrolling waters 200 miles

ahead of the task force. Their primary function was to divert

the ships in the event that other naval or commercial vessels

were detected along the route. The tankers represented the

logistics support for the task force. They were needed because

some of the ships did not have the range (7500 miles round trip)

to complete the operation without refueling. The carriers were

considered the operational fires of the Pearl Harbor plan

because their aircraft would attack targets of operational

significance, essential in achieving the objective. Of the six

carriers, the Akaai and the Kaga. were two of the most

formidable in the world. Each could carry approximately 90

planes. Total number of aircraft on all carriers exceeded 400.*

There were many tactical level hurdles to overcome with the

plan if it were to be successful. As previously stated, Pearl

Harbor was very shallow. It had a maximum depth of only 45

feet. This posed a problem for torpedoes because when launched

by air, they could submerge themselves in the harbor's bottom or

get snagged by torpedo nets prior to reaching the target. The

Japanese resolved this issue as the British did at Taranto by

modifying the torpedo fins and to change aircrew flying tactics.

Torpedo-bombers would be required to release their torpedoes at

lower altitudes than normal. Hand picked Japanese aircrews

trained around the clock to develop and fine-tune their skills

on these new tactics. These included horizontal and dive-

bombing, strafing tactics, and shallow-water torpedo drops.

Yamamoto even went so far as to relocate their training to

Kagoshima Bay in the southern tip of Japan, where the terrain

strongly resembled that around Pearl Harbor. To overcome any

difficulty presented by torpedo nets, some of the dive-bombers

would target naval vessels. It's interesting to note that

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific

Fleet, decided not to install torpedo netting. He based his

decision on the restrictive nature of the nets concerning ship

access into and out of the harbor. His decision essentially

doomed the battleships.'

The plan called for the Japanese task force to depart from

Tankan Bay in the Kurile Islands.10 This origination point was

selected because it was isolated and would ensure their

departure remained undetected. The task force was to proceed in

an easterly direction on a northern route to Oahu between Midway

and the Aleutians.* This course was chosen over the normal

southern course to avoid the most common commercial shipping

lanes. The main objective here was to arrive at the aircraft

launching point without being detected. The northern route

offered this advantage. During the winter months however,

storms in the Northern Pacific can create treacherous seas.

Although high seas could pose problems for refueling efforts,

the low probability of detection outweighed these concerns.

The task force would proceed at only a speed between 12 to

14 knots to conserve fuel. They would make their way to the

stand-by point, north of Oahu and just out of the range of

American land-based reconnaissance planes. At anytime during

this phase of the operation, the task force could be recalled if

ongoing negotiations between Japan and the United States would

result in an agreement favorable to the Japanese. From the

stand-by point, at a certain hour and day, they would proceed

south at 24 knots until they reached the launching point which

was approximately 230 miles north of Oahu. Given the range of

the aircraft involved in the attack, it was essential to be

relatively close to the island. This phase of the operation

represented the "point of no return" and was to be conducted at

night to minimize the possibility of detection.

The capital ships were considered America's center of

gravity in the Pacific by the Japanese. The priority of targets

was in the order that follows: battleships, carriers, and

"Map of the northern route found on page 24.

8

aircraft.11 Target locations included Pearl Harbor, and

airfields at Ford Island, Hickam, Wheeler, Ewa, and Kaneohe.

The operational objective was to be accomplished by formulating

a strike force of* fighters (air protection, strafing), dive-

bombers (ships, aircraft on the ground), and torpedo-bombers

(ships). The attack would be launched just before sunrise and

would be preceded by a pre-operation reconnaissance flight to

ensure the targets were not redeployed.12 Once confirmation was

received by the reconnaissance aircraft that the targets were

still there, two waves of attack planes comprising

approximately 180 aircraft each would be launched from the

carriers one hour and fifteen minutes apart. The duration of

the attack for both waves was between 30 and 60 minutes, after

which, they would return to their respective carriers. If the

first two waves of attack failed to attain the objectives set

forth in the plan, a second overall attack would be launched.

In the event that this happened, returning aircraft would be

refueled, rearmed, and relaunched. The 360 aircraft attack

force would represent the largest concentration of naval air

power in the history of warfare up to that period.

Additionally, 39 fighters would remain behind to provide an air

umbrella above the fleet, and 40 others would be kept in

reserve.11 Post-operation reconnaissance was prohibited to

lessen the probability of locating the carriers by American

forces. Battle damage assessment therefore, was accomplished by

aircrews involved in the attack.

Approximately 12 Japanese "IM class submarines were to

arrive at Oahu 48 hours before the attack to provide visual

reconnaissance of the harbor. Once the attack was initiated,

the submarines would sink any vessel(s) trying to leave the

harbor. Five of the submarines came with midget submarines

which were to access Pearl Harbor during the air attack and fire

their torpedoes at any remaining naval targets.

Once the operation was completed, the task force would

proceed west until it reached the safety of Japanese waters.

The carrier force could skirt near Midway if it was experiencing

a fuel shortage and if successful attacks in Oahu negated the

possibility of enemy counter-air attacks. In the event that

this happened, part of the task force (two carriers and two

battleships) would join a neutralization unit of surface ships

and carry out air attacks on Midway.14

Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo was selected as the Carrier

Task Force Commander and served as the tactical level commander

of the operation. Admiral Yaaamoto, the Combined Fleet

Commander, functioned as the operational level commander.

OPERATIONAL DECEPTION TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE

Admiral Yamamoto believed that the operation could only be

successful if it took the United States forces by complete

surprise. If the task force was spotted by enemy forces, it

must abort its mission at once and return to Japan. The Pearl

Harbor attack plan was war-gamed to determine its effectiveness

in Tokyo, September 1941.15 The results showed that an attack

10

from the north was less likely to be spotted by the enemy than

one from the south. It also determined that the attack could

only be successful if it completely surprised the enemy. If

not, it could prove to be a major disaster for the Japanese

Navy.

The plan and preparations were conducted in complete

secrecy. Only a few officers knew of its existence. Not even

the aircrews training for the operation were aware of the

mission they were about to embark.

Individual components of the task force left their home

ports at various times and formed the carrier task force in the

remote harbors of the Kurile Islands. This deceptive action was

taken to minimize suspicion that a major operation was taking

place. Additionally, the northern route taken to the launching

point was an example of operational maneuver. It facilitated

the element of surprise.

Although not a deliberate act of deception, the lack of

several carrier task force "call signs" referenced in radio

transmissions before and during the Pearl Harbor operation,

misled American signal monitoring forces in that they assumed

the ships were idle in their home ports.

The task force was instructed to maintain radio silence

during its voyage to Oahu. Information was passed to the task

force by radio from Tokyo and was coded for secrecy. A receive

only communication mode prohibited being located by direction

11

finding equipment. Communications to and from ships were

conducted with ship signal lights.

Sunday morning was selected as the time of the attack. It

was determined that the American defensive guard would be at its

lowest on that day. It was also assumed that the fleet would he

in port, her crews sleeping in late during their normal day off.

These assumptions were supported by intelligence information

gathered by espionage efforts in Hawaii.

Finally, in Washington DC, Japanese diplomats in the last

day leading up to the actual attack, delayed delivering a

declaration of war to the State Department until after the Pearl

Harbor air strikes had been initiated.

OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Japan used a network of spies in Hawaii which provided a

variety of information. Some of this included the number and

type of ships docked at Pearl Harbor, their movements,

topography of the area, defensive forces on the island,

schedules and location of sea patrols, crew relief procedures,

etc. Many of these spies were Japanese nationals which had

migrated to Hawaii.16 Armed with this information, Yamamoto

could structure a force to exploit weaknesses in air defense and

to successfully destroy the targets identified by his

intelligence sources.

Intelligence was also collected by submarines sent to

Hawaii to perform reconnaissance missions and by listening to

commercial radio broadcasts originating from Hawaii.

12

Additionally, crews from commercial vessels were involved in

intelligence gathering. One such example was in October 1941

when the Taiyo Mara made a tria? run to Hawaii using the

northern route earmarked for the Pearl Harbor operation.17

During the voyage, the crew kept a watchful eye for American

patrol planes. Daily records of the weather and sea conditions

were kept. The ocean liner observed strict radio silence

throughout the trip. They encountered enemy patrol planes at

approximately 200 miles north of Oahu. Once they arrived at the

island, the crew and some of the passengers were involved in

other intelligence gathering activities. All of this data was

used in the Pearl Harbor planning process and contributed to the

operations successful outcome.

EXECUTION

All phases of the Pearl Harbor operation were executed

flawlessly. The Japanese sunk or capsized four battleships, two

auxiliary ships, and one minelayer. There were 12 others that

sustained heavy or moderate damage. Additionally, there were

nearly 300 aircraft destroyed or damaged. The Japanese loses

included 29 Aircraft and 6 submarines.

Although the operational kills far exceeded Japanese loses,

Admiral Yamamoto stated in 1942 that a third and forth wave of

air strikes should have been launched. It was Vice-Admiral

Nagumo's (the Carrier Task Force Commander) decision not to do

this because he believed at the time that all operational

objectives had been achieved and that the longer the task force

13

remained in Hawaiian waters, the more vulnerable it became.

Unlike the United States, Japan could not afford to lose ships

because of their limited industrial capacity and shortages of

strategic materials. Admiral Nimitz was later quoted as saying

that the Japanese commander "missed a golden opportunity in

restricting his attack."u The reason for this was that Japan

had sunk or damaged less than 20 percent of the ships anchored

at Pearl on the morning of 7 December 1941. Likewise, important

shore support facilities came through the attack without

sustaining any damage. Yamamoto never forgave Nagumo for his

decision to launch only one strike."

Operation orders (OPOROS) were used to execute the plan.

As mentioned previously, priorities were established, timing of

combat actions were detailed and synchronized to facilitate

deconfliction, and an operational reserve of aircraft was

committed.

The Japanese felt that there would be a more significant

island defense than was actually encountered. The reason for

the relative ease of operation for Japanese aircrews during the

plans execution was that American island defense forces were

placed on Alert Posture One. This action was implemented to

facilitate protection of American forces from internal sabotage

which was identified by General Walter C. Short, the senior Army

commander for the island, as the most probable threat.20 Alert

Posture One put Army defensive forces in the worst possible

position in that actions taken included lining up aircraft in a

14

row "wing tip to wing tip" to simplify police protection.

Additionally, Army anti-aircraft (AA) weapons were locked up in

a secured area to ensure they weren't destroyed. These actions

made it easy for' the Japanese strike force to destroy Army

aircraft on the ground unhindered by AA weapons.

The weather during the transitory phase (Kurile Islands to

the launching point) was perfect. For seven days the skies were

overcast which provided superb cloud cover for the task force.

Bad weather in the Central Pacific forced the cancellation

of the Midway portion of the plan. While returning to Japan

however, two carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers were

diverted to Wake Island to assist in its invasion.21

15

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

Superficially, one night conclude that the Pearl Harbor

attack was superbly planned and flawlessly executed. Critical

analysis gives one a different perspective. Japan's planning of

the operation was flawed in that targets of operational

importance were ignored. The plan concentrated on Admiral

Yamamoto belief that America's center of gravity in the Pacific

was its fleet. Although he was correct in this assumption, he

underestimated the value of Pearl Harbor's support facilities

and the U.S. Navy's ability to use those facilities to help

reconstitute its naval forces.

Potential targets which should have been addressed in the

plan include naval repair facilities, fuel storage tanks, and

supply dumps. Without these facilities it would have made it

significantly more difficult for the United States to rebound

from the attack. Destroying the fuel storage tanks which took

a considerable amount of time to build and to fill, would have

drastically limited the United States Navy's ability to project

power in the Pacific. Likewise, demolishing the naval repair

and supply facilities would have severely limited the Navy's

ability to repair damaged vessels after the attack.

In determining why potentially lucrative targets were not

considered, I would submit that Japan fell victim to short

16

sighted planning motivated in part by Alfred Thayer Mahan's

maritime principles. Mahan's teachings focus on destruction of

the enemy's fleet as the first task of a navy at war. The

attack on Pearl Harbor itself, followed his theory implicitly.

The Japanese concentrated their efforts on destroying capital

ships and excluded shore based support facilities which were

later used to help reconstitute the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It

simply did not occur to them that they should pursue complete

neutralization of Pearl Harbor; one which targeted both ships

and their shore based support system. This strategy would have

been more conducive to their overall strategic aim.

The Port Arthur attack during the Russo-Japanese War may

have also contributed to weaknesses in the Pearl Harbor target

selection process. The Japanese sought to replicate the success

they achieved at Port Arthur. Undoubtedly, the operation had

some influence on the Pearl Harbor plan. The two operations had

one important difference however. Immediately after the Port

Arthur action, Admiral Togo's ships blockaded the harbor for

five months while Japanese ground troops were launching an

offensive. These two actions essentially neutralized the port

for the duration of the war. In the case of the Pearl Harbor

operation, no naval blockade or land campaign was initiated

after the attack, thus recovery operations by the U.S. could be

conducted immediately with impunity. Destruction of the

logistical facilities would have neutralized Pearl Harbor

without committing land forces or implementing a blockade for a

17

significant period of time. This would have given the Japanese

the success similar to that achieved at Port Arthur.

Although the plan did not address logistical facilities, an

aggressive task force commander might have targeted them anyway

if the initial attack was going well. Japan however, selected

the conservative Vice-Admiral Nagumo as its task force

commander, who implicitly adhered to the target selection

outlined in the plan. When aircraft attack units returned to

their ships in jubilation over the ease at which they achieved

their objectives, Nagumo ordered the task force to depart the

area. He did this over the objections of several of his staff

officers who wanted to exploit the situation further.22

Launching a second attack specifically addressing

logistical targets might have made the difference in Japan's

long term attainment of its overall strategic objective. It

would have allowed Japan more lead time to solidify the

Southwest Pacific region and build up island defenses in

preparation of a much later U.S. offensive campaign. This might

also have allowed the Japanese adequate time to cut off the

lines of communication between the United States and Australia.

It may have forced the U.S. to more carefully choose between the

war in Europe and the Pacific, from a logistical support and

weapons deployment priority perspective. A shift toward the

Pacific may have been enough to cause the Soviets to pursue a

peaceful termination in its war with Germany, complicating the

war effort considerably for America.

18

The plan was also flawed in that targets selected were not

prioritized correctly. Although the general opinion in 1941 was

that battleships were the most valued ship in the Navy, history

has shown us that the carriers represented a more potent force.

Admiral Yamamoto believed this to be true yet it was not

reflected in his priority of targets." This probably was

because Yamamoto's contemporaries did not share his opinion.

The priority may have been adjusted to reflect the general

consensus of the military establishment at that time and thereby

gain overall support for the operation. It is interesting to

note that the Japanese were aware seven hours prior to the

attack that the carriers and several heavy cruisers were not in

port. Primarily because the battleships remained, the operation

was allowed to continue.27

If aircraft carriers were reflected as the primary target

for the operation, aborting the Pearl Harbor attack would have

been a legitimate option. Undoubtedly, this would have been

difficult to do given the ramifications it would have on

subsequent operations involved in the Japanese campaign.

However, failure to postpone the attack until the carriers

returned essentially doomed the Japanese Navy in that American

"Several source documents differ with target priorities referenced in this study. The Pearl Harbor Operations; General Outline of Orders and Plans (reference 6 on the bibliography) states that battleships had priority over carriers. The Japanese were aware that the carriers were not anchored at Pearl prior to the attack, yet the operation was allowed to continue. This action would be consistent with the "battleship first" priority.

19

carriers later devastated the Japanese carrier fleet in June

1942 during the battle of Midway. Ironically, four of Japan's

six carriers involved in the Pearl Harbor attack were sunk by

U.S. carriers in that battle.

The failure of Japan's intelligence collecting activities

to keep them informed of the status of the U.S. Pacific Fleet,

was another major problem. This is quite perplexing given the

espionage activity they sponsored in and around Oahu. As it

happened, failure to adequately track capital ships, essentially

placed the Japanese in the unenviable position of having no

alternative but to continue with the operation — regardless of

target priorities. The reason for this was that by the time the

tactical commander was informed of the carrier's status, the

task force had already gone beyond Japan's self-imposed "point

of no return".

Another flaw in the plan's development and execution was

the failure to consider the significance of Pearl's shallow

harbor from an entirely different perspective than weapons

employment. The shallow harbor gave the United states an

opportunity to salvage and repair ships which ordinarily would

have sunk beyond recovery in deeper water's. Out of seven ships

sunk or capsized, the Navy was able to salvage three of them by

repairing the holes and floating them back to the surface. One

of these ships, the Battleship California, won seven battle

stars for its participation in later operations during the

war.2* A second overall air strike on the plans primary targets

20

may have inflicted sufficient damage to these ships so that

recovery would have either been impossible or cost prohibitive.

It was Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's decision not to launch

a second overall attack. This was a tactical error which

ultimately had operational and strategic implications. A second

overall attack may have drastically limited United States naval

presence in the region for a significantly longer period of

time. His decision to limit the attack was driven by his belief

that the task force was vulnerable to a counterattack by

American carriers thought to be in the area. Fortunately for

the United States, the opposite was true. Nagumo's decision was

a overly cautious one which negated the possibility of

inflicting further damage to Pearl's ships during a time when

America's naval forces were at their most vulnerable point.

The employment of 12 Japanese submarines outside the harbor

seem to have been completely ineffective. No Ymerican ships

were sunk by submarines departing the harbor although there is

some evidence that a midget submarine fired on a ship in Pearl

Harbor. The operation did nothing for building the reputation

of midget submarines as viable weapon system. All five were

captured or destroyed.

Finally, the plan assumed that the island did not have a

long range radar for early detection of flying aircraft; this

was not the case. Luck was with the Japanese however, in that

Army officers on-duty at the time ignored the warnings and took

no action to alert island military forces.

21

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

One can learn a great deal from past military operations.

In the case of Pearl Harbor, tactical and operational level

success did not produce the desired end state in the long run

for the Japanese. Flaws during operational planning primarily

in target selection and priorities, limited the success of the

Pearl Harbor attack for the Japanese. This highlights the fact

that correctly establishing tactical and operational objectives

that support strategic aims is a very difficult but essential

process. The primary reason for this is that you can not, with

great accuracy, determine the affects of the operation on your

adversary's will or ability to react. The key however, to

success on the strategic level is the net result of your

action(s) at the operational level. Ones maximum effort in this

endeavor is therefore absolutely vital.

During plan development, adhering to the principle of

simplicity allows for improvisation by operational and tactical

commanders during the plan's execution. When opportunities

present themselves in the fog of war, commanders must accurately

assess the situation, evaluate risks versus gains, and select

the best course of action. Clearly, Vice-Admiral Nagumo failed

to do this when he decided not to launch a second overall

attack. If he had, it probably would not have changed the

22

outcome of the war, but it certainly would have made victory

more difficult to achieve for the United States.

23

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Notes

1. A J Barker, Pearl Harbor (New York: Ballantine Publishing, 1969), p. 11.

2. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), p. 26.

3. Barker, p. 11.

4. Fuchida and Okumiya., p. 33.

5. Ifcid., p. 34

6. Barker, p. 27.

7. Ifeid-, p. 16-19.

8. Ibid.. p. 155.

9. Ifrjd., p. 24.

10. Arnold Lott and Robert Sumrall, Pearl Harbor Attack (New Jersey: Leeward Publications, 1974), p. 5.

11. Military History Section, Headquarters Section, Army Far East, Pear 3, Harbor operations; general cluing of. orders and Plans (Distributed by the Department of the Army, 1953). p. 14.

12. Ibid, p. 20.

13. Barker, p.92.

14. Military History Section, Headquarters Section, Army Far East, p. 11.

15. Barker, p. 40-41.

16. Ifeidx, p. 46.

17. Gordon W Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1981), p. 313-319.

18. Barker, p. 145-146.

19. IfeisL., p. 152.

20. Hans Louis Trefousse, What happened at Pearl Harbor (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958), p. 59-78.

21. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 20

25

22. Barker, p. 146.

23. Fuchida and Okumiya, p. 37-38,

24. Lott, p. 24

26

Bibliography

Barker, A J. Pearl Harbor. New York: Ballantine Books Inc, 1969.

Trefousse, Hans Louis. What Happened at Pearl Harbor. New York: United Printing serves Inc, 1958.

Lott, Arnold S. and Sumrall, Robert F. Pearl Harbor Attack. New Jersey: Leeward Publications, 1974.

Layton, Edwin T. And I Was There. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1985.

Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981.

Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans. Prepared by Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Far East, Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953.

The Campaigns of the Pacific War. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947.

Martin, David C. and Walcott, John. Best Laid Elflflgj The maids Story Ql America's War Against Terrorism. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1988.

Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatake. Midway. New York: Ballantine Books, 1958.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin Book, 1990.

Warner, Denis and Peggy. The Tide at Sunrise. New York: Charterhouse, 1974.

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