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IPTACTION FLIMSY

8 September I960Pages j d 11. lncl

I960 ANNUAL REVIEW - GERMANS

NOTE BY THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

INTRODUCTION

References: a . SGM-?itO4-6Ob. MCM-11O-6O

S flrt- p lS : f / O t

1 . Paragraph 2 of reference a lays down the procedure for handling the subject documents during the I960 Annual Review.

2. Attàched are two draft memoranda for SGREP, containinga. Military comments and final recommendationst>. Draft military portion of the country chapter and

.the country summary aDDralsal.

NON-STANDING GROUP NATIONS INVOLVED3 . Germany.

FINAL MILITARY APPROVAL REQUIRED4. Standing Group.

RELATED PAPERS ALREADY RELEASED TO THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE5. Reference b .

2 ENCLOSURES:1. Draft SGM2. Draft SGM

-10.RcGHADtp

„ , . DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. Per Autliorny--- -------------- -

flMS Control

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CONSULT ATI QNS: ' ALREADY ' CABBIES .OUT.6.. a_, .With'fii the Standing Group. None.

secrezb.. Outside - the Standing Group ' The Staff Officer, to the

German Military Reoresentsfci vp

FOLLOWING MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO BE OFFERED STANDING GROUP CONSULTATION '

7. Germart Military Representative.

RECOMMENDATIONS8. It is recommended that the Standing Group • approve, the

two attached draft memoranda and that distribution is made in accordance with paras 2 a and b of reference a. In view of the time factor,-it is’ further recommended that'the contents-of the Enclosures' be transmitted by signal to SGRÈP. In advance of the memoranda.

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^Î'ONORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE <S£C/?££COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

ICOPY NO._________

SOM- . -60 £ September i960

Pages 1_________

1 MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING OROUP REPRESENTATIVE2 SUBJECT: i960 Annual Review: Military Comments and3 Final Military Recommendations - GERMANY4 Reference: SGM-404-60

5 1 . In accordance with para 2 a of reference the Standing6 Group forwards herewith the military comments and recommendations7 on Germany.

8 '2. The Standing Group has noted the comments of /the9 /Major NATO Commanderai on Germany, and these are reproduced at10 Enclosure 1.

11 3. The final Military Recommendations of the Standing12 Group are at Enclosure 2.

13 FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

14 2 ENCLOSURES15 1. Military Comments - Germany16 2. Final List of Mil. Recommendations

17 DISTRIBUTION:

-1-SGM- -60 IPT 98/265

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'V/iïüSECRET.

EBCLOSURE 1Pages 1

MILITARY COMMENTS ON GERMANY

(Reproduce Annex I to SHAPE/106/60AG 21OO PROG (Germany), dtd 2 Sep 60)

-1- Enclosure 1SUM- -bO

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UE 1 The Standing Group has approved the following list of

2 military recommendations which it urges GermanyAlmplementImove- nearly

3 in order^to attain the requirements of MC 70 and standards of4 readiness of MC 55/1- These recommendations are listed in5 order of urgency without regard to service.

6 1. Increase the number of regulars and technicians.7 especially in the Army and the Air Force.

8 2. Increase the percentage of effectives in active units9 by means of an adequate number of special training units and a

10 longer period of national conscript service.

11 3. Provide the essential infrastructure facilities for12 permanent Army and Air Force SAS sites.

13 4. Provide the essential infrastructure facilities for14. Air Force SSM and SAM projects.

15 5* Provide the following training facilities;16 a. In conjunction with the Belgian authorities,17 a divisional training area at Elsenborn-Vogelsang or if18 this cannot be done, obtain equivalent training area19 elsewhere;20 b. Implement the Bitche-Ludwigswinkel project as21 a NATO training area or by bilateral arrangement with22 France.

23 6, Take all possible actions to Increase the rate of24 build-up of the Air Force.

-1- Enclosure 2SGM- -60 IPT 98/265

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ENCLOSURE 2Pages 1 - 2 , lncl.

FINAL LIST OF MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS

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i 7- Expedite the procurement or building of those fleet units not subject to future policy decisions.

8 . Expedite the provision of airfields and training facilities for naval air units.

9- Obtain basic equipment particularly mines, mining equipment, torpedo tubes and other items required to perform assigned naval missions.

10. Provide the essential facilities for storage of naval equipment, especially mines.

11. Provide the Army with sufficient non-organic combat and service support for sustained combat operations and balanced logistic support for the Army and Air Force.

-2- Enclosure 2IPT 98/265

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123

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L 'ATLANTIQUE-NORD✓ *

Standing Group .Groupe Permanent

SGM-5f*7~6OSeptember i960

Pages 1_________

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVESUBJECT:

Reference :

i960 Annual Review: Draft Military Portion of the Country Chapter and Country Summary Appraisal - GERMANY `SGM-4O4-6O

5 In accordance with paragraph 2 b of reference the Standing6 Group forwards herewith the draft military portion of/the7 Country Chapter and of the^Country Summary Appraisal^at8 Enclosures^2}andj^L^respectively.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

10 2 ENCLOSURES11 1. Draft Mil. Portion of Country Summary Appraisal12 2 . Draft Mil. Portion of Country Chapter

13 DISTRIBUTION:

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NATOSECRET,

DRAFT MILITARY PORTION OF THE COUNTRY SUMMARY APPRAISALON

GERMANY

1 1 . Although the rate of build-up of the German Armed2 Forces has not progressed as rapidly as expected, the3 improvements made and planned by the Federal Republi c of

4 Germany in the organization, equipment and training of its5 forces contributed to NATO are gratifying.

6 2. Some encouraging progress has been made on infrastructure7 during the past year. However, the current status of the land8 acquisition program is causing considerable concern. Limited9 progress has been made on facilities to be used by the US and10 Netherlands SAM units. There has, however, been virtually no11 progress on permanent facilities required by Belgium, France12 and Germany. The special ammunition storage facilities program,13 particularly as it relates to Type A storage, is virtually at14 a standstill.

15 3- Other serious problems which must be solved in order16 that the effectiveness of the German contribution to the NATO17 forces may continue to increase are shortages in junior officers,18 regulars, and technicians. In addition, compulsory service of19 12 months is considered inadequate.

20 4. Lack of suitable training areas and logistic facilities21 continues to impede the operational effectiveness of the German

ENCLOSURE 1Pages 1 - 2 , lncl.

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1 Armed Forces. It should be stressed, however, that these,- ■ „ V2 training and logistic difficulties can be overcome^with

3 the aid of other NATO nations.

4 5- The ARMY's intention to assign only fully combat-5 ready units Is expected to increase the combat effectiveness of6 the assigned units. The ground nuclear weapons plan of the7 German Army, contemplating the substltuion of additional HONEST8 JOHN launchers for LITTLE JOHN and LACROSSE^is noted. However,9 as more advanced nuclear ground delivery systems become available,

10 the German Army should ensure that its formations are adequately11 supported In terms of range and flexible fire power.

12 6. The NAVY's ship building programme has not progressed as13 had been anticipated. Existing shortfalls will not be corrected14 during the period under review.

15 7. There will be continued AIR FORCE shortfalls throughout16 the review period. The activation of German Air Force units17 will be primarily dependent upon the availability of aircraft18 and weapon systems.

19 8. In summary, during the period under review the20 capability of the German Armed Forces to carry out their wartime21 tasks will increase, though not as rapidly as had been hoped.

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DRAFT MILITARY PORTION OF THE COUNTRY CHAPTER ON GERMANY MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

ARMY1 1. (it Is requested that SGREP Insert at this point Army2 Force Tables and footnotes in accordance with paragraph 4 of3 SGM-4O4-6O.)

4 Organization and Equipment5 2. It is expected that the new plan of the Federal Republic6 of Germany to assign only fully combat-ready units and to7 establish special training units will increase the combat8 effectiveness of assigned units. As the time phasing shows a9 shortfall in the assignment of major units against the MC 7010 goals for 1961, 1962 and 1963, the urgent need for the11 accomplishment of the build-up of the German Army in the interest12 of the common defense is stressed.

13 3. The ground nuclear weapons plan of the German Army14 contemplating the substitution of additional HONEST JOHN15 launchers for LITTLE JOHN and LACROSSE^is noted. However, as16 more advanced ground nuclear delivery systems become available,17 the German Army should ensure that its formations are adequately18 supported in terms of range and flexible fire power. The nuclear19 capability of the German nuclear delivery units, as well as of20 those of the Allied Forces stationed in Germany, remains limited21 until permanent special ammunition storage sites can be provided.

ENCLOSURE 2Pages 1 - 7 . lncl.

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NATOf EC RET.

1 Training2 4. The lack of training areas is still a matter of serious3 concern. Continuing strenuous efforts to obtain training4 facilities for German army formations within Germany and/or5 within Allied countries through bilateral negotiations or MATO4 channels are encouraged. Specific reference is made to the5 Elsenborn-Vogelsang and Bitche-Ludwigswinkel training areas.

6 Personnel7 5- Although some improvement is evident in the manning8 level of assigned divisions, the manpower problem, especially the9 shortage of junior officers, trained NCOs, longer-serving10 volunteers and technicians, remains the most important to be11 overcome in the build-up and maintenance of combat effectiveness12 of the German Army. The efforts made by the Federal Republic of13 Germany to overcome this adverse situation are appreciated. The14 German authorities are urged to continue their efforts to increase15 the regular content of the Army.

16 6. With respect to length of conscript service, the17 studies and experience of the NATO military authorities indicate18 that a conscript only begins to pay a dividend in terms of useful19 service after 12 months training. It is therefore considered that20 18 months service is necessary for nations which depend on21 compulsory service for a significant proportion of their forces.

22 Logistics23 7. Although progress is significant in the build-up of the24 German Army with regard to modern equipment, some critical25 shortages still exist. It is stressed that reserve stocks of

Enclosure 2IPT 98/265

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1 equipment and ammunition should be built-up in phase with2 existing and planned forces and should be balanced. It is hoped3 that the current studies on the establishment of depots for the4 storage of war reserves may lead to a solutio'n of this serious5 problem. In addition, non-organic combat and service support6 at divisional level and above should be increased.

7 Conclusions8 8. During the period under review the German Army contri-9 bution will improve considerably in its ability to carry out its10 assigned missions. However, the German Army will not be fully11 capable until the following major deficiencies have been correct-12 ed:13 a. Inadequate number of regulars and technicians;14 b. Insufficient length of national conscript15 service;16 c. Inadequate nuclear capability due to delays in17 provision of permanent special ammunition storage18 facilities;19 d. Inadequate training areas and logistic facilities;20 e. Inadequate non-organic combat and service support;21 f. Inadequate balanced logistic support for sustained22 combat operations.

23 NAVY

24 9* (it is requested that SGREP insert at this point Navy25 Force Tables and footnotes according to paragraph 4 of26 SGM-4o4-6o .)

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1 Organization, Equipment and Training2 10. The ship building program has not progressed as3 rapidly as had been hoped. Obsolescence, therefore, continues to4 be a source of concern.

5 11. Existing shortfalls will not be corrected during the6 period under review. The plan of the German Navy to procure three7 LSTs especially for minelaylng is welcomed. The necessity for the8 early acquisition of these vessels in order to meet current9 mlnelaying plans is emphasized.

10 12. The lack of suitable air fields and training facilities11 for naval air units will delay their becoming fully operational.

12 1 3. The plan of the German Navy to include three missile13 carriers (MRBM) in the construction program is noted. Pending14 further discussion between the Federal Republic of Germany and15 NATO military authorities, comment on the German intention is16 withheld.

17 Personnel18 14. It is noted with satisfaction that the number of19 longer-serving volunteers is adequate and that, in general, NCO20 requirements are being met. The serious shortfall of junior21 officers remains a matter of concern.

22 Logistics23 1 5. The progress made in improving mobile logistic support24 could partially offset the effects of the delays in providing25 adequate depot storage facilities. Also, the Federal Republic of26 Germany1 s plans to provide a balanced 40/45 day stock level by27 1963 will overcome a ouvrent deficiency. Finally, although

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'MTOXCREl

1 improvement In procurement of Initial supply items of operational2 equipment Is noted, serious deficiencies remain in torpedo control,3 electronics, mines, and raining equipment.

4 Conclusions5 16. During the period under review, It is considered that6 the German Navy will achieve a moderate capability to fulfill Its7 wartime tasks. However, the German Navy will not be fully8 capable until the following major deficiencies have been9 corrected:10 a. Early acquisition of a specific minelaylng11 capability;12 b. Shortfalls and delays in ship construction;13 ç . Lack of storage facilities.

14 AIR FORCE

15 1 7. (it is requested that SGREP insert at this point Air16 Force Tables and footnotes according to paragraph 4 of17 SGM-4O4-6O.)

18 Organization, Training and Equipment19 1 8. The plan for the build-up of the German Air Force20 contains shortfalls at end 1963. One of the principal reasons is

r » / y

21 the delay in activating German Air Force units which is^due to22 the non-availability of aircraft and other weapon systems.23 ,is-hoped_that_gr.eater-progress-wi 1-1—be-made --in--the~actIva'tloh- of24 SAM-uni-tB—than“indi-cated~in-current^German~pTans\j

25 19. The progress of the German Air Force in the training26 field is encouraging. The training areas at DECIMOMANNU (Sardinia)

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1 and SOLENZARA (Corsica), and, later on, the NATO missile range2 will help the German Air Force in solving this major facet of3 its training problem.

4 Personnel5 20. Deficiencies in the personnel field still impair the6 effectiveness of the German Air Force, although some improvement7 has been made. In the near future personnel deficiencies,8 especially in the technical field, will limit seriously the9 effectiveness of existing and future units of the German Air10 Force.

11 Logistics12 21. The shortfalls in SAM facilities and special13 ammunition storage sites for both German and Allied nations*14 units impair the air defense posture of Germany and Western15 Europe.

16 22. Although the German Air Force still falls short of17 the combat readiness standard of MC 55/1, it is noted that the18 combat ready rate has decidedly improved during the past year.

19 2 3. The overall improvement of airfield ground equipment20 is noted, but deficiencies in certain critical items remain.21 Additional stocks planned for 196I should be provided by the22 earliest possible date, especially for all aircraft units which23 are operational. The achievement of more depth in the German24 Air Force logistics system by bilateral or multilateral25 agreements is strongly urged.

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Conclusions2 24. During the period under review the German Air Force3 will achieve a moderate capability to fulfill its wartime4 missions. However, the German Air Force cannot be considered5 fully capable until the following major deficiencies have been6 corrected:7 a. Shortages of regulars and technicians;8 b . Delay in provision of necessary supporting9 infrastructure facilities;10 c.. Non-availability of equipment required for11 activation of units, especially air defense units.

12

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MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS

25. The NATO Military Authorities' Recommendations, in the light of the foregoing considerations, are at Annex^2-«-9-^dh. tr _-to)

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