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Atlantic City Surveillance Atlantic City Surveillance Atlantic City Surveillance Atlantic City Surveillance NEWS! 2 Back To Basics: Atlantic City Surveillance Roots Issue Internet viewing on the World Game Protection Catwalk: http://www.worldgameprotection.com/archive/

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Atlantic City SurveillanceAtlantic City SurveillanceAtlantic City SurveillanceAtlantic City Surveillance NEWS!

2 Back To Basics: Atlantic City Surveillance Roots Issue

Internet viewing on the World Game Protection Catwalk:

http://www.worldgameprotection.com/archive/

Page 2: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

To order a copy use the following link:

http://www.pdce.net/calendar/PDsubmit.cfm

To order a copy use the following link:

http://www.pdce.net/calendar/PDsubmit.cfm

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By Trump Taj Mahal Surveillance Department We sit up above it all. We never have to hear it, smell it, or be a physical part of any of it if we so choose. I think it goes without saying; we have the best jobs in the casino industry. We have understanding management, talented staff members in the games, slots, and finance departments, experienced security employees and seasoned law enforcement officers that work together to tackle the challenges of our establishments. Over the years our surveillance teams have seen it all. The scams, thefts, fights, slip and falls, heart attacks and other illnesses, even suicides. Some are serious, some are humorous, some are bizarre, and some are really bizarre. After many years, the unexpected has become somewhat routine to us. Through our experiences, we have perfected the art of “honing” in on what odd behavior looks like from our vantage point. Review after review, the incidents we catch for the most part seem to take on a common behavior. Even though we do not necessarily catch all incidents as they are happening, the ability to Monday morning quarterback through video review helps us to develop ways to prevent future incidents as best we can. We have been instrumental in refining policies, inserting new and more fortified measures, training and re-training personnel as we learn the methods and behaviors of the newest scams. What happens when all of our collective experience fails to recognize the intentions of a truly twisted and motivated criminal? Could we have recognized it? Should we have recognized it? How do you come to terms with what happens when you don’t recognize it? Surveillance employees sit day to day, switching from camera to camera, watching the silent video as they scan the casino floor. In the midst of hundreds of patrons high fiving each other at a slot machine, knuckle punching to celebrate a blackjack, a security guard carrying a fill to a pit, floorpeople adding a rating to the system, cage cashiers converting gaming chips to cash, so many people are commingling, laughing, talking, and going about their daily business as we sit above and watch it all. That is exactly how we viewed the world until 3:45pm on May 27th of this year when everything changed. Our quiet day was interrupted by heightened security radio chatter. Someone was transmitting a plea for medical help in our card and dice storage room. Other security personnel were in pursuit of a suspect, possibly armed, and advising of the locations. It took a moment for us to realize, with sobering clarity, that all these radio transmissions were related. At that moment, experience kicked in to high gear as we began reviewing coverage to quickly piece together the past as it led up to the present devastating situation. The review and re-review, over and over made the surreal very real, as the

Editor’s Desk…

A Time to Reflect

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agony and shock of what took place set in. The surveillance staff fell silent towards each other as their hearts filled with grief. How? Why? It can’t be. It wasn’t a robbery, a car accident, a fluke. It was a cold and calculated murder of one of this industry’s most beloved employees, and it took place right under us.

THE SYSTEM WORKED As a result of the quick actions of all involved, State and local police acting on their active shooter protocol arrived and made the apprehension without further incident within four minutes of the shooting. Emergency medical services were on the scene just as fast. All actions were correct and perfect, and we have video evidence of it all. The final outcome is what went wrong. A stalker with a twisted mind saw an opportunity. He monitored his target’s movements all day, and when he saw fit with no behavioral warning, calmly and purposefully walked through a doorway in plain view and fired 3 shots at point blank range, mortally wounding Ray Kot, our casino shift manager, respected colleague, friend, husband and father. Surveillance technology has come so very far throughout our careers. We run to see the newest and best IP cameras that can query a system and locate a history of where a subject has been. Some cameras can tell if a gaming chip made its way to a dealer’s pocket and the float characteristics are different from one minute to the next. We work with algorithms, facial recognition, digital laser sharp DVD quality image capturing and playback. Lightning fast communication networks allow us to send information and photos of individuals suspected of wrongdoing. We wish a camera could have been developed to get into someone’s thought pattern (for ill purposes only…..please). We learned a very painful lesson that day. With every bit of technology and with every ounce of our experience and commitment to do our jobs effectively, we failed to protect what is most important to us. We learned that there is no way to protect against that. We view the casino floor with a completely different perspective now. Thanks to all of you who called to offer assistance, condolences, and kind words of support. Thank you to Mark Juliano, Trump CEO and Rosiland Krause, General Manager who helped the Taj Mahal family grieve with dignity and who continue to be committed to Ray Kot’s legacy and memory. Finally, to the Kot family, there are absolutely no words, just the deepest appreciation for the honor of knowing, working with, and loving a human being like Ray. Thank you Greg, Tony and the Borgata Surveillance Department for requesting we be a part of this issue, and for the great newsletter you put out there for everyone.

Mary J. Volturo, Director of Surveillance, Trump Taj Mahal Hotel and Casino Email: [email protected] Telephone: (609) 449-6702

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TheStandard.Com

Macau casino cheats nabbed Nickkita Lau, Friday, September 11, 2009

Macau police have arrested six mainlanders at Wynn Macau and seized 38 highly sophisticated counterfeit gaming chips, each with a face value of HK$10,000.

The five men and a woman, aged from 22 to

63, had successfully passed off 16 of the chips - implanted with microchips -dealers and infrared detectors on the gambling tables and made it all the way to the casino cage.

But they pushed their luck in trying to pass off the remaining 22 chips, by which time the chips were detected by a more delicate detector in the cage.

Casino staff using CCTV cameras found the suspects were still gambling. They were taken to the security room and arrested two hours later. Genuine Hong Kong banknotes and real chips totaling HK$210,000, which police believe they got from cashing the chips that included the 16 fake ones, were found on them.

The mainlanders arrived in Macau at about 4pm on Tuesday and immediately went to Wynn. They gambled on tables with the fake chips and collected real chips and cash in payoffsdelicate detector in the casino cage found the 16 fake chips, which contained lower6pm.

Police found 22 fake chips on the suspects, who came from Guangdong and Hubei. They will be charged with deception in gambling and participating in a syndicate. Chau WaiCriminal Investigation Department, said the fake csyndicate that has been active for no more than a month.

The syndicate hired so-called "drivers" to go to Macau casinos to cash in the fake chips. Police are now trying to determine if the syndicate deceived other casinos and whether other "drivers" are still being hired. The mastermind is still at large.

A Wynn Macau spokeswoman confirmed an attempt to cash in counterfeit gaming chips was detected on the spot, thanks to vigilant staff and the effectiveness of security technology. The casino refused to comment further as police investigations are continuing. It's not the first time Wynn Macau has been targeted by counterfeit criminals.

In March last year, a Zhejiang man commissioned an advertising companWynn chips and put them on fake chips. He managed to exchange 44 chips for HK$220,000. He was

ACSN National News: Torn from the Headlines

Macau casino cheats nabbed

Friday, September 11, 2009

Macau police have arrested six mainlanders at Wynn Macau and seized 38 highly sophisticated counterfeit gaming chips, each with a face value of HK$10,000.

The five men and a woman, aged from 22 to

63, had successfully passed off 16 of the chips - which fooled

dealers and infrared detectors on the gambling tables and made it all the way to the casino

But they pushed their luck in trying to pass off the remaining 22 chips, by which time the chips were

icate detector in the cage.

Casino staff using CCTV cameras found the suspects were still gambling. They were taken to the security room and arrested two hours later. Genuine Hong Kong banknotes and real chips totaling HK$210,000,

y got from cashing the chips that included the 16 fake ones, were found on them.

The mainlanders arrived in Macau at about 4pm on Tuesday and immediately went to Wynn. They gambled on tables with the fake chips and collected real chips and cash in payoffs before an expert using a more delicate detector in the casino cage found the 16 fake chips, which contained lower-value microchips, at

Police found 22 fake chips on the suspects, who came from Guangdong and Hubei. They will be charged with deception in gambling and participating in a syndicate. Chau Wai-kuong, head of the Judiciary Police Criminal Investigation Department, said the fake chips were probably produced in the mainland by a

has been active for no more than a month.

called "drivers" to go to Macau casinos to cash in the fake chips. Police are now trying to determine if

ived other casinos and whether other "drivers" are still being hired. The mastermind is still at large.

A Wynn Macau spokeswoman confirmed an attempt to cash in counterfeit gaming chips was detected on the spot, thanks to

ess of security technology. The casino refused to comment further as police investigations are continuing. It's not the first time Wynn Macau has been

In March last year, a Zhejiang man commissioned an advertising company to replicate the stickers on the Wynn chips and put them on fake chips. He managed to exchange 44 chips for HK$220,000. He was

ACSN National News: Torn from the Headlines

room and arrested two hours later. Genuine Hong Kong banknotes and real chips totaling HK$210,000, y got from cashing the chips that included the 16 fake ones, were found on them.

The mainlanders arrived in Macau at about 4pm on Tuesday and immediately went to Wynn. They gambled before an expert using a more

value microchips, at

Police found 22 fake chips on the suspects, who came from Guangdong and Hubei. They will be charged with kuong, head of the Judiciary Police

hips were probably produced in the mainland by a

y to replicate the stickers on the Wynn chips and put them on fake chips. He managed to exchange 44 chips for HK$220,000. He was

ACSN National News: Torn from the Headlines

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arrested two months later when he entered Macau again. Police seized 149 semi-completed chips and 444 HK$1,000 stickers.

Planet Hollywood poker scam nets arrests of four supervisors 9 September 2009

By Our Partners at the Las Vegas Sun

LAS VEGAS, Nevada -- Four Las Vegas Strip resort casino supervisors and managers have been charged in an alleged plot to take phony jackpot payoffs.

Nevada State Gaming Control Board investigators uncovered the scam at Planet Hollywood after months of investigation, said David Salas, deputy enforcement officer for the board.

Losses to Planet Hollywood are "in the thousands of dollars," and the investigation is continuing, Salas said.

The four men worked in Planet Hollywood's poker room, where "high hand" jackpots sweetened the payouts on 26 different hands, Salas said. If a person got one of those 26 hands, the player was to get a higher payment. But investigators said the four supervisors allegedly filled out false paperwork documenting that players had "high hands" when they didn't -- then they kept the additional money that would have gone to the card player.

It took three levels of documentation for the resort to pay a player for the special hands, Salas said. "These four were working in concert to generate false documents to embezzle their employer," Salas said.

Jonathan Sanner, Jason Peterson, Thomas R. Kordick, all of Las Vegas, and Scott Marshall of Henderson were arrested Aug. 21 by Gaming Control Board officers, Salas said.

The four are charged with crimes including forgery, embezzlement and conspiracy.

The Gaming Control Board began an investigation after another employee caught on to the scam and

became suspicious.

Barred from casinos, alleged scammers closer to trial 21 September 2009

By Our Partners at the Las Vegas Sun

LAS VEGAS, Nevada -- The case against three alleged casino scammers is one step closer to going to trial.

William Cushing, Michael McNeive and Susan Lewanda are accused of possessing a cheating device, conspiracy to cheat at gambling and use of a cheating device in a slot machine. The trio allegedly used the scam at several Las Vegas casinos, including Boulder Station and Fiesta Rancho, in 2006.

At a hearing this morning, District Court Judge Douglas Herndon said a trial date will be scheduled after the next status check and evidentiary hearing, which is set for Sept. 29.

Police reports indicate surveillance videos show Cushing and Lewanda would stand watch at slot machines while McNeive inserted $1 bills and forged them as $100 bills using the cheating device.

Cushing and McNeive are in Nevada's List of Excluded Persons, otherwise known as the Black Book, and are barred from the state's casinos.

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According to Gaming Control Board records, Cushing, 57, was first arrested in 1984 and has been arrested numerous times for gaming crimes in Nevada and other states. McNeive, 68, was first arrested by the Nevada Gaming Control Board in 1996 and has been arrested for gaming-related crimes, including cheating slot machines, numerous times.

The Black Book was created in 1960 to battle organized crime in Nevada casinos. People can only be removed from the list if they die or if the commission determines that they shouldn't have been listed. People on the list who enter a casino or any casino that knowingly allows an excluded person to enter face gross misdemeanor charges.

Barred from casinos, alleged scammers closer to trial is republished from CasinoCityTimes.com

Two charged in brazen A.C. heists 17 September 2009

ATLANTIC CITY, New Jersey -- As reported by The Philadelphia Inquirer: "The chips are down for two Georgia men who allegedly pulled off three brazen heists earlier this week at two Atlantic City casinos. The burglaries netted gaming chips worth more than $72,000, state police said. "A surveillance camera captured images of a man early Monday as he used a screwdriver to pry a locked glass security device off a Showboat Casino Hotel gaming table. "After removing the device, called a chip float, the man snatched $18,600 in chips that had been stowed underneath, a state police spokesman said.

"Early Tuesday morning, the same man with an accomplice struck twice at Caesar's, hitting closed gaming tables at 3:30 a.m. and again at 4:30 a.m. to pilfer a total of $53,550 in chips. "...(Richard) Newman, (55, of Lawrenceville, Ga) and Gustavo Acuna, 22, of Gainesville, Ga., were arrested without incident. Inside the Chrysler, police found $50,000 in chips and cash, and two stun guns. "Both men were charged with theft by unlawful taking, conspiracy to commit theft, money laundering, possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. They were being held today on $150,000 bail each at the Atlantic County Jail..."

CasinoCityTimes

Court reverses conviction in blackjack case HeartlandConnection.Com

10.7.09

DES MOINES, IOWA (AP) -- The Iowa Court of Appeals has reversed the conviction of a man accused of cheating at blackjack at a southeast Iowa casino. Mitchell Smith was convicted of

prohibited gaming activities for increasing his bet after seeing his cards at the Riverside Casino and Golf Resort in 2006.

In Wednesday's ruling, the court says the issue is whether a gambler who engages in this practice "claims, collects or takes an amount of money or thing of greater value than the amount won." Smith claims his chips reflected his actual winnings. The court says the state is seeking to rewrite the law as if to read, "of greater value than the amount legitimately

won." The court says that's a broader concept, and the court is not at liberty to expand the definition of the law.

(Copyright ©2009 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)

Page 9: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

[Year]

By Bruce E. Band

Former Principal Inspector,

New Jersey Casino Control Commission

It was the winter of 1978 when I first drove to Atlantic City for an interview with the New Jersey Casino Control Commission (CCC). I was to be interviewed by retired F.B.I. agent David Mullane who had just been named Chief Inspector for the CCC. I had just graduated from The George Washington University and was somewhat nervous for my first real job interview. I was sporting a fashionable full beard, which was popular for the time. During the interview, I felt I had all the answers to Mr. Mullane's probing questions. At the end I was walking towards the door, when he asked the one question that I never saw coming, he looked me straight in the eye and ask, how attached are you to that beard? I quickly responded, as close as I am to my razor! I was part of the second class of Inspectors hired in June of 1978. The first class had started in April of 1978 and was already working the busy casino floor of the newly opened Resorts International Casino Hotel. Because the first class was under staffed for the workload the State was in a hurry to get us onto the casino floor, we started on June 26th and they only provided us with three days of training, telling us we could learn on the job and that we did. I reported to Resorts on June 30th for my first shift.

During the first year, there was a line with a three-hour wait to get into the casino. Once you were inside you waited another three hours to get a space at a table or slot machine, it was a casino's owners dream and a regulatory nightmare, but the job was fun and exciting. Everything we did would set the foundation for the regulatory process of the future of gaming in New Jersey as well as other jurisdictions. We were lucky enough to work with a great group of people that helped all of us learn the industry.

I always felt that over the years I attended Casino University with professors named Billy Weinberger, Steve Hyde, Jimmy Tuthill Sr., John Pasqualoni, Rick Santoro, Tim Burke, Bill Pangoras, Betty Parker, Larry Mullin, Nick Moles, Joe Corbo, Roger Martel, Paul Mollo, Chris Ford, Bill Ambrosio, Danny Wright, Mike Schultz, Joe Fusco, Joe Lordi, Howard Dreitzer, Joe Lupo, Ken Condon, Liza Cartlidge, Paul Tjoumakaris, Rudy Prieto, Vicki Guveiyian, Paul Chandler, Jim Darcy, Dave Lyons, Dave Jonas, Dave Coskey, Bob Boughner, Auggie Cipollini, Tony Piccolo, Mike Santaniello, Tony Celona, Butch Witcher, Steve Venuto.

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At Resort's I was lucky enough to work with Bob Peloquin who headed up Intertel a world-renowned investigative firm made up of former F.B.I. and C.I.A agents. Intertel was owned by Resorts and ran their security and surveillance departments. Glenn Robinette, who was a former C.I.A. electronic expert, and was the one who installed the security system on Oliver North's home during the Iran Contra affair, Glenn worked for Intertel and took turns during the first year working as Resort's compliance officer. Jim "Bounce" Covert who taught me how to play craps, Pete Demas taught me a variety of other table games, as well as many others. What a great faculty! I owe a lot to that group they educated me in casino gaming. It was this first year that I started my interest with casino surveillance.

I grew up a little differently than most. My father, who I would describe as an adventurer, was in the Flying Tigers in World War II, later getting his law degree and joining the F.B.I. In the 1950's he joined the U.S. Department of State. His role was never clear, but as I got older, I realized that he worked for the U.S. intelligence agency. Our first overseas assignment was Saigon, Viet-Nam. We lived there from 1957 to early 1960; one of our family friends and my father's co-worker was Bill Colby who later became the Director of the C.I.A. Our next assignment was in Manila, Philippines for two and a half years, then off to Bangkok, Thailand. At the end of that assignment, my father was named Director of Economic Warfare for Viet-Nam at which point we had to head home, landing in Cape May, NJ where my grandparents lived. My father's time with the U.S. government ended as Director of International Investigations for the Agency for International Development. During these tours oversees it was not uncommon for my father to take my brother and me Tiger hunting or somewhere else out in the backcountry. Even though because of his work we had to be apart for long periods, I can say he was the biggest influence on my view of the world and along with my mother shaped who I am today.

Back in the early days, promotions were fast and furious. At the end of the first year, prior to Boardwalk Regency opening I was promoted to the Position of Senior Inspector. At the end of the next year, I was promoted to the position of Principal Inspector, a position I held until April 1, 2009. There is one Principal Inspector in charge of each casino property in Atlantic City, that overseas all aspects of the casino/hotel operations. We are relocated every two to three years to different properties. During my tenure with the CCC, I worked at all the casinos in Atlantic City and some that are not around anymore. During my years with the CCC, I had the privilege of working with some great people in the casino, especially on the surveillance end. Names like Chuck Barry, Greg Schaff, Bob Deissler, Mike Flemming, Kathy Gonzalez, Charlie Guenther, Monty Montgomery, Dave Norcutt, Phil Smith, Mary Volturo, Kevin Kelly, Tony Weiss, Tom Scott, Aloha Edwards, Mike Engler, Jim Friel, and Jim Matteo. Without all these people as well as many others, I would have never received a proper surveillance education. I am truly lucky.

While with the CCC a good portion of my work expertise surrounded casino surveillance and security issues. I helped write the current surveillance regulations, as well as our security and surveillance guidelines (do not hold that against me!). Kidding aside, we always tried to make sure that the surveillance and security would maintain the staff and get the equipment they

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needed to operate first class departments, which is not an easy task in this industry. When I left the CCC, I was the last of the first two groups of Inspectors to leave the CCC. While the Commission has lost many of its innovators, such as Denis Kell, there are still some great people working to make the industry better, using their extensive knowledge to help the industry through these tough times. There are Principal Inspectors like Carolynne Pfeifer, Joe Papp, Bruce Ladd, Laurie Amaino, Bob Hanley, and Bill Perry who offer decades of experience to the casinos they are assigned. I urge the industry to take advantage of their knowledge while they are still with the CCC.

Over my thirty plus years, I have seen a lot of changes in surveillance. When I started many departments would use staff working the catwalks above the casino floor, as well as those working the ever so slow moving cameras in the CCTV monitor room. VHS tape was king and no one had a PC or knew what one was. Now many of the departments have made the transformation to the digital age for all their recording needs, catwalks are no longer required and cameras are not only high speed, but high resolution as well. Each department in Atlantic City is now required to have access to all the credit files, slot information systems, table games systems, and any other system used in the casino. We have seen many departments invest in card counting programs, Pai Gow tile programs and so on to help their staffs stay on top of the vast changes that are occurring in the industry. Many of the departments have made investments in Biometrica systems, or other programs that share information. The tools to assist those in the surveillance industry are changing rapidly.

I left the CCC this year to start a new challenge. I took a position with a software company called 21st Century Systems, Inc or 21CSI ( www.21csi.com ). The company is a software company that mostly does programs for the Department of Defense, Home Land Security, and other Agencies. I was hired to get their software into the casino industry. We are working with Borgata to fine tune some of our products for casino use. The first product we will be working on is a highly sophisticated search engine designed for casino surveillance and security departments based on our Webster-Ace program. The program does non-obvious relationship searches and data mining. The data searched are numerous databases that the casino uses in all areas of their building, as well as numerous gaming related internet sites, law enforcement sites, gaming regulatory sites, etc. These are sites that you may currently search individually, however they will be able to complete it with a single search. The program will also match non-obvious information, such as two or more people that share the same phone number, address, as well as other matchable data. You will be able to share information with other subscribers to the service, and search our information database that will grow with every new member. This type of software will be the next new wave of surveillance/security products that will revolutionize the industry. Where this new path will lead me, nobody knows, but it does allow me to stay in contact with the industry and people I love.

Bruce E. Band

[email protected] (609) 770-3619

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I remember taking my first surveillance job in the early 1990’s after working as a dealer for years. I was placed on grave shift to earn my stripes. Each Saturday I would anticipate the surveillance director stopping in to check on the shift as he was working late on a busy weekend night. Every attempt was made to question the director and obtain as much information and knowledge as possible. Unfortunately, he eventually moved on and I never had an opportunity to get the conversations on paper.

Here is my opportunity to avoid history repeating itself as Greg Schaaf, surveillance director of the Borgata Surveillance Department was gracious enough to accept my invitation to answer all of the questions I could think of to motivate and inspire the next wave of talent in our community. It helped to get the interview knowing Greg is a captive audience as I see him every day in the trenches. With that being said, “Thanks boss for allowing me to trap you for the interview!”

ACSN: Let’s start off the interview with a question regarding a word that I have never heard used concerning casino surveillance prior to meeting you. You have on several occasions talked about a legacy in surveillance. Your thought process was that each day is an opportunity to apply your craft and do great things that add to your legacy as surveillance professionals. Could you elaborate on this a little?

Greg Schaaf: If this is your chosen profession, be the best you can be. Make a difference. Each day is filled

with opportunities, take advantage of them. I was fortunate to realize this is the direction I wanted to

take since I was 23; twenty four years later, I have never been more excited about surveillance and the

opportunities to impact the operation and the surveillance community. I am confident that each day I

enter the surveillance operation I may have a positive effect on something or someone. Having a

wonderful family, I feel it is critical that my time away (at work) needs to be truly relevant. We are

fortunate to be in an arena that provides an environment to be creative, pro-active and productive. Our

The Building Blocks of Success Interview:

A Q&A with Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa Surveillance Director Greg Schaaf

By Tony Weiss ACSN

Page 13: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

staff is exceptional, so developing a positive work environment where associates can excel is a

responsibility I take very seriously.

In my opinion, surveillance has never been more critical to a casino operation. By taking advantage of

the enhanced digital technology and utilizing all the available IT systems and programs, surveillance has

the ability to directly affect each aspect of the overall property. We all should strive to enhance our scope

of work and areas that we can positively affect.

A thought I refer to regularly is: my 11 year old son asks me how my day was, I would never want to be

perceived with “Great, I really got over on them and kind of stole my paycheck”. We all have a

responsibility to our co-workers and family to “give it your best shot each and every day”. Life is full of

choices; select a career path that will make you happy and satisfied.

ACSN: Perhaps the easiest practice to increase productivity may be the most difficult. Motivation and creating a positive work environment by treating the staff with respect, sending positive messages and fashioning opportunities for the staff to excel with each member being made to feel their contribution matters. Could you talk about the amount of effort it takes to live this philosophy?

GS: If you believe in it, not much at all. You want to develop a staff that you can go to battle with. I

strongly believe in explaining the department’s operational philosophy during the interview stage. Each

surveillance operation is different and you want the right fit for both the needs of the department and

the needs of the surveillance associates. Each director should establish high standards for the operation

and have realistic but challenging expectation of each staff member. With that being said, you must

create an environment where each associate takes ownership in their responsibilities and are given the

tools to succeed. Each department’s greatest asset is its personnel. As a leader you must create an

environment where each associate has the opportunity to create a balance between their professional

and personal life. To be truly successful in life, this is an art we must all master. With all the challenges

both inside and outside of work, creating a positive work environment is critical; and open

communication and leaving your ego at the door is essential.

Developing a solid operational philosophy is key to any department’s success. As you marry this with

quality personnel and the proper equipment and tools, you “stack the deck” in your favor. A solid

operational philosophy should be utilized as the basis for each management decision and how day-to-

day activities are handled. The plan should be well thought out and include each aspect of the complex

surveillance operations of today. These three key factors (pro-active operational philosophy, quality

personnel and the appropriate equipment/tools) can only be accomplished with the support of executive

management.

ACSN: Legendary world class blackjack advantage player Tommy Hyland is quoted in the blackjack hall of fame stating, “If someone told me I could make $10 million a year working for a casino, I wouldn’t even consider it. It wouldn’t take me five minutes to turn it down … I don’t like casinos. I don’t like how they ruin people’s lives. I don’t think the employment they provide is a worthwhile thing for those people. They’re taking people that could be contributing to society and making them do a job that has no

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redeeming social value.” The first few questions covered both legacy and job satisfaction in our chosen industry. How do you feel about the above statement?

GS: I do not concur but respect his opinion. He has risen to the top of his chosen profession through hard

work and taking advantage of each opportunity presented to him. This mirrors my approach to my

career: A plan to work on taking full advantage of each professional opportunity. Life is filled with

choices. I have found my career in the casino industry to be very challenging, stimulating and rewarding.

My position has afforded me the opportunity to develop a great balance in both my personal and

professional life. As happiness is a choice and we all deserve to be happy identifying the proper career

path for you is critical. I have been given the opportunity to utilize my education and work in multiple

jurisdictions throughout the country. Each jurisdiction and culture has provided a unique outlook on life

and the gaming industry.

Regarding the opinion of having no redeeming value, I have had the pleasure to be surrounded by not

only excellent “casino people”, but exceptional individuals. Many of my peers and co-workers in the

industry are coaches, mentors, big brothers/big sisters, great parents and active members of their

communities. They have made a difference in the lives of many. The casinos themselves are active

contributing members of the community through blood drives, breast cancer awareness, contribution

and organizations such as the Heart & Soul Foundation.

ACSN: Let’s talk about the surveillance concept of working for the casino as an all inclusive “service tool”. We are in an environment where surveillance must understand the entire casino operation. We must understand the “letters” and “numbers” of the business. EBITDA (Earnings before interest expense, income tax expense, depreciation and amortization expenses), ROI (Return on Investment) and MGR (Master Gaming Report) totals have impact on either a redredredred or blackblackblackblack number each and every gaming day. Is each area and department as important to the bottom line as the next? How does surveillance determine where it should be concentrating its efforts?

GS: Each department must evaluate its operational philosophy, capabilities and needs of the property. A

successful operation will then develop a “roadmap for success”. You must utilize the department’s

expertise, tools and personnel to positively affect all gaming related departments. Each associate must

be one of the many moving parts to successfully achieve the property’s goals and meet the daily

challenges. You must slice up each shift to handle various responsibilities (finance, table games, slots,

security, risk management, etc.) of the property to keep a complex operation moving in a positive

direction. Heavy concentration must be placed on time management to ensure the property’s needs are

being met.

With the many high tech tools at the surveillance department’s disposal, it is only rational to take a pro-

active approach to analysis and enhanced productivity. We all must look at removing the “glass ceilings”

we place on ourselves. There are opportunities in each phone call, incident and in the available numbers.

ACSN: The strength to allow your leaders to grow and lead is a basic military concept that is not always practiced in the private business sector. It takes an extremely confident manager to hire staff with ability to not only do their job, but do the job of their direct report as well. Does this concept allow you as a

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surveillance director the freedom to excel beyond your defined role within the organization and exceed expectations?

GS: Absolutely. Each surveillance professional possesses a particular skill set. The goal of a director is to

put together a management team with diverse skill sets. I am comfortable with my particular skill set

and am aware of areas that require development. Hiring managers with diverse skill sets enable our

operation to be extremely effective as a myriad of areas can be reviewed and evaluated. Through this

process we can enhance the expectations of each department on property (both traditional and non-

traditional gaming departments). Each manager is given the freedom to do their job effectively; but also

have a clear understanding that with freedom comes responsibilities. They are all challenged with goals

and expectations to excel and develop. Each surveillance professional should be trained and developed to

successfully operate as a manger and/or director. As a director I have a serious responsibility to prepare

each associate to be highly successful in whatever challenge or opportunity comes their way.

ACSN: When a new casino development reaches completion it brings a renewed energy to the market. This is a good thing for all the casinos in town. What are your thoughts regarding the economic health of the Atlantic City gaming market? How does Revel infuse a positive shot in the arm to the region?

GS: AC is down but far from out. I believe Revel will provide positive energy to Atlantic City’s landscape,

perception and marketing approach. There are many highly intelligent and innovative individuals in and

around the AC Gaming Industry. They have billions of dollars worth of capital investment, a great

location and the Jersey shore to capitalize on. AC must re-invent itself. It will require a community effort

by the city, state and industry. Being a Jersey Guy, I believe we are up for the challenge.

ACSN: Let’s get your thoughts on communication tools such as ACSN, Charlie Guenther’s original concept of the Northeast Casino Network mail list and its possibilities and the NE Director’s Conference?

GS: Responsible communication is critical in the surveillance community. We are one of the few areas in

the industry where there is no direct competition. Each Surveillance Department operates under their

own operational philosophy, but we all face common challenges and threats. Sharing vital information

can assist each operation in combating the ever changing face of crime and threats. Being an island is

counterproductive. We can all learn from each other. Each communication is an opportunity (we should

all put our egos aside and pick-up the phone). The only scams in print are the ones that are complete

and/or were caught. The advancement of technology is far outpacing the proper security measures that

are put in place.

Our community is populated with highly intelligent, creative and self-motivated professionals.

Involvement in Conferences (such as Willy Allison’s World Game Protection Conference and the

Northeast Surveillance Director’s Conference) presents unique opportunities to teach, learn and network.

My own operational development has evolved greatly through my many long conversations with my

peers at these events.

Our involvement in the Atlantic City Surveillance News and the Northeast Casino Surveillance Network

has opened many doors to our staff and operation. Through responsible communication we have worked

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on multi-jurisdictional cases which have posed a threat to us all; we have successfully prepared our

operation for new threats; opened lines of positive communication within our own jurisdiction and met

many great people along the way.

ACSN: Finally, for every hard working person who reports to work each day and works in a department other than surveillance, could you define surveillance and our ultimate goal?

GS: To be a support tool to management (providing them with detailed and appropriate information to

afford them the opportunity to make a well informed management decision) and to protect the integrity

of the operation and its assets. Each surveillance department has the responsibility of ensuring the

regulatory requirements and the company’s policies are adhered to. Today’s surveillance department

enjoys great tools and great personnel. We must find ways to properly take advantage of each

opportunity. Each call, request and inquiry is an opportunity. Surveillance is more than a necessary evil.

In this day and age, the surveillance team can be effectively utilized for developing a true understanding

of the property’s efficiencies, revenue streams, legitimacy of each incident or activity, asset protection

and integrity.

Each surveillance operation must understand the complexities of the regulatory requirements and the

mission of the property. I have fortunately found my mentor in the CEO of our Property. A professional

relationship has developed where open communication is essential. Being a member of the Boyd

Gaming Management team, “I get it”. Developing a true understanding of the property and the

surveillance department’s responsibilities to the integrity of the operation lays the foundation for the

Department’s operational philosophy and decision making process. Development of an “Integrity is

everything” approach has created the groundwork for us to meet each challenge in a responsible manner

and provide the environment to be positive, pro-active and professional.

“I am confident that each day I enter the surveillance operation I may have a positive effect on

something or someone” Greg Schaaf, Borgata Surveillance Director

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Is it possible that 23:59 hours of each day, 365 days a year potential large sums of revenue is completely unaccounted for within a successful casino? This investigative report will detail the need for surveillance analysis regarding table games grind.

To simplify the scenario we note that a dealer takes in $80 on a blackjack game and the player eventually loses without requesting to be rated. The dealer is taught not to have the initial transaction approved at the supervisory level as it is under $100. The supervisor doesn’t rate the play and the $80 sits in the drop box until it is eventually counted and added to the official gaming report total for the gaming date. If you take into consideration that these types of transactions occur from the very beginning of the gaming day, it is amazing that the unrated currency which is known as “grind” money totals up to tens of millions of dollars per year.

This information leads to so many areas of concern. Table Games, security and the count room all have access to the grind money at some point within each gaming day. We will detail many of the concerns that have been noted over the years and explain how to investigate and analyze the information that could save your operation potential millions of dollars.

The days of little clip boards hanging off the side of the gaming tables utilized to document the player’s ratings and then taken to a pit clerk to enter each individual rating into the system are long gone. Casino software programs have replaced data entry clerks and rating cards. We now utilize touch screen rating systems that allow multiple open ended games to be rated at the same time by a single table games supervisor. Each rating ends up as part of the history of the game

An ACSN Exclusive by Russ Schellhas

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for the day. Categories such as the ratings of cash and markers can be compared to the actual totals attributed to the game once all of the paperwork and currency is tallied in soft count.

We will drill down on each area to show how all of this data at surveillance’s disposal can lead you to discovering holes in the system. The following examples could be an area of concern at your casino:

The negative hold aspect of the casinos table games has been at the forefront of many reviews by Surveillance leading to concerns from both executive and casino management. These investigations include advantage players on the table, wins and rating efficiency, false rating by an employee for the purpose of justifying the rack and finally internal theft at the table or a possible dealer agent scam taking place.

The unaccounted for cash or “Grind” as many people in the industry call it, is a wide open area and one that has not been considered regarding investigations of negative holds on the games. This program will show how you can keep a better eye on the grind money and know when a red flag emerges within the data report assessments.

Another segment of the investigation regards rating errors that lead to over-comping. The reviews have shown that the rated cash, time of play and even the average bet are incorrect at times. The numbers all have an effect on the theoretical calculations used for determining comps. If you have the support of your executive team and professionally present the information to casino operations management, it can have a major impact on the bottom line. Yes, surveillance is a revenue generating department.

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Table Actual Win Actual Cash Rated Win Rated Cash

BJ-101 $44,996 $41,785 $39,550 $35,115

BJ-102 $20,500 $15,500 $50,500 $45,500

BJ-103 $23,780 $26,550 $26,750 $29,450

BJ-104 $25,350 $28,250 $28,600 $31,150

BJ-105 $29,150 $32,525 $32,634 $35,465

BJ-106 $84,235 $82,385 $80,630 $78,020

BJ-107 $50,250 $68,150 $70,350 $65,200

BJ-108 $60,780 $29,450 $30,550 $25,150

BJ-109 $22,185 $45,680 $20,150 $15,250

BJ-110 $43,150 $50,185 $42,050 $20,290

BJ-111 $55,925 $60,250 $25,780 $30,650

BJ-112 $29,110 $25,950 $59,725 $55,650

BJ-114 $60,250 $45,150 $30,750 $43,450

BJ-115 $30,350 $42,650 $60,780 $39,365

Let’s take a look at a typical generic ratings screen for a blackjack pit. Our goal is to review the rated play versus the actual play. The four areas that are shown will give you the variables that you can review for discrepancies.

The needle in the haystack that we are looking for is any situation where the supervisor has rated more cash/win than was actually counted in the drop box. Below are examples of the possible reasons for a variable as compared to other games.

� BJ-101 and BJ-106 is good ratings with reasonable variables shown.

� BJ-102 both the rated cash and rated win dropped by $30k in the actual cash and actual win. This area can be a concern in three ways, first a player can be rated with a $30k higher cash buy in and win. The second would be a theft of cash from the drop box during the table cash box pick up. The third would be a theft of cash in the soft count process.

� BJ103, BJ-104 & BJ-105 all have overstated cash. That amount of cash is a direct relationship to the drop in win for that table for the day. If it was just one rating showing up like this, it may be a bad rating by the floor or maybe a false rating for a friend. But

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with three ratings showing up all next to each other and possibly all rated by the same floor on one shift. A big area of concern would be a large scale rating scam by a particular floor person.

� BJ-107 the rated cash and actual cash are at a good variable, but the actual win has dropped by $20k. This variable has six concerns; one is just an overstated rated win to a player by the floor. The second is a possible theft of gaming chips at the table. The third is a problem with a fill incorrectly stated in the table inventory. The fourth is a theft of gaming chips from a fill. The fifth is a fill sent out incorrectly and the sixth is an understated table closer.

� BJ-108 this table had a reasonable variable in the cash but had a $30k increase in the rated win. This is possibly a player understated rated loss by $30k, a fill incorrectly stated in the inventory or an overstated table closer.

� BJ-109 has a reasonable actual win over the rated win but the actual cash has increased by $30k. This is an extreme example of missed or unrated cash buy- in.

� BJ-110 has a reasonable actual win over the rated win but the actual cash has dropped by $30k. This is an extreme example of overrated cash buy-ins or a large amount of refused name play for the day at that table.

� BJ-111 has an increase of $30k in both the cash and win. This is an example of a possible $30k missed buy in along with a possible $30k underrated player loss.

� BJ-111 & BJ-112 one game has an increase in the cash and win and the other has a decrease in the rated cash and win and the amount is the same for both games at $30k. The two games shown like this combined could be a problem of possible mixed cash during the soft count process.

� BJ-114 & BJ-115 combined has a rated versus actual cash variable that is good at both tables but one table has a $30k drop in win and the other has a $30k rise in the win. This problem could be a result of a fill being put on the wrong game and the fill slip dropped on the right game.

One thing to keep in mind when assessing the hold percentage of a game, a good hold is not always a reason to think that all is well with the game regarding the true counted drop for the game. The variables within this program will shed a different light on that misconception.

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VASAR is tool developed by Borgata Surveillance that casino surveillance personnel can use to analyze any given game or location. The method will allow you to determine if a variable is a constant fluctuating aspect that is just inherent to the day to day operations of that game or location. The system will also allow you to see if a inconsistency is connected by other means that would directly affect the integrity and/or the monetary return of that game.

� Variable – Examining any portion of the associated bits of information noted between the rated versus actual cash and win.

� Associated - How you group or compare the information together. The information grouped is your type of variable, the table type and the pit. All this information shown in your table detail will show you what direction to start your investigation.

� Schematic – A blueprint you use that allows you to quickly evaluate any given variable creating a point to start your investigation. These blueprints can be as simple as comparing the rated versus the actual, to formatting a spreadsheet that details more in-depth information.

� Asset - Your table and player rating details that give you all this information.

� Recognition - Your final result to the investigation and what has happened as a result.

This entire process with the blueprint can be used in a much larger format to create a spreadsheet to evaluate a certain game or series of games in a pit for a certain day or over an extended period of time to validate the performance of the casino floor. The numbers can be broken down and percentages applied to evaluate all the data and present it in a way that both Casino Operations and Marketing achieve optimal profits based on true ratings. Surveillance will ultimately drive the bottom line as well as uncovering potential internal and external financial and criminal threats.

Russ Schellhas is a 12 year casino surveillance associate who currently works in the surveillance department

at Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa. He has developed these theories over the course of his career.

ACSN thanks Russ for his contribution and all of the potential V.A.S.A.R. has to protect assets

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With the migration of analog systems to digital applications, surveillance departments must change their policies and procedures relevant to the security of evidence. Evidence must be validated. In the digital world, validation requires verification from the digital domain where the evidence was created, processed and transferred, including the evidence file. Electronic evidence is information of value related to a broad range of devices and data formats. A formal definition is difficult but generally accepted as information in digital form that has some probative value.

Digital evidence is often considered superior to analog or conventional paper evidence, being easier to locate and process, key details and quick access such as date/time and history of file. Digital is persistent because of the consistent recording and history of a file not previously available in analog form. The outcome of a case will rely on evidence that proves or disapproves the legal argument. Evidence is mapped by a timeline of reconstructed events. The question becomes: Can enough evidence be located and can the validity of the evidence be satisfactorily described and determined? My legal experience is certainly questionable, but a case can collapse if the defense can show the security integrity of the network, contamination or potential for alteration of digital evidence is suspect. If it can be shown that unskilled use is made of the digital evidence unanticipated and often-detrimental outcomes can result. It is very frustrating to have what appears to be clear and convincing evidence thrown out because it can be shown there are integrity issues, the network is defective, or there is potential of alteration of the digital evidence it is supposed to protect. If the validity of the evidence can be established, its weight in legal argument is enhanced. If the validity is uncertain then its weight in evidence is diminished or negated. Digital evidence is much more complex, susceptible to manipulation and alteration, more so than conventional analog. Such manipulation may not be evident, therefore more susceptible to questions of validity. A step-by-step process should be integrated into the evidence gathering, saving and storage. Research, trial and error resulted in a five-step approach for our procedures:

By Robert Deissler, Surveillance Director Harrah’s Resort Casino, Atlantic City

Processing Digital Evidence

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Step 1 - Locate the Evidence

This is the information gathering stage. Collecting specific data such as date

and time, locations and descriptions. Then search and identify the recorded video and provide support to the observed or reported activity.

Step 2 - Select the Evidence

This is the investigative stage. Although the 1st stage may be thought of as

investigative, it is not. Once video has been located, the video must be scrutinized to determine what events/activities occurred in the digital evidence and the significance and value it has to the case in question.

Step 3 - Preserve the Evidence

Once the digital evidence has been investigated, the selected evidence is to be

saved. Preserving the evidence stabilizes and isolates the evidence to prevent loss and contamination. Preserving the evidence with set and specific procedures prevents any question to its admissibility and weight in court.

Step 4 - Validate the Evidence

The evidence has been selected and preserved. Now it must be tested to

determine validity. Basically, can the evidence be authenticated to allow an assertion to be drawn from the digital evidence? During this stage the team can also revisit the selection and preservation stages to review overall evidence, research any new leads. The incomplete scrutiny of evidence, failure to validate digital evidence can result in a detrimental outcome.

Step 5 - Secure Evidence/Chain of Custody

Proof of custody and the dissemination of evidence will be introduced and

questioned in court. A person may be required to testify to any one of the following: Testimony that evidence is what it purports to be, testimony of continuous possession by each individual who has had possession from time it was seized until time it is presented in court, testimony by person who had possession that the evidence remained in substantially the same condition from the moment one person took possession until the moment person released evidence into custody of another. This chain of custody lays a foundation for the evidence by showing absence of alteration, substitution or change in condition. As analog systems are migrated to digital, procedures for the security of evidence must be revised. Digital evidence must be secured in a way to leave no question to its validity. Internal controls to safeguard this evidence must be detailed to eliminate the potential for methods to be questioned and to provide testimony in a skilled and detailed manner.

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By Dan Eitner, Surveillance Director of “The Venetian, Las Vegas”

Ever since I can remember I wanted to be in Law-Enforcement; “To protect and Serve…” and of

course…all the (paid) adrenalin-injected Action! The hunger for that Action is not something I

can really explain; it was simply bigger than me, a passion. But instead I joined the Marine Corps

when I was 19. Four years later I got my first Casino job in Atlantic City, New Jersey at Resorts

International Casino circa 1987, as a Security Officer. This is where I experienced a lot of old-

school education one can encounter in the Private Sector, from a few of the toughest retired

cops and veteran SOB’s around, my bosses that is, but for me, it was the closest path to Law-

Enforcement and being an officer at that time afforded me absolute, priceless Action. I was

growing up and already, thanks to 4 years of Marine instruction, I was totally driven to succeed.

Not sure where I would end up, but I knew it would be good, and I went after it with stubborn

determination. This, of course, was a far cry from my teenage years when I spent my time

making my parents mature prematurely.

My penchant for observation, street-smarts and common sense allowed me to excel as an

Officer. I took it very seriously; spotting all prior thieves, cheats, card-counters and coupled with

my natural fearlessness (a youthful affliction), I absorbed the smallest marks anywhere and

everywhere. Before long my knack for detail was noticed by the personal assistant to the

Resorts’ Surveillance Director, he soon understood that my talents would better serve me, and

the casino, behind a monitor…and I‘ve been hooked ever since; I finally found the action I was

“From Atlantic City Surveillance to Worldwide System Design”

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searching for. Then Surveillance Shift Manager Greg Schaaf took me under his wing and gave

me the extensive training I needed to excel as a surveillance agent. I was promoted to Shift

Manager in a year and a half and by ’92, I became a Surveillance Director for the Biloxi Belle

Casino in Biloxi, MS. The promotion in my career was great since Surveillance was now not only

a career path but a huge part of who I am and who I will always be. So the sacrifice of moving

all the way from the East Coast to Mississippi for the Director’s job was not something I was

afraid to do, taking risks in order to shine in the field became par for the course. My new post

allowed me to oversee daily operations for Biloxi Belle in Biloxi and the Southern Belle in Tunica,

MS. In the two years I was there I began to learn the technical side of Surveillance. Technical

and business acumen paid off every time. I began to single handedly design, install and manage

surveillance systems for both Casinos. I’m at times teased by my crew to be the highest paid

tech on the Strip. In any case, the combination gave me more confidence in my potential and

more control; I had to be the best at both. So aside from all the Self-learning, being in MS. was

when I began taking risks and the initiative to teach myself as much as I could and that,

doubtlessly, I was certain, would escort me far. And it did. To Mother-ship, Vegas.

In ’94 I was offered the Director position at State Line, overseeing the 3 properties of

Primadonna Resorts; Buffalo Bills, Whiskey Pete’s and the Primadonna. This was a whole new

playing field, and though it wasn’t the Strip or even Downtown, the industry was far more

“grown-up” here as far as the money, opportunity and crash course introduction to the height of

crime that Vegas sometimes avails by its very nature, though for me, it was action that just kept

getting better and better. A long way from Biloxi. Furthermore, all 3 hotels needed a lot of work

and were rampant with inside corruption and abuse of position and of company assets,

something that was first on my honey-do-list of rectifying and one of the main reasons I was

hired; my reputation was growing for my honesty and taking care of business wherever it was

needed. The second was the condition of the Surveillance System, which I methodically

overhauled and re-designed. Then in ’98 somebody mentioned my name to a VP of a casino that

was just being built, one of the most ambitious joints on the Las Vegas Strip, it was being raised

on the on the old Sands lot; Las Vegas Sands’ Venetian Hotel Resort.

It is now the world renowned Venetian/Palazzo- in

which I have had more than a hand in design and

installation of the Surveillance System. Two years ago,

I designed, from scratch, the entire system for the

Palazzo Hotel Resort. With little respite, I then began

designing the surveillance system for the Sands’ next

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venture, Sands Bethworks in Bethlehem, PA. and managing its system installation, the daily

operations, of which I oversee, as well as being deeply involved in implementing Policies and

Procedures and assisting in the openings of all three and those of Sands’ two Resorts in China,

Venetian Macau and Sands Macau. Being in charge of designing the systems for many of Sands

Surveillance Systems has pushed me to become self proficient, and again self taught, in Auto

Cad Architecture. Though I am not finished learning, being so ingrained in the

Casino/Surveillance/Technical Design and overseeing installations, continuously, I know that I

have learned very much, with the help and confidence from gracious and influential people, and

a lot due to my tireless need to always pursue the next evolution in the business and being

compelled to teach myself and stay progressive.

I have been a part of the Sands Corporation for 11 years and that has both personally and

professionally proven to be extremely challenging, but without a doubt, very rewarding, my

biggest break and biggest reward yet. I hope to become Vice President of Surveillance

Operations one day, and I know I will. I am proud of all the risks I have ever taken because they

have all brought me here. I have no regrets about my place here or anything I’ve achieved since

being a part of it. My position now continues to challenge and teach me new things every single

day, it is truly the longest way from my modest beginnings as a young, cocky Security Officer in

Atlantic City, to the Director of Surveillance in one of the most powerful Las-Vegas Corporations.

I never feel that I’m done. And I hope I never do.

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[Year]

Taking a Good Look Security Perspective on Surveillance

By Apryl Donnelly,

Security Investigator, Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa

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State of the art is hard to define these days with the rapid growth of technology.

It is evident however, that even the best equipment is only as good as its

operators. At the Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa, it is the dedication behind the

cameras and the actions carried out by responding personnel that brings us

great success.

On a busy night in the peak of our summer season, a very concerned customer

reported to Security that her $700.00 slot voucher had been stolen. A more than

familiar scenario was described: “I just walked away from my machine for a

minute to try to find my husband and when I returned my voucher was gone.”

Although a debate still continues regarding “unattended” property, the “Takers”

in these cases are not always from the criminal element. There are some people

who can rationalize the notion “Finder’s keepers, loser’s weepers”. Yet thanks to

our Eye in the Sky and Security duo, we are declaring “Finders weepers, loser’s

keepers.” Immediate notification, Surveillance review and careful dialogue all

proved positive and the “Taker” in this case was located, informed of the

situation and the victim was handed back the $700.00. Within the hour our very

concerned customer was transformed into a very satisfied customer and had

returned to the slots to gamble.

The percentage of returned property continues to be on the rise. According to

Borgata Security Director Michael J. Schultz, Security receives customer

appreciation feedback, both verbal and in writing, regarding recovered

property.

Quick, clear review of incidents, accidents and criminal activity has been well

worth the investment. Even more evident, maintaining qualified, reliable

associates and positive working rapport between the Surveillance and Security

Departments is perhaps our greatest asset.

What is it that brings Surveillance to the above and beyond approach?

Surveillance Operator Francis Hauser, who has over twenty-five years of casino

experience and three and a half years with Borgata, explains, “When you call

up, you are our customer.” Hauser gives great credit to his Director, Greg

Schaaf, and the philosophy that when Surveillance produces a product, be it a

report, a DVD, whatever the request is, the goal is to produce an accurate, high

quality product.

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Hauser also applauds the equipment: “Our response time now, with the new

system, I can probably do the review while you’re still on the phone” (Hauser is

referring to a new digital recording system) and believes that a combination of

experience and intuition contributes to achievement, claiming “Experience

sparks your intuition.”

Hauser feels that the rapport between Surveillance and Security has improved

over the years and likes the “enthusiasm” that is expressed by Security.

On the other side of this team approach, Travis Watson, currently working as a

Borgata Security Supervisor, with previous work as a Surveillance Supervisor (at

another casino property) has this to say: “The working relationship between

Security and Surveillance is effective. There is a lot of teamwork. The Surveillance

personnel are very talented and I also give credit to the equipment. Digital has

made Surveillance much more effective”.

Watson also believes that “awareness” and “anticipating what we are working

on” are traits that play a big part in our achievements.

Timely review and accuracy allows Security to approach these situations with

complete understanding. The Who, What, Where and How’s are answered

before making contact with the “Takers”, leaving them no room for duplicity.

Taking a good look at the men and women who are taking pride in their

accomplishments brings the leaders of these departments to a new view. The

unyielding efforts of associates are not something that can be placed on the

annual budget wish list. High-tech apparatus does not ensure quality of work

and wouldn’t be defined as having intuition, experience and enthusiasm. It is an

important focus and consideration when balancing the challenges and

demands for those who are responsible for protecting life, property and assets.

Apryl Donnelly is a long term security professional having worked in the

Atlantic City casino industry for the last 25 years. Her career includes

security management, fire command, training and development as well as

her current position as an investigator at Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa.

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The 2009 Northeast Surveillance Director’s Conference took place in Niagara Falls, New

York at the Seneca Niagara Casino on August 18, 2009. It was hosted by Seneca Niagara

Casino surveillance director Jeff Maracle and his team. The event was a great opportunity

for surveillance professionals to get together in an open forum and discuss the issues that

concern our industry. Jeff should be commended for a first class conference. The one day

event was attended by both corporate and tribal surveillance representatives from New

York, Connecticut and New Jersey. Also in attendance were regulators from two states.

The casino is a beautiful facility that

rivals the biggest and the best. There

are about 4,300 slots with

approximately 100 table games to

choose from. Several fantastic

restaurant venues surround the

casino’s 147,000 square feet. The pool deck

overlooked the mist from Niagara Falls as well

as the surrounding community. The area was

home to many Victorian style buildings to

include churches with bells ringing in the

distance. The higher up in the hotel tower you

stayed, the better the view was of the Canadian

side Niagara Fall’s skyline.

The day started out with a tour of the surveillance monitor room detailing both the

technical and operational aspects of the department. The room was well thought out in its

design and functionality. The digital system ran perfectly with all of the software

monitoring programs in place. The operations team was on their game as they fielded calls

and requests from the many contact departments. Soft count, bill validator teams and

table games were all monitored in a seamless effort by the team. The surveillance

operators were pleasant and answered all of the questions the touring members had for

them. The same effort was made by the technical manager who toured the visitors in the

switch room and (dvr) room explaining all of the functions. I will not give away all of the

By Tony Weiss, ACSN

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secrets and software packages employed by Jeff and his team. All I say is beware cheaters

as you may want to try another casino for your exploits as the surveillance staff is more

than capable of figuring out your moves.

The conference moved to a meeting room once the tour of the monitor room was

completed. As the conference opened up it became clear that two concerns would be the

focal points. The first was brought up during the introduction

Director of the Seneca Tribe’s flagship Seneca Niagara Casino,

for continued communication within the community and especially in the Northeast

corridor. His point was emphasized when he stated that more states are expan

gaming or will soon have a vote for legalized gambling. A great point was raised that

cheats will go to these new jurisdictions and perfect their craft only to bring back all of

their new moves to our casinos.

Perhaps the most motivating si

Maracle as he stated that surveillance is one of the most important functions of his casino

as his team is responsible for protecting the assets that are delivered to many of the tribal

members as possibly their only source of income. He feels that surveillance is playing a

major part in the survival of his tribe

accomplished if every surveillance operation took their work as seriously?

The conference continued the communication, training and economic concerns discussions

as Seneca Niagara Casino investigations detailed an Asian group of card markers hitting

the casino (same group being investigated nationwide). There are also internal

investigations going on. From that point a BOLO was handed out detailing an NRT scam

that was recently detected at Borgata Casino and Spa in Atlantic City. Mohegan Sun also

explained a recent simulcasting scam and concern with the SAM machines.

The key presentation was given by Turning Stone Casino

Brad Mitchell. He detailed the importance of accountability within any surveillance training

module. He also explained tangible result

approved within the budget (catching the bad guy).

secrets and software packages employed by Jeff and his team. All I say is beware cheaters

as you may want to try another casino for your exploits as the surveillance staff is more

ur moves.

The conference moved to a meeting room once the tour of the monitor room was

completed. As the conference opened up it became clear that two concerns would be the

focal points. The first was brought up during the introduction by Jeff Maracle

Director of the Seneca Tribe’s flagship Seneca Niagara Casino, as he expressed the need

communication within the community and especially in the Northeast

corridor. His point was emphasized when he stated that more states are expan

gaming or will soon have a vote for legalized gambling. A great point was raised that

cheats will go to these new jurisdictions and perfect their craft only to bring back all of

their new moves to our casinos.

Perhaps the most motivating single thought of the conference was also made

surveillance is one of the most important functions of his casino

as his team is responsible for protecting the assets that are delivered to many of the tribal

their only source of income. He feels that surveillance is playing a

part in the survival of his tribe. Can you imagine the great things that could be

accomplished if every surveillance operation took their work as seriously?

The conference continued the communication, training and economic concerns discussions

as Seneca Niagara Casino investigations detailed an Asian group of card markers hitting

the casino (same group being investigated nationwide). There are also internal

vestigations going on. From that point a BOLO was handed out detailing an NRT scam

that was recently detected at Borgata Casino and Spa in Atlantic City. Mohegan Sun also

explained a recent simulcasting scam and concern with the SAM machines.

entation was given by Turning Stone Casino, New York surveillance director

Brad Mitchell. He detailed the importance of accountability within any surveillance training

module. He also explained tangible results and productivity assist for outside training

(catching the bad guy).

“The The The The financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal

OperationOperationOperationOperation depends on profits from depends on profits from depends on profits from depends on profits from

our gaming operationsour gaming operationsour gaming operationsour gaming operations” Jeff Maracle

secrets and software packages employed by Jeff and his team. All I say is beware cheaters

as you may want to try another casino for your exploits as the surveillance staff is more

The conference moved to a meeting room once the tour of the monitor room was

completed. As the conference opened up it became clear that two concerns would be the

by Jeff Maracle, Surveillance

expressed the need

communication within the community and especially in the Northeast

corridor. His point was emphasized when he stated that more states are expanding into full

gaming or will soon have a vote for legalized gambling. A great point was raised that

cheats will go to these new jurisdictions and perfect their craft only to bring back all of

ngle thought of the conference was also made by Jeff

surveillance is one of the most important functions of his casino

as his team is responsible for protecting the assets that are delivered to many of the tribal

their only source of income. He feels that surveillance is playing a

. Can you imagine the great things that could be

The conference continued the communication, training and economic concerns discussions

as Seneca Niagara Casino investigations detailed an Asian group of card markers hitting

the casino (same group being investigated nationwide). There are also internal

vestigations going on. From that point a BOLO was handed out detailing an NRT scam

that was recently detected at Borgata Casino and Spa in Atlantic City. Mohegan Sun also

explained a recent simulcasting scam and concern with the SAM machines.

surveillance director

Brad Mitchell. He detailed the importance of accountability within any surveillance training

for outside training to be

financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal financial survival of our Tribal

depends on profits from depends on profits from depends on profits from depends on profits from

Jeff Maracle

Page 32: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

The conference continued its positive dialog as

new ideas were brought forward to continue the

communication within the ranks of the Northeast

Surveillance Network.

The possibility of a controlled portal for a one-stop

type information and training internet-based site

was raised. The portal would be much like the OSN

Oregon Surveillance Network that originated the

idea. Within the portal you will be able to gain

access to verified valuable cheating, training and

intelligence information. The idea was met with

much enthusiasm!

The Northeast Casino Network has also opened up a group on Linked-In that will allow some

continued dialog with the possibility of instant messaging. You can gain access (once approved)

by following the link: http://wwwhttp://wwwhttp://wwwhttp://www.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2218391.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2218391.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2218391.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2218391....

It was very interesting to see that economic concerns are hitting every gaming jurisdiction. It

does not matter if we operate within a private casino or tribal gaming. Every aspect of the

operation must be addressed as the highest possible profit to the bottom line is now the main

objective.

The one point that was agreed upon was that communication is key. The need for real-time

verified intelligence is top on any surveillance operation’s wish list. Some of the ideas presented

in the conference at Seneca Niagara Casino will be the thumb print to the beginning of this

objective.

Let’s keep the dice rolling with regards to communication, training and sharing of vital

information. Thanks to Jeff Maracle and his fantastic operations and technical staff for all they

did to make the conference a great success.

Page 33: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Throughout the past year our Surveillance department has gone through some very dramatic changes in equipment and procedures. With the advancement in technology and the Company’s commitment to maintaining an impeccable standard, a financial investment was provided to our department in equipment, specifically the migration of analog recording to digital. Toward the end of 2008 and into 2009 our department initiated a transition from an out of date system to a technologically advanced system that has dramatically changed the face of operations for our Surveillance department. We continue to review advancements toward analytics, software and database systems. It’s a new wave of technology for our profession. While the idea of an updated Surveillance department operating in the digital world, is certainly positive, it presented a variety of challenges to the department. These challenges included:

Installation process: During the migration the department had to maintain analog recording while installing the new digital equipment. This was a huge challenge to everyone. Constant checks on equipment were performed during the process because we had to ensure the continuity of our coverage. Communication and preparation was paramount during this transition. From the Vendors, to the Supervisors and down to us, the Officers, communication was vital. Operating Cost: Digital equipment is expensive and there is an increased maintenance to keep the system running efficiently. As we learn more and more of the system we identify methods to try and reduce cost. A recent change in our equipment will result in thousands of dollars saved to the department and Property in replacement costs. Plus it provided us with improved quality of video. This change and cost savings could not have been accomplished without the digital system. Procedures: The majority of the department’s internal procedures had to be revised to incorporate digital. For example: In this newsletter there is an article on digital evidence. This addresses just one of the many changes we have experienced since the migration. Many of our procedures have been streamlined, eliminating redundancy. Training/Experience: With new technology comes new training. Our team has been very aggressive in learning the new technology, not only digital, but learning and revising our skills in computer software and overall computer technology. This learning curve has provided us skills never required before in the surveillance field, and better yet these skills are needed in our everyday lives!

Surveillance and a new Age of Technology

A point of view from the monitor room

Page 34: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

We have also eliminated multitudes of paperwork to make our commitment to our Company’sinitiatives. This would not have been as aggressive, if not for the advancements in our department’s commitment and computer driven technology. Operations: Our digital system has increased our workload, but in a very positive and productive way. We can provide quick and accurate decisions to our internal customer in matter of seconds, rather than minutes. With analog, tapes had to be pulled from VCRs, usually recording in another room, then video had to be played back to identify the incident, kat a good quality. After all this is completed, we then get the answer back to the customer. take forever. Now technology has allowed us to review video at our fingertips within secondtimes keeping the customer on the phone while we analyzed the video. The migration to digital has permitted us to expand our recording and therefore more activities are identified. This has more responsibilities for the Officer, in reviand our value to the Property has increased. This is a winimproved our professionalism and advanced our career growth. Logistics: Digital storage has reduced the overall physical space required for storage. VHS tapes required large cabinets and more and more space was required to install these cabinets. Digwhether to a hard drive or to disc, minimizes this storage and the need fwe must continue to hold previous analog evidence for retention purposes, as we move forward our required physical storage will be reduced. Growing pains and challenges arise with any change in operations. The digital migraproven we can adapt to those growing pains and meet the challenges headfor ways to utilize this new equipment,a previous subscription our Director discussed an article on change. It is important to have a staff willing to embrace change. Their efforts will be well worth the final result. Just like any other business, the casino industry is changing and for all of us.

Kevin Duffey, Surveillance Supervisor Mike Soldyn. Surveillance Shift Supervisor

Harrah’s Resort Casino, Atlantic City, N.J.

We wrote this article in order to let the surveillance fraternity know that technology is changing the way we operate.

We have also eliminated multitudes of paperwork to make our commitment to our Company’sinitiatives. This would not have been as aggressive, if not for the advancements in our department’s commitment and computer driven technology.

Our digital system has increased our workload, but in a very positive and productive way. We can provide quick and accurate decisions to our internal customer in matter of seconds, rather than minutes. With analog, tapes had to be pulled from VCRs, usually recording in another room, then video

to identify the incident, keeping your fingers crossed that the tape waat a good quality. After all this is completed, we then get the answer back to the customer. take forever. Now technology has allowed us to review video at our fingertips within secondtimes keeping the customer on the phone while we analyzed the video. The migration to digital has permitted us to expand our recording and therefore more activities are identified. This has

the Officer, in reviewing, tracking and investigating. But productivity increases and our value to the Property has increased. This is a win-win situation. We believe this technology has improved our professionalism and advanced our career growth.

rage has reduced the overall physical space required for storage. VHS tapes required large cabinets and more and more space was required to install these cabinets. Dig

or to disc, minimizes this storage and the need for additional space. Although we must continue to hold previous analog evidence for retention purposes, as we move forward our required physical storage will be reduced.

Growing pains and challenges arise with any change in operations. The digital migraproven we can adapt to those growing pains and meet the challenges head-on. We will continue to look

s to utilize this new equipment, such as in analytics to bring additional value to our Company. In Director discussed an article on change. It is important to have a staff

willing to embrace change. Their efforts will be well worth the final result. Just like any other business, the more we can improve our skills and improve our worth the better

ACSN Article Contributors: Kevin Duffey, Surveillance Supervisor [email protected]

Mike Soldyn. Surveillance Shift Supervisor [email protected]’s Resort Casino, Atlantic City, N.J.

We wrote this article in order to let the surveillance fraternity know that technology is changing the way we operate.

Don’t fight it! Embrace it!

We have also eliminated multitudes of paperwork to make our commitment to our Company’s green initiatives. This would not have been as aggressive, if not for the advancements in our department’s

Our digital system has increased our workload, but in a very positive and productive way. We can provide quick and accurate decisions to our internal customer in matter of seconds, rather than minutes. With analog, tapes had to be pulled from VCRs, usually recording in another room, then video

eeping your fingers crossed that the tape was recording at a good quality. After all this is completed, we then get the answer back to the customer. This seemed to take forever. Now technology has allowed us to review video at our fingertips within seconds, many times keeping the customer on the phone while we analyzed the video. The migration to digital has permitted us to expand our recording and therefore more activities are identified. This has created

ewing, tracking and investigating. But productivity increases win situation. We believe this technology has

rage has reduced the overall physical space required for storage. VHS tapes required large cabinets and more and more space was required to install these cabinets. Digital storage,

or additional space. Although we must continue to hold previous analog evidence for retention purposes, as we move forward our

Growing pains and challenges arise with any change in operations. The digital migration has certainly on. We will continue to look

bring additional value to our Company. In Director discussed an article on change. It is important to have a staff

willing to embrace change. Their efforts will be well worth the final result. Just like any other business, nd improve our worth the better

[email protected]

We wrote this article in order to let the surveillance fraternity

Page 35: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Over the years there has been a pretty strong consensus on what to look for from casino to casino but not as much emphasis on why. In putting together these tells we hope to open a dialogue into not only what we look for but why. Even though our vantage point is different the goals of surveillance and games management are the same: prevent theft internal or external, reduce liability, be more efficient and generate a better win and hold percentage. In looking for a starting point for our “ACSN tell of the issue”, we decided that betting patterns and what they tell us would be a good place to begin. These betting patterns can be a critical component in a live observation or a review. As this series of tells unfolds we will examine the information we are looking

to uncover by examining betting patterns. Since each game type presents a different concern we will further breaking down these tells and betting patterns by game type. The first game we will examine is Baccarat.

Baccarat The game is fairly simple as the player has basically only three options – “banker”, “player” and “tie”. The “banker” hand is a slight favorite of 1.06% and as such will win more often than the “player”. This edge is offset by the 5% commission paid on winning “banker” wagers. The “player” hand loses at about a 1.25% rate but there is no 5% commission charged. The “tie” bet is 14% dog and is usually avoided even at 8 to 1. With these percentages in mind the players will bet the “banker” most often, followed by the “player” wager and the “tie” bet a distant third. This also, helps discern a player’s betting pattern or style of play.

Banker Bettor This player will bet the “banker” on a consistent basis because the “banker” is favored and he will fade the 5% charge.

Player Bettor This player will bet the “player” as a slight dog to avoid paying the 5% commission.

Chasing the Shoe This method of betting takes elements of both “banker” and “player” bettors. Given the proximity to a 50/50 proposition – the “banker” is about 50.62% to 49.38% - these players assume a close to even split in decisions during each shoe. However, they find the

To�“tell”�the�truth�

By Kevin “Ask the Professor” Kelly

Page 36: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

notion that it would alternate each hand B/P/B/P to be a statistical improbability so, they chase streaks. Each of these methods has a model shoe that will lead to a big win. In the case of a long “banker” run, both the “banker” bettor and the “chasing the shoe” bettor will have substantial wins especially, if wins are “pressed” or they are at table maximums. A prolonged “player” run will lead to a big win for the “player” bettor as well as the player “chasing the shoe”. These streaks are usually the reason for large or sustained “house” losses and in the absence of any problems with the shuffle, handling of the cards or shoe, are to be expected given the betting patterns of most players. A shoe that alternates between “banker” and “player” or “chops” is devastating to the player “chasing the shoe” and will keep the “banker” and “player” at expected valuations. If a player does not fall into one of these three categories and randomly move his wagers between “banker”, “player’ and “tie” we would expect to see standard deviations in his win/loss that would be quite close to our overall house edge. However, if a player alternates his wagers between these bets and has a high degree of success this should be considered highly suspicious. This was very evident in our false shuffle case in 2003 and was the accelerant for the investigation. In that case the players went from sitting hands out or table minimum to $3000 a hand – they also went from 0 or $5 on the “tie” to $400 – in each instance their change from “banker” to “player” or “tie” won. The chances of a player or table full of players correctly making 7 or 8 independent decisions moving between “banker”, “player” and “tie” is highly unlikely and should always be investigated fully. This is a much more suspicious scenario than 8 “bank” or “player” decisions in a row. This suspect betting pattern can be a sign of a false shuffle, perfect shuffle, marked cards, compromised shoe, “card muck” or “flashed” cards. Marked cards and “flashed” cards can give the player 1st card knowledge – which will cause the player(s) to alternate their wagers between “banker” and “player” in relation to the chart below. They won’t necessarily win each decision as in a false or perfect shuffle but the “player” hand will most likely contain a 7, 8 or 9 – when large wagers show on the “player”.

Ace – Deuce – Three Favor “banker” 7 – 8 – 9 Favor “player” Off Set Wagers

Page 37: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Another betting pattern of concern is offset wagering between two or more players. In this case the players bet even amounts on “banker” and “player” – again this might be a group of players with numerous bets on both sides but if all of the wagers are totaled they will be a wash. In this scenario the group is willing to lose the 5% on winning “banker” wagers but this will be offset by promotional or “comp” dollars. On the surface this looks like bad play and a guaranteed 5% win for the house. However, there a few scenarios that warrant a closer look. First the players may be looking for a method of laundering or cleaning the money. Another factor may be a combination of cash and credit play as half of the players (credit) can slow pay, refuse to pay back their markers or get a discount of some kind – while the cash players can redeem the remaining chips for cash. With discounts on markers and promotional dollars it is possible that the players may get to a positive expectation overcoming the 5%. Looking for the offset betting patterns and shared bankrolls is a critical component in properly protecting the game. This concludes our first look at how betting patterns can be a tell in recognizing suspect play in Baccarat – we look forward to some feedback and opening up a dialogue on game protection moving forward.

Kevin brings over 27 years of surveillance experience to ACSN. He has consulted in Puerto Rico, Aruba and Argentina. Kevin has also managed surveillance operations in the British West Indies and Aruba. He currently is the training/manager at the Borgata Casino and Spa. He also is the Adjunct Professor at ACCC/CCI for their casino seminar certification advanced course. He instructs the surveillance portion of the course. Look for Kevin at the 2009 World Game Protections Conference as he is slated as a speaker.

Page 38: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Surveillance Notes on Counterfeit Notes The casino industry continues to be hit with counterfeit bills. Atlantic City is no exception as counterfeit bills with “Israeli Note” serial numbers, front and back plate identifiers are still being pulled from our drop boxes. Estimates show that potential thousands of dollars are passed each month in casinos. This particular note has been linked to possibly supporting terrorism efforts. Research shows Specimens of counterfeit notes from the “production line” of the printing presses in the town of Brital, Lebanon as early as 1998.

A counterfeit $100 bill produced by a printing press owned by the Mazloum clan is such a high-quality forgery that it features a good watermark, both the red and blue fibers and even has the security stripe with the “USA” print. The “Israeli Note” that is being passed in casinos and other areas of the United States has accounted for untold amounts of dollars in bogus money.

Did you know that counterfeiting concerns detailed by the United States are to the point that actual governments are being investigated? The “Supernote” is suspected of being produced in North Korea, Iran, China and even Russia. The “Supernote” is given its name due to the fact that the technology utilized to create the counterfeit note is more detailed than the technology for producing actual U.S. currency. Secret Service lists the notes under the classification family (PN-14342) code.

Investigation continues to determine the origin of both the “Israeli” and “Supernote” counterfeits. The Secret Service has tested the “Supernote” against state of the art bill validator, currency counting machines and casino technology.

By Tony Weiss, ACSN

Page 39: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Below is the only flaw that was purposely placed in the “Supernotediagonal loop on the upper right portion of the bill. Within that loop is a minor The terrorist network has closed the loop in black ink so they can change leg“Supernote” counterfeits when making

The latest effort to foil counterfeiters was brought forward by the Secret Service as they quietly approacall of the leading manufacturers of quality laser printersembed a series of yellow dots into each dochowever; the series of yellow dots has now been decodedserial number of the printer, date and time of the document being generated. This gives the Secret Service the ability to know when and where a counterfeit was printed. An actual sequencedots is shown on a printed document that has the embedded yellow dot coding.

Document as seen by the naked eye

Casino Investigations regarding counterfeits are time consuming and rarely result in a conviction. It takes a dedicated cohesive effort between table games, surveillance and security to present a well organized evidence package for state and federal enforcthat casino operations lose revenue each time a game is stopped to closely scrutinize currency. Developing patterns of play for specific suspects showing up on games where counterfeits have been pacritical starting point of any investigation. counterfeit when working with the dealers who will ultimately be the best line of defense regarding apprehension.

urposely placed in the “Supernote”. The letter “N” in United States has a diagonal loop on the upper right portion of the bill. Within that loop is a minor white inner break in the ink. The terrorist network has closed the loop in black ink so they can change leg

” counterfeits when making alleged arms deals.

The latest effort to foil counterfeiters was brought forward by the Secret Service as they quietly approacs of quality laser printers and copiers. The Secret Service requested that they

embed a series of yellow dots into each document that is printed. The code is invisible to the naked eye as now been decoded by independent investigators

serial number of the printer, date and time of the document being generated. This gives the Secret Service the ability to know when and where a counterfeit was printed. An actual sequencedots is shown on a printed document that has the embedded yellow dot coding.

Visual Aided Encryption Technology

Document as seen by the naked eye

Casino Investigations regarding counterfeits are time consuming and rarely result in a conviction. It takes a dedicated cohesive effort between table games, surveillance and security to present a well organized evidence package for state and federal enforcement agents to process. Surveillance must also understand that casino operations lose revenue each time a game is stopped to closely scrutinize currency. Developing patterns of play for specific suspects showing up on games where counterfeits have been pacritical starting point of any investigation. Consider identifiers such as the serial numbers or feel of the counterfeit when working with the dealers who will ultimately be the best line of defense regarding

”. The letter “N” in United States has a white inner break in the ink.

The terrorist network has closed the loop in black ink so they can change legitimate bills in for the

The latest effort to foil counterfeiters was brought forward by the Secret Service as they quietly approached and copiers. The Secret Service requested that they

invisible to the naked eye by independent investigators. They identify the

serial number of the printer, date and time of the document being generated. This gives the Secret Service the ability to know when and where a counterfeit was printed. An actual sequence of the arranged yellow

ncryption Technology

Casino Investigations regarding counterfeits are time consuming and rarely result in a conviction. It takes a dedicated cohesive effort between table games, surveillance and security to present a well organized

ement agents to process. Surveillance must also understand that casino operations lose revenue each time a game is stopped to closely scrutinize currency. Developing patterns of play for specific suspects showing up on games where counterfeits have been passed is the

Consider identifiers such as the serial numbers or feel of the counterfeit when working with the dealers who will ultimately be the best line of defense regarding

Page 40: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

This cheating scam on Roulecheating activity that continues to scam casinos throughout various team decided it was time to discuss the activity and what placed to thwart such activity. In this roulette scam one team pocket three stacks, (60) chips. L$25 n/v chips by another team member. The team requiresbut can have more to ensure the scam works correctly. The 1st member of the teamindividual will look for opportunitiesdealer is distracted placing bets for patrons, restacking chipsthe 1st member has a tendencychips. This facilitates the easy removal of chips from the table and allows him to keep an accurate count of the chips removed As shown in the above graphic we see that seats #1 and the player at the classic positions for professional past posting up on any seat making it difficult to look for specific seating assignments. player removes exactly threeof three. By removing three stacksbe even, thus preventing the dealer from being alerted to psychology of the cheat comes to light as uniform as possible.

ette is certainly not new to our industry, but it is a popular cheating activity that continues to scam casinos throughout various jurisdictionsteam decided it was time to discuss the activity and what protection procedures can be placed to thwart such activity.

team member will buy in for non value dollars chips, stealthily chips. Later on the same $1 n/v chips will be reintroduce

another team member. The team requires a minimum of three membersto ensure the scam works correctly.

of the team will buy in for n/v dollars. During the course of play thopportunities to pocket the n/v chips. This may occur

placing bets for patrons, restacking chips, etc. We have notia tendency to reorganize the stacks of 20 chips into stacks of 10

e easy removal of chips from the table and allows him to keep an accurate count of the chips removed.

As shown in the above graphic we see that seats #1 and the player at the classic positions for professional past posting teams. The demon switch teams can show up on any seat making it difficult to look for specific seating assignments. player removes exactly three stacks because the float has fifteen stacks arranged in rows of three. By removing three stacks, that color in the float will be short, but the rows will be even, thus preventing the dealer from being alerted to the color that psychology of the cheat comes to light as the group attempts to have the remaining stacks

is certainly not new to our industry, but it is a popular jurisdictions. Our

protection procedures can be

rs chips, stealthily reintroduced as

a minimum of three members,

buy in for n/v dollars. During the course of play the cket the n/v chips. This may occur while the

We have noticed that into stacks of 10

e easy removal of chips from the table and allows him to keep an

As shown in the above graphic we see that seats #1 and the player at the columns are The demon switch teams can show

up on any seat making it difficult to look for specific seating assignments. Also, the stacks arranged in rows

, but the rows will that is short. The

as the group attempts to have the remaining stacks

Page 41: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Once enough chips have been pocketed the individual will leave the table. Player will give the dealer an excuse, leaving behind the rest of the n/v cheques on the table. This individual will meet up with a 2nd player, typically in a restroom where there is no camera coverage. At this time the n/v chips are passed to the 2nd player. A 3rd player may already be at the table or will arrive before the 1st, or before 2nd player returns to the game. The 3rd player will buy value $25, but will usually buy n/v dollars as well. This takes an n/v color out of play, plus he is playing $25 value. A 4th player, if involved, will arrive at the table any time from when the 1st player buys in till the time the 2nd player buys in for n/v quarters. The 4th patron will buy in for n/v dollars, again taking another color out of play. This player also puts another body on the game to cause more distractions for the dealer and may be used as a blocker for chips going into or out of a pocket. The 1st player will return to the table and cash in his remaining n/v dollars usually after placing one or more rounds of bets. At this time the 3rd player will place a value quarter bet on the layout. Once the 1st player cashes out he will leave the table. The 2nd player will then attempt to buy in for n/v quarters, (we have seen $400 but usually $500 buy ins) specifying to the dealer that he wants the same color the 1st player was playing. If the 2nd player is successful in buying-in and getting the color he wants, he will place bets on the layout while looking for opportunities to reintroduce the original $1 n/v chips from his pocket. These chips are now wagered as $25 n/v. This provides a significant increase to any winning wager. When player #2 wins a bet and is paid he will add chips from his pocket to his chips on the table. He waits to win a bet because the dealer knows he legitimately will have more than the 20 chips he bought in for. Another method is to take the chips straight from his pocket to place bets on the layout. The player will try to keep a hand in front of his chips on the table not allowing the dealer to clearly see how many cheques he has at any time. This allows him to increase his chip stack while not being obvious to the dealer. Another way is to palm chips from his pocket and pick up a short stack, now giving him a full stack in his hand that he can use to bet with or place with his other chips. Once the player removes all of the chips from his pocket he will cash in, completing the scam. Any remaining team members will color up and leave the table. If the 2nd player is unsuccessful in buying in for the n/v color he wants, typically the player will either buy in for another color and play for just a spin or just not buy in at all.

Ways to protect the game This scam can be easily thwarted by proper game protection. 1. Once a dealer notices that a stack or multiple stacks of n/v chips are missing from the n/v float the dealer should only allow them to be sold for dollar value. If this is done the roulette scam will never be successful.

Page 42: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

2. If a dealer allows the shorted colorFloor Supervisor and/or Pit Boss should be notified. 3. Notify Surveillance to watch the suspicious activity, such as removing chips from his pocket 4. A review by Surveillance with the previous player of that color. 5. A policy of notifying CCTV of any $25 n/v buy in should also be made. alert CCTV to the possibility of cheating.

Law enforcement will require the following elements in order to obtain a successful prosecution:

The cheating move. You must demonstrate that because of cheating the chips that were bought legitimately for $1 were game as $25 chips. This occurs when player #1 removes the $1 chips and player #2 adds the same color chips from his pocket to the $25 n/v chips he bought. Identify the players are working coverage of player’s #1 and #exchange the chipsdeparting together or meeting away from the table. Loss to the casino. Identify through video coveragechips were bought for $60 and later introduced as $1,500 worth of quarter chips. This is an immediatbeen in the drop box if the chips were bought for full value. Added to this is the amount that the n/v quarter player cashed out for

($400 or $500). Once you have demonstrated that the team has successfully cheated a table, any attempts at other tables, even if not successful (can’t buy n/v quarter color they want) can be included as an added count of cheating.

ACSN thanks Harrah’s Resort Casino Surveillance Department for this article

Dennis Lamond, Rick Pfeifer and Tina CarlettiHarrah’s Atlantic City Surveillance Department

shorted color chips to be sold for more than the dollar value a r Pit Boss should be notified.

to watch the player who just bought in for that n/v color, such as removing chips from his pocket.

by Surveillance should be done to see if any suspicious activity is observed with the previous player of that color.

A policy of notifying CCTV of any $25 n/v buy in should also be made. alert CCTV to the possibility of cheating.

Prosecution

enforcement will require the following elements in order to obtain a successful

The cheating move. You must demonstrate that because of cheating the chips that were bought legitimately for $1 were reintroduced back onto the

25 chips. This occurs when player #1 removes the $1 chips and player #2 adds the same color chips from his pocket to the $25 n/v chips he

the players are working together. For example: providecoverage of player’s #1 and #2 going into the restroomexchange the chips. In addition identify team members arriving or departing together or meeting away from the table.

ss to the casino. Identify through video coverage that the 3 stacks of chips were bought for $60 and later introduced as $1,500 worth of quarter chips. This is an immediate loss of $1,440, the difference that would have been in the drop box if the chips were bought for full value. Added to this

amount that the n/v quarter player cashed out for, minus his buy in. ($400 or $500). Once you have demonstrated that the team has successfully cheated a

any attempts at other tables, even if not successful (can’t buy n/v quarter color they as an added count of cheating.

ACSN thanks Harrah’s Resort Casino Surveillance Department for this article

Dennis Lamond, Rick Pfeifer and Tina Carletti Harrah’s Atlantic City Surveillance Department

dollar value a

player who just bought in for that n/v color for any

uld be done to see if any suspicious activity is observed

A policy of notifying CCTV of any $25 n/v buy in should also be made. That would

enforcement will require the following elements in order to obtain a successful

The cheating move. You must demonstrate that because of cheating the reintroduced back onto the

25 chips. This occurs when player #1 removes the $1 chips and player #2 adds the same color chips from his pocket to the $25 n/v chips he

together. For example: provide ng into the restroom together to

team members arriving or

that the 3 stacks of chips were bought for $60 and later introduced as $1,500 worth of quarter

e loss of $1,440, the difference that would have been in the drop box if the chips were bought for full value. Added to this

minus his buy in. ($400 or $500). Once you have demonstrated that the team has successfully cheated a

any attempts at other tables, even if not successful (can’t buy n/v quarter color they

ACSN thanks Harrah’s Resort Casino Surveillance Department for this article

Page 43: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

I was a newly promoted “Boxperson” at the Tropicana Casino in the early

was sitting “double box”

a very busy Saturday night when all of

the field and only one die at my end of the table! The “Stickperson” was

hand and calling the number at the other end after the die stopped sliding along the layout!

A craps crew worst nightmare was about to occur! Of course, you can guess where I’m going with this

scenario. The die on the other end of the layout nearest to the shooter was a “SIX” and the die on my

end was a “SIX!” The $3,000.00 cash is still lying

screaming it was a field bet! When the Floor Supervisor and the Pit Manager arriv

the players are agreeing he had a “Field” bet prior to the dice being thrown. I, of course,

bet was late and it was received as “

the floor supervisor, the pit manager

render a final decision.

Needless to say, the shift manager sided with the players and

It was very painful to watch $6,000.00 going out to the player

was a scam! During this time, the feeling was,

professional dice cheats or suspects in a dice sliding team

that we were the victims of a cheating scam with no recourse but to pay!

entire craps crew including the floor supervisor

presented with a final written warning for not following proper game protection procedures.

learned, right?

Here’s how they did it!

These guys did their homework by scanning the craps pit

located a low limit but heavy action table with a weak

nearest to the boardwalk for a quick getaway in case something went wrong

was set-up for them to take advantage of the dealer’s inexperience, combined with heavy action, and the

remoteness of a low limit table!

The scam went like this… Three men approach the table positioning

standing on the 3rd base side positioned next to the

way “prop and hardway” bets or otherwise being loud and disruptive

the hook 2nd base side watching the game with no visible chips

busy distracting the other Boxperson and the Floor

The first part of this scam starts when it’s time for the man on the 3

the man on the 2nd base side reaches in his pocket to remove the $3,000.00 cash and toss it on the

Dice Sliding from a Surveillance/Casino Ops PerspectiveACSN exclusive article written by Borgata & Harrah’s Casino Surveillance

Personnel with Decades of Craps Experience

I was a newly promoted “Boxperson” at the Tropicana Casino in the early

was sitting “double box” on a $5.00 minimum table nearest to the boardwalk exit on

a very busy Saturday night when all of a sudden $3,000.00 in $100.00 bills is

at my end of the table! The “Stickperson” was pointing at one end with one

e other end after the die stopped sliding along the layout!

worst nightmare was about to occur! Of course, you can guess where I’m going with this

end of the layout nearest to the shooter was a “SIX” and the die on my

$3,000.00 cash is still lying in the middle of the “Field” and the player is now

screaming it was a field bet! When the Floor Supervisor and the Pit Manager arrive at the game all of

s are agreeing he had a “Field” bet prior to the dice being thrown. I, of course,

bet was late and it was received as “Change only!” It was like witnessing a shark feeding frenzy while

pit manager, and now the shift manager filtered through all of the statements to

manager sided with the players and paid the $3,000.00 field bet

$6,000.00 going out to the player when, deep-down in my heart

the feeling was, the three people involved with the incident were

suspects in a dice sliding team. The feeling was palbable throughout the pit

that we were the victims of a cheating scam with no recourse but to pay! After the bet was paid, the

crew including the floor supervisor were systematically removed from the table and

presented with a final written warning for not following proper game protection procedures.

by scanning the craps pit searching for the most vulnerable table; they

located a low limit but heavy action table with a weak dealing crew, crowded with most

nearest to the boardwalk for a quick getaway in case something went wrong. The best case scenario

up for them to take advantage of the dealer’s inexperience, combined with heavy action, and the

The scam went like this… Three men approach the table positioning themselves as follows: One

se side positioned next to the stickperson with chips in his hands betting late or two

way “prop and hardway” bets or otherwise being loud and disruptive. The second man is standing on

watching the game with no visible chips or cash in his hands. T

Boxperson and the Floor Supervisor attempting to get rated prior to his play.

hen it’s time for the man on the 3rd base side to shoot

base side reaches in his pocket to remove the $3,000.00 cash and toss it on the

Dice Sliding from a Surveillance/Casino Ops Perspectiveexclusive article written by Borgata & Harrah’s Casino Surveillance

Personnel with Decades of Craps Experience

I was a newly promoted “Boxperson” at the Tropicana Casino in the early 80’s and I

table nearest to the boardwalk exit on

in $100.00 bills is lying in

pointing at one end with one

e other end after the die stopped sliding along the layout!

worst nightmare was about to occur! Of course, you can guess where I’m going with this

end of the layout nearest to the shooter was a “SIX” and the die on my

and the player is now

e at the game all of

s are agreeing he had a “Field” bet prior to the dice being thrown. I, of course, am arguing the

nly!” It was like witnessing a shark feeding frenzy while

filtered through all of the statements to

paid the $3,000.00 field bet to avoid a riot!

down in my heart I knew it

the three people involved with the incident were

throughout the pit

ter the bet was paid, the

ematically removed from the table and

presented with a final written warning for not following proper game protection procedures. Lesson

vulnerable table; they

crew, crowded with most spots taken, and

The best case scenario

up for them to take advantage of the dealer’s inexperience, combined with heavy action, and the

as follows: One man is

betting late or two

. The second man is standing on

. The third man is

to get rated prior to his play.

to shoot the dice while

base side reaches in his pocket to remove the $3,000.00 cash and toss it on the

Dice Sliding from a Surveillance/Casino Ops Perspective exclusive article written by Borgata & Harrah’s Casino Surveillance

Page 44: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

layout. The shooter on the 3rd base side sets the dice on double “SIX” and appears to toss the dice

leaving one die behind. However, the die that is thrown is not actually picked up off the layout but slid

along the layout without hitting the back wall or any other object during the roll. It’s almost as if it was

an innocent “muffed toss” but still legal throw.

During this period, the stickperson is slightly distracted by the one die being left behind and is

concentrating on obtaining the number of that die before the player touches the die knowing, if needed,

the other die will be called by the other base dealer. Note: Dealer’s are trained to keep their eyes on the

dice at all times so, when one die is left behind they will instinctively want to obtain the number of the

die closes to the shooter prior to knowing and calling the combined number of both die. This scenario

occurs over and over throughout the day of any craps pit. Players muff shooting the dice much in the

same way but are not necessarily involved in a scam.

The second part of this scam continues with the timing of the $3,000.00 cash tossed on the layout and

the reaction of the dealer and Boxperson. At the moment the dice are being thrown the $3,000.00 is

tossed into the field area and nothing is said by the player; he purposely tosses the cash into the field and

waits for the dealer to react or ask the player what he wants to do with this cash. Experienced dealers

and Boxperson would announce, “Change only” and not book any action while the dice are out! In this

case, the dealer was inexperienced and said nothing as the cash hit the layout. As the Boxperson, I

announced, “Change only” but, the dice were called and the argument ensued without any pause. The

player immediately insisted the cash was a field bet! Because the cash was on the layout at the moment

the stickperson called 12 Craps; he insisted on being paid the $6,000.00 pooling the other players in his

favor!

As the incident progressed further and further, I had this sick feeling in my stomach that I was “flim-

flamed” as the player accepted his $6,000.00 and all three exited through the Boardwalk entrance as

quickly as they appeared prior to the incident. It was a memorable but teachable moment to say the

least. Any person that has dealt or supervised a craps game has seen or heard of this type of scam at

least one time in their career. The only way to combat this type of scam is for the game protection

policies and procedures be strictly enforced with no exceptions.

As trained surveillance personnel we should be searching for the signs and symptoms preceding an

attempted scam. For example; while scanning the craps pit we should be searching for anything out of

the unordinary, dealer’s being heavily toked (Tipped) by a aggressive player, dealer’s hawking the dice,

dealer’s, box, or floor looking for the location of the pit manager, stickperson not watching the dice,

Boxperson not watching the dice, any suspicious activity such as players exchanging chips or cash on or

away from the game, and any cash that is tossed on the table layout without a reaction by the dealer or

Boxperson prior to the dice leaving the shooter’s hand. We have all seen the dealer’s, box and floor

exhibiting these types of behavior during a routine scan of the craps pit; these are just some of the signs

and symptoms to be aware of before an attempted scam is perpetrated in your casino craps pits.

This article has been coauthored by surveillance professionals: John Spollen, Harrah’s Resort Casino

and Frank Hauser, Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa

Page 45: ACSN Issue 8 PDF
Page 46: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

A scam was detected within the last week utilizing slot vouchers or bills in the ticket redemption and bill breaker machines. The Wincor-Nixdorf machines were victimized as a customer used his fingers to hold the shutter door open as he pull out the currency from the redeemed TITO slot voucher or bill breaking transaction..

He pulled the money out of the dispenser and held the shutter door open causing the redemption machine to continue trying to push the payment until the command to retract the money is triggered. Once the command is triggered the customer would continue to hold the shutter until the redemption machine stopped for a couple of seconds. As soon as the customer felt or heard that the redemption machine re-activated and started pulling backwards, “retracting”, he released the shutter door. This action tricked the redemption machine into posting a “Failed to dispense” event on the files and also printed a “REDEEM AT CASHIER” slip indicating partial dispense with a retracted $ amount to be paid by the cashier. The shutter being held causes the machine to register a mechanical error code and start the process of retracting. However the optic light sensors located by the shutter and along the dispenser track fail to detect that no currency passed thru the path and was not retracted therefore a “Redeem at cashier" slip is printed. This is a design flaw that may cause a transaction to be paid twice as in the case of this customer who received full payment for his transaction and also a “Redeem at Cashier slip". He now has both the cash and a failed to dispense" slip for the same amount and has doubled his initial amount in illegal gains!

The arrow shows the dispenser track, where the optic sensor is, in the open position. The shutter is besides it.

The currency is dispensed as the shutter opens. The suspect must have knowledge of the inner workings of the machine in order to know how long to hold the shutter to cause a Redeem at Cashier slip to be issued without causing a permanent malfunction.

This particular scam only works on “Pro-cash 1500 NG” model type dispensers that have the track with the optic light sensor. Most dispensers for ATMs and redemption machines in use employ the track and light optic sensor.

AAAA

CCCC

SSSS

NNNN

****

TTTT

IIII

TTTT

OOOO

MMMM

AAAA

CCCC

HHHH

IIII

NNNN

EEEE

SSSS

CCCC

AAAA

MMMM

ShutteShutteShutteShutterrrr

ShutterShutterShutterShutter

The investigation also showed an operating flaw where the three optic path light sensors along the retrieval

belt assembly did not pick up the fact that no currency was coming back into the dispenser.

The newer version of the dispensers “Pro-Cash 1500 XE” and “Quick-Jack II” models use a retrieving clamp

and will be positioned further back in the housing at a closed position. They will not have a mechanism to

cause this error code so the scam listed above is not possible.

Page 47: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

oulette is a game that has fallen victim to every type of theft, scam and cheating technique. We see teams incorporating advanced cheating that utilize electronic equipment to aid in determining where the ball will drop within a section of numbers. At http://www.roulettecomputerreviews.com/ you’ll see all of the data that is presented for advanced roulette analysis methods. The NOK roulette computer was the highest rated system and reportedly was used at the Ritz in London to take 1.3 million off of a table.

Page 48: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Now that we have looked at advanced systems for roulette, let’s take a look at the tools utiliin a little known scam that can easily fall through the cracks. This scam uses principles of scouting out situations that are conducive to pulling off the scam. Below we see the tools of the trade for this scam are very simple to obtain. You need nothioxford shirt and some black double

The scam is so simple that it is pure genius. The casino is not the victim so the game protection measures never come into play. Our scammer walks into a busy casino on a Saturday night and scouts out each roulette game. He is looking for a busy roulette game with lots of action and excitement. finds a busy table and a player that is wagering value $100 black gaming cheques all over the board, he will be able to put his scam into motion.

The scam begins with a simple $20 buy suspect quietly places a few wagers politely excusing their reach as to not offend the high roller with the $100 chips. The spin is completed and the process it repeated for a total of five spins. The suspect hangs around for a few spins and walks away a $20 loser. The supervisor is so busy that a $20 buy in is never noted in the ratings as if the play never existed. The high roller continues to enjoy himself and leaves about an hour later without any all is well?

Now that we have looked at advanced systems for roulette, let’s take a look at the tools utiliin a little known scam that can easily fall through the cracks. This scam uses principles of scouting out situations that are conducive to pulling off the scam. Below we see the tools of the trade for this scam are very simple to obtain. You need nothing more than a long sleeve black

ord shirt and some black double-sided tape.

The scam is so simple that it is pure genius. The casino is not the victim so the game protection measures never come into play. Our scammer walks into a busy casino on a Saturday night and scouts out each roulette game. He is looking for a

ame with lots of action and excitement. Once he finds a busy table and a player that is wagering value $100 black gaming cheques all over the board, he will be able to put

The scam begins with a simple $20 buy in for $1 gaming cheques. The table is so bususpect quietly places a few wagers politely excusing their reach as to not offend the high roller with the $100 chips. The spin is completed and the process it repeated for a total of five spins.

suspect hangs around for a few spins and walks away a $20 loser. The supervisor is so busy that a $20 buy in is never noted in the ratings as if the play never existed. The high roller continues to enjoy himself and leaves about an hour later without any noted incident. Seems like

Not So Fast!

Now that we have looked at advanced systems for roulette, let’s take a look at the tools utilized in a little known scam that can easily fall through the cracks. This scam uses principles of scouting out situations that are conducive to pulling off the scam. Below we see the tools of the

ng more than a long sleeve black

in for $1 gaming cheques. The table is so busy that our suspect quietly places a few wagers politely excusing their reach as to not offend the high roller with the $100 chips. The spin is completed and the process it repeated for a total of five spins.

suspect hangs around for a few spins and walks away a $20 loser. The supervisor is so busy that a $20 buy in is never noted in the ratings as if the play never existed. The high roller

noted incident. Seems like

Page 49: ACSN Issue 8 PDF

Our $1 average bet player that managed to stay well under the radar actually walked out of the casino with a $500 scam. Here is how it went down. Prior to entering the casino the thief placed double sided black tape on the underside forearm area of their black long sleeve shirt.

The wagers are placed with an excuse me attitude as our scammer ever so slightly brushes the top of a large stack of $100 black gaming cheques while reaching to make a wager. A reverse photo from below the table shows how dark the shirt and double sided tape are not visible to the naked eye. The players on the game have no idea the high roller is being victimized each roll. The thief takes

a small step back away from the table and removes the $100 gaming cheque from the bottom of the shirt and pockets the instant profit.

We started out showing the million dollar roulette computer scams that have been documented so much in the media. We also see that the smallest scam has the possibility to have tremendous impact on a casino. Many of the small scams are never realized as the workings of the scam are simple in their process but, extremely difficult to pick up from both a table games and surveillance perspective.

All of the photos are taken in a night vision type

format to show the tape and gaming chips as

they are taken off the game. In ordinary

circumstances you would not see either

Page 50: ACSN Issue 8 PDF