ACRS MEETING WITH THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

8/3/2019 ACRS MEETING WITH THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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SU.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtectingPeopleand theEnvironment

ACRS MEETING WITHTHE U.S. NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONNovember 29, 2011

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U.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtectingPeopleand theEnvironment

Overview

Said Abdel-Khalik

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Accomplishments Since our last meeting with the

Commission on June 6, 2011, weissued 16 Reports.

* Topics:InitialACRS Review of: (1) the NRCNear-Term Task Force Report onFukushima and (2) Staff'sRecommended Actions to be TakenWithout Delay

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* Topics (cont.):- ACRS Review of Staff's

Prioritizationof RecommendedActions to be Taken in Response toFukushima Lessons Learned (SECY-11-0137)

- ProposedRulemaking to Introducea Site-Specific PerformanceAssessment and Human IntrusionAnalysis Requirement to 10 CFRPart614


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* Topics (cont.):- Draft SECY Paper, Options forProceedingwith Future Level 3ProbabilisticRisk AssessmentActivities"- Selected Chaptersof the Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) with OpenItems for Certificationof the U.S.APWR Design- Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,

Unit 2, Extended Power UprateApplication5


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* Topics (cont.):- FinalSER Associated with theLicense Renewal Application for

Hope Creek GeneratingStation- GeneralElectric Topical ReportNEDC-33173P, Supplement 2, Parts1, 2, and 3, "Analysis of Gamma

Scan Data and Removal of SafetyLimit Minimum CriticalPower Ratio(SLMCPR) Margin"

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* Topics (cont.):- Assessment of the Quality of

Selected NRC Research Projects- Draft FinalRevision 6 of Standard

Review Plan Branch TechnicalPosition 7-19, "Guidance forEvaluation of Diversity andDefense-in-Depth in DigitalComputer-BasedInstrumentationand Control Systems"

- Enhancing the Fuel Cycle OversightProcess

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* Topics (cont.):Draft Regulatory Guides in Supportof Proposed10 CFR 50.46(c) Rule,"Requirements for Emergency CoreCooling Systems for LWRs":m DG 1261, Conducting Periodic:Testing

for Breakaway Oxidation Behaviorm DG 1262, Testing for Postquench

Ductilityw]DG 1263, EstablishingAnalyticalLimits for Zirconium-BasedAlloyCladding

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* Topics (cont.):

Revision 19 to the AP1000 DesignControlDocument (DCD) and theAP1000 FinalSafety Evaluation* In December 2010, we concluded

that the API000 DCA maintainsthe robustness of the previouslycertified design

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- Rev. 19 to APIO00 DCD (cont.)* Conclusion relied in part oncommitments provided by WEC

during our meetings which were notyet included in the DCA application

* Revision 19 of the DCD wassubmitted in June 2011 and staffFSER issued in August 2011

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-Rev. 19 to APIO00 DCD (cont.)DCD Revision 19 Changes/Additional finite element analyses

of Passive Cooling System Tankvl Additional analyses of seismic and

thermal load combinationsof theEnhanced Shield Building (ESB)VAdditional Tier 2* information

describingsteel modules of theESB wall

/Updated containment accidentpressure analysis

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- Rev. 19 to APIO00 DCD (cont.)* The changes proposed n theAPI00 DCD amendment, including

those made in Revision 19,maintain the robustness of theprevious certified design.

* There is reasonableassurancethat the revised design can bebuilt and operated without unduerisk to the health and safety of thepublic.

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New PlantActivities* Reviewing:DC applicationsand SERs associatedwith the U.S. EPR and US-APWR

designs-Adequacy of Long-Term Core CoolingApproach for the ABWR and US-APWR-Reference COLAs for ABWR, ESBWR,US-APWR, and U.S. EPR

Subsequent COLAs for API00* Continuing to complete reviews ofavailablematerialpromptly'14


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License Renewal* Interim and final reviews to be

performed for Columbia,Davis Besse, Seabrook, andSouth Texas

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Power Uprates* Will review the GrandGulf, Turkey

Point,St. Lucie, Monticello, FortCalhoun, Peach Bottom, and PrairieIsland Extended Power UprateApplications

* Will review GE Topical Report NEDC-33436P,"BWR Vessel Internals Project,Methodology for DemonstratingSteamDryer Integrity for Power Uprate"

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Other OngoingiFutureActivities Fukushima Longer-Term Reviews SOARCA4 Watts Bar 2 DigitalI&C0 10 CFR 50.46(c)0 Emergency Planning or Small ModularReactors* Revision to the ConstructionReactor

Oversight ProcessAssessment Program Blending of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Safety Culture Emerging Technical Issues Extended Dry Cask Storage 17


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KU.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtectingPeopleand theEnvironment

ACRS Review ofFUKUSHIMA

Said Abdel-Khalik18


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ACRS Briefings on Fukushima" April 7- NRC Staff on InitialResponse" May 26- DOE and NEI* June 23 - NRC Staff on Task Force

Actions* July 12-INPO" August 16 & September 8- Near Term

Task Force October 7- Fukushima Steering

Committee

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ACRS Reports on FukushimaResponses to Commission Tasking viaSRM-SECY-11-0093, "Near-Term Reportand Recommendations for AgencyActions Following the Events in Japan"- ACRS Letter Report dated October 13, 2011- ACRS Letter Report dated November 8, 2011

* Additional Letter Reports will be issuedas we engage with the staff on actionplans related to specificrecommendations

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011" Staff's recommended actions are

appropriately ocused on lessonslearned from what is currentlyknown

" Near-term recommendationsunlikely to be negated, or renderedinappropriate, y the acquisitionofnew information

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011" ACRS review focused on

completeness and appropriatenessof recommended staff actions

* Two categoriesof recommendations- Additional immediate actions (2.1-Day

Report)- Additional actions beyond those

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Immediate Actions (21-Day Report)

Actions related to NTTF Recommendation2.1 (seismic and flood re-evaluations)should be expanded to include anexpedited update of the applicableregulatoryguidance,methods, and datafor external flooding

* Actions related to NTTF Recommendation2.3 (seismic and flood walkdowns) shouldbe expanded to address the integratedeffects of severe storms


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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Immediate Actions (21-Day Report)

Actions related to NTTF Recommendation4.1 (SBO regulatoryactions)should beexpanded to include issuance of anadvanced notice of proposed rulemakingand require licensees to provide anassessment of capabilities o cope withan extended SBO

* Actions related to NTTF Recommendation5.1 (reliablehardenedvents for Mark Icontainments)should also be applied toBWRs with Mark II containments

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Immediate Actions (21-Day Report)" Discussionswith stakeholdersshould be

initiatedregardingnear-term actions foradditionalhydrogen controland mitigationmeasures in reactorbuildings for plantswith Mark I and Mark II containments.

* Information should be requested fromlicensees regardingcurrentplant-specificspent fuel pool instrumentation,powersupplies, and sources of makeup andcooling water.

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Immediate Actions (21-Day Report)* Actions related to NTTF Recommendation8 (integrationof EOPsISAMGsIEDMGs)should be expanded to include fireresponse procedures.

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Recommendations to

NTTF Report* Performance-based riteria o

mitigate and manage an extendedSBO should be consideredas analternative to the specific copingtimes proposed n Recommendation4.1z

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NTTF ReportRecommendation 6 should beexpanded to include:- a requirement for BWR plants with MarkI and Mark !I containments toimplement combustible gas controlmeasures in reactorbuildings as a near-term defense-in-depth measure.

- an assessment of the vulnerabilitiesintroducedby shared ventilationsystems or sharedstacks in multi-unitsites.

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011Additional Recomm endations to

NTTF Report

* Selected reactorand containmentinstrumentationshould be enhancedto withstand beyond-design-basisaccident conditions.

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NTTF ReportThe NRC should proactively engagein efforts to define and participate nprograms to capture and analyzedata from the Fukushima event toenhance understandingof severeaccidentphenomena, including BWRmelt progression,seawateradditioneffects, hydrogen transportandcombustion, and safety systemsoperability.

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ACRS Letter - October 13, 2011ContainmentAccident Pressure

Licensing actions requiringthegrantingof containment accidentpressure (CAP) credit should besuspended until the implicationsofpost-Fukushima containmentpressure control measures areunderstood.


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ACRS Letter - November 8, 2011Staff's three-tierapproachandcriteria or prioritizationof NTTFrecommendations are appropriatesubject to the following additionalrecommendations:

Rulemaking activities related tostrengthening of SBO mitigationcapabilityshould be expedited

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ACRS Letter - November 8, 2011(additional ecommendations)Tier 1 recommendationsshould beexpanded to include additionalactions identified in our O ctober 13,2011, report:" guidance for flooding hazardsevaluations" integratedwalkdowns" station blackout" BWR hardenedvents" shared ventilations systems" hydrogen control and mitigation" spent fuel pools" integrationof onsite emergencyactions 33


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ACRS Letter - November 8, 2011(additional ecommendations)NTTF recommendation 10.2regardingevaluation of the commandand control structure andqualificationsof decision makersshould be initiated n parallelwithTier 1 activities related to integrationof onsite emergency actions

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ACRS Letter - November 8, 2011(additional ecommendations)Tier 2 recommendationsshould beexpanded to include the additionalrecommendationsregardingenhancement of selected reactorand containment instrumentation,and the need to proactively engage inefforts to capture and analyze datafrom the Fukushima event

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ACRS Letter - November 8, 2011(additional ecommendations)Tier 1 recommendation 7.1-2,"Develop and issue order to licenseesto provide reliableSFPinstrumentation,"should bereconsidered. Schedules for SFPinstrumentation mprovements andother modifications to the SFP shouldbe informed by quantificationof thecontributionmade by SFPs to overallplant risk.

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Summary Staff's recommended actions areappropriately ocused on lessonslearned from what is currently known* Near-term recommendationsunlikely tobe negated, or rendered inappropriate,by the acquisitionof new information* Looking forward to future engagementswith staff to review specific actionsrelated to prioritizationefforts.

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SU.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtectingPeopleand theEnvironment

ProposedRulemakingto addSite-Specific Analysis toPart61

Michael T. Ryan.38


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SRM-SECY-08-0147Directed the staff to:

e Proceedwith rulemaking to add site-specific analysis for disposalof largequantitiesof depleted Uranium (DU)

SRM-SECY-10-00Directed the staff

Incorporate argelevel waste (LLW)

Ntonscale blending of low-in the rulemaking

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CurrentPart61 PerformanceObjectivese 61.41 - Principal equirementsfor protection of members of thepublic9 61.42 - Protectionof theinadvertentintruder9 61.43 - Protectionof individualsduring operations

. 61.44 - Stability of the disposa lsite after closure40


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ProposedMajor Rule ChangesS61.41*Adds Site-Specific Performance

Assessment*Adds Period-of-Performance POP)of

20,000 years

S61.42*Adds Site-Specific IntruderAnalysis"Adds 500 mrem annualdose for anIntruder"Includes POP of 20,000 years

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ProposedMajor Rule Changes461w13Adds Site-Specific Long-Term Analysis:

-Consider the potential long-termradiological mpacts-Calculate peak dose that would occur20,000 years or more after site closure

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ACRS Recommendations* Part61 should not be amendedas recommended by staff* Assessment methodology should

be risk informed andperformance based* POP should not be specified inrule; It should be site-specificand risk informed with respect todisposaltechnology and sitecharacteristics

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Risk-InformedApproach" Radionuclide Characteristics" Waste Form" Waste Package" DisposalTechnology* Cover Technology" GeohydrologicalEnvironment

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POP* 20,000 years is excessive.

- IAEA Safety Standard (SSR-5)recommends "severalhundredyears" for short-lived and"severalthousandyears" forintermediate and high-levelwaste

- DOE (Order435.1) uses 1000years for LLW

- NRC HLW (Part63) uses 10,000years

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POP (cont.)ACNW previously (1997 and 2000)recommended two-part approach:* (1) Site-specific time to address

more mobile radionuclides-peak dose for compliance* (2) Qualitativeassessment ,

without compliance measure, toidentify possible deficiencies inlong term perform ance offacility

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POP (Cont.)" Assessments longer than a few

hundred to a thousandyearsshould focus on major failures ofa disposal system , rather han afew intruders" Only one commenter out of 15 ondraft proposed languagespecifically supported 20,000 yearPOP

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Disposal of DU" DU can be acceptable waste for

disposal n a Part61 LLW facility,under certain circumstances" DU can be evaluated in a risk

informed performance assessmentfor a LLW facility* For example - a range of depth

of burials could be evaluated tominimize intrudercontact withDU waste

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Inadverten in truders OriginalPart61 - intruderanalysis was

a simplified bounding calculation toestablish concentrations or certainradionuclides

More realistic nadvertent intruderscenarios that consider site-specificfactors should be used within a risk-informed approach

Most LLW is decayed away with only asmall number of radionuclidespresentafter 300 years

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In Conclusion" Greateremphasis on a risk

informed approach for LLWmanagement" Focus on radionuclidequantity

rather han waste origins orconcentrations* Realistic treatment of intruder

protection, including probabilityand consequences of intrusion,andotherparameters(depth of burial,performance of intruderbarriers)

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SU.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtectingPeopleand the Environment

Options for Proceedingwith Future Level 3ProbabilisticRisk

Assessm ent ActivitiesJohn W. Stetkar

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SEC Y-11-0089" "Options for Proceedingwith Future

Level 3 ProbabilisticRisk AssessmentActivities"

" Option 1: Status Quo - Evolutionarydevelopment of PRA technology

Option 2: Focused Research -Address identified technology gapsbefore conducting full-scope PRA

* Option 3: Full-scope Level 3 PRA foroperatingnuclearpower plant52


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ACRS Reviews" Subcommittee meetings in November

2010 andMay 2011" Full Committee meeting in June 2011" ACRS recommended modified version

of Option 3" SRM for SECY-11-0089 in September2011 approved modified version ofOption 3

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Analytical Advances SinceNUREG.1150

* PRA methods (human reliability,fires, seismic, other external events)

* Severe accidentphenomena Risk during shutdown modes* Characterizationand quantification

of uncertainty

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Industry Advances SinceNUREG.1150

" Plantoperationsand maintenance Plantmodifications" Risk-informed configurationcontrol Severe accidentmitigationguidance" Emergency planning

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Level 3 PRA" Fully integratedassessment" Identificationof important linkages

and dependencies (physical,functional,human)

" Balanced understandingof currentrisk profile and contributors

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Option 3 vs. Option 2" Additional researchwill be needed

to address specific issues" Level 3 PRA provides scenario-based

context and focus" Level 3 PRA may identify otherimportantknowledge gaps that

requirepracticalsolutions" Simplified or bounding assessments

can distort understandingof actualrisk57


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IntegratedLevel 3 PRA Results* Interim results should benefit from

integratedassessment of Level 3 riskfor specific hazard categoriesandplant operatingstates- Internal events and hazards at full power- External events at full power- Multi-unit site risk at full power- Internal events and hazards at shutdown-External events at shutdown- Multi-unit site risk, mixed unit modes- Other contributors(e.g., fuel pools, ISFSI)

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Available Technical Information Active industry participationand

collaborative nput" Selection of participatingplant site" Benefit from existing SPAR models

and plant-specific analyses" Benefit from other NRC initiatives(e.g., SOARCA)

" May be prudent to select PWR site,pending understandingof FukushimaDaiichiaccidentprogression

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Expected Level 3 PRA Benefits" Staff knowledge and experience

from performance of a modern full-scope Level 3 PRA

* Integratedrisk perspective" Input to emergency planning" Input to resolution of generic issues" Quantitative framework to address

new reactordesign and siting issues

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Abbreviations


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ABWR Advanced Boiling Water ReactorACNW Advisory Committee on NuclearWasteACRS Advisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards

APWR Advanced PressurizedWater ReactorAPIO00 Advanced Passive 1000BWR Boiling Water ReactorCAP ContainmentAccident PressureCFR Code of FederalRegulationsCOLA Combined License ApplicationDC Design CertificationDCA Design CertificationAmendmentDCD Design Control DocumentDG Draft Regulatory GuideDOE U.S. Departmentof EnergyDU Depleted UraniumEDMG Extreme D amage Mitigation GuidelineEDO Executive Director or OperationsEOP Emergency OperatingProcedureEPR Evolutionary Power ReactorESB Enhanced Shield BuildingESBWR Economic Simplified Boiling Water

ReactorFSER FinalSafety EvaluationReportGE GeneralElectricHLW High Level Waste

IAEAINPOISFSII&CLLWLWRmremNEINRCNTTFPRAPOPPWRRGSAMGSBOSECYSERSF PSOARCASPARSRMWEC

InternationalAtomic Energy AgencyInstitute of Nuclear Power OperationsIndependent Spent Fuel StorageInstallationInstrumentation& ControlLow Level WasteLight Water ReactormilliremNuclearEnergy InstituteNuclearRegulatory CommissionNear-Term Task ForceProbabilisticRisk AssessmentPeriodof PerformancePressurizedWater ReactorRegulatory GuideSevere Accident Management GuidelineStation BlackoutSecretary of CommissionSafety Evaluation ReportSpent Fuel PoolState-of-the-Art Reactor ConsequenceAnalyses.StandardizedPlantAnalysis RiskStaff Requirements MemorandumiMemorandaWestinghouse Electric Company

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ACRS MEETING WITH THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION