MarineCorpsPersonalPapers,BoardmanCollection Japanese Special Naval Landing Force troops mount a British-tio before the battle.This filmwas developed froma Japanese made, Vickers eight-inchnavalcannon into its turreton Be-camerafoundintheruinswhilethebattlewasstillon. miralHarryW."Handsome Harry" Hill to command the southern group, TaskForce53,fortheassaulton Tarawa. Julian Smith would accom- pany Hill on board the old battleship USSMaryland(BB46).Thetwo officerswereopposites - Hill,out- spoken and impetuous; Julian Smith, reservedandreflective -butthey workedtogetherwell.Spruance set D-Dayfor 20November1943. ColonelShoup came upwithan idea ofhow totackle Betio'sbarrier reefs. He had observed the Marines' newLandingVehicleTracked(LVT or "Alligator"), an amphibian tractor, inoperationduringGuadalcanal. The Alligators were unarmored logis- ticvehicles,notassaultcraft,but they were true amphibians,capable of being launched at sea and swim- ming ashore through moderate surf. Shoup discussed the potential use ofLVTsas assaultcraft with Major Dreweslikedtheidea,butwarned Shoup that many ofhis vehicles were in poor conditionafterthe Guadal- canalcampaign.Atbest,Drewes could provide a maximumof75 ve- hicles, not nearly enough to carry the entire assaultand following waves. Further,the thin hulls ofthe vehicles werevulnerabletoeveryenemy weaponandwouldrequiresome form ofjury-rigged armor plating for minimalprotection.Shoupen- couragedDrewes tomodifythe ve- hicles with whatever armor plate he couldscrounge. GeneralJulianSmithwasaware that a number ofLVT-2s were stock- piledinSan Diego,and hesubmit- tedan urgentrequestfor 100 ofthe newermodelstothecorpscom- mander. Holland Smith endorsed the request favorably, but Admiral Turn- er disagreed. The two strong-willed officers weredoctrinally equal dur- did not dispute the Marines' need for a reef-crossing capability, he object- edtothe factthatthenewvehicles would haveto be carriedto Tarawa intanklandingships(LSTs). The slowspeedoftheLSTs(8.5knots max) wouldrequire aseparate con- voy,additionalescorts,andanin- creased risk oflosing the element of strategicsurprise.HollandSmith reduced the debate to bare essentials: "No LVTs,no operation." Turner ac- quiesced,butitwas notacomplete victory for the Marines.Halfofthe 100newLVT-2swouldgotothe ArmyforceslandingatMakin against much lighter opposition. The 50 Marine vehicles would not arrive intimeforeitherwork-uptraining ortherehearsallandings.The first time the infantry would lay eyes on the LVT-2s would be in the pre-dawn hours ofD-Dayat Tarawa - ifthen. AssaultPreparations Henry C. Drewes,commanding theingthe planningphase,and the ar-Asreplacementtroopsbeganto 2dAmphibianTractorBattalion.gumentwasintense.WhileTurnerpourintoNewZealand,General Smithrequestedtheassignmentof ColonelMerrittA."RedMike"Ed- sonasdivisionchiefofstaff.The fiery Edson,alreadya legend inthe Corps for his heroic exploits in Cen- tralAmericaandGuadalcanal, workedtirelesslytoforgetheamal- gam ofveterans and newcomers into aneffectiveamphibiousteam. IntelligencereportsfromBetio were sobering. The island, devoid of naturaldefiladepositionsandnar- row enough to limit maneuver room, favored the defenders. Betio was less thanthreemileslong,nobroader than 800 yards at its widest point and contained no natural elevation higher than 10 feetabove sealevel. "Every place on the island can be covered by direct rifle and machine gun fire," ob- servedEdson. Theelaboratedefensesprepared by Admiral Saichiro were impressive. Concreteandsteeltetrahedrons, minefields,andlongstringsof double-apron barbed wire protected beachapproaches. The Japanese also built a barrier wall oflogs and coral aroundmuchoftheisland.Tank traps protected heavily fortified com- mandbunkersandfiringpositions inlandfromthebeach.Andevery- wheretherewerepillboxes,nearly 500 ofthem,mostfully coveredby logs,steelplatesandsand. TheJapaneseonBetiowere equippedwitheight-inch,turret- mountednavalrifles(the so-called "Singapore Guns"), as well as a large numberofheavy-calibercoast defense,antiaircraft,antiboat,and fieldartillerygunsandhowitzers. Dual-purpose 13mm heavy machine gunswereprevalent.Lighttanks (mounting 37mm guns), 50mm "knee mortars,"andanabundanceof 7.7mmlightmachinegunscom- plementedthedefensiveweaponry. The 2dMarineDivisionatTarawa ajor General Julian C.Smith'sutmost concern when he assumed command ofthe 2d Marine Division on 1May 1943 was the physical con- dition ofthe troops. The division had redeployed to New Zealand from Guadalcanal withnearly 13,000 confirmed casesofmalaria.Halfthedivisionwouldhavetobe replaced before the next campaign. The infantry regiments ofthe 2d Marine Division were the 2d. 6th, and 8th Ma- rines; the artillery regiment was the 10th Marines; and the engineers,pioneers,andNavalConstructionBattalion ("Seabees") were consolidated into the 18th Marines. These werethe principal commanders asthe division began its intensified training program leading to Operation Galvanic: C0, 2dMarines:Col William M.Marshall CO,1/2: Maj WoodB.Kyle CO,2/2:Lt 61 HerbertR.Amey,Jr. CO,3/2: Maj John F. Schoettel CO,6th Marines:ColMaurice G.Holmes CO,1/6: Maj William K. Jones CO,2/6: LtColRaymondL. Murray CO,3/6:LtColKenneth F. McLeod CO,8th Marines:ColElmerE.Hall CO,1/8: Maj LawrenceC.Hays,Jr. CO,2/8:Maj Henry P. " J i iCrowe CO,3l8: Maj RobertH.Ruud CO,10th Marines:BGen Thomas E.Bourke CO,18th Marines:ColCyril W.Martyr Other officers who would emerge in key roles at Tarawa included Brigadier General ko 0.Hermle,Assistant Di- vision Commander; Lieutenant Colonel Presley M.Rixey, commanding 1/10, a pack-howitzerbattalion supporting the2d Marines; LieutenantColonel Alexander 8.Swen- ceski, commanding the composite 2d Tank Battalion; Major Henry C. DrPwes, aomrnanding 2d Amphibian Tractor Bat- talion; Major Michael P.Ryan, commanding Company L, 3/2;and F b t Lieutemnt WiIllan D. Hawkins, c o ding the Smut Sniper Hatoon in the 2d Madnes. Albgdm, 18,088 Mrriares a d d m s oftihe division participated in the assaulb on h w a AtdL About 55 percent wnc wnr- bat veterans, U n k CwaMcanal, the Mmines at Tarawa carried modern inf-weapons,k d u h G d M-1 semi-automatfc rines, Bnmmimg au~~nraticdim, and po* able flame throwers.Assault Manines landed wi&a cam- bat load conrdsting of lampaad, poncho, drenching ~ 1 , bayonet, fidd n tiom, andmorske (qdakip diecasded). Marry ofdrwcamylng heavy ws~pons,prmnunidon,or radios drowned during the h h debarkation from lad- i q d under fireatthed s edge. %lopsofthe 2d Murfne Divisian &barkdown cago nets fromab o p hffnspor?duringmnphibioushainirrg. LtGenJulian C. Smith CollectionAn LVT-1 is lowered from a troop transport during landing camouflage utilities while the others are in the usual herring-rehearsals . Some of the Marines shown here are wearing bone twill. Note that the sea appears unusually calm.TheJapanese during Augustreplaced Saichero with Rear AdmiralMeichi Shibasaki, an officer reputedto be more of a fighter than an en-gineer.American intelligence sourcesestimated the total strength of the Be-tio garrison to be 4,800 men, ofwhomsome 2,600 were consideredfirst- rate naval troops ."ImperialJapanese Marines;" Edson told thewar correspondents, "the best Tojo' sgot. " Edson's 1st Raider Battalion hadsustained 88 casualties in wrestingTulagi from the 3d Kure SpecialNaval Landing Forcethe previousAugust.Admiral Shibasaki boasted to hi stroops, "a million Americans couldn' ttake Tarawa in 100 years . " H is opti-mism was forgivable.The island wasthe most heavily defended atoll tha tever would be invaded by Alliedforces in the Pacific.Task Force 53 sorely neededdetailed tidal information for Tara -wa.Colonel Shoup was confidentthat the LVTs could negotiate the reefat any tide, but he worried about theremainder of the assault troops ,tanks, artillery, and reserve forcesthat would have to come ashore inH iggins boats (LCVPs) .The criticalwater depth over the reef was fou rfeet, enough to float a laden LCVP.Anything less and the troops wouldhave to wade ashore several hundredyards against that panoply ofJapanese weapons .Major Frank H olland, a NewZealand reserve officer with 15 years'experience sailing the waters of Tara-wa, flatly predicted, "there won't b ethree feet of water on the reef! "Shoup took H olland's warnings seri -ously and made sure the troops knewin advance that "there was a 50- 50chance of having to wade ashore. "In the face of the dauntingJapanese defenses and the physicalconstraints of the island, Shoup pro-posed a landing plan which includ-ed a sustained preliminarybombardment, advance seizure ofneighboring Bairiki Island as an ar-tillery fire base, and a decoy landing .General Smith took this proposal tothe planning conference in Pearl H ar-bor with the principal officers in-volved in Operation Galvanic:Admirals Nimitz, Spruance, Turner,and H ill, and Major General H ollandSmith.The Marines were stunned to hearthe restrictions imposed on their as-sault by CinCPac.Nimitz declaredthat the requirement for strategic sur-prise limited preliminary bombard-ment of Betio to about three hour son the morning of D- Day.The im-perative to concentrate naval forcesto defend against a Japanese fleet sor-tie also ruled out advance seizure ofBairiki and any decoy landings.ThenH olland Smith announced his ownbombshell:the 6th Marines would bewithheld as corps reserve.All of Julian Smith's tactical op-tions had been stripped away .The 2d4

INTELLIGENCE MAPBITITU (BETIO) ISLANDTARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS5C' A00 300 200 100 0 1000 0 sTAKEN FROM 2D MAR OI VSPECIAL ACTION REPORTpreceded by advance seizure of th epier by the regimental scout snipe rplatoon (Lieutenant William D.Hawkins).Landing abreast at H-Hour would be LT 3/2 (3d Battalion,2d Marines) (Major John F.Schoet-tel) on Red One; LT 2/2 (2d Battal -ion, 2d Marines) (Lieutenant ColonelHerbert R.Amey, Jr . ) on Red Two ;and LT 2/8 (Major Henry P.JimCrowe) on Red Three.Major WoodB.Kyles LT 1/2 (1st Battalion, 2dMarines) would be on call as theregimental reserve .General Smith scheduled a large-scale amphibious exercise in Hawke sBay for the first of November an dmade arrangements forNew Zealandtrucks to haul the men back to Wel-lington at the conclusion in time fo ra large dance .Complacently, the en-tire 2d Marine Division embarkedaboard 16 amphibious ships for th eroutine exercise .It was all an artfulruse .The ships weighed anchor andheaded north for Operation Galvan-ic.For once, "Tokyo Rose" had n oclue of the impending campaign .Most of Task Force 53 assemble din Efate, New Hebrides, on 7 Novem -ber.Admiral Hill arrived on boardMaryland . The Marines, now keen-ly aware that an operation was un-derway, were more interested in th earrival from Noumea of 14 newSherman M4- A2 tanks on board th edock landing ship Ashland (LSD 1) .The division had never operated wit hmedium tanks before .The landing rehearsals at Efate di dlittle to prepare the Marines for Be -tio.The fleet carriers and their em-barked air wings were off assaultin gtargets in the Solomons.The Sher-man tanks had no place to offload .The new LVT- 2s were presumabl ysomewhere to the north, underwaydirectly for Tarawa .Naval gun shipsbombarded Erradaka Island, wellaway from the troops landing a tMele Bay.One overlooked aspect of the re -hearsal paid subsequent dividend sfor the Marines in the coming as-sault .Major William K."Willie K. "Jones, commanding LT 1/6, took th eopportunity to practice embarkinghis troops in rubber rafts.In the pre -war Fleet Marine Force, the first bat-talion in each regiment had bee ndesignated "the rubber boat battal -ion. " The uncommon sight of thismini- flotilla inspired numerous cat -calls from the other Marines .Joneshimself was dubbed "The Admiral ofthe Condom Fleet . "The contentious issue during thepost- rehearsal critique was the suita-bility of the naval gunfire plan .Thetarget island was scheduled to receivethe greatest concentration of navalgunfire of the war to date .Man ysenior naval officers were optimisti cof the outcome ."We do not inten d6to neutralize[the island], we do notlittle armor. I want you to know the intend to destroy it," boasted one ad-Marines are crossing the beach with miral,"Gentlemen, we will obliteratebayonets,and the only armor they'll it."ButGeneralSmithhadheardhaveisakhakishirt!" enoughoftheseboasts.InavoiceWhileatEfate,ColonelWilliam taut withanger he stoodtoaddressMarshall,commandingCombat the meeting: "Even though you navalTeamTwoandscheduledforthe officersdocomeintoabout1,000major assault roleat Betio,became yards,I remind you that you have atooilltocontinue.Inamemorable decision,GeneralSmithpromoted David Shoup to colonel and ordered himtorelieveColonelMarshall. Shoup knew the 2d Marines,and he certainlyknewtheplan.Thear- chitect was about tobecomethe ex- ecu tor. OnceunderwayfromEfate,Ad- miralHillorderedthe various com- The Japanese Special T amwa was t hr firstlarge-scaleenmunter between U.S.blarines and the lapanme Srlrcinl Niriwl L~rtrl- ir~gFnrcrs.The division intelligence staifhad lore- warnerl that"naval units ofthis type are usually more high- lytrainedandh a w agreatrr tenacitvandfightingspirit than the average lapanew Armv unit," butthe Marines wcw surprisedattheterncityofthedefendemonBetin. Thelapanesr"lmprrialhlarines"earnedthegrudgin!: respect ottheirAmericancounterparts lor their esprit, dis- c~pline. marksmanship.proficiencywithheavy weapons, small-unitleadenhip.manitestbravery,andastoicwill- ingnesstodietnthelastman. MajorWilliamK.loncs, whose1stBattalion. 6th Marines,engaged more ofthe ene- myinhand-to-handcomllaton Betic) than any other unil. sl i d "these Idefenders) wereprettytough.andtheywere hip,six-foot,thebiggestlapsthatIeversaw:'Maior I_arvrence C.Havsreportedthat"their equipmentwas ex- mllentandtherewasplentyntsurplustound, including Iarxcamountsof ammo:' ThelapaneseusedStrerinf NnrnlLnrrdirrnFnrresfre- qutmtlyinthe earlyvearsnithe war.InDecemher1041. aforce nf5.000 lancletl cinGuam,and another unitot 450 assaulteclWake Island. A small detachmentot113 men was the tintlapanese reintnrcing unitto land on Guadalcanal. 10davsaftertheAmericanlanding.A350-manShTF NavalLandingForces detachmentprovidedficrcrresktancr tnthe1stMarine Di- visionlandings on Tulaai and Gavutu-Tanamtl(go carlv in the Guadalcanal campaign. AtypicalSNLF unitIna dekn-sive role was commandedbvanar y captain and mnsisted 01threeriflecompanirzaugmcnt dlwantiaircraft, coast clefense,antiboat,andlirlclartillrnrunitsofwvwalbat- terieseach.plusserviceandlahortroops. The Tapanrce garrisnnon RetinonP-Dav cnnsist~clof the 3,fS ~ wi n l EinscForrr( I nr mt dy the 6t lrYoLrlstrk 11 5p*- r ~ nl Nnwl Lntdiirxhrrc*~. the-!/I 5ndw C;lrt~-inIN17m1 Lnrldir1.q Forcrfwhichinclrl [led200NCOs and ot iicers ol theTnt~~mrrrnNnzwl G~trrr~rv-wSCIWDII,thr111th Pinttrri~. andthe4thCnnstrtrrtinr~Unit,anestimatrclc.randtotal ni 4.850men. Allcrew-senredweaponsonRetin,from7.7mmlight machine prunstn el ~ht - ~nchnavalrifles.were interrated Into the tnrtificrl d~f ens i vr wstcmthatinclutlerl 500 p~llhnxes. blockhnuses,andrithvremplacrments.Thchasicheach detenseweaponiaceclbytheMarines duringttifmirIand- ings on thenortherncoastwas theMo313mm, dualpur- pnse(antiair,antihoat Iheavymachinegun. Inmanv seawall rmplacemmt5.these lethalweapon< were sitedtn providrtlanking f ~ r ~ along wirerntanglrmrntq andother h a tobst acl s.Flanking tire discipline i v a ~ insuwcl hv seal- ing(dfthelrontemtirasures. Admiral Shihasahl organized his troops on Pet in for "an the beach." 141sment o u ~h t with rdbitterlighting. 4.boO lavrle.d. ; takenwwc.ccinscriptrclKorean civrrallJrcisivr Iletrnsr ,>I greatvalnr.Nt er76 houn Mostofthe1 4 ~ pr ~s nnerla t ~or e n.Onl y17 woundedlapanesesurrenderrd.

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NMG UP TO'EO nBARRICADE CONSTRUCTEDOF L OG S . SANDBAG S AN DPROBABL Y CEMENTPOSITIONS BUIL T OF SANGBAG SON TOP OF SEAWAL L , 3-'I FT.HIG Hz (SAND BAG S --~- s kCORALBTO 3BREACSEVERA14Cm,RIFL ESCAMOUFL AG EDIo5m,NABeach Redl 4*1 -BeachA. B .GUNS, HMG'sUP TO 40 mmLA IN ES / /.EFINITE COVERED POSITIONSR55L 9~NOFEP MOLES I3rANTI BOAT G UN SHMG S UP T .*Om. RD-2 SITUATI'N MFOR ANNEX "D"(INT LLIGETO OPN. 0 NO. I.4 . 2.2 ' 0.Znd Marine Div/sio nRIFL E PITSCN9''(SAAWAL LNIG HSO INPL ACES DEFINITE COVERED POSITIONSv. . [RED'ABMarin e CorpsPers on al PapersA detailed view of Division D-2 situation map of western Be- and Red Beach One, especially those within the "re-entrant"do was prepared one month before the landing . Note the cove along the north shore. Intelligence proj ections provedpredicited position of Japanese defenses along Green Beach almost 90 percent accurate and heavy casualties resulted.ordered hiss hipsto res ume firin g at0605. Sudden ly, at 0610, the aircraf tappeared, bombin g an d s trafin g th eis lan d for the n ext few min utes .Amid all this , the s unros e, red an domin ousthrough the thicks mok e .The battles hips , cruis ers , an d des-troyersof Tas kForce 53 begana s atu -rationbombardmen t of Betio for th en ext s ev eral hours .The awes omes hockan d s oun dsof the s hellin gwere experien ced av idly by the Ma-riv es .Staff Sergean t NormanHatch ,a combat photographer, thought t ohims elf, "we jus t really didn 't s ee ho wwe could do [an ythin g] but go i nthere an d bury the people . . .thiswas n 't goin g to be a fight . " Time cor-res pon den t Robert Sherrod thought ,"s urely, n o mortal mencould liv ethrough s uch des troyin g power . . .an y Japsonthe is lan d would all b edead by n ow. " Sherrod'sthought swere rudely in terrupted by a geys erof water 50 yardsas ternof the s hip.The Japan es e had res umed fire an dtheir targetswere the v uln erabl etran s ports .The troop s hipshas tilygot un derway for the s econ d tim ethat morn in g .For Admiral Hill an d Gen era lJulianSmith onboard Marylan d, th ebes t s ource of in formationthrough -out the lon g day would prov e to b ethe Vought- Sik ors k y Type OS2UKin gfis her obs erv ationaircraf t9LVT-2andLVT(A)2 T he LVT-2,popularly known as the Water Buffalo, wasbuiltb improveuponahortoomings inthe design ofthe Marine Corps' initial amphibian ve- hicle, the LLVT-.The new vehicle feaWa des@edsus pension system with rubber-tired road wheels and torsion springs for imprcmed stability and a moother ride. The p o w train was ! # a d a d dwith that ofthe M3A1 Stu- art light tank. Thisthe LVT2 greater power and relia- bilitythanitspredecessorand, combinedwithnew Wahaped treadsl gave it greater propulsion on land and in the water. The new vehicle also a d d carry 1,500 pounds mom c q p thanthe originalLWl. The LVT-2e n d production in June 1942, but did not see combat until Tarawa in Nav~mbg.1943. The Matines used a combination of LVT-1s and LVT-2s in the assault on W o . The 50 LVT-2sused atTarawaweremodifiedin Samoa just before the battle with W8-inch boiler plates in- stalled around thecabfor greater protection fromsmall a r ms Hr e a n d ~ ~ t s . De s p i ~ t h e ~ s s o f 3 0 o f thee vehidestoenanyfirPatTarawa,theimprovisedarmorwas mnsidered promisirrg andled toa call for truly annored LVTs. 'TheLVT(A)2 ["ANfor annored] requested bytheU.S. Army was a version which saw limited use with the Ma- rine Corps. The LVT(A)2 had factoryinstalled armor plat- iq on the hull and cab b resist heavy machine gun fire, The new vendon appeared identical to the LVT2 with the emraption ofarmored drivers' hatches. With legithate ar- mor pmtection, the LVT(A)2 could function as an assault AmphibianTractors vehicle in the lead wavesofa landing. The armored am- phibian vehicle provided d e n t serviee when it was itt.- troducedMarlne opmtions onNew Britain. Mom than 3,000 LW2s and LLVT(A)Zs wem maa& tured during Wodd War 11.These d t vehicb pxoved tobevaluableassetstoMarine Corps assaultteams throughout the Pacific campaign, tramporking thousands ofbwps andtons ofequipment.Theddesign, howeverI left some operational deficiencies. For one thing, the vehicles lacked a camp. AU troops and equipment had t~ be !loaded and unloaded over the gunwales. This c a dpmblemsinnormalfielduseandwasparticularly hazardous during an apposed landing. This fador would lead to the further development ofamphibian tractors tn the L W family duriag the war. Compiled bySecond LiautenantWgsley 2, . Mght,USMC launched by the battleships.At 0648, Hill inquired ofthe pilot ofone float plane,"Isreef coveredwithwater?" The answer was a cryptic "negative." At that same time, the LVTsofWave One,with700infantrymenem- barked,lefttheassemblyareaand headedforthelineofdeparture. The crews and embarked troops in theLVTshadalreadyhadalong morning, complete with hair-raising cross-decktransfersinthechoppy sea and the unwelcome thrill ofeight- inchshells landing intheir proximi- ty.Nowtheywerecommencingan extremelylongruntothebeach,a distance ofnearly 10 miles. The craft started ontimebutquicklyfell be- hind schedule. The LW-1s ofthe first wave failedto maintainthe planned 4.5-knotspeedofadvance due toa strongwesterlycurrent,decreased buoyancy from the weight ofthe im- provisedarmorplating,andtheir overaged power plants. There was a psychological factor at work as well. "Red Mike" Edson had criticizedthe LVTcrewsfor landingfive minutes earlyduringtherehearsalat Efate, saying, "early arrival inexcusable, late arrival preferable." Admiral Hill and General Smith soon realized that the threestrugglingcolumnsofLVTs wouldnevermakethebeachby 0830. H-Hour was postponedtwice, to 0845, then to 0900. Here again, not allhandsreceivedthisword. The destroyers Ringgold (DD 500) and Dashiell (DD 659) entered the la- goon in the wake oftwo minesweep- ers toprovideclose-infire support. Once in the lagoon, the minesweep- erPursuit(AM108)becamethe PrimaryControlShip,takingposi- tion directly on the line ofdeparture. Pursuitturnedhersearchlightsea- ward to provide the LVTs with a bea- conthroughthethickdustand smoke. Finally, at 0824, the first wave ofLVTscrossedtheline,still6,000 yards away from the target beaches. Aminutelaterthesecondgroup ofcarrier aircraftroaredover Betio, rightontimefortheoriginalH- Hour, but totally unaware ofthe new times. This was another blunder. Ad- miralKellyTurnerhadspecifically providedallplayersinOperation Galvanicwiththisadmonition: "Times ofstrafing beaches with refer- ence to H-Hour are approximate;the distance ofthe boats from the beach is the governing factor." Admiral Hill hadtocallthemoff. The planes re- mainedon station, but with deplet- edfuelandammunitionlevels available. The LVTsstruggledshoreward in three long waves, each separated by LtGen Julian C. Smith CollectionTroops of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division, load magazines andclean their weapons enroute to Betio on board the attack transport Z eilin (APA3) .a 300- yard interval : the 42 LVT- 1s o fWave One, followed by 24 LVT- 2s ofWave Two, and 21 LVT- 2s of Wav eThree .Behind the tracked vehicle scame Waves Four and Five of LCVPs .Each of the assault battalion com -manders were in Wave Four.Furtherastern, the Ashland ballasted downand launched 14 LCMs, each carry-ing a Sherman medium tank.Fou rother LCMs appeared carrying lighttanks (37mm guns) .Shortly before 0800, ColonelShoup and elements of his tacticalcommand post debarked into LCVPsfrom Biddle (APA8) and headed fo rthe line of departure .Close by Shoupstood an enterprising sergeant, ener -getically shielding his bulky radi ofrom the salt spray .Of the myriad o fcommunications blackouts an dfailures on D- Day, Shoup's radiowould remain functional longer an dserve him better than the radios o fany other commander, American o rJapanese, on the island .Admiral Hill ordered a ceasefire at0854, even though the waves were.still 4,000 yards off shore.Genera lSmith and "Red Mike" Edson object-ed strenuously, but Hill consideredthe huge pillars of smoke unsafe fo roverhead fire support of the assaul twaves .The great noise abruptlyceased .The LVTs making their fina lapproach soon began to receive long-range machine gun fire and artiller yair- bursts .The latter could have bee nfatal to the troops crowded int oopen- topped LVTs, but the Japanes ehad overloaded the projectiles withhigh explosives .Instead of steel shellfragments, the Marines were "douse dwith hot sand . " It was the last tacti -cal mistake the Japanese would makethat day.The previously aborted air strik ereturned at 0855 for five minutes ofnoisy but ineffective strafing alongthe beaches, the pilots again heedingtheir wristwatches instead of th eprogress of the lead LVTs .Two other events occurred at thi stime .A pair of naval landing boat sdarted towards the end of the lon gpier at the reef's edge .Out chargedFirst Lieutenant Hawkins with hi sscout- sniper platoon and a squad ofcombat engineers .These shoc ktroops made quick work of Japanesemachine gun emplacements along th epier with explosives and flam ethrowers.Meanwhile, the LVTs ofWave One struck the reef andcrawled effortlessly over it, com-mencing their final run to the beach .These parts of Shoup's landing planworked to perfection.But the preliminary bombard-ment, as awesome and unprecedent-ed as it had been, had failedsignificantly to soften the defenses .Very little ships' fire had been direct -ed against the landing beaches them -selves, where Admiral Shibasak ivowed to defeat the assault units atthe water's edge .The well- protecte ddefenders simply shook off the sandand manned their guns .Worse, thenear- total curtailment of naval gun-fire for the final 25 minutes of the as -sault run was a fateful lapse .Ineffect, the Americans gave their op -ponents time to shift forces from th esouthern and western beaches t oreinforce northern positions.Th edefenders were groggy from th epounding and stunned at the sight o fLVTs crossing the barrier reef, bu tShibasaki 's killing zone was stil llargely intact .The assault waves wer egreeted by a steadily increasingvolume of combined arms fire .For Wave One, the final 200 yard sto the beach were the roughest, es-pecially for those LVTs approachingRed Beaches One and Two .The ve-hicles were hammered by well- aime dfire from heavy and light machin eguns and 40mm antiboat guns .Th eMarines fired back, expending 10,000rounds from the. 50- caliber machineguns mounted forward on eac hLVT- 1.But the exposed gunners wereeasy targets, and dozens were cu tdown.Major Drewes, the LVT bat-talion commander whohad workedso hard with Shoup to make this as -sault possible, took over one machinegun from a fallen crewman and wa simmediately killed by a bulletthrough the brain .Captain Fenlon A.Durand, one of Drewes' companycommanders, saw a Japanese officerstanding defiantly on the sea wall11waving a pistol, "just daring us tocome ashore :'On they came .Initial touchdowntimes were staggered : 0910 on Re dBeach One; 0917 on Red BeachThree ; 0922 on Red Beach Two .Th efirst LVT ashore was vehicle number4- 9, nicknamed "My Deloris," drive nby PFC Edward J .Moore . "MyDeloris" was the right guide vehicl ein Wave One on Red Beach One, hit-ting the beach squarely on "the bird'sbeak. " Moore tried his best to driv ehis LVT over the five- foot seawall ,but the vehicle stalled in a near -vertical position while nearb ymachine guns riddled the cab .Moorereached for his rifle only to find i tshot in half . One of the embarke dtroops was 19- year- old Private FirstClass Gilbert Ferguson, who recalledwhat happened next on board th eLVT: "The sergeant stood up an dyelled 'everybody out : At that ver yinstant, machine gun bullets ap -peared to rip his head off . . . " Fer-guson, Moore, and others escape dfrom the vehicle and dispatched tw omachine gun positions only yard saway.All became casualties in shortorder .Very few of the LVTs could negoti-ate the seawall.Stalled on the beach ,the vehicles were vulnerable topreregistered mortar and howitze rfire, as well as hand grenades tossedinto the open troop compartments byJapanese troops on the other side o fthe barrier.The crew chief of one ve-hicle, Corporal John Spillane, hadbeen a baseball prospect with the St.Louis Cardinals organization beforethe war .Spillane caught twoJapanese grenades barehanded inmid- air, tossing them back over thewall .A third grenade exploded in hi shand, grievously wounding him .The second and third waves ofLVT2s, protected only by 3/8- inc hboiler plate hurriedly installed i nSamoa, suffered even more intens efire .Several were destroyed spectacu-larly by large- caliber antiboat guns.Private First Class Newman M.Baird, a machine gunner aboard oneembattled vehicle, recounted his or-deal : "We were 100 yards in now an dthe enemy fire was awful damn in-tense and getting worse .They wer eknocking [LVTs] out left and right .Marines and sailors traveling on board a troop transport receive their initial briefing on the landing plan for Betio.Department of Defense Photo (USMC)10180712U.S. NavyCombatArt Collection"Downthe Net," a sketch by Kerr Eby .A tractor'd get hit, stop, and burstinto flames, with men jumping ou tlike torches : ' B aird's own vehicle wasthen hit by a shell, killing the crewand many of the troops . "I grabbedmycarbine and an ammunition boxand stepped over a couple of fellaslying there and put my hand on th eside so 's to roll over into the water.I didn't want to put my head up. Th ebullets were pouring at us like a sheetof rain. "On balance, the LVTs performedtheir assault mission fully withi nJulian Smith's expectations. Onlyeight of the 87 vehicles in the firstthree waves were lost in the assault(although 15 more were so riddledwith holes that they sank uponreaching deep water while seeking toshuttle more troops ashore) . Withina span of 10 minutes, the LVTs land-ed more than 1,500 Marines on B e-tio's north shore, a great start to th eoperation. The critical problem layin sustaining the momentumof theassault. Major Holland's dire predic-tions about the neap tide had provenaccurate. No landing craft wouldcross the reef throughout D- Day.Shoup hoped enough LVTs wouldsurvive to permit wholesale transfer-line operations with the boats alongthe edge of the reef . It rarely worked .The LVTs suffered increasing casual -ties .Manyvehicles, afloat for fivehours already, simply ran of gas .Others had to be used immediatelyfor emergency evacuation of wound -ed Marines . Communications, nevergood, deteriorated as more and moreradio sets suffered water damage orenemy fire. The surviving LVTs con-tinued to serve, but after about 1000on D- Day, most troops had no otheroption but to wade ashore from thereef, covering distances from 500 to1,000 yards under well- aimed fire.Marines of Major Schoettel's LT3/2 were particularly hard hit on RedB each One. Company K sufferedheavy casualties from the re- entran tstrongpoint on the left. CompanyImade progress over the seawall alon gthe "bird's beak ;" but paid a highprice, including the loss of the com-pany commander, Captain WilliamE. Tatom, killed before he could evendebark from his LVT . B oth units los thalf their men in the first two hours.Major Michael P. "Mike" Ryan'sCompany L, forced to wade ashorewhen their boats grounded on th ereef, sustained 35 percent casualties .Ryan recalled the murderous enfilad -ing fire and the confusion. Sudden-ly, "one lone trooper was spottedthrough the fire and smoke scram-bling over a parapet on the beach tothe right;" marking a new landin gpoint. As Ryan finally reached thebeach, he looked back over his shoul-der. 'All [I] could see was heads withrifles held over them," as his wadin gmen tried to make as small a targetas possible. Ryan began assemblin gthe stragglers of various waves inarelatively sheltered area along GreenB each .Major Schoettel remained in hisboat with the remnants of his fourthwave, convinced that his landingteam had been shattered beyondrelief.Noone had contact with Ryan.The fragmented reports Schoettelreceived from the survivors of th etwo other assault companies weredisheartening. Seventeen of his 3 7officers were casualties .In the center, Landing Team 2/2was also hard hit coming ashore overRed B each Two. The Japanese strong -13'TheSingapore Guns' hefiringonBetiohadbarelysubsidedbefore apocryphal claims begantoappear inprintthat A thefoureight-inchnavalriflesusedascoastal defense guns bythe Japanese were the same ones captured from the British at the fall ofSingapore. Many prominent historians unwittingly perpetuated this story, among them thehighlyrespectedSamuel EliotMorison. In 1977, however, British writer William H. Bartsch pub- lished the results ofa recent visit to Tarawa in the quarter- ly magazine After the Battle. Bartsch personally examined each ofthe four guns and discovered markings indicating manufacture by Vickers, the British ordnance company. The Vickers company subsequently providedBartsch records indicating the four guns were part ofa consignment of12 eight-inch, quick-firing gunswhichweresoldin1905 to the Japanese during their war with Russia. Further investi- gationbyBartsch atthe Imperial WarMuseum produced the fact that there were no eight-inch guns captured bythe Japanese at Singapore. In short, the guns at Tarawa came from a far more legitimate, and older, transaction with the British. The eight-inch guns fired the opening rounds in the bat- tleofTarawa, butwere notbythemselves a factor inthe contest. Earlier bombing raids may have damaged their fire control systems. Rapid counterbattery fire from American battleships took out the big guns in short order, although one ofthem maintainedan intermittent, ifinaccurate, fire throughout D+1. Colonel Shoup stated emphatically that the 2dMarine Division was fully aware ofthe presence of eight-inch guns on Betioas early as mid-August 1943. By contrast,the division intelligence annex toShoup's opera- tion order, updated nine days before the landing, discounts external reports that the main guns werr likely to be as large as eight-inch, insisting instead that "they are probably not more than 6-inch.''Prior knowledge notwithstanding,the fact remains that many American officers were unpleasantly surprised to experience major caliber near-misses bracket- ingtheamphibioustaskforceearlyonD-Day. Destructionofone ofthe fourJapanese eight-inchVickers gunson Betio wascaused by naval gunfireand air strikes. DevartmentofDefensePhoto(USMC) 63618 pointinthere-entrantbetweenthe twobeachesplayedhavocamong troopstryingtoscrambleoverthe sides oftheir beachedor stalled LVTs. Five ofCompany E's six officers were killed.Company Fsuffered50 per- centcasualtiesgettingashoreand swarming over the seawall toseize a precariousfoothold.CompanyG couldbarelyclingtoacrowded stretch ofbeach along the seawall in themiddle.Twoinfantryplatoons and two machine gun platoons were driven away from the objective beach andforcedtolandonRedBeach One,most joining"Ryan's Orphans." When LieutenantColonel Amey's boatrammedtoasuddenhalt against the reef,he hailedtwo pass- ing LVTs for a transfer. Amey's LVT thenbecamehunguponabarbed wire obstacle several hundred yards offRedBeachTwo.Thebattalion commanderdrew hispistoland ex- horted his men to follow him into the water.Closertothebeach,Amey turned to encourage his staff, "Come on! Those bastards can'tbeat us!" A burstofmachine gun fire hit him in the throat, killing him instantly. His executive office, Major Howard Rice, wasinanotherLVTwhichwas forced to land far to the west, behind MajorRyan.Theseniorofficer presentwith2/ 2wasLieutenant Colonel Walter Jordan, one ofseveral observers from the 4th Marine Divi- sionandoneofonlyahandfulof survivors from Amey'sLVT.Jordan did whatany Marine would do un- derthecircumstances:heassumed commandandtriedtorebuildthe disjointed pieces ofthe landing team intoacohesivefightingforce.The taskwasenormous. The only assault unit to get ashore withoutsignificantcasualtieswas Major"Jim" Crowe'sLT2/ 8 on Red BeachThreetotheleftofthepier. Many historians have attributed this good fortune to the continued direct fire support 2/ 8 received throughout its run to the beach from the destroy- ers Ringgoldand Dashielinthela- goon. The two ships indeed provided outstanding fire support to the land- ing force, but their logbooks indicate bothshipshonoredAdmiralHill's 0855 ceasefire; thereafter,neither ship firedinsupportofLT2/ 8untilat least 0925. Doubtlessly,the prelimi- naryfirefromsuchshortrange served to keep the Japanese defenders on the eastern end ofthe island but- toned up long after the ceasefire. As a result,Crowe's teamsuffered only 25casualtiesinthefirstthreeLVT waves.CompanyE madeasignifi- cant penetration,crossing the barri- cade and the neartaxiway,butfive ofits six officers were shot down in the first 10 minutes ashore. Crowe's LtGen Julian C. Smith Collectio nHeywood (APA 6)lowers an LVT-1 by swinging boom in Marines, on D-Day at Betio. The LVT-1 then joined up wit hprocess of debarking assault troops of the 2d Battalion, 8th other amphibian tractors to form up an assault wave.LT 2/8was up against some of themost sophisticated defensive posi -tions on the island; three fortifica -tions to their left (eastern) flan kwould effectively keep these Marinesboxed in for the next 48 hours .Major "Jim" Croweformer enlist -ed man, Marine Gunner, distin-guished rifleman, star footballplayerwas a tower of strengththroughout the battle. His trademarkred mustache bristling, a comba tshotgun cradled in his arm, he exud -ed confidence and professionalism,qualities sorely needed on Betio thatlong day. Crowe ordered the cox-swain of hisLCVP "put this god-damned boat in!" The boat hit th ereef at high speed, sending theMa-rines sprawling. Quickly recovering,Crowe ordered his men over th esides, then led them through severalhundred yards of shallow water,reaching the shore intact only fou rminutes behind his last wave of LVTs .Accompanying Crowe during thishazardous effort was Staff SergeantHatch, the combat photographer.Hatch remembers being inspired b yCrowe, clenching a cigar in his teethand standing upright, growling at hismen, "Look, the sons of bitches can'thit me . Whydo you think they ca nhit you? Get moving . Go!" Red Beac hThree was in capable hands.The situation on Betio by 0945 onD-Day was thus : Crowe, well -established on the left with modes tpenetration to the airfield; a distinc tgap between LT 2/8 and the sur-vivors of LT 2/2in small clustersalong Red Beach Two under the ten -tative command of Jordan ; a danger-ous gap due to the Japanesefortifications at the re-entrant be-tween beaches Two and One, withafew members of 3/2on the left flankand the growing collection of oddsand ends under Ryan past the "bird' sbeak" on Green Beach; MajorSchoettel still afloat, hovering be-yond the reef ; Colonel Shoup like-wise in an LCVP, but beginning hismove towards the beach ; residua lLVT-ls follow wave guides from transport area towards Betio at first light on D-Day.Department of Defense Photo(USMC) 6390915Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65978LVT-ls in the first assault wave enter the lagoon and approach the line of departure .LVT-2s of the second and third waves proceed on parallel courses in background .members of the boated waves of th eassault teams still wading ashore un-der increasing enemy fire; the tanksbeing forced to unload from thei rLCMs at the reef's edge, trying to or -ganize recon teams to lead themashore .Communications were ragged. Th ebalky TBX radios of Shoup, Crowe,and Schoettel were still operational.Otherwise, there was either dead si -lence or complete havoc on the com -mand nets . No one on the flagshi pknew of Ryan's relative success on th ewestern end, or of Amey's death an dJordan's assumption of command .Several echelons heard this ominou searly report from an unknownsource : "Have landed. Unusuallyheavy opposition . Casualties 70 per -cent . Can't hold ." Shoup ordere dKyle's LT 1/2, the regimental reserve,to land on Red Beach Two and workwest .which increasingly had the rangedown pat . At least five vehicles weredriven away by the intense fire an dlanded west at Ryan's position, ad -ding another 113 troops to GreenBeach . What was left of Companie sA and B stormed ashore andpenetrated several hundred feet, ex -panding the "perimeter ." Other troop ssought refuge along the pier or trie dto commandeer a passing LVT. Kylegot ashore in this fashion, but manyof his troops did not complete thelanding until the following morning .The experience of Lieutenant GeorgeD. Lillibridge of Company A, 1st Bat-talion, 2d Marines, was typical . Hi sLVT driver and gunners were sho tdown by machine gun fire . The sur-viving crewman got the stranded ve-hicle started again, but only inreverse. The stricken vehicle thenbacked wildly though the entire im-pact zone before breaking downagain . Lillibridge and his men did notget ashore until sunset .The transport Zeilin,which ha dlaunched its Marines with such fan -fare only a few hours earlier, receive dits first clear signal that things wer egoing wrong on the beach when aderelict LVT chugged close aster nwith no one at the controls . The shi pdispatched a boat to retrieve the ve -hicle . The sailors discovered thre edead men aboard the LVT: two Ma -rines and a Navy doctor. The bod-ies were brought on board, thenburied with full honors at sea, th efirst of hundreds who would be con -signed to the deep as a result of themaelstrom on Betio .Communications on board Mary-land were gradually restored t oworking order in the hours follow-ing the battleship's early mornin gduel with Betio's coast defense bat-teries. Onboard the flagship, GeneralJulian Smith tried to make sense outof the intermittent and frequentl yconflicting messages coming in ove rthe command net . At 1018 he or-dered Colonel Hall to "chop" Majo rRobert H. Ruud's LT 3/8 to Shoup'sCT Two . Smith further directed Hallto begin boating his regimental com -mand group and LT 1/8 (MajorThree hundred yards to go! LVT-1 45 churns toward Red Beach Three just east ofthe long pier on D-Day .Heavy fighting is taking place on the other side of the beach .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6405 0This would take time . Kyle's menwere awaiting orders at the line o fdeparture, but all were embarked inboats . Shoup and others managed toassemble enough LVTs to transpor tKyle's companies A and B, but thethird infantry company and theweapons company would have towade ashore . The ensuing assaul twas chaotic . Many of the LVTs weredestroyed enroute by antiboat guns16LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio nwhat eastward from the original landing point on "the bird'sbeak," but she was too riddled with shell holes to operate.Af-ter the battle, "My Deloris " was sent to the United States a san exhibit for War Bond drives .The historic vehicle is no wmoving her some- at the Tracked Vehicle Museum at Camp DelMar, California .LVT-149 ("My Deloris'), the first vehicle to reach Betio's shore,lies in her final resting place amid death and destruction, in-cluding a disabled LVT-2 from a follow-on assault wave .Thi sphoto was taken after D-Day.Maintenance crews attempte dto salvage "My Deloris" during the battle ,Lawrence C . Hays, Jr .), the divisio nreserve . At 1036, Smith reported t oV Amphibious Corps : "Successfullanding on Beaches Red Two andThree . Toe hold on Red One . Amcommitting one LT from Divisio nreserve. Still encountering stron gresistance throughout :'Colonel Shoup at this time was inthe middle of a long odyssey tryin gto get ashore. He paused briefly fo rthis memorable exchange of radi omessages with Major Schoettel .0959: (Schoettel to Shoup )"Receiving heavy fire all alon gbeach. Unable to land all . I ssu ein doubt :'1007: (Schoettel to Shoup)"Boats held up on reef of rightflank Red 1 . Troops receivingheavy fire in water:'1012 : (Shoup to Schoettel)"Land Beach Red 2 and wor kwest . "1018 : (Schoettel to Shoup) "Wehave nothing left to land ."When Shoup's LCVP was stoppe dby the reef, he transferred to a pass -ing LVT. His party included Lieu -tenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson ,already a media legend for his earli -er exploits at Makin and Guadal-canal, now serving as an observer,and Lieutenant Colonel Presley M.Rixey, commanding 1st Battalion ,10th Marines, Shoup's artiller ydetachment. The LVT made three at -tempts to land ; each time the enem yfire was too intense . On the third try,the vehicle was hit and disabled byplunging fire. Shoup sustained apainful shell fragment wound in hi sleg, but led his small party out of th estricken vehicle and into the dubiou sshelter of the pier. From this position,standing waist-deep in water, sur-rounded by thousands of dead fis hand dozens of floating bodies, Shou pmanned his radio, trying desperate -ly to get organized combat unit sashore to sway the balance .For awhile, Shoup had hopes tha tthe new Sherman tanks would serv eto break the gridlock . The combatdebut of the Marine medium tanks,however, was inauspicious on D-Day. The tankers were valorous, bu tthe 2d Marine Division had no con -cept of how to employ tanks againstfortified positions . When four Sher-mans reached Red Beach Three lat ein the morning of D-Day, Majo rCrowe simply waved them forwar dwith orders to "knock out all enemypositions encountered:' The tankcrews, buttoned up under fire, werevirtually blind. Without accompany-ing infantry they were lost piecemeal,some knocked out by Japanese75mm guns, others damaged byAmerican dive bombers .Six Shermans tried to land on Re dBeach One, each preceded by a dis-mounted guide to warn of under-water shell craters . The guides wereshot down every few minutes b yJapanese marksmen ; each tim eanother volunteer would step for-ward to continue the movement.Combat engineers had blown a hol ein the seawall for the tanks to pas sinland, but the way was now blocked17Marine Corps Personal Paper sAerial photograph of the northwestern tip of Betio (the "bird's water at left, seaward of the re-entrant strongpoints.A num-beak") taken from 1,400 feet at 1407 on D-Day from a King- ber of Marines from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, were killedfisher observation floatplane .Note the disabled LVTs in the while crossing the sand spit in the extreme lower left corner .with dead and wounded Marines .Rather than run over his fellow Ma -rines, the commander reversed hi scolumn and proceeded around th e"bird's beak" towards a second open -ing blasted in the seawall . Operatin gin the turbid waters now withou tguides, four tanks foundered in shel lholes in the detour . I nland from th ebeach, one of the surviving Sher -mans engaged a plucky Japaneselight tank . The Marine tan kdemolished its smaller opponent, bu tnot before the doomed Japanese cre wreleased one final 37mm round, aphenomenal shot, right down th ebarrel of the Sherman .By day's end, only two of the 1 4Shermans were still operational ,"Colorado" on Red Three and "Chi -na Gal" on Red One/Green Beach .Maintenance crews worked throug hthe night to retrieve a third tank ,"Cecilia," on Green Beach for Majo rRyan . Attempts to get light tanks intothe battle fared no better. Japanes egunners sank all four LCMs lade nwith light tanks before the boats evenreached the reef. Shoup also ha dreports that the tank battalion com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel Alex -ander B . Swenceski, had been kille dwhile wading ashore (Swenceski,badly wounded, survived by crawl-ing atop a pile of dead bodies to kee pfrom drowning until he was finallydiscovered on D+1) .Shoup's message to the flagship at1045 reflected his frustration: "Stif fresistance . Need halftracks . Ourtanks no good." But the Regimenta lWeapons Companys halftracks ,mounting 75mm guns, fared no bet-ter getting ashore than did any othe rcombat unit that bloody morning .One was sunk in its LCM by long -range artillery fire before it reache dthe reef . A second ran the entir egauntlet but became stuck in th eloose sand at the water's edge . Thesituation was becoming critical .Amid the chaos along the expose dbeachhead, individual examples o fcourage and initiative inspired th escattered remnants . Staff Sergean tWilliam Bordelon, a combat enginee rattached to LT 2/2, provided the firs tand most dramatic example on D -Day morning . When a Japanese shelldisabled his LVT and killed most o fthe occupants enroute to the beach ,Bordelon rallied the survivors an dled them ashore on Red Beach Two .Pausing only to prepare explosiv echarges, Bordelon personall yknocked out two Japanese position swhich had been firing on the assaul twaves . Attacking a third emplace -ment, he was hit by machine gun fire ,but declined medical assistance an dcontinued the attack . Bordelon the ndashed back into the water to rescuea wounded Marine calling for help .As intense fire opened up from ye tanother nearby enemy stronghold ,18the staff sergeant prepared one las tdemolition package and charged th eposition frontally. Bordelon's luc kran out . He was shot and killed, laterto become the first of four men of th e2d Marine Division to be awarde dthe Medal of Honor.I n another incident, Sergeant Ro yW. Johnson attacked a Japanese tan ksingle-handedly, scrambling to th eturret, dropping a grenade inside ,then sitting on the hatch until th edetonation . Johnson survived this in -cident, but he was killed in subse-quent fighting on Betio, one of 21 7Marine Corps sergeants to be kille dor wounded in the 76-hour battle.On Red Beach Three, a captain ,shot through both arms and legs ,sent a message to Major Crowe,apologizing for "letting you down."Major Ryan recalled "a wounded ser -geant Ihad never seen before limp -ing up to ask me where he wasneeded most ." PFC Moore, wound-ed and disarmed from his experiencestrying to drive "My Deloris" over th eseawall, carried fresh ammunition u pto machine gun crews the rest of th eday until having to be evacuated t oone of the transports . Other brave in-dividuals retrieved a pair of 37m mantitank guns from a sunken land -ing craft, manhandled them severa lhundred yards ashore under night -marish enemy fire, and hustled the macross the beach to the seawall . Th etiming was critical . Two Japanes etanks were approaching the beach -head. The Marine guns were too lo wto fire over the wall . "Lift them over;'came the cry from a hundred throats,"LI FT THEM OVER!" Willing hand shoisted the 900-pound guns atop thewall. The gunners coolly loaded,aimed, and fired, knocking out on etank at close range, chasing off th eother. There were hoarse cheers .Time correspondent Robert Sher -rod was no stranger to combat, bu tthe landing on D-Day at Betio wasone of the most unnerving ex-periences in his life .Sherrod accom -panied Marines from the fourth wav eof LT 2/2 attempting to wade ashor eon Red Beach Two .In his words :No sooner had we hit th ewater than the Japanesemachine guns really opened u pon us . . . . I t was painfullyslow, wading in such deepwater . And we had sevenhundred yards to walk slowl yinto that machine-gun fire,looming into larger targets aswe rose onto higher ground . I"D-Day at Tarawa," a sketch by Kerr Eby .This drawing cap- through barbed wire obstacles and under constant machin etures the desperation of troops wading ashore from the reef gun fire.The artist himself was with the invading troops .U.S. Navy Combat Art Collectio n19Maj Henry P."Jim" Crowe (standing, using radio handset) ral-lies Landing Team 2/8 behind a disabled LVT on Red BeachDepartment of Defense Photo(USMC) 63956Three on D-Day.Carrying a shotgun, he went from foxholeto foxhole urging his troops forward against heavy enemy fire.was scared, as Ihad never beenscared before . . . . Those wh owere not hit would alwaysremember how the machin egun bullets hissed into th ewater, inches to the right, inche sto the left.Colonel Shoup, moving slowl ytowards the beach along the pier, or-dered Major Ruud's LT 3/8 to landon Red Beach Three, east of the pier .By this time in the morning therewere no organized LVT units left tohelp transport the reserve battalio nashore . Shoup ordered Ruud to ap -proach as closely as he could b ylanding boats, then wade the remain -ing distance . Ruud received his as-sault orders from Shoup at 1103 . Fo rthe next six hours the two officerswere never more than a mile apart ,yet neither could communicate withthe other.Ruud divided his landing team intoseven waves, but once the boats ap -proached the reef the distinction sblurred . Japanese antiboat gunszeroed in on the landing craft wit hfrightful accuracy, often hitting justas the bow ramp dropped. Survivorsreported the distinctive "clang" as ashell impacted, a split second beforethe explosion . "I t happened a dozentimes;" recalled Staff Sergeant Hatch ,watching from the beach, "the boatblown completely out of the wate rand smashed and bodies all over theplace :' Robert Sherrod reported froma different vantage point, "Iwatcheda Jap shell hit directly on a [landin gcraft] that was bringing many Ma -rines ashore . The explosion was ter-rific and parts of the boat flew in alldirections :'Some Navy coxswains,seeing the slaughter just ahead,stopped their boats seaward of thereef and ordered the troops off . Th eMarines, many loaded with radios o rwire or extra ammunition, sank im-mediately in deep water; mostdrowned. The reward for thosetroops whose boats made it intact tothe reef was hardly less sanguinary :a 600-yard wade through witherin gcrossfire, heavier by far than that en -dured by the first assault waves at H-Hour. The slaughter among the firs twave of Companies K and L was ter -rible . Seventy percent fell attemptin gto reach the beach .Seeing this, Shoup and his partywaved frantically to groups of Ma-rines in the following waves to see kprotection of the pier. A great num -ber did this, but so many officers an dnoncommissioned officers had beenhit that the stragglers were shatteredand disorganized . The pier itself wa sa dubious shelter, receiving intermit -tent machine-gun and sniper fir efrom both sides . Shoup himself wa sstruck in nine places, including aspent bullet which came close topenetrating his bull neck. His runne rcrouching beside him was drilled be-tween the eyes by a Japanese sniper .Captain Carl W. Hoffman, com-manding 3/8's Weapons Company,had no better luck getting ashorethan the infantry companies ahead."My landing craft had a direct hitfrom a Japanese mortar. We lost si xor eight people right there ." Hoff -20man's Marines veered toward th epier, then worked their way ashore .Major Ruud, frustrated at bein gunable to contact Shoup, radioed hi sregimental commander, Colone lHall : "Third wave landed on Beac hRed 3 were practically wiped out .Fourth wave landed . . . but only afew men got ashore:' Hall, himself i na small boat near the I ine of depar-ture, was unable to respond.Brigadier General Leo D. ("Dutch")Hermle, assistant division com-mander, interceded with the message,""Stay where you are or retreat out o fgun range :' This added to the confu -sion . As a result, Ruud himself di dnot reach the pier until mid-afternoon . I t was 1730 before h ecould lead the remnants of his me nashore; some did not straggle in un -til the following day. Shoup dis -patched what was left of LT 3/8 insupport of Crowe's embattled 2/8 ;others were used to help plug the gapbetween 2/8 and the combinedtroops of 2/2 and 1/2 .Shoup finally reached Betio atnoon and established a comman dpost 50 yards in from the pier alon gthe blind side of a large Japanesebunker, still occupied. The colonelposted guards to keep the enem yfrom launching any unwelcome sor -ties, but the approaches to the site it -self were as exposed as any otherplace on the flat island . At least tw odozen messengers were shot whilebearing dispatches to and fro mShoup. Sherrod crawled up to th egrim-faced colonel, who admitted,"We're in a tight spot. We've got t ohave more men :' Sherrod looked ou tat the exposed waters on both sidesof the pier. Already he could coun t50 disabled LVTs, tanks, and boats.The prospects did not look good.The first order of business uponShoup's reaching dry ground was t oseek updated reports from the land -ing team commanders . I f anything ,tactical communications were wors eat noon than they had been durin gthe morning. Shoup still had no con -tact with any troops ashore on Re dBeach One, and now he could n olonger raise General Smith onMaryland. A dire message came fro mLT 2/2 :"We need help . Situatio nbad:' Later a messenger arrived fro mthat unit with this report: "All com-munications out except runners . C Okilled. No word from E Company"Shoup found Lieutenant Colonel Jor-dan, ordered him to keep comman dof 2/2, and sought to reinforce hi mwith elements from 1/2 and3/8 .Shoup gave Jordan an hour to or-ganize and rearm his assorted detach -ments, then ordered him to attac kinland to the airstrip and expand th ebeachhead.Shoup then directed Evans Carlsonto hitch a ride out to the Marylan dand give General Smith and Admira lHill a personal report of the situatio nashore . Shoup's strength of charac -ter was beginning to show. ""Y ou tellthe general and the admiral ;' he or-dered Carlson, "that we are going t ostick and fight it out ." Carlso ndeparted immediately, but such wer ethe hazards and confusion betweenthe beach and the line of departurethat he did not reach the flagship un -til1800 .Matters of critical resupply the ncaptured Shoups attention . Beyon dthe pier he could see nearly ahundred small craft, circling aimless -ly. These, he knew, carried assorte dsupplies from the transports and car -go ships, unloading as rapidly as the ycould in compliance with Admira lNimitz's stricture to "get the hell in ,then get the hell out :' The in -discriminate unloading was hinder -ing prosecution of the fight ashore .Shoup had no idea which boat hel dwhich supplies . He sent word to th ePrimary Control Officer to send onl ythe most critical supplies to the pier -Captain and crew of Z eilin (APA 3)pause on D-Day to commit casualties to th edeep.The three dead men (two Marines and a Navy surgeon), were found in aderelict LVT drifting through the transport area, 10 miles away from the beaches.LtGenJulian C . Smith Collectio n21Sherman MediumTanksat Tarawa 0 ne company ofM4-A2Sherman mediumtanks wasassignedtothe2dMarineDivisionfor Operation Galvanic from the I Marine Amphibi- ous Corps. The 14 tanks deployed from Noumea in early November 1943, on board the new dock landing ship Ash- l md (LSDI),joining Tmk Force 53 enroute to the Gilberts. Each34-ton,diesel-poweredSherman was operatedbya crew offive and feahwd a gyro-stabilized 75mm gun and three machine guns. Regmttably, the Marines had no op- portunity to operate with their new offensiw assets until the chaos ofD-Dayat Betio. The Shamans joined Wave 5 ofthe shipto-sho~leassault. The tanks negotiated the gauntlet ofJapanese fire without inddent, but five were lost when they plunged into unseen shell craters in the turbid water. Ashore, the Marines' lack ofoperating experience with medium tanks p r o dcostly to the survivors. Local commanders simply ordered the ve- hicles inland to attack targets ofopportunity unsupport- ed.Allbuttwowere soonknocked outofaction. Enterprisii salvage mw s worked throughout each night to cannibalize sewrely damaged vehicles in order tokeep other tanks operational. Meanwhile, the Marines learned to employ the tanks within an integrated team ofcovering infantry and engineem The Shermans then proved invalu- able in Major Ryan'sseizure ofGreen Beach on D+1, the attacks ofMajor Jones and Major Crowe on D+2, and the final assault by Lieutenant Colonel McLeod on D+3. Ear- ly in the battle, Japanese 7Jmm antitank guns were dead- lyagainstthe Shermans, butoncetheseweapons were destroyed,the defenders could do little moR than shoot out the periscopes with sniper fin. Colonel Shoup's opinion ofthe medium tanks was am- bivalent. His disappointment in the squandered deployment and heavy losses among the Shermans on D-Day was tem- peredbysubsequentadmirationfortheirtacticalrole M-4A2 Shermantank ("Charlie") of 3d Platoon,Compa- ny C, MediumTanks, was disabled inland fromRed Beach Three by mutually supporting Japaneseantitank guns fir- ing from welldug in positions not too jiv finm the beaches. ashore. Time and again, Japanese emplacements ofrein- forced concrete, steel, and sand were reduced by direct fire from the tanks' main guns, despite a "prohibitive ammuni- tion expenditure." Shoup also reported that "the so-called crushing effect ofmedium tanks, as a tactical measure, was practidy negligible in this operation, and I believe no one should place any faith in eliminating fortifications by run- ningaver themwith atank." The Marines agmd that the advent ofthe Shermans ren- dered their light tanks obsolete."Mediumtanks are just as easy to get ashore, and they pack greater armor and )ire- power," concluded one battalion commander. By the war's end,theAmerican ordnance industry hadmanufactured 48,064 Sherman tanks for employment by the U.S.Army and MarineCorps inall theaters ofcombat. head:ammunition,water,blood plasma,stretchers,LVTfuel,more radios. Shoup thenconferredwithLieu- tenantColonelRixey.Whilenaval gunfire support since the landing had been magnificent,it was time for the Marines to bringtheirown artillery ashore. The original plan to land the 1st Battalion/lOthMarines,on Red One was no longer practical.Shoup and Rixey agreed to try a landing on the left flank ofRed Two, close tothe pier.Rixey'sguns were75mmpack howitzers, boated in LCVPs. The ex- peditionarygunscouldbebroken down for manhandling. Rixey,hav- ingseenfromcloseathandwhat happened when LT3/ 8 hadtriedto wade ashore from the reef, went af- terthelastremainingLVTs.There were enough operational vehicles for justtwo sections ofBatteries A and B.Intheconfusionoftransfer-line operations, three sections ofBattery CfollowedtheLVTsshorewardin their open boats. Luck was withthe artillerymen.The LVTslanded their guns intact by late afternoon. When the trailing boats hung up on the reef, theintrepidMarineshumpedthe heavycomponentsthroughthe bullet-sweptwaterstothepierand eventually ashore at twilight.There would be close-in fire support avail- ableatdaybreak. JulianSmithknewlittleofthese events, and he continuedstrivingto piecetogetherthetacticalsituation ashore.Fromobservationreports fromstaffofficers aloftinthefloat planes, he concludedthatthe situa- tionintheearlyafternoonwas desperate.Although elements offive infantry battalions were ashore, their toeholdwasatbestprecarious.As Smith later recalled, "the gap between Red 1and Red 2 had not been closed andtheleftflankonRed3 wasby nomeanssecure." SmithassumedthatShoupwas Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6414 2U. S.Navy LCM-3 sinks seaward of the reef after receiving a direct hit by Japanes egunners on D-Day .This craft may have been one of four carrying M-3 Stuart ligh ttanks, all of which were sunk by highly accurate coastal defense guns that morning .still alive and functioning, but h ecould ill afford to gamble . For th enext several hours the commandinggeneral did his best to influence th eaction ashore from the flagship .Smith's first step was the most criti -cal . At 1331 he sent a radio messageto General Holland Smith, reportin g"situation in doubt" and requestin grelease of the 6th Marines to divisio ncontrol . I n the meantime, having or -dered his last remaining landing tea m(Hays' 1/8) to the line of departure ,Smith began reconstituting an emer -gency division reserve comprised ofbits and pieces of the artillery, en -gineer, and service troop units .General Smith at 1343 ordere dGeneral Hermle to proceed to the en dof the pier, assess the situation an dreport back . Hermle and his smal lSSgt William J.Bordelon, USMC, wa sawarded the Medal of Honor (posthu -mously) for his actions on D-Day .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12980staff promptly debarked from Mon -rovia (APA 31) and headed toward sthe smoking island, but the trip too kfour hours .I n the meantime, General Smit hintercepted a 1458 message fro mMajor Schoettel, still afloat seawardof the reef : "CP located on back o fRed Beach 1 . Situation as before .Have lost contact with assault ele-ments ." Smith answered in no uncer-tain terms : "Direct you land at anycost, regain control your battalio nand continue the attack ." Schoette lcomplied, reaching the beach aroundsunset . I t would be well into the nex tday before he could work his wa ywest and consolidate his scattere dremnants .At 1525,Julian Smith receivedHolland Smith's authorization to tak econtrol of the 6th Marines . This wasgood news . Smith now had four bat -talion landing teams (including 1/8 )available . The question then becam ewhere to feed them into the figh twithout getting them chewed t opieces like Ruud's experience in try -ing to land 3/8 .At this point, Julian Smith's com -munications failed him again . At1740, he received a faint message tha tHermle had finally reached the pierand was under fire. Ten minutes later ,Smith ordered Hermle to take com -mand of all forces ashore . To his sub -sequent chagrin, Hermle neverreceived this word . Nor did Smithknow his message failed to ge tthrough . Hermle stayed at the pier,sending runners to Shoup (who un -ceremoniously told him to "get th ehell out from under that pier!") an dtrying with partial success to unscrewthe two-way movement of casualtiesout to sea and supplies to shore .Throughout the long day ColonelHall and his regimental staff had lan -guished in their LCVPs adjacent t oHays' LT 1/8at the line of departure ,"cramped, wet, hungry, tired and alarge number . . . seasick" I n late af -ternoon, Smith abruptly ordere dHall to land his remaining units o na new beach on the northeast tip ofthe island at 1745 and work wes ttowards Shoup's ragged lines . Thi sGetting ashore on D-Day took great courage and determination .Attacking inlan dbeyond the relative safety of the seawall on D-Day required an even greater measure .De p artment of Defense Photo (USMC) 6345 723Marine Corps Historical Center Combat Art Collectio n"Tawara, H-Hour, D-Day, Beach Red ." Detail from a painting in acrylic colors by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR .This aerial photograph, taken at 1406 on D-Day, shows the entanglements are visibleoff both beaches .A grounde dlong pier on the north side of the island which divided Red Japanese landing craft is tied to the west side of the pier.F aintl yBeach Three, left, from Red Beach Two, where 'a man could visible in the right foreground, a few Marines wade from alift his hand and get it shot off" in the intense fire .Barbed wire disabled LVT towards the pie r 's limited safety and shelter.Marine Corps Personal Papers24LtGen Julian C. Smith Collectio nMarines try to drag a wounded comrade to safety and medical treatment on D-Day .was a tremendous risk . Smith's over-riding concern that evening wasaJapanese counterattack from theeastern tail of the island against hi sleft flank (Crowe and Ruud) . Oncehe had been given the 6th Marines ,Smith admitted he was "willing tosacrifice a battalion landing team" i fit meant saving the landing forc efrom being overrun during darkness .Fortunately, as it turned out, Hal lnever received this message fro mSmith . Later in the afternoon, a floa tplane reported to Smith that a uni twas crossing the line of departureand heading for the left flank of Re dBeach Two . Smith and Edson as-sumed it was Hall and Hays going inon the wrong beach . The fog of war :the movement reported was the be -ginning of Rixey's artillerymen mov -ing ashore . The 8th Marines spen tthe night in its boats, waiting for ord-ers . Smith did not discover this fac tuntil early the next morning .On Betio, Shoup was pleased toreceive at 1415 an unexpected repor tfrom Major Ryan that severa lhundred Marines and a pair of tank shad penetrated 500 yards beyond RedBeach One on the western end of th eisland. This was by far the most suc -cessful progress of the day, and thenews was doubly welcome becaus eShoup, fearing the worst, had as -sumed Schoettel's companies and th eother strays who had veered in tha tdirection had been wiped out .Shoup, however, was unable to con -vey the news to Smith .Ryan's composite troops had in -deed been successful on the wester nend. Learning quickly how best tooperate with the medium tanks, th eMarines carved out a substantialbeachhead, overrunning manyJapanese turrets and pillboxes . Butaside from the tanks, Ryan's men ha dnothing but infantry weapons . Crit-ically, they had no flamethrowers o rdemolitions . Ryan had learned fro mearlier experience in the Solomon sthat "positions reduced only withgrenades could come alive again :' B ylate afternoon, he decided to pul lback his thin lines and consolidate."Iwas convinced that withou tflamethrowers or explosives to clea nthem out we had to pull back . . .to a perimeter that could be defend-ed against counterattack by Japanesetroops still hidden in the bunkers ."The fundamental choice faced bymost other Marines on Betio that da ywas whether to stay put along th ebeach or crawl over the seawall andcarry the fight inland . For much o fthe day the fire coming across the topof those coconut logs was so intenseit seemed "a man could lift his han dand get it shot off :' Late on D-Day,there were many too demoralized t oadvance . When Major Rathvo nMcC . Tompkins, bearing messagesfrom General Hermle to ColonelShoup, first arrived on Red Beac hTwo at the foot of the pier at duskon D-Day, he was appalled at th esight of so many stragglers . Tomp -kins wondered why the Japanes e"didn't use mortars on the first night .People were lying on the beach sothick you couldn't walk ."Conditions were congested on Re dBeach One, as well, but there was adifference . Major Crowe was every-where, "as cool as ice box lettuce . "There were no stragglers . Croweconstantly fed small groups of Ma-rines into the lines to reinforce hi sprecarious hold on the left flank.Captain Hoffman of 3/8 was not dis-pleased to find his unit suddenly in -tegrated within Crowe's 2/8. An dCrowe certainly needed help as dark -ness began to fall . "There we were ;"Hoffman recalled, "toes in the water ,casualties everywhere, dead an dCol Michael P.Ryan,USMC,wears theNavy Cross awarded to him at Tarawa .Ryan, the junior major in the Division ,was instrumental in securing the wester nend of Betio, thereby enabling the firs tsubstantial reinforcements to land intact .Marine Corps Historical Collectio n25U.S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n"The Hard Road to Triumph," a sketch by Kerr Eby .The action shows Maj Crowe'sLT 2/8 trying to expand its beachhead near the contested Burns-Philp pier .wounded all around us . But finallya few Marines started inching for -ward, a yard here, a yard there ." I twas enough . Hoffman was soon abl eto see well enough to call in nava lgunfire support 50 yards ahead. HisMarines dug in for the night .West of Crowe's lines, and just in -land from Shoup's command post,Captain William T. Bray's CompanyB, 1/2, settled in for the expectedcounterattacks. The company ha dbeen scattered in Kyle's bloody land-ing at mid-day. Bray reported to Kylethat he had men from 12 to 14 differ-ent units in his company, includingseveral sailors whoswam ashor efrom sinking boats. The men werewell armed and no longer strangersto each other, and Kyle wa sreassured.Altogether, some 5,000 Marineshad stormed the beaches of Betio o nD-Day. Fifteen hundred of these wer edead, wounded, or missing by night-fall. The survivors held less than aquarter of a square mile of sand andcoral. Shoup later described the lo -cation of his beachhead lines th enight of D-Day as "a stock marke tgraph." His Marines went to groundin the best fighting positions the ycould secure, whether in shellholesinland or along the splintered sea -wall . Despite the crazy-quilt defen -sive positions and scrambled units,the Marines' fire discipline was su -perb. The troops seemed to shareacertain grim confidence ; they ha dfaced the worst in getting ashore .They were quietly ready for any sud -denbanzai charges in the dark .Offshore, the level of confidenc ediminished. General Julian Smith onMaryland was gravely concerned ."This was the crisis of the battle," herecalled . "Three-fourths of the I slan dwas in the enemy's hands, and eve nallowing for his losses he should havehad as many troops left as we hadashore ." A concerted Japanese coun-terattack, Smith believed, woul dhave driven most of his forces int othe sea . Smith and Hill reported upthe chain of command to Turner ,Spruance, and Nimitz : "I ssue remainsin doubt :' Spruance's staff begandrafting plans for emergency evacu -ation of the landing force .The expected Japanese counterat -tack did not materialize . The prin -cipal dividend of all th ebombardment turned out to be th edestruction of Admiral Shibasaki' swire communications . The Japanes ecommander could not muster hi smen to take the offensive. A few in -dividuals infiltrated through the Ma -rine lines to swim out to disabledtanks and LVTs in the lagoon, wher ethey waited for the morning . Other -wise, all was quiet .The main struggle throughout th enight of D-Day was the attempt byShoup and Hermle to advise Julia nSmith of the best place to land th eMarines of Landing Teams 2/8 and 3/8 advance forward beyond the beach.LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n26

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A D V A N C E S D U R I N G D A Y. L I . W . L L P O S I T i O N S A T S U N S E T. A C k c N O . I8 L A C KI N T E L L I G E N C E M A P B I T I T U ( B E T I O )T A R A W A A T O L L G I L B E R T I S L A N D SS I T U A T I O N 1 8 0 0 D - D A YD 0 O 4 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 ( 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Y O SI I I I I IR D 5 0 9 0T A K E N F R O M 2 0 M A R D I VS P E C I A L A C T I O N R E P O R TN O T E L I N E S A R E G E N E R A L I N D I C A T I O N O N L Y .G A P S W E R E C O V E R E D B Y S M A L L G R O U P SA N D B Y F I R E . S E C O N D A R Y L I N E S W E R EE S T A B L I S H E D W H E R E P O S S I B L E B E H I N DF R O N T L I N E S .from the beached inter-islandschoonerNiminoaat the reef's edge .Hays' men began to fall at everyhand .U.S . Navy Combat Art Collectio nTheWaveBreaks on the Beach," a sketch by Kerr Eby.The scene represents the un-welcome greeting received by LT 1/8 off Red Beach Two on the morning of D+1.al Hermle, specified the landing o fHays' LT 1/8 on Red Beach Two"close tothe pier . " That key compo -nent of Shoup's request did not sur-vive the tenuous communicationsroute to Smith . The commandin ggeneral simply ordered Colonel Hal land Major Hays to land on Red Twoat 0615 . Hall and Hays, oblivious ofthe situation ashore, assumed 1/ 8would be making a covered landing .The Marines of LT 1/8 had spentthe past 18 hours embarked i nLCVPs. During one of the endless cir -cles that night, Chaplain W. Wyet hWillard passed Colonel Hall's boa tand yelled, "What are they saving u sfor, the Junior Prom?" The troopscheered when the boats finallyturned for the beach .Things quickly went awry. Th edodging tides again failed to provid esufficient water for the boats to cros sthe reef . Hays' men, surprised at th eobstacle, began the 500-yard trek t oshore, many of them dangerously farto the right flank, fully within th ebeaten zone of the multiple guns fir -ing from the re-entrant strongpoint ."I t was the worst possible place theycould have picked ;" said "Red Mike "Edson . Japanese gunners opened a nunrelenting fire . Enfilade fire cam efrom sniperswho had infiltrated t othe disabled LVTs offshore during th enight . At least one machine gu nopened up on the wading troopsThe Marines on the beach di deverything they could to stop th eslaughter. Shoup called for nava lgunfire support . Two of Lieutenan tColonel Rixey's 75mm pack howit-zers (protected by a sand berm erect-ed during the night by a Seabe ebulldozer) began firing at the block -houses at the Red 1/Red 2 border ,125 yards away, with delayed fuse sand high explosive shells . A flight o fF4F Wildcats attacked the hulk of th eNiminoa with bombs and machin eguns. These measures helped, but fo rthe large part the Japanese caugh tHays' lead waves in a witheringcrossfire.Correspondent Robert Sherrodwatched the bloodbath in horror ."One boat blows up, then another.The survivors start swimming fo rshore, but machine-gun bullets do tthe water all around them . . .. Thisis worse, far worse than it was yester -day." Within an hour, Sherrod coul dcount "at least two hundred bodie sReadily disassembled and reassembled, the 75mm pack howitzers of 1st Battalion ,10th Marines, were ideal for Tarawa's restrictive hydrography .The battalion man -handled its guns ashore under heavy fire late on D-Day.Thereafter, these Marinesprovided outstanding fire support at exceptionally short ranges to the infantry .LtGen Julian C .Smith Collectio n28LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio nNavy medical personnel evacuate the wounded from the beachhead on D-Day .Thi swas difficult because there were few places anywhere that Marines could walk up-right.The shortage of stretchers compounded the problems of the landing force .which do not move at all on the dryflats ."First Lieutenant Dean Ladd wa sshot in the stomach shortly afte rjumping into the water from his boat.Recalling the strict orders to thetroops not to stop for the wounded ,Ladd expected to die on the spot .Oneof his riflemen, Private Firs tClass T. F. Sullivan, ignored the ord -ers and saved his lieutenant's life .Ladd's rifle platoon suffered 12 kille dand 12 wounded during the ship-to -shore assault .First Lieutenant Frank Plant, th ebattalion air liaison officer, accom -panied Major Hays in the comman dLCVP. As the craft slammed into th ereef, Plant recalled Hays shoutin g"Men, debark!" as he jumped into th ewater. The troops that followed weregreeted by a murderous fire. Planthelped pull the wounded back intothe boat, noting that "the water allaround was colored purple withblood." As Plant hurried to catch u pwith Major Hays, he was terrified a tthe sudden appearance of what h etook to be Japanese fighters roarin gright towards him . These were theNavy Wildcats aiming for the near -by Niminoa . The pilots were exuber-ant but inconsistent : one bomb hi tthe hulk squarely; others missed by200 yards .An angry David Shou pcame up on the radio : "Stop strafing !Bombing ship hitting own troops! "At the end, it was the sheercourage of the survivors that gotthem ashore under such a hellis hcrossfire . Hays reported to Shoup a t0800 with about half his landin gteam . He had suffered more than 30 0casualties; others were scattered allalong the beach and the pier . Worse,the unit had lost all its flamethrow -ers, demolitions, and heav yweapons . Shoup directed Hays to at-tack westward, but both men kne wthat small arms and courage alon ewould not prevail against fortifiedpositions .Shoup tried not to let his dis-couragement show, but admitted i na message to General Smith "the sit-uation does not look good ashore . "The combined forces of Major sCrowe and Ruud on Red Beac hThree were full of fight and ha dplenty of weapons. But their leftflank was flush against three largeJapanese bunkers, each mutuallysupporting, and seemingly unassail -able. The stubby Burns-Philp com -mercial pier, slightly to the east of th emain pier, became a bloody "no-man's land" as the forces fought forits possession. Learning from th emistakes of D-Day, Crowe insure dthat his one surviving Sherman tan kwas always accompanied by infantry.Crowe and Ruud benefitted fro mintensive air support and naval gun -Marines under fire along Red Beach Three near the Burns-Philp pier hug the groun das Navy planes continually pound the enemy strongpoints in front of them .LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n29Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 1244 81stLt William Deane Hawkins, USMC,was awarded the Medal of Hono rposthumously for sustained braverythroughout the first 24 hours ashore atBetio .Hawkins commanded the 2d Ma-rines ' Scout-Sniper Platoon, which seize dthe long pier to begin the assault .fire along their left flank . Crowe wasunimpressed with the accuracy an deffectiveness of the aviators ("our air -craft never did us much good"), bu the was enthusiastic about the nava lguns . "Ihad the Ringgold, th eDashiell, and the Anderson in sup -port of me . . . . Anything Iaskedfor Igot from them . They wer egreat!" On one occasion on D+1,Crowe authorized direct fire fromadestroyer in the lagoon at a larg ecommand bunker only 50 yard sahead of the Marines . "The yslammed them in there and youcould see arms and legs and every-thing just go up like that! "I nland from Red Beach Two, Kyl eand Jordan managed to get some o ftheir troops across the fire-swept air -strip and all the way to the sout hcoast, a significant penetration . Thetoehold was precarious, however ,and the Marines sustained heav ycasualties . "Y ou could not see th eJapanese," recalled Lieutenant Lil -libridge, "but fire seemed to comefrom every direction ." When Jorda nlost contact with his lead elements ,Shoup ordered him across the islandto reestablish command. Jordan di dso at great hazard . By the time Kylearrived, Jordan realized his ownpresence was superfluous. Only 5 0men could be accounted for of LT2/2's rifle companies. Jordan or-ganized and supplied these survivorsto the best of his abilities, thena tShoup's directionmerged themwith Kyle's force and stepped backinto his original role as an observer.The 2d Marines' Scout Sniper Pla-toon had been spectacularly heroicfrom the very start when they led theassault on the pier just before H-Hour . Lieutenant Hawkins continu-ously set an example of cool disdainfor danger in every tactical situation .His bravery was superhuman, but itcould not last in the maelstrom. Hewas wounded by a Japanese mortarshell on D-Day, but shook off at-tempts to treat his injuries . At dawnon D+1he led his men in attackinga series of strongpoints firing on LT1/8 in the water . Hawkins crawleddirectly up to a major pillbox, fire dhis weapon point blank through th egun ports, then threw grenades insideto complete the job. He was shot i nthe chest, but continued the attack,personally taking out three more pill-boxes. Then a Japanese shell nearl ytore him apart. I t was a mortalwound. The division mourned hisdeath . Hawkins was awarded theMedal of Honor posthumously. Sai dColonel Shoup, "I t's not often thatyou can credit a first lieutenant withwinning a battle, but Hawkins cam eas near to it as any man could."I t was up to Major Mike Ryan an dhis makeshift battalion on thewestern end of Betio to make the big-gest contribution to winning the bat-tle on D+1 . Ryan's fortunes had beengreatly enhanced by three develop -ments during the night: the absenc eof a Japanese spoiling attack agains this thin lines, the repair of the medi-umtank "Cecilia ;" and the arrival o fLieutenant Thomas Greene,USN, anaval gunfire spotter with a fullyfunctional radio . Ryan took his tim eorganizing a coordinated attac kagainst the nest of gun emplace-ments, pillboxes, and rifle pits con -centrated on the southwest corner ofthe island . He was slowed by anothe rfailure in communications . Rya ncould talk to the fire support ship sbut not to Shoup . I t seemed to Rya nthat it took hours for his runners t onegotiate the gauntlet of fire back t othe beach, radio Shoup's CP, andreturn with answers . Ryan's first mes-sage to Shoup announcing his attac kplans received the eventual response ,Working parties ignore sniper and artillery fire to unload 75mm ammunition deli-vered by LCVPs from Biddle(APA 8) at the head of the long Burns-Philp pier .LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n30Department of Defense Photo(USMC) 6349 2Navy hospital corpsmen attend a critically wounded Marine on Betio .The 2d Ma -rine Division's organic medical personnel paid a high price while administering ai dto fallen Marines :30 Navy doctors and corpsmen were killed ; another 59 wounded ."Hold up we are calling an ai rstrike ." I t took two more runners t oget the air strike cancelled. Ryan the nordered Lieutenant Greene to call innaval gunfire on the southwest tar-gets . Two destroyers in the lagoo nresponded quickly and accurately . A t1120, Ryan launched a coordinate dtank-infantry assault. Within th ehour his patchwork force had seizedall of Green Beach and was ready t oattack eastward toward the airfield .Communications were still terri -ble. For example, Ryan twice report -ed the southern end of Green Beac hto be heavily mined, a message tha tnever reached any higher headquart -ers . But General Smith on boardMaryland did receive direct word ofRyan's success and was overjoyed . Forthe first time Smith had the oppor -tunity to land reinforcements on a co-vered beach with their unit integrityintact .General Smith and "Red Mike" Ed-son had been conferring that morn-ing with Colonel Maurice G .Holmes, commanding the 6th Ma-rines, as to the best means of gettingthe fresh combat team ashore . I nview of the heavy casualties sus -tained by Hays' battalion on RedBeach Two, Smith was reconsiderin ga landing on the unknown easter nend of the island . The good newsfrom Ryan quickly solved th eproblem . Smith ordered Holmes t oland one battalion by rubber rafts o nGreen Beach, with a second landin gteam boated in LCVPs prepared t owade ashore in support .At this time Smith received report sthat Japanese troops were escapin gfrom the eastern end of Betio bywading across to Bairiki, the next is -land. The Marines did not want tofight the same tenacious enemytwice . Smith then ordered Holmes t oland one battalion on Bairiki to "sealthe back door ." Holmes assignedLieutenant Colonel Raymond L .Murray to land 2/6 on Bairiki, Major"Willie K ." Jones to land 1/6 by rub -ber boat on Green Beach, and Lieu -tenant Colonel Kenneth F. McLeod tobe prepared to land 3/6 at any as-signed spot, probably Green Beach.Smith also ordered the light tanks o fCompany B, 2d Tank Battalion, toland on Green Beach in support ofthe 6th Marines .These tactical plans took muchlonger to execute than envisioned.Jones was ready to debark fro mFeland (APA 11) when the ship wa ssuddenly ordered underway to avoida perceived submarine threat . Hourspassed before the ship could retur nclose enough to Betio to launch th erubber boats and theirLCVP towcraft . The light tanks were among th efew critical items not truly combatloaded in their transports, being car -ried in the very bottom of the carg oholds . I ndiscriminate unloading dur -ing the first 30 hours of the landin ghad further scrambled supplies an dequipment in intervening decks. I ttook hours to get the tanks clear an dloaded on board lighters .Shoup was bewildered by the lon gdelays . At 1345 he sent Jones a mes-sage: "Bring in flamethrowers if pos -sible . . . . Doing our best ." At 152 5he queried division about the esti -mated landing time of LT 1/6 . Hewanted Jones ashore and on the at -tack before dark.Meanwhile, Shoup and his smallstaff were beset by logistic suppor tproblems . Already there were team sorganized to strip the dead of thei rammunition, canteens, and first ai dpouches . Lieutenant Colonel Carlsonhelped organize a "false beachhead "at the end of the pier . Most progres scame from the combined efforts ofLieutenant Colonel Chester J . Sala -zar, commanding the shore party;Captain John B. McGovern,USN,acting as primary control officer o nboard the minesweeper Pursuit (AM108) ; Major Ben K . Weatherwax, as -sistant division D-4 ; and Major Ge -orge L . H. Cooper, operations officerof 2d Battalion, 18th Marines .Among them, these officers gradual -ly brought some order out of chaos .They assumed strict control of sup -plies unloaded and used the surviv-ing LVTs judiciously to keep th eshuttle of casualties moving seawar dand critical items from the pierhea dto the beach . All of this was per-31LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio nThis desperate scene hardly needs a caption .The Marine is badly hurt, but he'sin good hands as his buddies lead him to saftey and shelter just ahead for treatment .formed by sleepless men under cons-tant fire .Casualty handling was the mos tpressing logistic problem on D+1 .The 2d Marine Division was heroi -cally served at Tarawa by its organ -ic Navy doctors and hospita lcorpsmen . Nearly 90 of these medi -cal specialists were themselves casual -ties in the fighting ashore . Lieutenan tHerman R. Brukhardt, Medica lCorps, USN,established an emergen -cy room in a freshly capturedJapanese bunker (some of whoseformer occupants "came to life" wit hblazing rifles more than once) . I n 3 6hours, under brutal conditions,Brukhardt treated 126 casualties ;only four died.At first, casualties were evacuate dto troopships far out in the transportarea . The long journey was danger-ous to the wounded troops an dwasteful of the few available LVTs o rLCVPs. The Marines then bega ndelivering casualties to the destroy -er Ringgold in the lagoon, eventhough her sickbay had bee nwrecked by a Japanese five-inch shel lon D-Day. The ship, still actively fir -ing support missions, accepteddozens of casualties and did her best .Admiral Hill then took the risk o fdispatching the troopship Doyen(APA 1) into the lagoon early o nD+1 for service as primary receiv -ing ship for critical cases . Lieutenan tCommander James Oliver, MC,USN,led a five-man surgical teamwith recent combat experience in theAleutians. I n the next three daysOliver's team treated more than 550severely wounded Marines . "We ranout of sodium pentathol and had t ouse ether;" said Oliver, "although abomb hit would have blownDoye noff the face of the planet ."Navy chaplains were also hard a twork wherever Marines were fight-ing ashore . Theirs was particularlyheartbreaking work, consoling th ewounded, administering last rites tothe dying, praying for the souls of th edead before the bulldozer came tocover the bodies from the unforgiv-ing tropical sun .The tide of battle began to shif tperceptibly towards the Americansby mid-afternoon on D+1 . The fig