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ACCIDENTS HAVE ESSE IN ACTU BUT NOT AN ACT OF BEING (ESSE AS

ACTUS ESSENDI) OF THEIR OWN

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Although accidents have a secondary existence (existentia), a second esse in actu, they do

not have an act of being1 (esse as actus essendi) of their own, but rather are by reason of the act of being (actus essendi) which belongs to the substance. Esse in actu corresponds to esse essentiae. Accidental esse is the esse in actu in first substance (substantia prima), esse accidentale being a secondary existence derived from the real substance. Accidental being (esse accidentale) would indicate, explains Cornelio Fabro, the reality of the accidents insofar as they are properties and acts or perfections of the individuated substance from which they proceed and in which they are received; []. In other words, the accidents have and give a modus essendi according to a proper content and this esse accidentale, which is actuated according to that temporal-plexus, can be called existentia. accidents are attributed a proper existence, a proper special-temporal situation in the substance, but not a proper esse as actus essendi.2

Concerning the act of being (esse as actus essendi) Fabro writes in his Partecipazione e

causalit (1960): Esse ut actus essendi is the principium subsistendi of the substance, thanks to 1 If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, the act of being (esse) is that which makes a thing to be. Explaining certain features of the act of being (esse) as act, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo state: a) Above all, esse is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term act is used in metaphysics to designate any perfection or property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used exclusively to refer to actions or operations (the act of seeing or walking, for instance). In this sense, a white rose is a flower that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a specific perfection. Similarly, that is which is applied to things indicates a perfection as real as the perfection of life in living things. In the case of esse, however, we are obviously dealing with a special perfection. b) Esse is a universal act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusive to some particular kind of reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk about anything, we have to acknowledge, first of all, that it is: the bird is, gold is, the clouds are. c) Esse is also a total act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only refer to some part or aspects of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing has, without any exception. Thus, the act of reading does not express the entirety of the perfection of the person reading, but esse is the act of each and of all the parts of a thing. If a tree is, then the whole tree is, with all its aspects and parts its color, shape, life and growth in short, everything in it shares in its esse. Thus, esse encompasses the totality of a thing. Esse is a constituent act, and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is that by which things are. As essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that (chair, lion, man), esse is that which makes things to be. This can be seen from various angles: (i) Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in their principles of diversity (their essence), but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike, namely, the act of being. (ii) Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a subsisting subject in which it inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for without it, nothing would be. Hence esse is not an act derived from what things are; rather it is precisely what makes them to be. (iii) We have to conclude, by exclusion, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or biological property of beings their energy, molecular or atomic structure can make things be, since all of these characteristics, in order to produce their effects, must, first of all, be. In short, esse is the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from within, all of its perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the form of the body by giving life to it, esse intrinsically actualizes every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is the principle of entity or reality of all things(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 20-22). 2 C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit secondo san Tommaso dAquino, SEI, Turin, 1960, p. 200.

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which both the essence of the substance as well as that of the accidents are in act esse in the proper sense is only actus essendi which gives subsistence to the substance. There is, therefore, esse essentiae and esse which is actus essendi; the actualizing esse which is non-divisible actus essendi, is so because it indicates the quality of absolute act that makes the first discrimination of the real and the first foundation of truth, since it is inseparable and most simple affirmation of its act and only has non-being for its contrary.3

Esse in the proper sense is actus essendi. In its intensive meaning esse as actus essendi

emerges over all other acts, formalities and perfections, it being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, as St. Thomas Aquinas writes in De Potentia Dei and the Summa Theologiae: That which I call esse is among all (things), the most perfect, and this is clear because act is always more perfect than potency. Now no signate form is understood to be in act unless it be supposed to have esse. For humanity or fiery nature may be considered as existing potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the intellect: but when it has esse it becomes an existens in act. Wherefore it is clear than when I say esse, it is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections.4 Esse is the most perfect of all, for it is compared to all as act; for nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. Hence esse is the actuality of all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver.5

Christian Ferraro, professor of Metaphysics at the Lateran University, explains in his

Appunti di metafisica (2013) that, although accidents do indeed have a second esse in actu, they do not have an esse as actus essendi of their own (which belongs to the substance), this esse as actus essendi being that which enters into a real composition with the essence (essentia) and is the principle of subsistence of the suppositum. The suppositum, Ferraro stresses, has only one esse ut actus, which is the esse suppositi, but he notes that the suppositum has a multiplicity of esse in actu, according to the specific degree of the substantial essence and of the diverse accidental actuations: Che gli accidenti allora non siano composti da essenza e atto di essere? Effettivamente. Gli accidenti non hanno un esse proprio. Lesse ut actus (lessere come atto, latto di essere, ipsum esse, actus essendi) propriet esclusiva della sostanza, principio della sua sussistenza. Pertanto, mentre ci che appartiene al genere della sostanza per forza realmente composto, invece ci che appartiene ad alcuno dei nove generi di accidenti non composto, bens semplice, anche se entra in composizione con la sostanza come abbiamo appena visto.6

Se laccidente non ha lesse ut actus, non detto per che non abbia lesse in actu.

Anche la forma accidentale infatti d lesse in actu, com proprio di ogni forma. Gli accidenti

3 C. FABRO, op. cit., pp. 201, 203-204. 4 De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. 5 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. 6 Cf. De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.

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esistono, sono attuali, e questa loro attualit lesse in actu, con il quale arricchiscono la sostanza.

Ora, questo esse accidentale, del quale parla pi volte san Tommaso, non per da

confondersi con lesse ut actus, quellesse che entra in composizione reale con lessenza ed il principio della sussistenza del supposito.7 Si tratta invece dellattualit seconda che acquista la sostanza sussistente in virt della forma accidentale. Infatti, cos come la forma sostanziale specificava lesse ut actus determinandone il grado dintensit e conferendo al composto lesse in actu, in maniera simile la forma accidentale determina ulteriormente il tutto sostanziale conferendo un secondo esse in actu, a seconda di tutte le modalit accidentali: un esse qualis, un esse quantum, un esse ad, ecc. Perci laccidente non ente nel senso di eseguire o di avere esso stesso lesse ut actus, bens nel senso che per esso (eo mediante) un qualcosa in un determinato modo secondario, che presuppone lattualit e consistenza sostanziale. Il supposito pertanto ha un unico esse ut actus, che lesse suppositi, ma molteplice il suo esse in actu, a seconda del grado specifico dellessenza sostanziale e delle diverse attuazioni accidentali.8

7 Per non aver adeguatamente distinto lesse in actu e lesse ut actus, molti rappresentanti della scuola tomista (Gaetano, Giovanni di san Tommaso, Gredt, Maritain, M.-D. Philippe, Elders, De Raeymaeker, per elencare soltanto alcuni) hanno attribuito agli accidenti un esse (ut actus) proprio. Si sono visti costretti ad ammetterlo, sia sulla base di certi testi di san Tommaso che sembrerebbero affermarlo (nei quali per egli parla soltanto ed esclusivamente dellesse in actu), sia sulla base della loro fuorviante interpretazione dellesse ut actus come exsistentia, nel senso del principio per cui la cosa messa fuori delle cause: se infatti laccidente reale, esso allora dovrebbe avere una existentia propria. Certamente, poi aggiungevano che questo atto di essere era s debole da aver bisogno di poggiare sulla sostanza. chiaro che questa posizione non rispecchia fedelmente il pensiero di san Tommaso. Daltronde, un esempio quanto mai eloquente dellessenzialismo formalista e del da Heidegger deprecato oblio dellessere. 8 C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, pp. 282-283.