Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M

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Accepting TestimonyAuthor(s): Matthew WeinerSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 256-264Published by: Wileyfor The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542868.

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2/10

The

hilosophical

uarterly,

ol.

3,

No.

11

ISSN

oo31-8o94

April 003

DISCUSSIONS

ACCEPTING TESTIMONY

BY MATTHEW WEINER

I

defend

he

cceptance

rincipleor

testimony

APT),

that earersre

ustj#ed

n

accepting

testimony

nless

hey

ave

ositive

vidence

gainst

ts

eliability,

gainst

lizabeth

ricker's

ocal

reductionist

iew. ocal

eductionism,

he octrine

hat

earers

eed

videncehat

particulariece

of

testimony

s reliable

if

they

reto be

justified

n

believing

t,

must n

pain

of

cepticism

e

complementedy principle

hat

rantsefault

ustification

o ome

estimony;argue

hat

APT)

is the

rinciple

equired.

consider

wo

lternative

eaker

rinciples

s

complements

o

ocal

reductionism;

ne

ields

ounter-intuitiveesultsnless e

ccept

APT)

as

well,

whilehe thers

tooweak o

nableocal eductionismo void

cepticism.

I.

Introduction

Recently

many

philosophers

ave stressed he

mportance

f

testimony

s

a

source

of

our

knowledge.

uring

a

day

in a

strange ity,

we

rely

n what we are told and

have

been told for

ll

mannerof

nformation,

ven for he

knowledge

f what

city

we are in.' As

Sosa

says,

we

rely

n

testimony

or ur

grasp

of

history,

eography,

science and

more'.2

f

we were not

generallyustified

n

accepting

the word of

others,

we

would know

very

ittle.

o

avoid

this,

satisfactory

ccountof

testimony

must onformo the non-scepticalonstraint':

NSC.

Testimony

ften

ustifies eople

in

beliefswhich

they

annotconfirm t

first

hand,

including

eliefs bout the

near

or

distant)

ast,

beliefs bout

places

they

have never

isited,

nd beliefs bout

science,

nterlia.3

We

must

sk, hen,

what

consequences NSC)

has

for

he

epistemology

f

testimony.

Elizabeth Fricker

as

argued

for

'local

reductionist' iew of

testimony,

hich

disclaims

he need to find

videncefor he

general

reliability

f

testimony,

ut em-

phasizes

the need to

examinethe

evidencefor he

trustworthinessf

any

particular

I See

C.AJ.

Coady, estimony:

PhilosophicaltudyOxford: larendon

ress,

992),

pp.

6-7.

2

E.

Sosa,

Testimony

nd

Coherence',

n

B.K.

Matilal

nd A.

Chakrabarti

eds),

Knowing

from

Words

Dordrecht:

luwer,

994),

P- 9-67,

t

p.

59-

3

(NSC)

s much

ike

Christopher

nsole's

commonense

estraint':eehis

Seeing

ff

he

Local

Threat o

Irreducible

nowledge

y Testimony',

he

hilosophical

uarter~y,0 (2000),

pp.44-56,

t

p.

44;

my

xposition

f he

ialectic

n

general

wesmuch

o nsole's.

C The

Editors f The

hilosophical

uarterly,

003.

Published

y

Blackwell

ublishing,600

Garsington

oad,

Oxford

x4

2DSQ

UK,

and

350

Main

Street,

alden,

MA

02148,

USA.

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3/10

ACCEPTING ESTIMONY

257

piece

of

testimony

hat we

accept.

In

particular,

rickerdenies that

we

should

always

give

testimony

he benefit f the

doubt: there re

many

kinds

of

testimony

thatwe should not

believe unlesswe

have

some

specific

vidence hat

supports

ts

trustworthiness.hus she deniesthe acceptance principle ortestimony'derived

from

urge):

APT.

We are

ustified

n

accepting

nything

hatwe are

told unless here s

positive

evidence

gainst oing

o.4

I

shall

argue

that ocal

reductionism

ithout

APT)

will

be

unable to

satisfyNSC).

To avoid

widespread

cepticism

bout

testimony,

e

must

grant

efault

ustification

to all

testimony.

2.

Local nd

lobal

eductionism

As a

preliminary,

should

say

something

bout

the idea

of

default

ustification.

shall define

default

ustification

s

a

justification

or

belief hat

does

not

depend

on

other

beliefs ased

ultimately

n

the believer's

ast

or

current

xperiences. xperi-

ences which

ground

beliefs

providing justification

ver

and

above

any

default

justification

or

believing

ome

proposition

rovide positive

videnceor

that

pro-

position.

The

question

s

when,

if

ever,

someone has

a

default

ustification

or

believing

estimony.

Hume's

accountof

the

epistemology

f

testimony

rants

t no

default

ustification

whatsoever.

On

his

account,

the

justifications

e

gain

from

testimony

an be

reduced to

ustifications

ained

from

erception,

memory

nd

reason. We

believe

testimony

ecause of

our

observation

f

the

veracity

f human

testimony',

hich s

'discovered

by experience'.5

n

my

terms,

he

Humean view

is that

our

experience

gives

us

positive

vidence

hat

estimony

s

reliable.This

evidence

tself

annot

rely

on

what we

have been

told,

ince

otherwise

e would

not be

justified

n

accepting

the

evidence

ntil

we

had

established ome

ustification

or

ccepting

he

testimony.

The

Humean view

thus

requires

what

Fricker

alls

a

'global'

reduction,

which

'would

require

hat

hearer

have

evidence

hatmost

f

what

he

has

ever

earnt

hrough

testimony

s

true,

here

his

videncedoes not n

any way

rest n

knowledgecquired

by

her

through

estimony'.6

ricker alls this iewof

testimonylobal

eductionism:

GR.

To

be

justified

n

believing

much

of

what I

am

told,

must have

positive

evidence

of

the

truth f

mostof

what

have

been

told,

where

this

evidence

relies

nly

n

non-testimonial

ustifications.7

Fricker,

owever,

denies that

global

reduction s

necessary

o

justify

eliance on

testimony.

atherthan

treating

ll

testimony

t

once,

we can

focus

on a

particular

4This

s a

special

ase of

Burge's

riginal

cceptance

rinciple,

hich

s

not

restrictedo

testimony:

ee

his

Content

reservation',hilosophicaleview,

02

(1993),p.457-88, tp.467.5

Hume,

Enquiries

oncerning

uman

nderstanding

nd

Concerning

he

Principles

f

Morals,

d.

P.H.

Nidditch

Oxford

P,

1975),

X,

p.

88.

6

E.

Fricker,

Against

ullibility',

n

Matilal

nd

Chakrabarti,

p.125-61,

t

p.

134-

7

I

have

ast

his

rinciple

nd

thenext wo

n the

irst

erson

n

order o avoid

onflating

evidence

athered

y

n

ndividual ith

vidence

atheredy

he

ommunity,

s

Hume eems

to:

ee

Coady,

Testimony,

p.

8o-i.

?

The

Editors fThe

hilosophicaluarterly,

003



4/10

258

MATTHEW

WEINER

piece

of

testimony.

What Fricker alls

a localreductions

provided

p. 133)

when

a

hearer has evidence that

the

particularpeaker

n

question

s to be trusted

with

respect

o her current

tterance,

ithout

ssuming

his

very

act'.Local

reductionism

requires local reduction s a justificationorrelying n any particular iece of

testimony:

LR.

To be

justified

n

believing particular hing

hat have

been

told,

must

have evidenceof the

reliability

f

that

speaker

with

respect

o that

piece

of

testimony,

here his

vidence oes not

rely

n that

estimony.

In

(LR),

part

ofthe

hearer's vidence

or he

current tterance's rustworthiness

ay

come

from

estimony

ther han

the

current

tterance.

nly

reliance n the

current

utterances excluded.

It is debatable whether ocal reductionisms compatiblewithgranting efault

justification

o

any testimony.

ricker,

s

I

shall

show,

thinks

hat ome but not all

testimony

ives

us default

ustification,

ut nsole has

argued

that

his s

inconsistent

with ocal

reductionism. ather han

attempt

o resolve his

uestion,

shall

modify

local

reductionismo make room

explicitly

or

default

ustification:

LR*. To be

justified

n

believing particular hing

hat have

been

told,

must

eitherhave default

ustification

or

believing

hat

he

testimony

s

reliable,

r

have

positive

vidence

of

the

reliability

f

that

speaker

with

respect

o that

piece

of

testimony,

here his vidence

does not

rely

n that

estimony.

To

apply

LR*)

we need a

principle

hat tateswhen

testimony

ives

default

usti-

fication.

APT)

is one such

principle, iving

default

ustification

o

all

testimony;

other

principles

ould

give

default

ustification

o some subsetof

testimony,

r

to

none at all.

(LR*)

with

APT)

is

arguably

not

locally

reductionistt

all,

since the

clause

requiring

local

reduction s never

nvoked.

t

does,

however,

hare with

local

reductionismhe

characteristichatour

ustification

or

believing particular

piece

of

testimonyepends

on

the evidence

hat t

s

trustworthy,

hen there s

any

positive

vidence or r

against

ts

rustworthiness.

(GR) can be dismissed uickly:t s incompatible ithNSC). Forboth GR) and

(NSC)

to

hold,

ndividual

earerswould have to

be able to

gather

ositive

vidence

forthe

generalreliability

f

testimony,

hichwould

require

confirming

he

truth,

without

elying

n

any testimony,

f

many

of the

things

hat

they

have

been told.

This is

implausible;

s

Coady

points

out

(p. 82),

'it

seems

absurd to

suggest

hat,

individually,

e

have done

anything

ike

the

amount of

field-work

hat

[(GR)]

requires'.

We

rely

on

testimony

ven

in

the first-hand

bservations

hatwe

use

to

gather

videncefor he

reliability

f our

informants.or

instance,

f

Alice

tellsme

that

she

will mail a

letter,

may

wish

to

verify

his

testimony

s

evidence

of her

veracity,ywatching

er

drop

an

envelope

nto

certain lue

metal

ontainer.

ut,

watching

his,

only

know

that have

seen Alice mail a

letter

ecause

I

have

been

told

that imilar

ontainers re mailboxes r

that

people

have

received etters

put

in

them.

f

gave

up

all

beliefs

ained

through estimony,

could never

gather

he

evidencethat

llowed

me

to

get

them

back.

(GR)

thus

violates

NSC),

thatwe are

justified

n

believing

wide

range

of

testimony.

?

The Editors f

The

hilosophicaluarterl,003



5/10

ACCEPTING ESTIMONY

259

This

argument gainst GR),

however,

oes not

immediately

ell

against LR*),

even

a

version of

(LR*)

on

which no

testimony

rovides

default

ustification.

According

o thisversion f ocal

reductionism,

ustification

or

believing

estimony

requires ositive videncefor hetestimony'srustworthiness,utI maybe able to

rely

n

other

estimony

o

provide

he evidencefor he trustworthinessf this

esti-

mony.Only

reliance

n this

estimony

tself

s

explicitly

orbidden.

hus if

Alice has

said she will

mail a

letter,

might

ry

o

obtainevidence f her

veracity y watching

her

do so.

My knowledge

hat he is

mailing

letter

will

depend

on

testimony,

or

instance,

bout

what

mailboxes ook

ike,

but thisneed not

be Alice's

own

testimony.

Thus

I

shall have

obtainednon-circularvidence

for

her

veracity,

nd

thereby

or

the truth

f

her

future

estimony.

o

long

as

a

local reduction f one

piece

of

testimony

an

rely

on

other

estimony

n

this nd similar

ways,

hen

LR*)

will

not

require n impossiblemount ffield-worknorder osatisfyNSC).

We must

sk, then,

when a local

reduction

f

testimony

an

rely

n other

esti-

mony.

n

thenext ection shall

rgue

that

LR*)

withno default

ustification

annot

rely

n

testimony

ften

nough

o

salvage

NSC).

3.

The

needfor

ome

efaultjustification

For beliefs ased on

past testimony

o

be available

for

se

in a

local

reduction,

hose

beliefsmust themselves

e

justified.

According

to

(LR*),

this

requires positive

evidence

for

the

trustworthiness

f

the

past testimony,

nless that

testimony ives

defaultustification. s Leslie Stevenson ointsout,our relianceon testimonyan

involve

a

regress

f

dependence,

ustifying

's

testimony,

r

that

f

people

ike

A,

or

testimony

bout

topics

ike

p, by

appeal

to the

testimony

f

B,

or of

people

of a

kind

which

B

exemplifies,

r

about

topics

ike

q'.8

If

no

testimony

ives

default

ustifica-

tion,

hen

we

need

positive

vidence n

order

to

accept

each

piece

of

testimony

o

which we

might

appeal,

and

the

regress

can

only

end with

testimony

whose

reliability

an

be established

ithout

ppeal

to

any

other

estimony.

Establishing

he

reliability

f this

regress-stopping

estimony

ould

require

posi-

tive evidence for ts

trustworthinesshich

does not

presuppose

he

reliability

f

testimonyt all.Anyother estimonyhathadbeenreduced othis estimonyould

in

turn be

supported

by

this

non-testimonial

ositive

evidence.

Only testimony

supported y

non-testimonial

vidence

n

this

way

would be

acceptable,

ccording

to

(LR*),

without efault

ustification;

ny

other

estimony

ould

fall

victim o

the

regress

fjustifications.

ince

NSC)

requires

hatwe

should

be

ustified

n

accepting

testimony

n

a

wide

range

of

subjects,

o

satisfy

NSC)

we

would have to have

positive

on-testimonial

vidence

n

support

f

testimony

n

a

wide

range

of

topics.

This,

however,

would

amount

o

a

global

reduction;

he

argument

gainst

GR)

has

shown

hat

we

cannot

gather

ositive

on-testimonial

vidence n

support

f

enough

testimonyosatisfyNSC). So (LR*)without efaultustificationollapses nto GR).

Bothare

incompatible

ith

NSC):

they

xclude

oo

many

estimonial

ustifications.

To

avoid this

ollapse

nto

GR),

we

must

upplementLR*)

with

ome

principle

determining

hich

testimony

ives

default

ustification.

his

privileged

estimony

8

L.F.

Stevenson,

Why

BelieveWhat

People Say?',

Synthese,4

(1993),PP. 429-51,

t

p. 437.

C

The

Editors

f

The

hilosophical

uarterly,

003



6/10

260

MATTHEW

WEINER

can

stop

the

regress

f

dependence: estimony

elieved

on a

default

ustification

an

providepositive

vidence

for

a local

reduction

f other

non-privileged

estimony.

Thus

the

rgument

hat t

s

mpossible

o confirm

ost

estimony

ithout

ppealing

to othertestimony illnot bear on (LR*), when it is combinedwitha principle

granting

efault

ustification

though

shall

how n

?5

that

imilar

rguments

efute

excessively

eak

default

ustification

rinciples).

I

shall

argue

that

APT)

is

the

necessary

efault

ustificationrinciple,

o

that

we

are

ustified

n

believing

nything

e

are

told,

unless here

s

positive

vidence

gainst

the

testimony's

rustworthiness.

APT)

gives

default

ustification

o all

testimony

rather

than

a

proper

subset. Weaker

principles

which

privilege

proper

subsets,

I

claim,

face one

of two

problems.

The first

roblem

occurs

when

accepting

he

weaker

principle

ut

rejecting

APT) yields

mplausible

esults

oncerning

whether

certain eliefs re ustified. he secondproblem ccurswhentheweakerprinciples

too weak

to allow

LR)

and

(NSC)

to

be reconciled.

I

shall

defend

APT)

against

wo lternative

eaker

rinciples

mplicit

n

Fricker's

analysis;

ach

weaker

rinciple

aces

one

of

these wo

problems.

he

first

rinciple

s

essentially

hatwe have

default

ustification

or

elieving

whatwe are

toldbeforewe

reach

full

maturity,

ut not

afterwards.

his,

I

argue

n

?4,

yields

ounter-intuitive

results

oncerning

estimonial

ustification.

he

second

principle

s

essentially

hat

everyone

s

competent

o

form

accurate beliefs

concerning

ertain

topics,

and

that

we have default

ustification

or

believing estimony

n those

topics.

This,

I

argue n?5, stooweaktoreconcileLR*)withNSC).

4.

Developmentalestimony

Fricker

oints

out that

whether his s

ustified

r

not,

everyone

ccepts testimony

uncritically

t

an

early

age.

It is

during

his

developmental

hase'

that a

person

comes to know

the

world-picture

f

common

sense,

ncluding

he

common sense

conception

f

the

link

of

testimony

tself'.9 nce we

have

acquired

the

common

sense

world-picture,

e

enter

he

mature

phase,

n

which the

nature

of

testimony,

as

a

link

which

common

ense]

reveals,

ntails

hatour

belief

n

whatothers

ellus

shouldalwaysbe governed yourmonitoringf themfor rustworthiness'p. 403).

For

Fricker,

he

common sense

world-picture rovides

the

background

gainst

whichwe

learn new

things,

ut t is

common

ense not

to

accept

what we

are told

unless

ur

monitoring ields

ositive

vidence hat

ur nformant

s

trustworthy.

et

the

common

ense

world-picture

ncludes

manythings

hatwe were

told

during

he

developmental

hase

and

accepted

without

equiring

ositive

vidence.So we

are

only

ustified

n

accepting

he common

sense

world-picture

f

we

were

ustified

n

simple

cceptance

f

developmental-phaseestimony.

This

suggests

he

acceptance

principle

or

evelopmental

estimony':

APDT. We are ustifiednaccepting omethinghatwe are toldduring urdevelop-

mental

hase,

unless

here s

positive

vidence

gainst

oing

o.

This

principleustifies

s

in

accepting

he

common

ense

world-picture,

ecause

the

9

Fricker,

Telling

nd

Trusting:

eductionism

nd

Anti-Reductionismn

the

Epistemo-

logy

f

Testimony',

Mind,

104

1995),

P- 393-411,

t

p. 402.

C

The

Editors f The

hilosophicaluarterly,

003



7/10

ACCEPTING

ESTIMONY

26I

pieces

of

that

picture

re

acquiredby accepting

estimony

uring

he

developmental

phase.

On

(APDT),

therefore,

he

regress

f ocal reductions f

testimony

ay

end

at

a

piece

of the common sense

world-picture,

hich

we are

ustified

n

accepting

without ositive vidence. o (LR*) complemented y APDT) mayallowus togain

testimonial

ustification

n the wide

range

of

topicsrequired

y NSC);

at

least,

he

argument

have

presented

gainst

he

possibility

f

global

reduction oes not

show

that

we cannotreducemost

estimony

o the

common ense

world-picture.

The

objection

to

(APDT)

is that t

privileges estimony

eard in the

develop-

mental

phase

over

testimony

eard n

themature

hase,

whereas

here s no reason

for his.

f

APDT)

holds but

APT)

does

not,

then

estimony

eard

n

the

develop-

mental

hase providesustification

or elief n the

absence

of

positive

vidence f ts

reliability,

ut

testimony

eard

n

the

mature

hase provides

o

ustification

ithout

thispositive vidence.This is thewrongwayround.Developinghearers re surely

worse

udges

of

testimony

han

maturehearers.

n

the

developmental hase

we are

not

yet

familiar

withthe

conditions nder which

people

lie or

make

mistakes;

we

begin

to learn

these

things

s

we

adopt

the common sense

world-picture,

nd

we shall

earnmorewithmature

xperience.

o

developing

hinkersre

more

ikely

to

neglect

omething

hat

fora

mature

thinker ould be

evidence

of

testimony's

unreliability,

nd the

ustification

hat

heyget

from

nsupported estimony

hould

be seen as weaker

han the

ustification

hat

mature hinkers

et

from

nsupported

testimony.

Two maturethinkers, lice and Sarah, are each wonderingwhat theyellow

boxes on street

orners o. Each was

once told thatthe

boxes control

raffic

ights,

and

each has no other vidence

oncerning

he matter r

concerning

he

reliability

of

that

testimony.

lice, however,

was told

this

n

her

developmental hase,

and

Sarah

was told t

n

her

mature

hase.

Surely

arah's

entitlemento

belief s

at

least

as

strong

s

Alice's.

After

ll,

when Sarah

was

told,

he had

already

mastered he

common

sense criteria

or

when

testimony

s

not to be

believed;

that he

has no

evidence

against

the

testimony's

eliability

means

that

the

testimony

id not fail

these

riteria.When

Alice

was

toldwhat

theboxes

do,

she had not

yet

mastered he

common ensecriteria or ccepting estimony;hemight avefailed odetect ome

signs

f

nsincerity

r

incompetence

hat

would have

served

s

evidence

gainst

he

testimony,

ad

she been more

mature.

o

put

this

nother

way,

Alice

accepted

what

she was

told t an

age

when he

did notfind

nything ishy

bout Santa

Claus. Yet

if

we

accept

(APDT)

and

deny

the

stronger

APT),

we

are leftwith

the counter-

intuitive

esult hat

Alice s

ustified

n

believing

hat

he was told nd Sarah

is

not.

I

conclude

that,

f

we

accept APDT),

we should also

accept

the

strongerAPT).

Otherwise

testimony

eard in

the

developmental hase

will

be

privileged

ver

testimony

eard n

the

mature

phase,

though

here

s no

reason to believe t

more

reliable.

5.

Mundane

estimony

(APT)

may

seem to treat ll

testimony

like

n

an

implausible

way.

Fricker

p. 407)

points

ut that

some

people

or

types

f

people

on some

topics

re

reliable,

thers n

others

ren't'.She

suggests

hat

we

may

generally

make

the default

ssumption

hat

?

The Editors

of

The

Philosophical

uarter~y,

003



8/10

262

MATTHEW

WEINER

testimony

eflects he teller's

eliefs,

ut

that

we

may

make the default

ssumption

that

hosebeliefs

re correctwith

espect

o a

subclass f

tellings nly,

iz

hose

with

subject

matters or

which

common sense

psychological

nowledge

icenses

one

to

expectthe speakerto be competent bout them:such as her name,whereshe

lives,

what

she

had for

breakfast,

hat s

in

clear view

n

front

f

her,

nd so

forth'

(p.

405).

I

take

t,

particularly

iven

he

istof

examples,

hat

Fricker

means to

pick

out

subject

matters

bout

which

ll

speakers

may

be

expected

o be

competent,

n

the absence

of

evidence to the

contrary.

shall

call these

subject

matters

mundane

topics;hey

argely omprise hings

hat re

readily

vailable to

speakers'

enses

nd

memory,

s well

as

things

such

s

one's

date of

birth)

hat

lmost

veryone

s

told

by

someonewho

saw or

rememberedt.

Fricker's

ccount

of

default

ssumptions uggests

he

acceptance

principle

or

mundane estimony:

APMT. We

are

justified

n

accepting

omething

hat

we are told

concerning

mundane

opic

unless

here s

positive

vidence

gainst

oing

o.'0

This

principle,

shall

argue,

is

too weak

to

reconcile

LR*)

with

NSC).

The

problem

s that too few

topics

of

testimony

re

mundane.

f

we

requirepositive

evidence o

ustify

elieving estimony

n

any

non-mundane

opic,

we shallnever

be

justified

n

believing

estimony

n the

wide

range

of

topics

equired y

NSC).

An

example

is

knowledge

of

historical

happenings

beyond living

memory.

Common sensedoes not tellus that veryones competentoncerning nybutthe

mostfamous

historical

appenings,

o

history

s

not

a

mundane

topic.

Most

of

our

historical eliefs

ome from

estimony

omehow;

what licenses us

to

accept

this

testimony?

APMT)

willnot

directly

icense

his

estimony's

cceptance.

f

we

accept

(APMT)

but not

(APT),

a

local

reduction f a

piece

of

historical

estimony

ill

require positive

evidence of the

testimony's

eliability

hat

depends

only

on

testimony

cceptedthrough

APMT)

and

on

our own

observation,

memory

nd

in-

duction. shall

howthat

hough

his

may

be

practical

or

hort

hainsof

testimony,

it

will

be

unduly

burdensome orthe

engthy

hains that

tretch

ack to

historical

events.

(APMT)

would

sometimes llow

us to

gain

justification

or

accepting

non-

mundane

testimony

y

accepting

estimony

n a

mundane

topic

that

mplies

he

speaker's

ompetence

oncerning

he

non-mundane

opic.

Suppose

Janet

ells

Mary

that

he

Pittsburgh

irateswon

today's

baseball

game.

This

is not

a mundane

opic,

since

common

sense

does

not tell

Mary

that

everyone

nows

whether

he

Pirates

won

today.

Thus

(APMT)

does not

ustify

Mary

n

accepting

his

estimony

ithout

further

upport.

uppose

further,

owever,

hat

Janet

says

that

she

attended he

game.

This

is

mundane,

ince

common ense

tells

Mary

that

Janet

knows

whether

she

attended

baseball

game today;

so

by (APMT) Mary is ustifiedn believing

that

Janet

attended

the

game.

This in

turn

provides

evidence that

Janet

knows

whether

he

Pirates

won,

which

ustifies

Mary

in

accepting

anet's

original

esti-

mony

hat

hey

id win.

10

APMT)

s

much ike he

principleTCP)

proposed y

Stevenson,

Why

Believe

What

People ay?',

.

442,

whodoes

not laim

hatt

yields

nything

ike

NSC).

C The

Editors

f

The

hilosophical

uarterly,003



9/10

ACCEPTING

ESTIMONY

263

As a chain of

testimonyroceeds,

however,

he evidence

hatmustbe cited

grows

increasingly

nwieldy. uppose

Mary

tellsBarbara that the Pirateswon

today.

f

Mary

adds that

Janet

told her

so,

thiswill be mundane

testimony;

t is common

sense thatMary knows whether anettold her something. o (APMT) justifies

Barbara

n

believing hatJanet

old

Mary

that he Pirates

won. The

problem

s

that

so

far

Barbara has no

positive

vidence

hatJanet's estimony

s reliable.For her

to

get

that

vidence,

Mary

must lso tellher

thatJanet

aid that he attended he

game.

(APMT)

justifies

arbara

in

believing

hat

Janet

said

this,

ince what

Janet

told

Mary

is

mundane for

Mary;

given

this,

APMT)

justifies

he

belief that

Janet

attended

he

game,

sincewhether he attended he

game

is

mundane

forJanet;

his

belief

n

turn

providespositive

videnceforthe

reliability

f

Janet's

report

n

the

outcome of the

game.

If

Barbara

then

wishes

to

give anyone

else

ustification

or

believing hat he Pirateswon,she must aythatMarysaid that anet aid that he

Pirates

won,

and

also that

Mary

said

thatJanet

aid

that he had attended he

game.

This

recapitulation

fthewhole chain of

testimony

ill

quickly

ecome

mpractical,

particularly

or chain

beginning

ith n

eyewitness

o

a

historicalvent.

Another

trategy

or

btaining ositive

vidence

for teller's

eliability

ould be

to

verify

ther

estimonyy

that eller nd to infer

nductively

hat he current esti-

mony

was reliable. This

strategy,

owever,

faces

a

dilemma. Either

the

other

testimony

hat we

verify

s mundane or it is not.

Verifying

ary's

testimony

n

mundane

topics

will

not

provide

evidence for her

reliability

n

a

non-mundane

topic. t willonlyreinforce hat common sense tellsus, that she is competent n

mundane

opics

and sincere).

videnceofher

reliability

n non-mundane

opics, y

definition,

ust

go beyond

hese

deliverances f common ense. On theother

hand,

ifwe

seek to

verifyMary's

testimony

n non-mundane

opics,

we face the

problem

ofhow to do so.

My

discussion fhistorical

estimony

as shown

how difficultt s to

verify

estimony

n

a

non-mundane

opic

f

hehearer an

rely

n

testimonynly

s

permitted y APMT).

The few ases

n

which hehearer

may

be able to

verify

hat

Mary

has said

concerning

on-mundane

opics

willnot

yield

ufficientvidence or

her

general

eliability

n

non-mundane

opics.

(APMT) alone, then, s too weak. Ifwe restrictefault cceptanceto mundane

testimony,

e lose

testimonial

ustification

n a

wide

variety

f

topics. LR*)

with

(APMT)

fails o

satisfyNSC);

it reducesus to

scepticism

bout almost

ll

but the

plainest yewitness

eports.

6.

Testimony

nderhe

cceptance

rinciple

To

conclude,

shall

show that

APT)

does not

face the

problems

hat

APDT)

and

(APMT)

face.

(APMT)

yields

too little

estimonial

ustification;

f

we have default

justification

nly

on

mundane

topics,

we are not able to

obtain testimonial

usti-

fication n thewiderangeoftopicsrequiredby NSC). On (APT),we are ustified

in

accepting estimony

n

any

topic

so

long

as

there s no

positive

vidence

gainst

accepting

that

testimony.

his

will

immediately

llow us to obtain

testimonial

justification

n the

wide

range

of

topics equired y NSC).

(APT)

will

also allow

us to obtain

positive

vidence for the

trustworthinessf

many

ndividual

ieces

of

testimony.

When one

piece

of

testimony

onfirms hat

?

The Editors f

The

hilosophical

jarterly,

00oo3



10/10

264

MATTHEW WEINER

another

ays,

t will

provide

ositive

vidence

or

hetruth

f

that

estimony;

hiswill

providepositive

vidence

forthe

speaker's

reliability

nd

thus for he truth f

the

rest of

that

speaker's

testimony.

n the other

hand,

two

pieces

of

contradictory

testimonymay each providepositive videnceagainstthe trustworthinessf the

other.

n this nd similar

ways

we

may

obtain a wide

variety

f evidencefor

nd

against

he trustworthiness

f various

pieces

of

testimony,

ithout

oing

an

imposs-

ible amount

of field-work.

his

shows

how

(LR*)

with

APT)

can come close to

a

strictocal reductionist

iew;

though ny

piece

of

testimony

an be

accepted

without

a local

reduction,

fthere

s

no

positive

vidence or

r

against

t,

the

acceptance

of

most

testimony

ill

depend

on

a

local reduction

n which we do consider

the

available

positive

vidence.

(APDT)

was

rejected

because

it

yields

counter-intuitive

esults

concerning

justificationyprivilegingevelopmentalestimonyver mature estimony.APT)

privileges

ll

testimonyqually,

o it willnot

yield

he counter-intuitive

symmetries

that

APDT)

does.

Its

very ymmetry,

owever,

may

seem counter-intuitive.

e are

not nclined o

give

credence o

all

testimonyqually,

ven

when

we are

told

things

by strangers

nd we seem to

have no evidence

concerning

heir

testimony.

stranger

ho

tellsus the time

even

withno watch

visible)

eemsmore credible

han

a

stranger

ho

gives

us

a

stock

ip.

We

can,

however,

ccount

for his

symmetry

nder

APT). Experience

hould

teach us that tock

ips

are

particularly

ikely

o be

unreliable. ither

we

will

have

confirmedhisdirectly y investigatingtocktips,or we will have confirmedt

indirectly y learning

what

n

human

psychology

eads

people

to tell others

bout

financialmatters

ven

when

they

ack

good

information.

his

experience

rovides

positive

vidence

gainst

stock

ip

even

when we have

no

particular

nformation

about the

speaker;

he

topic

of the

testimony

s

enough

o

providepositive

vidence

of tsuntrustworthiness.

Accepting

APT),

then,

llows

us to

ustify

ur extensive eliance

on

testimony

while

avoiding

ounter-intuitiveesults

oncerningustification;

either f the

pro-

posed

alternativesan do so. Under

APT), verifying

estimony

s

about as burden-

some as itought o be. When there s something ishyboutthetestimony either

we have

specific

vidence

gainst

ts

trustworthiness,

r

general xperience

ellsus

that

his ort

f

testimony

s not reliable thenwe need

positive

videncebeforewe

are

ustified

n

believing

what we

are

told. When there

s

nothing ishy

bout the

testimony,

owever,

we

are

ustified

n

giving

t

thebenefit f

the

doubt.'

University

f ittsburgh

I

An

earlier ersion fthis

aper

was

read t

the

Graduate onferencen

Philosophy

t

the

University

f

llinois,

rbana-Champaign;

ark

Sargent

ommentednd

Gary

Ebbs

chaired. hanks o

audiencemembersor

elpful

iscussions,

articularly

manda oen and

Ben

Bayer.

hanks lsofor

xtremely

elpful

omments

o

Nuel

Belnap

nd two

eferees

or

The

hilosophicaluarterly.

C The

Editors f The

hilosophical

uarterly,003

Documents

Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M