Academy of Management Executive Cross-border transfer of ...kimboal.ba.ttu.edu/MGT 5384 Spr 2012/globe project.pdfCross-border transfer of knowledge: Cultural lessons from Project

Cross-border transfer ofknowledge: Cultural lessons

from Project GLOBE

Mansour Javidan, Gunter K. Stahl, Felix Brodbeck, and Celeste P.M. Wilderom

Executive OverviewDistant cross-border business is on the rise. It necessitates effective transfer of

knowledge across geographic and cultural borders. In this article we present the keyresults from the GLOBE study of 62 cultures and apply them to a real-life case of a NorthEuropean business school designing and offering a substantial executive developmentprogram for a large South Asian corporation. We show how cultural differences cancomplicate the successful transfer of knowledge across borders and makerecommendations on how executives can better manage the complex task of transferringknowledge across cultures. We provide advice on how GLOBE findings can be used tobetter manage the content and process issues in such transfers.

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Cross-Border Transfer of Knowledge

In line with the rapid globalization of economicactivity, cross-border transactions by corporationshave exploded over the past 20 years. For example,worldwide foreign direct investment was $1271 bil-lion in 2000, compared to $55 billion in the early1980s.1 Over this same period, international tech-nology payments rose from $7.5 billion to over $60billion. The number of cross-border mergers andacquisitions in 2000 was over four times the num-ber in 1997 (9,200 transactions vs. 2,100).2 Accordingto a recent KPMG study, 41 percent of all mergersand acquisitions in 2000 were cross-border, com-pared to only 24 percent in 1996. With this hugeincrease in cross-border business, the need for ef-fective cross-border knowledge transfer is greaterthan ever and will continue to increase. An exam-ple of what can happen when cross-border knowl-edge transfer is inadequate is General Motors’ di-sastrous experience with acquiring Japaneseproduction processes in 1998.3 It resulted in strikesand production losses of $2 billion a week. GMfailed to take into account that Japanese workers’great loyalty to their employers and the strongculture of worker participation accounts for a largeportion of the success of such production systemsin Japan. Understanding international knowledgetransfer is not only increasingly crucial to the suc-

cess of MNCs, it is also critical to transferring anywork-related operation across national or culturalboundaries.

In this article we illustrate and sum up our re-cent understanding of how differences in nationalcultures impact the dynamics and outcomes ofcross-border knowledge transfer. We portray andanalyze a real-life case in which the cross-borderknowledge transfer was not well managed. Weapply the recent findings of the GLOBE project.They enable us to pinpoint differences and simi-larities in the two national cultures involved in thecase. We also reflect on how the findings from theGLOBE study can be used to inform managersseeking to transfer knowledge across culturalboundaries. Finally, we offer a few suggestions onhow executives can better manage the transfer ofknowledge across cultural borders, using the in-sights that the GLOBE data offer.

International Transfer of Knowledge: A Real-LifeCase

The case relates the experiences of NORDED, aNordic European business school seeking to estab-lish a base in South Asia. In 2002, NORDED signedan agreement with TAI BANK to train several co-horts of middle and upper-middle managers over aone-year period. The purpose of this first program

� Academy of Management Executive, 2005, Vol. 19, No. 2

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was to teach the participants about leadership andmanagement of change. It provided an overview ofwhat is effective leadership and how the TAI BANKmanagers could better manage large-scale changein their organization. The top management at TAIBANK had concluded that their strategic and orga-nizational challenges were significant enough towarrant an exploration of how major Western cor-porations deal with such issues. The bank wasfacing strong competitive pressures from globalbanks such as Citibank and HSBC. They wanted towork with a highly reputable Western businessschool to ensure that they received high qualityadvice, but they also wanted to make sure that theSouth Asian cultural issues were not ignored andthe advice offered incorporated an understandingof the South Asian culture and provided some in-sights into how the Western ideas of leadershipcan be taught hand-in-hand with an understand-ing of their applications within the South Asianculture. As a result, the Human Resources (HR)Director approached the business school about de-signing a leadership program to help prepare thebank managers for the organizational transforma-tion being planned by its top management. Neverin its history had the bank made such a largeinvestment in training and development. The pro-gram’s main objective was to facilitate TAI BANK’stransition from a local bank to a major regionalplayer and to provide a series of leadership skillsthat would help TAI BANK’s managers to imple-ment the organizational changes required to helpthe bank achieve its strategic goals. They ap-proached NORDED because of its world-class rep-utation and because it had historical roots in Asiaand had established a physical presence in theregion. The project was strategically important toNORDED because it had the potential to generateadditional programs for the same client and forother corporations in South Asia.

Although the program started well, fundamentaldifferences in philosophy, styles, and approachesbetween NORDED and TAI BANK soon became ap-parent. These differences soured the relationshipbetween the two parties, especially between theacademic program directors and TAI BANK’s Hu-man Resources group. As will be explained andillustrated later, many of the differences couldhave been foreseen if both sides had taken a pro-active approach and identified their cultural dif-ferences. We will offer the GLOBE findings as atool for taking such a proactive approach to helpmanagers in similar situations.

After the first module, participants reported highlevels of satisfaction with the program and theinstructors. Open-ended comments were quite

complimentary and indicated a high degree of po-tential relevance to the challenges facing TAIBANK managers. However, as the program wenton, ratings of participant satisfaction declined.Open-ended comments from participants at theend of module 3 (five months into the program)suggested frustration in applying what they hadlearned to their work environment. Table 1 pre-sents sample comments from participants at twodifferent stages of the program.

The drop in participant satisfaction was of graveconcern to NORDED’s program directors. Theyidentified the TAI BANK culture and the attitudesof senior management as major barriers to deliv-ering a successful program. They believed thatwhile the TAI BANK senior executives, includingthe CEO, valued the abstract notions of employeeempowerment, transformational leadership, andchange management that were being taught bythe NORDED instructors, the realities of the orga-nization’s culture and operations were impedingthe program’s value. As a NORDED program direc-tor noted, “The hierarchical culture and authoritar-ian style of TAI BANK’s senior executives create anatmosphere of top-down autocracy that stifles thegrowth of managers from lower down.” Informalconversations with participants confirmed thatthey faced major barriers to implementing theirnewly acquired knowledge and skills in their workenvironment. Many complained about senior man-agement’s top-down communication and decision-making style, organizational inertia, and resis-tance to change. Middle managers were seenmerely as discipline enforcers and informationlinks rather than as partners in the search for newideas and improved processes. These factors cre-

Table 1Sample Comments from TAI BANK Program

Participants

After module 1: “Excellent”; “Very inspiring”; “The coursematerials and cases are highly relevant”; “Useful trainingfor leaders”; “Best program I have ever attended”;“Valuable knowledge”; “Very practical”; “I want to go backto work and use the leadership tools we have learned”;“They [the instructors] know our [TAI BANK’s] challenges”;“I gained valuable new insights”; etc.

After module 3: “Too far removed from our reality”; “Tootheoretical”; “Not all the professors understand thechallenges that we are facing at TAI BANK”; “Theassignments were very confusing”; “Interesting conceptsbut how can they be implemented?”; “It will be frustratingnot to be able to put into practice what we have learned”;“This may work in theory but not in our [TAI BANK’s]organization and culture”; “How can we empower ouremployees when all important decisions are made by topmanagement?” etc.

60 MayAcademy of Management Executive

ated enormous frustration among the participatingmanagers and led the NORDED program directorsto conclude that TAI BANK was not ready or able toadopt the leadership styles promoted in the pro-gram.

These problems were intensified by what theprogram directors saw as unexpected and undis-cussed curriculum changes by TAI BANK’s HR ex-ecutives. For example, the HR group, without con-sulting with the NORDED program directors,decided that all program participants were re-quired to take a daily exam to assess what theyhad learned (and, thereby, determine the effective-ness of the program); in addition, each participanthad to make a personal recommendation to the TAIBANK top management, and groups of participantswere expected to work on a project and share theirconclusions with top management on the last pro-gram day. These changes caused a great deal ofstress and confusion among the participants, be-cause of their concern that their presentations andpersonal recommendations might not satisfy thenewly introduced expectations of the TAI BANK topmanagers (who were, in some cases, their directsuperiors).

The NORDED program directors were dismayedand frustrated by TAI BANK’s abrupt decision-mak-ing and lack of consultation. As experts in the field,they felt that their views should be given moreconsideration and that the last-minute changesimposed on the participants effectively destroyedtheir program design. What made things worsewas that the TAI BANK HR executives were quitevocal when something was less than satisfactoryto them, but not very vocal when things were goingwell. As a result of these difficulties, communica-tion between the program directors and TAIBANK’s HR executives broke down almost com-pletely.

We will return to NORDED and TAI BANK’s ex-periences shortly, to discuss what the program di-rectors could have done better to manage theirrelationships with the TAI BANK HR executives.We emphasize that our intent is not to criticize anyparty but to illustrate that cross-border transfer ofknowledge is affected by foreseeable cultural dif-ferences that are typically underestimated, regard-less of the good intentions of all members of theparties. To better convey the impact of culture andcultural differences on cross-border transfer ofknowledge, we offer the key results of a recentlycompleted landmark study of national cultures(GLOBE) as a way to gain insight into what wentwrong in this case.

Understanding Differences in National Cultures:Project GLOBE

GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Be-havior Effectiveness) is a research project involv-ing 62 societies around the world. Over 160 socialscientists and management scholars representingall major regions of the world are engaged in thisprogrammatic series of cross-cultural leadershipstudies. The GLOBE findings presented here arebased on surveys of over 17,000 middle managersin the banking, food processing, and telecommuni-cation industries in 62 cultures. In the mid-1990s,participating managers were asked to report theirperceptions of the cultural practices and values intheir countries. Practices were measured with sur-vey items assessing “what is” or “what are” com-mon behaviors and institutional practices in soci-ety. They represented the way things werecurrently done in a culture. Values were expressedin response to the same questionnaire items in theform of judgments of “what should be.” They re-flected the respondents’ desires and aspirations interms of the way things should be done.

The goal of the GLOBE project is to develop em-pirically based theories to describe, understand,and predict the impact of specific cultural vari-ables on leadership effectiveness and organiza-tional cultures in societies. GLOBE defines cultureas “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, andinterpretations or meanings of significant eventsthat result from common experiences of members ofcollectives and are transmitted across age genera-tions.”3 More detailed information is available onGLOBE’s public website at http://www.thunderbird.edu/wwwfiles/ms/globe/.4

GLOBE developed nine dimensions for compar-ing the different societal cultures of the world. Ta-ble 2 provides short descriptions of these nine di-mensions.

Of particular relevance is the double nature ofthe GLOBE dimensions. That is, on each dimensiona society is positioned in terms of both its culturalpractices (“As Is”-scores) and its cultural values(“Should Be”-scores). Cultural practices data tellus something about the current perceptions of eachculture. Cultural values tap the respondents’ feel-ings about their cultural aspirations and the direc-tion the respondents want their culture to developin the future. In short, the “Should Be” scores canbe used to estimate cultural visions and the desireof a culture for change. If two cultures have differ-ent cultural practices (As Is) but similar values(Should Be), that latter agreement should makeknowledge transfer easier than it would otherwisebe. Emphasizing similarities in cultural values is a

2005 61Javidan, Stahl, Brodbeck, and Wilderom

good managerial strategy to minimize the poten-tially negative consequences of the “As Is” differ-ences for the success of the knowledge transfer. Iftwo groups differ on cultural values and don’tknow it, a knowledge transfer initiative can beproblematic.

In Figures 1 to 9, the scores on cultural valuesand practices are used to position the cultural clus-ters identified by GLOBE (for details, see Appendix1 and 2). Note that while the potential range foreach GLOBE dimension is from 1 (lowest) to 7(highest), the scales depicted in the figures rangefrom 2 to 6 which suffices to represent the totaldistribution of cluster scores. Every point at thebeginning of an arrow shows a culture’s reportedpractices (As Is) score. The tip of an arrow shows itsvalues (Should Be) score. The Differences (repre-sented by the arrows) show discrepancies betweenwhere a culture is and where it aspires to be. Notethat in some instances the arrows of Southern Asiaand Nordic Europe point into opposite directions(e.g., for Institutional Collectivism, Figure 3, andUncertainty Avoidance, Figure 4). This means thatthe societal cultural visions and potential forchange in these clusters point towards oppositeends of each dimension.

While Figures 1-9 compare all the cultural clus-ters of the GLOBE study, the South Asian - NorthEuropean comparison is highlighted by bold ar-rows. Their respective mean scores and ranks aresummarized in Table 3. The most notable differ-ences lie in South Asian cultures’ higher levels ofPower Distance practices (rank 1 versus rank 10),In-Group Collectivism practices (rank 1 versusrank 10) and lower levels of Uncertainty Avoidancepractices (rank 7 versus rank 1). Furthermore, thereare some marked discrepancies in cultural values(Should Be): As compared to Nordic European cul-tures, South Asian cultures show higher levels ofInstitutional Collectivism (rank 1 versus rank 10),Uncertainty Avoidance (rank 1 versus rank 9), andFuture Orientation (rank 2 versus rank 10). Themanagerial implications of these differences for

Table 3A Summary Comparison of South Asian and Nordic European Culture Clusters (N � 10 Culture Clusters)

Dimension

South Asian Cluster Nordic European Cluster

As Is Should Be As Is Should Be

Mean (Rank) Mean (Rank) Mean (Rank) Mean (Rank)

Power Distance 5.4 (1) 2.8 (4) 4.5 (10) 2.5 (9)In-Group Collectivism 5.9 (1) 5.8 (1) 3.7 (10) 5.7 (4)Institutional Collectivism 4.3 (4) 5.0 (3) 4.9 (1) 4.1 (10)Uncertainty Avoidance 4.1 (7) 5.2 (1) 5.2 (1) 3.8 (9)Future Orientation 4.0 (5) 5.9 (2) 4.4 (2) 4.8 (10)Gender Egalitarianism 3.3 (5) 4.1 (9) 3.7 (2) 4.8 (3)Assertiveness 3.9 (9) 4.7 (1) 3.7 (10) 3.6 (7)Humane Orientation 4.7 (1) 5.3 (9) 4.2 (4) 5.6 (1)Performance Orientation 4.3 (4) 6.0 (4) 3.9 (7) 5.8 (7)

Table 2Descriptions of the Nine GLOBE Cultural

Dimensions

GLOBE Cultural Dimensions

Power Distance Degree to which a culture’s people are(should be) separated by power,authority, and prestige

In-GroupCollectivism

Degree to which a culture’s people (should)take pride in and (should) feel loyaltytoward their families, organizations, andemployers

InstitutionalCollectivism

Degree to which individuals are (shouldbe) encouraged by institutions to beintegrated into broader entities withharmony and cooperation as paramountprinciples at the expense of autonomyand individual freedom

UncertaintyAvoidance

Degree to which a culture’s people (should)seek orderliness, consistency, andstructure

FutureOrientation

Degree to which a culture’s people are(should be) willing to defer immediategratification for future benefits

GenderEgalitarianism

Degree to which a culture’s people (should)support gender equality

Assertiveness Degree to which a culture’s people are(should be) assertive, confrontational,and aggressive

HumaneOrientation

Degree to which a culture’s people are(should be) fair, altruistic, generous,caring, and kind toward others

PerformanceOrientation

Degree to which a culture’s people (should)encourage and reward people forperformance


knowledge transfer will be discussed in the nextsection.

National Culture Differences and KnowledgeTransfer

A firm’s knowledge base is generally seen as itsmost important competitive weapon.5 Knowledgeis a resource that exists in an individual or a col-lective and is embedded in rules, processes, orroutines. It is a product of human reflection andexperience and is either explicit and codified informal rules, or tacit and not easily articulated orexplained. At its core, knowledge transfer is abouthow individuals and groups communicate andlearn from each other. Since individuals and orga-nizations are part of their societies, it is plausibleto expect them to reflect their national culture intheir thinking, practices, and values.6

Cross-border transfer of knowledge is complex.Culture and cultural differences can have an im-pact, particularly in the case of tacit knowledgesuch as leadership skills and management know-how. This type of knowledge is not easily codifiedand depends on human intuition, but it is oftenconsidered the most valuable, complex and cultur-

ally determined.7 Successful transfer of knowledgerequires that the target unit assimilates the newknowledge and uses it.

Gupta and Govindarajan8 suggest that effectiveknowledge transfer within or between one or moreorganizations is a function of the following fiveforces:

1. Value of the source unit’s store of knowledge:The greater its value, the greater its attractive-ness for other units.

2. Motivational disposition of the unit that sourcesthe knowledge: Organizational politics, inter-unit rivalry, and other barriers may reduce aunit’s desire to share its knowledge with otherparts of the organization.

3. Existence and richness of transmission chan-nels: Knowledge flows across the organizationare facilitated if there are clear communicationchannels, as well as open and frequent commu-nication among the parties.

4. Motivational disposition of the unit to which theknowledge is directed: Ego-defense mecha-nisms9 and power struggles may lead the targetunit’s managers to resist adopting knowledgefrom the source unit. Such resistance is based

FIGURE 1


on ignorance or underestimation of the value ofthe knowledge.

5. Absorptive capacity or assimilation ability ofthe target unit: Its “ability to recognize the valueof new information, assimilate it, and apply it tocommercial ends”10 determines its success inadopting the incoming knowledge. Absorptivecapacity refers to the extent the target unit iscapable of assimilating the new knowledge andis a function of the unit’s prior knowledge andits similarity to the source unit. The closer thenew knowledge is to the target unit’s priorknowledge and the greater the similarities be-tween the sending and target unit, the higherthe absorptive capacity of the target unit.

While a variety of barriers to knowledge transfercan appear in any or all of these five areas, thetransfer of knowledge from and to geographicallydispersed units within the organization (e.g., fromheadquarters to a foreign subsidiary) and betweenorganizations (e.g., from an acquirer to the ac-quired company) is likely to be affected by differ-ences in national cultures.

We will now use the Gupta and Govindarajan11

model and apply, at the same time, the findings

from the GLOBE project to further analyze the re-lationship between the North European businessschool, NORDED, and its South Asian client, TAIBANK. We aim to provide insights on how culturaldifferences might have affected the dynamics andoutcome of knowledge transfer. Our intent here isnot to criticize any organization or culture. Rather,our purpose is to examine the knowledge-transfercase through a cross-cultural lens and to reachpractical conclusions for managers who are in-volved in similar situations.

National Culture and Cultural Distance Shapethe Perceived Value of Knowledge

Research has shown that the greater the culturaldifferences, the more difficulties people in the re-ceiving unit have in seeing the advantages ofadopting knowledge or organizational practicesfrom the source unit.12 Even if employees in thereceiving unit see the value in adopting certainroutines and practices from the source unit, theperceived – and often real – costs involved in doingso are likely to be higher when countries are cul-turally distant.13 Differences in cognitive struc-

FIGURE 2


tures, values, and practices, as well as languageand communication barriers, all raise the costsinvolved in knowledge transfer.14 As a result, theparties involved in the knowledge transfer are lesslikely to share and apply new knowledge.

GLOBE results show that the cultural distancebetween Southern Asia and Nordic Europe is sub-stantial. Their mean cultural distance, measuredby the average difference between the two cul-tures’ rankings on all nine dimensions, computesto 4.4 (for As Is) and 6.0 (for Should Be). In compar-ison, the mean distance between Southern Asiaand Confucian Asia are 3.1 and 3.7 respectively,and between Nordic and Germanic Europe, theyare 3.4 and 2.7 respectively. Thus, the visions andthe potential for cultural change differ stronglybetween South Asia and Nordic Europe. As wasdescribed above, in the case of Uncertainty Avoid-ance (Figure 3) and Institutional Collectivism (Fig-ure 4) the practice to value trajectory is in theopposite direction. Applying our cross-cultural in-terpretation of the Gupta and Govindarajan15

framework to the case, these findings should havealerted NORDED and TAI BANK to take proactiveaction. Differences in cultural values are more hid-den and require more effort to be adequately un-

derstood and managed. Under these conditions,knowledge transfer requires not only extensivepreparation but also close monitoring and timelyadjustment at all stages of the project.

In the case presented here, the academic direc-tors at NORDED were primarily concerned aboutthe perceived value of the program to the variousdecision makers at the bank. Obviously they did agood job in selling the training product to topexecutives at TAI BANK. However, the Europeanbusiness school designed the leadership programbased on a belief that organizations are better offgetting their managers and employees involved indecision making because such involvement leadsto better-quality decisions and stronger organiza-tional buy-in. NORDED designed the program toeducate the participants on how they could bemore effective transformational and empoweringleaders.

While this goal was consistent with the NordicEuropean cultural practices of low Power Distancepractices, and high Institutional Collectivism prac-tices, it did not fit at all with the client firm’s nationaland organizational culture of high Power Distancepractices. As explained earlier, the top managementat TAI BANK had approached NORDED to educate

FIGURE 3


its management teams on transformational lead-ership. But it is not clear that this particular lead-ership style is effective or desirable in the SouthAsian culture. Furthermore, even though the topmanagement group had decided to offer such aprogram to their managers, it is not clear that theyfully understood the extent to which the adviceoffered in the program would be useful and whatits behavioral implications were for every man-ager, including those at the top.

As for NORDED, they incorporated sessions inthe program which explicitly discussed the SouthAsian culture and its implications for transforma-tional leadership, but they did not have sufficientin-depth conversations with the top managementat TAI BANK to examine the potential value andapplication of their teachings for the corporation.The program’s value and applicability was essen-tially taken for granted and not much discussiontook place with the top management.

National Culture and Cultural Differences Shapethe Motivational Disposition of the Source Unit

Transferring knowledge is not cost free. It is alsovery much context bound. Managers and employ-

ees in a source unit must spend time and resourcesto provide relevant knowledge to the target unit.Their willingness to do this is likely to be affectedby their own national culture. Two different typesof cultural collectivism, Institutional and In-groupCollectivism, are likely to have opposite effects onthe source unit’s motivation to transfer knowledge.Managers in a high In-group Collectivist cultureare used to working closely with the members ofthe in-group but are less concerned with knowl-edge transfer to those outside their own group.They are reluctant to spend the time and the effortto build close relationships with outsiders.16 Incontrast, managers from a high Institutional Col-lectivist culture tend to promote and encouragemore system-wide information systems and knowl-edge transfer to encourage greater organizationwide communication and collaboration.

Now let’s apply our cross cultural interpretationof the Gupta and Govindarajan17 framework to thecase of the European business school and its SouthAsian client. The NORDED academic directorswere initially highly motivated to deliver a greatprogram. However, the TAI BANK’s HR executives’approach in dealing with them and the partici-pants’ lack of voice in program changes were per-

FIGURE 4


ceived as a constant source of frustration. In part,this may be due to the extremely high In-groupCollectivism evident in TAI BANK’s societal culture(Rank 1 for “As Is” and “Should Be”, see Table 3),perhaps leading the HR group to not anticipate thepotential negative impact on their outside part-ners. At the same time, the respective practices inNORDED’s societal culture rank lowest (Rank 10,see Table 3) which may have led to misunder-standings about the reasons why there was lack ofcommunication and involvement.

Furthermore, coming from a high Power Dis-tance culture, the client probably expected thebusiness school to implement its instructions im-mediately without much discussion. The middleand upper-middle managers attending the pro-gram had little to say about any aspect of theprogram. The TAI BANK’s HR group believed thatthe program participants should merely follow in-structions without discussion – and the partici-pants obviously met those expectations. In con-trast, NORDED representatives, who operated onthe basis of low Power Distance practices (As-Is,Rank 10) and values (Should Be, Rank 9), wereexpecting more feedback and communicationsfrom TAI BANK’s HR group and the program par-

ticipants. They also viewed themselves as the ex-perts in the field and felt that their views were nottaken into consideration and that the quality of theprogram was negatively impacted by the HRgroup’s directive and exclusive style of decision-making. As a result, even though the program wasof great strategic and financial importance toNORDED, as discussed by the Gupta and Govin-darajan18 framework, its program directors soonstopped investing much time in building and sus-taining the relationship. Such a loss of motivationis counterproductive to any project’s success. How-ever, as was pointed out above, the high societalcultural distance between NORDED and TAI BANKrequires extra effort to monitor and adjust projectactivities. Under these conditions, lack of motiva-tion which impedes further development of rela-tionships is particularly dysfunctional.

Cultural Differences Affect the Richness ofTransmission Channels and CreateCommunication Barriers

Any form of knowledge transfer requires substan-tial, high-quality communication between the par-ties. In cross-border cases, this is both important

FIGURE 5


and hard to achieve. The most basic barrier islanguage. Even though English is the predominantlanguage of cross-border communication, manag-ers in many parts of the world do not have a goodcommand of English. This can cause communica-tion problems, especially in cases of non-face toface communication. One way to deal with suchproblems is to increase the level of face-to-facecontact. However, this is relatively time-consum-ing and expensive in most cross-border settings.

Another important issue related to communica-tion is the methods used by the source unit totransfer knowledge. Differences in cultural prac-tices can play an important role here. When thetransferor is from a high uncertainty avoidanceculture and the receiving unit is from a low uncer-tainty avoidance culture, the two parties may findthe knowledge transfer process frustrating. This isbecause the former will emphasize organized, for-mal, and structured forms of communication whilethe latter will prefer informal, unplanned, and un-structured approaches.

The South Asian cluster’s low score on Uncer-tainty Avoidance practices seems to reflect a lackof attention to due process and a tendency to makeabrupt decisions. For example, emails were sent to

NORDED program directors to inform them ofchanges taking place in the program just as theprogram was scheduled to start. And little instruc-tion or explanation was provided to the directors orthe participants about what was expected of themunder the new directives. This resulted in confu-sion during the program among NORDED repre-sentatives and visible stress among the partici-pants because of their concern that theirpresentations might not match the expectations oftheir superiors.

On the one hand, NORDED’s high UncertaintyAvoidance cultural practices made them investmore time and effort in anticipatory planning andthe design of the training program, along withhigh attention to detail and organization before theactual delivery of the program. On the other hand,TAI BANK’s low Uncertainty Avoidance culturalpractices made them invest more time and effortduring program delivery, by monitoring, and ad-justing — if felt necessary, and exploring opportu-nities for quick change when problems appearedor as they developed new ideas. From NORDEDstaff’s perspective, these practices appeared as“abrupt decisions” and “unannounced changes,”which compromised their well-planned program.

FIGURE 6


From TAI BANK’s perspective, the more the leader-ship program unfolded the more they felt theyneeded to make changes and adjustments, as aresult of the reasons described above. Moreover,they may have perceived NORDED’s staff as prob-ably not (yet) trustworthy enough to be fully in thedecision-making loop, and thus, TAI BANK’s topexecutives (who have the authority – high PowerDistance) decided to take direct action for adjust-ments.

TAI BANK executives, being from a high In-groupCollectivist culture, were probably not predis-posed to coordination and consultation with anexternal partner such as NORDED and more com-fortable working with groups they already knewand had worked with.19 NORDED was unsure abouta continuing relationship with the South Asianclient. The school was not certain that the clientwas finding the experience of sufficient value, buthad not taken much of a proactive approach todealing with the issues. While there had been in-ternal complaints at NORDED about the client, theattitude had been somewhat passive and not manysolutions had been identified. A possible culturalexplanation for this is provided in Table 3. TheNordic European and South Asian cultures are

both low on Assertiveness practices (As-Is). Thismay explain why NORDED was not very aggres-sive or proactive in maintaining the lines of com-munication with the client. While TAI BANK alsorepresents a low Assertiveness As Is (practice)score, it has a much higher Should Be (value) score(4.7 vs. 3.6), and was probably expecting a muchhigher level of praoctivity and initiative fromNORDED, something which was not forthcomingand was aggravating the cross-cultural chal-lenges.

No one at the business school built strong per-sonal ties with the key people at TAI BANK and asa result, the continuity of the program was in doubtdespite the initial expressed satisfaction of theparticipants. The NORDED leaders could have rec-ognized these cultural realities and talked directlyto TAI BANK’s leadership by tasking one or moretop ranked representatives (to accommodate theirhigh Power Distance practices) to build strongerties with the client. Maintaining a regular highlevel contact would have reduced obstacles andcreated stronger mutual support for the programand its administration, but as explained in theGupta and Govindarajan20 framework, communi-cation channels between the two parties suffered

FIGURE 7


as a result of cultural differences and lack of aproactive approach to building rich and open linesof communication resulted in a dysfunctional rela-tionship. A positive atmosphere between NORDEDand TAI BANK was not really developed and theinitial base of goodwill at the time of signing theagreement deteriorated after the first issuesemerged, thus hampering the transfer of manage-ment knowledge and acceptance of the NORDEDapproach—a finding that is also at the core ofHolden’s model of cross-cultural knowledge trans-fer.21

National Culture and Cultural Differences Shapethe Motivational Disposition and AbsorptiveCapacity of the Target Unit

Research on knowledge transfer has shown that atarget unit’s absorption of new knowledge de-pends in part on its stock of prior related knowl-edge. Knowledge development is path-depen-dent22 and cumulative in the sense that it consistsof a gradual and incremental process of learning;the new knowledge gets connected to the existingrelated knowledge and builds on it. Totally newknowledge has no anchor in organizational mem-

ory. Therefore, it cannot hook into an existing pieceof knowledge. Existing knowledge can thus en-hance the target unit’s ability and motivation tobetter understand and evaluate the new incomingknowledge. A target unit faced with totally newknowledge may therefore be unable to determineits relevance and value. The inability to assess thevalue of the incoming knowledge, in turn, reducesthe motivation and ability of the target firm toinvest the energy and effort to assimilate and ex-ploit it.

A target unit’s absorptive capacity is also af-fected by the cultural differences between thesource and target unit.23 The degree of similaritybetween both units, in terms of values and be-liefs (among other things),24 is important. This isbecause when individuals or groups share com-mon meanings, they find it easier to communi-cate, and the target unit is more receptive to thenew knowledge.25 Applying our cross-cultural in-terpretation of the Gupta and Govindarajan26

framework to the TAI BANK/NORDED case, eventhough the participants seemed to value gettinga Western training program, their ability to im-plement the new knowledge was in doubt due tocultural obstacles. The academic directors’ big-

FIGURE 8


gest concern shifted from: are the program par-ticipants learning something valuable to: doesthe client organization have the ability to actu-ally implement the ideas learned. They were un-sure whether the client organization was willingand able to adopt the leadership styles pro-moted. They believed that senior executives didvalue the abstract notion of leadership. However,they felt that the organization’s culture, reflect-ing the broader national culture, impeded lead-ership progress. If they had been more proactive,they could have used cultural similarities tobuild stronger trust and to ensure better under-standing and support from TAI BANK. For exam-ple, as seen from Table 3, both cultures are veryhigh on Performance Orientation values; theirShould Be scores are quite similar. The wholeprogram design and the process of communica-tion and collaboration could have been strength-ened if the two parties had been aware of thissimilarity and used it as the basis of their col-laborative work. The similarity in PerformanceOrientation values could have been used as astrong vehicle for building understanding andsupport for the program’s goals and objectives.The common value of high Performance Orienta-

tion could have been used to invest more timeand effort in developing common metrics or cri-teria to evaluate the success of the program stepby step.

How to Manage Cross Cultural Issues: GLOBEAdvice on Cross-border Knowledge Transfer

Now we will advise managers on how they can usethe GLOBE findings to better manage the transferof knowledge across cultures.

1. Define Common Goals in Advance ofKnowledge Transfer

Foremost, it is important for parties involved inknowledge transfer to agree on a set of commongoals and objectives in their joint initiative. Crite-ria and metrics for defining success need to beidentified by parties and agreed to in advance.This is critical because we know that culturallydifferent parties define success differently and, asa result, expect different goals and attach differentvalues to prospective knowledge transfer. If par-ties agree on the metrics, they are more likely to

FIGURE 9


converge on how important the knowledge is andwhat to expect from the process.

An important element in defining common goalsis the perceived value of the knowledge content. Itis important that the parties understand and agreeon the value and applicability of the knowledge to betransferred before they agree on their common goals.A critical success factor in a cross-border knowledgetransfer is an agreement on how and why the partic-ular knowledge is of value to the target unit. Such adiscussion will result in a better understanding ofthe target unit’s needs and may lead to a change inthe content of the knowledge to be transferred.

In the TAI BANK/NORDED case described here,there was little upfront discussion. The GLOBE re-sults would have warned that differences and diffi-culties would become apparent on: a) the use of hi-erarchy for organizational communication (highPower Distance, Figure 1); b) the acceptance andimplementation of foreign leadership concepts (highIn-Group Collectivism, Figure 2); and c) the amplepreparations necessary before training results canbe implemented widely (high Uncertainty Avoid-ance, Figure 4). Parties often wrongly assume thattheir criteria for success and their goals are thesame. But clarity on what the different parties expectfrom the transfer and how they measure its successcan go a long way in reducing future misunderstand-ing and miscommunication. In the case here, had thenoted differences been taken more seriously, moreeffort would have been spent to define the content ofthe program and their common goals. Memberswithin both parties would then have realized muchearlier what exactly they could expect from and dotoward effective collaboration. Also it could havehelped substantially to enhance the parties’ motiva-tion to engage in the knowledge transfer. In the casedescribed here, if NORDED had engaged the seniorexecutives and the HR group in such a discussion, itwould have likely achieved a greater common un-derstanding and cooperation. The common goalsand the metrics for success could be short-termand/or long-term, and could be defined narrowlyand/or broadly. For example, if NORDED and TAIBANK’s HR group had initially agreed that an impor-tant metric for this program would be the extent towhich the participants could better communicatewith and motivate their employees, every time theHR group proposed an idea without consultation, theprogram directors could discuss it within this agreedupon context. Clarity and agreement on commongoals and success criteria reduce the chances of fu-ture misunderstanding and help provide a commonground to resolve potential cultural misunderstand-ings.

2. Map the Cultural Profiles

Parties involved in cross-border knowledge trans-fer must understand their own and the other side’scultural profiles. GLOBE provides the scientificallybased tool for doing this. The parties can use theinformation provided by GLOBE to prepare a cul-tural map of each country involved in order toclearly identify cultural differences and similari-ties. The profiles enable an understanding of howthey are different or similar. On that basis, keymembers of the parties to the transfer should en-gage in a discussion of the different cultures. It isadvised to do so very early on in the transfer pro-cess. Parties need to discuss the possible ways inwhich the identified differences can impede orcomplicate the knowledge transfer process.GLOBE uses nine cultural dimensions to producecultural profiles. The parties need to identify thesubset of cultural differences that can negativelyimpact the process and explore possible ways toaddress them. Such a discussion, early in the pro-cess, can be helpful and constructive; it preventsan emotional or confrontational debate and facili-tates a rational, preemptive, and constructive ap-proach.

Discussions on cultural profiles should not beonly focused on cultural differences. A review ofthe specific cross-cultural similarities can help putthe parties at ease. It can identify potential areasof leverage to help deal with the cultural differ-ences. One possible area of convergence is similarcultural values (i.e., on the Should Be responses).As shown in the nine GLOBE figures, cultures mayhave different practices but similar values. Peoplein different cultures may share common aspira-tions about the way things should be in their soci-eties. In terms of identifying common values tostart from, in the TAI BANK/NORDED case, despitestrong differences between Southern Asia and Nor-dic Europe in Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoid-ance, and In-Group Collectivism cultural prac-tices, which were discussed above, there is a basisfor a common cultural orientation in terms of: 1)Humane Orientation (see Figure 8) and 2) Perfor-mance Orientation (see Figure 9). First, taking thetime to explore and develop a common under-standing of the ground rules of interacting andcollaborating with each other on the basis of Hu-mane Orientation should have worked, becausehere, both cultural clusters are very similar. Thatis, cultural principles and values of fairness, altru-ism, generosity, carefulness, and kindness arestrongly endorsed. Their enactment surely differsin the two cultural clusters, however, their impor-tance is about equally highly valued. Starting with


these and exploring the differences in enactmentshould have helped to develop the trust and mu-tual respect needed to proceed with sufficient careto avoid or identify difficulties in time.

Second, taking the time and effort to articulatethe common goals and criteria for success, that is,what TAI BANK and NORDED each mean by highperformance, would have been a constructive dia-logue. Both cultural clusters are high on Perfor-mance Orientation, that is, the degree to which asociety encourages and rewards people for perfor-mance. Again, the enactment of Performance Ori-entation differs between cultures, but the empha-sis put on this orientation is similarly high, andparties from both cultures would have been willingto invest in common ground on performance crite-ria. These are just two examples for an area inwhich upfront investment in terms of time andeffort is likely to have resulted in more commonground/space for running the project with less frus-tration and surprise than was actually the case.

In general, constructive discussions on culturalprofiles should lead to better management of thetransfer process and lead to insights on how tocommunicate more effectively. In the case here, theNORDED administrators should have also pro-actively engaged TAI BANK representatives in adiscussion of cultural impediments to building astrong transformational leadership team. The highIn-Group Collectivism cultural practices in theSouth Asian culture served as an impediment.However, TAI BANK had already crossed this lineby hiring a European institution to do the job. Stillthe cultural difference exists and should havebeen discussed in the sense of “How far are youwilling to go against this cultural context?” An-other starting point would have been to inform thetop management and the HR group of the apparentvalue differences between modern Western-typetransformational leadership and traditional SouthAsian culture (autonomy, individual freedom, par-ticipative leadership, low power distance versusharmony, collaboration, directive leadership, andhigh power distance). The relative match in theShould Be scores in Power Distance is a solidground for convergence, meaning that the trajec-tory of cultural development in South Asia andNordic Europe is in the same direction, namelylower Power Distance.

3. Assign Relationship Managers in Cross-Cultural Transfers of Knowledge

In the TAI BANK/NORDED case, the knowledge-transmitting process seems under-coordinated, be-cause the two parties did not keep open the lines of

communication. We may even go so far as to con-clude that a cross-culturally focused socializationprocess between members of TAI BANK and theNORDED directors would have been the only wayto prevent the culture clash. Given the complexi-ties of cross-border transfer of knowledge, neitherparty could take anything for granted. All partiesshould have cross-culturally aware individuals ac-countable for the success of the transfer. Theyshould also hold regular meetings and discussionsto better manage the relationship. A typical cross-border transfer of knowledge involves many indi-viduals and groups from the organizations in-volved. The larger the number of players andorganizations involved, the higher the likelihood ofcross-cultural misunderstanding and the less theprobability of success. By assigning those respon-sible for the relationship, each organization in-volved can help prevent cross-cultural friction.

The parties involved in cross-border knowledgetransfer need more than open lines of communica-tions. They need to create a common space wherethe parties feel comfortable and confident to worktogether to nurture and develop the mutual rela-tionship. The common space is developed throughan understanding of common cultural traits andcommon goals for the transfer, but it also requiresconstant contact, in the form of both distant andface-to face and formal and social exchanges todevelop the requisite trust. Especially in the caseof a high in-group culture, the challenge for theexternal partner is to find ways that would help itbecome part of the other party’s in-group. Socialand informal gatherings tend to be particularlyimportant in such settings.

Of course, it is the provider of the knowledge, inthis case NORDED, which should take the initia-tive. They should make sure they have their ownrelationship manager(s) and ask for the creation ofsuch a role within the client side. They may need toexplain the importance of this role and how itwould help others involved in the actual transfer.The fundamental reason for such a role is to en-hance the chances that the client does receive thebest value possible in this complex exchange.

4. Learn from Knowledge Transfer

The parties involved in cross-cultural knowledgetransfer need to see it as a learning opportunity.The success of organizations is increasingly de-pendent on productive relationships with people inother culturally different organizations. Cross-cul-tural knowledge transfer is a fact of daily life formost corporations worldwide. It is therefore criticalfor managers to view each case of knowledge


transfer not as an isolated situation but as a pointin a stream of learning opportunities. Time andmoney need to be budgeted and spent on thiscross-cultural learning. An important lesson fromthe case presented here is that success in a cross-border transfer of knowledge depends not just onthe receiver’s absorptive capacity, but on the pro-vider’s transformative capacity and its ability tomanage the knowledge transfer process. A pro-active and culturally sensitive approach by thesource can go a long way to improving the chancesof success.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have discussed the issues relatedto cross-border transfer of knowledge. The essenceof our article is that while any case of knowledgetransfer may face obstacles and complexities,cases of cross-border knowledge transfer may facean extra challenge of cross-cultural hurdles. Butcultural differences do not per se create problems;rather it is the way that cultural differences aremanaged that often results in poor knowledgetransfer outcomes. If managed effectively, culturaldifferences can be a source of synergy and a stim-ulus for mutual learning. So the message to exec-utives is not to automatically shy away from cross-border situations in knowledge transfer. Instead,our message is that executives need to take a pro-active and systematic approach to dealing withcultural differences. They need to be aware of howthe partnering cultures are different and be mind-ful of their implications. As explained in the paper,the parties need to define their common goals inthe transfer and their success criteria, need to un-derstand and discuss their potential cultural chal-lenges, need to ensure they have proper manage-ment of the relationship, and need to treat everycase of cross-border knowledge transfer as a learn-ing opportunity to improve their chances for thenext time.

We also presented GLOBE and its findings as ahelpful tool for executives to be more prepared forthe challenges and issues they will be facing.GLOBE’s nine cultural dimensions and its analy-ses of cultural values and practices will be thestate-of-the-art for many years to come and canhelp managers develop a global and culturallysensitive mindset. GLOBE provides a rigorous toolto help managers understand the similarities anddifferences among the various cultures worldwideand to take a proactive and constructive approachto resolving cross-cultural issues. GLOBE can pro-vide valuable assistance in identifying the cultur-ally appropriate content of the knowledge to be

transferred and in effectively managing the trans-fer process.

Appendix 1

1. Power distance refers to the extent to which a collectivemaintains inequality among its members by stratifying in-dividuals and groups with respect to power, authority, andprestige (sample item: “Followers are (should be) expected toobey their leaders without question.”). The range of scoresfor both practices and values is from 1 (very low) to 7 (veryhigh). A score of 2 means low practices or values of powerdistance; a score of 6 means high practices or values. Thevertical axis represents cultural practices (As Is) and thehorizontal axis represents cultural values (Should Be). Notethat in Figure 1 the scores ascribed to practices of powerdistance (As Is) range between 4 (medium) and 6 (high),whereas the scores ascribed to values of power distance(Should Be) range between 2 (low) and 4 (medium). Thus, inall studied countries power distance is less valued than it isactually practiced.

2. In-group collectivism refers to the extent to which members ofa society take pride in membership in small groups such astheir family and circle of close friends, and the organizationsand units in which they are employed (sample item: “Employ-ees feel (should feel) great loyalty toward this organization”).Interestingly, in all cultural clusters, in-group collectivism isvalued quite highly (range between 5 and 6). However, theperceived cultural practices differ more strongly. Most Euro-pean cultural clusters (Nordic, Germanic, Latin) and the An-glo cluster endorse in-group collectivism to medium (4) orsomewhat high (5) extent. They are the most individualisticcultures. In these European clusters we found a desire formore in-group collectivism.

3. Institutional collectivism refers to the degree to which indi-viduals are encouraged by societal institutions to be inte-grated into broader entities. In more collectivist societies,harmony and cooperation are paramount whereas in moreindividualistic countries, autonomy and individual freedomare more stressed (sample item: “Leaders encourage (shouldencourage) group loyalty even if individual goals suffer”).There is a negative correlation between As Is and Should Bescores evident, that is, country clusters with high scores onpractices of institutional collectivism tend to score signifi-cantly lower on respective values (e.g., Nordic European) andthose with low scores on cultural practices tend to desiresignificantly higher levels of institutional collectivism (e.g.,Latin America).

4. Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which membersof a collective seek orderliness, consistency, and structure tocover situations in their daily lives. It reflects society’s reli-ance on social norms and procedures to alleviate the unpre-dictability of future events (sample item: “Most people lead(should lead) highly structured lives with few unexpectedevents”). There is a negative correlation between As Is andShould Be scores evident. Most prominently, the Germanicand Nordic European clusters score on the high end of thedistribution for uncertainty avoidance cultural practices (AsIs) and show much lower levels (even below medium) foruncertainty avoidance in terms of cultural values (Should Be).In sharp contrast, Eastern European, Middle East and LatinAmerican cultures score below medium in uncertainty avoid-ance cultural practices and high on the respective culturalvalues.

5. Future orientation refers to the extent to which individualsengage in future-oriented behaviors such as delaying grati-fication, planning, and investing in the future (sample item:“More people live (should live) for the present rather than forthe future,” scored inversely). All country clusters rangearound the medium between 3.5 and 4.5 for Future Orienta-tion practices and range between 4.8 and 6.0 in terms of theirfuture-orientation values.

6. Gender egalitarianism refers to the degree to which a collec-tive minimizes gender inequality (sample item: “Boys areencouraged (should be encouraged) more than girls to attaina higher education,” scored inversely). With the exception ofthe Middle East cluster (which scores below 3.0 for GenderEgalitarianism practices and below a medium 4.0 for Gender


Egalitarianism Should Be), all other country clusters rangebetween 3.0 and 4.0 on Gender Egalitarianism cultural prac-tices (As Is) and between 4.0 and 5.0 on Gender Egalitarianismcultural values (Should Be). In Eastern and Nordic Europeancultures Gender Egalitarianism seems to be reasonably highand stable, which is indicated by a comparatively smalldifference between As Is and Should Be scores.

7. Assertiveness refers to the degree to which individuals areassertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relation-ships with others (sample item: “People are (should be) gen-erally dominant in their relationships with each other.”). Innearly all country clusters the Assertiveness cultural prac-tices range near the medium of 4.0 (the Germanic clusterscores above 4.5, the Nordic European cluster scores near 3.5).More variance is evident for the Assertiveness cultural val-ues, with the Germanic cultures at the lower end (3.0) andConfucian and Southern Asia on the higher end (near 5.0). Forthe Germanic cultures one can note a disparity betweenhigher scores for Assertiveness practices and lower values forAssertiveness. In Confucian and Southern Asia cultures wenote a trend towards higher Assertiveness (Should Be) ascompared to the current practices.

8. Humane orientation refers to the degree to which a collectiveencourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic,generous, caring, and kind to others (sample item: “Peopleare generally (should be generally) very tolerant of mis-takes”). In all country clusters, Humane Orientation culturalvalues are highly endorsed (all range around 5.5). However,in terms of Humane Orientation cultural practices there isstrong variance between the cultural clusters. The highestHumane Orientation As Is scores are evident for SouthernAsia (near 5.0), followed by Sub Sahara Africa and MiddleEast (near 4.5). On the lower end is the Germanic cluster (near3.5). All other clusters range below or above the median valueof 4.0.

9. Performance orientation refers to the degree to which a col-lective encourages and rewards group members for perfor-mance improvement and excellence (sample item: “Studentsare encouraged (should be encouraged) to strive for continu-ously improved performance”). A clear trend among all coun-try clusters is evident; there are much higher Should Bescores in Performance Orientation (between 5.5 and 6.5, ascompared to the practices range of about 3.7 to 4.7). Interest-ingly, Confucian Asia ranges high on Performance Orienta-tion As Is (4.6) and comparatively low on Performance Orien-tation Should Be (5.6). This indicates a sensible fit betweenpractices and values. This is especially so when compared toall other cultural clusters which display much higher dis-tances between As Is and Should Be scores (for example,Latin America: As Is � 3.8, Should Be � 6.3).

Appendix 2The GLOBE countries grouped in 10 cultural

clusters27

Latin Europe FranceSwitzerland (French speaking part)IsraelItalyPortugalSpain

Germanic Europe AustriaGermany (former East)Germany (former West)NetherlandsSwitzerland (German speaking part)

Anglo Europe IrelandUnited Kingdom

Nordic Europe DenmarkFinlandSweden

Eastern Europe AlbaniaGeorgiaGreeceHungaryKazakhstan

PolandRussia.Slovenia

Latin America ArgentinaBoliviaBrazilColombiaCosta RicaEcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaMexicoVenezuela

Confucian Asia ChinaHong KongJapanKorea, Rep.SingaporeTaiwan

Anglo (outside Europe) AustraliaCanada (English speaking part)United StatesNew ZealandSouth Africa (white sample)

Sub-Sahara Africa NamibiaNigeriaSouth Africa (black sample)ZambiaZimbabwe

Southern Asia IndiaIndonesiaIranMalaysiaPhilippinesThailand

Middle East Egypt, Arab Rep.KuwaitMoroccoQatarTurkey

Endnotes1 Kumar, N. 2002. Globalization and the quality of foreign

direct investments. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.2 Levy, A. 2001. Promises unfulfilled. Bloomberg Markets, 10

(4): 37–45.3 Holden, H. 2002. Cross-cultural Management: A knowledge

management perspective. Harlow: Financial Times/PrenticeHall.

3 House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M. Dorfman, P., & Gupta, V.(Eds.) Leadership, culture, and organizations: The GLOBE studyof 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

4 See, E.G., Javidan, M., & House, R. 2002. Leadership andcultures around the world: Findings from GLOBE: An introduc-tion to the special issue. Journal of World Business (SpecialIssue), 37, 1–2.

5 Dierickx, I. & Cool, K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation andsustainability of competitive advantage. Management Science35:1504–1514; Lippman, S.A., & Rumelt, R.P. 1982. Uncertain imi-tability: An analysis of interfirm differences in efficiency undercompetition. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 418–438.

6 House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Ruiz-Quintanilla, S. A., Dorfman,P.W., Javidan, M., Dickson, M.W., Gupta, et al. 1999. Culturalinfluences on leadership and organizations: Project GLOBE. In


W. H. Mobley, M. J. Gessner, & V. Arnold. (Eds.), Advances inglobal leadership. Stamford, CN: JAI. 171–233.

7 De Long, D.W., & Fahey, L. 2000. Diagnosing cultural barri-ers to knowledge management. Academy of Management Ex-ecutive 14(4): 113–128. See also Bhagat, R.S., Kedia, B.L., Har-veston, P.D., & Triandis, H.C. 2002. Cultural variations in thecross-cultural border transfer of organizational knowledge: Anintegrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 27(2):204–221.

8 Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. 2000. Knowledge flowswithin multinational corporations. Strategic Management Jour-nal 21: 473–496.

9 Sherif, M. & Cantril, H. 1947. The psychology of ego involve-ments: Social attitudes and identification. New York: Wiley.

10 Cohen, W.M. & Levinthal, D.A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: Anew perspective on learning and innovation. AdministrativeScience Quarterly 35: 128–152. p. 132.

11 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.12 Stahl, G.K., Bjorkman, I., & Vaara, E. 2004. National cultural

differences and capability transfer in cross-border acquisitions.Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference,New Orleans, August 6–11, 2004. See also Szulanski, G. 1996.Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer ofbest practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17:27–43.

13 Kostova, T. 1999. Transnational transfer of strategic orga-nizational practices: A contextual perspective. Academy ofManagement Review, 24: 308–324.

14 Simonin, B.L. 1999. Ambiguity and the process of knowl-edge transfer in strategic alliances. Strategic ManagementJournal, 20: 595–623.

15 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.16 Glisby, M., & Holden, N. 2002. Contextual constraints in

knowledge management theory: The cultural embeddedness ofNonaka’s knowledge-creating company. Knowledge and Pro-cess Management, 10(2): 1–8.

17 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.18 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.19 Javidan, M., & Dastmalchian, A. 2003. Culture and leader-

ship in Iran: The land of individual achievers, strong familyties, and powerful elite. Academy of Management Executive,17(4): 127–143.

20 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.21 Holden, H. 2002. op. cit.22 Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, op. cit.23 De Long & Fahey, 2000, op cit.24 Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000, op cit.

25 Rogers, E.M. 1995. Diffusion of innovations. New York: FreePress.

26 Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. op. cit.27 Dorfman, P., Hanges, P.J., & Brodbeck, F.C. 2004. Leadership

and cultural variation: The identification of culturally endorsedleadership profiles. In R.J. House, P.J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P.Dorfman, & V. Gupta (Eds.) Leadership, culture, and organiza-tions: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage Publications, Inc.: 669–719.

Mansour Javidan is Director of the Garvin Center for Culturesand Languages of International Management at Thunderbird,The Garvin School of International Management. He is a boardmember and co-author of the first GLOBE book, recently pub-lished by SAGE, which won the Society for Industrial and Or-ganizational Psychology’s (SIOP) 2005 M. Scott Myers Award forApplied Research in the Workplace. Contact: [email protected]

Gunter K. Stahl is Assistant Professor of Organizational Behav-ior at INSEAD. His current research focuses on the link betweenstrategy and leadership, global leadership development, trustwithin and between organizations, and management of merg-ers and acquisitions. His most recent co-edited books are“Mergers and Acquisitions: Managing Culture and Human Re-sources” (with Mark Mendenhall; Stanford University Press2005) and the “Handbook of Research in International HumanResource Management” (with Ingmar Bjorkman; Edward Elgar2005). Contact: [email protected]

Felix C. Brodbeck is professor of Organizational and SocialPsychology, Head of Work and Organisational Psychology, andDirector of the Aston Centre for Leadership Excellence (ACLE),at Aston Business School, UK. His research, manifold publica-tions and consulting cover the fields of HRM, OB, OD, Social andCross-Cultural Psychology, currently focusing on leadership,teamwork, diversity, and distributed knowledge in organiza-tions. Contact: [email protected]

Celeste P.M. Wilderom is a full professor in Management &Organizational Behavior (University of Twente, the Nether-lands). She obtained a Ph.D. from the State University of NewYork at Buffalo (USA) in 1987. Her main research is on leader-ship and culture. She is one of the three editors of the award-winning Handbook of Organizational Culture & Climate (2000,Sage). Currently she serves as an associate editor of the BritishJournal of Management, previously also: International Journalof Service Industry Management as well as the Academy ofManagement Executive. Contact: [email protected]


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