Abraham Mansbach - Heidegger on Art

OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM: HEIDEGGER ONTHE HEROIC ROLE OF THE WORKS OF ART

Abraham Mansbach

AbstractIn this paper I argue that although Heidegger’s Being and Timeand ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ seem to deal with differenttopics, there is continuity between these two texts. In the latterHeidegger was trying to solve a central problem that arose in theformer: how to account for authentic existence and at the sametime overcome the anthropocentrism of traditional philosophy.

In Being and Time Heidegger tries to overcome traditionalphilosophy, by redefining human existence in non-Cartesianterms. Yet, his treatment of the problem of the Self preserves oneof the main tenets of that tradition: its anthropocentrism. Thisanthropocentrism is implicit in Dasein and further reinforced bythe notion of the hero as the paradigm and channel of authenticexistence.

In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ Heidegger solves that prob-lem. Placing man at the periphery and the work of art at thecentre of his endeavours, gives works of art a special status similaronly to that of heroes. Works of art open up new horizons forgenerations to come by drawing in advance the paths for authen-tic behaviour.

This shift is more than merely methodological. Heidegger over-comes not only the anthropocentrism of his previous analysis butalso the instrumentality that derived from that anthropocentrism,thus revealing the essence of things.

One of the problems in analysing Heidegger’s philosophy is theabsence of a unified picture. The variety of topics he treats andthe variety of perspectives of his analyses give the impressionthat some of his writings are unrelated to others. This impres-sion is especially strong when we compare Heidegger’s seminalwork Being and Time with his post-1930 writings. The explana-tion generally given is that Heidegger’s thought took a turn(Khere) at this time which divided his philosophy in two mainperiods.

One example of the discontinuity is the text ‘The Origin of theWork of Art,’ which was part of a series of lectures on art and the

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work of art that Heidegger gave in 1935 and 1936.1 There is noevidence that Heidegger dealt with these questions before. It isthus reasonable to argue that he was trying to expand the rangeof his thinking by exploring a new field, namely aesthetics.Though this explanation is accurate it is also partial. In this paperI will show that there is continuity between Being and Time and‘The Origin of the Work of Art.’ In the latter Heidegger wastrying to solve a central problem that arose in the former: how toaccount for authentic existence and at the same time overcomethe anthropocentrism of traditional philosophy.

The scope of this paper does not allow us to ponder the effectof this continuity on the question of the turn. Nevertheless, oursuggestion is that the view that Heidegger made a radical changeat some point in the 1930’s should be tempered.

In order to see how the question of anthropocentrism, aresidue of Cartesianism, remains unsolved, let us take a brief lookat Heidegger’s strategy to solve the problem of authentic exis-tence.

A major problem in Being and Time is that of the Self. In thatwork, Heidegger abandons the Cartesian substantial subject anddeals with the problem of Being by analysing Dasein. The term‘Dasein’ refers to the human structure to which the inquiry onBeing in general – that is, the being of all entities includingDasein itself – is essential. Dasein is what Heidegger terms theclearing (lichtung, lumen naturalis): the place of ontological clari-fication where Being is revealed. But if Heidegger’s aim is, amongother things, to account for entities in the world, the question ofthe individual person, the Self, must also be solved. Taking as thepoint of departure the general structure of human existence,Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis must account for the waythe individual as such is constituted.

Heidegger wrestles with this query throughout Being and Time,proposing the structure of mineness (Jemeinigkeit) as a means to

158 ABRAHAM MANSBACH


1 The first lecture was given on November 13, 1935, in KunstwissenschaftlichenGesellschaft zu Freiburg im Breisgau. The second lecture, based on the first, was given inJanuary 1936, at the University of Zurich, under the title ‘Vom Ursprung desKunstwerkes.’ A third elaboration on the topic, based on a series of three lectures givenat the Freie Deutsche Hochstif in Frankfurt am Main, in November and December 1936, waspublished for the first time in 1945 under the title ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.’Heidegger added a postscript in 1956.

This paper is based on Alfred Hofstadter's translation of ‘Der Ursprung desKunstwerkes,' which appeared as ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,' in Poetry Language andThought, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 15–87.

resolve it. Mineness is that existential structure which makes itpossible for Dasein to question and to elucidate its own being.This elucidation reveals two modes of existence which constitutethe Self: authentic and inauthentic. These are the confines ofhuman existence along which the Self is shaped. Inauthenticity isdue to the fact that Dasein is thrown into a world in which things,social norms and values, and institutions were already producedby other human beings in the course of history. That is, the worldis already invested with meaning which originated in the activitiesand interpretations of Others. At the same time, the world is partof Dasein, even though it did not acquire its meaning throughthe activities of the individual, and Dasein obtains its meaningfrom those things which already have meaning. It adopts andprojects onto the future a present which is not its own. Its exis-tence is thus inauthentic. The inauthentic Self is the ‘they’ (dasMan).

Heidegger regards the authentic mode of existence as possibleonly after familiarity – the meaning of the everyday world –collapses and authentic selfhood is laid bare. In the authenticmode, human existence both gives meaning to itself from withinitself and makes possible the disclosure of Being, which togetherallow man to fulfil his existential purpose of serving as the placewhere Being is manifested.

There are three moments in which the possibility of authenticexistence is disclosed – but not actually realized. These are facingdeath, anxiety, and the call of conscience. In these momentsDasein is transparent to itself. Yet, while these provide the basisfor authenticity, they are insufficient to unravel Dasein from itsinauthentic mode.

When the human being discovers his own mortality, the worldwhich has acquired meaning originating in Others is eclipsed,and death appears as one’s own, with no possibility of beingusurped by Others. The realization that there is something thatcan be only one’s own allows Dasein to focus on itself as an indi-vidual and to realize that absorption into Others is not inevitable.

Anxiety is a state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) which does not origi-nate in any specific thing, and thus reveals entities within theworld to be meaningless. As a result, the world itself is perceivedas completely lacking in significance: It collapses into itself. Thepossibility of self-understanding in terms of the world collapses aswell, and a feeling of uncanniness (unheimlichkeit) seizes Dasein.Anxiety thus brings Dasein face to face with itself, the world, and

OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM 159


things as they are – that is, not independent realities but mean-ingful insofar as they are endowed with meaning by human exis-tence.

Yet, though this human endowed meaning constitutes thebasis for authenticity, the possibility of authentic existence isundermined by what Heidegger says is ‘the dominance of thepublic way in which things have been interpreted.’ This, accord-ing to Heidegger, ‘has already been decisive even for the possi-bility of having a mood . . . The “they” prescribes one’sstate-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees.”2 Themood of anxiety, then, and the resulting lack of meaning are thusin some sense determined by the inauthentic they. Thus it followsthat ‘authenticity is only a modification but not a total oblitera-tion of inauthenticity.’3

This modification is made possible by conscience. Heideggertreats conscience as a kind of call by the anxious Self out of itsfeelings of uncanniness. Absorbed in the they and taking its possi-bilities from the inauthentic mode, Dasein listens to others andfails to hear its own Self. The call of conscience breaks into thisinauthentic idle talk (Gerede) and, in the process, the inauthentic‘they-Self is modified . . . so that it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self.’4

But the problem of the inauthentic source of authenticity isnot resolved by the call of conscience. Heidegger does not saythat the call of conscience comes from the authentic Self; he isambiguous and leaves the matter cloaked in mystery, telling usthat ‘the call comes from me and yet from beyond me.’5

The impossibility of deriving authentic existence from theindividual is not only due to the unidentifiable source of the callof conscience. Heidegger regards Dasein as being constantly withothers, Dasein is Mitsein. Thus, he proposes that the only way for



2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquirre and EdwardRobinson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 213.

3 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 171. See also Heidegger, Being andTime, p. 168.

4 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 313. 5 Ibid. This interpretation of authenticity was exposed, along different lines, in

Charles. B. Guignon, ‘Heidegger’s ‘Authenticity' Revised,' Review of Metaphysics, 38 (1984)pp. 321–339; Jay A. Ciaffa, ‘Towards an Understanding of Heidegger’s conception of theInter-relation between Authentic and Inauthentic Existence,' Journal of the British Society forPhenomenology, 18 (1987), pp. 49–59; and Abraham Mansbach, ‘Heidegger on the Self,' inIyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (1991), pp. 65-91.

Dasein to obtain authentic existence is within a group of individ-uals devoted to the same matter. Dasein must shape its world andmake it its own together with the community. Heidegger termsthe mode of behaviour in which the Self may attain authenticexistence by acting in concert with its environment and Othersresoluteness (Entschlossenheit). Moreover, since Dasein is a tempo-ral entity and hence historical, authentic existence must be notonly communal but also historical.

To achieve authentic existence Dasein must consider both itsown past and the past of the entire generation -- its heritage. Tobe authentic it must choose and appropriate a common heritagewithin a communal framework. But here, too, the possibility ofauthentic existence is called into question. Heidegger tells us that‘even resolutions remain dependent upon the “they” and itsworld,’6 thus leaving a trace of inauthenticity in every human actand choice, including the decision made in selecting a past.

Heidegger’s concept of the hero, even though he mentions itonly twice in Being and Time, comes to tackle this impasse.7 AsHeidegger depicts him, the hero is the only being who mayperform some authentic acts. He is the only one for whomauthenticity is not a mere possibility, but an actual mode of exis-tence. From this, one may extrapolate that choosing and follow-ing a hero somehow do not entail the inauthenticity that isinherent in every other choice and act. To be authentic, to actresolutely, and to loyally follow ‘in the footsteps of that which canbe repeated,’ Heidegger says, ‘Dasein may choose its hero.’8

The heroic action may be understood as a cultural-philosoph-ical act which reveals Being, and the hero’s whole existence asidentified with that revelation. The hero’s deeds thus open pathsthat become the destiny of a historical people. In choosing a heroDasein chooses a role from among those which come down to itthrough tradition and history, makes an authentic past its own,and, with the community, projects that past onto the future.

Yet though the concept of hero solves the problem of authen-tic existence, it raises doubts as to whether Heidegger succeeds inovercoming the shortcomings of traditional philosophy, whichwas one of his major motivations. As is well known, the focus onthe meaning of Being in Being and Time is directed towards that



6 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 345–346. 7 The term ‘hero' (Held) appears in Being and Time, on pages 422 and 437. 8 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 437.

end. Heidegger argues that this question has been forgotten intraditional philosophy, with a resulting distortion of the ontolog-ical picture. In positing Dasein as the starting point, Heideggeraims to provide a new and firm foundation for ontology. This is aunique foundation in the history of Western philosophy, for itcontains no presuppositions at all about man and reality otherthan the possibility of ontology itself: the possibility of raising thequestion of Being. Heidegger thus erects a barrier between hisfundamental ontology and the Cartesian-Kantian tradition,which posits as its starting point a subject with characteristics andboundaries.

Yet although Heidegger overcomes substantialism by redefin-ing human existence in non-Cartesian terms, his treatment of theproblem of the Self preserves one of the main tenets of that tradi-tion: its anthropocentrism.

In positing Dasein as the starting point of his fundamentalontology, Heidegger attempts to depart from the traditionalanthropocentric philosophical view. He describes Dasein’s basicattitude as that of questioning, thus it does not set up the worldas does the cogito. Nonetheless, Heidegger does not entirelyescape anthropocentrism, for it is through human existence ingeneral and authentic existence in particular that Being isrevealed. The questioning reveals that Dasein has an under-standing of Being, and, as a result, that human actions are projec-tions onto the world of this understanding; these actions givemeaning to the world. In trying to come to grips with selfhood,Heidegger analyzes human and non-human entities so as to showhow man is reflected in entities which he encounters in theworld. Anthropocentrism is further reinforced by the notion ofthe hero as the paradigm and channel of authentic existence.

The lecture ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ comes to solve thisproblem. Here Heidegger invites us to ‘go to the actual work andask the work what and how it is.’9 He calls on us to ‘ask the ques-tion of truth with a view to the work [of art].’10 Human existenceis no longer the centre of the analysis, and no longer serves as theconduit of meaning. The focus is shifted to art and its product,the work of art.

Using the work of art as a prism for his phenomenologicalanalysis, Heidegger accords it a special status which sets it apart



9 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 18. 10 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 41.

from the entities in Being and Time. Heidegger had defined theseentities as present-at-hand (vorhanden) and ready-to-hand (zuhan-den). The work of art is neither, but rather an entity throughwhich the truth of beings is disclosed. It has a privileged relationto Being, similar only to that accorded to Dasein.

Like Dasein, the work of art generates truth by constituting theworld, thereby permitting entities, including human beings, tobe part of the world. Dasein shapes and structures the worldthrough its constant involvement with other entities in a complexweb of relationships. The work of art gives meaning to the spacein which it appears and thereby creates a place where all entitiesare brought forth.

Works of art have a thingly nature, while Dasein is existential.In placing man on the periphery and the work of art at the centreof his endeavours, Heidegger thus did more than make a merelymethodological shift. He overcame not only the anthropocen-trism of his previous analysis but also the instrumentality thatderived from that anthropocentrism.

Consistent with his rejection of the representational world viewand adherence to the aletheiac conception of truth, Heideggerdenies that the capacity of the work of art to disclose truth derivesfrom its mimetic nature. He holds rather that the connectionbetween the work of art and truth lies in the former’s being ‘thereproduction of the thing’s general essence.’11 The problem withDasein based analysis is that it cannot fully reveal the essence ofthings, that is, the thingness of beings. Dasein encounters entitiesin the world through use, and thus reveals them either as beingsthat are ready-to-hand, when useful for some purpose, or present-at-hand, when they become un-ready-to-hand and cease to beuseful for Dasein’s purposeful activity. In other words, when thelens is the structure of human existence, beings reveal only theirinstrumentality.

Analysis based on the work of art allows the thingness ofbeings to be brought to light. The revelation of thinghood ismade possible by the nature of the relationships between theartist and his creation and between the work of art and the beingreproduced through it. The relation between the artist and hiscreation is not instrumental. Works of art, especially great ones,stand by themselves, unrelated to other entities or even to theartist who created them. The only aspect of the artist’s intention



11 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 37.

preserved in the work of art is its having been created to stand onits own.

Standing by themselves, works of art have a unique relation towhat is reproduced through them. Taking Van Gogh’s painting ofa pair of peasant shoes as an example, Heidegger tells us that it‘is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasantshoes, is in truth.’12 The relation between the painting and thepair of shoes allows us to see the latter within its environment.The painting brings its own world into the open, revealing thepeasant, the field-path, ‘the dampness and richness of the soil,’13

and, most importantly, the thingly character of the thing: theearth which ‘vibrates’ in the shoes. More will be said shortly ofthe role of ‘earth.’ Here what is important to emphasize is thatgreat works of art thus make the world, and this is the source oftheir power to reveal truth.

Another important function of art lies in its historical dimen-sion. Heidegger illustrates this historicity with the example of aGreek temple:

It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the sametime gathers around itself the unity of those paths and rela-tions in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victoryand disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape ofdestiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of thisopen relational context is the world of this historical people.14

The temple opens up a world both for individuals and for theentire community: both are nourished by the history it evokes, bythe heritage it transmits. But the temple is only a particularlyclear example of the way in which works of art enable people tolive a common present shaped by an acknowledged past andprojected future. This is a major function of all works of art.

Furthermore, in addition to constituting the world, the workof art also ‘sets forth’ earth. Earth and the world are the two‘essential features in the work-being of the work [of art].’15 Thesetwo features make the revelation of thinghood possible. Theaddition of earth to Heidegger’s philosophical menu is morethan a matter of terminology, but rather points to an important



12 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 36. 13 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 34. 14 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, pp. 41–42. 15 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 48.

development in Heidegger’s thought. Earth differs from world ina vital way. While the world consists of things that have meaning,earth consists of the totality of things that lack meaning and thevague aspects of entities which are part of the world of Dasein butcannot be fathomed. Among the latter are the colours of thepainting, which are impenetrable in the form of colour as suchbut comprehensible in their embodiment in the painting, andthe stones of the temple, whose thingness similarly becomescomprehensible only in the work of art.

In contrast to the instrumentalities of anthropocentric analy-sis, earth is essentially irrational and incomprehensible.According to Heidegger, it retreats when we want to give it form;it withdraws when we attempt to appropriate it. Earth ‘shattersevery attempt to break into it’; it is ‘essentially self-secluding(Sichverschliessende).’16 While the world consists of the familiar,earth represents otherness. ‘Earth’ represents the limitations ofhuman existence, the difficulty and indeed the impossibility ofmaking intelligible all the aspects of entities: ‘There is much inbeing that man cannot master. There is but little that comes to beknown. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered inse-cure.’17

Analysis focused on Dasein ignores earth, since it treats entitiesas equipment and emphasizes their instrumental purposes. Inthat instrumentality, the material – earth – disappears into useful-ness. In the production and use of a tool, material is secondary todesign. We see a hammer as a tool, and not as a wooden handlewith an iron head.

Being set forth by a work of art does not make earth intelligi-ble in and of itself. For instance, while it is possible to quantify theheaviness of the stone, still, ‘this precise determination of thestone remains a number, but the weight’s burden has escapedus.’18 To be set forth through art means to be laid bare as unin-telligible.

At the same time, Heidegger maintains that the work of artopens up a world but ‘does not cause the material to disappear;’it rather ‘causes it to come forth for the very first time and tocome into the Open.’19 ‘Material’ is used here in a broad sense,



16 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 47. 17 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 53. 18 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 47. 19 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 46.

covering the paint of Van Gogh’s painting, the sounds ofBeethoven’s Eroica, the words of Sophocles’ Oedipus, and thestones in a work of architecture. The work of art manifests thethingness of entities by revealing their earthly aspects. It is inthese great works of art that the rock comes to be rock, colourscome to glow, ‘tones to sing and words to speak.’20 And, in thissense, the artist uses colours, stones, voices and sounds, but theydo not disappear (as they do in instruments), but are preservedin the work of art.

Besides disclosing the line between the rational and the irra-tional, works of art are free of residual inauthenticity. This, forHeidegger, is the feature that makes them unique. It is also thefeature that makes them very much like heroes.

In analysing the Self in Being and Time, Heidegger reinterpretsthe traditional meaning of reflection. The traditional view holdsthat the ego or Self is known through reflection. Heideggerclaims, however, that reflection is not to be understand as intro-spection, as ‘the ego bent around backward and staring at itself.’Rather the ego ‘show(s) itself in a reflection from something.’21

In reflection, we ‘discover ourselves in things,’22 namely in thingsthat have acquired meaning through our acts. By reflection,‘Dasein gets its ontological understanding of itself . . . from thoseentities which it itself is not but which it encounters within theworld.’23

Works of art, like other objects, are sources of reflection. Butthough Heidegger tells us that, like these other objects, theGreek temple ‘gives to things their look and to humans theiroutlook on themselves,’24 and in this sense has a thingly charac-ter, the work of art also functions like a hero. The disclosuregenerated by the work of art is unique. The work of art acts likeanxiety except in that it is entirely authentic. Anxiety bringsDasein back from its absorption in Others. It causes everydayfamiliarity to collapse and Dasein to fail to understand itself andthe world as interpreted by the anonymous ‘they.’ It makes itclear that what we are anxious about is not a thing, but does nothave the character of any being at all and, in fact, is nothing.

Just as anxiety discloses the nothingness behind all phenomena



20 Ibid. 21 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 159. 22 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 161. 23 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 85. 24 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 43.

and thereby gives new meaning to phenomena, so too does thework of art. When placed in a designated setting -- or erected, asin the case of the Greek temple -- it radiates a light, opening upa clearing which gives new meaning to its surroundings:

Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is ina greater degree than are beings. This open centre is thereforenot surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting centre itselfencircles all that is, like the Nothing that we scarcely know.25

Until they are integrated into the new world constituted by the workof art, beings lose their meaning and slide into nothingness. Theclearing which the work of art creates makes authentic existencepossible. For it discloses the nature of all entities and thus ‘grantsand guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that weourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are.’26

Works of art counter inauthenticity. For in containing theopposition between earth and world, each work of art opens upa world which is ‘the clearing of the paths of the essential guid-ing directions with which all decision complies.’27 Dasein’s choicecan be guided by the paths cleared by works of art, just as it canbe guided by adopting the hero’s past as its own.

Great works of art are analogous to heroes in placing thenewly-generated world within the historical perspective of anation giving birth to history: ‘Wherever art happens . . . a thrustenters history, history either begins or starts again.’28 By givinghistorical significance to their environment, they provide Daseinwith a heritage, a past that can be appropriated to shape anauthentic future, making authentic existence possible.

The work of art, like the hero, acts historically in a dualmanner: it inaugurates history and it also endures throughouthistory for generations to come. The world generated by thework of art is not absorbed and exhausted within one generation;it is not revealed once for all time. The earth within the work ofart challenges each successive generation anew to realize,preserve and interpret its inexhaustible meaning.

The work of art determines in advance the future that cominggenerations must appropriate and preserve. In the work of art,says Heidegger, ‘truth is thrown toward the coming preservers,



25 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 53. 26 Ibid. 27 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 55. 28 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 77.

that is, toward an historical group of men.’29 This group consistsnot of the entire community, but of the preservers who appreciatethe historical and artistic value of the work of art and the truth itgenerates. They are the interpreters and readers of the greatworks of art, not necessarily academics or experts. Thesepreservers mediate the relationship between the community andthe work of art. It is not enough that a work of art is created. Itmust function as a projected truth which engenders new conceptswith historical meaning for future generations. The role of thepreservers is similar to that of the artists, for ‘what is createdcannot itself come into being without those who preserve it.’30

The work of art discloses Being and enables authentic self-hood. This happens when ‘we remove ourselves from ourcommonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by thework, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand in thetruth of what it is.’31 Like the heroes in Being and Time, works ofart open up new horizons for generations to come by drawing inadvance the paths of authentic action. Through art, historybecomes ‘the transporting of a people into its appointed task asentrance into that people’s endowment.’32

Any attempt to draw narrow political conclusions fromHeidegger’s short discussion of heroes would be mistaken.Heidegger’s concept of history, as it evolves from our examina-tion, would fall under what Nietzsche calls ‘monumental’ history.Heidegger regards history as a chain of human creations, eachone arising as a monument and representing a new era. Eachmonument opens up a new perspective from which to look atthings, human beings, and history, and thereby throws new lighton the past and confers new meaning on the future. UnlikeNietzsche, however, Heidegger does not think of history as serv-ing life and an unhistorical power, but rather as disclosing Being.His concept of the hero is not romanticism in a new garb. It doesnot point to the man behind the creation, but to the creationitself, which makes the disclosure possible.

Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBer-Sheva, Israel



29 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 75. 30 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 66. 31 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 75. 32 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 77.

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Abraham Mansbach - Heidegger on Art