Abortion LegMed

8/17/2019 Abortion LegMed

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The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:

1. That there is a pregnant woman.

2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.

3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.

4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having

been expelled therefrom.

(People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988)

Pregnant women become tired more readily; therefore, the prevention of fatigue must

be stressed very emphatically. The body is made up of various types of cells, each

type with a specific function. Depletion of nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and

fatigue causes certain reactions in the body that are injurious. (Maternity Nursing 12th

Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder and Mastroianni, Jr.)

It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be employed in the followingtypes of occupation and they should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more

sedentary works:

(a) Occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work; and

(b) Occupation involving continuous standing and moving about. (One of the

Standards for Maternity Case and Employment of Mothers recommended by the

Children's Bureau of the United States) (Rollo, p. 12,)

Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the influence of periodicity as the

uterine muscle reaches a certain state of detention; or in various accidents as a fall,

strain or overmuscular exertion when the uterus reacts and expels its load. (Emphasissupplied; "Anatomy and Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181)

(Carbajal v. GSIS, G.R. No. L-46654 August 9, 1988)

As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as

follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such

pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally

exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or

after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that

the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive

at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6

months is not viable. In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the

appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

(People v. Paycana, G.R. No. 179035 April 16, 2008)



People vs. Bandian

G.R. No. 45186

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and

Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to

the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength

to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was

helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the

truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the

fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that

from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her

extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage

which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is aprimipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to

childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and

the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five

centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned

from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why

she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was

unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or

insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal

Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to

leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the

thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she

had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as

that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because

of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness

and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by

mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such

circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).



People vs. Jaca and RasalanG.R. No. L-34866

There is no dispute about the fact that Severa Jaca's new-born baby died a violent

death; this has been sufficiently proved. The evidence for the prosecution points to

Proceso Rasalan as the offender; but Margarita Jaca, the latter's wife, affirms that it

was Aurea Zabella, the midwife who attended Severa Jaca in her delivery, who

caused the death of the child.

This accusation of Margarita Jaca against Aurea Zabella is not supported by the

evidence of record. The appellant himself does not blame Aurea for the death of theinfant, for he assured in his testimony that he had only heard the child cry once, and

when Aurea Zabella, who was assisting the woman in labor, went to attend to the

babe, she found it already dead (pages 145, 146, t. s. n.). Furthermore, there is nothing

in the record to show what motive Aurea Zabella might have had to take the life of

that unfortunate new-born babe.

Rejecting, then, this incrimination of Aurea Zabella as unlikely and unproved, let us

see if there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court convicting

Proceso Rasalan of the infanticide.

Two eyewitnesses, Aurea Zabella and Agapita Navaja, both of them related to the

appellant, the first by consaguinity and the second by affinity, testify that Proceso

Rasalan wrapped up the baby in a cloth which asphyxiated it — resulting in its death.

Tomas Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law, testified that when the latter handed to him

the corpse of the newly-born child in order that he might secretly throw it into the

river, the accused revealed to him that he, Proceso Rasalan, had killed it in order to

conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca, which cast a reflection upon them, for Severa

was the witness Tomas' Daughter, and the defendant's sister-in-law. The defendant

questions the veracity of these three witnesses, especially of the two last, Agapita

Navaja and Tomas Jaca, alleging that they had a grievance against him and his family.

The grievance mentioned is not, to our mind, sufficient to make the witnesses tell a

falsehood in accusing their own relative of so serious crime.

In addition to this evidence, there is the plain, clear, and evident proof of the

appellant's own admission contained in Exhibit C, assailed on the ground that the

defendant signed it under pressure of the Constabulary Lieutenant Santiano and the

justice of the peace Velez Martinez, without knowing its contents. That the accused

signed said exhibit knowingly and willingly has been satisfactorily proven by the

testimony of said justice of the peace, whose veracity there is in the record no reason

to doubt.



That the infant really died, through asphyxiation, is amply shown by the testimony of

Doctor Potenciano, who examined the exhumed corpse, thus corroborating the other

witnesses for the prosecution.

As it has been established in the record that the crime charged was committed, and

that the defendant committed it; that, inasmuch as he is not an ascendant of the deadchild, he has incurred, according to the law (art. 409, par. 3, Penal Code) the penalty

for murder and is guilty of this crime (U. S. vs. Aquino and Casipit, 34 Phil., 813).

United States vs. Vedra

G.R. No. L-4779

No proof has been offered, however, that an accident of any sort had occurred which

might have produced the death of the child. Inasmuch as it was born alive and in a

healthy condition, it is not to be presumed, without some just reason therefor, that it

died a natural death within the extremely short time that elapsed between its birth and

its burial. The latter took place immediately after without further interval of time thanthat which was strictly necessary to carry the child a distance of about 150 meters

from the house of the defendant to the site where the infant was buried. On the

contrary, all of the acts related above, performed by the accused immediately after her

confinement, reveal in a clear and unquestionable manner her decided intent to kill the

newly born child in order to conceal her dishonor; and the signs of violence found on

the body demonstrate that she actually effected her purpose. The aforesaid signs,

together with the abovementioned conduct of the accused, constitute conclusive proof

of her guilt as the author of the crime of infanticide herein prosecuted.

People vs. PaycanaG.R. No. L-179035

As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as

follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such

pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally

exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or

after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that

the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.

However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive

at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6months is not viable. In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the

appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 4828 because by a single

act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as

well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed

when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less

grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be

applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying



circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the

most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of Appeals properly

commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua,

pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

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