Abandoning of Semi-Presidentialism in Central Europe? Cases of Croatia and

Poland

Davor Boban, University of Zagreb, Croatia

Introduction

Political changes that started in Eastern Europe in 1989 introduced new system of

government in that region – semi-presidentialism. Changes that lead toward transition from

communism began in the Soviet Union with Gorbachev’s new policies, perestroika and

glasnost. That new political direction of the Soviet regime allowed other countries in that

region to introduce their new policies more freely than in the previous period. First country in

which transition started was Poland. That country was specific among other members of the

Soviet bloc because of its mass oppositional movement “Solidarity” that had shook regime in

the beginning of the 1980’s. Even if it was banned in 1981 its leaders managed to retain part

of their political influence. New wave of strikes in 1988 forced communist government to

start negotiations with them. Those negotiations culminated in the “Round Table” Agreement

from April 1989. Following day after the agreement had been signed, Polish Sejm changed

Constitution and laid legal basis for political change.

Intention of the communist govenment was to change political system, but not to

abolish it completely. Communist party should remain governing force and the “Solidarity”

should become legal part of the system. Two new political institutions were established,

President of the Republic, and second chamber of parliament, Senat. Even if the President was

not supposed to be elected in popular elections, but in the parliament, he got significant

constitutional powers and became powerful institution. But, elections held in June 1989

deeply affected system and the transition toward democracy started irreversibly. Communist

leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected in the new parliament for the first Polish

President after 1952, but in new circumstances his strong constitutional powers did not mean

too much. After regime satellite parties United People’s Party (ZSL) and Democratic Party

(SD) crossed on “Solidarity” side, Jaruzelski was forced to appoint Tadeusz Mazowiecki for

the new Prime Minister. His previous choice, General Kiszczak, was approved for the Prime

Minister in the Sejm, but he did not manage to form the cabinet. Instead of him, Mazowiecki

formed multiparty cabinet with “Solidarity”, ZSL, SD, and communist members. After that,

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Jaruzelski completely lost his influence in the Polish politics. Government and not the

President became leading and decisive part of the executive and it launched policies that

changed political and economic system of Poland.

Polish constitution-making process had a few stages. Most important of them were

three: constitutional changes in 1989, adoption of so-called Small Constitution in 1992, and

adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in 1997. Each of the three mentioned

acts regulated in different ways role of the President of the Republic in the Polish system of

government. He was most powerful according to the provisions of the 1989 amendments.

They enabled him to dismiss parliament in the case of the threat to his powers. This power

was designate not for ordinary, but for extraordinary situations. Using of it depended on

President’s attitude about did parliament do something that could menace established system.

President’s power of the dissolution cannot be regarded as a state of political accountability of

the parliament toward President. Such presidential powers were abandoned in the Small

Constitution, but he nevertheless stood a political institution with significant powers.

Experience of inter-institutional relations, which occurred during the Lech Wałęsa’s

presidency, leaded constitution-makers toward decreasing of the presidential powers in the

1997 Constitution.

Transition in Croatia was part of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe but it was

burdened with the crisis of Yugoslav Federation, to which it belonged in that time. Transition

started in 1990, with first free elections. Some oppositional parties were founded in previous

year but they were illegal until February 1990. Constitution-making process started after

elections in April and May 1990 in which Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had

predominantly won and secured for itself absolute majority in Croatian parliament, Sabor.

New Croatian President and leader of the HDZ Franjo Tuđman had dominant role in that

process, which ended with the adoption of the new Constitution on December 22, 1990.

Constitution established semi-presidential form of government in which President of the

Republic had two important powers: right to issue decrees with the legislative power in

extraordinary situations, and the right to control the cabinet. President gained not only power

to appoint Prime Minister and (on his advice) ministers, but also to dismiss cabinet.

Parliament got power to vote confidence to the new cabinet or appointed minister, and right to

vote them no confidence. According to Shugart and Carey (1992) typology, new Croatian

system of government had characteristics of president-parliamentary sub-type of semi-

presidentialism. In the first decade of the new system of government in Croatia, President

could both appoint and dismiss prime minister. Although Croatian Constitution declared that

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“the Government is accountable to the president and the House of Deputies of the Sabor” and

that the “House of Deputies could put a motion of censure”, in reality Government was under

his complete and firm control. Constitution-making process in Croatia was not finished with

the adoption of the new Constitution in 1990. Shaping of the new political system was

continuing in the next ten years with the changes of that Constitution. Change in 2000 was

significant for the system of government because it decreased presidential powers and

strengthened the cabinet in its relations to the President. From that time, President does not

have right to unilaterally dismiss cabinet; that right only has parliament. Some parts of that

change were similar with the change that occurred in the new Polish 1997 Constitution. In

that Constitution Prime Minister got more powers than he had before and President got less

than before. Last change of the Croatian Constitution was in the spring of 2001 and it

abolished second chamber of the Sabor.

Theoretical and conceptual disputes on semi-presidentialism

Today there are a few trends in the political science and the constitutional law about

semi-presidentialism. Besides Maurice Duverger’s original concept, there are three more that

deserve our attention: Shugart and Carey’s (1992) and Shugart’s (2005), Sartori‘s (1994), and

Elgie’s. According to Duverger, „A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the

constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is

elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite

him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power

and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them“ (1980:

166). Shugart and Carey adopted that concept with some changes, but what is more important

in their work is diversification of semi-presidentialism in two subtypes: premier-

presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Former one is a type in which prime minister

is appointed by a president but is responsible only to a parliament. Latter one is a type in

which prime minister is not only appointed by the president, but is also accountable to him,

along with his accountability to parliament.

Sartori (1994) gave new important remarks on semi-presidentialism with the

foundation of new defining characteristics of that type of system of government. Three of

them are important for this analysis: 1) changing of the primacy in the executive between

president and the prime minister; 2) the independence of the government from the president;

and 3) no separation of constitutional norms and the political practice in remarking is the

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system of government in some country semi-presidential or not. First characteristic is

connected with the dual structure of the executive in semi-presidentialism. That is main

differentiating feature of that type of system of government in comparison with the

presidentialism and parliamentarism. Dual structure also means presence of the dynamic

relations between two heads of the executive (president and prime minister) in which each of

them can have dominance in that branch of the government if appropriate conditions are

present. That defining characteristic is connected with the second one which enables that

dynamic structure. President-parliamentary systems cannot fulfil those requirements and

because of that Sartori criticizes Shugart and Carey (1992) against their typology of semi-

presidentialism arguing that the president-parliamentary sub-type is not semi-presidential one.

And third, non separation of constitutional norms and the political practice is Sartori’s request

for the appropriate characterization of semi-presidential countries, but it is very difficult to

apply that in the practice. It is easy to say that the Fifth Republic is semi-presidential because

its dual executive exists not only in the Constitution but also in the reality, and that Iceland is

not semi-presidential because it has in reality parliamentary form despite constitutional norms

that establish dual executive. Problem arises when one needs to find out what semi-

presidential practice is and what constitutional and practical characteristics of the dual

executive are.

Elgie tried to resolve those problems with the minimalist concept of semi-

presidentialism and abandoning of “significant presidential powers” from his concept. Direct

presidential elections became main feature of that system of government in comparison with

the parliamentary one and that solution really remove problem of classification of countries

under the semi-presidentialism. But, such minimalist solution cannot explain nature and

characteristics of system of government in some particular country. Its application on Croatia

and Poland shows that both countries have semi-presidential regime from the 1990 until

today. It, however, disregards the fact that the role of presidents in their constitutions and

political arenas was changed and that that had influence on characteristics of the whole

system of government with the possible change of their type.

Croatian system of government and the transition: President as an obstacle to the

democratization

Powerful presidency was established at the beginning of the democratic transition in

Croatia. Ruling HDZ was more a movement than a political party strictu senso. Its leader

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Franjo Tuđman had among party members charismatic status from the very beginning of the

democratic changes and had dominant and unquestionable position in party hierarchy. After

his election in Sabor for the new Croatian President in May 1990, he was elected on two

following popular elections for the head of the state. In a period between May 1990 and

August 1992, when he was elected on popular elections for the first time, Croatian system of

government had only constitutional features of semi-presidentialism but not all those features

in practice. Similar system had been in France in a period between 1962 and 1965. Direct

elections for the French President were part of the French Constitution from the constitutional

change of 1962 but first were held three years after that, in 1965. Because of that, first couple

of years Fifth Republic had not been semi-presidential state. It became that constitutionally in

1962 and in reality in 1965. Nevertheless, in those first years of the new French political

system President De Gaulle shaped institution of the Presidency and managed to establish it

as a most powerful political institution of the Fifth Republic. Croatian President Franjo

Tuđman in much did the same, but unlike Charles de Gaulle whose legacy outlived him,

Tuđman’s legacy provoked constitutional changes after his death.

According to the type of elections, Tuđman governing could be divided in two

periods: first, from 1990 to 1992, and second, from 1992 to 1999. We could make hypothesis

that different sources of legitimacy affect possibility of the President of the Republic to rule

more independent from the parliament and the cabinet or not. In a case of the election in the

parliament, President would be more constrained in his possibility to use his significant

constitutional powers. Elected in a parliament, he could not connect his demands to become

dominant institution in the political system with the popular source of legitimacy. And on

contrary, popular elections would allow him to do that and he would have more influence on

other institutions than in a previous case. Croatian case shows that this hypothesis is false.

From the very beginning of his govenings President Tuđman has been most powerful political

institution. Different type of elections that were held in 1990 and 1992 did not have influence

on his position in Croatian politics. Beside constitutional powers and source of legitimacy, his

position was caused with some other factors, too. Types of electoral and party systems, his

charisma, control of media, and special circumstances in which Croatia was during the 1990’s

were additional factors that put him on the top of government hierarchy.

During the 1990’s HDZ had absolute majority of seats in both chambers of Sabor.

High popularity that that party enjoyed among Croatian citizens was reinforced with electoral

laws. In first free elections in 1990, in force was majority system with two ballots. If no one

candidate won absolute majority of votes in first round, every candidate who won more than 7

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percents of votes in first round had right to run in second one. Such majority system in the

end enabled HDZ to be overrepresented in Sabor and to won more seats than votes (in

percentage). For second parliamentary elections, held in 1992, was prepared new electoral

law. Instead of the previous majoritarian system, for those elections was made mixed system.

Half of the seats were elected according to the first-past-the-post system, and the other half

according to the PR system. Such formula again enabled HDZ to won much more seats than it

won votes. Also, it is important to say that those elections were held simultaneously with

presidential elections and almost immediately after armistice appeared. After almost one year

of the war, Croatia managed to defend itself and to proclaim independence from Yugoslavia.

HDZ and Tuđman were at the peak of the popularity at that time and that helped them to won

parliamentary and presidential elections.

Following cycle of parliamentary elections was held in 1995. Like in 1992 elections,

combination of the victory in the war and electoral rules helped HDZ to win parliamentary

elections again. They were held after the Operation “Storm”, in which almost all occupied

territory of Croatia was liberated. HDZ and President Tuđman had high rates of popularity

and because of that were held these early parliamentary elections. Electoral system was still

mixed, but with additional feature: ten percents of the seats in the first chamber of the

parliament were reserved for Croatian citizens who lived abroad. Actually, that meant for

ethnic Croats who lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had Croatian citizenship. They were

overwhelmingly HDZ’s and Tuđman’s supporters and that was publicly known. Number of

seats in the majority segment of elections was decreased to 28 and number of PR seats

increased to 80. In those elections HDZ won all seats reserved for so-called diaspora and in

the end absolute majority of the seats in the first chamber of Sabor. Following parliamentary

elections were held in January 2000.

With such legislative background during the 1990’s, Tuđman could become leading

and dominant actor of Croatian politics. Dependence of the cabinet and Prime Minister on

him was not only constitutional norm, but was also result of Tuđman’s role in the HDZ.

Democratic transition was in every country in Central and Eastern Europe more or less

traumatic experience. Transition in Croatia was featured with the war for the independence

and efforts in state-making after the exit from Yugoslav Federation. In such circumstances,

there was a place for authoritarian tendencies of governing of powerful President. Absolute

majority of his party in both chambers of the parliament, president-parliamentary system of

government, movement’s nature of the HDZ, high public popularity that Tuđman enjoyed,

and readiness of the citizens to accept his authoritarian tendencies enabled Tuđman to become

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dominant figure in Croatian politics, but at the same time main obstacle for further

democratization of the political system. Tuđman’s death in December 1999 and the following

change of the parliamentary majority in 2000 elections deeply changed Croatian political

system.

Constitutional changes in 2000 and 2001

After two cycles of early elections, on January 3, 2000 were held first ordinary

elections. Coalition of six parties won majority in the first chamber of Sabor and acting

President of the Republic appointed leader of SDP, the strongest party of winning coalition,

for the new Prime Minister. New Government started with the process of changing of the

Constitution and abandoning of the semi-presidential system. New constitutional provisions

decreased presidential powers. Main change was abolishing President’s right to control

cabinet and to unilaterally dismiss it. But, in months before constitutional reform of the

system of government, President of the Republic, Prime Minister and parliament also changed

their roles in the still existing semi-presidential system. Stjepan Mesić, new President of the

Republic elected in February 2000, was not in a position to be dominant power institution like

his predecessor. During the presidential campaign, main candidates agreed that President

should have less power than before, but they also did not want to become “ficus” in the

presidential Cabinet, as one of the candidate Dražen Budiša said. That meant that they wanted

to retain some of the presidential powers in a bigger amount than purely ceremonial.

Constitutional reform of the political system really did not put President in a position

of the ceremonial head of the state. He retained significant powers in two areas: one is foreign

policy and the other is defence and national security. President was declared as co-creator of

the foreign policy together with the Government, which means that he stands equally with the

Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in that area. In an area of defence and national

security President is still Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. But in other areas his

powers were decreased. Except losing the control of the cabinet, President’s right of issuing

legislative decrees were also bounded with the need of the Prime Minister’s countersignature.

Only a few months after 2000 constitutional changes, new were made in spring 2001.

In those ones was changed a structure of Croatian Sabor. Second chamber was abolished and

Sabor became unicameral. That did not affect relations between legislative and executive

institutions but was a final step in restructuring of the political system. After that, no

constitutional change was made.

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New political and constitutional environment had effect on executive’s functioning.

From that time, President Mesić has not been one of the two heads of the dual executive, but

only a head of the state with significant powers in some of the policy areas. Executive got

mono-structure characteristics and the Prime Minister became its only head. Instead of the

previous hierarchical structure between President and the Prime Minister and the cabinet, new

constitutional provisions and political reality established quasi-transactional relations between

them. They are not real transactional because President lacks powers in many policy areas,

which Government have. Post of the Prime Minister became most desirable function for

parties’ leaders and the system of government is perceived among public, politicians and

scholars as parliamentarian. Main creator of the 1990 Constitution Smiljko Sokol calls a new

system “quarter-presidential” or “fithy parliamentarism” because President still possesses

some significant powers.

President Mesić’s style of governing

President Tuđman’s style of governing had impact on the institution of presidency in

Croatia. Even if President Mesić started his term with different style, he did not completely

abandon possibility of the President to be involved in many political and policy areas.

According to the constitutional provisions from 2000, his domain in domestic politics is very

limited. Nevertheless, Mesić has tried to be present in many cases which Constitution does

not provide as presidential domain. But, Mesić was not sole in such attitude toward

presidential role. Media has frequently asked him his opinion about almost any issue that has

occurred in the country and he has been constantly present in the media. That attitude of the

media toward the President and his readiness to respond on that was not uncommon for

political system that was being in Croatia during the 1990’s. President of the Republic in that

time was really dominant and decisive institution of the system and his opinion had real

weight for the public and other political institutions. But, in new circumstances President has

got only limited influence on political processes and on other institutions. Mesić has not

enjoyed public popularity which had Tuđman and has not got strong party support as Tuđman

had. Mesić was vice-president of the Croatian People’s Party (HNS) before he became

President of the Republic. After elections he ceased to be not only its vice-president, but also

its member. In following 2005 presidential campaign he used party apparatus of other centrist

and left-wing parties, not only of HNS, which meant that he distanced himself from that party.

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Table 1

President’s powers 1990 Constitution 2001 ConstitutionDirect presidential elections + +Appointment of the Government + -Government accountable to the

President

+ -

Decrees passing right without

counter-signature

+1 -/+2

Legislative initiative - -Legislative veto - -3

Autonomous right to call

referendum

- -

Commander-in-chief of the

armed forces

+ +

Ratification of treaties +4 +5

1 Art. 101 of the 1990 Constitution: „The President of the Republic shall pass decrees with the force of law and take emergency measures in the event of a state of war or an immediate danger to the independence and unity of the Republic, or when government bodies are prevented from regularly performing constitutional duties. During the time the President of the Republic is making use of such powers, the House of Representatives may not be dissolved. The President of the Republic shall submit decrees with the force of law for approval to the Chamber of Representatives as soon as the Parliament is in a position to meet.“2 Art. 100, par. 1,2,3 of the 2001 Constitution: „During the state of war the President of the Republic may issue decrees with the force of law on the grounds and within the authority obtained from the Croatian Parliament. If the Croatian Parliament is not in session, the President of the Republic is authorized to regulate all the issues required by the state of war by decrees with the force of law. In case of an immediate threat to the independence, unity and existence of the State, or if the governmental bodies are prevented from performing their constitutional duties regularly, the President of the Republic shall, at the proposal of the Prime Minister and with his counter-signature, issue decrees with the force of law. The President of the Republic shall submit decrees with the force of law for approval to the Croatian Parliament as soon as the Parliament is in a position to convene.”3 Art. 88 of the 2001 Constitution: „ Laws shall be promulgated by the President of the Republic within eight days from the date when they were passed in the Croatian Parliament.If the President of the Republic considers the promulgated law not in accordance with the Constitution, he may initiate proceedings to review the constitutionality of the law before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia.“4 Art. 132 of the 1990 Constitution: „International agreements shall, on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, be concluded by the President of the Republic, but may also be concluded, in conformity with law, by the Government of the Republic of Croatia.“Art. 133 of the 1990 Constitution: „International agreements which entail the passage or amendment of laws, international agreements of a military and political nature, and international agreements which financially commit the Republic shall be subject to ratification by the Croatian Parliament. International Agreements which grant international organizations or alliances powers derived from the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, shall be subject to ratification by the Croatian Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote of all representatives.5 Art. 138 of the 2001 Constitution: „International agreements shall be concluded, in conformity with the Constitution, law and the rules of international law, depending on the nature and contents of the international agreement, within the authority of the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government of the Republic of Croatia. „Art. 139 of the 2001 Constitution: „International agreements which entail the passage of amendment of laws, international agreements of military and political nature, and international agreements which financially commit the Republic of Croatia shall be subject to ratification by the Croatian Parliament. International agreements which grant international organization or alliances powers derived from the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, shall be subject to ratification by the Croatian Parliament by two-thirds majority vote of all representatives.

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Autonomous right of the

appointment and the recalling of

ambassadors

+ -

Autonomous right to dissolve

parliament

- -

Annual address to the

parliament

+ -

Declaration of the martial law +6 +7

Appointment of Constitutional

Court judges

- -

Duration of President’s term in

office

5 5

Restriction of the number of

President’s term in office

+ +

Number of institutions included

in the process of President’s

impeachment

2 2

President has right to be

member of the political party

+ -

Presidential elections in 2005 had two major candidates: incumbent President Stjepan

Mesić and vice-president of the Government and of the ruling HDZ, Jadranka Kosor.

Campaign rhetoric of those two candidates was not bounded with the real possibility of the

President of the Republic to govern, i.e. with his constitutional powers which give him

significant powers only in foreign and security policies, but they also said what they would do

in internal politics as a new President. These elections were also widely covered in main

media in Croatia and were seen as an important political event. But, main political parties did

not put their leaders to be presidential candidates. HDZ did not make candidature of its leader

Ivo Sanader, who was Prime Minister in that time. Instead of him, party put Jadranka Kosor

in the race. Main opposition party SDP did not have its candidate for that post but stood

behind Mesić. Other candidates were or less known persons or not so important politicians.

During the first Mesić’s term in office, HDZ from time to time had heavily attacked him

because of his attitude toward some important political problems of Croatia. After HDZ won

The President of the Republic shall sign the documents of ratification, admittance, approval or acceptance of international agreements ratified by the Croatian Parliament in conformity with sections 1 and 2 of this Article. International agreements which are not subject of ratification by the Croatian Parliament are concluded by the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Government, or by the Government of the Republic of Croatia. 6 Art. 100, par. 3 of the 1990 Constitution: „On the basis of a decision by the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic may proclaim war and conclude peace.“7 Art. 99, par. 3 of the 2001 Constitution: „On the basis of the decision of the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic may declare war and conclude peace.”

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parliamentary election in 2003, it took conciliatory attitude toward Mesić, which lasted until

presidential campaign in 2005. During the campaign their relations were again harsh, because

Mesić and Kosor were two main rivals. After elections, those relations again became almost

smooth.

Parliamentary election in 2007 was marked with the competition between two biggest

parties, HDZ and SDP. After election, HDZ had 10 seats in the parliament more than SDP,

but not absolute majority. According to the Constitution, President shall “confide the mandate

to form the Government to the person who, upon the distribution of the seats in the Croatian

Parliament and consultations held, enjoys confidence of the majority of its members“. Mesić

had been doing this in a period of two weeks before he appointed Ivo Sanader for the new

Prime Minister, trying to give himself role of important arbiter in that process. Mesić was

criticized in Croatian public because of that behaviour and Sanader announced possibility of

changing Constitution because of such delayed process. He proposed that Constitution should

norm that the biggest party in the parliament should get mandate to form new Government

after parliamentary election.

Polish system of government: weakening of the presidential powers in constitution-making

process

Institution of the presidency was established in Poland in specific historical

circumstances. First three Polish Presidents from 1989 were parties’ leaders or prominent

politicians who were attracted with the power of that institution. Wojcieh Jaruzelski and

Aleksander Kwaśniewski were leaders of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and the

SLD, and Lech Wałęsa was one of the “Solidarity” leaders in 1980’s. Lech Kaczyński had

been prominent politician before he became President, but he is first Polish President who was

not chairman of first person in a party or political organization that he was member. That post

in PiS has had his brother Jarosław, who was Polish Prime Minister in a period from 2006 to

2007.

Polish 1952 Constitution abolished the institution of the Republic’s presidency.

“Round Talks” introduced it again in the Polish political system. This reform was part of the

institutional arrangement which introduced not only presidency, but also second chamber of

the parliament, Senat. Those two institutions should made possible transition to democracy by

including “Solidarity” opposition into political system. Even if there was no provision in the

agreement about what side would hold the presidency or Senat, free elections for the second

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chamber would make possibility for “Solidarity” to have majority in it, and election for the

President which would be hold in the National Assembly (joint session of the Sejm and Senat)

would make possibility for communists to capture that post. Because of that, President got

significant powers in the changed Constitution and was constitutionally able to control

process of the transition. Such arrangement made possibility for institutional conflicts and

constitutional crisis. In the new Sejm 37 percent of seats were reserved for the PZPR and in

the Senat communists won no one seat. Senat had right to put veto on laws that were adopted

in the Sejm. For a final adoption of the law in the Sejm, it was needed two-third majority in

that chamber to overpass Senat’s veto. After June elections, communists and their allies in the

Sejm did not have that majority of seats. Having almost all seats in the Senat and more than

one third of seats in the Sejm, Solidarity could block any law that passed in the first step in

the Sejm. President of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) also had veto right and the same

majority of votes was needed to overpass his veto in the Sejm. After ZSL and SD changed

their sides in the Sejm and crossed to the “Solidarity”, those groups had absolute majority in

the Sejm and could pass any law disregarding PZPR. But, that party had more than one-third

of seats in the Sejm and two-third majority to overpass presidential veto could not be achieved

without PZPR’s votes. After August 1989 communists on one side and “Solidarity” with its

new allies on the other side could effectively block each other in the legislative process.

Combination of constitutional norms and the party structure of the parliament could become

precondition for the crisis of the new political system from the very beginning of its existence.

But, new circumstances and realising of the final breakdown of the communist authoritarian

regime prevented PZPR and Jaruzelski from such actions.

System of government which was established with new constitutional provisions had

all characteristics of semi-presidentialism, with the exception of one: direct or popular

presidential elections. Almost all concepts of that system of government demand such type of

elections as a necessary condition for some system to be classified as semi-presidential. In

Poland, such provision was not part of the Constitution and formally its system could not be

classified as semi-presidential. Nevertheless, constitutional amendments made basis for the

future shaping of Polish system of government and the post of the President of the Republic

has remain an important political institution until today. Following year, Sejm adopted

amendment which introduced direct elections for the President. Jaruzelski resigned and first

presidential elections were held in December 1990. With that amendment and those elections

Polish system of government got all defining characteristics of semi-presidentialism.

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President Wałęsa in the following five years tried to make presidency a dominant

institution of the Polish political system. In that attempt he was often coming in conflicts with

the parliament and the cabinet or individual ministers. That conflict was especially visible

during the second convocation of the Sejm, from 1993 to the end of his term in office. But

even First Sejm, who lasted from the end of 1991 to the middle of 1993, had unstable

relations with Wałęsa. He demanded from the new Sejm after 1991 elections that approve him

as a new Prime Minister. Such solution would make Polish system of government presidential

and Sejm refused to do that. In 1992 parliament could not find solution about new constitution

that would replace 1952 Constitution. As a temporary act, parliament adopted so-called Small

Constitution, which regulated powers and relations between Polish legislative and executive

institutions. In a new provisional Constitution President’s powers were constrained in

comparison with the 1989 Constitutional amendments. Legislative powers remained to him

and he had significant role in the appointment of the cabinet if parliament failed in its

attempts to do that. Beside that, he had right to issue decrees, but only a few of them did not

need counter-signature of the Prime Minister or respective minister. That enabled President of

the Republic to stay significant institution in the Polish political system.

Wałęsa wanted more than this. He tried to force new parliament, elected in 1993, with

the centre-left majority to give him list of three candidates for the new Prime Minister, even if

Small Constitution did not regulate appointment of the new Government in such arrangement.

Coalition of SLD and Polish People’s Party (PSL) made concession to Wałęsa proposing

Waldemar Pawlak, leader of the minor partner in the coalition, for the new Prime Minister,

instead of some of the SLD’s candidate. In following two years Wałęsa occasionally came in

conflict with the parliament and the Government and that situation lasted until presidential

elections in 1995. He often tried to put his candidates on the posts of Belweder ministers (i.e.

ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and the defence) and threatened Government with the

possibility that he would solve problems in the country if Government could not do that. In

January and February 1995 he threatened parliament with the dissolution because he refused

to sign bill on the budget for 1995. Occasionally, he put veto on bills that were adopted in the

Sejm. Coming on power of the new President, SLD’s leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski, meant

changing of relations between President, Government, and the parliament and beginning of

the period of consolidate majority government.

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Making of the 1997 Constitution and its norms

Constitution-making process in a period from 1992 to 1997 was burdened with the

ideological conflict about the contents of the new Constitution. Lack of consensus between

main political and social actors disabled adoption of the new Constitution and delayed that

process until 1997. Beside ideological, problem was in restructuring of the system of

government. Powers of the Polish President were weakened in the Small Constitution in

comparison with the April 1989 constitutional novel. Farther weakening of his role in the

system was obvious in the middle of the 1990’s. Wałęsa was against such solution and

advocated strengthening of the presidency instead of its weakening. Ironically, President’s

role in the Constitution’s draft was strengthened after he left the post of the President in

December 1995. New Polish President and until then chairman of the parliamentary

Constitutional Commission abandoned his previous views about President’s powers in the

new Constitution and demanded its strengthening in the constitutional draft in relations with

the previous draft’s solution. Beside those problems, right wing parties which were not

represented in the Second Sejm, accused parliament because of the lack of its legitimacy and

demanded delay of the adoption of the new Constitution until summoning of the Third Sejm.

They even prepared its draft of the new Constitution. At the end of the Second Sejm

consensus between four parliamentary parties, SLD, PSL, Labour Union (UP), and

Democratic Union (UD) made possible the adoption of the Constitution and National

Assembly voted in April for it. After that it was approved on national referendum by citizens.

System of government was changed. President lost some of his powers. For example,

so-called Belweder ministers have not any more being appointed after consultations between

Prime Minister and the President. He also lost his right to appoint new Prime Minister and the

whole government without Sejm’s approval in a case after several times Sejm did not vote

confidence in the new government. His legislative rights mostly remained. President lost

possibility to veto bill on the budget but he still has right of the legislative initiative and the

legislative veto. Now it is required lower majority of votes in the Sejm to overpass President’s

veto. Instead of the previous two-third majority, 1997 Constitution establishes three-fifth

majority. During the constitution-making process SLD had demanded abolishing of the

President’s veto right, but after Kwaśniewski came on power in 1995, he wanted that that

power remain and that two-third majority would be necessary to overpass President’s veto.

Overpass of the veto changed its form in the draft of the Constitution several times, from

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absolute majority, via two-third majority to three-fifth majority of the votes. After all,

President retained his power with three-fifth majority.

There is a list of presidential acts that do not need counter-signature of the Prime

Minister in the new Constitution. All other President’s acts need that signature and only from

Prime Minister, not other ministers. Small Constitution also had institute of the counter-

signature on presidential acts, but it was given from the Prime Minister or respective minister.

New Constitution restrained President’s right on issuing acts without signature from other

head of the executive, Prime Minister, but mentioned list of exceptions shows that President

has remained important figure in the political system. That list contains about thirty

exceptions and such number, actually, norms them as something that is not so exceptional.

Among them are legislative veto, legislative initiative and the right to call referendum with

the consent of the Senat.

In the area of defence and security policy President is still Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces but in a peace time he exercises his command through the Minister of Defence.

During the war, President shall appoint Commander-in-Chief on request of the Prime

Minister.

Living Constitution

Two Presidents have ruled under the new Constitution: Aleksander Kwaśniewski and

Lech Kaczyński. Each President has had different style of governing. Kwaśniewski had more

conciliatory style toward other political institutions from the very beginning of his first

presidential term. Unlike Wałęsa, he did not try to become dominant power institution, even

during periods of the consolidate majority government. At least from 1997 first head of the

executive were Prime Ministers and President played more prominent role only in foreign

affairs. Combination of such style of the presidency and constitutional norms that regulated its

position and role in the Polish system of government after 1997, made impression that semi-

presidentialism had been abolished in favour of the parliamentarism. Similar as was the case

with Croatia, decreasing of President’s powers in constitutional amendments in the eyes of

public and scholars has been seen as the change of the system of government. Contrast

between styles of governing between Tuđman and Mesić, and Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski (even

if Mesić and Kwaśniewski governed first period of their presidential term under the “old”

constitutions) has been seen as a change of the nature of the system of government which was

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sealed with constitutional changes. Kwaśniewski was more oriented toward the foreign policy

and took more conciliatory position toward parliament and the government than Wałęsa did.

President Kaczyński has different style than his predecessor. That can be seen in the

number of legislative veto that he put against laws that were adopted by parliament, in his

conflicts with the government, and in his role in foreign affairs. In 2009 President and

government came into conflict because of the question about who should represent Poland in

international summits, President or Prime Minister. That problem came on the desk of the

Constitutional Tribunal which gave answer on that question in May 20, 2009. According to

the Tribunal, President of the Republic has right to be present and to represent the Republic of

Poland in international summits and conferences, but he must cooperate with the government

about planning and realising Poland’s foreign policy. He is empowered to represent Poland in

international relations but government is the main creator of foreign policy, not President of

the Republic. In a situation of divided majority government President’s possible desire to

dominate in the foreign policy can effectively be blocked, but government and parliament

cannot expelled him from at least being present in its creation.

In the last five years Kaczyński was not able to become first head of the executive and,

according too the Giovanni Sartori’s (1994) concept, that would be proof that there is no

semi-presidentialism in Poland. Constitutional provisions arrange system of government in

such a way that Prime Minister has dominant role in the executive. President is independent

from other power institutions, i.e. he is not politically accountable to them, but his possibility

to become first head of the executive is minimal in such constitutional arrangement.

Nevertheless, Polish President has significant constitutional powers and according to Steven

Roper’s (2002) research, he is more powerful than the Fifth Republic’s President. Because of

that, it is hard to argue in favour of Sartori’s concept which ultimately demand’s changing

positions between President and the Prime Minister at the head of the executive. Polish

President is more than only head of the state or president with ceremonial role. His legislative

powers, his powers of issuing many acts without counter-signature, and his powers in foreign

affairs make him an institution with significant role in the system. This role can be strengthen

in the case of the consolidated majority government in which he will also have prominent or

leading role in his party. He, we can almost certainly say that, cannot be first head of the

executive, but in that case prime minister in president-parliamentary systems also cannot be

first head of the executive. This problem Sartori resolved with the expulsion of the president-

parliamentary system from semi-presidential typology of the system of government, but we

can see that such system is not so rare in modern world and that there are no real reasons for

16

such solution except to confirm his own concept. Along with Weimar Republic and the

French Fifth Republic, Russia became third famous example of the republican democratic

system with the dual executive and with the many features that shared (at least

constitutionally) with the premier-presidential countries. In Russia, President is first head of

the executive at least because of the Prime Minister’s accountability to him. In Poland,

President and Prime Minister are in transactional relations and are not accountable to each

other. But, Prime Minister’s and Government’s role which is shaped in the Constitution

allows them to be more influential than the President and so to be more powerful in everyday

politics than he. Nevertheless, because of his significant powers in foreign and domestic

politics we cannot put him in a position of the classic presidents that exist in parliamentary

systems. In everyday politics, he is less influential than the Fifth Republic’s President but

more than President of the Croatian “quarter-presidentialism”.

Table 2

President’s powers 1989 Constitution 1992 Small

Constitution

1997 Constitution

Direct presidential elections - + +Appointment of the

Government

- + +8

Government accountable to

the President

-/+9 - -

Decrees passing right

without counter-signature

+ -/+10 -/+11

Legislative initiative + + +Legislative veto + + +Autonomous right to call - -12 -13

8 Art. 154, par. 1, 2 of the 1997 Constitution: „The President of the Republic shall nominate a Prime Minister who shall propose the composition of a Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic shall, within 14 days of the first sitting of the Sejm or acceptance of the resignation of the previous Council of Ministers, appoint a Prime Minister together with other members of a Council of Ministers and accept the oaths of office of members of such newly appointed Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister shall, within 14 days following the day of his appointment by the President of the Republic, submit a programme of activity of the Council of Ministers to the Sejm, together with a motion requiring a vote of confidence. The Sejm shall pass such vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies.”9 According to the Art. 138 of the 1989 Constitution, Government is accountable to the Sejm and between two sessions of the Sejm to the President.10 Counter-signature is not needed in cases from Art. 47 of the 1992 Small Constitution.11 Counter-signature is not needed in cases from Art. 144 of the 1997 Constitution.12 Art. 19., par. 2. of the 1992 Small Constitution: „The right to order a nationwide referendum shall be vested in 1) the Sejm, to be taken by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, or 2) in the President with the consent of the Senate given by an absolute majority vote.“13 Art. 125, par. 2 of the 1997 Constitution: „The right to order a nationwide referendum shall be vested in the Sejm, to be taken by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, or in the President of the Republic with the consent of the Senate given by an absolute majority vote

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referendumCommander-in-chief of the

armed forces

+ + +

Ratification of treaties + + +Autonomous right of the

appointment and the

recalling of ambassadors

+ + +

Autonomous right to

dissolve parliament

-/+ - -

Annual address to the

parliament

- -14 -15

Declaration of the martial

law

+ + +

Appointment of

Constitutional Court judges

- - -16

Duration of President’s term

in office

6 5 5

Restriction of the number of

President’s term in office

+ + +

Number of institutions

included in the process of

President’s impeachment

2 2 2

President has right to be

member of the political party

+ + +

Conclusions

Semi-presidential system of government is the product of the 20th century’s political

and constitutional engineering. Until 1990’s, two most known systems with that form of

government were Weimar Republic and French Fifth Republic. Beginning of the democratic

transition in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 meant abandoning of communist political

system and its system of government and foundation of a new one. Every country in those

regions chose its types of those systems according to the political and social situation that

taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators.“14 Art. 39 of the 1992 Small Constitution: „ The President deliver a Message to the Sejm or to the Senate. Such Message shall not be a subject of debate.“15 Art. 140 of the 1997 Constitution: „The President of the Republic may deliver a Message to the Sejm, to the Senate or to the National Assembly. Such Message shall not be a subject of debate.“16 Art. 194, par. 2 of the 1997 Constitution: „The President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from amongst candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.“

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existed in it in that time. Croatia was one of the first countries (than still a member of the

Yugoslav Federation) which adopted new constitution. Its President Franjo Tuđman already

in that time had charismatic reputation among great part of Croatian citizens and rank and file

members of his party. In such circumstances, he could easily demand that the institution of the

President in the new Constitution be powerful. During the following nine years opposition

from time to time demanded foundation of the parliamentary system instead of semi-

presidential but HDZ refused that. After Tuđman’s death at the end of 1999 HDZ agreed on

abandoning existing system of government and declared its conformance with the change to

parliamentary system.

Unlike Croatian, Polish constitution-making process lasted eight years and was

burdened with the ideological confrontation of the post-communist forces and forces that

stemmed from the “Solidarity”. System of government was almost of second importance in

comparison with the worldview or ideological issue, but Wałęsa’s style of governance made it

more important. Forming of the consolidated majority government at the end of 1995 change

intentions of the parliamentary majority represented in the Constitutional Commission for the

sharp decreasing of presidential powers in the new Constitution in a favour of modest

decreasing. Main powers which remained to the President in the new Constitution were

legislative initiative and legislative veto. In combination with some others, maybe less

important, President remained important part of the Polish system of government and its

executive.

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Constitutions

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990)

http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2001)

http://www.usud.hr/default.aspx?Show=ustav_republike_hrvatske&Lang=en

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997

http://www.sejm.gov.pl/pr awo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm

Ustawa konstytucyjna z dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach mięzdy

władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawzcą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie

terytorialnym, Dziennik Ustaw 1992 Nr. 84, Poz. 426

http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/index.html

Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej,

Dziennik Ustaw 1989 Nr. 19, Poz. 101 http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/index.html

Journal article

Ne žele mi ni Sanader ni Milanović

www.globus.com.hr/Clanak.aspx?BrojID=265&ClanakID=7348

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Internet site

President of the Republic of Croatia

http://www.predsjednik.hr/

President of the Republic of Poland

http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=4042718

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