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Jordan Food Dependency and Agriculture Sustainability.
Main Economic and Social Challenges.
Myriam Ababsa1 December 2014
DRAFT VERSION -‐ not for citation unless with permission of the author The aim of this paper is to outline the main economic and political points regarding Jordan’s paradox of being a food dependant country without a real agrarian movement. Jordan is one of the most food dependant countries in the world, importing 90 % of its needs and 80 % of its foodstuffs. This dependence is mainly due to structural reasons, as Jordan is the fourth most water-‐deficient country in the world, with 147 m3 of water per capita in 2010, but also due to political reasons, as the agricultural sector is controlled by powerful capitalists who are able to obtain water subsidies for growing vegetables and fruits trees. Unlike Egypt and Syria, Jordan did not undergo agrarian reform. Large landowners managed to increase production by means of mechanisation and by replacing the Jordanian work force with Egyptian migrants, and since the Syrian crisis, with Syrian refugees. These workers are not legally protected, as working laws do not apply to the agricultural sector. Small and medium sized holdings, first consolidated under the British Mandate, have been progressively reduced by inheritance and urbanisation. Half of the holdings are smaller than 10 hectares (ha). With foreign manpower, the agrarian question has been avoided in Jordan, and small farmers have difficulty mobilizing in a highly liberal environment. The current state of the agricultural sector is the result of several decisions taken since the country’s independence, aimed at boosting production for exportation, without the social considerations of farmers and peasants. A clear distinction must be drawn between winter dry cereal production in the highlands and irrigated vegetable and fruit production in the Jordan Valley. Cereal production has considerably reduced since the mid-‐seventies, when capital was invested to irrigate high profit vegetables and fruits for exportation to the Gulf. Jordan has increased its fruit and vegetable exportation over the past thirty years, at the expense of its water resources. At the same time, rainfed wheat production has dropped from 133,600 tons in 1980, to 46,800 tons in 1994 and to 19,200 tons in 2012 (DoS 1980, DoS 2014). This reduction can be explained by three factors: the policy of trade liberalization adopted by the government in 1994, the drought since 2001, particularly after 2007, and strong land speculation over former agricultural land. Although all cities have to follow strict guidelines in order to preserve agricultural land and reduce the cost of urban services provision, informal urban sprawl has continued on pastoral and arable land. In order to counter the social effects of the liberalisation of the agricultural sector, Jordan launched a National Strategy for Agricultural Development in 2002. One of its aims was to guarantee “food security” in Jordan by means of a relief program to poor farmers. Jordan did not tackle the question of food sovereignty that would protect small producers by marketing mechanisms and production subsidies. However, 2014 marked a major shift in the Government of Jordan’s (GoJ) agriculture policy. After months of mobilisation by domestic producers, the government announced in July 2014 that it 1 Geographer, associate researcher at the French institute for the Near East, Ifpo Amman.
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would raise the wheat price from 425 JD (600 $) to 450 JD (635 $) per metric ton. This measure aims at boosting wheat production in the poorest areas of the country, with the government paying more than double the global price (286 $ per ton). Since March 2011, the question of Jordan’s food sufficiency has become urgent in the context of the Syrian crisis, as nearly one million refugees have come to Jordan (620,000 registered by UNHCR in December 2014), and as trading routes to Eastern Europe through Syria and the Syrian markets have been closed, severely affecting medium vegetable producers. This paper will first present macroeconomic data about Jordan’s food dependency in 2014, quoting several UN sources and the work of Justa Hopma on the topic (Hopma 2012). It will then show the agrarian structure and land fragmentation, and finally outline a case study undertaken on a farm south of Amman (Um al Kundum).
1. Jordan’s Food Dependency
Structurally, Jordan lacks the water resources to attain food sustainability. As a consequence, it imports 95 % of its cereals and 100 % of its rice and sugar. In 2014 Jordan imported 99 % of its cereals, or 915,000 tons of wheat and 720,000 tons of barley, as the population grew with the arrival of Syrian refugees (USDA 2014). It is self-‐sufficient for vegetables except carrots and onions, and exports two thirds of its tomatoes and half its production of cucumber, eggplants and squash. Affluent landowners in the Jordan Valley managed to lobby to maintain high levels of cucumber and tomato production which are lucrative and do not require technology. Plus, water is highly subsidized by the government, in the short-‐term interests of big landowners and large production lobbyists. This production, which only benefits a minority, consumes half of Jordan’s water. The government cannot reform this sector for political reasons. It can only provide money to improve water irrigation techniques and support programs for poor olive and cereals producers. “The big Jordan Valley producers, or big whales as they are referred to in Arabic, are strong political players with far-‐reaching influence. Any confrontation of their position is not without political consequences” (Hopma 2012, p. 12).
Approximately 261,000 ha, or 2.7 % of Jordan’s land area is arable (figure 1). “75,000 ha are irrigated and 157,000 ha are dedicated to permanent crops. Pastures occupy 791,000 ha. Agriculture is primarily practised in two distinct agro-‐climatic regions: (i) the predominantly rainfed highlands, which produce mainly wheat, barley and some pulses, in addition to olives, grapes, almonds and other stone fruits; and (ii) the more intensive, irrigated farms in the Jordan Valley and southern Ghors, which produce fruits and vegetables for the local market and export. Livestock-‐keeping, mainly of sheep and goats, is an important activity in the rainfed, semi-‐desert areas (the Badia) despite a fall in numbers of some 30 per cent. Wheat is the main crop, with barley and some lentils and chickpeas also grown. Although demand for wheat has soared to about 650,000 tonnes annually, average annual production has ranged from 30,000-‐70,000 tonnes” (IFAD 2011, p. 4). Wheat is a winter crop, planted in areas of 300-‐450 mm precipitation. The yield is very low, around one tonne per ha, which is three to four times below the global average. Traditionally, one harvest out of seven is good, depending on the amount of rain and its distribution (the best time for rain being at the beginning and middle of plant development).
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Figure 1: Jordan agricultural land use (GTZ, MWI, 2003, Ifpo 2009)
(Source Atlas of Jordan, Ababsa 2013) “The agricultural sector contributes 2.9 per cent to GDP in Jordan, employs around half a million people, and generates 14.5 per cent of total country exports. Agriculture imports are almost three to one in respect to exports (imports: US$1.379 billion to exports: US$563 million). The sector absorbs 65 per cent of total water use, including grey water” (IFAD 2011, p. 4). “The contribution of agriculture to the GDP, at current prices, has declined steadily from 14.4 percent in 1971, to 8.3 percent in 1975, to 7.1 percent in 1980, to 6 percent in 1995 and finally to 3 percent in 2006. The decline has not been limited to its relative share in the GDP, but also in absolute value, which decreased, during the period 1991-‐2000, from about JD 223 million in 1991 to JD 178 million in 1995,
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and to JD 114.6 million in 2006 » (UN 2007). The lack of incentive for small landowners to produce added to the boom in land prices which led to a drastic reduction of the cultivated surfaces in wheat and barley. Plus, the government stopped buying wheat in 2008, but started again in 2013. Table 1. Jordan cultivated land in 2010 Crops Total Area (ha) Irrigated Area (ha) Non-‐Irrigated Area (ha) Tree crops 82 712 44 724 37 988 Field crops 128 556 12 862 115 694 Vegetables 48 080 44 885 3 195 (Source DoS 2012) Figure 2: Total harvested crop area in Jordan (1994-‐2012) in donums
(Source: Department of Statistics, 2014, online website).
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Figure 3: Jordan Wheat Production (1960-‐2014) (thousands tons)
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Figure 4: Wheat and barley production in Jordan (1994-‐2012) (in tons)
(Source: Department of Statistics, 2014, online website).
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The Jordanian government has been concerned with ‘food security’ as a policy area since the late 1990s. It has adopted the conventional definition of food security as an objective. Despite a number of substantial problems, it aims to increase agricultural production. In order to do so, the following policy options are pursued in the Jordanian Badia, the Highlands and the Ghor area:
1 Achieving sustainable agricultural development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions
2 Achieving food security and reducing poverty in rural areas through the optimum use of natural resources such as soil and water
3 Making rural financial and marketing services available to farming households (UNDP 2004 in Hopma 2012). The objectives for improvement laid out by the National Strategy for Agricultural Development, however, are highly ambitious. In 2012, many of its objectives were not achieved. It identified rainfed agriculture, rangeland development and water use efficiency as priorities. Nothing was mentioned about soil preservation and sustainable cropping systems that would allow both sufficient incomes and sustainability for the farmers. The Jordanian agricultural sector is a victim of trade liberalization and the elimination of most agricultural subsidies after joining the WTO. A structural adjustment program of the agricultural sector started in 1994. As a result, measures undertaken for the protection of local production from external competition were abolished. Subsidies have been totally lifted and national agricultural products have had to compete with imported goods in the domestic and export markets. These developments coincided with a decline in the quality and quantity of water available for irrigation, which affected crop productivity and quality of produce and its competitiveness, in quality and price, in domestic and export markets (UN 2007). « Liberalization of trade in agricultural commodities in Jordan started in 1994 as part of the Agricultural Structural Adjustment Program (ASTAP), and the Agriculture Structural Adjustment Loan (ASAL) provided by the World Bank. Jordan subsequently took numerous measures to liberalize its domestic and international trade in agricultural commodities, which centered around removal of direct subsidies and non-‐customs protection, reducing support to irrigation water, removal of feed subsidy, and abolishing the monopoly of the Agricultural Marketing and Processing Company (AMPCO) for importing fresh vegetables and fruit short on the market » (UN 2007).
Structural adjustments have transformed the food sector – from food subsidies and price and import control policies in the 1970s and 1980s to a gradual liberalization and the removal of food subsidies by the 1990s – contributing to lower revenues and higher production costs for the sector (IFAD 2011, p. 5). The price of wheat increased in the mid-‐2000s, and as a consequence the government stopped purchasing wheat in 2008. This caused a significant reductıon in wheat production. After months of mobilisation by domestic producers, the government announced in July 2014 that it would raise the wheat price from 425 JD (600 $) to 450 JD (635 $) per metric ton. This measure aims at boosting wheat production in the poorest areas of the country, with the government paying more than double
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the world price (286 $ per ton). However the main issue is to change the cropping patterns both in the Jordan Valley and in the Highlands in order to preserve farmers’ income levels, soil fertility and water. Cereal production is now less attractive due to considerable development assistance given by international donors to Jordan, a country hosting one of the highest numbers of refugees, in both absolute and relative terms. Direct assistance given by the United Nations and the USA government has allowed the Jordanian government to subsidise food production. In 2014, Jordan had 580,000 tons of wheat reserves in silos and 200,000 tons at sea and in Aqaba port, which is enough to feed the country for ten months (USDA 2014). After the Kerak food riots in 1996, the price of bread has been fixed at 0.16 JD a kilo, three times less than the production cost. Most Jordanians resent the importation of American wheat which is considered less nutritious than the local durum wheat (qamah haurani)2. In 2002 a national biodiversity strategy and action plan were drawn up by the GoJ in order to conserve biodiversity and combat desertification. « Some crop species are now considered to be on the verge of national extinction. Plant diversity in Jordan is facing a dramatic decline as a result of habitat loss and degradation. Triticum dicoccoides, the direct progenitor of durum wheat is one of the most threatened species in Jordan if conservation strategies are not applied to the sites of origin. Other crops such as wild almond and historical olive trees are under threat due to the replacement of these species by the new varieties ». (NCARTT 2007, p. 15) Jordanian agrarian businessmen have tried to invest in Sudan but without success, and are now planning to invest in Russia (Hopma 2012). In October 2011, the Minister of Agriculture made trips to Romania, Russia, Bulgaria and Kazakhstan to discuss the acquisition of land to be developed for wheat cultivation by Jordanian investors (Jordan Times, 16-‐2-‐2012).
2. Jordanian agrarian structures: latifundia versus land fragmentation According to the historian Michael Fischbach, one of the reasons for the stability of the Hashemite regime is that small and medium-‐sized holdings were consolidated under the British Mandate, while large landholdings were not affected by land reforms (as was the case in Syria and Egypt). Unlike Syria and Palestine, in the early 1920s Jordan was characterized by a relatively egalitarian structure of land ownership, dominated by smallholdings of around 40 donums (4 ha). Although the big sheikhs and wealthy traders had managed to amass large areas of land, inequalities were less striking than in the rest of Bilad al-‐Sham. There was considerable social control over land, as evidenced by the extent of musha’a ownership (communally owned land with periodic rotation of use apportioned among villagers). Communal (musha’a) ownership represented 82% of land in Ajlun province, 22% in Balqa and 26% in Kerak, and none in Ma‘an. Private (mafruz) land was the most common in the central regions of Balqa (except in the villages of Bani Sakhr), in Kerak and in Ma‘an. Olive groves and orchards were mostly privately owned. Sheikhs oversaw the yearly allocation of musha’a land shares (Fischbach 2000, p. 68).
2According to the archaeologist Fawzi Zayadin, local wheat includes 16 % protein in contrast to 8 % in the American wheat. 24 -‐1-‐2012.
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Transjordan’s economy was largely based on agriculture. In order to benefit from it, the British government decided to reform land policy and taxation. They broadened the tax base and replaced the system of communal land ownership with that of private ownership, in an attempt to improve crop yields and extend areas planted with fruit trees. The British implemented a new land registration system. One of the objectives of the British was to gradually replace the system of communally owned musha’a land with privately owned land, which was believed to give better yields. They began by registering land in mandated Palestine. The Land Demarcation and Valuation Law was introduced in 1927. For the first time, village boundaries were set following consultation with village mukhtars and demarcated with steel markers. To combat deforestation, it was decided that all forests should come under state control, but the population was opposed to this decision, especially in Ajlun. This led to increased deforestation as villagers rushed to extend the land area of their villages by cutting down the forests. By 1933 all of Jordan’s fertile land had been surveyed and registered, making up a total of 10,008,000 donums (1 million ha), of which 4,556,007 donums were cultivated, and 600,000 donums were state land. Fertile state land accounted for 18% of all registered land (FISCHBACH 2000, p. 94). The Land Settlement Law was enacted in 1933 to settle disputes between private and communal landowners. Farmers subsequently began clearing rocks and stones from land that was previously collectively owned. However this new law overlooked one of the major advantages of the old musha’a communal system; it limited the division of land among heirs, since each received a share of the total yield. The average size of plots was reduced by half, resulting in the leasing of the smallest parcels of land to large landowners. Thus in Ajlun in 1953, 25% of land was leased out because it covered less than 10 donums. Moreover, the reduction of musha’a land put an end to the upkeep of communal erosion banks and wind-‐break walls, thus increasing soil erosion (Fischbach 2000, p. 137). 2.1. Land fragmentation Land fragmentation is now a major concern, particularly after half a century of inheritance. This has not been reduced by endogamous weddings (39,5 % of marriages in 2007). According to the agricultural census in 2007, 41,6 % of non-‐irrigated holdings are smaller than 100 donums, the majority being around 40 donums. Large properties of more than 1000 donums represent a quarter of the total crop surface (table 1). Table 2 Number and Area of Agricultural Crops Holdings by Size Class of the Holding, Jordan, 2007
% Area % Number
Small properties < 10 ha 41.6 80073 95.3 53519 Middle properties 10 -‐ 100 ha 32.4 62380 4.3 2420 Large properties > 100 ha 26 49975 0.4 212 Total 100 % 192428 100 % 56151
(Source DOS Agriculture Census 2007, table 1.2.)
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« According to available data from 1975 and 1997, the area of smallholdings (less than 0.5 ha), increased by 19%, while those of 0.5 – 1 ha by 182%, that of 1-‐2 ha by 101%. The three categories of holdings that suffered the most from fragmentation were those of 1 – 20 ha which decreased by 42%, those of 20 – 50 ha, which decreased by 48%, and those of 50 – 100 ha, which decreased by 43%. Agriculture accounts for only a small part of income of the rural poor, likely because of the small size of agriculture particularly in the marginal areas that have the largest proportion of the rural poor. According to a recent study by the Department of Statistics (DOS) and jointly conducted by the World Food Program (WFP) and the Jordanian Alliance Against Hunger (JAAH), only 12% of households in rural areas were involved in agriculture production» (Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2013, p. 205).
2.2. Cropping patterns One of the main concerns is to change cropping patterns both in the Jordan Valley and in the Highlands in order to preserve farmers’ income levels, soil fertility and water. Traditionally, the following cropping patterns are followed: «Crop rotation plays an important role in maintaining agricultural production in Jordan, and practices vary from one area to the other as follows: (1) The desert zone (100-‐200 mm rainfall): there is no definite crop rotation, and a successful crop of wheat can only be obtained in this zone every 10 years or so; (2) The marginal zones (200-‐300 mm rainfall): a 3-‐year crop rotation is followed, and patterns of wheat-‐wheat-‐fallow, wheat-‐wheat-‐lentil/vetch are usually practiced. The wheat-‐wheat-‐fallow pattern is the dominant rotation, but the planned rotation depends mainly on the rainfall; (3) Semi-‐arid zones (300-‐400 mm rainfall): due to the reliable rainfall pattern in these areas, there are well-‐planned patterns of crop rotation. There are three types of rotation: a 2-‐year rotation of wheat and legumes, a 2-‐year rotation of wheat and a summer crop (e.g. Snake cucumber and okra) and a 3-‐year crop rotation of wheat-‐legumes-‐summer crop; (4) Semi-‐humid zones (more than 400 mm rainfall): a 2-‐year crop rotation predominates in this zone, with wheat followed by either legumes or a summer crop (Duwayri, 1985) » (Salman & Al-‐Karablieh, 2001). However according to a former director3 of the French regional mission for agriculture, MREA, Jordan’s agricultural problems are not only linked to a lack of land and water, but also with soil degradation by incorrect cropping patterns, considerable use of pesticides and fertilizers, and the habit of ‘burning the soil’ with water under a plastic cover between crops, in order to get rid of viruses. These habits have had negative consequences on soil fertility and bacteriological balance. The former director recommends the introduction of lucerne in rotation with wheat, in order to give the soil back its health and help reduce the use of fertilizers.
3 Interview 6th December 2014, Amman.
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3. Case study : Land speculation and farming system modification in south Amman during the XXth Century
The western parts of Amman’s plains, which developed as arable land in Roman times, and later by pioneers in the 19th century (Abujaber 1989), are progressively disappearing, being the victim of urban sprawl and land speculation. We will study the two villages of Um al Kundum and Yadudeh, located south of Amman, and developed mid XIXth century by the important Christian families of Besharat and Abujaber. This area was within the cradle of world agriculture (Um al Kundum derives its name from the Aramaic Kundum (wheat), thus literally ‘the mother of wheat’). But the Abujaber preferred to sell their land starting from the 1990s whereas the Besharat kept agriculture activity.
Rainfed cereal areas are being broken up because of post inheritance land fragmentation. Another reason for this fragmentation is the surge in Gulf land investments, especially after February 2005, and the Lebanese Prime Minister’s assassination. Private sport clubs, golf, karting areas and universities are being built for rich Ammani clientele. A century after the main Christian landowning families purchased land from the Bedouin tribes, this land, which was originally developed to the Badia’s limits, is being used differently. Investment in service activities has had a strong speculative impact on land prices. A donum, which used to be sold for less than 50,000 JD, is now sold for between 100,000 and 200,000 JD and sometimes more.
The reduction of the agricultural area of Amman Governorate demonstrates the phenomenon of urban sprawl. In 2009, the Amman Governorate allocated just 1.1% (34,241 ha) of its land area for agriculture as opposed to 42,500 ha in 2003. Vegetable cultivation occupied 3148 ha or 31,485 donums (as opposed to 52,627 in 2003), cereal cultivation 225,168 donums (as opposed to 285,719 in 2003) and fruit trees 85,775 donums (as opposed to 86,872 d. in 2003).
Former cereal plains are now covered by hundreds of greenhouses installed by Jordanian and Pakistani producers. These producers pump in water reserves, use tons of pesticides and harm the soil. On top of this they exploit Egyptian workers who are not protected by law.
In 2008 the Greater Amman Municipality set out a plan to control urban expansion of more than 3% per year over farmland. This plan included offering several wadis to Arab investors to develop mixed-‐use complexes, for example in Wadi Abdoun. The land along the airport highway has been specified for gated-‐community development and industrial and commercial use, with little land set aside for vegetable cropping and gardening. In 2009, a member of the Greater Amman Municipality announced that it would develop urban agriculture, as all major cities do, in order to supply the inhabitants with vegetables and fruits and reduce transportation costs.
A year after the Arab Spring, the subject of property speculation over land south of Amman became topical. Indeed, members of the surrounding tribes in Amman and Zarqa petitioned to the King for ownership of the rangeland located in the Badia (the steppe within 250 mm of precipitation). On 14 February 2011, 3000 from these tribes and Zawarah Khalailah blocked the road to Azraq for 25,000 donums (2500 ha) of land. Two days later, on 16 February 2011, 500 members of the Bani Sakhr blockaded the road from the airport demanding the return of 22,000 donums (2200 ha) purchased at low cost in 1978 for the airport’s construction. In September 2011, the government decided that the six municipalities located south of the capital that had been included in the Greater Amman Municipality urban territory in 2007, would become independent.
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Figure 5: Limits of Um al Kundum and Yadudeh villages in 1909, south of Amman, at the limit of the ma’mura, the sedentary inhabitated land.
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Figure 6: Amman urban sprawl from 1961 to 2008, the airport road and the urbanization the village of Yadudeh
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Since the 1970s, greenhouse crops have been cultivated south of Amman with the introduction of irrigation from wells dug into groundwater. The year 1978 marked the opening of the airport highway and the start of the flow of remittances from the Gulf into Jordan. The landscape changed from familiar dry farming to intensive irrigated agriculture in greenhouses, using underpaid foreign labor. According to an engineer of the Besharat family, employed by a private company selling fertilizer and pesticides, nearly 200 entrepreneurs have 5,000 greenhouses between them that now extend south of Amman, which primarily produce cucumbers, salads, navy beans and lentils for Amman’s market. 85% rent the land to plant their greenhouses (costing 1700 JD per greenhouse, renewed every two years). Of these 200 entrepreneurs, forty are Pakistanis who arrived in the 1970s with their families. They are particularly well established and make significant profits because they do not employ Egyptian workers, but rather use their children to work in the greenhouses, thus avoiding paying wages. The two major costs of these greenhouses are water and workers. Only 15% of landowners invest in greenhouses, as the majority prefers to lease their land for 100 JD per donum per year to contractors.
Jordan is the fourth most arid country in the world (according to the ratio of volume of water per capita). Its aquifers use 150% of recharge (GTZ 2007), and wells are being drilled deeper and deeper. On average in south Amman, wells are dug 150-‐175 m costing around 150,000 JD using a pump, but some reach even deeper than 300 m. On Mamduh Besharat’s farm in Um al Kundum, which was bisected by the airport highway in 1978, 40 greenhouses are installed on 65 donums, consuming between 6000 and 7000 m3 per month of water4 in the eight months of production (April to November). The water is purchased at a price of 0.5 JD per m3 (including pumping costs) from one of Mamduh’s cousins, Abujaber, who has dug his own well (it costs Abujaber 0.3 JD per m3). This is less than the public price of 0.7 JD per m3.
4 Fieldwork conducted in January 2012.
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Figure 7: Greenhouses versus sport and education facilities south of Amman, Yadudeh and Um al Kundum
On the farm, the greenhouses produce cucumbers (over an area of 10 donums), green salad (10 donums), beans (foul) (10 donums), onions (4 donums), broccoli (2 d.), cabbage-‐flowers (2 d.) and red cabbage (1 d.). Six Egyptian workers are employed and paid 200 JD per month (the Jordanian minimum wage is 180 JD per month for a 6-‐8 hour working day). Four more Egyptian workers and ten female workers from the Jirarat and Swima tribes of the Jordan Valley (who traditionally migrate to the highlands in summer) are hired during this season (the time of maximum output from April to November). These female tribal workers come with their husbands who spend several months in a tent drinking tea watching them work, because of a "culture of shame" (thaqafat al a`ib), the idea that some jobs are not worthy enough for them to perform. The government is trying in vain to fight against this pernicious aspect of culture which affects the national economy with nearly 600,000 foreign workers willing to do the hardest work that Jordanians refuse to do. To tend to 40 greenhouses, the farm pays 38,000 JD for its workers’ labor. The farm also pays 12,000 JD for seeds and 10,000 JD for fertilizers. The average income is 1000 JD per greenhouse, totaling 40 000 JD per year. However these crops can be problematic: they use large quantities of pesticides and fertilizers, and the pumping of water has become more and more expensive since the lifting of subsidies in 2008. Finally, marketing is done directly without producer cooperatives guaranteeing the price. So only those contractors who have a sufficient sized business are able to negotiate the selling price on wholesale markets. Many small owners, or those who do not have wells, have sold their land, especially after the soaring of land prices since 2005.
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Picture 1: greenhouses in Yadudeh, with Abujaber fortified farm (Ababsa 2012)
Picture 2: irrigation for the greenhouses in Yadudeh, (Ababsa 2012)
However in the south of Amman, it is not the lack of water that is the most decisive factor, but the intense land speculation and lack of enforcement of the 1985 zoning plan to control the expansion of the city. In the absence of regulations, a donum (0.1 ha or 1,000 m2) of agricultural land was sold in 2011 for between 100,000 and 200,000 JD whereas in 2005 the same land was worth between 50 000 and 100 000 and less than 50,000 in 2000. Therefore, the owners (who in the fourth generation of the Besharat family inherit between 200-‐400 donums, in comparison to 12,000 in 1895), rush to sell their lands located along the airport highway.
The value of the land has changed dramatically. Whereas before the price was determined by the number of people the land could feed, now it is the geographical location and building potential of the land that gives it its value. Consequently, with Amman being a great metropolis of over three million inhabitants (including Russeifa and Zarqa), the land south of Amman and to the north of the Queen Alia International Airport (5.4 million passengers in 2011) has become incredibly sought after and valuable. The reduction in grain fields is regrettable because of the history of the land as the cradle of world agriculture.
Conclusion
Jordan is one of the most food dependant countries in the world. This dependence is mainly due to political reasons, as the agricultural sector is controlled by powerful capitalists who are able to obtain water subsidies for growing vegetables and fruits trees. Water is highly subsidized by the government, in the short-‐term interests of big landowners and large production lobbyists. Greenhouses vegetables production, which only benefits a minority, consumes half of Jordan’s water. The western parts of Amman’s plains, which developed as arable land in Roman times, and later by pioneers in the 19th century, are progressively disappearing, being the victim of urban sprawl and land speculation. Large landowners managed to increase production by means of mechanisation and by replacing the Jordanian work force with Egyptian migrants, and since the Syrian crisis, with Syrian refugees. The government cannot reform this sector for political reasons. It can only provide money to improve water irrigation techniques and support programs for poor olive and cereals producers.
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Jordan did not tackle the question of food sovereignty that would protect small producers by marketing mechanisms and production subsidies. It is only in 2014, in the context of the Syrian crisis and the influx of nearly one million refugees, that the government has started to give incentives to small producers to develop rainfed wheat production in the badia. The main issue is to change the cropping patterns both in the Jordan Valley and in the Highlands in order to preserve farmers’ income levels, soil fertility and water; by introducing lucerne a punctual irrigation.
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