Special Cold Weather Edition In this issue…

Eventful Takeoffs 2

Secure Content Locker 5

First Flight Manual Start Procedure 6

Remote Engine Running De-Ice 7

Engine Run-Up in Icing Conditions 7

Cold Temperature Restricted Airports 9

Upper Wing Inspections 10

Cold Weather Securing Procedure 11

Mountain Wave TPs 12

BLEED NOT CLSD Fault Messages 12

EFB (JeppPro and Secure Content Locker) 13

ASAP Events 15

Misc. Interesting Bus Stuff 15

Flight Crew Incidents 15

Performance Reports 19

Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports 19

LCP/AQFO Hiring Update 20

What’s News 21

This newsletter is published by the A319/320 Fleet and Pilot Standards Teams. It is intended to provide additional detail surrounding operational policies and procedures and aircraft technical information for the line pilots. The discussion of flight procedures herein is not intended to override or replace official guidance in the flight manuals. Where a conflict exists, the current flight manual governs. The opinions expressed are those of the Chief Line Check Pilot, Fleet Captain and/or the Fleet Technical Manager.

October 2015

A319/320

Fleet Newsletter

Captain Rich Kaynor Fleet Captain

Rich.kaynor@delta.com 404-715-0333

Captain Bruce Graham Chief Line Check Pilot

Bruce.graham@delta.com 404 715-1956

Eventful Takeoffs The fleet has recently experienced a number of incidents during takeoff, some high profile and very concerning. These include:

• Taking off with the incorrect flap setting (Flaps 1 instead of 3). One of these occurred at MDW, one at MSP, and another at TVC (with this one the flap handle was moved from 1 to 3 during the takeoff roll).

• Rejected takeoffs due to the pilot selecting the incorrect thrust setting or the ambient temperature reaching the FLEX temp. One of these RTOs was at over 140 knots. (See Flight Crew Incidents in this newsletter for examples)

• Rejected takeoffs due to non-symmetrical engine acceleration or a BRAKES HOT ECAM caution.

In this article we’ll discuss these situations and how to avoid them. We’ll also review some recent procedural changes to VOL I, which have been implemented to prevent future occurrence of some of these.

Incorrect Flap Setting

As you might expect, distraction played a part in these. It’s interesting that it only took commonplace distractions (i.e. getting a new ATIS or manually inserting the ZFW/ZFWCG due to the engines being started), to interfere with the crew’s normal procedures. The lesson here is that we all can make mistakes. Also, there are times when the stars align so that both pilots make the same mistake. That’s why we use checklists.

Checklists are designed to trap these mistakes before really bad things happen.

However, to be effective a checklist has to be used with a certain level of skepticism. The Rev. 2 version of the OE Guide (should be available when you read this) provides the following Fleet Best Practice:

Best Practice: The Airline has had multiple instances of crews departing with the wrong flap setting. In these cases the checklists were all performed, but the pilots answered with what they expected to see, rather than what was there in actuality (expectation bias). How can we prevent this? The following two techniques will help:

• Occasionally imagine what an incorrect checklist setting would look like. For example, how would the ECAM E/WD look if the flaps were set to 2 for takeoff? Likewise, when verifying landing gear extension in the Landing Checklist, imagine how an abnormal indication would look. This can slow down your learned response to the checklist, which will help in ensuring that you don't “see” only what you expect to see.

• Best Practice: point at each flap indication. Point has a tendency to slow you down and give you a chance to trap the error.

• Be methodical in your checklist responses. Some pilots have been taught a fast checklist response is a sign of being proficient. However, in actuality, it’s a sign sign of complacency. There are no extra points for hurrying!

• Did you notice the repeated word in one of the previous paragraphs? If so, good job! If not, this goes to show why we need to be methodical.

Another way to defuse the possibility of taking off with the wrong flap setting is to brief the threat beforehand. If the runway is short and conditions are such that you might expect a Flaps 3 takeoff, brief that as a threat during the WARTS brief. This TEM technique heightens both pilots awareness so that they will be extra vigilant during the Taxi Checklist.

Incorrect Thrust Setting 2

There are several possible errors in setting takeoff thrust, each of which has recently resulted in an RTO. The Rev. 2 OE Guide includes the following review of these potential errors:

• FLEX/MCT detent selected for takeoff without a FLEX temperature entered. Or, the ambient temperature equals or exceeds the entered FLEX temperature, requiring a TOGA takeoff: - If the PF inadvertently selects FLEX without a FLEX temperature entered, the ECAM message

ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET occurs, alerting the pilot that MCT is set as opposed to FLEX. - Alternatively, if the ambient temperature equals the entered FLEX temp, the E/WD displays

TOGA and the same message ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET appears if the FLEX detent is selected.

Caution! This last point is the reason the response to the “Thrust” challenge (Taxi Checklist) is read from the E/WD, rather than the PERF page. The E/WD displays TOGA if the ambient temperature equals the PERF FLEX temperature.

Note: The A321s and A319/320s with the latest Flight Warning Computer (H2F7) display the message ENG SAT ABOVE FLEX TEMP when the ambient temperature equals the FLEX temperature during the taxi phase. - If the message ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET is received during the takeoff roll, the pilot should

select TOGA and continue the takeoff. Caution! When operating in warm conditions where the ambient temperature is close to the FLEX temp, crews are cautioned that the runway air temperature is often a couple of degrees warmer, which may necessitate TOGA.

• CLB detent used for takeoff thrust:

- If the PF inadvertently selects the CLB detent for takeoff and fails to crosscheck the FMA to catch the error, once again the ECAM message ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET occurs.

- If the crew doesn't respond to the ECAM message, at 80 knots the aural "RETARD, RETARD, RETARD...” command will be heard. What happens is that the aircraft remains in the Taxi Phase since it hasn't detected a takeoff power selection. When it senses a speed greater than 83 knots, it departs the Taxi Phase looking for the proper phase of flight. It can't be the Takeoff Phase, as the thrust levers aren't in a takeoff setting. It can't be Taxi Phase, the speed it too high. Since it knows it is on the ground, the FWC concludes it must be the Rollout Phase, but because the thrust is above idle, the “RETARD” call is generated.

How to prevent these errors from occurring? Awareness is part of prevention. If the ambient temperature is high (30 C and above) and the FLEX temperature is low (meaning only a slight reduction in performance is possible), the two may meet once on the hot asphalt of the runway. Again, briefing the threat will raise awareness. Also, if the ambient temperature is close to the FLEX temperature as you approach the runway, remember that you can always use TOGA for takeoff, even though the V-speeds were associated with FLEX. Lastly, the main part of error prevention in this case is verification of the proper thrust setting. Let’s discuss this last point further.

Q: What’s the first thing you should look for after setting takeoff thrust, or after the PF sets takeoff thrust?

A: Hopefully you answered the FMA, as that’s where the first indication of normal takeoff thrust is displayed.

Q: What FMA indications should I look for after takeoff thrust is set?

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A: You should look for either “MAN FLX” or “MAN TOGA” in column 1 and “SRS” in column 2. Other normal indications are “A/THR” armed in column 5 and “RWY” in column 3 if the runway has an associated ILS.

An important point is that with each of the takeoff thrust setting errors described previously, the FMA does not change from the TAXI depiction (i.e. blank/CLB/ NAV [or blank]/blank/1FD2).

Note: If you had to think about what should be depicted, a review of the FMA may be in order. There’s a good FMA review on the fleet site under Training/Reference Material/ FMA PPT.

Note: The fleet feels that referencing the FMA column 1 as takeoff power is set (verifying MAN FLX or MAN TOGA) is a vital PF and PM check. Insuring crews verify column 1 during takeoff has been added to the LCAs line check emphasis items and the fleet is considering specific crew callouts to confirm either MAN FLX or MAN TOGA are verified in column 1 during each takeoff.

Non-Symmetrical Engine Acceleration

A recent VOL I change now calls for pausing at 50% long enough to allow the engines to stabilize momentarily, before advancing the TLs further (Ref. VOL I NP.20.47):

Advance thrust levers to approximately: 50% N1. Allow the engines to stabilize momentarily then promptly advance the thrust levers to takeoff thrust.

This is a small, but significant change; as we used to teach to only verify both engines were accelerating, prior to advancing thrust. Now, we’re teaching to actually wait for both engines to stabilize at 50% (momentarily) before advancing thrust. This ensures both engines are accelerating symmetrically. Why? The Rev. 2 OE Guide includes the following:

RTOs have occurred after the pilot sensed an inordinate amount of rudder input to maintain centerline control. FOQA confirmed the pilot failed to confirm symmetric acceleration prior to advancing the thrust levers to FLEX/TOGA. Because of the difference in age and condition of the engines, a significant lag can develop below 50% N1. CFM advised DAL that the time difference from 21% N1 and 31% N1 to takeoff thrust can be 5-20 seconds!

- The pilot should not advance the thrust levers further, until ensuring both engines have symmetrically achieved 50% N1.

- Performance requirements demand that the takeoff thrust be set by 40 knots and achieved by 60 knots.

BRAKES HOT

While cooler weather will bring relief from high brake temperatures in many places we fly, hot brakes can still be an issue. A recent change to VOL I clarifies guidance on maximum takeoff brake temperatures to avoid a BRAKES HOT ECAM during the takeoff roll. The fleet has had several rejected takeoffs result from a BRAKES HOT caution, in some cases leading to fuse plug melting and lengthy delays.

FOQA has been used to study brake temperatures and has found that using 275o C as a maximum can

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prevent a BRAKES HOT caution from occurring during the takeoff roll. Therefore this guidance has been added to the VOL I SP section under ‘Brake Temperature” (Ref. VOL I SP.14):

To avoid a BRAKES HOT ECAM during takeoff roll or climb, crews should verify brake temperatures are a maximum of 275ºC prior to initiating takeoff.

Many crews use a “fuel, weight, warm-up time” check prior to taking the runway. With this change we’d recommend adding the brake temperatures to this check.

The Rev. 2 OE Guide includes a discussion about “Brake Temperature Management”. It’s pretty good reading and encourages crews to adopt a holistic approach to managing brake temperatures.

Secure Content Locker A common request we’ve received from pilots is for easy access to this Newsletter and the Topics of Interest (formally known as Bus Bites). This is now possible as all 40 current TOIs, as well as the previous year’s (12 total) Newsletters, are now available in your tablet’s Secure Content Locker. They are accessed as follows:

Q: How can I search for something within these documents? Let’s use the article “The Scary Button”, I remember reading it a while back in one of the newsletters and now can’t find it?

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A: Since you recalled reading it in a prior newsletter, tap on the A320 Newsletter – 11 Month Archive and the following screen will open. Once you tap on the “FIND” arrow after typing in what you want to search for, the results will show up like this:

First Flight Manual Start Procedure The fleet has adopted an Airbus/CFM recommendation of employing Manual Start procedures for all first flight starts when the ambient temperature is 10o C or lower. Early last month Fleet Bulletin 15-09 was published outlining the new procedure. So far crew compliance with this procedure has been a little disappointing. We have received several reports of start faults during the first flight of the day, and the crew contacts have indicated the crew had chosen to use the automatic start procedure. Delays associated with engine start faults can be substantial. Also, as the fault occurs during the first flight of the day, the delay often affects several additional flight segments flown with that aircraft.

Fleet Bulletin 15-09 and the September Newsletter contain additional information regarding the first flight start procedure; here are a few of the highlights:

• Delta is not the only Airbus operator using this procedure. In fact, nearly all Airbus operators conduct manual start procedures under cold temperature conditions.

• Manual engine starts are REQUIRED for all first flight of the day when ambient temperature is 10 degrees C or colder. First-flight is defined as when the engines have been shut down for 4 hours or longer, but crews can use this procedure whenever they are starting a cold engine.

• Manual Starts do not provide the same FADEC protections as automatic starts. Because of the reduced protections, pilots are strongly encouraged to perform this procedure as a “read and do” checklist and Captains should carefully consider the higher workload of a manual start when deciding on whether to single-engine taxi on first flights. The F/O performing the manual start should focus their full attention on the engine start.

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• Max Motoring N2 is the Key! Airbus and CFM identified maximum motoring N2 as the key to a

successful start when using the Manual Start procedure. Maximum motoring speed is indicated when N2 acceleration is less than 1% in approximately 5 seconds – that might take 30-40 seconds to achieve. The recommended minimum N2 is 26%, however pilots should obtain the maximum motoring N2 prior to advancing the ENG Master. After the Fleet Bulletin has been issued, use the procedure contained within for every first flight engine start when OAT is 10 C or lower. One way to remember this is if you need a 5-minute warm-up (i.e. it’s a first flight) and it’s cool enough where you need to consider the use of engine anti-ice, you should be using the Engine Start-Manual Procedure.

Delta Tech Ops is continuing to work with Airbus and CFM for a long-term solution to cold weather first-flight engine start difficulties. In the meantime, manual engine starts, when performed according to this new procedure, provide the best opportunity to avoid start faults and increase fleet reliability.

Remote Engine Running De-Icing Ah, the smell of de-icing fluid in the morning! Hard to believe, but de-icing isn’t far away. Some points to remember:

Taxiing to remote de-icing

Unless Green Page remarks dictate otherwise (e.g. SLC), crews are permitted to single engine taxi to the remote de-icing facility. Obviously, the decision to SE taxi should be based on taxiway conditions, manual start requirements, workload, etc.

Note: Do check the Green Pages! At some airports like SLC, crews are required to taxi in and out of the de-ice facility using both engines.

Flight control check required after de-icing

A flight control check is required after de-icing – even if a control check was accomplished prior to the de-icing operation. Therefore, if you two engine taxi to the de-ice facility and perform a control check prior to de-icing, you will still need to accomplish a second control check after leaving the de-ice facility.

Engine Run-Up in Icing Conditions A recent incident highlights the well-known fact that the engine clearing procedure, conducted during icing conditions, is not a risk free procedure. Last winter a 737, which uses the same CFM engine and has the same engine run-up guidance, departed the paved surface while conducting the clearing procedure. Crews are often faced with a choice of two evils, ice on the spinner or the risk of asymmetric thrust on a slippery surface.

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The 319/320 and the 737 use CFM manufacturer guidelines for the clearing maneuver. One of the more problematic aspects of the guidance is the 70% N1 language. On a slippery taxiway, it is clearly not practical, nor safe, to run one or both engines up to 70% N1. Crews must use good judgment in evaluating the taxi environment. The best course of action may be to perform the clearing procedure only while situated on taxiways or ramp areas where braking action is good, or to delay the engine run-up until holding on the runway prior to departure.

In icing conditions, performing the engine clearing procedure is required before takeoff. Normally, the procedure should be performed in conjunction with the standing takeoff procedure. However, crews may need to perform the clearing procedure on other airport surfaces. If performing the clearing procedure on a surface other than the departure runway, crews should confirm that the area behind the aircraft is clear and must assess the surface braking action to ensure it is suitable for the engine run-up. Coordination with ATC may be required.

Note: The clearing procedure consists of two steps, acceleration to an elevated N1 and dwell time at the elevated thrust level. If lower thrust levels are required due to braking effectiveness or taxiway congestion, consider increasing the dwell time at a lower N1.

Procedure:

• Hold the brakes and accelerate to as high an N1 as conditions permit - Max 70% N1 • One pilot must continually monitor for aircraft movement • Monitor Engine acceleration and engine VIB • Maintain increased thrust for as long as practical – Max 30 seconds CAUTION! If during thrust increase, the aircraft starts to move, immediately retard the thrust levers to IDLE.

The bottom line is the crew needs to use caution and good judgment went conducting the engine clearing procedure. Temper your procedures to take into consideration both the level and type of precipitation and the ramp conditions. Consider conducting engine clearing at higher power settings only on taxiways with good braking, or delay the engine run-up until established on the runway awaiting takeoff clearance.

Cold Temperature Restricted Airports

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In response to recognized safety concerns over cold weather altimetry errors, the FAA completed a risk analysis to determine if current Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 97 are at risk during cold temperature operations. As a result of the analysis, Cold Temperature Restricted Airports have been designated in the NAS. The list of airports, the segment(s) of the approach requiring cold temperature altitude correction and associated operating procedures may be found at www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/notices NTAP, Part 4. Graphic Notices, Section 1. General - Cold Temperature Restricted Airports.

Mandatory compliance with these procedures will be in effect Sep 17, 2015.

Temperatures for Cold Temperature Restricted Airports are completely separate from the temperatures published on area navigation (RNAV) approaches. Temperature restrictions on RNAV approaches for lateral navigation (LNAV)/vertical navigation (VNAV) minima must be followed, even if it is warmer than the temperature associated with the approach plate Note.

Sections of the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), which address cold temperature altitude corrections, have been revised to reflect these changes. Pilots will be responsible for applying altitude corrections and must advise Air Traffic Control (ATC) when these corrections are to be made on the intermediate and/or missed approach segment. However, advising ATC of planned altitude corrections in the final segment is not required.

Additional cold temperature correction guidance can be found in the Airway Manual. Cold temperature correction charts will be included within the Special (Green) Pages. And the fleet has created a cold temperature correction NOI guide that will appear in a Fleet Bulletin issued in October.

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Upper Wing Inspections We have a threat to our fleet that lacks a good mitigation strategy, other than increased crew vigilance - Upper Wing Ice. The fleet had two troubling wing ice events last winter. In each case, the crew performed a normal walk around and then, after pushback, ice or heavy frost was noted (and photographed by passengers from the cabin) on the upper wing. Each of these events DID NOT occur in falling precipitation and in each case the temperature was above freezing. Simply put, ice formation on the upper wing can occur quickly and in temperatures in excess of freezing. In fact, most incidents of undetected wing ice do not occur with falling precipitation, it occurs with clear skies and cool air.

As you know, departure with frost, ice or snow on the upper wing is prohibited. As I’m sure you’re also aware, a clear view of the upper wing surfaces (of both wings) is not always possible. So let’s look at our procedures:

In Cold Weather Operation crews are directed to perform an upper wing inspection from the “Best Vantage Point”. What’s the “Best Vantage Point”?

The FCTM directs you to the overwing inspection position within the cabin. So in cold weather operation, the pilot conducting the exterior inspection would be expected to view the upper wings from inside the cabin.

Okay, that’s a start, but we’ve had several upper wing ice events occur even when crew did perform a cabin inspection of the upper wing. Let’s read a pilot’s report of overwing icing:

Crew Report: I want to share the insidious nature of the formation of wing frost on the wing panels of the A319/320. On October 19 we flew Flight XXXX, the 5:25 AM departure from MSP to ATL. The 4 AM temperature was 4o C, the 5 AM temperature was 6o C. I viewed the wing panels from the cabin and determined there was sufficient evidence to have a deicing crew come out to the aircraft for a more thorough inspection. As a side note, the only location one could properly view the potential contamination was from the cabin. At 5:20 AM the deicing crew confirmed there was frost on the spoiler panels.

Q: What’s our takeaway?

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A: Overwing ice can form at temperatures above freezing, in conditions without any falling precipitation. Overwing ice may not be readily apparent in a visual inspection, i.e. the surface may simply look “wet”. If in doubt, a tactile inspection by ramp personnel or a trip through the de-icing pad should be performed.

Cold Weather Securing Procedure

Cold Weather Securing Procedure End of the day. You’re ready to put the jet to bed and head for the layover hotel. But with cold weather, you generally have one task left - the Cold Weather Securing Procedure. This additional procedure (found in VOL I SP.16) is designed to prepare the aircraft for overnight de-icing by station personnel and to protect the aircraft in the event of a significant snow/icing event overnight.

One caution we need to pass along for the crew approaching the aircraft the next morning. Last winter we learned that when this procedure is applied, the doors closed, and external air is connected to the aircraft, the aircraft pressurizes – not a lot, but enough to cause a pretty violent push as the main cabin door is opened. In one case a gate agent in GRR was injured and in another two crewmembers were tossed to the ground.

Here’s the background. Delta ACS and Tech Ops policy is to insure all the exterior openings (outflow values, avionic ventilation/extract valves, etc.) on the aircraft are closed at night during cold weather operations. Closing the exterior openings inhibit the intake of snow, ice and de-ice fluid and prevents cold air from entering the fuselage – an important aspect of freeze protection for potable water lines. That’s the reasoning behind the additional securing procedures for cold weather operation found in the Vol. 1 [SP.16.8]. However, it turns out the 319/320 is a little tighter ship than the Boeings and Mad Dogs. With exterior opens secured (via the DITCHING pb), cabin doors closed and external air connected, pressure builds up in the cabin. That has resulted in two fairly serious ASAP reports. In each case ACS had connected external conditioned air and then closed the main cabin door overnight. When the crew arrived at the aircraft, the door was still closed. Although it took a pretty good tug, the door was pulled open and the added differential pressure was enough to throw the crewmember back several feet.

The OE Guide addresses this as follows:

Opening Cabin Door on First Flight

If the aircraft has been secured for cold weather with the DITCHING pb ON (Ref. Vol. 1, SP 16, Cold Weather Operation), external air applied, and all doors closed, opening a cabin door can be hazardous. The reason for this is that the aircraft may be somewhat pressurized. Though not enough to activate the red light, there can still be over 100 lbs of force on the door.

If the cabin door is closed following an overnight in cold weather conditions, request ground personnel turn off external air prior to opening the door. Then use caution when opening.

Note: ACS has been asked to keep the main cabin door cracked slightly when external ground air is connected.

The fleet recommends the following:

1) Continue to perform the cold weather securing procedures as published in Vol. 1.

2) Remind the agents meeting the flight to remember to crack the door if external conditioned air will be connected overnight.

3) If the main cabin door is closed and external conditioned air is connected, DO NOT attempt to open the main cabin door. Have the external air removed from the aircraft, and wait a few minutes before opening the door.

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Mountain Wave TPs Every autumn we get ASAP reports about flights, which have inadvertently transited active Mountain Wave areas. Yes, the TP system is not as user friendly as it could be, or will be in the future. However, it’s still the crew’s responsibility to avoid designated Mountain Wave areas when active. What tools are available to help with this?

• The Jeppesen HIGH 1+2 chart is marked with Mountain Wave areas (e.g. MWMWDENMWMW). Yes, the green font can be hard to see at times, and we’ve suggested that Jepp use a bolder font, but they are on there.

• The Airway Manual (Ref. AM SUP-4WX.2.11) includes the general graphic shown at right.

• The Airway Manual (Ref. AM SUP-4WX.2.17) lists LAT/LONGS that define each Mountain Wave area. These can then be plotted in the Secondary Flight Plan for reference. Below are the DEN Mountain Wave area coordinates:

40.52N 107.20W 40.52N 104.30W 39.20N 104.00W 38.40N 106.40W 40.00N 108.20W

• Another option is a friendly ACARS to your Dispatcher to verify an alternative or direct routing will keep you clear of any Mountain Wave areas, prior to accepting the clearance.

BLEED NOT CLSD Fault Messages Our friends in mainenance ask us to be mindful of this simple procedure. AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED NOT CLSD fault messages are a continuous source to departure delays.

The fault generally occurs on the ground after engine shut down. Note, that a simple reset is required. If the ENG Bleed resets an INFO ONLY write-up (so MCC can track the anomaly) is all that’s necessary.

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EFB and Surface Tips, Tricks, and How To’s (EFB JeppPro and the Secure Content Locker)

EFB Contingency - Overview

After signing in for duty, a crewmember may experience a complete loss of the EFB due to a number of reasons (theft, damage, loss, separation, etc.). Individual applications may also experience failure or reduced operating capabilities. Flight Operations, along with Delta’s OCC, have developed contingency procedures which will allow a flight to continue. A basic understanding of these procedures will aid the crew in what to expect.

There are two aspects to the above-described situation:

1. The ability to operate the flight, and 2. Resupplying an EFB to the pilot.

EFB Failure – What do I do?

When a loss occurs with either an application or the device, the crew will notify their respective dispatcher of the exact nature of the problem. The dispatcher will gather the required information and provide the crew with the required documents to conduct the flight, either in electronic or paper format.

The information and format will change as application capabilities and the eLINK program mature. There are three components of the data to expect for a flight (see table below):

* Excerpted material, not the complete document.

** Selected charts determined by dispatcher

*** On approved devices

Fleet Common and Fleet Specific data can be provided to the crew by station personnel via printed-paper or downloaded to an approved device if available. It is preferable to download the material, rather than print it, due to the amount of time required to print such large files.

If a working EFB is available, pilots should use the EFB jointly and use the provided strip charting as a backup. Strip charting is similar to paper enroute charts, but is specific to the intended route of flight.

Type Description Delivery Method # of Copies

Fleet Specific * Vol 1, *ODM, *FB’s electronic or paper (1)electronic or paper

Fleet Common

* FOM ,* APB’s, *Comm Maps,

*Country Specific Emergency pages,

electronic or paper

(1)electronic or paper

Flight Specific ** Terminal charts,

**Enroute Strip charts

electronic or paper

(2) electronic *** or

(1) Paper

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Fleet Common and Fleet Specific material can be used by the crew as needed in the format provided (electronic/paper). Remember, the fleet common/specific material is excerpted from the source document and is not the entire VOL 1 or ODM.

Q: OK…I was surfing the Secure Content Locker (SCL) and came across these folders labeled “A319-320 GOFile” What is this for?

A: Go Files support the operation in case of tablet or app failures. They contain selected, required information and are for use by flight crews when no other way of obtaining and carrying this information is possible.

Go Files can be used in two ways:

• A crew can obtain a digital copy for use on a device other than a Delta-provided EFB (e.g. a SkyPro device borrowed from a Flight Attendant, a personal tablet or smart phone), or

• The Go Files can be printed by the crew or station personnel at a gate or station.

Q: Which Go Files Do I need?

A: There are three versions of GO Files. Depending on the failure, crews may need one, two or all three versions for dispatch. There are flow charts to provide pilots with a course of action based on the specific EFB related issue.

Note: Do not use Go Files unless directed by a Dispatcher!

Flow Charts

These flow charts are also published on the EFB webpage located on DeltaNet. They are also located in the EFB Support folder of Content Locker (CL) on the EFB.

Individual Flow Chart Descriptions:

• Single EFB Dispatch - One or more pilots’ EFB is inoperative or missing, leaving a single remaining operative EFB.

• Dispatch without Operable EFB (Zero Tablet Dispatch) - All Pilots’ EFBs are missing or inoperative.

• Software or Application Not Functioning Properly - One or more Pilots’ EFB is malfunctioning due to software or applications.

• EFB Out of Date - One or more Pilots’ EFB does not have current Charts, Manuals or Bulletins.

Reference these flow charts any time a situation with your EFB arises for your affected flight. Whenever a contingency arises where “other than normal” EFB is to be used, always consult with your Dispatcher.

Help Desk:

• Call 404-714-HELP or toll-free 1-888-714-0529

• Email: tabletandmediasupt@delta.com

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ASAP Events ASAP: I had not been to DTW for several months. I programed the FMGC at the gate and nothing stood out as unexpected however, during taxi-out, while confirming/briefing the departure routing, I noticed that the FMCG had no discontinuity from KDTW to the first fix (VEELA). I paused my briefing to correct the issue in the FMCG and failed to complete the preview/briefing of the departure - completely missing the note at the top of the page indicating a 280KIAS airspeed limitation. On departure, ATC provided vectors to 'increase spacing for the departure' which meant to me that we were too close to the aircraft ahead of us on the same departure routing. So I stayed at 250 even after passing 10000'MSL. When we were cleared direct to the first fix on the departure, I assumed we had adequate spacing and so began accelerating on schedule. As we reached about 300KIAS, ATC called to remind us to remain at 280 KIAS, which we immediately did. I then reviewed the departure instructions and noticed the speed limit on the top of the page.

Misc. Interesting Bus Stuff A very interesting animation created by BAE regarding Air France 447 Accident:

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=vSz-UeEGbUw&feature=youtu.be

Vanity Fair Article on AF 447:

http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash

Children of the Magenta:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbQB72-4WQ0

Terrain Box Training PDF

https://app.box.com/s/hlyxl5bvyb8sdiscf0n91q81j8nnzpc5

Flight Crew Incidents DTW-MSN Ship 3232 RTO at approximately 80 KIAS due takeoff warning indications.

• RWY change in DTW during taxi out; crew accomplished RWY change items and CA briefed appropriate TO items for new RWY

• Power advanced normally and at approximately 80 KTS the warning system annunciated “RETARD” three times.

• CA noticed throttles not in proper detent and advanced to FLEX • When warning continued, CA elected to reject TO • RTO above 80 KTS led to hot brakes upon taxi back to gate • Consulted with A319/320 CLCP for information regarding TO warning on the A320 • Crew pulled pending review by ERC

Follow-up

Reports indicate that the “RETARD” warning was announced three (3) times and resulted in the rejected takeoff.

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A crew debrief determined that the thrust levers were not in the correct position (“not in proper detent and advanced to FLEX”). Maintenance performed an inspection engine and performed FADEC test – no discrepancies or faults found. The aircraft was returned to service.

SHIP 3209 SLC-SNA. RTO around 50kts for an ECAM caution message

• The crew aborted the takeoff around 50kts for the ECAM caution message FLEX TEMP NOT SET • A flex temp of 31 degrees was set with an OAT of 30 degrees • Once clear of the runway all applicable checklists were consulted • The crew consulted with MCC and waited for the brakes to cool prior to another takeoff attempt • FODM debriefed the crew and consulted with the WEST CPO; crew will continue

Follow-up

The above-mentioned ECAM message was displayed due to the OAT being equal to or exceeding the FLEX temp planned. A slight change in temperature that occurs from the time the FLEX temperature is set and the actual takeoff can result in the aircraft essentially inhibiting the planned FLEX takeoff.

The flight crew followed their normal preflight procedures in preparation for takeoff. At the time the aircraft left the gate, information obtained through ATIS indicated that the outside air temperature (OAT) was 30 degrees. The Takeoff Data Uplink (TDU) was received and the WDR provided a Flex Temp setting of 31 degrees. The uplinked data was confirmed and taxi checklist completed. Prior to taking the runway, the pilots verified thrust set (via challenge and response) was “FLEX 31”. The routine continued and the thrust levers were advanced for takeoff and set to the FLEX detent. At approximately 40 – 45 knots, a Master Caution/single chime alerted the crew to an ECAM message for "ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET". The Captain called for the takeoff to be discontinued.

DTW-MSN Ship 3232 RTO at approximately 80 KIAS due takeoff warning indications.

• RWY change in DTW during taxi out; crew accomplished RWY change items and CA briefed appropriate TO items for new RWY

• Power advanced normally and at approximately 80 KTS the warning system annunciated RETARD • CA noticed throttles not in proper detent and advanced to FLEX • When warning continued, CA elected to reject TO • RTO above 80 KTS led to hot brakes upon taxi back to gate • Consulted with A319/320 CLCP for information regarding TO warning on the A320 • Crew pulled pending review by ERC

Follow-up

Reports indicate that the “RETARD” warning was announced three (3) times and resulted in the rejected takeoff. A crew debrief determined that the thrust levers were not in the correct position (instead were the in CLB detent).Maintenance performed an inspection engine and performed FADEC test – no discrepancies or faults found. The aircraft was returned to service.

SLC-ORD Ship 3248 ATB due to ENG 1 REVERSE UNLOCKED message.

• During climb-out through approximately 7000 ft. MSL, the number one engine reverser indicated unlocked

• QRH complied with; engine remained at idle • Emergency was declared • MTC and Dispatch consulted and decision made to return to SLC

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• Uneventful landing on RWY 16R • Landing was approximately 4500 lbs overweight • Crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

The aircraft is currently out of service. SLC Maintenance is working the replacement of latch stow targets/latch fittings and switches.

MSP-BZN Ship 3134 Odor in cabin after crossbleed engine start and taxi out.

• Normal pushback from gate with uneventful start of #1 engine • During taxi-out, crew performed crossbleed start of #2 engine • During #2 engine start, crew noticed high N2 vibrations on #1 engine • With throttle at idle, all engine indications normal • Crew increased power on #1 engine to approximate power setting for crossbleed start; N2 vibrations

indicated approx. 4.2 • Crew contacted maintenance and during troubleshooting, max N2 vibrations noted at approx. 5.4;

crew returned to the gate • After engine shutdown at gate, crew opened cockpit door and noted faint burning odor in front part of

cabin/forward galley; no smoke present • Logbook entry complete for engine vibration; Smoke/Fumes questionnaire completed and faxed to

maintenance • Crew swapped aircraft and continued to destination

Follow-up

Maintenance inspected the #1 engine for tip blade rub and turbine clearance – no discrepancies noted. A high power engine run was performed to check for odor and vibration - no discrepancies noted (30 minutes of engine operation). Maintenance accomplished fan blade lube task and vibration test per AMM. All vibration test results were within limits. The aircraft was returned to service.

MSY-LAX Ship 3119 Aircraft damage to the top of the left engine cowling as a result of the aircraft impacting the jetway during taxi-in.

• On taxi in, ACS noted jetway made contact with cowling of aircraft • CA stated she stopped aircraft when marshaller and two wing walkers said to stop • Jet bridge took five mins or so to pull up to airplane and seemed to have a problem with driving it • Heard no noise nor felt any kind of impact with jetway • MTC was called by ramp tower for possible damage • MTC cleared airplane to continue in service • No logbook entry made by either crew or MTC • Airplane continued with crew to SEA • ACS and MTC met aircraft in SEA and found more substantial damage than initially thought • OCC Duty Pilot, SOF and CPO discussed and crew will be placed on CPAR in SLC

Follow-up

Maintenance repaired one of two damaged panels and replaced the other. Following the repair/replacement, panels were treated / painted and the aircraft was returned to service.

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BWI-SLC Ship 3267 Emergency declared and diversion initiated to DEN due to a fume/ odor throughout the aircraft.

• F/O’s leg, in cruise over DEN, pilots detected odor similar to overheating component • Immediately received notification from In-Flight crew of odor in cabin • Masks were not donned; contacted dispatch to advise of situation • Fume smell began to increase quickly • Declared an emergency and turned back to DEN for quick approach; no time for QRH • Met by ARFF upon clearing runway; taxied to gate and deplaned pax • Logbook, Fumes Questionnaire, FOM considerations briefed • Cleared to continue

Follow-up

Maintenance determined that a faulty potable water compressor was the source of the odor. The compressor and an associated were replaced. No further issues noted.

MSP-MKE Ship 3222. Possible media event. Blown bleed duct during engine start.

• After pushback, crew elected to start both engines • Crew had a successful engine 1 start and proceed to start engine 2 • During start, crew got low APU bleed pressure and aborted started • A 2nd attempt was made and crew got an APU BLEED LEAK msg • Crew discontinued start and shut APU down • During the 2nd start attempt, cabin crew and passengers heard a single loud “pop” sound • Shortly after the sound, dust and insulation emitted through the ceiling vents into the cabin • Crew taxied aircraft back to gate • O2 bottle was used for a few passengers • Possible media attention • Logbook entry made and Smoke/Fumes Questionnaire completed • FODM spoke with CA – will continue • Per MCC, during engine 2 start, APU bleed air duct separated APU

Follow-up

Maintenance discovered that the APU pneumatic supply air duct, located in the aft cargo sidewall, failed. The duct failure resulted in dust and insulation entering aft cabin ceiling panel area. No smoke was produced by the duct failure. The broken duct was replaced and system checks were normal.

PHX-SLC Ship 3228. Crew reported loss of Green hydraulic system. Emergency declared on arrival.

• Normal departure out of PHX • Shortly after departure crew reported a loss of the Green Hydraulic System • First Officer PF • Dispatch/MC consulted. • Collective decision was made to continue to SLC due to PHX weather • No Flight attendants or Passengers onboard • Emergency declared with SLC Approach Control • Aircraft towed to the hangar after landing • Crew cleared to continue after layover in SLC

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Follow-up

Maintenance discovered a leak at a green system hydraulic pressure line. The line is located on the rear spar above the MLG actuator and unable to apply a Rynglok repair. Working to procure a replacement line. Ready time is pending.

Performance Reports Thank you for looking for opportunities to perform SE taxi. SE taxi saves Delta millions of dollars each year from fuel savings as well as engine wear and FOD damage. Our fleet leads the way (48.7%) for outbound SE taxi – great job!

Best practice after landing is for the FO to hack the clock after the aircraft is safely slowed to taxi speed. After 3 minutes of cool down, ask the CA if SE taxi is appropriate.

Flaps 3 Landings

Flaps 3 landings increased during the spring and then decreased (as expected) with the warmer weather in June. With cooler weather approaching, we expect to see an increase in the usage of Flaps 3 landings. A Flaps 3 approach/landing reduces fuel burn by about 50 lbs. Airbus also recommends Flaps 3 approaches for higher crosswinds and approaches with potential for windshear. As we’ve mentioned before, Flaps 3 is the fleet’s preferred landing configuration. However, keep in mind that every landing needs to be analyzed and the best flap configuration chosen. Short or contaminated runways, capricious winds, higher altitude airports, or quick turn time may mean a Flaps 3 landing isn’t the best choice. Both Flaps FULL and 3 landing configurations are considered “normal” - choose the landing flap configuration that best fits the landing environment.

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Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports These reports are invaluable to the fleet and to Delta. We use the information from ASAPs to develop or revamp policies and procedures and to monitor safety. Without your reports, the quality of Flight Standards would be dramatically decreased.

Honestly, we really appreciate your reports! That said, when you file reports, we need details. A report that identifies a date and place and simply says “and we missed the restriction” does the program no good – and it could cost the crew the opportunity for the protections afforded by ASAP. The ASAP program is a two way street. The crew gives the program valuable information and the program provided protections. Please, for the good of the program and to assure you receive the protections afforded by the ASAP program, file detailed reports.

One final request: As a common courtesy to your flying partner, if you plan to file an ASAP report, please inform your crewmate. Each week we have several incidents where only one crewmember filed a report. Each pilot must file an independent report to receive ASAP program protections. Thank You!

Line Check Pilot (LCP) and Airport Qualified First Officer (AQFO) Hiring Update By: Dave McNeill, ATL Lead Line Check Pilot

Thank you to the many A319/320 Captains and First Officers who have submitted a Line Check Pilot (LCP) or Airport Qualified First Officer (AQFO) Application in the DeltaNet A319/320 Flight Standards section.

We are very fortunate to have a number of outstanding Applicants for each of these positions and are now properly staffed in DTW and NYC, and overstaffed in ATL, MSP and SLC with Line Check Pilots. We are also currently "right staffed" system-wide with AQFOs.

But our LCP and AQFO staffing needs could quickly change due to Instructor attrition and/or increased training loads due to DAL Network changes, pilot AE bidding and fleet growth with the A321s.

For Line Check Pilots, Delta Air Lines requires 200 hours Pilot in Command (PIC) time on the A319/320 and 1,000 total PIC at DAL. Or, 200 hours PIC on the A319/320, 600 total PIC at DAL and 1,000 hours PIC / SIC on the A319/320.

The A319/320 fleet prefers to hire someone with well above the DAL minimum requirement of 200 hours of A319/320 PIC time and we are currently looking for a minimum of 600 hours.

Again, thank you for the great response and please submit an Application if you are interested in an LCP or AQFO position in the future!

What’s News?

A321s:The BIG news on the fourth floor has to do with the approaching A321 deliveries. Earlier last month we got a look at the A321 Airbus systems manuals and QRH. The fleet is in a full court press to develop a Delta QRH as well as FCTM and Vol. 1 and 2 differences. We’re also planning for delivery flights in Hamburg Germany and Mobile Alabama.

RNP: Hopefully as you’re reading this, RNP will have been approved by the FAA.

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Initially the fleet will be authorized approaches flown to RNP .3, but as new DMC software (V70) is installed, we expect the entire fleet to become authorized to conduct approached to a RNP .1 level. An important part of authorization is documentation of RNP approaches. It’s important that every RNP approach is documented – SP.5.25 has instruction on how to document completion of a RNP approach.

O.E. Guide: O.E Guide Revision 2 will be uploaded to the SCL very soon. The O.E. Guide isn’t just used for training new A320 pilots, the guide is packed with the fleet’s best practices and good to know information. You can access the O.E Guide from the SCL.

ACARS 602: The upgrade of our ACARS to 602 is planned for this fall. You can expect a Fleet Bulletin outlining the differences in the next few weeks.

TOIs and NLs in the SCL: Okay, we’ve mentioned this several times, but we’re very happy to provide all the Topics of Interest (TOI) and the last 12 Fleet Newsletter in the SCL. Please, on your next long leg, take a look. The TOIs are very well written article by the Fleet Technical Pilot, Fleet Captain or highly experienced LCPs. Challenge yourself to read a couple TOIs every rotation. Reading TOIs in cruise is authorized!

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