A2 Religious Language

8/12/2019 A2 Religious Language

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A2 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

What follows should act as reminders. For full revision you need to do more than rely on these notes. Use your course notes,

essays and text books.

1. Key Words: Religious language is cognii!eif it is thought of as conveying knowledge of what is really there. Religiouslanguage is non"cognii!e it is thought as conveying feelings or expressing desires or guiding ways of behaving. Religiouslanguage is re#$isif it is thought of as conveying testable facts that actually pertain in reality. Religious language is non"re#$isit is thought of as conveying guiding ideals but with no basis in factual reality. Religious language offers # corres%ondence

&eory o' r(&if it is thought of as being able to point to the reality that it is trying to convey. Religious language offers #co&erence &eory o' r(&if it is thought of as conveying making sense within a network of other beliefs which people hold tobe true.

2. W Re$igio(s L#ng(#ge is: Religious language is an outlet for emotion in special times of life. Religious language is thelanguage of worship. t is performative, ! baptise you in the name of the Father, the "on and the #oly "pirit$, and it isprescriptive %law making & i.e. honour your father and mother'. #owever, none these uses of religious language is our focus.O(r 'oc(s is &o) re$igio(s $#ng(#ge *ig& *#+e r(& c$#i*s #,o( &e re#$iy o' God #nd )&e&er i c#n s(cceed in doing&is. (hilosophers have suggested many different ways in which this might be done. )hese include:

Via Negativa *nalogy "ymbol +yth

(hilosophers have made a distinction between c##%ic God"#$+which involves reflection on the revealed names of odsuch as !good$, or !wise$,$ %this includes analogy, symbol and myth' and #%o%ic God"#$+which recognises that the realityof od is beyond all such revealed names and so od in od-self is unknowable. )his is the view of the via negative.

3. Via Negativa: &e via negativa- or neg#i!e )#yis an attempt to prevent people from misrepresenting od. t argues that theonly way we can talk about od is ,y s#ying ) God is no. For example, when we say that od is infinite we are saying thatod is not finite, when we say that od is immortal we are saying that od is not mortal, when we say that od is immutablewe are saying that od is not mutable %able to change'. od is so beyond our ability to grasp that the only way we can get someidea of the reality of od is by continuing saying that od is not what anyone claims od to be. od is more than whatever issaid of od. )his view was held by the reek philosopher P$oin(s %/0-1/', the 2ewish philosopher oses #i*onides%3340-3/5' and 6hristian medieval philosophers like Pse(do"/ionysi(sand 6hristian mystics like eiser Ec+r %37/-3410. #+e s(re yo( c#n s#y so*e&ing #,o( &e Via Negativain e#c& o' &ese &in+ers so yo( #re #,$e o i$$(sr#e#n #ns)er on &e Via Negativa)i& e#*%$es. For all of these thinkers the real od is the od beyond whatever we speak ofas od. #uman language creates confusion when it is used to talk about od. )his makes it necessary to negate all the thingsthat we say about od. We must speak of od only by saying what od is not. n this way we can begin to experience a senseof the mystery, total otherness and transcendence of od. )he via negativais a way of unknowing it is not to be seen as a formof scepticism or unbelief. 8ur language is inade9uate. We cannot talk about od. 8nly in recognising this can we affirm that

od is more than we can ever hope to grasp. od is ineffable can never be described so we can only ever say what od is notSreng&s o' &e Via Negativa3. t allows things to be said about od without implying that the finite can grasp the infinite.. t asserts the claims of revelation, that od is good and then recognises goodness to be a human word and so must be negatedby saying too that od is not good to convey the transcendent reality of od$s goodness.We#+nesses o' &e Via Negativa1. )he via negativamay implicitly assume an idea of od 2. )he via negativabecomes a new way of speaking positively aboutod when, for example, we take the attributes of immutability, infinity, impassability etc. literally. . We would never be able toidentify an ob;ect if we were re9uired to talk of it only in negative terms. 3. )he via negativamay lead some people to concludethat the reason why our language cannot describe od is because there is nothing to describe. 4. Religious people wish to saysomething positive about od. i.e.S. 5&o*#s A6(in#s suggests that our language about od should be understood asanalogical.

3. An#$ogy #s # )#y o' e%ressing &e &(*#n (nders#nding o' God

God is in'inie #nd &(*#n ,eings #re 'inie. Ho) c#n &e 'inie gr#s% ) is in'inie7 Ho) c#n )ords dr#)n 'ro* 'iniecre#(res c#%(re &e essence o' &e in'iniy )&ic& is God7 5&is is &e re#$ iss(e o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge . S. 5&o*#sA6(in#s %35-315' believed that the answer was to understand our talk of od as analogical. )his was an alternative tounderstanding talk about od univocally with everyday uses of words or e9uivocally.


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in two different ways. #e calls these analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion. An#$ogy o' #ri,(ionis made when wecan establish a causal relationship between the two things which are being compared. )o use *9uinas$ example, a diet may besaid to be healthy because it causes health in the person who is said to be healthy. )here is a causal relationship between ahealthy diet and a healthy person. >9ually, we can talk of urine as being healthy as an analogy of attribution to the healthyperson that produced it. n the same way, we can use analogy to talk of od as !living$ drawn from human experience of lifebecause od is the cause of life. od can be said to be !good$ by analogy of attribution because od is the source %the cause' ofall goodness. od can be said to be wise because od is the source of all wisdom. #ere, the relation of the two terms is arelation of cause. An#$ogy o' %ro%orionis made when we use words in proportion to the nature of the thing being described.For example, we know what it means for a dog to be faithful based on an analogy of proportion with human faithfulness. ?ut adog$s faithfulness is merely a shadow of what we mean when we talk of human faithfulness. n the same way, humanfaithfulness is merely a shadow of what it means to speak of od=s faithfulness. )he analogy of proportion is thus 9ualified bythe nature of what it is being applied to. )hus, a banana is said to be =good= in proportion to what it means to be a banana. *human is said to be =good= in proportion to what it means to have the conscious but finite nature of a human being. od is saidto be =good= in proportion to what it means to have od=s infinite and eternal nature. We apply and then 9ualify the analogyaccording to %or in proportion to' the nature of that to which the analogy is being applied. *ccording to @uns "cotus *nalogy ofproportion implies a connection of being between these items rather than ;ust a causal relationship and this connection must alsoimply some form of univocity. #owever, *9uinas denies this. For *9uinas, words are used neither univocally nor purelye9uivocally of od, but analogically. A#e notes thatB CWe cannot speak of od at all except in the language we use of creatures,and so whatever is said both of od and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to od as to their source andcause in which all the perfection of things pre-exist transcendentally.D %*9uinas=s Summa Theologiae in (atrick "herry

Philosophy of Religion p. 0E' )he order of relation and participation that creatures have to od allows analogy of proportionwhile the pre-existence in od of all perfections as their source and cause allows for the analogy of attribution. )he linkbetween od and creatures through analogy is imperfect but one that, nevertheless, allows us to speak of od without limiting

the infinite reality of od. * similar approach to that of *9uinas$ analogy of proportion has been taken more recently by theformer bishop of @urham - I#n R#*sey %330-31'. n his book Religious LanguageRamsey argues that words like !good$,and !wise$, are models which disclose something about od but these models have to be 9ualified by words like !infinite$ or!eternal$ when applied to od. n this way the models are used in proportion to the reality of od rather than the reality ofhuman beings.Sreng&s o' #n#$ogy3. iven the infinity of od and the finitude of human language analogy provides an appropriate way of speaking about od thatis neither empty of content nor to be taken literally.. *nalogy gets beyond the impasse found in the failure of both e9uivocal and univocal uses of language to say anything aboutod.4. t allows us to repeat with confidence the descriptions of od that are revealed in scripture.We#+nesses o' #n#$ogy3. n order for analogy to work we must assume it applies univocally. We have to know what it means to attribute love to od ifwe are to understand the appropriateness of any attribution %the view of @un "cotus'.. "winburne 9uestions what is wrong with univocal language for od. We can legitimate speak of od$s goodness and our owngoodness univocally.4. We know too little about od for analogical language to have any meaning. *nalogy operates in a context of what iscompletely known. Get, in the case of od, we are dealing with the unknown. We have no idea what it might mean to attributeinfinite wisdom to od. human language must fall silent in the face of the mystery of od.%the view of via negativa'

4. Sy*,o$ #s # )#y o' e%ressing &e &(*#n (nders#nding o' God"ymbols evoke an understanding of od *ccording to P#($ 5i$$ic&, symbols are different from signs. "ymbols make it possibleto say something meaningful about od even though they are not to be understood as saying anything literal about od."ymbols not onlystand forbut alsopoint toa meaning beyond themselves while not actually being that thing for which theystand or point to. *ccording to )illich, the symbol also participatesin the thing it symbolises. 2ust as the national flag as asymbol of the nation participates in the life of the nation without being the nation so, e9ually, symbols for od like !love$ and!being$ participate in the @ivine reality without actually being that reality. )his inner connection with the thing being

symbolised means that a true symbol is never chosen arbitrarily. "ymbols open up levels of reality that would otherwise not becommunicated. *lso remember to say how important symbols are in evoking meaning. )hink of the (oppy. n religion !light$and !water$ are important symbols as are ritualised actions.Pro,$e*s )i& 5i$$ic&9s (nders#nding o' sy*,o$s3. )he distinction between signs and symbols is more complex than )illich thought.. )he issue of the non-symbolic raises a problem at the heart of )illich$s understanding of symbolic language. >ither there issomething non-symbolic to which the symbols for od refer in which case something we say has to be non-symbolic oreverything is a symbol and symbols merely revolve around each other with no central focus.4. )illich never ade9uately explains what it means to say that religious symbols participate in what they symbolise.5. f every statement about od is symbolic it is not entirely clear what we are to make of creeds and other formalised statementsof faith which are not symbolic in intention.O&er !ie)s o' sy*,o$s: Re#$iss #rg(e &ere is so*e&ing ($i*#e$y re#$ o )&ic& #$$ o(r sy*,o$s #,o( God re'er)&ic& is no ise$' 8(s # sy*,o$. f only we had access to this @ivine reality we would be able to describe it as it literally is initself. )his view is expressed by #ne #rin Sos+ice, o&n Hic+ #nd S#$$ie cF#g(e. Sos+ice #rg(esthat the reality of

od is articulated in metaphors and which, while re9uiring revision over time, nonetheless, convey information about a realitythat, being so totally transcendent, cannot be spoken of in any other way. For Hic+, religious people use their own, culturallybound, symbols to talk about the non-symbolic Real. cF#g(eopts for a gamble of faith which says that there is a personalpower on the side of life and its fulfilment which we then express in appropriate symbols. For her, these should include!mother$, !lover$ and !friend$. Non"re#$iss deny #$$ &is. 5&ey #rg(e #$$ )e e!er !e 'or #$+ing #,o( God is *ore#nd *ore sy*,o$s. )his is the conclusion which /on ;(%i reaches. For &i*- sy*,o$s #re o(side$ess &ey 'or* ) &ey


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e!o+e #nd e!o+e e!ery&ing )&ic& &ey 'or*. )here is no real od outside of religious symbols. od is the creation of thesymbols we use to talk about od.Sreng&s o' sy*,o$3. * symbolic use of religious language provides a way of talking about od in a meaningful way without saying anything aboutod that is to be taken literally. For )illich, symbols and more potent than signs because they stand for, point to and participate in the thing they symbolise.4. "ymbols allow us to describe od in new ways since the language is symbolic not literal. We could talk of od as !mother$ aswell as !father$. %+cFague, #ick'.5. "ome symbols like light and water seem to have universal resonance as conveyers of meaning.We#+nesses o' sy*,o$3. "ymbols may come to take on a literal meaning. (eople become too attached to them %e.g. the symbol !father$ to speak ofod'.. n the attempt to avoid idolatry a symbolic use of language might lead some to think there is no literal understanding of odat all. f all symbols are drawn from the finite world then everything we say about od is going to be merely human.4. *theists like Richard @awkins argue that understanding religious language in symbolic terms is an elaborate attempt to hidethe ultimate meaninglessness of talk about od.5. "ymbols have their meaning within particular cultures and may only have meaning relative to culture. When cultures changesymbols can lose their resonance and power and discredit the reality they were meant to convey.0. "ymbols may be arbitrary uses of language, particularly if we do not know what od is independently of the symbols we use.

or kerygma0 o' &e e#r$y ;&(rc& in *y&ic#$ 'or*. )he process of understanding the mythic language of the ?iblecentres upon the significance of 2esus for &(*#n eisence. ?ultmann believed that the early 6hurch expressed thissignificance in the mythical language of their day. O(r #s+ no) is o see &ro(g& &is *y&ic#$ $#ng(#ge o &e r(&s #,o(&(*#n eisence #nno(nced in &e e#c&ings >kerygma)#,o( es(s ;&ris. ?ultmann called this process ?de"*y&o$ogising.t is the facts of human existence that, for ?ultmann, provides the link between the now un-meaningful mythical language of the?ible and the concerns of our own time. )he analysis of human existence in existential philosophy provides the key forunlocking or de-mythologising the meaning in the ?iblical myths. #owever, philosophers like Richard Iearney and ianniJattimo have pointed to problems with de-mythologising in this way. For Iearney there are other resources for de-mythologising than existential analysis which would give a different meaning to the myths. For him myths act as pointers to ahoped for future. For Jattimo it is de-mythologising which needs de-mythologising as we come to see that today we have our

own myths which shape our view of the world.Sreng&s o' *y&3. myth provides a way of conveying complex religious beliefs about od to the next generation in an easy to understand way.. +yths convey religious truth and meaning in a way that does not need to be taken literally4. )his allows for an acceptance of both science and the traditional religious narratives. )he belief that is expressed in thecreation story can e9ually be held to apply to the ?ig ?ang and evolution. )he belief that od was working in 2esus understoodas myth rather than saying 2esus was uni9uely od allows 6hristians to keep the central importance of 2esus for them while alsoaccepting that od could also be working in the significant features of non-6hristian religions.5. +yths communicate universal themes of human existence which through careful analysis can be demythologised to allowtheir relevance to speak to any culture0. +yths provide a narrative framework through which we develop a !world view$ that allows us to give coherence to ways inwhich we engage with the world around us.7. +yths offer ways of explaining puKKling features of existence.

1. +yth offers a positive way of speaking about od making the via negativaunnecessary.E. +yths are over-abundant with meaning. Understanding traditional religious language as myth may open up a variety ofe9ually valid interpretations of the meaning behind traditional religious texts.

We#+nesses o' *y&3. "cholars disagree about which stories are to be classified as myth.


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2. Sc&o$#rs #$so dis#gree #,o( )&e&er&e )riers o' r#diion#$ re$igio(sn#rr#i!es such as the ospels inended &eirn#rr#i!e o ,e (ndersood #s *y&. )here is also disagreement about the theological function of myths4. +yths they may not now be the best form of narrative by which to convey beliefs or values. *ccording to ?ultmann, mythsare outdated ways of expressing religious truth. )hey need to be de-mythologised and re-expressed in terms which highlighttheir original significance for human existence5. )he over-abundance of meaning in myth creates such a diversity of 6hristian interpretations that the 6hristian faith may nolonger holds together as a coherent whole.0. )here are no external criteria that would allow us to ;udge the validity of one interpretation of a myth over another.7. )here is a danger in secular culture that re$igio(s n#rr#i!es )i$$ ,e (ndersood #s *y& not,ec#(se o' # dee% !#$(#ion o'*y& #s # n#rr#i!e 'or* ,( ,ec#(se (nders#nding &ese n#rr#i!es #s *y& ,eco*es &e on$y )#y o &o$d ono &e*)i& so*e sor o' credi,i$iy i' &ey c#nno ,e (ndersood #s &isory. (eople like Kei& W#rd #nd 5o* Wrig&are nothappy to see this shift to myth to plicate secular sensibilities. For them, the resurrection is a historical not a mythical event@. Iner%reing re$igio(s $#ng(#ge #s *y& *ig& s%eed (% &e dec$ine o' re$igio(s in &e Wes #s *ore #nd *ore %eo%$eco*e o (nders#nd *y& no si*%$y #s (nr(e ,( #s *ir#ge #nd '#iry #$e.E. +yths might be unable to function appropriately when we are consciously aware that they are myths.. t is not always clear that myths stand the test of time or that they are transferable to cultures from which they did notoriginate. +yths are not universal they are culturally relative.

5&e %rinci%$e o' !eri'ic#ion #nd &e *e#ning'($ness o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge)he philosophy behind the verification principle is Logical (ositivism, worked out in the 3/$s and 34/$s by a group ofphilosophers who met in Jienna and known as the Jienna 6ircle. )he early work of Wittgenstein was influential but he wasnever a member. n ?ritain, Logical (ositivism is associated with *. 2. *yer. ts aim was to provide the criteria by which it ispossible to determine the meaningful use of language. )hey argued that on$yAn#$yic#$ a prioris#e*ens >s#e*ens o'$ogic #nd *#&s0 #nd Syn&eic a posterioris#e*ens >s#e*ens #re e*%iric#$$y es#,$e0 !e *e#ning. )heyexpressed this in terms of what came to be called &e srong !eri'ic#ion %rinci%$ewhich state that !W c#nno ,e !eri'ied,y o,ser!#ion or #n#$ysis is *e#ning$ess.9 ;onse6(en$y- t&e gre# 6(esions o' *e#%&ysics #nd re$igion s(c& #s- Is&ere # God79- W is &e %oin o' $i'e79 #nd Is &ere $i'e #'er de#&79 #re i*%ossi,$e o #ns)er no ,ec#(se &ey #redi''ic($ ,( ,ec#(se &ey #re *e#ning$ess. )he problem with the strong verification principle was that it excluded theverifications of universals like !all polar bear are white$ and historical realities. )he members of the Jienna 6ircle tried,without much success, to refine the principle to include all factual claims but exclude metaphysical and supernatural claims. n?ritain, *yer suggested a weak verification principle which proposed that statements of fact only re9uire so*e re$e!#no,ser!#ion o deer*ine &eir %ro,#,$e r(& or '#$siy and conse9uently their meaningfulness. #owever, he laterabandoned this in favour of the strong version because the weak version appeared not necessarily to exclude the verification ofsome religious beliefs. #e then proposed that some propositions are verifiable by direct observation while others are verifiableindirectly by a connection they have with propositions that are directly verifiable by observation. ?ut this too seemed to leaveopen the door to some forms of religious language. n the end, *yer was forced to admit that an exact elucidation of theverification principle had eluded him.

Sreng&s o' !eri'ic#ion3. Jerification tries to provides a clear criteria for determining what is and is not to count as a meaningful use of language.. t allows us to say what use of language points to ob;ective truths and what use of language merely give sub;ective opinion.

We#+nesses o' !eri'ic#ion1.


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5&e %rinci%$e o' '#$si'ic#ion #nd &e *e#ning'($ness o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge*ntony Flew %34-//7' argued that religious language fails the test of meaningfulness because it does not cohere with theprinciple of falsification. according to the falsification principle, 'or #ny &eory o ,e *e#ning'($the person proposing i *(s,e #,$e o s&o) &o)- in %rinci%$e- &e &eory co($d ,e '#$si'ied . Iarl (opper argued that social theories such as +arxism andFreud$s psycho-analytical theory are not to be considered as scientifically meaningful because they fail to propose the conditionsunder which they might be falsified. Flew, applies the principle of falsification to religious language. For a proposition to bemeaningful it must be possible to imagine a state of affairs that would make that proposition false. F$e) #rg(es #%ro%osiion )&ic& does no r($e o( #ny&ing s no *e#ning . t is empty. )o avoid this )e !e o ,e #,$e o s#y ))o($d co(n #g#ins # %ro%osiion i' %ro%osiion is o ,e #cce%ed #s *e#ning'($ . For example, we can imagine that themoon might come crashing into the earth. f it did, this would falsify the propositions that make up our current theory ofgravity. )here would be a least this state of affairs that would not be compatible with the theory of gravity. )hus, asserting thetheory of gravity is to make a meaningful assertion. F$e) #rg(ed re$igio(s s#e*ens $i+e ?God s # %$#n?- or ?Godcre#ed &e )or$d?- or ?God $o!es (s #s # '#&er $o!es &is c&i$dren? #re #$$ *e#ning$ess s#e*ens ,ec#(se &e re$igio(s,e$ie!er )o($d ne!er #$$o) s(c& s#e*ens co($d e!er ,e '#$si'ied .


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We#+nesses o' '#$si'ic#ion3. Falsification undermines ultimate commitments and beliefs that we all take on trust and shape our other beliefs %+itchell$spoint'. t might not itself be open to falsification. s there any state of affairs that might lead Flew to regard it as falseH4. *ccording to Wittengenstein and R + #are the falsification principle fails to see that the meaning of language cannot to bedetermined by empirical criteria alone but is found in the ways it is used within different forms of life or what #are calls !bliks$.

Wigensein #nd $#ng(#ge g#*es

In &is $#er %&i$oso%&y-Wittgenstein noted that &e s#*e )ords !e di''eren *e#nings de%ending (%on &e )#y &ey #re(sed in di''eren cones. Wigensein c#$$s &ese cones ?'or*s o' $i'e?. f we get the use of words in different =forms of

life= mixed-up we will end up in confusion. 5&e %oin o' %&i$oso%&y- &e no) &o(g&- )#s no o de'ine &e %ro%er (se o'$#ng(#ge ,( o &e$% %re!en con'(sion. P&i$oso%&y )#s *ore $i+e &er#%y 'or &e con'(sed n $i+e # science. f weassume that religious language is used in the same way as scientific language is used then we are in effect confusing twoseparate =forms of life=. Religion language has its own depth grammar. When we know how the language is being used we cansee the rules that govern its use, that is, we can detect the $#ng(#ge g#*ethat is being played. Religion is a =form of life= which,like science, communicates itself in a number of different language games. A ?'or* o' $i'e? is a taken-for-granted set ofbehaviours, assumptions, or practices which condition the way we see the world. * =form of life= provides the context in whichwords are used. )heir use will be governed by rules. )hese rules constitute the language game that is being played. )ounderstand the meaning of words we have to be able to ascertain howthey are being used what game is being played. !f say,!od is love,$ am not, according to the followers of Wittgenstein, making a claim about od$s nature am showing how theword !od$ is used in the context of a certain religious form of life. 8utside any such form of life any use of language appearsgroundless.. )his even applies to scientific uses of language such as, !)his is an electron$ )his only makes sense for someonewho inhabits the form of life of the physicist. n the context of religious belief it makes perfect sense to say, =When pray, prayto od=, because the depth grammar of this statement, as defined by its context, can mean nothing else. )he very meaning of thepractice of prayer is that it is prayer to od. #owever, this says nothing about the ob;ective nature of od in the scientific sense,and everything about the life of the person who prays. n that life, prayer is prayer to od. Religious beliefs and language arenot like scientific hypotheses they are ways of regulating one=s life by reference to more important realities than scientifichypotheses alone could appreciate. )o see this, you have to be able appreciate how a believers words are bound up with theirform of life. When a believer says that he will meet up with those he loves after his death, Wittgenstein tells us, that thisstatement constitutes a way of looking at the world which cannot be reduced to other, scientific or ethical uses of language.6onse9uently, Wittgenstein re;ects both a cognitive use of religious language like that found in #ick and a non-cognitive use ofreligious language like that found in ?raithwaite.

Sreng&s o' $#ng(#ge g#*es1. t recognises the distinctive value religious language has. 2. t negates the need to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive uses of language replacing this distinction with the purpose which a language serves. . Language game theory policesthe boundaries between different uses of language thereby preventing confusion. 3.t is possible to defend the use of a religious

language within a religious form of life.We#+nesses o' $#ng(#ge g#*es1. Language games provide no criteria for ob;ective truth outside of particular games and so can lead to relativism. 2. )hoseoutside of the religious language game will not understand it unless they first immerse themselves in it. . ?ecause the rules of alanguage game emerge within a form of life it is not clear how these rules get revised. 3. "ome people argue that some uses oflanguage are not bound to a form of life but have an absolute meaning that transcends the context in which it is used.

O&er !ie)s #,o(r #nd (sed o' Re$igio(s L#ng(#ge"ome religious writers argue that there is more to religious language than simply attempting to say what is true about od.)hey argue that %ii' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is e*oi!e. t expresses feelings in worship about our sinful nature and our hopes forsalvation. 6ritics like * 2 *yer argue that religion is nothing but emotion and @awkins sees it as stirring up negative emotionsof hate and violence. #owever, Peer /ono!#nhas argued that properly utilised re$igio(s $#ng(#ge &e$%s %eo%$e o disci%$ine&eir e*oions#nd cnne$ &e* #%%ro%ri#e$y for positive gain. 6reating things like compassion for the weak. %iii' 8thersargue that the sole and proper us of religious language is to express adoration. t is to praise od in prayer and worship. )o

thank od for all that od has done. )his is known as doxology. Re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is esseni#$ doo$ogic#$ in n#(re .8thers argue that %iv' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is (sed %er'or*#i!e$y. )he words themselves perform the role that makes the realityof the event in which they are used. )his is most clearly seen in a baptism or a wedding ! now pronounce you man and wife.$We thank od by saying words of thanks. We praise od though words of praise. )he words make the reality. t is also arguedthat %v' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is o'en (sed %rescri%i!e$y as moral commands to encourage people to behave in a particular way.Richard ?raithwaite, for example, has argued that religious language is essentially a story like mythical language with an ethicalpurpose.

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A2 Religious Language